After reading Battlefield of the Future I think it is also important to mention how airpower has changed the approach to strategy based on the following advantages/attrbutes we have noted : transcending geographical borders; the instant and apocalyptic effects of airpower; infrastructure and communications paralysis; stealth & precision.

For example, Colonel Warden’s Five Rings model gives us a strategic framework (which he believed were critical centres of gravity) as to how an opponent can be defeated by destroying key components of the enemy’s system -  specifically in many instances made viable through the attributes of airpower - instead of engaging in conflict through attrition warfare.

Targeting the leader in the central ring has the highest strategic value (also the smallest target) and the rings further outwards become bigger but have less strategic importance. 

As Michael pointed out one of the key attributes of airpower is the ability to transcend borders and go beyond the traditional limits of fielded forces and hit more critical systems. In terms of strategy it shows a shift away from previous tactical approaches used in WW1  (attrition warfare and using airplanes for reconnaissance purposes) to a more strategic approach as seen in Colonel Warden’s 5 Rings system and the examples of Shane’s WW2 & US drone warfare examples. 

 

While the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq showed once again that cheap IEDs or rockets can cripple ground operations, only states remain capable of conducting or combatting air operations due to costs associated with aircraft, infrastructure, and technological development required to combat aircraft operating at hypersonic speed and suborbital altitude. Without the ability to effectively engage or parry the attack of an opponent, aircraft are merely an expensive coffin for their pilots. 

 

Uniquely tied to the technological considerations for air warfare are those intertwined with the political and information environments. Without the ability to accurately project air power with no or minimal civilian casualties, the air becomes a strategic loss on the net balance of a war’s effectiveness. The drones used in the American “Global War on Terror” provide a case in point regarding Colonel Warden’s prediction that information “will become a prominent, if not predominant, part of war”. While a $20,000,000 drone can fire a $100,000 Hellfire missile within inches of an intended hit point, the Afghan response to this unseen terror in the sky was one of distrust and fear. 

 

The British response to the Blitz provides further evidence of the response to foreign air war. Despite the overwhelming terror wrought by V2 rockets and German bombing raids, the resolve of the British people hardened, and perhaps actually net contributed to British success in the conflict by galvanizing the unity of the nation. Thus, the use of air power ironically appears to have significant limitations on its use not found in the use of ground forces. The precision and limited effectiveness of a single Soldier’s rifle typically has only limited, tactical effect.

 

While in theory air power has the ability to transcend geographical borders to paralyze an enemy’s will and capability to fight, modern warfare in the age of counterterrorism presents significant limitations. The alleged precision of modern munitions means very little in an age of urban combat where civilian populations are always within a blast radius, and the information environment is eager to be inflamed by any miscalculation. Air war must have the strength of a sledgehammer and precision of a scalpel, capable of evading advanced enemy defence systems if it is to have any strategic value.