While we can agree that the person (you) on the near side of the spectrum is not the same person on the far side, it is not clear at which point ‘you’ cease to survive. In other words, there is no single minute change to mind and body along the spectrum that unequivocally determines the difference between survival and death. In other words, identity is indeterminate and to many questions concerning identity, there is no clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. Consider the inconclusive case of patients with alzheimer’s, who while losing some of their memories, often retain muscular memory as well as their character dispositions. In the Schwanda case, there is a strong physical connection to you, but a weak psychological one. Whereas there is a strong psychological and some physical connection (in the form of the brain) to Wanda.  Neither case fits into the unambiguous ends of the spectrum, therefore we can dismiss Locke's view that identity is always determined. 

Why:

It is plausible that at each stage of the Dr Nefarious process, (from the first person perspective) that I can rationally fear the possibility of torture despite the fact I will have my memories erased and/or replaced. It is rational to fear not only physical pain but a future amnesiac state when one is in pain but with no understanding of why. In addition, the possibility of having one’s memories replaced and then being in pain resembles mental derangement and torture combined, and should be feared. This is analogous to the fear a person may hold for both their physical and mental self after a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s. Knowing that late in life we will lose our memories does not alter our concernment for our future physical self. Thus, my undergoing physical pain in the future is not excluded by any psychological state I may be in at the time, with the exception of psychological states which by their nature, exclude experiencing pain (such as unconsciousness) example: anaesthesia. 

YET....
Yet, this is arguable mainly in relation to the physical, as the case of pain does not necessarily exclude the impact of other psychological states in concernment for the future. For example, if I were due to meet my teenage love for the first time in twenty years, but then would have my memories of that love erased beforehand, the feelings that characterised my concernment (anticipation or excitement) would potentially disappear. Yet, in the case of physical concernment, no predicted change in character, beliefs or dispositions can unseat the fear or desires I have. Thus, the body matters. 

 

+Action ownership requires consciousness, which is dependent upon a body. 

 

+If action-ownership is dependent upon memory, then many memories are embodied (such as riding bicycles, typing or playing a musical instrument) and thus require the body to be ‘remembered’.