-          House of uncertainty, decision makers can never be completely certain of the motives of other powers actions- “…the existential condition of uncertainty means that governments (their decision-makers, military planners, foreign policy analysts) can never be 100 per 

-          cent certain about the current and future motives and intentions of those able to harm them in a military sense.”. known as ‘unresovable uncertainty’ and is key in the establishment of the security dilemma. Concept first articulated by Herz and Butterield (1951) known as ‘ambiguous symbolism’- the idea that it is possible to determine an offensive and defensive weapon, e.g sword vs shield, but a defensive weapon can be a part of an offensive strategy. 

-          Dilemma of interpretation: Interpretation of state’s actions lies with military decision makers, thus they are at the crux of the security dilemma. How these people react shapes the world- e.g Germany in the 30’s, risk of further provoking German nationalism and confonring them re breaking TOV or assure Germany of its place in Europe by accepting their military growth. When decision makers take a side, there is no longer a dilemma, but, misreading the situation can lead to mutual hostility again, Germany in the 30s. When viewed as offensive move, known as ‘strategic challenge’. What underlies the security dilemma is fear. 

-          Three logics: Fatalist (security competition can never be escaped- intl. anarchy means humans will live in conflicted world), Mitigator (security competition can be dampened for a time but never eliminated) and Transcender (society self constructive- global community is possible but improbable)

-          In 21^st century, Cold War w China, new arms race, danger of many nuclear powers, dangers of terrorism. 

-          intl war prevention three key points; fear that despite support now, may defect later, in order to protect their own possessions states often seek to expand and control resources outside of their territory to assure flow of goods during war time (Japan into china+asia pre ww2) + prevention of direct attack and the security dilemma.

-          Mandelbaum and Mueller argue major war is becoming obsolete as an instrument of foreign policy due to increased cost of war and decreased benefits. Use of force is no longer considered acceptable unless extreme circumstances e.g 9/11 and wars in Iraq+Afghanistan 

-          Idea of ‘democratic peace thesis’- democratic states don’t attack each other. 21^st century liberal democracies do not fear attacks from other liberal democracies. Key parts of this are; shared value system, existence of mechanisms to resolve conflicts, diffuse nature of power in liberal democracies makes it difficult to sustain military conflicts and the unwillingness of high-tech societies to support the costs of war. Further works have shown strong correlation between political participation and frequency of highly militarised disputes. 

-          Original thesis assumed anarchic nature of intl system but in 21^st century, not fully anarchic as may have been in mid-20^th century. States’ relations are now highly regulated by itnl law. Growth in globalisation also impacts likelihood of going to war. Asymmetries between states- threat increased when against ‘rouge states’- one that does not adhere to intl law, behaves aggressively and breaches human rights against its own citizens. E.g Iraq under Saddam Hussain. 

-          In areas of major crisis e.g Middle East, parties whose intentions are aggressive for political ambition which causes instability. Conflict arises from internal threat as regimes threats are largely internal opponents. External adversary can’t mitigate internal threat, no level of security dilemma can better the tension. 

-          Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance is a significant influencer on the degree of a state’s insecurity. strong offensive advantage makes conquest easy, increase in aggressive behaviour and intensifies security dilemma. Strong defence makes conquests on them harder and leaves them more secure. Offence/defence balance also affects perception. Defensive realists argue state’s security policies are decided in part by their assessment of others’ motives and intentions. State’s are more likely to have a hard-line strategy when adversaries are thought to be hostile. 

-          Military posture: The offence-defence balance communicates information about others’ intentions- when offence has advantage, more likely to attack, when defence has advantage, less likely to attack. Security dilemma can be mitigated or exacerbated by knowing a state’s motives- military posture can indicate these motives. Posture can be perceptive and as long as uncertainty, dilemma continues. 

-          Only states w determination to expand will chose an offensive strategy whilst security seeking states will seek a defensive strategy. 

-          These arguments illustrate that states don’t have the ability to overcome the lack of intl power of the anarchic system 

-          Four Worlds: Nilsson argues with the four initial ‘worlds’ of the security dilemma through the idea that defence makes the security dilemma more dominant. 

-          First world: impossible to create security without threatening others. Wars expected to be short and easy to win for aggressor- arms race more likely and offense is the best defence 

-          Second World: inability to differentiate between offensive and defensive posture making the dilemma present but since defence is perceived to have an advantage and wars are long and hard to win, it is not extreme. 

-          Third world: security problems as offence viewed to have upper hand, wars are expected to be short and aggression is possible but war preparations are easy to detect and easy to distinguish an offensive posture from a defensive one

-          Fourth world: Security dilemma can be eliminated altogether as defence believed to have advantage, wars are expected to be long and it is easy to determine an offensive posture.

-          These worlds have changed since the initial philosophy creating a possible 8 worlds

-          Fifth World: if an offensive posture not distinguishable posture, security dilemma less severe. Expectation of longer wars and all other concerns with that makes war less likely.

-          Sixth World: Defence believed to have advantage but postures not distinguishable. offensive posture not distinguishable meaning security dilemma more severe than first thought. 

-          Seventh World: postures not distinguishable, offence believed to have advantage. Aggression less tempting as wars are costly and long wars increase chance of aggressor losing.

-          Eight World: Offensive posture distinguishable but defence believed to have advantage. Security dilemma heightened as defences keep being built up in fear of offensive attack or future offensive attack. 

Severity of security dilemma is exaggerated when offense is dominant. Also underestimated height of security dilemma when defence is dominant. 

-          UN key body for intl relations, established many covenants for member states to follow the release of the ‘Millennium Report’ in 1992 and a subsequent report ‘The Responsibility to Protect’. 2003 Organization of American States (OAS) outlining a number of threats to global security such as corrupted governance and attacks on cyber security which member states of the UN must seek to protect/prevent. This re-defined security making it a broad term encompassing all citizens of the world making them have a clear vested interest. 

-          Scholars to UN: Re-defined sovereignty, a key term in intl pols- sovereignty is the ‘duty to protect and to prevent’, setting 6 key aspects. 21^st century states must be proactive, the failures of past need to be revised for the present, rulers are in danger when tensions escalate, state responsible for safety, well-being and lives of citizens, nations are responsible to intl community and where suffering is the new definition of sovereignty will prevail over the old Westphalian principle. Any new govt. not willing to follow this is not sovereign and therefore not a state.   

[1] Nilsson, Marco. (2012). “Offense—Defense Balance, War Duration, and the Security Dilemma.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no.3 (June 2012): 476-480. www.jstor.org/stable/23248796