rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the left-behinds has fueled popular resentment of the political classes. This situation is believed to have made the less secure strata of society – low-waged unskilled workers, the long-term unemployed, households dependent on shrinking social benefits, residents of public housing, single-parent families, and poorer white populations living in inner-city areas with concentrations of immigrants-- susceptible to the anti-establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering exploited of populist movements, parties, and leaders, blaming ‘Them’ for stripping prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from ‘Us’.  2oldal
Robert F ingkehart and Pippa Norris 

The Deep Causes of Secular Stagnation and the Rise of Populismby James Montier, Philip Pilkington of GMO, 3/2
Looking at this chart, it is not hard to see why people tend to blame their economic problems on migrants. We have already seen that unemployment has reached structurally higher levels after the Golden Age of capitalism. This has been accompanied by increases in net migration into the US. It is not difficult to understand why unemployed people would tend to take this correlation to imply causation and blame their joblessness or job insecurity on migration.

But the key impact that globalisation has had on working people is not to encourage the free movement of labour, but rather to encourage the free movement of goods and services. This has both pros and cons. On the pro front, the US consumer has benefited from lower prices. The cons include reduced domestic demand and job losses.

This is reflected in the rhetoric of many populist campaigners who tell their constituents that globalisation has served to take their jobs and create unemployment.

They craft an image as man of action rather than worlds , who is not afraid to take difficult and quick decisions.

Women populist can use their genes , as an outsider.

Another groups of populist are the enterpentaurs- billionares. 

Trump, Berlusconi, Ross Petrot.

They present themselves , as businessman who made the fortune not because of the corrupt elite, but because they are self made mens. 71 
Case Mudde and Cristobal Kaltweisser : A very short in troduction

This principled anti-pluralism then also explains

why populists so frequently oppose the, so to speak,

morally correct outcome of a vote to the actual empir-

ical outcome of an election, when the latter was not in

their favor (which, of course, is a variation on contrast-

ing the general will and the will of all). Think of Victor

Orban claiming after losing the 2002 Hungarian elec-

tions that “the nation cannot be in opposition”; or think

of Andes Manuel Lopez Obrador, arguing, after his

failed bid for the Mexican presidency in 2006, that “the

victory of the right is morally impossible” (and declar-

ing himself “the legitimate president of Mexico”)

32

;or

think of Recep Tayyip Erdogan insisting in the face of

rather strong empirical evidence that Turkish citizens

were

protesting against his policies in Gezi Park that

the protesters did not belong to the Turkish people. In

short, the logic of populism is not: we are the 99%.

It is: we are the 100%.
487 oldal 
The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People”:

Reflections on Populism

Continent-wide, however, the picture is unambiguous: 12.5 million Europeans lived in a country with at least one populist cabinet member in 1998; in 2018, that has risen more than tenfold, to 170.2 million.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist

3. Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kaltwasser 

4.Federico Finchelstein Returning Populism to History 

5. Populism 

A very short introduction

Oxford university press 2017

3 oldal
Robert F.Inglehart and Pippa Norris

Harvard Kennedy School August 2016  RWP16-026
2 oldal
7.Jan-Werner Müller „The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People: Reflections on Populism”

Matthew Goodwin is professor of politics at the University of Kent

The Deep Causes of Secular Stagnation and the Rise of Populismby James Montier, Philip Pilkington of GMO, 3/2
8.Ritchie Savage
A DEMOKRÁCIA ELŐSZOBÁJA?

Tue 20 Nov 2018 The guardian

1.    bár a modern populizmus a fasizmusból ered, de a a populizmus hívei is alkalmazkodó- és tanulóképességükről tettek tanúbizonyságot, aminek eredményeképpen a populizmus mára már esszenciálisan különbözik a fasizmustól.

2.a fasizmus diktatórikus keretek közötti újbóli megvalósítása a megváltozott ideológiai térben immáron ellehetetlenült. A legitimitás és a hatalom megszerzésére csak demokratikus keretek között nyílik lehetőség, így a főleg Dél-Amerikában megjelenő populista rendszerek tulajdonképpen a fasizmus demokratikus újratervezésén alapulnak. ( dél-amerikai populizmusok és történetük külön fejezet)

3.A bipoláris világrendben pedig a populizmus egyfajta ideológiai harmadik útnak feleltethető meg, a liberális és a kommunista tömbök között, ami egyben a társadalmak válaszreakciója volt 1945 után, ugyanúgy mint napjainkban.
Válaszreakció a liberális demokráciák gyenge pontjaira, amely hangsúlyozottan demokratikus keretek között a képviseleti rendszer „korrekciójára” irányul.

Federico Finchelstein Returning Populism to History 

Populism in American politics

Mark D. Brewer*

DOI 10.1515/for-2016-0021

If there is one thing that appears to connect all of the elements of American populism outlined above it is that populism requires an enemy. This is not to say that America’s populist movements have not been for anything. Indeed, populist efforts in the US have been marked by a diverse array of hopes and goals. But it is absolutely essential for American populism to have something and/or someone to be against, often viscerally against. Hatred may be too strong of a word to use here, but this question is certainly open to debate. 255 oldal

The Oxford Handbook of populismOxford : Oxford University Press 2017

. It is now evident that populism draws strength from public opposition to mass immigration, cultural liberalization, and the perceived surrender of national sovereignty to distant and unresponsive international bodies. If economic arguments had determined the outcome of the Brexit vote, Britain would have remained in the EU. 

The rise of the populist right has coincided with a catastrophe for the center-left.

Under pressure, center-right parties have felt compelled to adjust by shifting toward populist policies and rhetoric.
The rise of European populism and the collapse of the center-left

Thursday, March 8, 2018


It is, of course, no coincidence that the wave of populist nationalism now breaking over the West began in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, when millions of working- and middle-class voters lost savings, jobs, and future prospects. But the wave engulfed liberal politics even where economic pillars remained intact. Poland was Eastern Europe’s economic engine—its Germany—when the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party defeated the classically liberal Civic Platform in 2015. Civic Platform Prime Minister Donald Tusk had described his platform as the maintenance of “warm water in the tap.” When I was in Warsaw the following year, Konstanty Gebert, a columnist and former Solidarity leader, said to me, “He thought that was enough, but he was wrong. People wanted history, they wanted glory, they wanted meaning. And PiS offered a meaning. Their meaning was, ‘We’ll make Poland great again.’”

Bannon has claimed that the American electorate is dividing between “nationalists” and “cosmopolitans.” Trump plainly agrees, and he knows his base. A 2017 survey found that “fears about immigrants and cultural displacement were more powerful factors than economic concerns in predicting support for Trump among white working-class voters.” Almost half of such voters agreed with the statement, “things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own country”—an echo of the title of Arlie Russell Hochschild’s study of working-class 

1. playing the role of the underdog; 2. use of professional expertise;

Populism and the Media 55

56 Twenty-First Century Populism3. rallies;
4. free media publicity;
5. staging events; and
6. tactical attacks on the media.(Stewart, Mazzoleni and Horsfield, 2003)Playing on an underdog status is an uncertain strategy as it is not always successful. Le Pen and Bossi have paradoxically gained more support when targeted by unfriendly news coverage. In various elections, Silvio Berlusconi has cleverly exploited the aggressive hostility of the liberal Italian press and his supposed ‘demonization’ by the opposition. Like Berlusconi, Haider and Le Pen have also used professional media relations advisers and, in so doing, have succeeded in getting less hostile coverage. Similarly, in Belgium, theVlaams Blok benefited from a professional leadership, strong and verbally skilled politicians and a pronounced communication strategy – perfectly suited to striking the anti-political chords of the population (Jagers and Walgrave, 2003).
55-56 

The Oxford Handbook of populismOxford : Oxford University Press 2017

Jan-Werner Müller
Open mind https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BBVA-OpenMind-Jan-Werner-Muller-The-Rise-and-Rise-of-Populism-1.pdf

The recent crisis has had a major impact on the European economy. The EU-wide unemployment rate increased from 7 percent in 2007 to 11 percent in 2013. Unemployment dynamics have been uneven. After a short-lived spike in 2008–09, unemployment in Germany fell to pre- crisis levels; in Greece and Spain, it climbed above 20 percent. There has been substantial heterogeneity in unemployment dynamics within the EU periphery and core 310 old. The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism


The people are being fed up by the economic and social policies of the established parties and goverments

In an in eivoremnt where you want a simple, digest message across, these populist are perfect. The media is also helping. For example : Make America Great again.- there is n o substance hear , but we don't have time for substance thank you .

The peoples want reward ant they ,fell they don't get this to being a good citizen.

SERGEI GURIEV

ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU

EVGENIA PASSARI