BCRM - 2022 Itaewon Disaster by Du Juan Chua

Inference 1 - Poor Management due to Lack of Central Organisation

chuadujuan05 — 2024-12-02 09:18:04 UTC

Despite the predictable nature of the large Halloween gathering, there was a clear lack of preparedness from authorities. This indicates a possible underestimation of the event's scale or a complacency in handling large crowds.

There was also no main organising committee for the event. This was also another reason for the inefficient crowd management.

Observation 2 - Life-Safety

chuadujuan05 — 2024-12-02 09:19:28 UTC

Victims tried to escape by entering the bars and clubs or by climbing the walls to avoid the crowd. There were also members of the public who performed CPR on the unconscious victims.

Police rushed to pull people out of the crowd, whilst first aiders worked to rush victims to the hospitals

Observation 3 - Environmental Protection

chuadujuan05 — 2024-12-02 09:20:37 UTC

The crowd crush occurred in a steep, narrow alley leading from near the Itaewon subway station to bars and clubs along a main street. The bars and clubs continued their operations as per normal as they were unaware of the severity of the crowd crush outside.

Analysis 2 - Police Lacking Manpower at the Location

chuadujuan05 — 2024-12-02 09:22:31 UTC

Only 137 policemen were deployed for the event.

This would mean that there were 137 policemen who were trying to control the 100,000 crowd of people, which was not viable. There was no proper crowd control plan in place.

This was because 6,500 police were mobilised for another demonstration in the South Korean capital attended by 25,000 people.

Analysis 3 - Delayed Response to Warnings

chuadujuan05 — 2024-12-02 09:25:14 UTC

The police failed to respond adequately to numerous emergency calls and reports of overcrowding, which began hours before the incident. This could have prevented the incident, at least a severity of it.

Observation 1 - Escalation; Unexpected Crowd (High Density)

chuadujuan05 — 2024-12-02 09:25:46 UTC

While Itaewon has always been famous for its Halloween celebrations, this was the first physical event after the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions. Crowds were expected but not to this extend. It was stated that there were up to 100,000 people in the crowd.

The population density in the area rose to 7.57 ped/m², which already indicates a high risk as the human bodies are packed together so tightly that they could not freely move about. This would then cause the bodies to behave like a fluid, whereby pressure waves would travel through them and the bodies could lose control of how they wish to act.

Inference 3 - Urban Design Failure

chuadujuan05 — 2024-12-02 09:26:07 UTC

The incident occured in a narrow, steep alley. This emphasizes the need for urban planners to consider crowd dynamics and safety in city design.

Inference

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 03:51:08 UTC

Analysis

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 03:52:09 UTC

Observation

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 03:52:27 UTC

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 04:18:44 UTC

Why did the Halloween Crowd Crush Disaster happen at Itaewon 2022? What could have been improved on?

Analysis 1 - Overcrowding

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 04:41:31 UTC

The primary cause was the substantial population in a confined space. The high density of human bodies prevented people from moving to where they wish to go.

This also explains the chain effect of how if 1 person falls, all those surrounding them would be affected.

Analysis 4 - Flawed Pedestrian Flow Management

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 04:44:04 UTC

A misguided crowd management strategy rerouted pedestrians from the sidewalk to the driveway, significantly increasing congestion near the alley where the crush occurred.

Analysis 5 - Psychological Factor, Escalating Panic amongst the Crowd

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 04:44:49 UTC

The official report noted frequent police calls indicating an increasing sense of panic in the critical region, which was not addressed in time.

Observation 4 - Communication and Notification

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 12:24:22 UTC

Despite receiving multiple emergency calls starting from 6:34pm, the police failed to respond adequately to the escalating situation.

The first call through the inter-government agency communication network (KPAS) was made at 11:41 p.m., 86 minutes after the first emergency call reporting deaths.

Inference 2 - Failure to Recognize Escalating Panic

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 12:32:37 UTC

The relavant authorities did not have the sense of urgency to reply to the requests made via the emergency calls. This caused increase panic amongst the party goers, creating more opportunity for panic to ensue.

Inference 4 - Poor Crowd Control Decisions

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 12:37:25 UTC

The rerouting of pedestrian worsened congestion.

Analysis 6 - Underutilisation of Korean Public Alert Service (KPAS)

chuadujuan05 — 2025-01-19 13:13:29 UTC

The KPAS allows access to emergency messages in affected areas via a mobile app. However, this app was not used during the incident.