Your response is:

1. Paragraphs directly copied from your sources. One paragraph per source, and total of two sources are required. Make sure your copied paragraphs are relevant to the topic you chose.

2. Upload a link to a Youtube video you found to your post - make sure the video answers the topic you chose.

3. Write a 100-200 word reflection on how both paragraphs and the video elaborate on the topic you chose.

At the bottom of your response, cite your sources in the form of Title, Author, and URL address. Make sure to use reliable sources. 

Theme:

1. UN (United Nothing) - focus on the shortcomings and failures of UN Peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. Why was the UN so useless in Bosnia? 

Keywords: Srebrenica, UN, failure

2. American Leadership - focus on how the transition from President Bush Sr. to President Clinton shaped US policy in Bosnia. Why did Clinton become more active in intervening into Bosnia? 

Key phrases: Clinton interventionism, Clinton foreign policy Bosnia, Bush foreign policy Bosnia

3. Questionable Allies - focus on how US allies in Europe approached the question of peace in Bosnia, and how their different approach collided with American approach. 

Key phrases: French British foreign policy Bosnia, NATO slow decision Bosnia...

4. Choose your own angle, consult with me before pursuing your own angle on Bosnian War. 

Period: 3

Theme Number: 1

"DutchBat III, so called because it was the third of several Dutch Army contingents to serve as UN peacekeepers in the Srebrenica enclave, arrived in January 1995. The battalion was under-supplied, under-equipped and its superiors at the UN command in Sarajevo were unwilling to given it extensive support.

Its mandate was not clearly defined, and Dutch military officials had made no efforts to procure detailed information about what was going on in the Srebrenica area. All this created an impossible situation for the Dutch troops who were tasked with implementing their orders to watch over the UN-declared ‘safe zone’, which had been encircled by Bosnian Serb forces, without using force except for in self-defence."

‘It Was Hell’: Dutch Troops Recall Failure to Stop Srebrenica Deaths, Balkan Insight, Tom Brown, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/08/it-was-hell-dutch-troops-recall-failure-to-stop-srebrenica-deaths/

"''Through error, misjudgment and the inability to recognize the scope of evil confronting us we failed to do our part to save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder,'' a senior United Nations official said today, introducing the report. ''These failings were in part rooted in a philosophy of neutrality and nonviolence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia.''

''In particular,'' this official said, ''the report makes clear the inadequacy of the entire approach of the United Nations to the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing and mass murder, culminating at Srebrenica.''"

U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre, The New York Times, Barbara Corsette, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un-details-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html.

Reflection:

In the early 1990s, the United Nations' attempts to prevent violence in Bosnia, especially in Srebrenica, were marred by profound incompetence and ineffectiveness. DutchBat III, the Dutch Army contingent serving as UN peacekeepers in Srebrenica, was critically under-supplied and under-equipped, reflecting the UN command's reluctance in Sarajevo to provide necessary support. This battalion, arriving in January 1995, faced an undefined mandate and a lack of effort from Dutch military officials to understand the situation in Srebrenica, creating a dire scenario for the troops. Tasked with overseeing a UN-declared 'safe zone' surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces, they were instructed not to use force except in self-defense, effectively setting them up for failure. The UN's acknowledgment of its failure, as highlighted by a senior official, stems from a misguided adherence to neutrality and nonviolence, a stance ill-suited to the conflict's realities. This approach failed to address the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing and mass murder, culminating disastrously at Srebrenica, underscoring a comprehensive failure in the UN's strategy and execution.

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html#:~:text=United%20Nations%20peacekeeping%20officials%20were,and%E2%80%94without%20interference%20from%20U.N.

"The fall of the town of Srebrenica and its environs to Bosnian Serb forces in early July 1995 made a mockery of the international community’s professed commitment to safeguard regions it declared to be “safe areas” and placed under United Nations protection in 1993. United Nations peacekeeping officials were unwilling to heed requests for support from their own forces stationed within the enclave, thus allowing Bosnian Serb forces to easily overrun it and—without interference from U.N. soldiers—to carry out systematic, mass executions of hundreds, possibly thousands, of civilian men and boys and to terrorize, rape, beat, execute, rob and otherwise abuse civilians being deported from the area."

Why the United Nations Cannot Stop a Genocide

Cooper Scherr

https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=historical-perspectives#:~:text=In%20the%20aftermath%20of%20Bosnia,organizational%20will%20to%20fully%20intervene.

"Then, in 1992, the UN stationed a peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), in Bosnia so as to protect the civilian population from becoming casualties of the war. Finally, the UN continued to pursue a “negotiation process aimed at convincing the ‘warring parties’ to settle their differences.”2 These policies all failed to achieve the UN’s goal of establishing peace in the region, and if anything, allowed the Serbs to continue their campaign of genocide. For instance, the arms embargo “froze in place a gross imbalance in [Bosniak] and Serb military capacity” and left the Bosniaks “largely defenseless.”3 Thus, the blockade was “naïve and destructive… provid[ing] a major advantage to Serbian aggressors” and “play[ing] a key role in undermining the Bosnian state.'"

Reflection: As discovered throughout this lesson in addition to the allocated sources, the United Nations role in the Bosnian War was one of failed peacekeeping. Sanctions, threats, and international attention seemed to be to enough to stop physical conflict, though the UN was far from right. The duo-nationality established all the way back from Yugoslavia created bonds between ethnic groups so strong that their own interests outweighed everything else. Much like other genocides, the international hope to stop killing was all too late, placing the UN as an "ineffective" power to stop war. History repeated itself yet again, nations spoke out against being reserved when countries go to war, yet history is always due to strike again. After all of the controversy we still are left with the same question, how can we stop genocide?

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html#:~:text=United%20Nations%20peacekeeping%20officials%20were,and%E2%80%94without%20interference%20from%20U.N.

Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War: The U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the World Conference on Human Rights, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have all decried the atrocities in Bosnia-Hercegovina as genocide. Yet the international community has failed to fulfill its moral and legal duty to prevent genocide and to insist that those who commit acts of genocide, as well as those responsible for parallel war crimes and crimes against humanity, be brought to justice.

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ureca 

Reflection: The UN's inability to properly act and stop the horrors committed during the Bosnian War,most notably the massacre in Srebrenica, is highlighted in these paragraphs. Even after Srebrenica was designated as a "safe area" and put under UN protection, the UN peacekeeping forces were unable to stop Bosnian Serb forces from attacking, which allowed thousands of civilians to be massacred. A number of reasons contribute to the UN's failure in Bosnia, including poor decision-making and a reluctance to act upon calls for assistance from their own soldiers. Notwithstanding condemnations from a number of UN authorities, the international community has failed to stop genocide and prosecute those responsible, which highlights the UN's failures in carrying out its legal and moral mandates.Ultimately, the horrific losses incurred during the Bosnian War serve as a large reminder of the UN's failure to implement its policies and put an end to the violence, which resulted in great suffering and fatalities for many people.

Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War

By Iman Zekri

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ureca#:~:text=During%20the%20conflict%20in%20Bosnia,permitted%20the%20conflict%20to%20persist.

"...the UN declared the cities of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa as "safe areas" under UN safeguard (Brunborg, Torkild, and Urdal 2003, 235). Most of these UN declarations were ultimately unfulfilled promises that were not enforced and were frequently disobeyed by Serbian forces. It is apparent that the UN did not back up their claims with appropriate actions, but if the UN did use military force against the Bosnian Serbs for their transgressions, then the Serbs would have no choice but to surrender."

#2

Report: U.N. 'Appeased' and Unwittingly Aided Genocide
By Colum Lynch

https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/pmextra/nov99/15/unitednations.htm

"On July 6, 1995, as Bosnian Serb forces began a five-day assault on the town, senior U.N. commanders repeatedly rejected appeals from the Dutch peacekeeping force for NATO air support, while the U.N.'s local officer refused to release weapons to the Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves. When assistance finally came, it was "too little, too late," according to a U.N. cable. The blame for the fall of Srebrenica was not the U.N.'s alone, according to the report. It says the 15-nation U.N. Security Council, of which the United States is a member, was the chief architect of a policy that was doomed to fail from the start. The out-gunned, lightly armed Dutch peacekeepers also come under criticism for failing to fire on the town's besiegers or to warn of the enormous danger facing the enclave. And the major powers, including the United States, refused to provide intelligence on Serbian troop movements, the report says."

Reflection:

It seems as if the only reason that the United Nations sent peacekeepers to Bosnia was to ease pressure put on them by concerned individuals. It seems like there was not enough men committed, not enough arms distributed to help protect the Bosniaks, and no real effort to defend these zones when they were under attack by Serb forces. They also failed to provide the air support that they had said they would. The UN only really had their own interests and lives in mind and they could've easily put down the Serbian forces. The UN had enough munitions and arms to make the Serbian forces surrender. All around, this was just a huge fail on the United Nations part.

The Yugoslav conflict and European Community diplomacy, University of Luxemborg, (Khalil) https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/1f5d29d1-bc79-44af-ae41-6fdb3f41608e/9d5f248f-3b34-4e90-ad0e-8900503b2459

The Bosnian Serbs implemented their strategy with horrifying results. In July, Serb forces turned their focus to Srebrenica, a small village near the eastern border with Serbia swollen with some 60,000 Muslim refugees. It was there that the then-U.N. commander, French General Philippe Morillon, had two years earlier made the U.N.’s final stance, declaring at the time: “You are now under U.N. protection of the United Nations…. I will never abandon you.” Despite the U.N. flag flying over the enclave, the Bosnian Serb assault in July 1995 met no U.N. resistance either on the ground or from the air. Within 10 days, tens of thousands of Muslim refugees streamed into the Muslim-controlled city of Tuzla. Missing from the stream of refugees were more than 7,000 men of all ages, who had been executed in cold blood – mass murder on a scale not witnessed in Europe since the end of World War II.

Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended, Ivo H. Daalder, (Steven) https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/

Reflection:

The above sources described the UN's general position in the war: noncommittal. Generally, nations of the UN were resistant to doing anything more for the war than sending aid. Even the troops they sent to protect "safe zones" were more or less abandoned as soon as the enemy forces began to invade. Some countries, like the Netherlands, France, and Germany, were for intervening, but other countries' oppositions led to a lack of action. Even the planes they sent for bombings failed to commit fully, overall showing a resistance to commitment on the part of the UN.

The Yugoslav conflict and European Community diplomacy

In September, in an attempt to halt the fighting, the Netherlands Presidency of the European Community, supported by France and Germany, proposed sending a Western European Union (WEU) intervention force to the region, but the United Kingdom, backed by Denmark and Portugal, was opposed to any commitment of troops. The EEC Member States, unable to reach agreement on sending a European intervention force, called on the UN Security Council to intervene in November 1991. Moreover, France then called for a United Nations Emergency Force to be dispatched, but the Security Council did no more than impose an embargo on the supply of arms to Yugoslavia. However, its effect was to hamper the resistance efforts of the Croatians and the Bosnians against the Serbs, who were already extensively equipped.

Source 2: (Steven)

Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended - Ivo Daalder

The Bosnian Serbs implemented their strategy with horrifying results. In July, Serb forces turned their focus to Srebrenica, a small village near the eastern border with Serbia swollen with some 60,000 Muslim refugees. It was there that the then-U.N. commander, French General Philippe Morillon, had two years earlier made the U.N.’s final stance, declaring at the time: “You are now under U.N. protection of the United Nations…. I will never abandon you.” Despite the U.N. flag flying over the enclave, the Bosnian Serb assault in July 1995 met no U.N. resistance either on the ground or from the air. Within 10 days, tens of thousands of Muslim refugees streamed into the Muslim-controlled city of Tuzla. Missing from the stream of refugees were more than 7,000 men of all ages, who had been executed in cold blood – mass murder on a scale not witnessed in Europe since the end of World War II.

Reflection:

The Serbian invasion and massacre in Srebrenica was not properly addressed by both the UN and NATO. This is shown by NATO's failure to provide air support to the Dutch UN troops and also by the UN's failure to provide sufficient troops to defend their "Safe Zone". Source 1 says that "France then called for a United Nations Emergency Force to be dispatched" but it was never answered. This shows the UN's failure to commit to the "Safe Zone", and NATO's failure to send air support until well after the invasion had happened (and even then it was far too little, too late) shows how Bosnian allies failed to keep peace in Bosnia.

Source 1

https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=historical-perspectives#:~:text=In%20the%20aftermath%20of%20Bosnia,organizational%20will%20to%20fully%20intervene

In the aftermath of Bosnia and Rwanda, it was clear that the United Nations, as a slow, reactionary bureaucracy, failed to effectively combat the genocides. The UN’s approach to the genocides was ineffective because of its aversion to military confrontation and an overall lack of organizational will to fully intervene. This lack of will stemmed from the reluctance of UN member nations to contribute to peacekeeping operations, and thus, the UN could not exert any influence throughout the world while possessing such little influence over its own members. Therefore, the UN served as a scapegoat as human rights violations went unpunished, when in reality, as a cumbersome bureaucracy with 1 Scherr: Why the United Nations Cannot Stop Genocide Published by Scholar Commons, 2019 122 little support from its sovereign member states, it was in no position to be defending the world from such evil.

Source 2

https://apnews.com/article/forensics-the-holocaust-massacres-d36f211a4248538126a99267d464f59a

In July 1995, Bosnian Serbs overran a U.N.-protected safe haven in Srebrenica. They separated at least 8,000 Bosniak men and boys from their wives, mothers and sisters, chased them through woods around the eastern town and slaughtered them.

My sources support the idea that the UN was largely ineffective during this war becasue they all give different examples of either of what the UN should have done, or what they had failed to do. My first source describes how the UN failed to stop the genocide the second source describes how the UN could not keep its peacekeeping zones, and my youtube video gave a short overview of the UNs entire impact on the war.

"it declared to be “safe areas” and placed under United Nations protection in 1993. United Nations peacekeeping officials were unwilling to heed requests for support from their own forces stationed within the enclave, thus allowing Bosnian Serb forces to easily overrun it and—without interference from U.N. soldiers"

https://srebrenica.org.uk/what-happened/history/introduction-srebrenica

"By July 1995, only 400 lightly armed and poorly supplied Dutch peacekeepers remained in the town. When Serb forces launched a major offensive to take the town on 6^th July, the Dutch forces deployed requested NATO air strikes twice to halt the Serb advance. UN commanders repeatedly rejected the requests. On 11th July 1995, the request for bombing was finally approved but it was too little, too late. The enclave fell to Serb forces on the afternoon of 11th July 1995."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7LgFoYlw7E

Reflection:

The UN was useless against Serb attacks because it did not commit to defending the "safe areas" in Srebrenica. Only 400 Dutch soldiers were in Srebrenica, and their main goal was to keep peace. UN peacekeeping officials did not respond to calls for help from the soldiers. Eventually, the soldiers turned to NATO for help, but by the time it was approved in July 1995, it was too late. This failure led to the name "United Nothing" for the UN.

Theme: 1 

“It can be argued that the UN failed primarily because of domestic limitations within Bosnia rather than limitations within the UN structure. This argument indicates that the UN's ineffectiveness was not due to lack of preparation or inaction, but that the Serbs defiance and the UN's self-imposed obligation to act responsibly hindered its success. The UN is obligated to maintain some degree of neutrality and it cannot blatantly put peacekeepers in a situation of guaranteed harm or the international organization would suffer from a complete breakdown. There were pressures from other nations and high expectations from the international community to protect the peacekeepers, but also to fix the problem in Bosnia. Although the UN's undertakings were undoubtedly not enough, it is crucial to point out these conflicting demands of the international community. It was impossible for the UN to meet one of these expectations without sacrificing the other. The UN was expected to stop the violence, but numerous countries expected their citizens within the peacekeeping forces to be looked after.”

Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War, Iman Zekri 

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ureca#:~:text=The%20case%20of%20the%20UN,individuals%27%20needs%20were%20not%20satisfied

“As the war progressed, the UN sent in additional troops to combine their forces with the existing troops supervising the ongoing relief operations. However, there was an absence of blueprints according to which the UN peacekeepers could carry out a clear mandate. The mandate was marred by those who contributed troops but wanted to put forth a limited mandate and those who wanted a bold mandate but refused to contribute troops to aid the matter. Moreover, to maintain their neutrality, the peacekeepers left the Bosniaks to be dealt a devastating blow at the hands of the formidable Serbs. There were numerous peace plans which were proposed before the Dayton Accords (1995) came into being, including Carrington-Cutileiro, Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenburg, and Contact Group. Nevertheless, the UN failed to rally around any one of them and take decisive actions to ensure its implementation.” 

An Avoidable Fallout: A Case Study of the UN’s Failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Saman Ayesha Kidwai 

https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=0&ContentID=8934#

Reflection

During the Bosnian War, the UN failed miserably when it came to protecting the “safe zones,” leading to the massacre of thousands of innocent people. They deployed a small number of troops to Srebrenica who were lightly armed and ill-equipped to go against the forces of Serbia. It is argued that a reason for the UN’s failure is the limitations for not being able to put their peacekeepers in immediate danger and also having to uphold their neutrality. They had to protect their peacekeeping soldiers while also expected to stop the violence, which left them in a position that they could not do one without sacrificing the other. 

Reflection

Based on the provided context, the investigation will evaluate the UN's structure and domestic limitations in Bosnia during the Bosnian War to determine their role in the outcome of the UN operation. The success of the UN peacekeeping mission in this case will be assessed based on criteria such as strong leadership, de-escalation of the situation, and meeting the needs of afflicted individuals. Conversely, failure will be determined by factors like weak leadership, escalation of the situation, and unmet needs of those affected. Additionally, the UNHCR's effectiveness in managing worldwide refugee challenges and providing humanitarian aid will be examined. The UNHCR's mandate is to protect refugees and ensure their right to seek asylum in another country. This paper will focus on evaluating the UN's performance as a peacekeeping organization during the Bosnian War, arguing that it was ineffective in this role.

Paragraph 2

The most constant refrain from the media on the effectiveness of the UN in the former Yugoslavia has been that the UN failed. This is a view echoed by a number of witnesses before the Committee. The view of the Bosnian community in Australia was emphatic that 'the UN failed in its fundamental role to protect international law, basic human rights and the sovereignty of the state. ... [and] while promising Bosnian civilians a kind of doubtful protection ... the UN, through the arms embargo, denied a fundamental right of 5 human beings and of the state to defend themselves against an aggressor.' the Victorian Foundation for the Survivors of Torture, Mr Aristotle reported to the Committee:

Reflection

The prevailing sentiment in the media and among witnesses is that the UN failed in its mission in the former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian community in Australia strongly believes that the UN did not fulfill its duty to uphold international law, basic human rights, and state sovereignty. The arms embargo imposed by the UN was seen as denying Bosnian civilians and the state the right to defend themselves against aggression. Mr. Aristotle from the Victorian Foundation for the Survivors of Torture reiterated this view to the Committee.

"As early as 1992, the UN had recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign nation-state.[3] However, when the Croatian and Serb proxies were ambushing the Bosniaks from all corners, it failed to condemn both Serbia and Croatia as aggressors in the war. A parallel between the Bosnian war and Kuwait’s invasion could be drawn. Unlike the latter case, wherein the UN invoked Chapter VII and condemned Iraq as the aggressor state under resolution 678, the former perhaps was not even a blip on its radar.[4] As the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) community was being shelled and raped, and the fundamental values of its inception were being violated, the UN failed to immediately deploy an Emergency Peacekeeping Force to the country to halt the ongoing carnage. It found itself unable to secure a lasting ceasefire between the two major warring parties, i.e., the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks."

"An avoidable fallout: A case study of the UN’s failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina"

https://ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=0&ContentID=8934

"The UN learned the hard way in Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia that where the UN wants peace more than those in conflict, then the illusion of peacekeeping can perpetuate instability and cost lives.

Out of the disasters of the 1990s came a new model including an ethos of “responsibility to protect”. No longer would UN forces stand idly by while innocent people were murdered. That has helped drive a rapid expansion of peacekeeping to become the UN’s single largest operation.

In 1991, the year the Soviet Union collapsed, the peacekeeping budget was just $490m. Over the past decade it has leapt from $3.8bn to about $9bn as the size and length of missions has expanded. More than 100,000 UN peacekeepers have served in Haiti since 2004 and close to 250,000 been deployed to the DRC over the past 15 years. There is little prospect of either mission ending soon."

"Whats the point of peacekeepers when they don't keep peace

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia

Reflection:

The Bosnian War showed us how the UN struggled to keep things peaceful. Even though Bosnia was recognized as its own country, the UN didn't really step in to stop the fighting or protect regular people, especially the Bosniaks who were really suffering. It seemed like they didn't care as much about what was happening there compared to other places where they got involved. Even though they spent a bunch of money and sent out a lot of soldiers, they still didn't really keep their promise to keep everyone safe. This war taught us that the UN needs to change how they do things so they can actually help in future wars and stop more innocent people from getting hurt. Maybe they need to figure out better ways to solve conflicts and make sure they act fairly and quickly to protect people who need it most. It's important for the UN to learn from what happened in Bosnia so they can do better next time and make a real difference in keeping peace around the world.

"A parallel between the Bosnian war and Kuwait’s invasion could be drawn. Unlike the latter case, wherein the UN invoked Chapter VII and condemned Iraq as the aggressor state under resolution 678, the former perhaps was not even a blip on its radar.[4] As the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) community was being shelled and raped, and the fundamental values of its inception were being violated, the UN failed to immediately deploy an Emergency Peacekeeping Force to the country to halt the ongoing carnage. It found itself unable to secure a lasting ceasefire between the two major warring parties, i.e., the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks."

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ureca#:~:text=The%20case%20of%20the%20UN,individuals'%20needs%20were%20not%20satisfied.

Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War

by:Iman Zekri
"This case of the UN peacekeeping mission will be considered a success if there was 1) strong leadership, 2) the situation was deescalated, and 3) the afflicted individuals' needs were satisfied. Similarly, this case of the UN peacekeeping mission will be considered a failure if there was 1) weak leadership, 2) the situation remained the same or escalated, and 3) the afflicted individuals' needs were not satisfied."

"The UN is obligated to maintain some degree of neutrality and it cannot blatantly put peacekeepers in a situation of guaranteed harm or the international organization would suffer from a complete breakdown. There were pressures from other nations and high expectations from the international community to protect the peacekeepers, but also to fix the problem in Bosnia. Although the UN's undertakings were undoubtedly not enough, it is crucial to point out these conflicting demands of the international community. It was impossible for the UN to meet one of these expectations without sacrificing the other. The UN was expected to stop the violence, but numerous countries expected their citizens within the peacekeeping forces to be looked after."

Reflection:

the united nation failed to take a fast response to the violence happening in Bosnia let the war claim more lives and let the situation worsen. this choice to due so was to keep international neutrality. but the peace keeping mission to gain a cease fire were all relatively failures as they were not able to last long nor to be followed. UN inaction was due to wanting to stay neutral which led to the lack of force needed to secure ceasefire to stop war making their efforts useless and leading the Bosniak people to give the UN nickname of United nothing as their impact on the war was very little due to their effort to stay neutral during the war.

Period: 1

Theme Number 1:

Source 1: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html

"The fall of the town of Srebrenica and its environs to Bosnian Serb forces in early July 1995 made a mockery of the international community’s professed commitment to safeguard regions it declared to be “safe areas” and placed under United Nations protection in 1993. United Nations peacekeeping officials were unwilling to heed requests for support from their own forces stationed within the enclave, thus allowing Bosnian Serb forces to easily overrun it and—without interference from U.N. soldiers—to carry out systematic, mass executions of hundreds, possibly thousands, of civilian men and boys and to terrorize, rape, beat, execute, rob and otherwise abuse civilians being deported from the area."

Source 2: https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/bosnian-genocide/

"As soon as the war broke out in Bosnia in 1992, the leadership of Bosnia appealed to the United Nations to help but they refused, and Serbs went from town to town to execute boys and men. Hundreds of women were raped and placed in concentration camps. Resolutions after resolutions were passed in the UN, condemning the onslaught by the Serb forces, but the most powerful member states of the UN did nothing. A ray of hope emerged for Bosnians when on March 12th, 1993, General Philippe Morillon, the UN peacekeeping commander in Bosnia, brought long-awaited medical aid, food, and protection. With a plethora of refugees, General Morillon instantly realized that it would be harder to leave Srebenica the same night as they had planned."

Video: "How the UN Failed to Stop a Genocide in Bosnia":

https://www.facebook.com/JohnnyHarrisVox/videos/how-the-un-failed-to-stop-a-genocide-in-bosnia/1650416158731243/

Reflection:

The Bosnian Genocide occurred during the Bosnian War, which lasted from 1992 to 1995. The provided paragraphs and video shed light on the tragic events of the Bosnian genocide and the failure of the international community, particularly the United Nations, to prevent it. They illustrate the betrayal of trust by the UN in safeguarding "safe areas" like Srebrenica, which were declared under their protection. Despite numerous appeals for help, UN peacekeeping officials failed to provide adequate support, allowing Bosnian Serb forces to commit atrocities with impunity. The accounts highlight the systematic nature of the violence, including mass executions, rape, and the establishment of concentration camps. During the Bosnian War, the United Nations Security Council established "safe areas" within Bosnia and Herzegovina to protect civilians from the conflict. These safe areas were meant to provide refuge for civilians fleeing the violence and were designated as areas where UN peacekeeping forces would be deployed to ensure the safety of the population. Srebrenica was one such safe area, along with other towns like Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Sarajevo. However, the effectiveness of these safe zones was severely compromised by a lack of robust international intervention and enforcement mechanisms. Despite being declared safe areas, many of these zones, including Srebrenica, faced attacks and atrocities.

"The fall of the town of Srebrenica and its environs to Bosnian Serb forces in early July 1995 made a mockery of the international community’s professed commitment to safeguard regions it declared to be “safe areas” and placed under United Nations protection in 1993. United Nations peacekeeping officials were unwilling to heed requests for support from their own forces stationed within the enclave, thus allowing Bosnian Serb forces to easily overrun it and—without interference from U.N. soldiers—to carry out systematic, mass executions of hundreds, possibly thousands, of civilian men and boys and to terrorize, rape, beat, execute, rob and otherwise abuse civilians being deported from the area."

Source 2: Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War, Iman Zekri, Florida Gulf Coast University. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ureca

"The primary arguments in this analysis include: the UN was ineffective in the conflict in Bosnia since it failed to end the bloodshed; the UN was most limited by domestic factors in Bosnia (the situation on the ground) rather than factors within the UN structure; the UNHCR was the only effective UN agency during the conflict; and the tragic losses during the Bosnian War could have been prevented or greatly reduced if the UN had effectively enforced its strategies. The failure of the United Nations in Bosnia is evident due to its inability to successfully stop the violence before the death toll escalated to 200,000."

Reflection: The UN was ineffective in stopping the bloodshed in Bosnia, causing more people to die and the violence to continue. the UN were supposed to serve as peacekeepers in the genocide, and to stop if from continuing. However, the international community failed to fulfill its moral and legal duty to prevent genocide and to insist that those who commit acts of genocide, as well as those responsible for parallel war crimes and crimes against humanity, should be punished. The UN allowed Bosnian and Serb forces to take over their power and allowed them to execute large groups of people. If the UN had stepped in and help their power, they would have been able save citizens, and cut off the fighting before it turned to a genocide. The Dutch army was in need of assistance and more supplies in order to continue fighting, but the UN did nothing about it and did not assist them.

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html#:~:text=United%20Nations%20peacekeeping%20officials%20were,and%E2%80%94without%20interference%20from%20U.N.

Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War: The U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the World Conference on Human Rights, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have all decried the atrocities in Bosnia-Hercegovina as genocide. Yet the international community has failed to fulfill its moral and legal duty to prevent genocide and to insist that those who commit acts of genocide, as well as those responsible for parallel war crimes and crimes against humanity, be brought to justice.

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ureca 

Reflection: During the conflict with Bosnia, the UN was ineffective at protecting the citizens of Bosnia and preventing bloodshed. As the violence in Bosnia was considered a genocide, the International community failed in their duty, a legal and moral obligation, to create peace and negate any type of genocidal action. Even though the UN stabilized Bosnia-Herezogovina's political system after the war, they failed to intervene in the violence and killing of Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats. The UNHCR was the only part of the UN system that truly impacted the conflict, as it can be argued that the UN was primarily limited by domestic reasons within Bosnia. Instead of lack of preparation and inaction, the UN was ineffective by the obligation to act in a responsible manner and the Serbians defiance of their involvement. The UN had an obligation to act in a way that maintains neutrality, creating peace in a situation of conflict, and also could not put peacekeepers in a position of possible harm, which is extremely difficult to successfully accomplish, especially with high expectations from other international communities.  

UN-Untied Nothing

Source: 

#1 

Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War

#2

Bosnia - United Nations Attempt To Bring Peace

#3 

Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping

#1

“.......Similarly, this case of the UN peacekeeping mission will be considered a failure if there was 1) weak leadership, 2) the situation remained the same or escalated, and 3) the afflicted individuals' needs were not satisfied. ……..The UNHCR will also be examined to assess its success or failure in managing worldwide refugee challenges and providing humanitarian aid…..”

#3

“… We report on the mishandling of the crisis by the U.N.’s Bosnia peacekeeping force UNPROFOR/UNPF—from the craven decisions of its field commanders prior to the fall of Srebrenica, to its apparent suppression and destruction of evidence of massive human rights abuses immediately after the fall of the “safe area.” We also report on the Dutch Defense Ministry’s “mislaying” of a crucial list of missing Bosnian men and boys and its destruction of a video tape showing Bosnian Serb soldiers engaged in extrajudicial executions as Dutch U.N. troops looked on…”

The ineffectiveness of the U.N. 's peacekeeping mission in Bosnia allowed for the tragic deaths and bloodshed of thousands. Factors such as “1) weak leadership, 2) the situation remained the same or escalated, and 3) the afflicted individuals' needs were not satisfied”, Furthermore, the situation in Bosnia remained volatile and even escalated despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. This failure to bring about meaningful change and stabilize the region exacerbated the suffering of civilians. Instead of providing a respite from violence, the safe zones became synonymous with ongoing conflict and insecurity. The inability of the UN to effectively address the underlying causes of the conflict and bring about lasting peace allowed violence to persist, leading to tragic consequences for innocent civilians caught in the crossfire.

Sources:

• Bosnia - United Nations Attempt To Bring Peace, AP Archive, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWilyCLFrTE2

• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: An Analysis on the Role of the United Nations during the Bosnian War, Iman Zekri, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ureca#:~:text=Although%20the%20UN%20did%20not,(Crisp%202001%2C%20174).

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping, Human Rights Watch, Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping

Theme: 1

“As early as 1992, the UN had recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign nation-state.[3] However, when the Croatian and Serb proxies were ambushing the Bosniaks from all corners, it failed to condemn both Serbia and Croatia as aggressors in the war. Unlike the latter case, wherein the UN invoked Chapter VII and condemned Iraq as the aggressor state under resolution 678, the former perhaps was not even a blip on its radar.[4] As the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) community was being shelled and raped, and the fundamental values of its inception were being violated, the UN failed to immediately deploy an Emergency Peacekeeping Force to the country to halt the ongoing carnage. It found itself unable to secure a lasting ceasefire between the two major warring parties, i.e., the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks.”

An avoidable fallout: A case study of the UN’s failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina, International Affairs Forum, https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=0&ContentID=8934

“As soon as the war broke out in Bosnia in 1992, the leadership of Bosnia appealed to the United Nations to help but they refused, and Serbs went from town to town to execute boys and men. Hundreds of women were raped and placed in concentration camps. Resolutions after resolutions were passed in the UN, condemning the onslaught by the Serb forces, but the most powerful member states of the UN did nothing.”

The Bosnian Genocide: The UN’s Ultimite Faluire, Mahnoor Najeeb, 

https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/bosnian-genocide/

Reflection:

In general, many people were able to recognize that the UN was not successful in the peacekeeping in Bosnia. In their defense, as seen in the video, they stated that the people of Bosnia didn’t respect the ceasefire, like many other countries that they DID have success in peacekeeping. If the ceasefire can’t be respected, then nothing could be done to help maintain any peace. When looked at from a different point of view, the United Nations did nothing to help attacks on Bosnia. Even after the Bosniak community was bombed and rapped, they hesitated in sending their Emergency Peacekeeping Force to help. Also, when the leader of Bosnia went to the UN for help, they refused, so because of that, the Serbs were able to execute thousands of people. All in all, even though the United Nations made a solid argument, it still doesn’t explain why they refused to help prior to the conflict.

Source 1:

“The Clinton White House seems so intoxicated by the prospects for success that they have effectively ignored the risks. The economy is in good shape; Clinton is riding high in the polls, and his GOP challengers are increasingly unpopular. The White House seems to think a foreign-policy triumph in Bosnia will seal Clinton’s reelection. If things go well in Bosnia, Clinton will look decisive and strong. Lingering doubts among the electorate about his character and courage will be put to rest. He will be well-placed not only to win reelection in 1996, but to stand up against what looks to be a near-permanent GOP majority in Congress during his second term.”

Mead, W. R. (1995, November 26). DIPLOMACY: Clinton Bets His Presidency on Bosnian Peace. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-11-26-op-7462-story.html

Source 2:

“The Clinton administration was weakened by the image of an America unwilling to use its power to end the terror, rape, torture and killing that seared Bosnia. Anthony Lake, Clinton's national security adviser, said in an interview that the war "became a symbol of our foreign policy as a whole." A series of outside events in mid-1995 finally pushed Clinton to act. Chirac was pressing for a more aggressive policy against the Serbs. The capture of the Bosnian Muslim towns of Srebrenica and Zepa had undermined the credibility of NATO.”

Sciolino, E. (1996, July29). Bosnia Policy: Shaped by U.S. Military Role. New York Times Archive. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/politics/0729clinton-bosnia.html

Source 3 (video):

“‘The United States has interests at stake in Bosnia -- an interest in helping to stop the slaughter of innocents, an interest in helping to prevent a wider war in Europe, an interest in maintaining NATO as a credible force for peace in the post-Cold War era, and in helping to stem the flow of refugees. These interests justify continued American leadership and require us to maintain a steady purpose, knowing that there will be difficulties and setbacks and that in this world, where we have a set of cooperative arrangements not only with NATO but with the United Nations, there will often be delays that would not be there were we acting alone or in a context in which our security were more immediately threatened.’”

C-SPAN. (1994, April 20). Conflict in Former Yugoslavia. C-SPAN. https://www.c-span.org/video/?56230-1/conflict-yugoslavia

Reflection:

The result of the transition from President Bush to President Clinton was a shift in US Policy towards Bosnia. Clinton’s decision to actively intervene was driven by many different factors. Also, the way Clinton handled the situation was very different from Bush who was usually very cautious; he was more proactive and cared about the public’s opinion. The pressure on him nationally and internationally was one reason Clinton seemed to push very hard to intervene in Bosnia later on in the war. Clinton was determined to secure a “foreign-policy triumph” (source 1) to ensure his reelection. He wanted to make peace in Bosnia to make him look like a capable leader and President of the US. Furthermore, as mentioned in Source 2, the Clinton administration’s image was very important to him as well. Clinton did not want the public to think his administration was ignoring the tortures and killings happening in Bosnia. So, he was still focused on America’s credibility and image. Also, in Source 3, Clinton mentions in a speech regarding the former Yugoslavia that “prevent[ing] a wider war in Europe” was also one of their interests. Aside from maintaining stability in Europe, stopping the deaths of thousands of innocent people in Bosnia and upholding NATO’s credibility were also stated as reasons for the change in policy making towards the whole situation. In conclusion, Clinton’s decisive intervention into Bosnia was a combination of protecting human rights, preventing further war in Europe, and keeping up American leadership; it had shaped and influenced US policy by increasing the amount of times the US stepped into international conflicts or wars. It had set a precedent and created a certain mindset that supported more proactive policies and stances towards international issues.