13 defendants who were detained in 2016 while participating in a protest against the West Roxbury Lateral Pipeline were declared innocent by a Massachusetts district court on the basis of a necessity defence, the Climate Disobedience Center said on March 27, 2018. The prosecutor reduced the charges of trespass and disorderly conduct to civil infractions that did not call for a trial, according to The Climate Defense Project, one of the organisations whose attorneys represented the defendants. The defence had prepared for a full trial in which they would mount a climate necessity defence, relying on experts like climate scientist James Hansen and the founder of 350.org, Bill McKibben. The judge did, according to the Climate Disobedience Center, permit each defendant to testify explaining the necessity of their acts.

Section 302 of the Penal Code was utilised to charge the accused with the murder of his wife. According to the post-mortem report, the deceased had received 26 stab wounds. The accused said that he was despondent and that his mind was filled with unpleasant thoughts. He could hear voices instructing him to do things to his wife. It was like taking over his thoughts and controlling him. He remembered going to the bathroom and smashing down the door, but he had no idea what happened afterwards. He could only recall leaving the house and getting into his car. In support of his defence, the accused brought a doctor, who testified that the accused had a mental ailment known as a jealous delusional disorder. Auditory and visual hallucinations were among the symptoms. The accused believed his wife had been unfaithful. The doctor concluded that the respondent was of unsound mind at the time of the incident and had no idea that his actions were illegal. Based on the defence evidence and on prosecution’s failure to lead evidence in rebuttal, the Federal Court agreed with the trial judge’s acquittal of the accused/respondent on the charge of murder on the ground of insanity under Section 84 of the Penal Code. at the time of the incident. The learned trial judge correctly observed that 'intention' is not a necessary element in s 300(d) of the Code and all that is required to be proved is ‘knowledge' that the act is likely to cause death. Moreover, the intoxication, if at all, was admittedly self-induced and therefore, he must be deemed to have committed the act with the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated. The charge he was facing was murder under s 300(d) of the Code. The men rea   for that offence is 'knowledge' and not 'intention'

Aladin v Public Prosecutor

The appellant, who had overindulged at a wedding reception, afterwards quarrelled with one 'O,' but was separated by his brother. Following that, the appellant grabbed a parang and dashed to the wedding, where he sliced numerous other people, including the murdered 'O.' He challenged his murder conviction, claiming, among other things, that when he struck the victim, he was briefly mad owing to alcohol. The Court of Appeal determined that all of the evidence indicated that the accused was aware of what he was doing.

1) App was convicted for the murder of a male Indian

2) He appealed and alleged that the trial judge had failed to consider the fact

that the appellant was drunk at the time of the attack and accordingly was incapable of forming the intention to kill.

Held:

1) The only evidence adduced that the accused consumed liquor came from the accused himself.

2) He did not disclose what he drank, the quantity he drank or the state of his intoxication.

3) It was insufficient to support the defence of intoxication laid down in section 85 (intoxication insane)

4) The bare statement of the appellant that he was drunk was inadequate to negative the intention to kill and this ground of appeal failed.

Accused beats a person with his fists. The latter’s wife interfered. The accused hit the woman, but blow ‘accidentally’ struck the baby and two days later the baby dies as the effect of the blow.

a car driver who rammed into a group of adolescent bikers, killing eight and wounding another eight, was released on police bail.

The 22-year-old lady was released after police recorded her testimony about the collision, according to Johor Police Chief Datuk Seri Wan Ahmad Najmuddin Mohd. He stated that the police were in the process of finishing the accident investigation paper before presenting it to the deputy public prosecutor for further action. He stated that the police do not rule out taking action against parents who leave their children unsupervised on the streets after midnight.

According to the Johor police chief, the accident may have been avoided if the teenagers' activities had been strictly watched by their parents.

The cyclists were hit by a Nissan Almera car driven by a woman near Jalan Lingkaran Dalam about 3 a.m. on Saturday.

Chirangi killed his son by mistake thinking he was a tiger. He was troubled by bilateral cataract. There was also proof that he had an abscess in his leg, which would have caused a fever and maybe caused temporary delirium. This could have resulted in a subsequent illusion that affected his vision.

Held:  In essence, all that happened was that the appellant thought his target was a tiger for a short instant and attacked it with it with his axe.

 

The defendant, a police constable, was on duty when he noticed the complainant carrying three pieces of cloth under his arm. He approached the complaint and questioned him, suspecting that the cloth was stolen property. He took hold of one of the cloth pieces to inspect it more closely. The complainant protested and punched the officer, who arrested him. The complainant accused the acc of improper restraint and imprisonment.

Held: He acted in good faith, the complainant had no right to resist him

1) The appellant had been convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder

2) He was first attacked by the deceased with a piece of iron

3) And that by the time he struck the fatal blow the same piece of iron has passed from the deceased’s possession into his own possession.

4) Issue was whether after disarming the deceased of the piece of iron, the appellant was justified in going further than it is necessary to defend himself.

Held:

1) The law in this country gives greater latitude to a person who is attacked than does the law in England.

2) In England, if self-defence is to be successful, the attacked must attempt to disengage himself from the attack, and his killing the assailant is only excusable if there was no other way of saving his life.

3) The question in such cases is not whether there was an actual continuing danger but whether there was a reasonable apprehension of such danger.

4) If such a condition exists, the person attacked is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary till he finds himself out of danger.

5) And if in a conflict between them, he happens to kill, such killing is justifiable.

6) Referring to the case of Alingan Kunhinayan v The Emperor:

a) The learned session court judge was suggesting that the first accused could have escaped further injury by resorting to less violence or running away.

b) The court of appeal commented that this will place a great restriction on the right or private defence of the body than the law requires.

c) A man who is assaulted is not bound to modulate his defence step by step, according to the attack, before there is a reason to believe the attack is over.

d) The all important facts in connection with the question whether the 1st accused exceeded the rights of private defence of his body when he gave the stab with his knife which proved fatal to the deceased, are that the deceased was the first to use the knife and had inflicted a wound on the 1st accused which might well have proved fatal.

7) The one blow which the appellant gave to the deceased with the trident was for the purpose of preventing a renewed attack upon him, he was entitled to acquittal.

 

Section 83 - Nothing is an offence if done by a child above 10 and below 12, not yet attain sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequence of his conduct.

 

Section 113 EA - Boy who is below 13 years old is presumed to be not capable to conduct rape. It is rebuttable by way of proving his maturity.

 
- Doli incapax is a Latin legal maxim meaning ‘incapable of doing any harm or incapable of committing a crime’.

- It is a presumption that a child is incapable of forming the necessary criminal intent for committing an offence.

- A person is to be held criminally responsible only for those acts that he intends to commit.

- A child below the age of 7 years does not have sufficient mental understanding to know the consequences of his actions and therefore lacks the criminal intention/mens rea required to hold a person guilty of an offence.

- A child has to be protected from the rigours of the law at his tender age.

- The accused, who was 24 years old at the trial, had been convicted the theft. The magistrate took into account the fact that the accused had two previous convictions, one of which was for theft when he was 10 years old, and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment.

- On appeal, Ong J reduced the prison sentence by a year after quoting section 83 and 'wonder ling] if the lad had sufficient maturity' when he committed theft as a 10-year-old. With respect, Ong J was disallowed from doing this since s 83 is a defence which had to be proved by the accused.

- Accordingly, his Honour had to assume that the trial court hearing the theft charge those many years ago had not been persuaded by the accused by the accused to apply s 83 in his favour. Ong J's approach amounted to paying lip service to s83 but effectively invoking the English common law presumption that the accused was incapable of committing theft unless proved otherwise by the prosecution.

 

Ulla Mahapatra v King (1950) Cut 293

- An 11-year-old boy had picked up a knife and advanced towards the victim saying that he would cut him to bits and did actually cut him. The court held that the boy's entire conduct led to the one inference which was that he knew that a cut inflicted by the knife would effectuate his intention of hurting the victim. Although the s 83 defence failed, the court prepared to recognise the offender's youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing.

Section 84 - Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.

if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or

Section 90 - A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code

 

Section 98 - When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind, or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.

Section 464 - A person is said to make a false document

(c) who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him he does not, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration

 

Section 491 - Whoever, being bound by a lawful contract to attend on or to supply the wants of any person who by reason of youth, or of unsoundness of mind, or of a disease or bodily weakness, is helpless or incapable of providing for his own safety or of supplying his own wants, voluntarily omits so to do, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to four hundred ringgit or with both.

1) At the time of the commission of the offence, the accused is suffering from unsoundness of mind.

the rule under both M’Naghten rule and Section 84 of the Penal Code, the accused must be suffering from unsoundness of mind at the time he commits the alleged offence. 

- Medical evaluations performed after a crime is committed are typically used to determine a person's mental incapacity.

- However, it is crucial to establish that the accused was insane at the time of the act in addition to taking into account the insanity of a person, which may be caused by any factor and may be either permanent or temporary and can be discovered through medical examinations.

- In most cases, medical documentation is required to support claims of disease or mental insanity.

- The accused's medical history, either before or after the alleged crime was committed, is important in determining whether or not the accused was insane at the time the alleged crime was allegedly committed.

- Insanity may also result from factors such as a person's actions, beliefs, and practices that caused the mind to not function properly, in addition to the medical evidence.

- Section 84 is not confined to only the disease of the mind to cause unsoundness of mind but also mental deficiency not resulting from the disease of mind.

- The cause could have been any cause not necessarily medical insanity

 

2) The accused is incapable of knowing the nature of his act or did not know that his act was wrong or contrary to law.

- It should be noted that merely proving to the court that a person was not of sound mind when the crime was committed will not excuse them from criminal responsibility.

- However, it is also very important to prove to the court that at the time of the commission of the crime, unsoundness of mind of the accused person was in severe condition which destroys the accused’s capacity to know the nature of the act, or his act was wrong or contrary to the law. 

Section 85 -  (1) Save as provided in this section and in section 86, intoxication shall not constitute a defence to any criminal charge.

(2) Intoxication shall be a defence to any criminal charge if by reason thereof the person charged at the time of the act or omission complained of did not know that such act or omission was wrong or did not know what he was doing and—

(a) the state of intoxication was caused without his consent by the malicious or negligent act of another person; or

(b) the person charged was by reason of intoxication insane, temporarily or otherwise, at the time of such act or omission.

 

Section 86 -  (1) Where the defence under subsection 85(2) is established, then in a case falling under paragraph (a) thereof the accused person shall be acquitted, and in a case falling under paragraph (b), the provisions of section 84 of this Code, sections 347 and 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code [Act 593] shall apply.

(2) Intoxication shall be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the person charged had formed any intention, specific or otherwise, in the absence of which he would not be guilty of the offence.

(3) For the purpose of this and the preceding section “intoxication” shall be deemed to include a state produced by narcotics or drugs.

Voluntary intoxication is defined as the willing intake or injection of any alcohol, drug, or other intoxicating substance that the defendant is aware has the potential to cause intoxication. In Montana v. Egelhoff, the Supreme Court concluded that states are constitutionally authorised to eliminate the voluntary intoxication defence, and several states have done so. In Delaware, for example, the defendant is not permitted to submit any evidence of voluntary intoxication. Other states, such as California, allow defendants to raise voluntary intoxication only in cases of specific intent crimes (as opposed to general intent crimes) and only to prove whether the defendant acted with the necessary mens rea to establish criminal liability. However, evidence of voluntary intoxication cannot be brought to negate or lessen a charge due to the inability to form the mental state of the crime charged.

The state of Intoxication, under the influence of alcohol or drugs, can also be a crime in itself in certain circumstances, such as DWI/DUI violations and public intoxication.

Section 88 - Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for the benefit of a person.

Section 89 - Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or person of unsound mind, by or by consent of guardian.

Section 90 - Consent known to be given under fear or misconception and consent of a child or person of unsound mind

Section 91 - Acts which are offences independently of harm caused to the person consenting, are not within the exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89

Section 92 - Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent

- Three situations where consent can operate as a defense are sexual offenses, situations that do not result in serious bodily injury or death, and sporting events.

Based on James Stephen - An agreement freely given, voluntary by rational and sober person who was able to form a rational opinion upon matter which he is consented

a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.

b) A, an officer of a Court, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.

Section 79 - Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.

a) A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the act, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in self-defence.

(ii) Good faith

(iii) Bound by or justified by law

The question is whether the accused's belief was true and honest (subjective). It makes no difference whether the accused's incorrect belief was reasonable or not. This is not the case where the required state of mind is negligence, in which case reasonableness will be considered because an unreasonable mistake would be evidence of the negligence that is the basis of culpability.

Mistake provides no defence to strict liability offences. In cases where the criminal intention is subjective recklessness, then the mistake will also be considered subjectively.

A is at work with a hatchet, the head flies off and kills a bystander. In this case, if A acted with reasonable prudence, his actions are excusable and not criminal.

(ii) Prohibited result of accident or misfortune

(iii) Lawful act in lawful manner by lawful means

(iv) Proper care and caution

To rely on the 'accident' defence, an accused person must claim that the alleged offending occurred as a result of unplanned, involuntary, or unexpected activities. If you are accused of a criminal act and can prove it was caused by an accident, you will not be held directly accountable for your acts since the element of intent will be eliminated.

The second requirement is that the defendant lacked any other practical means of preventing the injury. Before claiming necessity, the defendant must exhaust all feasible and practical alternatives.

Section 97 - Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend—

(a) his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;

(b) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.

Section 98 -  When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind, or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.

Section 99 - (1) There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law.

(2) There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.

(3) There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.

(4) The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.

Section 100 - The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right is of any of the following descriptions:

(a) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(b) such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

(c) an assault with the intention of committing rape;

(d) an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;

(e) an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;

(f) an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.

Section 101 -  If the offence is not of any of the descriptions enumerated in section 100, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death.

Section 102 - The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence, though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.

 

Section 103 - The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrongdoer, if the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, is an offence of any of the following descriptions:

(a) robbery;

(b) housebreaking by night;

(c) mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property;

(d) theft, mischief or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised.

Section 104 - If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, is theft, mischief or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions enumerated in section 103, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend subject to the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the wrongdoer of any harm other than death.

Section 105 - (1) The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences.

(2) The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property, or till assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or till the property has been recovered.

(3) The right of private defence of property against robbery continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death, or hurt, or wrongful restrain, or as long as the fear of instant death, or of instant hurt, or of instant personal restraint continues.

(4) The right of private defence of property against criminal trespass or mischief, continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief.

(5) The right of private defence of property against housebreaking by night continues as long as house-trespass which has been begun by such housebreaking continues.

Section 106 -  If, in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender is so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.

There must be an immediate danger to the defendant's life or property, or to the property of another, and there must be no time to report the danger to the local authorities. The defendant can begin a private defence if he is unable to get in touch with that particular authority.

The defendant must use appropriate force. It shouldn't go beyond what is necessary.

 

Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.

- The threat must create a reasonable fear in the defendant.

- There must be no reasonable means for the defendant to escape the threat except by committing the crime / not expose to the threat voluntarily.

FACTS OF THE CASE

- Appellant is guilty of trafficking 2700grammes of cannabis

- Deemed to be in possession and knowledge of the said drugs

- He admitted that he carried 2 bags containing cannabis to Padang Besar.

- He did it under the threat from a male, who is Thai national in a hotel in Sadau, Thailand.

- The man threatened him with a pistol, ordered him to carry the 2 bags across the border to railway station.

 

- S94: there must be reasonable fear, at the very time, of instant death

- Person who do criminal act from fear of anything other than instant death, do them at their peril, not protected by section 94.

- If an offence is completed when all danger of instant death has been removed, the person committing the offence is not protected under section 94.

-If the accused on his own accord places himself in a situation by which he becomes a subject to the threats, even if it is a death threat, section 94 does not apply

- Appellant had complied with the request to carry the 2 bags to the railway and reached the station, placed the bags on the platform and gone to purchase ticket to leave Padang Besar. He had been carrying the drug for 1 and half hour without making any attempt to seek for help.

- Although the Thai was 20 feet away on the platform when he last saw him, there are people at the public place, and there are officers from whom he can seek for help. (there is no reasonable apprehension of death)

- The duress was no longer instant, imminent, extreme, and persistent.

- The moment he placed the bag and purchase ticket, mission completed under no such duress present or continue.