Japan declared in its Constitution that it doesn’t accept war as a method of resolving international disputes, and it’s adjusting its Defence/Military Policy to strengthen Japan-US security cooperation. Below is an excerpt from Mikhail Yuriev’s article commenting on the adjustment, published in the Russian Independence Review on 29th May.

At the end of April 1999, the Japanese lower house approved a series of draft bills to make its court of lawsuit “New guiding principles of Japan-US cooperation in the Military field.” The draft bills included an adjustment to the agreement with the US on logistics assurance, the Law on "Defence forces,” and measures to guarantee "security and peace in special circumstances in areas bordering Japan.”

In general, the Japan-U.S military alliance in terms of objectives and direction, has become very similar to NATO with its new strategic doctrine, such as the establishment of joint military planning bodies. The scope of the alliance extends beyond its previous traditional framework, aiming to address a range of tasks not directly related to an attack on one of the alliance members, including "regional conflict situations."

Japan, a country that suffered two atomic bombings by the United States, has put forward the famous "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" (not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons). However, it has now begun to declare that "theoretically" or "from a purely legal perspective," Japan can possess nuclear weapons and can conduct preemptive strikes. After long hesitation, Japan has finally agreed to cooperate with the United States in establishing a regional theater missile defense system. Notably, Japan's new long-term defense program, adopted in 1995, lacks traditional principles such as renouncing the right to collective self-defense and prohibiting arms exports.

Notably, along with expanding the framework of the Japan–U.S. alliance, the role and functions of Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the alliance have also increased significantly. Japan now has greater obligations in providing logistical support for U.S. armed forces. This includes ensuring transportation, mine clearance, search and rescue in international waters, and providing infrastructure for military needs. Clearly, Japan’s participation in joint military operations with the U.S. will become much more active.

Japan - a country that suffered two atomic bombings - once proclaimed its famous “three non-nuclear principles” (not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons). However, it has gradually acknowledged that, in theory or from a purely legal perspective, it could possess nuclear weapons and even launch preemptive strikes. After long hesitation, Japan eventually agreed to cooperate with the U.S. in developing a regional theater missile defense system. Its new 1995 National Defense Program Guidelines notably omitted long-standing principles such as the renunciation of collective defense and the ban on arms exports.

Arguably, it would be more logical for countries in the region to strengthen collective consultation mechanisms on issues of security and stability in the Asia–Pacific region. For example, transforming the ASEAN Regional Forum into an effective multilateral security mechanism, where all participating countries have equal rights, would be a constructive approach to maintaining peace and regional order.

Japan announced in its constitution to not accept war to be a measure for international dispute, now, it is adjusting the national defense policy for Japan - US security cooperation promotion. Mikhail Yuriev’s article extraction discussing those changes, published on Independence, Russia, May 29th is below.

In late April, 1999, the Japanese Lower House approved a series of bills in order to make Japanese suitable for “New principles on US-Japan national defense cooperation”. The principles included adjusting agreement on army ordnance logistics with the US, modifying law on “defense force” and “measures for security and peace maintenance in special situations at the adjacent areas with Japan”.

It would be more logical if the countries in the region pursued a direction of strengthening mechanisms for collective discussion on issues related to ensuring security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, transforming the ASEAN Regional Forum into effective multilateral mechanisms for security assurance, with equal rights among all countries in the region.