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      <title>Apple v. FBI Iphone encryption (2016) and ongoing debate on “warrant proof” encryption by KSC Librarians</title>
      <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb</link>
      <description>There are lots of issues where data tracking could be invasive or even lead to criminal prosecution.  Your group will skim read through the articles, look for more information - identify how data is being used, by who, whose data, how are they accessing the data, what control options are there? Do a little research, create your poster or padlet and share with the class.
What are some implications of data tracking?</description>
      <language>en-us</language>
      <pubDate>2025-08-15 16:25:12 UTC</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>2025-09-25 20:07:57 UTC</lastBuildDate>
      <webMaster>hello@padlet.com</webMaster>
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         <url></url>
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      <item>
         <title>1. Overview of the issue</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601865107</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<ul><li><p>The dispute began after the December 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack, when the FBI seized the attacker’s iPhone 5C to try to retrieve data that might reveal accomplices or networks.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>The FBI asked Apple to build “special software” (a backdoor) to bypass security (disable features like auto-erase after failed password attempts, etc.). Apple refused, arguing that doing so would compromise the security and privacy of all iPhone users.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>The heart of the conflict: <strong>law enforcement’s desire to access encrypted data for safety/justice</strong> vs. <strong>user privacy, data security, and precedent risks</strong>.</p></li></ul>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-24 13:29:57 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601865107</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>2. Study findings, data, or statistics</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601867831</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<ul><li><p>The sources don’t dive into a lot of broad statistics, but some relevant figures / technical details:</p><ul><li><p>The iPhone in question used <strong>256-bit AES encryption</strong>, which is considered extremely strong and essentially infeasible to brute-force with current technology.</p></li><li><p>The phone was protected so that 10 failed passcode attempts would wipe (erase) all data. </p></li><li><p>Apple claims it has responded to <strong>over 125,000</strong> law enforcement requests for data (what it can access server-side) but that it cannot comply when it comes to device decryption without user credentials.</p></li></ul></li></ul>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-24 13:31:33 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601867831</guid>
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      <item>
         <title>3. What / whose data was (or could be) accessed, stolen, shared, or requested</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601870651</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<ul><li><p>The target was the iPhone 5C belonging to one of the shooters (Syed Rizwan Farook).</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>The FBI sought to access all internal data (messages, contacts, emails, location data, app data, etc.). Because of encryption, Apple’s cooperation would mean bypassing all security protections.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>There is no known broader data breach in this case (i.e. Apple’s systems were not compromised); the case is about forced access and weakening encryption.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>Apple argued that, if such software were built, malicious actors or other governments could demand or exploit it and access the data of <em>millions</em> of voluntary users.</p></li></ul>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-24 13:33:11 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601870651</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>4. Laws / legal principles involved &amp; how they were (allegedly) violated</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601876784</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<ul><li><p>The FBI petitioned under the <strong>All Writs Act</strong> (a statute that lets federal courts issue writs “necessary or appropriate” to carry out their duties). They asked a federal magistrate judge to compel Apple to assist.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>Apple countered that forcing it to create and provide decryption software would violate (or undermine) constitutional protections (e.g. Fourth Amendment privacy interests) and public policy on data security. (It also raised arguments that the order would overreach into private sector obligations.)</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>There was debate about whether the demand was overly broad, whether Apple should be forced to build something akin to a universal “master key,” and whether it would be safe.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>No clear statutory law (e.g. no explicit “you must build a backdoor”) had been previously established in U.S. law; so this case was pushing the boundaries.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>Some political and legislative proposals have tried (or advocated) forcing companies to build “lawful access” mechanisms, but critics warn such requirements fundamentally weaken encryption for all.</p></li></ul>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-24 13:36:15 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601876784</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>5. Outcome &amp; legal resolution</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601878892</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<ul><li><p>Before the court could force Apple to comply, the FBI announced it had found a <strong>third-party (external) method</strong> to unlock the iPhone. As a result, the government withdrew its court order / request to Apple.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>Apple never made the software, and the case did not result in a binding precedent forcing Apple (or any company) to build backdoors.</p></li></ul><p> </p><ul><li><p>The larger debate continues, especially as new technologies (biometrics, stronger encryption, cloud storage) evolve and governments continue asking for “backdoor access” in criminal or national security cases.</p></li></ul>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-24 13:37:21 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3601878892</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>Use</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3602621450</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>"Apple would be able to choose the extent to which it aided the FBI in unlocking the phone, and the company would be allowed to keep and destroy the software it created to do so."</p><p><br></p><p>"The FBI&nbsp;eventually accessed that device without Apple’s help, working with&nbsp;a third-party security firm."</p><p><br></p><p>"If there’s a backdoor for the good guys, you better believe that the&nbsp;bad guys&nbsp;will figure out how to exploit it" </p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-24 22:40:12 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3602621450</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title>&quot;use&quot;  I think</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3602623750</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>"Jane Horvath, said that “end-to-end encryption is critically important to the services we rely on.” And with regard to fighting terrorism, she continued that&nbsp;“building a backdoor to encryption is not the way we’re going to solve those issues.”"</p><p><br></p><p>highlights that data could have been used, perhaps some wanted to even use it. although the quote highlights why they do not. </p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-24 22:44:51 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3602623750</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title></title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3604303860</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>I don't have an issue with getting inside the phone of someone like a mass-shooter like in this case. Once you commit such a serious crime, you should absolutely lose any right to privacy. People have a right to know why something might've happened and what a killer's motives were. </p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-25 16:20:13 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3604303860</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title></title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3604312454</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>I could see why some would be concerned about the FBI being able to unlock devices in special ways because they could use this for bad purposes theoretically too. However, the case of a mass-shooter or terrorist makes it a lot different in my opinion. Because it is not only important if possible to find motives but also means of prevention. For example, if there was another attack or attacks planned, the FBI could use that phone information to prevent it. </p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-25 16:26:48 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3604312454</guid>
      </item>
      <item>
         <title></title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3604334201</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<p>From this article: <a rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.ucumberlands.edu/blog/understanding-the-ethics-of-data-collection">https://www.ucumberlands.edu/blog/understanding-the-ethics-of-data-collection</a></p><p><br></p><p>"It doesn't take much in the way of research to discover examples of major data breaches and other instances where businesses simply weren't as serious about protecting customer data as they <em>should</em> have been."</p><p><br></p><p>This is a major concern of companies being able to store personal information. While data leaks aren't an everyday occurrence, they happen and it's important to consider this. </p>]]></description>
         <enclosure url="https://www.ucumberlands.edu/blog/understanding-the-ethics-of-data-collection" />
         <pubDate>2025-09-25 16:42:29 UTC</pubDate>
         <guid>https://padlet.com/edolinger/n8bm9rwda8um4tb/wish/3604334201</guid>
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