CONCLUSION:
Ultimately, the Court found that many rights had been violated in addition to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the transfer of the applicant from the respondent State’s territory despite the existence of a real risk that he could face a flagrant denial of justice.
MY OPINION:
I agree that this was a violation of the applicant's Article 6 right under the Convention because of the known risk that he could be treated unfairly.

RKH: This is a great case to pick to consider and can be compared to the Othman case in the UK. Your summary is good, but it would probably helpful to look at other academic opinions to develop your own critique. Just because there is a risk that someone could be treated unfairly, does this necessarily mean they can't be deported? This doesn't necessarily follow, as was evident from all of the debate surrounding these cases. 

 

It is a complex case which involve many rights of ECHR. So I would like to introduce part of facts about this case, which are relevant to Art.6 right to a fair trial. 

Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell were the prisoners who were believed by the authorities to form part of, or to be connected with, Irish Republican Army terrorist activities and were guilty by various offences. Although they consistently denied they had conncetion with IRA.  

Then they engaged in a protest in the prison. After that, the Prison Board of Visitors of disciplinary held a disciplinary proceeding against Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell privately.

Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell, therefore, they alleged that this kind of non-public proceeding is a violation of Article 6. They believe that a fair trial should include both public hearing and public judgment.

However, the Board insisted that it is reasonable to hold the proceeding privately for public order, national security and judicial interest.

2. CONCLUSION

If proceedings were held outside, similar problems would arise as regards the prisoner’s transportation to and attendance at the hearing. To require that disciplinary proceedings concerning convicted prisoners should be held in public would impose a disproportionate burden on the authorities of the State. The Court therefore accepts that there were sufficient reasons of public order and security justifying the exclusion of the press and public from the proceedings against Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell. There was accordingly no violation of Article 6 para. 1 in this respect. 

3. MY OPINION

It might be reasonable and acceptable for the Board to hold privately and support by the judges. In my opinion, however, whether it is the board or the judge, their arguments and reasoning process are not convincing. Especially for this judgment, it only said that requiring a public proceedings would impose a disproportionate burden on the authorities of the State. But how? And is it relevant to principle of public hearing? Not seen. 

In the end, I would like to quote the dissenting judges’ opinion: 

“It was of course for the Government to show that the circumstances were such as to justify recourse to one of those exceptions. However, the Government (followed in this by the majority of the Chamber in paragraph 87 of the judgment) relied on the general nature of Board of Visitors’ proceedings and on the general practice and, although Mr. Campbell was stated to be a "category A" prisoner, the Government adduced no evidence to show that the absence of publicity of proceedings was in his specific case warranted by Article 6 (art. 6) as coming within the permitted exceptions. ”

RKH: This is a great summary of the case and I think your perspective on it is really important and interesting. This case is really interesting in the extent to which judges disagree with each other (note multiple dissents) over several issues - three judges felt Article 6 was not applicable at all (it is interesting to compare the case to Engel in this regard and think about whether you think these are criminal proceedings or whether you agree with the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Vilhjalmsson and Golcuklu and the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Vincent Evans). This means it is really interesting to look at the dissenting judgments as you have done. It may be interesting to think more about the dissent, which doesn't suggest that the proceedings couldn't have been held in private, but just that the government needed to provide further justifications for doing so. Think about how much the government should have to justify all decisions if this is the case - should the ECtHR be policing Parliament this closely?

 

Perinçek, a Turkish politician, during his visits to Switzerland, repeatedly called the Armenian Genocide of 1915 a "great international lie". But he later clarified that there had been massacres, but reiterated his belief that these did not constitute genocide. He was then found guilty of racial discrimination by a Swiss district court. After appealing,  the Swiss Federal Court confirmed the original judgement. Perinçek then appealed to the ECtHR, alleging that his conviction violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. 

2. CONCLUSIONS 

The court considered: 

Firstly, Nature of Perinçek’s statements. The Court concluded that while his remarks “were virulent and that his position was intransigent, but it should be recognized that they apparently included an element of exaggeration as they sought to attract attention.” [para. 239] 
Secondly,  the Court held that it is difficult to assert that “any hostility that exists towards the Armenian minority in Turkey is the product of his statements in Switzerland or that his criminal conviction in Switzerland protected that minority’s rights in any real way or made it feel safer.” [para. 246] With regard to time factor, the Court held: “Whereas events of relatively recent vintage may be so traumatic as to warrant, for a period of time, an enhanced degree of regulation of statements relating to them, the need for such regulation is bound to recede with the passage of time.” 
Then the court considered the extent to which the statements affected the rights of Armenians,  existence or lack of consensus among the States parties to the Convention and severity of the interference.
Finally, the Court concluded that the Swiss government’s interference with Perinçek’s right to freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society. As a result, it found the government in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
3. MY OPINION
Leave Mr. P’s politician identity aside.

The key issue here is the fact of the massacres. If the court does not identify the massacres as genocide, then perhaps Mr. P’s remarks can be protected by freedom of expression. The court was tricky, it avoided to discuss and did not answer whether the massacre could be characterised as genocide. However, the reality is that even if the court did not answer this question, the 29 countries in the world have officially recognized this massacre as genocide. The UN Sub-commission On Prevention of Discrimination And Protection of Minorities also gave a positive answer to this question.

Therefore, the logic of the judgment may be understandable if we consider on the previous elements. But if you do not answer the question of the determination of genocide, it will be difficult to convince the majority, also it will easily lead people to think that the court is timid which just like the dissenting judges wrote.