From a Marxist perspective, I think that Adkins et al.’s approach is sensible. Exploitation is evident regarding housing situations, with those who depend on renting and from whom value is extracted on the one hand, and those who accumulate wealth through capitalising on basic human needs, on the other.

From a Weberian perspective, renting and owning housing appears to be a key determinant for life chances due to the generational factor which Adkins et al. (2019) also identify. Since it determines what someone can do with the money that they own or earn, I think it also relates to social mobility and its limits. It might also determine, based on someone’s class background that they inherit ‘from home’ - among other factors such as tuition fees and available funding, as well as academic merit that is, however, also tied to structural factors - what career path a person can pursue, in terms of balancing earning a wage to survive and education to earn higher 'employability'. This later then influences the wealth a person can accumulate, and if they can buy a house for their own, or even build up a highly valuable portfolio; or if they will rent forever, or are at high risk of losing their housing all together, possibly pushing people into (more) poverty, or even homelessness, further down the line. By focussing on labour and capital alone, these aspects are being overlooked. Therefore, I think that focussing on housing is useful for class analysis, as well as, aiming for raising ‘class consciousness’ in a Marxist sense in the spirit of gazing up at those who exploit needs that are crucial for sustainable survival, and thus it might be useful in uniting a ‘renting-class’ of people whose housing is valorised. 

Yet, I want to note that I think class based on housing assets cannot entirely replace other dominant class approaches, as labour - as discussed above - and culture also play their roles. On the one hand, it is gradational, rather than relational, which reduces a complex issue to a few calculable categories. On the other hand, while I am strongly opposed to the individualisation approach and the subsequent erasure of class; I think we need to consider our historical conjuncture, and that neoliberalism has brought an increased focus on the individual, which in turn shapes how people (affectively) perceive class, also in relation to housing and ‘lifestyles’. Conversations in the classroom about contradictory class positions have shown me that these cultural dimensions strongly influence how people see class due to the sense of belonging it aggregates through cultural, and social, aspects. Thus these remain also important to consider. I think that housing could be treated as a crucial aspect of economic capital in cultural class analysis in an attempt to marry the approaches, and facilitate collectively gazing up to the very top. 

Bibliography 

Adkins, L. et al. (2019) ‘Class in the 21st century: Asset inflation and the new logic of inequality’, Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 53(3), pp. 548–572. doi:10.1177/0308518x19873673. 

Fast forward to 2024, I still watch reality TV. However, a lot of things have changed. While my economic capital has not changed much, culturally and socially I have become more middle class than ever. I do not aspire to become famous, anymore. Yet, I still engage with seemingly low-brow entertainment. Also, a new career pipeline exists for those who expose themselves on reality TV: becoming influencers and making money through capitalising on their persona, and sponsorships. Interestingly, since the late 2010s, a new genre of content has emerged in the German youtube content creation cosmos: commentary on reality TV (mainly dating) shows, episode by episode (see examples linked on Padlet). While I also watch full episodes, sometimes I just watch these videos. Reflecting on them with a class lens, they remind me of what Angela McRobbie (2004) identified as the ‘middle-class social habitus’ and symbolic violence in reality TV shows. While she analyses it within the context of makeover shows and how upper-middle class/upper-class women police the appearance of working-class women (in the UK) on the show, I think the youtube commentary adds a new dimension to it within the contemporary conjuncture of influencer marketing. Basically, ‘higher class’ influencers comment on ‘lower class’ ones - or people who often but not always come from working-class backgrounds - who might aspire to be like the people who comment on them to make a living. Mirellativegal (Mirella) is a good example for this. Most of her content that is not focussed on ‘trash TV’, revolves around lifestyle, being a mother, and living vegan. Yet, when she comments on shows like Love Island, or Temptation Island, she mostly makes fun of candidates, and judges their behaviour. She especially focuses on their performances of gender, and exaggeration of heteronormative gender roles from a feminist perspective. However, in her commentary she ignores the intersections of gender and class. I think that she, as a upper-middle class woman (and influencer) gazes down on people who aspire to become stars/influencers through these shows - men and women alike - while mainly focussing on stereotypes that are often ascribed to - or even stigmatise - working class culture as being stuck in hyper-heteronormative gender roles. It is missing nuance. Notably, these shows invite this kind of middle class judgement, as they are designed that way (Lyle, 2008; McRobbie, 2004). In the context of a middle-class social habitus, it echoes aspirations to teach working-class people how to become ‘better’ while drawing the lines between ‘the middle’ and everything that is ‘below them’. This comes back to an individualisation of class which detracts from structural factors that shape people’s classed (and gendered) experiences.  

Bibliography

Lyle, Samantha.A. (2008) ‘(Mis)recognition and the middle-class/bourgeois gaze: A case study of wife swap’, Critical Discourse Studies, 5(4), pp. 319–330. doi:10.1080/17405900802405239.

McRobbie, A. (2004) ‘Notes on “what not to wear” and post-feminist symbolic violence’, The Sociological Review, 52(2_suppl), pp. 99–109. doi:10.1111/j.1467-954x.2005.00526.x. 

This commodification has consequences beyond social media. Nowadays, it costs around 15 to 30 Euros to enter a club, which does not account for drinks, outfits or anything else that people might want to purchase ‘to be in with the crowd’. This price - and the attached ‘products’ that are regarded or marketed as necessary to entry - leads to many people who are working-class being excluded from the community due to the fact that they cannot afford to be part of it. These prices are also related to the broader picture of dramatically increasing gentrification in Berlin which is connected to a wave of dying clubs whose plots are ‘redeveloped’ (Dawson, 2020); and sometimes clubs need to make money to be able to afford survival. 

Techno and its culture Berlin have become gentrified, and a part of the neoliberal system we live under. I think that this development is sad to see and it alienates me from something that I regard as ‘my culture’ due to my mom being heavily involved in the post-1989 rave and techno community, as well as her attached leftist political activism. My mom has also been alienated from her community due to the ever-increasing commercialisation that transformed something where she used to feel at home at, into something she does not recognise anymore. Techno in Berlin used to be about marginalised people coming together to celebrate hedonistic raves, to forget about the harsh realities of everyday life in a city that was in the process of deindustralisation, and swift change due to reunification. Especially for East German youth, this was important as many of them struggled with finding a perspective for their futures in a unified country that treated (and still treats) them as second-class citizens, and dispossessed their parents of housing and jobs. There was something powerful about seizing or maybe even ‘reclaiming’ derelict factories and warehouses - it was also largely illegal. It was not about performing as a raver, which includes dancing or dressing in a certain way. The motto was ‘come as you are and dance like no one is looking’, according to my mom. The genre and attached club culture were born out of resistance to neoliberal governance and brought together many people from different backgrounds, such as but not limited to East and West German youth. 

While individuals, and artist collectives might carry on the spirit of the 1990s, and some marginalised people - however, rarely along the lines of class without the necessary social capital - are still able to find refuge within the community, the field has significantly changed beyond its commodification through social media. Now more than ever a revival of resistance is necessary - and partially it is already in the works. Devastating neoliberal  projects  - for both the environment and community - like extending the Autobahn A100 through the city, remain issues for the survival of clubs and their communities in Berlin; and the community has protested this project (Chang, 2023). While this is positive, issues of neoliberalisation of the culture itself persist. We need to bring class and its intersections back into the picture and become more conscious about class and its intersections as a diverse group to resist the neoliberal chokehold of the system more broadly and save our culture and communities from within.

Bibliography

Chang, M. (2023) Why 20,000 ravers are protesting Berlin’s A100 motorway expansion, Dazed. Available at: https://www.dazeddigital.com/music/article/60784/1/why-7000-berlin-ravers-protesting-a100-motorway-expansion-about-blank-club-ost (Accessed: 28 February 2024). 

Dawson , B. (2020) Griessmuehle: Berlin mourns the loss of yet another club, Dazed. Available at: https://www.dazeddigital.com/life-culture/article/47724/1/griessmuehle-berlin-mourns-the-loss-of-yet-another-club-cocktail-d-amore (Accessed: 28 February 2024). 

Harvey, D. (2002) ‘The Art of Rent: Globalisation, Monopoly and the Commodification of Culture’, Socialist Register, pp. 93–110. 

Fast forward to high school where I had stopped acting as my parents could not afford to pay for acting lessons, and there were not really any viable local options where I could have participated for free. I briefly joined a theatre group at my local theatre when I was 14 years old, however, everyone was much younger than me and I did not really enjoy the sessions and projects we were doing because I felt out of touch with my fellow group members. However, I wanted to become either an actor or do something adjacent in the future like studying dramaturgy and becoming a director, or theatre pedagogy so I could at least work in a theatre environment. I felt that I had the necessary talent, and I did a compulsory internship for school at my local theatre in grade 10 and enjoyed it. To be honest, my parents were not thrilled about this. While they wanted to support me in what I am passionate about, they kept saying how jobs in this field are ‘breadless art’ (directly translated from the German idiom ‘brotlose Kunst’ which refers to a job in the field of art but that does not earn someone a living), and that there is a high chance that I would not be able to actually pursue a career that relates to what I would have studied. The common thing that I have heard is ‘most people who study this end up as taxi drivers’. They thought I had to find something that would make me money so I can survive. I ignored these warnings because at the time I still believed in the myth of meritocracy, and was unaware of my own class reality. I thought that I wanted to take the risk, and that I still had a chance because I have talent, right? …

However, an advisor at the jobcentre actually talked me out of my plans and laid out how unlikely it would be for me to even get into a good theatre-related course as they 1) are often hosted at private universities with extortionate fees that my family cannot pay, and 2) the entry exams are extremely competitive and because I did not have lessons, or the tools to make a short movie (which are also expensive) to showcase my supposed talent, it was unlikely that I would get in, to begin with. This realisation crushed my dreams and I have never picked up the smithereens of this possible future again. 

I am happy with what I am doing now, however, my story has some crucial implications for the intersections of class, art and the myth of meritocracy. Reflecting on this with a cultural class lens, I can see that my parents were worried about this as getting a career in the arts is seldom achieved without the help of some form of nepotism, and for someone from a working-class background who does not possess the social capital to do this, chances are lower for being able to secure paying jobs in the arts, as Orian Brook, David O’Brien, and mak Taylor (2018) have shown in their study ‘Panic! Social Class, Taste, and Inequalities in the Creative Industries’ in the UK. While this study is UK-specific, to some degree I think that this can be applied to Germany as well since it is also a neoliberal state in which art is a highly gatekept field; and as my story demonstrates what they found out circulates as a sort of ‘folktale’ about the harsh reality of working in art around working-class communities. 

To be honest, I also did not possess the cultural capital to compete with others in the field who come from a ‘higher’ class background, as my knowledge about literature and drama was mainly stemming from the limited exposure I had in school. I am the opposite of well-versed in high arts such as classical theatre as my parents never exposed me to it. Going to the theatre is expensive, and we simply did not have the money to partake in this leisure activity. I also think that my working-class parents do not possess the cultural capital to value performance arts highly as a pastime beyond my interest in acting. However, my father and I often went to circus shows because we got in for free as my family of Travellers is a traditional circus family, and my father used to be a well-known and highly skilled performer as well. Yet, in my experience, circus arts are regarded as lowbrow entertainment compared to theatrical performance arts. I also did not have the chance to ‘professionally’ improve my skills before studying due to a lack of economic capital which further decreased my cultural capital. Overall, it shows that meritocracy is a myth, and that many other systemic factors influence whether someone can do certain things. The creative industries are an unequal playing field. 

Bibliography

Orian, B., David, O. and Mark, T. (2018)Panic! Social Class, Taste and Inequalities in the Creative Industries. Available at: https://createlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Panic-Social-Class-Taste-and-Inequalities-in-the-Creative-Industries1.pdf (Accessed: 07 March 2024).

In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and West Germany was reunited with its eastern counterpart which had become part of the Soviet sphere of influence as a consequence of World War II. This event marked a significant point in time as the beginning of an era of ‘Western triumphalism’ (Hobson, 2012) due to the increase of democratisation around the world. This coincided with an increase of neoliberal policies in Western European states. With that the region experienced a transition from seemingly ‘socialist’ governance to neoliberalism. This resulted in deindustrialisation of Germany's east which means that many industries were eroded, resulting in the loss of jobs with no alternative to find labour for thousands of people (Balhorn et al., 2020). This development had detrimental effects on many east Germans as they had inevitably become dependent on welfare, without meaningful state support to increase their employability in new sectors. 

Moreover, in 2002 the Social Democrat-led (SPD; comparable to the UK’s Labour party) government introduced a reform to welfare for (long-term) unemployed people: Hartz IV (OXFAM, 2013). As part of the neoliberal paradigm, these benefits have perpetuated structural poverty as they are designed to be kept as low as possible in order to “motivate” people to get to work, projecting the cause of poverty on individual traits of a person rather than connecting it with structural factors. Due to the afore-mentioned deindustrialisation, people from east German backgrounds have been disproportionately impacted by this inadequate welfare policy. 

Furthermore, factoring in the media’s portrayal of the influx of refugees in Germany since 2015 can further explain how east Germans have become politicised through framing which makes the apparent favoured treatment of refugees responsible for the problems that east Germans face. This especially applies to the narrative which was spun by the German newspaper ‘Bild’ which is mainly read by working class Germans (Lupo, 2006). However, this is a fabricated story rooted in racist logics, creating an identity politics centred around whiteness, riling up one oppressed group against another, resulting in increased privilege of those who are already at the economic peak of the German social class system – majorly white West Germans – through increasing popularity and political influence of the AfD in east Germany. The “advantageous” treatment that refugees and other migrants apparently receive is the bare minimum, and overshadows that there are many structural barriers which complicate the lives of non-German citizens. This includes the same issues caused by neoliberal governance that white east Germans who have lived there for many years face, such as inadequate welfare, inadequate housing and educational inequalities. Migrants and refugees are part of the working class just as much as white people with an east German background. 

In the context of neoliberalism and Western triumphalism, the issues of east Germans are rooted in the same colonial and Eurocentric logics as racism, and impact people beyond white working class communities. Yet, those who want to prove that they belong to a unified German nation, think that they are more deserving because of their apparent whiteness which is supported by popular mainstream media discourses. We need more class consciousness in a traditional Marxist sense to unite those who are exploited by the same system. What we do not need is identity politics that creates an elusive category of whiteness – connected to the construction of a German national identity – which polarises those who are impacted by the same systemic issues because of their shared class status. 

Bibliography

Balhorn, L. et al. (2020) Why the East Germans lost, Jacobin. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2020/10/east-germany-gdr-reunification (Accessed: 26 March 2024). 

Hobson, J.M. (2012) The eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760-2010. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 

Lupo (2006) Wer liest ‘Bild’ und ‘Bild am sonntag’?, BILDblog. Available at: https://bildblog.de/1580/wer-liest-bild-und-bild-am-sonntag/ (Accessed: 26 March 2024). 

OXFAM (2013) The true cost of austerity and inequality: Germany case study. Available at: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/10546/301384/29/cs-true-cost-austerity-inequality-germany-120913-en.pdf (Accessed: 05 March 2024).