The views of political philosopher Charles Beitz is in stark contrast to that of Griffin. Beitz’s view is that individuals possess the capacity for rational moral reasoning and self-governance. He also is of the belief that human rights can and should be applicable to all individuals regardless of their particular circumstances. In his book Political Theory and International Relations, 1979, Beitz focuses heavily on autonomy in the international system. He strongly believes that state autonomy is not absolute and it must be subject to both moral and ethical restraints. This is done in order to protect the individuals autonomy and dignity. 

 
Griffin places a strong emphasis on personal autonomy as a core value underlying human rights. He believes that human rights are necessary to protect and promote individual autonomy, enabling individuals to lead lives according to their own conception of the good. Beitz's focus on autonomy is more centered on the autonomy of states in international relations. While he acknowledges individual rights, his work often discusses state autonomy in the context of international human rights law.
Although Griffin and Beitz share a commitment to the importance of human rights, their differing emphases regarding the role of autonomy in human rights portray some of the distinctions in their approaches to this important topic. These differences reflect the diversity of perspectives within the field of human rights philosophy.
Personally, I believe that Griffin's view is one that should not be undertaken in the international human rights realm as who is to say one individual deserves rights over another based on agency?  

 

I would define dignity as the intrinsic sense of value and self-worth that an individual holds, influencing their interactions with others and the level of respect they afford to themselves and to those around them. 

Jeremy Waldron is a well-known political philosopher who has made significant contributions to the field of human rights and the concept of dignity. Waldron distinguishes two primary uses of the term "dignity." The first pertains to the idea that human rights are rooted in the inherent dignity of individuals, while the second underscores that dignity specifies the particular content of certain rights. His view on dignity in my opinion is very helpful and relevant in understanding dignity in human rights today. 

 

Stephanie Jeanette asserts that the concept of dignity is not limited to individuals but can also extend to encompass communities. Her perspective aligns with that of Hennet, who also maintains that dignity has relevance on a broader, communal scale rather than just for isolated individuals. In today's world, the notion that dignity can be attributed to an entire society is crucial for giving it any meaningful significance. If dignity does not apply to larger groups, there would be little incentive for people to uphold it. In my view, this broader application of dignity fosters a sense of mutual reliance among community members. Nonetheless, the application of dignity within the legal context, as utilised by judges in legal cases, has faced criticism from scholars like Christopher McCrudden. Judges will occasionally employ the concept of dignity with some level of discretion when rendering judgments. McCrudden argues that dignity does not offer a consistent and principled foundation for making legal decisions. To put it succinctly, he contends that judges, when invoking the term "dignity," may exercise a considerable degree of latitude in their judgments. Having said that, I hold the view that, on the whole, dignity has a more positive than negative impact, particularly in the context of fostering broader and more inclusive communities.

 

Sen and Nussbaum are both autonomy theorists, but their views are much different from that of Griffin and Kant. Sen and Nussbaum look at autonomy with a more realistic approach in a world that is unequal. I think this approach is most effective as it shows how capabilities would function in the real world. 

 

In her book, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, Nussbaum identifies ten central capabilities that are essential for human flourishing. These include life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, and control over one's environment. Nussbaum argues that these capabilities are necessary for living a dignified and valuable life.

The ultimate aim for both Sen and Nussbaum is not solely to uphold the dignity of every individual but to take a step further, placing everyone in a position where they can truly live in a humanly manner. While their capabilities approach has faced some scrutiny, Nussbaum defends her theory by explaining the rationale behind her ten capabilities, emphasising that they are not arbitrary but derived from observations about the essential opportunities required for a life characterized by human dignity. Nonetheless, in my view, the primary criticism of this approach is akin to Griffin's perspective, which is that Nussbaum assumes individuals possess a minimum level of agency, asserting that humans require this minimal level of agency to realize their capabilities.

 

In my opinion, the capabilities approach in the context of human rights underscores the importance of assessing and promoting not just the absence of harm but also the presence of the freedoms and opportunities necessary for individuals to lead lives that are meaningful, fulfilling, and in line with their values and preferences. This broader perspective aligns with the goal of human rights to protect and enhance human dignity and well-being. I think that this is the most important justification of human rights as it puts the wants and needs of the individual first. 

 

The benefit of this approach is that it obviates the need to repeatedly reference a single value such as autonomy or dignity for the validation of a human right. Instead, the basic interests approach empowers us to examine a broader array of interests that can serve as justifications for human rights. Additionally, it is important to note that the basic interests approach does not rely on agency. It is a much more inclusive approach in that it doesn’t exclude those without agency like in autonomy or dignity. A drawback of the basic interests approach attempts to balance universality and cultural diversity, but critics argue that striking this balance can be challenging, and the approach may not fully address the concerns of cultural relativists.

 

 

 

Charles Beitz, a political philosopher has explored the complex issue of interference in international relations, particularly concerning humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. In his article What Human Rights Mean, Beitz explores the concept of human rights and their moral and political significance. Beitz discusses the universality of human rights and the challenges that arise in balancing the principle of state sovereignty with the moral imperative to protect individual rights. He delves into the tension between non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the duty to prevent and address severe human rights abuses. 

 

He justifies his stance on interference by asserting that rights can be discerned through practical application. According to him, there's no need for delving into deeper concepts like autonomy or dignity to fully understand and unveil the entire spectrum of human rights. Instead, he argues that we can simply examine international practice and the discourse on human rights to corroborate and endorse them. The primary advantage of this method lies in its ability to differentiate between how human rights are put into practice on both the international and state levels and what the actual rights encompass. It also permits room for variations in opinions regarding the contents of these rights and the underlying principles that support them. Thus, Beitz's approach allows for a consensus on the fundamental nature of human rights as a matter of global concern, while also accommodating diverse perspectives and debates about the specifics of these rights. However, the challenge associated with this approach is that it may not work effectively in practice and could restrict what is considered within the realm of human rights.

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Bilahari Kausikan have both made significant contributions to the discourse on diversity in human rights through their respective works. An-Na'im's approach underscores the necessity of accommodating cultural diversity while maintaining universal minimum standards, emphasizing the importance of respectful cross-cultural dialogue and adaptability. Kausikan, on the other hand, has shed light on the unique perspectives of Asian nations and their distinct approach to human rights. Together, these scholars have enriched the conversation about the intersection of diversity and universality in human rights, highlighting the need for a balanced and nuanced approach that respects cultural differences while upholding fundamental human rights principles. Their contributions serve as a reminder that recognizing and embracing diversity in the human rights framework is not only crucial for inclusivity but also essential for fostering a more equitable and just global community.