https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui Questions en-us 2021-06-14 19:35:16 UTC 2021-07-06 11:18:11 UTC hello@padlet.com https://padlet.net/icons/png/1f4d6.png zacirving https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625593108 I really like you point that goal-related mind-wandering might not be task-related mind-wander (and so the task-switching objection might not work). I think that's right, actually, if we define tasks more precisely than in the psychological literature. Say a task is (something like) a goal that guides attention according to a task set. Then, the goals that our minds wander to are not tasks, because they don't guide attention. So I do think TUT can respond to the objection. But only if you adopt my view of mind-wandering as unguided attention. Then it would come out that TUT is necessary for mind-wandering, but this is a symptom of the fact that mind-wandering is unguided rather than the defining feature of midn-wandering.]]> 2021-06-25 15:56:44 UTC https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625593108 zacirving https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625601187 This is a really good objection. I define mind-wandering in terms of the processes (guidance) that TEND to produce meandering/wandering streams of consciousness. But I very much doubt that we can observe those processes directly. Rather, we just observe the typical symptoms of those processes (namely, meandering thought). So the best we can do is measure the typical symptom (e.g. using dynamic thought sampling) while knowing that this will be a somewhat noisy measure of mind-wandering. I'm not all that concerned with noise, since we have noise in most instruments. But it's definitely a concern.

Sidebar: there's a super deep philosophical objection about the nature of dispositions in the vicinity (the Shaup Conditional Fallacy). I talk about that in a forthcoming paper, but I doubt that the philosophical response will help with the empirical challenge.]]> 2021-06-25 16:03:39 UTC https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625601187 efemcarbonell https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625605099 The idea to cash out the notion of intention in term of tryings is interesting (in intentional cases I try to mind-wander by unfocusing, for example, in unintentional cases I don't try to do anything). I am wondering though, if it makes the view susceptible to the kind of worries in the philosophy of action literature against the postulation of "tryings". One alternative is to adopt a theory of trying without the need to postulate a separate category for tryings, like Ruben's counterfactual theory. ]]> 2021-06-25 16:07:17 UTC https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625605099 favolevf https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625630576 I didn't know that in the literature mind wandering wasn't classified as mental time travel (and viceversa), since for me i take mind wandering to have that feature. I wonder if regarding MW as MTT would also change what folks think about MW (re Zach's x-phi paper - NB: which i haven't read completely, so maybe the answer is there!). But i like your proposal Helgi! and very well experimental design there inspired by the philosophical literature!]]> 2021-06-25 16:27:10 UTC https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625630576 zacirving https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625655627 https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674063983&content=reviews

I'm sure you can find some good quotes from the book to say "hey look, I'm talking about really deep philosophy!" ]]> 2021-06-25 16:44:19 UTC https://padlet.com/jodierussell/f1i2eaeyhhpbchui/wish/1625655627