^{EXAMPLE: After the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna (1815) established the Concert of Europe, where the Great Powers maintained order through balance of power. Kissinger calls this the most refined system of equilibrium in history, ensuring decades of stability}

^{EXAMPLE: In 1935, the League of Nations failed to stop Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia, proving Morgenthau’s critique that states would not sacrifice national interest for collective action. By contrast, in 1950 the UN authorized action against North Korea but only because Cold War politics temporarily aligned.}

^{EXAMPLE: The SALT I Treaty (1972) exemplified détente: it marked the first arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow, reflecting Kissinger’s idea of a “structure of peace” built on negotiation rather than open confrontation.}

_{EXAMPLE: German unification (1871): Bismarck transformed nationalism from a revolutionary threat into a tool of Realpolitik, using it to unify Germany and reshape the European balance of power.}

^{EXAMPLE: The fragile diplomatic relations between the Philippines and China over overlapping claims in the West Philippine Sea. Under the blanket of diplomatic immunity, the Philippine envoy posted in China is protected from suit, arrest, or detention from any entity as an indirect form of retaliation against the Philippines for asserting its claim.}

_{EXAMPLE: The Philippines vs. China case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, where the Philippines challenged China's claims in the South China Sea under UNCLOS. The tribunal's 2016 ruling favored the Philippines, reaffirming its sovereign rights within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), although China has refused to recognize the ruling.}

_{EXAMPLE: China has long pledged a No First Use policy for nuclear weapons, signaling it will not launch a preemptive strike. However, some doubt its credibility due to limited transparency over its arsenal. In contrast, the United States, Russia, and others reject such a pledge, believing the threat of a first strike strengthens deterrence.}

• _{Customary Law: Early practices and norms (diplomacy, war conduct, sovereignty) emerge out of necessity.}

• _{Codification: Customs formalized into treaties and conventions (e.g., Peace of Westphalia 1648).}

• _{Institutionalization: International organizations (League of Nations, UN) help enforce rules but effectiveness depends on alignment with powerful states’ interests}

_{EXAMPLE: He discusses the establishment of the United Nations as a successor to the League, aiming to promote international cooperation and uphold international law, while acknowledging challenges in enforcement and the influence of powerful member states. In contemporary times, UN laws are considered the international law for which member-states must adhere to.}

_{EXAMPLE: The United Nations, officially established in October 1945, is currently composed of 193 countries, and its role is to take action on the problems facing humanity. These include the maintenance of peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, humanitarian emergencies, gender equality, etc.}

_{Early use was ad hoc, tied to specific conflicts, and often unilateral; states used economic or political pressure to coerce compliance or punish behavior. During the Cold War, sanctions became more strategic and formalized, reflecting global power dynamics. By the mid-20th century, sanctions were increasingly codified through international institutions like the United Nations.}

_{EXAMPLE: During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Egypt’s President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, prompting Britain and France to launch a military invasion. The United States opposed the intervention and applied economic pressure, threatening financial consequences to compel Britain and France to withdraw. The crisis ended without U.S. military involvement, demonstrating how sanctions can be used as a diplomatic tool to influence state behavior without resorting to war.}

Berridge, G.R. Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Plagrave, 2015.

Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society. Palgrave, 1977.

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. Vanguard Books, 1991.

Permanent Court of Arbitration, South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award of 12 July 2016.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982).

CONFLICT: Balance of Power is realist and grounded in suspicion; states only act if it serves their interests. Collective Security is idealist and assumes trust, legality, and universality. This contradiction surfaced in the League of Nations, here Britain and France invoked balance over solidarity when appeasing Hitler, undermining the collective pledge.

INFLUENCE: Failures of Balance of Power (e.g., World War I) spurred advocacy of Collective Security (League, UN). Conversely, failures of Collective Security (League’s collapse, UN paralysis during the Cold War) reaffirmed the continuing role of Balance of Power. Kissinger (1994) stresses they cannot be separated; collective schemes only work when underpinned by real balance of forces.

CONFLICT: Sovereignty vs. Nationalism. Nationalism may exceed the boundaries of sovereignty when it demands the expansion or unification of territories (e.g., irredentism in 19th–20th century Europe). Kissinger emphasizes that sovereignty is meant to stabilize borders, while nationalism often destabilizes them by demanding “self-determination” beyond established states.

INFLUENCE:

• Sovereignty on Nationalism. Sovereignty formalizes the political framework in which nationalism can operate. Without recognized sovereignty, nationalist movements remain insurgent or revolutionary (e.g., pre-independence colonies).

• Nationalism on Sovereignty. Nationalism often reshapes sovereignty, pushing for new states (e.g., post-WWI Europe with the collapse of empires, Wilson’s principle of self-determination)

INFLUENCE:

• Sovereignty on Diplomatic Immunity. Sovereignty ensures that diplomatic immunity is reciprocally respected and that states recognize each other as equal and allow representatives to function under protection.

CONFLICT: Nationalism vs. Diplomatic Immunity. Nationalist uprisings often disregard immunity when foreign diplomats are associated with oppression or interference. Example: The Boxer Rebellion in China (1900), where nationalist groups attacked foreign missionaries, rejecting both sovereignty agreements imposed by colonial powers and the immunities of foreign diplomats.

INFLUENCE: Nationalism on Diplomatic Immunity. Nationalism may weaken the observance of immunity in moments of crisis but also strengthens it when states demand that their own diplomats be respected abroad (reciprocity principle).

CONFLICT: Despite their interdependence, international law and multilateralism can come into conflict:

• Selective Application of Law – Powerful states may bypass international law when it clashes with their national interest (e.g., the problem with the West Philippine Sea, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, applying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ruled in favor of the Philippines. Despite this ruling, China rejected the decision, insisting on bilateral negotiations and continuing its island-building and military presence. ASEAN, which operates on consensus-based multilateralism, has struggled to enforce collective action, as some member-states are economically dependent on China.). This creates tension between the universality of law and the politics of multilateralism.

• Multilateral Gridlock – Multilateral institutions often struggle to enforce international law due to consensus-based decision-making (e.g., Security Council vetoes like the case of US using its veto power to protect Israel). This weakens the legitimacy of both law and institution.

INFLUENCE:

• International Law on Multilateralism: Law shapes the scope and legitimacy of multilateral organizations. For example, the Rome Statute (1998) established the International Criminal Court (ICC), embedding legal norms of human rights and accountability into the multilateral system.

• Multilateralism on International Law: Conversely, multilateral platforms expand, reinterpret, or weaken law. Trade law (e.g., WTO agreements) shows how collective negotiation reshapes legal principles like non-discrimination into binding economic rules.

  
  

  Kissinger (1994) emphasizes that the balance between law and multilateralism reflects the underlying distribution of power. For example, after WWII, the U.S. championed both international law and multilateralism to create an order aligned with its interests. Thus, their influence is dialectical: law legitimizes institutions, and institutions adapt law to political realities.

• Sanctions are punitive, aiming to pressure states into compliance by restricting economic, political, or military resources.

• Détente (literally "relaxation of tensions") is the opposite tool, seeking engagement, dialogue, and reduced hostility.

They are connected because both are responses to international crises and conflicts, but they operate with different strategies or approaches,sanctions through pressure, détente through accommodation.

CONFLICT: Despite this complementarity, sanctions and détente often clash:

• Sanctions emphasize confrontation and punishment, while détente seeks compromise and trust-building.
  For instance, during the Cold War, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union (e.g., after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979) while also pursuing arms control talks, which is truly a contradictory mix that undermined credibility.

• Mixed Signaling – When both are pursued simultaneously, states may perceive sanctions as insincere, weakening the effects of détente.

  A modern example is U.S. and Iran relations: while negotiations on the nuclear deal (JCPOA, 2015) represented détente, concurrent U.S. sanctions weakened Iranian trust, eventually contributing to the deal’s collapse.
  

INFLUENCE: Sanctions and détente influence each other in cyclical ways:

• Sanctions as Prelude to Détente – Pressure from sanctions can force states to the negotiating table, where détente can occur.

• Failure of One Weakens the Other – If sanctions fail, they can harden positions and make détente impossible. Likewise, if détente collapses, sanctions are often re-imposed more severely (e.g., U.S.–Russia relations after Crimea 2014).

• Balance of Power prevents dominance through shifting alliances.

• Collective Security creates universal commitments against aggression.

• Deterrence (nuclear or conventional) relies on the threat of overwhelming retaliation to dissuade aggression.

INFLUENCE: Deterrence, once established, reshaped both balance and collective security: Nuclear weapons made total war less likely, forcing states into proxy wars and legal-collective maneuvers instead. Kissinger (1994) implied that while the balance or equilibrium and collective security remain important, modern stability is unimaginable without deterrence.