From the social perspective: Bees will be allocated to different teams and each team will have their own area. To mitigate for differences between the quality as well as quantity of honey in each area, teams will rotate across different areas. The best team will be awarded and have to share their ideas in exchange. One potential consequence would be the free rider issue.   

From mental models: There are different types of bees. For example, one type of bee may prefer to carry a large amount of honey per trip at less trip amounts. However, another type of bee may prefer to carry a smaller amount but visits flowers more often. We need to ensure the performance system above can cover for both types of bees.

To design an effective system, we must consider different bee archetypes:

The Efficient Worker: Fast, high honey yield, follows rules (Goal-oriented, ethics prevails)

The Cheater: Steals honey, sabotages others, exploits loopholes. (Focus on individual perforemance/contribution, accept unethical behavior)

The Innovator: Finds new flower patches, optimizes routes(focuses on individual work efficiency collecting honey with the shortest time)

The Team Player/Leader: Shares knowledge, helps weaker bees. Also, leader would carry teammate to collect honey. 

The Burnout Bee: Overworks, then declines in productivity. (Performance more important than personal feelings/body status)

2. Problem:

Rating performance based on flowers visited is not an accurate representation of productivity. Meanwhile, measuring total honey produced is a good representation of performance, albeit such performance can be achieved unethically by killing other bees.

3. Goal:

Develop a performance evaluation system that can solve this problem:

• Encourage efficient honey collection

• Discourage unethical behaviour

4.Solution (system)

Set the rule

• Weighted Scoring (A performance matrix), include:

• Honey collected

• Flowers visited per trip

• Ethical behaviour

Bais target>should be around 50 flower

if they met the KPI, they would get a honey bonus of about 20%

Monitoring

team leader bee should make sure teammate have to the “Right Thing”, with means

back to the bee house and not kill the bee. 

The bear needs to monitor which bees are or aren’t visiting flowers and collecting honey.

Peer evaluation:

• Bees can evaluate each other, and individuals who have poor performance might face punishments, it could also avoid unfairness between bees. For bees who have minimal output

Reporting system:

• If a bee sees another bee killing another bee, the bee can report the killer bee to the higherup bee. Other unethical behaviors like stealing honey from others will still count.

• The reporting bee will receive a small bonus like 1% extra honey salary reward for each successful report

Penalties

- Honey deduction → execution is repeated offense

1 time limit

2 limited flower

measurement

1) long term group performance

2) peer evaluation to prevent freerider

3) distance flew

Mental model

Focusing sustainability, (preventing no. of bee decline which limited sustainability in long term)

Prevention of freerider

Limited chance of harming other group

Summary

1. Integration of process and outcome orientation： focusing on both number of flowers visited and honey brought back

2. Increase the cost of counterproductive work behaviour (unethical behaviours in production such as killing other bees). For example, impose performance deduction to those conducting Counterproductive work behaviour.

   implement a reporting channel for bees to report CWB.

3. Incentivise organizational citizenship behaviour（helping other bees or voluntarily bring back more honey than target. give additional benefits to those performing Organizational citizenship behaviour.

4. Hire external agents/supervisors to identify and ocb and cwb. Introduce in-group rating to identify the quality of collaboration of each bee.

5. Introduce group performance: reward the group which has high performance.

   
   

• Since the company owns their parking spaces, they can raise the parking fee by around 50%more than the current level to further discourage employees from driving.

• This will be effective as employees will either think using public transport is more cost-effective, or that it is not worth putting the extra effort to walk to the company premise by parking at a cheaper car park that is far away

• Another pricing method is implementing a tiered pricing system where frequent drivers pay significantly more. For example, employees can only park cars 2 days a week at normal prices. If they park more than 2 days a week, they will have to pay 25% more parking fee, then 50% for the 4th day, then 75% for the 5th time parking that week. Then 100% higher rent for 6th and 7th parking day.

Tiered Incentive Structure

Base incentive: $2 per employee for the first 600 employees who use public transportation, instead of $3

• Cost for 600 employees: 600 × $2 = $1200.

• Remaining budget: $1500 - $1200 = $300.

  • Less budget is needed 

  • OR Distribute the remaining $300 as a lottery or bonus to participants (e.g., a $30 daily raffle for 10 random participants who used public transportation).

    • Bonus can be in Cash or

    • Points to redeem coffee/snacks in the company cafe or canteen

Implementing a Reward System

Offer a lottery or points-based reward system where employees who take public transport get a chance to win gift cards, extra paid leave, lunch fee, all within the $1500 budget

Benefits:

* Increased Convenience: Traveling outside of rush hours reduces crowding and stress, making public transit more attractive.

* Cost-Neutral: This policy requires no additional funding, aligning with the Foundation’s goal of encouraging behavior change without added expense.

* Higher Participation: Employees who value schedule flexibility may be more inclined to shift from driving to public transit when given control over their commute times.

Furthermore, employees could earn points for each day using public transportation. Points can be redeemed for rewards (e.g., gift cards, additional vacation days, supermarket coupon, )

Prerequisite: We only target those who own the car based on the hr survey

Policy 1:  Tiered subsidies based on distance 

• Offer tiered subsidies based on the distance employees travel (e.g., those who live further from work would receive a larger subsidy for public transportation.

  • Tiers

    • $2.00 for those who live further

    • $0.5 who lives closer

• This could make public transportation more attractive to employees who would otherwise find it too expensive or inconvenient to commute via public transit

• This solution may increase participation from employees with longer commutes, potentially leading to a higher participation rate without increasing subsidy costs

• 300 high-need employees and 400 low-need at $0.50 = 600+200 = $800/day.

Policy 2: Two-level rewards

• For those who have developed their habit of taking public transport, grant them $1 per day only. 

• For employees who drove, increase the incentive to $4 to shift their mode of transport.

• This reward could incentivize more employees to switch to public transportation, especially if they perceive the reward as valuable

• 100 employees who used to drive 

• 300 employee who might shift their mode of transport

• 4 100 + 300 1 = 400+300 = $700/day.

Alternative thoughts: to use the same $1500 but cover more switchers. (Instead of $3, offer a lower subsidy to cover more switchers), but this may not be as effective as the previous two.

Another post for after intervention

1. Replace "If-Then" with "Now-That" Rewards:

Replace the 200 RMB support incentive with unexpected team bonuses for hitting goals.

2. Adjust Pay Structure:

Shift from 50-50 individual/team pay to 30% individual, 70% team to prioritize collective outcomes.

3. Peer Recognition:

Introduce non-monetary rewards (e.g., "Helper of the Month" awards) voted by peers.

Capped Individual Pay + Support Incentives

• Eliminates Bottlenecks: Capping individual output prevents "speed demons" from disrupting flow, while support pay ensures workers fill gaps.

• Rewards Collaboration: Support behaviors are explicitly valued, not penalized.

Reward System Design:

The reward system should balance individual and team-based pay to align personal incentives with team goals.

Encouraging Collaboration:

Mechanisms (like freerider reporting) can encourage individuals to support their teammates, reducing bottlenecks and improving overall productivity.

Monitoring and Feedback:

Regularly monitoring individual and team productivity can help identify bottlenecks and freeriders, ensuring fair and effective collaboration.

—reporting freeriders—addresses the issue of individuals who focus solely on their own productivity while neglecting team support. By penalizing freeriders:

It discourages individuals from exploiting the system for personal gain.

It incentivizes collaboration, as individuals are held accountable for their contributions to team productivity.

Explanation of Dynamics

Trade-Off Between Individual and Team Goals:

The diagram highlights a conflict between focusing on individual productivity (to maximize personal pay) and supporting team members (to improve collective productivity). Spending too much time helping others may reduce individual pay, creating a disincentive to collaborate.

Impact of Bottlenecks:

Bottlenecks occur when downstream workers face delays or inefficiencies, often due to a lack of support from others. This can lead to a vicious cycle where bottlenecks force individuals to focus on their own tasks, further reducing collaboration.

Systemic Challenges:

The system rewards individual productivity with pay, but this can discourage teamwork, creating a misalignment between individual and team goals. Over time, this can harm the overall productivity of the group.

Intervention:

Reporting system for freeriders:

•⁠ ⁠Freeriders can be reported by team members. After getting reported, a third party, such as the HRM department can individually conduct investigations (with the help of the production team leader) on that reported individual's actual production. When that person is confirmed to be a freerider, they will have their team-based pay slashed based on a predetermined fomula. This can deter individual workers from freeriding on other's hard work since the system has high transparency and credibility from the independent and authoritative review.

1. A’s Activity: Individual output from worker A, focusing on their own tasks.

2. Total Activity: The combined output of both worker A and worker B.

3. B’s Activity: Individual output from worker B, focusing on their own tasks.

4. Gain per Individual Activity: The reward each worker receives based on their individual output.

5. Net Gains for A: A's net financial gain from their individual work output and performance-based pay.

6. Net Gains for B: B's net financial gain from their individual work output and performance-based pay.

7. Resource Limit: The limit of resources (such as time, energy, and materials) that can be used by workers in the factory.

8. Team Activity: Minimal cooperation between workers, as the pay-for-performance system incentivizes individuals rather than teams.

9. Team Pay: 50% of total pay is based on team performance, but there’s weak collaboration due to individual incentive focus.

10. Free-rider Problem: Some workers do not contribute as much to the team effort, relying on others to meet team goals while still receiving team-based pay.

11. Support for Others: Low willingness to support others, as the individual pay component is the dominant motivator.

After Intervention (30% Individual, 70% Team-based Pay)

1. A’s Activity: Individual output from worker A, still important but now balanced with a stronger team focus.

2. Total Activity: Combined output of A and B, with more emphasis on team collaboration leading to higher overall output.

3. B’s Activity: Individual output from worker B, also influenced by team dynamics.

4. Gain per Individual Activity: The reward for individual output, but now smaller as more emphasis is placed on team-based performance.

5. Net Gains for A: A's net gain, now more dependent on team success due to the higher weight of team pay (70%).

6. Net Gains for B: B's net gain, similarly impacted by team performance-based pay.

7. Resource Limit: The available resources that still limit total activity, but with more cooperative use of resources.

8. Team Activity: Increased cooperation between A and B as both are motivated by the larger team-based pay component.

9. Team Pay: 70% of total pay is now based on team performance, encouraging more collaboration and shared responsibility.

10. Free-rider Problem: The free-rider problem should be reduced, as workers now realize that their team-based pay is at risk if they don't contribute.

11. Support for Others: Increased willingness to support others, as workers recognize that team success will lead to greater rewards for all.

Initially, the company hopes to solve the inconsistency in the productivity of each worker along the same production line, and introduced the fix - a 50/50 split between team-based pay and individual performance pay - to enhance support within the team that compensates the low productivity of some.

However, the measure promotes unfairness since individual effort is not reflected totally in the pay, triggering (1) free rider problem as low performers enjoy a higher pay relative to their effort when there are other hardworking workers in their team, and (2) reduction in support for low performers by high achievers as they realize their effort is not rewarded fairly.

This in turn reinforces the inconsistency in productivity due to the misalignment in individual goals and compensation.