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      <pubDate>2022-07-04 04:01:14 UTC</pubDate>
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         <title>Petitioner tortfeasor sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco </title>
         <author>letsrock009</author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/letsrock009/ub4zv35shtmw5jv9/wish/2236165838</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<div>Petitioner tortfeasor sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), to set aside its order allowing inspection of a written statement alleged to be within the attorney-client privilege.<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>Overview: Information related to <a href="https://nakaselawfirm.com/california-labor-laws/pto-paid-time-off-paid-sick-leave/">Pto vs sick time california<br></a><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp;&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>An individual who performed work on the tortfeasor's sidewalk made a statement to an investigator and adjuster employed by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier for the purpose of investigating the accident incurred by the real-parties-in-interest injureds on tortfeasor's sidewalk. The statement was transmitted to the insurance carrier's attorney. The same attorney represented the tortfeasor in the pending action. The tortfeasor allowed the injureds to inspect all written statements obtained from others relative to the sidewalk condition and the accident, but refused to permit inspection of the statement made to its insurance carrier's investigator on the grounds that the statement was subject to the attorney-client privilege. The court held there was substantial evidence to support the superior court's determination that the document was not privileged. The declarant was not a party to the action. There was no indication the declarant of the statement intended it to be privileged, that declarant knew the statement would be transmitted to an attorney, that declarant spoke as an agent of the tortfeasor, or that the statement was required by the tortfeasor for pending litigation.<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>The court discharged the alternative writ of mandate and denied the tortfeasor's petition for a preemptory writ to compel the trial court to set aside its order allowing inspection of a written statement by the tortfeasor's employee to the tortfeasor's insurer.<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>In consolidated appeals, plaintiff insured sought relief from a judgment of dismissal entered following the order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, granting a motion to strike under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. He also appealed from the subsequent order of the trial court awarding attorney's fees.<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>Based on allegations of claims handling misconduct by defendant insurance company, the insured sought relief under Cal. Bus. &amp; Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. The insurance company responded to the complaint with a motion to strike under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. The insurance company argued that the insured's allegations were based upon, and arose from, confidential written reports and related materials that the insurance company had filed with the Department of Insurance and thus constituted a "SLAPP suit" within the gatekeeping provisions of § 425.16. The trial court erred in granting the motion. The appellate court concluded that both the insurer and the trial court confused allegations of wrongdoing with the evidence required to prove them. There was no basis for a motion to strike the complaint under § 425.16.<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br><br></div><div>The judgment and order were reversed. The matter was remanded with directions.<br><br></div>]]></description>
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         <pubDate>2022-07-04 04:02:14 UTC</pubDate>
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