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      <title>Movement Review by </title>
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      <language>en-us</language>
      <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:30:20 UTC</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>2025-10-10 16:19:17 UTC</lastBuildDate>
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         <title>2014 - From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties.</title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626911172</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>This article focuses on how and why militant social groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, transform from illegitimate terrorist organizations into nationally recognized governing bodies. They provide lengthy statistics on the success of what he calls “partial goal achievement”. While this can mean anything depending on the group, in this case, it meant using violence to force Israeli troops out of Gaza, destroying 21 settlements during the retreat. Not only a massive moral victory, but the militant group Hamas now controlled land in the Gaza Strip, and had a responsibility to take care of it. This legitimized the group, allowing them to officially enter the political arena. The article goes on to explain that after they obtained “partial goal achievement”, they were able to readjust their playbook and set new goals previously thought unattainable. This is interesting because it shows that while Hamas made the change from an informal social movement into a political party, the deep roots of the social movement power the outward-facing political party.</p><p><br></p><p><br></p><p>Acosta, Benjamin. 2014. “From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties.” <em>The Journal of Politics</em> 76(3):666–83. doi:<a rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381614000188">10.1017/s0022381614000188</a>.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381614000188" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:32:40 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626911172</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>2012 - The Educational Philosophy and Curriculum of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement: From Arab Palestine to Arab-Islamic Palestine. </title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626913865</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>While not directly related to Hamas, this article is important to understand the roots of the group and what happens when a social movement takes control of public opinion. Specifically, it provides a complete overview of Palestinian nationalist and ideological education from 2000 to 2006, the 6 years before Hamas won its first election. This is incredibly helpful in understanding Hamas, because it explains why public opinion was so receptive to their message. In fact, Hamas’ founding charter specifies that, “Educators were called upon to cultivate 'Muslim awareness' and to propagate the 'spirit of jihad among the umma (believer community) so that education would serve the jihad against the Jewish occupation” (348). This is critical to understanding why Hamas was so successful as a social movement organization, as it had no choice but to legitimize itself.</p><p><br></p><p>Mueller, Chelsi. 2012. “The Educational Philosophy and Curriculum of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement: From Arab Palestine to Arab-Islamic Palestine.” <em>Middle Eastern Studies</em> 48(3):345–62.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23217360" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:34:57 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626913865</guid>
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      <item>
         <title>2012 - Results of a Specialized Opinion Poll among Palestinian Youth. </title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626914435</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>This is a study conducted on Palestinian youth in order to gain a better understanding of the political and social values they care about. Many of the questions in the poll show just how alive and well the social movement activity is in Palestine, despite years of occupation. For example, the poll states that 72% of children are willing to demonstrate against the occupation, which is likely much higher than in other countries. Much of Hamas’s organizing happens in the youth sector, as they try and set the roots of opposition early. In understanding how Hamas acts as a social movement organization, it is important to understand how it influences the youth and how the youth reacts to its message.</p><p><br></p><p>Arab World for Research and Development. (2012). <em>Results of a Specialized Opinion Poll among Palestinian Youth. </em>(Data Set) <a rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="http://www.miftah.org/Doc/Polls/AWRAD010212En.pdf">http://www.miftah.org/Doc/Polls/AWRAD010212En.pdf</a>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="http://www.miftah.net/Doc/Polls/AWRAD010212En.pdf" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:35:25 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626914435</guid>
      </item>
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         <title>2010 - Raising Extremists? Islamism and Education in the Palestinian Territories. </title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626915064</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>This article looks deep into the Palestinian education system, looking to determine whether or not extremism is built into Palestinian education. One of the ways they do this is by examining the effect of groups like Hamas and Fatah on educational content, and how much they have altered the curriculum to provide widespread social support for their beliefs and actions. Interestingly, the article talks little about the Islamic/nationalistic elements of Hamas in schools, and instead looks at an outsider view of how political struggle in Hamas has affected the operational abilities of charity-run school systems.&nbsp;</p><p><br></p><p>Hoigilt, J. (2010). <em>Raising Extremists?</em> <em>Islamism and Education in the Palestinian Territories. </em>Fafo. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/<a rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://opendata.uni-halle.de/bitstream/1981185920/107303/67/634458264.pdf">https://opendata.uni-halle.de/bitstream/1981185920/107303/67/634458264.pdf</a>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.fafo.no/publikasjoner/fafo-rapporter/raising-extremists" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:35:57 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626915064</guid>
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         <title>2005 - Egoistic Martyrdom and Ḥamās’ Success in the 2005 Municipal Elections: A Study of Ḥamās Martyrs’ Ethical Wills, Biographies, and Eulogies.  </title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626915469</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>With a focus on political violence, this article explains how martyrdom, such as self-immolation, can garner public support. While legitimate now, Hamas’s roots are those of a terrorist organization that produced dozens of martyrs through ideological training. In fact, they cite another article which claims that martyrdom is effective in “the formation of groups and the strengthening of group identity. The most effective legitimation for a newly formed group is an example of dramatic conviction staged in a confrontational public setting… The martyr is the virtuoso of conviction and, as such, is the most effective catalyst for the creation of a convictional community” (38). This article is critical to understanding how an illegitimate terrorist organization can use martyrdom and violence to garner enough public opinion to force legitimacy in order to achieve its goals.</p><p><br></p><p><br></p><p>Alshech, Eli. 2008. “Egoistic Martyrdom and Ḥamās’ Success in the 2005 Municipal Elections: A Study of Ḥamās Martyrs’ Ethical Wills, Biographies, and Eulogies.” <em>Die Welt Des Islams</em> 48(1):23–49.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20140791" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:36:22 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626915469</guid>
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         <title>2006 - The Palestinian Parliamentary Election and the Rise of Hamas. International Affairs and Defense Section.</title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626916543</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>This paper provides a general overview of everything related to Palestinian society and culture, and is thus pivotal in understanding how Palestinian society became tolerable of a militant organization. Much of Palestinian culture is tied to Arab nationalism, with religious groups acting as a catalyst for social discussion. A great example that this book provides is Ahmas al-Kurd, who was an Arabic teacher in UNRWA schools for 30 years before joining Hamas, and at the time of the book was the appointed minister of social affairs. While much of the humanitarian work is done by other groups, Hamas benefits heavily from their efforts, and much of Hamas's leadership was previously involved with either Hamas work or humanitarian aid through other providers.</p><p><br></p><p>Tim Youngs. 2006. <em>The Palestinian Parliamentary Election and the Rise of Hamas</em>. <em>House of Commons Research Paper</em>. House of Commons.<a rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/rp06-17/"> https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/rp06-17/</a>.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/rp06-17/" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:37:04 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626916543</guid>
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         <title>1988 - Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).</title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626920618</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was written in 1988 and provides critical insight into the thinking of the group prior to its political horizon. The majority of the charter discusses Islam, the connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, and other ideological foundations. Later, they move to explain the social role of the group and how specific groups of the population should interact with it. This includes a section on the role of Women, as well as another on “Educating Generations”. Additionally, it discusses relationships with Arab nations, as well as corruption and zionism in the West. This document gives primary insight into how Hamas viewed themself, and how they hoped to shape Palestine.</p><p><br></p><p><br></p><p>Hamas. 1988. “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement.”<a rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp"> https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp</a>.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:40:46 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626920618</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>2015 - Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance: The Hamas Government in Gaza between Effective Sovereignty, Centralized Authority, and Resistance. </title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626921325</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>This article centers on the idea of non-state armed groups acting as political, social, and military players. One section in particular talks about the social organizing role of Hamas prior to its institutionalization. They operated non-state welfare programs that worked through charities and mosques. Organizing in these spaces allowed them to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the public, if not internationally. These services are critical in the grassroots nature of early Hamas, and lay the structure for its future reception into public perception. While it takes on a more formal role today, the community behind Hamas has stayed the same.</p><p><br></p><p>Berti, Benedetta. 2015. “Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance: The Hamas Government in Gaza between Effective Sovereignty, Centralized Authority, and Resistance.” <em>Middle East Journal</em> 69(1):9–31.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698207" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:41:23 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626921325</guid>
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      <item>
         <title>2021 - Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement. </title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626921817</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>This article focuses mainly on the history of Hamas, including its ideology and founding. In order to understand Hamas as a social movement organization, we must first understand its inception. According to official documents, the article claims that Hamas sees itself as a “widespread Palestinian nationalistic movement, one which is worthy of leading the Palestinian people to independence and to the total liberation of its land” (385). From this perspective, it is easy to see why the transition to politics was made. In any situation, let alone that of Palestine, it is nearly impossible for a militant group to reach its goals through purely violent means. While it can happen domestically in civil wars or revolutions, the situation of Palestine is markedly different, as its opponent has virtually endless resources. This article does a good job of providing the grassroots background of Hamas and how they garnered enough public support to eventually shift their goals.</p><p><br></p><p><br></p><p>Bartal, Shaul. 2021. “Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement.” Pp. 379–401 in <em>Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements</em>, edited by M. A. Upal and C. M. Cusack. Brill.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.23?seq=1" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:41:42 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626921817</guid>
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         <title>2021 - Understanding Hamas: Remarks on Three Different and Interrelated Theoretical Approaches. </title>
         <author>nolon_ty</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626922317</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>This is perhaps the most important and relevant source, as it directly discusses Hamas as a social movement organization. Specifically, the authors use sociological understanding to examine the way Hamas integrates into Palestinian society, explaining how theories like collective action have furthered Hamas’ goals. The reading is split into three sections examining Hamas, with the second looking into the group's culture and ideology as a way to explain Hamas as an SMO. While it serves many other legitimate purposes, the roots of Hamas lie in grassroots social organizing. After explaining ways in which they operate as a social movement organization, the author makes sure to distinguish that, despite many social similarities, understanding Hamas as just an SMO risks minimizing the effect of settler-colonialism on Palestinian society, as well as exaggerating the independence of Palestinian politics.</p><p><br></p><p><br></p><p>Awad, Hani. 2021. “Understanding Hamas: Remarks on Three Different and Interrelated Theoretical Approaches.” <em>AlMuntaqa</em> 4(2):42–62.</p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48651943.pdf" />
         <pubDate>2025-10-10 15:42:09 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/nolon_ty/uc75vrym5syuhbi3/wish/3626922317</guid>
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