A core element of the Reagan Doctrine was the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Opponents ridiculed SDI as "Star Wars," but the Soviets believed that the United States had the technical ability to build an anti-ballistic missile system. Reagan’s unwavering commitment to SDI convinced the Kremlin it could not win an arms race and forced Gorbachev to end the Cold War at the bargaining table and not on the battlefield.

Almost as essential as SDI was President Reagan’s personal rhetorical offensive. For example, Reagan said the West should recognize that the Soviets "are the focus of evil in this modern world" and the masters of "an evil empire." Reagan took his freedom offensive into the heart of the disintegrating Soviet empire. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate in June 1987, he directly challenged the Kremlin, saying, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"

First, we need to find ways to reduce, and eventually to eliminate, the threat and use of force in solving international disputes. Today there are armed conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. As a first step, our governments should jointly examine concrete actions that we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability, and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding. Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and a broader arms control process.

In terms of military armaments, Source A claims that American rivalry with the Soviet Union consisted of the competition to achieve “superiority in military strength,” while Source B claims that American rivalry with the Soviet Union had resulted in “vast stockpiles of armaments in the world.” According to my contextual knowledge, this emphasis of Source A and Source B on American rivalry with the Soviet Union in the area of military armaments is a reference to the superpower arms race. Beginning in the second half of the 1960s, over a quarter of the Soviet GDP was spent every year on financing the Soviet military build-up. By 1970 the Soviets had 1300 (bodies of missiles) compared to 1054 American missiles. In 1983, when the Americans proceeded to install intermediate-range nuclear weapons in West Germany, the Soviets walked out of the arms control talks in disgust.

In terms of geographical sphere of influence, Source A claims that American rivalry with the Soviet Union consists of becoming masters of “empire,” while Source B claims that American rivalry with the Soviet Union consists of “U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas.” According to my contextual knowledge, both superpowers exploited unstable situations in poorer countries to increase their influence.  For the Soviet Union, this task was undertaken by military advisors and proxies such as the Vietnamese in Cambodia and the Cubans in Africa and Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The United States supported rebels such as the UNITA in Angola (a country in Africa) and the Contras in Nicaragua (a country in Latin America), but most of the time directed its support towards governments professing anticommunism.  U.S. military assistance to friendly regimes boomed. Military personnel from many countries trained in the United States, especially at the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia.

The objective - I emphasize, objective - conditions have taken shape in which confrontation between capitalism and socialism can proceed only and exclusively in forms of peaceful competition and peaceful contest. For us, peaceful coexistence is a political course which the U.S.S.R. intends to go on following unswervingly.

In accordance with an understanding reached in Geneva, there will be another meeting with the U.S. President. The significance that we attach to it is that it ought to produce practical results in key areas of limiting and reducing armaments.

Prime Minister, after meeting Mr. Gorbachev, are you more or less optimistic about détente and world peace in 1985?

Thatcher:

I am cautiously optimistic. I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together. We both believe in our own political systems. He firmly believes in his; I firmly believe in mine. We are never going to change one another. We have two great interests in common: that we should both do everything we can to see that war never starts again, and therefore we go into the disarmament talks determined to make them succeed.

BBC:

Did you form any impression about Gorbachev personally?

Thatcher:

Gorbachev was very ready to enter into full, detailed discussion; not to stick to prepared statements. So we had a genuine discussion.

Sources C, D, E and F support the assertion that Gorbachev ended the Cold War. The Sources discuss how Gorbachev’s policies were enthusiastically received by Western leaders and therefore contributed to the end of the Cold War.  Source C claim that the policies of “Soviet leaders” that were adopted after 1985 “were so conducive to American interests that U.S. leaders could declare the Cold War over.” Similarly, Gorbachev, in Source D, seems to be telling his Soviet audience in 1986 that “peace” was “something that has to be fought for” and that since then, “in Soviet-U.S. relations there seem to be signs of a change for the better, and realistic trends are beginning to resurface in the actions and attitudes of the leadership of some NATO nations.” Source E is an interview between the BBC and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher that was conducted in 1984. In that interview, Mrs Thatcher spoke very warmly of Gorbachev and claims that she and “Mr Gorbachev … can do business together.” Source F shows some Western leaders breaking out the champagne and congratulating Gorbachev for burying the Cold War.

According to my contextual knowledge, Gorbachev was popular in the West because he was the one who made the most number of concessions during arms control talks with Western leaders. In October 1986 when Gorbachev met Reagan for a summit in Reykjavik, Gorbachev offered an agreement to remove all superpower intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe, without including British and French weapons.  He also proposed a 50 per cent cut in intercontinental missiles.  But there was still no concrete agreement between the superpowers at Reykjavik.

Undaunted, after the summit, in February 1987 Gorbachev decided to make even more concessions with the approval of the Soviet Politburo. Gorbachev said he no longer wished to demand that the U.S. stop its programme of SDI development and research. In addition, Gorbachev recommended the removal of missiles of even shorter ranges (between 500 and 1,000 km) such as the West German Pershing 1A and the Soviet SS-23 and SS-12.

All these Gorbachev concessions resulted in the INF treaty being signed in the East Room of the White House between Gorbachev and Reagan on 8 December 1987 that was aimed at eliminating most intermediate nuclear forces.

Source B, a speech by Reagan in January 1984, offers a more diplomatic portrayal of U.S. leadership but still positions Reagan at the centre of the peace process. The speech outlines his plans to reduce international tensions, cut nuclear stockpiles, and build greater U.S.–Soviet cooperation. This demonstrates that Reagan actively sought to shape the direction of superpower relations, suggesting that the eventual end of the Cold War was the product of American policy initiatives rather than solely the result of Gorbachev’s decisions.

Together, these sources challenge the claim that Gorbachev ended the Cold War. Source A stresses confrontation and military superiority, while Source B focuses on diplomacy and engagement, but both depict Reagan as the primary agent of change. Gorbachev’s role is diminished to that of a respondent to U.S. initiatives, implying that the Cold War’s end was driven more by American pressure and negotiation than by Soviet reform alone.