<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rss version="2.0">
   <channel>
      <title>Why did the North Win by James Burfitt</title>
      <link>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1</link>
      <description>Read your article and post</description>
      <language>en-us</language>
      <pubDate>2017-08-30 03:49:14 UTC</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>2017-08-30 04:31:36 UTC</lastBuildDate>
      <webMaster>hello@padlet.com</webMaster>
      
      <item>
         <title>post paris peace accords </title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591169</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<div>Reasons:<br><br>The Paris Accord:<br><br>The Peace accord which finished the American commitment was seriously flawed at the outset, in that it permitted the North Vietnamese to maintain their forces within territorial South Vietnam after the signing of the agreement, thereby dooming the cease-fire.<br><br>The refusal of the United States government to take promised military action in the face of North Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire has also been examined as a key to the defeat.<br><br>The third (and most often exemplified) possible source of the defeat was that the U.S. Congress had simply written off and abandoned the Saigon government.[119] Materiel shortages were indeed severe, but they were not as crippling as they have been later portrayed. Historian Arnold Isaacs, who was on the scene in South Vietnam at the time, believed that "The psychological damage of the aid cuts was almost certainly greater than the real...Even with the full amounts requested by the executive, South Vietnam could not have done any more than preserve the battlefield deadlock for another year, after which the whole exhausting debate would have to be replayed yet again – and in a presidential election year."[120]<br><br>Additional Reasons:<br><br>The American policy of Vietnamization had ended as a prescription for defeat. The rapid and accelerating withdrawal of U.S forces that had begun in 1969 caught the South Vietnamese unprepared. The withdrawals were simply conducted faster than the South Vietnamese could or would improve.[121]&nbsp;<br><br>The South Vietnamese military had far greater problems than a lack of American aid. President Thieu was a disaster as commander-in-chief. During the two years prior to the offensive (when aid cuts were already occurring), neither he nor the General Staff made any adjustments in strategy, doctrine, organization, or training to compensate for the inevitability of further aid reductions. Thieu also deprived local commanders of any strategic or tactical flexibility in decision-making, which flowed downward from the presidential palace.<br><br>&nbsp;Added to these problems were the long-standing corruption and incompetence within the officer corps itself. Early defeats during the final campaign were compounded not by a lack of will or ability on the part of the enlisted men, but by the cowardice and failing morale the officers. According to Isaacs, "The army did not collapse in its foxholes or for lack of supplies. It disintegrated when its senior officers...deserted it."[120]<br><br>Key to the defeat of South Vietnam was the ability of the officers and men of the People's Army of Vietnam. The highly-motivated and newly modernized PAVN was, for the first time, freed from the restraints of previous combat doctrine. Battlefield commanders were then given a new flexibility. The quick application of massive force leading to the utter defeat of the enemy at little cost in manpower.<br><br>During the entire campaign, the North Vietnamese suffered relatively few casualties. According to General Dung: "The numbers killed and wounded was very small in proportion to the victories won, and the expenditure in terms of weapons and ammunition was negligible.<br><br><br></div>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2017-08-30 04:13:14 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591169</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>Fight for the long haul</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591228</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<div>- Mao had decided not to intervene in Vietnam because he realised that China's involvement in Korea in 1951 had cost the country dearly.<br>- Giap - 'Above all, we must avoid their launching a ground war in North Vietnam, no matter how limited.'<br>- Chinas most important contributions were guns and ammunition, artillery shells, mortars + 100 military transport vehicles.<br>- Even if they had occupied one small segment this would have caused us tremendous grief.<br>- 'The Americans could have bombed us as much as they wanted... they hardly bothered us at all'<br>- For every 100 bombs dropped only 0.23% hit the road.<br>- 1971(South should've attacked prior to 1971 - Too late) - Lam Son attack by ARVN + US - Trial they had launched off into numerous byways, circuits and short cuts.</div>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2017-08-30 04:13:38 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591228</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>Ken Webb </title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591312</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<div>Possible interpretations for Communist victory:<br><br>- Military factors<br>(strategies/tactics)<br><br>- US failure to sustain a credible and viable regime in SV<br><br>- Nationalism of NV<br><br>- Tet Offensive&nbsp;<br><br>- Anti-war movement&nbsp;<br><br>- US failure to understand nature of the conflict<br><br><br></div>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2017-08-30 04:14:17 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591312</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>Ken Webb Historians</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591582</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<div>- Power of anti-war movement of the home front and the Tet Offensive ultimately decided the course of the Vietnam War. Harry G Summers says, "US public opinion turned decisively [against the war] ... when Johnson was psychologically defeated by the enemy's Tet Offensive in 68; and when the alliance between the US and the Republic of Vietnam came unglued [after the Paris Accord]" <br><br>- Stanley Karnow thought that the final decision not to help South Vietnam in April 1975 sealed Saigon's fate, if it not had already been sealed. President Ford said at the time of Saigon's impending fall that the events "portended neither the end of the world nor of American's leadership in the world". Karnow concludes "the politicians were simply reflecting the opinion of the overwhelming majority, who favoured no further aid to the Saigon govt.</div>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2017-08-30 04:16:46 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591582</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>Easter Offensive 72</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591612</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<div>- The Eastertide Offensive occurs as 200,000 North Vietnamese soldiers under the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap<br>-&nbsp; undertaken as a result of U.S. troop withdrawal, the strength of the anti-war movement in America likely preventing a U.S. retaliatory response<br>-strategy involves the capture of Quang Tri in the northern part of South Vietnam, Kontum in the mid section, and An Loc in the south.<br>- In response, President Nixon authorizes a massive bombing campaign targeting all NVA troops invading South Vietnam along with B-52 air strikes against North Vietnam<br>- "The bastards have never been bombed like they're going to bombed this time," Nixon privately declares.<br>- April 30, 1972 - U.S. troop levels drop to 69,000.<br>- President Nixon announces Operation Linebacker I, the mining of North Vietnam's harbors along with intensified bombing of roads, bridges, and oil facilities. The announcement brings international condemnation of the U.S. and ignites more anti-war protests in America.<br>-Napalm bombs are accidentally dropped on South Vietnamese civilians,<br>- NVA attack on Kontum is thwarted by South Vietnamese troops, aided by massive U.S. air strikes.<br>- South Vietnamese troops begin a counter-offensive to retake Quang Tri Province<br>- October 22, 1972 - Operation Linebacker I ends. U.S. warplanes flew 40,000 sorties and dropped over 125,000 tons of bombs during the bombing campaign which effectively disrupted North Vietnam's Eastertide Offensive.<br><strong>-1973</strong><br>January 9, 1973 - All remaining differences are resolved between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.</div><div>President Thieu, once again threatened by Nixon with a total cut-off of American aid to South Vietnam, now unwillingly accepts the peace agreement, which still allows North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam. Thieu labels the terms "tantamount to surrender" for South Vietnam.</div><div>January 23, 1973 - President Nixon announces that an agreement has been reached which will "end the war and bring peace with honor."<br><br></div><div>January 27, 1973 - The Paris Peace Accords are signed by the U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Under the terms, the U.S. agrees to immediately halt all military activities and withdraw all remaining military personnel within 60 days.<br><br><br></div>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2017-08-30 04:17:10 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/jamesburfitt/shd17rdfcrj1/wish/183591612</guid>
      </item>
   </channel>
</rss>
