Forum 7. Quinn on DDE by Group 5 https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv 1. What is the Doctrine of Double Effects? What does it say? 2. Why does Quinn think that it is morally IMPERMISSIBLE to intend to harm someone even when the action can cause a greater good in society? 3. Does the DDE provide a good explanation about the Trolley Problem? (The Trolley Problem: it is permissible to proceed in Trolley, but not in Transplant, though the costs and benefits are the same in both cases.) en-us 2016-10-28 08:42:52 UTC 2016-11-23 07:31:24 UTC hello@padlet.com Forum Chair Answer s1112914 https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/133834400 1. As we all know that more than one effect will be caused when we perform an action. Sometimes, one of the effect is harmful. The Doctrine of Double Effects refers to under certain conditions, harmful action is morally accepted and to be performed. 

2. Quinn has argued that double effect does not rest on the distinction between intended and merely foreseen harm, but instead is best formulated using a distinction between direct and indirect agency. 
- in harmful direct agency, “harm comes to some victims, at least in part, from the agent’s deliberately involving them in something in order to further his purpose precisely by way of their being so involved”; whereas
- in harmful indirect agency, “either nothing is in that way intended for the victims or what is so intended does not contribute to their harm.” 
 
He claimed that harmful direct agency involves a stronger form of disrespect for its victims than harmful indirect agency.  
Quinn is not saying that all harmful direct agency is wrong, and all harmful indirect agency is permissible.
He said that the distinction between harmful direct agency and harmful indirect agency is morally significant.

3. We think that DDE does provide a good explanation about the Trolley problem. In Trolley, it is permissible to kill the one because one’s primary intention is to save the five. The death of the one on the side track is a double-effect.Trolley Problem provides three distinct arguments in favor of the Doctrine of Double Effect: summarizing, the Doctrine of Double Effect offers a solution to the Trolley Problem; the two scenarios which constitute the Trolley Problem illustrate the distinction between ‘means’ and ‘side-effects’ .
]]> 2016-10-28 08:44:29 UTC https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/133834400 DDE's unability to explain the Trolley Problem s1112914 https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/134086456 I disagree that the Doctrine of Double Effects provides a good explanation to the Trolley Problem. 

It makes sense to say that when the bystander pushes the fat man down the bridge, the fat man is used more like a 'tool' than the case of the bystander pushing the rod to change position, as no one purposefully moved the man at the side-track to such position in order for the cause of saving other's life, different from pushing the fat man on the track. However, we also cannot say that it is merely a kind of side-effect since the harm to the man at the side-track is still predictable. It is undeniable that the bystander did realise the man's presence, and still decided to take the action of pushing the rod. Therefore, the bystander's action is also a way to save the larger population by sacrificing the smaller population, which makes DDE fail in proving that harming one person for the sake of total benefit is impermissible. 

Angel Li Huiping
30/10/2016]]> 2016-10-30 15:11:44 UTC https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/134086456 Few questions to the Forum chair s1116911 https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/135998932 I would like to ask some questions for understanding after reading the Forum chair's answer.

In Question 1, your group mentioned that under some special situations, harmful actions would be morally acceptable. Can you raise some examples of the special situation?

Besides, in Question 2, your group expressed that Quinn thought there is a great moral distinction between harmful direct agency and harmful indirect agency. Is the significance made by the intention of the agent?

Chung Cheuk Lam Natalie
8/11/2016]]> 2016-11-08 05:47:23 UTC https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/135998932 Not totally wrong = permissible? https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/139516840 In the forum chair's response, they seem to agree with Quinn's view on DDE in which if one's primary intention is to save the five in the trolley case, even by killing one to save the five is also permissible. However, I do not agree with his viewpoints, as the action of killing one is actually foreseeable as mentioned by Angel, by turning the trolley to another action in fact constitutes to two intentions: first is to save the five by avoiding the trolley to run over them; second is to kill the one as a mean to save the five. From this, it is clearly seen that the primary intention is not merely about saving the five without any consequences. Therefore, I think Quinn's view on DDE cannot justify the trolley problem.

Siu Chi Ying Jenny
23/11/2016]]> 2016-11-23 07:22:05 UTC https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/139516840 Questions to the forum chair https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/139517289 As Natalie had mentioned, the forum chair mentioned the point that Quinn is saying in some circumstances, harmful direct agency may not be necessarily 100% wrong, which means harmful direct agency in some cases is still permissible and thus may not infer any moral blame. I would like to know the forum chair's view on the transplant problem, where one healthy person is to be sacrificed and donating his/ her organs to save the five people suffering from severe diseases. In this case, can we say the transplant action is permissible as the primary intention of the transplant action is simply to save the five patients? Can the idea of utilitarianism be used in this case so as to override the importance of negative right, right not to be killed? 

Siu Chi Ying
23/11/2016]]> 2016-11-23 07:26:48 UTC https://padlet.com/s1112914/r8iavm7llrvv/wish/139517289