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      <title>Repeated Bargaining by Learning Design at UTS</title>
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      <description></description>
      <language>en-us</language>
      <pubDate>2022-02-11 05:20:16 UTC</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>2022-04-27 11:55:37 UTC</lastBuildDate>
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         <title>Agency / Client Part II</title>
         <author></author>
         <link>https://padlet.com/postgraduate_futures/ii7pplzqil3zlpcn/wish/2134456079</link>
         <description><![CDATA[<div>In a repeated game, the equilibrium path differs. The Client's dominant strategy is to reject the pricing offered and the Agency's dominant strategy is to discount further.&nbsp;<br><br>This&nbsp;sequence, if played out over 10 rounds, would result a payoff of (-150 for the Agency, 450 for the Client). In reality this would never happen as the Agency would walk once their profit margin was too low. Alternatively, the client might sign once the price point reached their desired range.<br><br></div>]]></description>
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         <pubDate>2022-04-07 12:13:28 UTC</pubDate>
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