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Welcome to Taiwan

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明天我要去台湾和学习台湾的鼓励式。

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At the start, I set out to examine both the weekly topics and issues that are of importance to me. While in every post I did not always have a definitive conclusion, I tried to ask the right questions.

After all this was not just a class about The Big Questions, but asking good quality questions that provoke serious thought about differing aspects of China, its people, society and culture.

What is the use in viewing China in black and white terms when the nexus at which people, power and the Party meet is an evolving dynamic?

So where is this nexus currently?

1. It is around the dinning table of working and middle class families and at universities in China and abroad.

2. It is in transitioning workplaces of China's growing services economy and industrial economy.

3. It is in the transitions occurring in rural China due to urbanisation and land use pressures.

4. Finally, this nexus is in public internet forums of netizens.

Finally,  here are a few of the questions that I will continue to ask as I watch China.

How can the CCP enfranchise the growing middle class and maintain their hold on power, without resorting to oppressive violence?

How can the Chinese government manage the fluctuations that traditionally accompany the transition of capital from an industrial to services based economy?

How should/can we measure and account for the CCPs capability to adapt?

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"Our hunt for the next 
 
  Mikhail Gorbachev
  means we focus on how a new individual at the top could bring great change" - Ryan Manuel

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"Our hunt for the next 
 
  Mikhail Gorbachev
  means we focus on how a new individual at the top could bring great change" - Ryan Manuel

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Ryan's paper is an interesting perspective as Xi gets closer to the end of his last term of power. Recent observations, by Evan Osnos, of CCP power dynamics suggest that Xi is in fact representative of a  broader traditional movement re-asserting itself within the Party. The period of Hu Jintao it is argued was not only the lost decade but infact, it strayed away from CCP values. Xi is therefore the public face of revolutionary descendants reasserting power.

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by Ryan Manuel

Heir-apparent Xi Jinping's recent two-week absence from public appearances led to a flurry of articles about how opaque China's government is and how little we know about the future leadership. Some argued that it raised questions about the legitimacy of China's communist regime.

Even at the time, this questioning seemed a little overblown. Xi's absence was his third fortnight-long disappearance from the public eye this year. Although happy to guess at what ailed him, few Chinese commentators seemed to think this would genuinely threaten the Chinese system.

That does not mean that questions about the opacity of China's government are not valid ones. We can't say who will be in which positions in the senior leadership when they are unveiled on November 8. We can't say exactly how many people will be on the Politburo Standing Committee, China's top ruling body.

Elements of the Chinese system will always appear opaque, and predictions about elite politics will always be difficult due to the sheer difficulty of getting across all that is involved. And how much does our ability to predict the exact make-up of the senior leadership matter? We rarely know the exact details of any political transition or reshuffle, no matter what system.

The future Chinese leaders are not at all unknown. They've been senior leaders for a decade. It is almost certain that all of of the next standing committee will have been members of the 25-member Politburo running China for the past five years. All of them have met Western leaders, businessmen and diplomats many times. Xi has been to Australia and met leaders many times. These leaders are the subject of a number of biographies.

The hubbub over Xi's disappearance says as much about our analysis of China as it does about the Chinese regime. It reminds one of the tradition of parsing new leaders intently to see if they are reformers or hardliners, thinking a real reformer is right around the corner. Our hunt for the next Mikhail Gorbachev means we focus on how a new individual at the top could bring great change.

But Beijing focuses intently on preventing another Gorbachev turning up. So we inevitably end up disappointed.

This is worsened by our tendency to project habits onto incoming leaders. For example, who is this a description of? A brilliant young leader, chosen because he is apparently acceptable to both wings of the leadership, rises to the top, fresh from dazzling overseas observers with his unscripted style. He remains a mystery in the West and even to much of China. But he is considered part of the group of leaders who favour liberalizing the economy.

Given that top leader Hu Jintao is now usually described as wooden, and distant, perhaps few readers would have identified the description as how Hu was portrayed in 2001, a year before he took the top job.

This is a reflection of the fact that China is ruled by a collective leadership structure, and decision-making is based on consensus. Leaders are debate moderators, and final arbiters only in a stalemate. So their decisions will be based on a compromise between the interests and opinions of the entire senior leadership, with further input coming from trusted advisors or party insiders and ex-leaders.

Almost all the issues on which we might wish to shape Beijing's thinking are not issues for Xi Jinping and the top leadership. They are issues that have to be dealt with at the appropriate lower level.

So we need our engagement to either target this appropriate level, or the bosses of that level. But how often do we know what that appropriate level is?

Rectifying an inability to identify the right people to talk to is key to making the system less opaque and working with it effectively. But we're not going to get answers about how to solve that problem through analysing how Xi is feeling from day to day. We would be better occupied spending less time looking at Xi and more time looking at the system.

The Australian Financial Review

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Lots of elite-watching, little analysis of China's system

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Heir-apparent Xi Jinping's recent two-week absence from public appearances led to a flurry of articles about how opaque China's government is and how little we know about the future leadership. Some argued that it raised questions about the legitimacy of China's communist regime.

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To me, Wang Hui's perspective demonstrates the contemporary relevance of understanding history in understanding present day China.

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What is the purpose of history and how can it inform our understanding of society's problems

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What is the purpose of history and how can it inform our understanding of society's problems

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What is the purpose of history? To pursue facts and figures, to develop theories explaining events or to engage the past to help with the present?

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Most Popular

* * *

Today, historians worry that they have lost their audience, and their distress has made the search for the next trend seem especially pressing. At the beginning of her new book, Writing History in the Global Era, Lynn Hunt remarks that "history is in crisis" because it can no longer answer "the nagging question" of why history matters. David Armitage and Jo Guldi, in their History Manifesto, concur: in the face of today's "bonfire of the humanities," and a disastrous loss of interest in a topic in which the culture used to invest heavily (and in classes that students used to attend in droves), defining a new professional vocation is critical. History, so often viewed as a "luxury" or "indulgence," needs to figure out how to "keep people awake at night," as Simon Schama has said. Actually, the problem is worse: students today have endless diversions for the wee hours; the trouble for historians is keeping students awake during the day.

In the last few decades, Hunt has had the most reliable eye for new trends in the American historical profession, and what she considers important always amounts to more than the sum of her current enthusiasms. You may not like the enterprises she is bullish on; you may try to blow up one of her bandwagons-as I did in these pages when she invented human-rights history-only to find yourself riding it for life ["On the Genealogy of Morals," April 16, 2007]. What you cannot dispute is that she has a preternatural sense of the new new thing being touted by historians to study old things.

Like a few other famous trendsetters, Hunt, who recently retired from UCLA, was trained in the 1970s during the rising tide of social history, when what mattered most was learning about the ordinary men-and, even more important, women-lost to the enormous condescension of posterity. Having focused for centuries on kings (and, eventually, presidents) and their wars and diplomats and negotiations, historians realized that they had mostly ignored the social forces pulsing from below, and they longed to identify with the forgotten people who had been written out of history simply because they were not elites. Social historians often had left-wing sympathies, and, following the lodestar of E.P. Thompson's luminous The Making of the English Working Class (1963), they wanted social history to chronicle the rise in political consciousness of the laboring people (and, later, other oppressed or marginalized groups) who deserved justice. Because they were interested in the shape of society and not only its working classes, social historians drew on a then-newfangled body of thought. It was not just left-wing politics but Marxism as a theory of society that prospered under social history's reign; in turn, the whole tradition of such thinking, from the Enlightenment to Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, became canonical.

Hunt left the fold in the 1980s, bolting for what she famously dubbed "the new cultural history." Worlds became full of meaning, renegade social historians discovered, and the representations of power that people create, the rituals they practice, and the ways they interpret their worlds now trumped basic information about the social order. It wasn't enough to understand the class structure at the time of the French Revolution, Hunt argued in her landmark book Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (1984); one also needed to understand the world of political symbols and "political culture" that made social action meaningful-especially since class turned out not to matter as much as the Marxists believed. Trading in Marxism for anthropology and "postmodern" theory, the new cultural history was, among other things, a protest against the tabulation of people according to static categories like "the workers" or "the peasantry," and its breakthrough coincided with the failure of political efforts to win greater social equality.

Then Hunt changed her mind again. No sooner had the ink dried on The Family Romance of the French Revolution (1992)-a creative application of Sigmund Freud's originally individualized psychoanalysis to a collective event, which remains her most interesting book-than she declared that "theory" had gone too far. It seemed, Hunt complained, to be little more than a recipe for saying whatever you want. "Postmodernists often put the word 'reality' in quotation marks to problematize the 'there' out there," Hunt and several colleagues wrote in Telling the Truth About History (1994). But this statement wasn't itself realistic-the point of theory is that no "reality" is self-interpreting-and her verdict could hardly prove the uselessness of broader frameworks of interpretation, except to those who treat them as secondary in the first place. Frightened by the whirling fashions that seemed to threaten mere chaos, Hunt rallied around facts. She declared the cultural turn a vast mistake, and postmodernism a tissue of error. From whatever heaven or hell they reside in, the antiquarians were smiling.

* * *

But if facts provide permanent refuge to historians, fashions continue to entice them. Twenty years on, Hunt is again scrutinizing the latest trends, and the opinions she offers about them in Writing History in the Global Era should not be taken lightly. She begins by reviewing the shift from social to cultural history. As she confesses, one big problem with the search for "meaning" in the past is that it was so vague as to be useless, even if it showed that a shortcoming of social history was an incessant focus on anonymous and supposedly objective processes. But cultural history proved to be another cul-de-sac. Hunt explains it with a different metaphor: "What began as a penetrating critique of the dominant paradigms ended up seeming less like a battering ram and more like that proverbial sucking sound of a flushing toilet." In Hunt's telling, the clear need even two decades ago was for a new "paradigm" for historians to apply to their facts. But what is it?

Where cultural history often emphasized the small and the local, Hunt continues, the current wave of interest in "globalization" favors the far-flung. It gets its name from a process exalted by Thomas Friedman and excoriated by Naomi Klein, and Hunt shows that historians have hardly been immune from suddenly discovering the world beyond their cramped former national or regional redoubts. She also shows that the very term "globalization" has experienced a crescendo in the past two decades, with books and articles pouring forth from presses offering global histories on a welter of subjects. We have been treated to global histories of cod, comics and cotton, and one publisher offers a series dedicated to global accounts of foodstuffs like figs, offal, pancakes and pizza. German historian Jürgen Osterhammel's history of the nineteenth century, The Transformation of the World, shows what life was like when it took eighty days to travel around the globe, anticipating our age of supersonic movement of people and instantaneous transmission of bytes. Even Hunt has recently gotten into the act, editing a book about the French Revolution from a global perspective.

Proponents of globalizing history have persuasively argued that history has remained "Eurocentric," but Hunt rightly asks whether the contemporary fashion of writing history across large spaces does more than drastically expand the canvas for historical depiction. "Is globalization a new paradigm for historical explanation that replaces those criticized by cultural theories?" she asks. It may enlarge the scale of study, focusing on long-distance trade, far-flung empire or cross-border war, but such a perspective could merely draw greater mountains of facts in view, without explaining what they mean or why they matter.

What global history emphatically does not prove is that the classic authorities for interpreting the past have become obsolete, especially since Karl Marx himself described the phenomenon now called globalization. Hunt's starting point is different. She argues that because she and her fellow cultural historians so irreparably damaged the social theories that commanded history from Gibbon's time to our own, the options for doing history now can only take one of two forms. One is to do without any reigning "paradigm," which Hunt stipulates cultural history never had-beyond a general commitment to recapturing meaning, without agreement on how to interpret it. The other is to invent a new paradigm. Hunt's fear is that globalization, because it foregrounds anonymous processes once favored by social historians, will end up preferring the sorts of frameworks they once relied upon. Globalization could, that is, make obsolete the insights of the cultural revolution Hunt originally sponsored, while doing nothing to lead historians beyond the limits she now thinks are intrinsic to a global focus.

To her credit, Hunt makes it clear that her need for a new dispensation is hardly universal within the profession. It is conventional to group Hunt with her generational colleagues Joan Scott and William Sewell, since all three bolted from social history in a crowd, and all three have regularly explained their turns over the years. (Sewell is the author of the greatest book in the historiographical landscape, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation [2005].) But as Hunt notes, Scott has stuck it out with postmodernism-apparently believing it more defensible than Hunt does-while Sewell has gone "backwards" to Marxism. Hunt is not satisfied with either choice: "Must historians choose between a return to the previous paradigms," she wonders, "or no paradigm at all?"

For Hunt to ask this question, her twin premises-that cultural history utterly devastated social theory, while generating no real interpretive worldview of its own-must bear a lot of weight. Perhaps too much: Sewell doesn't think the first is true, while Scott would bridle at the second. For that matter, you might wonder whether the source of the problem is the roller coaster of approaches and its endless loops, which produces the demand for a new new theory.

Bravely, Hunt forges ahead to shape her own paradigm, in what is the most interesting chapter of her book. She concludes that historians need a novel approach to society-or, more precisely, a theory of the mutual relationship between the individual self and the larger society. Neither social nor cultural history, which submerged the individual in a larger system of forces or meaning-often to the point of rendering him entirely insignificant-could possibly fit the bill, Hunt says. But there is good news: "Ideas about the society-self connection are now emerging from an unlikely conjunction of influences." Her goal is to spell out what these are, as sources for a new paradigm.

Two of Hunt's sources are evolutionary neuroscience and cognitive psychology, which she tinkered with in earlier work. Her enthusiasm for them appears strange, given that the rule of biological processes is hardly less anonymous and deterministic than a globalizing turn that effaces human agency. Importing newfangled theories from other esoteric fields and leaning on works of pop science doesn't seem like a recipe for success. Remember the crop of historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who put their bets on scientific racism? Nobody does, except as cautionary tales, because their work is worthless.

What becomes even more confusing is that Hunt grafts this trend onto a return to the hoary tradition of social theory that she explicitly admits is simply a broader version of the approaches that cultural history supposedly overturned. The idea that "the social is the ground of meaning"-in Hunt's ultimate formula-was central to the tradition of thinking from the Neapolitan sage Giambattista Vico to Durkheim, Marx and Weber. It may be that social historians badly misunderstood this tradition in their efforts to think about society in terms of broad categories of people, just as cultural historians reversed the error in celebrating "meaning" as a separate object. But in her proposed return to the social, Hunt is essentially admitting that we progress not by seeking a new paradigm, but by fixing past mistakes. One of the biggest is the trend-driven thought that historians had to choose between studying society and studying culture, even if that false choice once made sense to Hunt and her generation.

For this reason, Hunt's book sometimes reads as if we have to live her own intellectual life story in order to follow her venture to craft a new paradigm. It could be, however, that all this talk of "paradigms" is misleading-a distraction from the fact that the relation of self and society has been the constant concern of social theory since its origin, and that there is a huge range of options within that tradition to explore and improve upon. Hunt repudiates the common postmodern position that the self is a historical product, as if merely proposing a compromise between the claims of society and the self were specific or sufficient. Even when it comes to her own modish neuroscientific flourish, Hunt connects it to an older French thinker, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and his broader notion that selves are embodied. But like Marcel Gauchet, a contemporary Frenchman on whom she draws heavily, Merleau-Ponty is merely one figure within a rich fund of resources in social thought.

Hunt raises but never resolves what may be the key quandary for historians today. The emergence of global history inevitably makes one wonder if the categories-starting with "society" itself-that Westerners have devised to study themselves are applicable to peoples of all times and climes. Hunt repudiates extremist commentators who insist that Western categories can only ever explain Western things. It is not clear that this overcomes the difficulty.

* * *

Whereas Hunt wants to reckon with the fashion of globalization, Armitage and Guldi are interested in larger time scales and not merely expanded geographical spaces. Armitage, a trusted Harvard colleague of mine, has never been above spotting trends himself, having already helped define the study of Atlantic history, Pacific history and international history. Now he has a couple of new themes-long-term history and present-minded history-and in his effort to expound them he is joined by Guldi, a younger whiz kid who is an expert in "big data."

Their exciting argument goes like this: in the past few decades, historians have dropped their emphasis on what the French historian Fernand Braudel called the longue durée. In his celebrated history of the Mediterranean Sea littoral, published in 1949, Braudel insisted on the superior reality of the long-term rhythms of life. The commanding forces of demography and environment, Braudel assumed, made individuals-even kings-mere "dust." Armitage and Guldi offer a series of reasons why, contrary to Braudel's inspiring example, historians broke for the short term. Perhaps the main one was cultural history: "meaning" seemed inevitably tied to a specific time and place, in ways that grand stories across vastly different times would always slight. But there were other reasons, too, like the pressures of finding new topics in the professional competition for turf. The results, Armitage and Guldi believe, were profound, as the average time scale of history books was precipitously compressed.

But retrieving our sensitivity to what the pair somewhat mysteriously call "vibrations of deeper time" is not just an attempt to return to Braudel's cool and remote surveys of aeons. The real reason to ascend to Olympian heights and the sweeping gaze they allow, Armitage and Guldi say, is to plunge into the political affairs of the city. How is it, they ask, that since classical times history played the role as magistra vitae-roughly, a teacher for living-and especially for the guidance of political actors, but now has been rudely displaced by other fields, and especially by dismal (and often disastrous) economic thinking? History used to be, if not exactly philosophy, then at least "philosophy teaching by examples," as Thucydides originally put it, and as the early modern Viscount Bolingbroke repeated in his Letters on the Study and Use of History (1735).

In this plea for relevance, Armitage is cutting against the famous stricture of his mentor, the Cambridge University don Quentin Skinner: if thinking is to be done, it has to be done "for ourselves," without the aid of historical perspective. Where Skinner voiced a conventional antiquarian view that the role of writing history is to cut the present off from very different pasts, Armitage and Guldi insist on the operative value of historical work, and indeed for the highest public causes. After chronicling the cult of the short term, the two turn to the pressing political reasons for abandoning it in order to bring the long term to bear on our present, with the help of new digital tools. Historians need, they say, to immerse themselves in the vast digital archives of searchable information now on offer, and compared to which their old search for archival documents looks narrow and quaint.

Even as they have some wise and penetrating things to say about the new services that big data affords, Armitage and Guldi make it clear that their brief is not for every historian to shift to the long term. In their defense, they cite none other than Lynn Hunt. Time-bound and local puzzles will always remain to be confronted; but for Armitage and Guldi, the really uplifting new new thing is that computerized data and computing power allow a set of rapid solutions to challenges that took Braudel and his ilk a decade to decipher. And these, they argue, could in turn allow historians a return to the public stage, whether it comes to debates about international governance or global land reform.

* * *

Armitage and Guldi are careful to distinguish their notion of the long term from other calls for "deep" and "big" history. Given her scientism, Hunt has a soft spot for the call for depth, one that is associated with another Harvard scholar, Daniel Smail, author of On Deep History and the Brain (2008). Smail refuses to restrict the history of humanity to the last few millennia and their documentary record, when archaeology and especially biology provide tools to extend history back much further. For acolytes of "big" history, like the Australian scholar David Christian, "deep" history that starts so late-with human beings-is itself too unambitious. It's an argument that has resonated beyond the ivory tower. Bill Gates has been agitating for high schools to teach history starting with the Big Bang. "I just loved it," Gates told The New York Times of his experience exercising on his treadmill while watching Christian explain the concept of big history on a video. "It was very clarifying for me. I thought, God, everybody should watch this thing!"

Perish the thought. Apart from the fact that Gates's scientism sacrifices the critical perspective that humanists have learned to maintain since their disastrous nineteenth-century dalliance with biology and other natural sciences, the trouble with massive expansions of the time line, even just to the totality of human history, is simple: it forces historians to become scientists, effectively converting their discipline into what is already somebody else's job. Gates's big historians already exist: they are called physicists. In any case, this is not what Armitage and Guldi seem to want. They justifiably insist that humanistic inquiry like history is supposed to provide an alternative to "the natural-law models of evolutionary anthropologists, economists, and other arbiters of our society." More than that, excessive expansion sacrifices the idea that the drama of human history is about the fate of our ends, and therefore what we ought to care most about, even when they affect the nonhuman world.

Yet even in their comparatively modest call for long time lines to confront burning problems (including a literally burning earth), Armitage and Guldi have no answer to what has always been the really hard question: How do you interpret facts across a tiny or huge time scale? Just as the globe provides a larger space, an extended time line merely allows a longer frame. To think about what happens in the sunlit uplands beyond the confinement of the local and time-bound, you need a theory. Data-including big data about the long term-is never self-interpreting. Nor is orientation toward the past for the sake of the future solely a problem for which more information is the solution; it is ultimately a philosophical problem that only speculation can solve. This was the point of social theory from Vico to Marx: to integrate necessary facts with a vision of human becoming, which never lacked an ethical and political dimension. Arguably, it is this, most of all, that people need today, not merely a proclivity for the long term.

Armitage and Guldi have no use for Marx except to inspire their title, and to allow them to begin their book by invoking the specter of the long term and to end it by demanding that the historians of the world unite. Unlike Hunt, they do not regard the newly won chronological sweep-like the larger space of globalization-as something that has to be filled by some theory or other that allows new or big (or old or little) data to be interpreted in compelling ways. Or if they do, it is not the focus of their brief for ambition.

Even our boldest trendsetters, then, do not see the wall between history and philosophy as the final frontier to breach, in part because it was the first one erected to define the discipline by antiquarians in love with their facts. Armitage and Guldi wisely remark that fashionable "critical turns" conceal "old patterns of thought that have become entrenched." Of these, the most durable is not the affection for the short term, but the refusal to risk the certainty of facts for the sake of a fusion of history and philosophy.

* * *

In 1966, Hayden White published "The Burden of History," his still invigorating attack on his professional colleagues. "History is perhaps the conservative discipline par excellence," White wrote, coming out swinging, and perhaps most of all against the factological ethics so central to the modern craft. The consequences, according to White, were grave: "As history has become increasingly professionalized and specialized, the ordinary historian, wrapped up in the search for the elusive document that will establish him as an authority in a narrowly defined field, has had little time to inform himself of the latest developments in the more remote fields of art and science."

Momigliano wrote a notorious polemic against White (a former teacher of mine) precisely for denigrating the recovery of factual truth, which he thought central to history. But if Momigliano turned that recovery into a punishing imperative of the historical superego, White wanted to substitute a different "ethics" for history-one that would make room for theory, or even insist on seeing beyond the contrast between history and theory, in the service of the present. Nearly 90 years old and still ahead of his time, White is back this year with his own lively new book, The Practical Past.

Because the past needs to be practical for us-there is no reason to care about it except insofar as it is useful to the present-White begins his book by once again putting Momigliano's professional "ethics" in their proper place:

The older, rhetorically structured mode of historical writing openly promoted the study and contemplation of the past as propaedeutic to a life in the public sphere, as an alternative ground to theology and metaphysics (not to mention as an alternative to the kind of knowledge one might derive from experience of what Aristotle called the "banausic" life of commerce and trade), for the discovery or invention of principles by which to answer the central question of ethics: "What should (ought, must) I do?" Or to put it in Lenin's terms: "What is to be done?"

It seems as if, in roundabout ways, all of our current historiographical trend-followers finally agree with White, in the face of what they regard as a great crisis for historical writing today. But it is one thing to call for speculation for the sake of relevance, and another to bring about a new marriage of history and philosophy. For the coming generation, one thing is clear: thinking will have to become our profession.

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* Today, historians worry that they have lost their audience, and their distress has made the search for the next trend seem especially pressing. At the beginning of her new book, Writing History in the Global Era, Lynn Hunt remarks that "history is in crisis" because it can no longer answer "the nagging question" of why history matters.

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In examining dissent in China, it's also important to examine the range of academic groups that evaluate China.

There seems to be a hegemonic human rights academic cohort within the legal and political human rights sphere. This cohort, rejects the alternative sophisticated work of others such as Randall Peerenboom.

Another cohort examines China's "assertiveness" this "academic security industrial complex" doesn't seek to engage China scholars but to benefit from fear of China's rise.

It is interesting that many of the strategic/security events I have gone to have, prominent speakers who often use a quote attributed to Napolean "China is a sleeping dragon. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world." - But Harvard Professor John Fitzgerald proved in 1996 that Napolean is not recorded as saying this (John Fitzgerald (1996), Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution, p. 62).

What does this say about the forgone conclusions made about China? What does this say about the "collective consciousness" of this field?

Dissent is difficult in examining China, but integral to understanding China.

I find myself agreeing with aspects of the CCP policy development. I think that in inquiring about China and informing a perspective on China that is important to be both academically and civic minded.

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"Solitude often frightens people. . . Solitude implies independence, self-reliance; it means not following the crowd. . . . While many intellectuals, especially undergraduate and postgraduate university students, like put on the mask of nonconformist isolation, they are in fact united by their collective consciousness."

Dissent and intellectual inquiry.

There are many barriers dissent. Liu Xiaobo's quote, for me, highlights the importance of internal solitude and the decision to accept a life-path based on intrinsic personal value rather then external validation.

In examining why people dissent, against all the external forces, it is interesting to learn about this topic from Liu's perspective.

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Liu Xiaobo: jailed Chinese intellectual wins Nobel Peace

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Liu Xiaobo, who was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize on Friday, has been a vocal champion for greater democracy and human rights protection in China for decades.

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China's largest media corporation highlights that Chinese don't just believe in the one ideology of the party but also of the importance in making a profit.

While Washington D.C. is concerned about Beijing's influence on Hollywood, is D.C actually worried about Chinese influence or D.C's own relevance?

The China Dream is crafting an idealistic narrative for a peaceful rise. Yet the USA is marred with electoral disenchantment, Wikileaks discourse and economic disenfranchisement.

This fear of China's rise may be a mirror of USA's own self-consciousness.

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Billed as an effort to "bridge the entertainment capitals of the world," the program will provide a 40 percent rebate on certain production spending in Qingdao, which is about 450 miles north of Shanghai and is the site of Wanda Studios, still under construction. Scheduled to fully open in 2018, Wanda Studios will feature 30 advanced soundstages, including the world's largest at over 107,000 square feet; an underwater stage; and a 221-acre back lot.

The rebate on each film or television production will be limited to $18 million. The total amount available to disperse will be $150 million annually. There will be three classifications of rebate productions, according to Wanda, and only one of those would require Chinese cultural elements, Chinese actors and Chinese investors - films classified by the Chinese government as co-productions that are not subject to import limits. (Only 34 non-Chinese films are allowed to play in the country annually and those must suit Chinese censors.)

Applications will be evaluated by a 10-person committee of government officials and Wanda executives, a Wanda spokeswoman said.

The incentives plan was to be announced on Monday by Mr. Wang; Eric Garcetti, the mayor of Los Angeles; Cheryl Boone Isaacs, the president of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences; and Jack Gao, the head of Wanda's Cultural Industry Group. A private dinner for 100 studio executives and agency chiefs was planned, with performances from acrobats, magicians and a Chinese pop star.

Mr. Wang, a spry former military officer who is said to be China's richest man, said he hoped that an additional $3 billion in Qingdao amenities - "international hospitals, international schools, yacht clubs, hotels, shopping" - would make American stars and marquee directors more willing to spend months at a time working there. "Like going on a vacation" is how he described it.

He added that the incentives were not just about busying Wanda Studios and increasing the supply of movies to Wanda's theaters, both in China, where it controls 3,056 screens, and elsewhere.

"Am I a fool? Of course not," he said, with a laugh, before alluding to Wanda's vast real estate division. "Because I attract so many people, that place will become very popular and famous. And the value of the land there will increase. And I can sell more houses."

If successful, the rebates could shift the global movie incentives game, in which Hollywood has moved production to locales like Canada, Romania and New Zealand. Legendary Entertainment has plans to film at least two movies under the program, including a sequel to "Pacific Rim."

In an interview, Mary Parent, Legendary's production chief, dismissed concerns that Wanda was seeking to push a pro-Chinese agenda. "There has been zero interference with storytelling," she said. Ms. Parent, an Oscar-nominated producer highly regarded in Hollywood, added that Wanda had made it possible for Legendary to increase its output.

"Unlike most Hollywood companies, we're not operating in a resource-constrained environment, which creates tremendous opportunity," she said.

Still, Mr. Wang's trip probably won't do much to ease concerns by some lawmakers, editorial writers and lobbyists about the ambition of Wanda, which has financial ties to relatives of senior Chinese Communist leaders. In an Oct. 6 letter to the Justice Department, Representative John Culberson, Republican of Texas, called for heightened oversight of Chinese moves in Hollywood. Mr. Culberson cited "serious concerns" about how Chinese media acquisitions "may be used for propaganda purposes."

Mr. Wang said that Wanda intended to control 20 percent of the world's movie theater seats by 2020. It currently has about 13 percent, including those run in Europe by the Odeon and UCI Cinemas Group, which Wanda bought for $650 million.

By 2020, Wanda aims to have annual revenue of $100 billion and net profits of $10 billion. With its real estate growth slowing, Wanda is also moving into sports. It recently paid $1.2 billion for Infront Sports and Media, a sports marketing company, and tourist destinations, including a $3.5 billion entertainment, shopping and hotel complex outside Paris.

"Cash flow for real estate in China is not stable in the long term," he said. Wanda remains interested in buying more Hollywood companies as it seeks growth, including a major studio, he added. "If it is a very good company," he said, there will be "no ceiling" for the price offered.

As Wanda pushes deeper into filmed entertainment, the company plans to build a $1.2 billion headquarters in Beverly Hills "to aid in China's entry into Hollywood's film industry and generally promote Chinese culture abroad," Wanda said in a news release.

But it is clear that Mr. Wang, who spoke to The New York Times with the assistance of an interpreter, has gotten the message that a bit less bombast might help smooth Wanda's forward march.

Take his approach to Disney. In the spring, as Disney was opening its first theme park resort on the Chinese mainland, the $5.5 billion Shanghai Disneyland, Mr. Wang went on the attack. "The frenzy of Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck and the era of blindly following them have passed," Mr. Wang said on state television in May. At the time, Disney called his remarks "patently absurd."

On Sunday, however, Mr. Wang struck a friendly tone. "We respect Disney," he said. "Competition is unavoidable," he added, noting that Wanda has five theme-park-style properties open in China and seven more under construction. "But I respect Disney very much."

Mr. Wang said he had personally visited every Disney resort in the world, with the exception of the Shanghai outpost.

In person, Mr. Wang came across as a disciplined executive - he arrived at exactly 8:59 a.m. for a 9 a.m. appointment and stayed exactly one hour - who cared only about making money and not tinkering with scripts. He said that he had not seen any video from "The Great Wall," a coming $150 million Legendary Entertainment film starring Matt Damon.

He "is not quite into the technical details like that, because the entire movie sector in Wanda accounts for only one-eighth or one-tenth of the revenue," he said. Wanda's culture division, which includes the theme parks, domestic movie theaters and sports holdings, made a profit of 43.9 million Chinese renminbi, or $6.5 million, in the first half of 2015, against assets of about $11 billion, according to a Wanda stock prospectus.

The more hands-off that Mr. Wang can appear, of course, the better Wanda will fare among those calling for heightened scrutiny of its entertainment dealings. But all that matters to Hollywood is Wanda's money. The mainstream movie industry, after all, has been only too happy to self-censor its scripts in an effort to appease Chinese regulators and win clearance into a fast-growing market.

By that measure, Qingdao applications should already be rolling in.

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Dalian Wanda of China Offers a Carrot to Hollywood

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Billed as an effort to "bridge the entertainment capitals of the world," the program will provide a 40 percent rebate on certain production spending in Qingdao, which is about 450 miles north of Shanghai and is the site of Wanda Studios, still under construction.

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While the specter of the Party State looms large over peoples lives, there are still many lenses through which Chinese and the Party-State perceive the world.

Interestingly, Chinese citizens are expanding their view of their role in the world. As China has developed, its citizens have developed an increased awareness of the international community and the defining role the middle kingdom can play in the international arena.

Recently, China has launched a bid to for the UN Human Rights Council. Is this a sign that China is looking to participate actively in promoting human rights or controlling the organ that has caused so many headaches for the CCP?

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Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project

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As China's economy has grown, so too has its role in world affairs. An increasingly assertive China has challenged the geopolitical balance of power in Asia and extended its economic reach in Africa, Latin America, Europe and elsewhere. The Chinese people recognize their country's growing prominence: 75% say China is playing a more important role in world affairs than it did 10 years ago. Only 10% of the Chinese believe that they are a less powerful player in the global arena.

China has benefited greatly from economic globalization, and most Chinese (60%) believe their country's involvement in the global economy is a good thing; only 23% think this is bad for China.

Such self-confidence about China's international stature coexists with some degree of anxiety and a general tendency to look inward more than outward. A majority of Chinese (56%) want Beijing to focus on China's problems. Just 22% voice the view that their government should help other nations. And there is widespread unease about the impact on China from the world around them. Roughly three-quarters (77%) of the public believes that their way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence, and such sentiment is up 13 percentage points since 2002. Moreover, about six-in-ten Chinese (59%) are concerned that territorial conflicts between China and neighboring countries could lead to military conflict.

The United States, another principal actor on the world stage, gets mixed reviews in China. Half give the U.S. a favorable rating, while 44% offer a negative one. But 52% think the U.S. is trying to prevent China from becoming an equal power; only 29% believe the U.S. is willing to accept China's rise. And the Chinese public names U.S. power and influence as the top international threat facing the country. Just under half (45%) say the U.S. is a major threat - the highest percentage among the seven potential threats tested on the survey.

The preference to look inward accompanies widely shared public worries about the domestic challenges facing the country. In particular, official corruption is a major concern. President Xi Jinping has made fighting corruption a centerpiece of his time in office, leading to the arrests of many Communist Party officials. Roughly half (49%) the Chinese public says corrupt officials are a very big problem in the country, while another 34% believe they are a moderately big issue.

Inequality is also a top worry. Even though it has slowed somewhat over the past couple of years, China has enjoyed remarkable economic growth in recent decades. But there is a perception that the spoils have not been shared equally. Thirty-seven percent consider the growing gap between rich and poor a very big problem, and 40% believe it is a moderately big problem.

With its growing middle class, many Chinese are worried about issues such as consumer and environmental safety. In recent years there have been numerous high-profile scandals regarding unsafe medical and food products, and the Chinese public is taking note. The share of the public rating the safety of medicines a very big problem has risen from 9% in 2008 to 42% today. Similarly, strong concerns about food safety have grown from 12% to 40%.

Meanwhile, more than three-in-ten say water and air pollution are very big problems, and about seven-in-ten consider them at least a moderately big problem. Moreover, many Chinese are willing to make tradeoffs to address environmental challenges. Half of those polled believe China should reduce air pollution even if it means slower economic growth, while just 24% think air pollution is the necessary price of a growing economy.

Still, many Chinese expect to see improvements on the country's major challenges. This is especially true of corruption - 64% expect progress to be made on corruption in the next five years. More than four-in-ten believe there will be progress on food safety and air pollution.

And the Chinese public remains upbeat about the country's economy. Almost nine-in-ten think the economy is in good shape and 76% expect it to improve over the next 12 months. They are slightly less optimistic about their personal economic fortunes, though still largely positive: 63% say their personal economic situation is good and 70% believe it will improve over the next year.

These are among the key findings from a Pew Research Center survey in China, conducted among 3,154 respondents from April 6 to May 8, 2016.

Chinese, American, European and Indian views of their role in the world

The Chinese (75%) are far more likely than Europeans (23%) or Americans (21%) to believe that their nation plays a more important role on the world stage today than it did a decade ago. Notably, Indians (68%) are similarly confident when it comes to seeing their country as more influential in global affairs, compared with a decade ago.

The Chinese (60%) resemble the Europeans (56%) in their embrace of global economic engagement, and are more upbeat about their involvement in the world economy than either Indians (52%) or Americans (44%).

When it comes to dealing with developing nations, Chinese views are generally more favorable than those in the U.S. A majority (55%) of Chinese support importing more goods from developing countries. This compares with a median of 64% of Europeans and 52% of Americans. Two-thirds of Chinese (67%) favor increasing Chinese companies' investment in developing nations. Roughly three-quarters of Europeans (76%) back their firms investing more in Africa, Asia and Latin America, while only about half of Americans (52%) support such business activities. And about six-in-ten (62%) Chinese support increasing China's foreign aid to developing nations. This share in favor of increasing foreign assistance is higher than the 53% of Europeans and only 48% of Americans who hold the same view.

China is one of the world's leading military powers, but the Chinese people are not any more eager than Americans or Europeans to believe that the use of overwhelming force is the best anti-terror strategy. Just 44% of Chinese say this, comparable to the views of both Americans (47%) and Europeans (41%). Indians differ: 62% back employing overwhelming military force as the best way to defeat terrorism.

The Chinese are, however, notably more inward-looking than either the Americans or the Europeans. Just 22% of Chinese say their country should help other nations deal with their problems. This is comparable to the Indian view (23%), but far less internationalist than the opinion of either Americans (37%) or Europeans (40%).

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Chinese Public Sees More Powerful Role in World, Names U.S. as Top Threat

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As China's economy has grown, so too has its role in world affairs. An increasingly assertive China has challenged the geopolitical balance of power in Asia and extended its economic reach in Africa, Latin America, Europe and elsewhere.

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Week 10/11 - What do Chinese people believe?

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Week 10/11 - What do Chinese people believe?

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Today's China is a one party state with one party line.

Dissent is at best not encouraged and at worst it's criminal.

In China there is no idea of loyal opposition.

One China, one time zone,  one party, one ideology. The ideology of the CCP is still very potent.

Yet despite this ideological discipline, religion is a part of peoples lives.

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Weekly wrap up - Why the CCP in China is not an imminent threat but it is seeking to alter conditions.

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Weekly wrap up - Why the CCP in China is not an imminent threat but it is seeking to alter conditions.

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Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has expanded. In 1991, Barry Buzan highlighted that "The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a subtstantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence."

In my view China is not an imminent threat, but they are looking to re-balance the international system - not completely in their favour - but less so in the post WW2 victors favour.

First, the CCP since coming to power have preferred bilateral dispute resolution and only used limited force to push adversaries to the negotiating table. Think India '62, Vietnam '79, Japan'12. In all cases CCP used force when it felt its interests were threatened and not recognised by the opposing state.

Second, in a unipolar world it is my view that a shift in power - let alone a new 'balance of power' cannot come about by being a status quo nation, but only through being revisionist. A nation growing in power, will seek to influence the system and revise the international system in a manner that is less in the Hegemons favour. This is a limited form of revisionism, rather than completely changing the system. The CCP's economic engagement and increased international participation illustrate it is participation within the customs established by the WW2 victors.

Third, the CCP is seeking to change a range of "conditions of existence" and this is making a range of groups and nations insecure. Yet, it also needs to be acknowledge that China is responding to signals being sent by the USA. Mearsheimer is a neo-realist who recently wrote about the expansion of NATO to the border with Russia. In sum, he argues that a Hegemon seeks out the other. Policy creep leads to confrontation by USA against the other. This led to Russia annexing the Crimea.

In 2011, the US announced its pivot to Asia. If you are China - what does that look like to you? Why is this increased presence on your doorstep needed? Additionally in early 2012, Japan "bought" the contested Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands. This creates the policy environment in which "维权，维稳“ develops, "One belt, One Road" originates. China's activity into the South China Sea can be seen as a defensive posturing against increased US activity.

Fourth, living with exceptionalism on both sides of the Pacific. Both the USA and China see their cultures and way of life as unique. Both see a need to protect their people from the darker elements of the chaotic international environment. Robert Kaplan interestingly used the analogy that the South China Sea was China's version of the Carrbibean Sea.

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Looking back at Keating's period in government - in which Gareth Evens was the Foreign Affairs Minister - demonstrates that visions can become international architecture. APEC developed during this period, in no small part to an active middle power. Australia can continue to have a role but it takes a Government willing to push its departments to deliver the architecture it desires.

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On August 30 2016 the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney presented the fourth instalment of our 'Prime Ministers Series': devoted to the China policies of former Australian Prime Ministers.Paul Keating was Prime Minister from December 1991 until March 1996.

Mr Keating's emphasis, as Treasurer and as Prime Minister, was on improving the competitiveness of Australian industry in a global market.

Mr. Keating discussed his time in office dealing with China and Australia's relationship with China today with eminent broadcast journalist Kerry O'Brien.

Download the conversation transcript here.

View the full event photo gallery here.
About the Hon Paul Keating
Paul Keating was born in Sydney on 18 January 1944. He was educated at De La Salle College in Bankstown where he obtained the Intermediate Certificate in 1958. Mr Keating left school at 15, joined the Australian Labor Party at this time and in 1966 became President of the NSW Youth Council, the predecessor to Young Labor.

In 1969 Mr Keating was elected to the House of Representatives as the Member for Blaxland, centred around the suburb of Bankstown where he had lived all his life. In 1975 he became the youngest ever federal Minister and held the portfolio of Minister for Northern Australia in the Whitlam Cabinet.

Between 1976 and 1983 Mr Keating served in the Opposition Shadow Ministry and was spokesperson for a number of portfolios including agriculture, minerals and energy. During this period Mr Keating was also President of the NSW Branch of the ALP.

When the ALP was returned to Government in March 1983, Mr Keating became Treasurer, a position he held until 1991.

This role saw Mr Keating implement far-reaching economic reforms, including the progressive deregulation of the financial sector, the float of the Australian dollar, extensive tax reform and the dismantling of many protectionist barriers. These reforms assisted the expansion of the Australian economy. He was responsible for deregulating the airline and telecommunications industries and for establishing a national framework for power.

Mr Keating became Prime Minister in December 1991 and led the ALP to an historic fifth term of Government in March 1993. As Prime Minister he continued his progressive reform program which included the establishment of a National Training Authority, a national superannuation scheme to redress low national savings and labour market and training reforms which addressed Australia's long-term unemployment problems.

Other key achievements of the Keating Government included the review of the Sex Discrimination Act, the historic Mabo legislation which recognised the land rights of Australia's indigenous people and the introduction of legislation ensuring protection of endangered species.

Mr Keating raised proposals for constitutional reform to make Australia a Republic. Mr Keating focussed Australian external policy towards the Asian region. He took an active role in the establishment of APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and initiated its annual leaders' meeting with its commitment to a regional free trade agenda. He also developed strong bilateral links with Australia's neighbours, especially Indonesia.

Following the defeat of the ALP in March 1996, Mr Keating resigned from Parliament.

He continues to take a close interest in the national issues with which he was associated in public life. Mr Keating is Visiting Professor of Public Policy at the University of New South Wales and has been awarded Honorary Doctorates in Laws from both Keio University in Tokyo and the National University of Singapore.

On 15 April 2003 Mr Keating was awarded a Doctorate of Laws LLD Honoris Causa from the UNSW in recognition of the economic and legislative reforms overseen by him as Treasurer and Prime Minister and for his work fostering better relations in the Asia-Pacific.

Mr Keating's book, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, examines Australia's foreign policy objectives and achievements during his term as Prime Minister and was published in March 2000. Mr Keating married in 1975. He has four children, Patrick, Caroline, Katherine and Alexandra.
About Kerry O'Brien
Kerry O'Brien is one of Australia's most respected journalists, with six Walkley awards including the Gold Walkley and the Walkley for Outstanding Leadership in journalism.

In a 50-year career, Kerry has worked for newspapers, television and wire service, and as a foreign correspondent. Thirty-three of those years have been at the Australian Broadcasting Corporation where he cut his teeth on the trail-blazing current affairs programs This Day Tonight and Four Corners. He was the inaugural presenter of Lateline for six years, the editor and presenter of 7.30 for 15 years, and is the presenter of Four Corners.

His acclaimed four-part interview series with Paul Keating was broadcast on the ABC in 2013, and he has also interviewed most of the influential world leaders of his time including Nelson Mandela, Barack Obama, Mikhail Gorbachev, Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. And then there was Robert Mugabe.

Kerry has specialised in national politics for the ABC as well as the Seven and Ten television networks, and was a press secretary to Labor leader Gough Whitlam. He has known Paul Keating for 40 years.

Event Gallery

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ACRI Prime Ministers Series: Keating and China On August 30 2016 the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney presented the fourth instalment of our 'Prime Ministers Series': devoted to the China policies of former Australian Prime Ministers.Paul Keating was Prime Minister from December 1991 until March 1996.

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1 of October is the Anniversary of the CCP founding

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1 of October is the Anniversary of the CCP founding

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Since 1949, the CCP have delivered large periods of stable central government. But there have been epochs of instability and turmoil that affected the majority of Chinese and cost the lives of tens of millions during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

Reflecting on the development of China since 1949, the social cost has been accepted by the majority people of China. For a country that has a history of regional instability, development under the CCP has been accepted for communal compliance to CCP social- norms.

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China's increasing intergration into the international community is at odds with the China threat scenario

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China's increasing intergration into the international community is at odds with the China threat scenario

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The Chinese 人民币 now sits along the Euro, US Dollar, Japanese Yen and the British pound.

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US defence analysts say "Chinese leaders have characterized modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as essential to achieving great power status and what Chinese President Xi Jinping calls the ‘China Dream’ of national rejuvenation. They portray a strong military as critical to advancing Chinese interests, preventing other countries from taking steps that would damage those interests, and ensuring that China can defend itself and its sovereignty claims."

But is this accurate? The siloed nature of the PLA made it exceptionally difficult for the CCP to control all aspects of the PLA from the Vice-Chairmen's to the soldiers on the ground.

It's my view that Xi recognises the importance of full civilian control and accountability of the PLA. This is integral to China's peaceful development.

Further for China to maintain and defend its interests requires an integration of all tiers of the military. Whether simply carrying out peacekeeping missions or actively defending stability in the South China Sea, integrated military solutions of Air, Sea, Land are required. China's military have not been capable of this to date.

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Defense Official Briefs Reporters on China Report

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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Abraham M. Denmark briefs Pentagon reporters on the China Report, May 13, 2016.

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Who is winning the media "war" and does it matter when China is censored? 

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Who is winning the media "war" and does it matter when China is censored? 

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The US Pentagon is very effective and nimble in getting content out to shape the narrative. While China, due to its consensus decision making approach and siloed information is relatively slow. But in the strategic environment I wonder whether media activity is being conflated with strategic progress. How many islands have been handed back by China as a result of this sustained media campaign? none.
So what is the purpose of this US led media narrative? In my view,

its to signal to US partners in the region that China is acting belligerantly,

to demonstrate US resolve domestically and internationally; and

put sustained pressure Chinese decision makers and to crowd out their time.

So in some, this content is not developed to sway opinions within China, but rather part of a multiple points of contact strategy to dissuade China over time. The US released this footage around the time of the International Pacific Rim exercises.

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Pentagon: Chinese jets flew within 50 feet of U.S. plane

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The Pentagon has said two Chinese jets have attempted an "unsafe" intercept of a U.S. air force aircraft over the South China sea. CNN's Brian Todd reports.

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Is China's possible economic meltdown more of a threat than military action

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Is China's possible economic meltdown more of a threat than military action

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This article was interesting because it made me think more about what a threat is considered to be. Are economic issues a threat and deserve to be securitised or should security issues remain the realm of military based threats? In my view, I think that over securitising is not helpful and clouds security decision making forums.

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If China's future course is the vital question, the answers in economy-world are different to those in security-world.

The versions of China offered in the two worlds clash in nature, form and quality.

In security-world, the worry is an ever stronger China.

In economy-world, the threat is a China that stumbles into a looming financial crisis of its own making.

Either world could deliver a belligerent China.

Security-world fears a confident China shouldering others aside and shaking the international system as it grabs for presumed prerogatives. Eco-world knows China as a mainstay of the international system and fears a stalling or shuddering China, losing its grip on prerogatives already earned.

The sky in each world is a different colour, yet ultimately these clashing realities must merge, if not reconcile.

At this bend in the river, we have more to fear in eco-world than what Beijing will do in security-world. Worry more about a weakened China.

Hold onto that thought as security-world prepares for South China Sea feeding frenzy on the decision from The Hague, expected to give China a mighty whack. Harken to the refrain of a frequent frenzied feeder lifting his eyes from the plate.

China's behavior in the South China Sea is deeply worrying. And this feeder has been feasting on it in the foreign affairs and debates of the Oz election, the US discussion of the menace confronting Asia's 'principled future', China's push back, and the security-world fear of Asia's order fading as jaw-jaw slides the war-war way.

My argument is with myself. Blog world wants more than that, so let's take issue with someone else. Step forward Alan Dupont, one of my guides in security-world for decades, who argues:

'Those who dismiss the South China Sea dispute as a storm in teacup, or persist with the illusion that China will refrain from antagonizing non-claimant states, need to think again. Far from de-escalating, this dispute is showing all the hallmarks of becoming the most serious security problem for Southeast Asia and Australia since the Vietnam War.'

Shaping as the biggest thing Southeast Asia has faced since Vietnam? Really?

Bigger than Cambodia's civil war and ASEAN's confrontation with Vietnam...the agony of Burma or East Timor...the China-Vietnam border war...the fall of Suharto and the possibility that Indonesia could disintegrate as a country?

The total death toll from all those events is in the hundreds of thousands. No body count yet from the South China Sea.

There are a lot of waypoints on the journey from storm in a teacup to the worst since Vietnam.

Australia hopes we are still closer to the teacup than full-on naval warfare. Canberra's caution was captured in the exquisite moment when the Foreign Minister said Oz is to sail 12.1 nautical miles from China's great mountains of sand. The exquisite bit is that point-one margin on top of 12 nautical miles. Proclaim loudly but push China gently,

Conflicting interests in the South China Sea mean disaster will arrive by accident and escalation will rest on disastrous miscalculation. What China does on Scarborough Shoal after The Hague judgement will show how much more miss and mess is being mixed into the calculation.

South China Sea is a lead indicator for China's security behaviour. But it ain't the whole game. Or even the biggest game.

Flip across to eco-world for a moment. China isn't interested in tearing up this international rules-based order because it's a winner.

China sits up top of eco-world and wants more; ideally more on its own terms. Beijing is a status quo tidal power. The status quo at home is sacrosanct, while the tidal shift elsewhere should be as slow as it is steady. The tide is shifting their way (riches, power, prestige) and they want it to keep flowing-gently.

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The Biggest China 'Threat': War in the South China Sea or Economic Meltdown?

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If China's future course is the vital question, the answers in economy-world are different to those in security-world. The versions of China offered in the two worlds clash in nature, form and quality. In security-world, the worry is an ever stronger China.

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Since the US pivot to Asia was announced in 2011, there has been a growing focus on China's increasing assertiveness rather than peaceful development.

PLA Navy actions in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute in 2012, and its expansion into the South China Sea, regardless of international conventions are worrying. Contrasting this, China is increasingly positively engaging with AIIB, OBOR and international peacekeeping. Yet all China's AIIB projects went to one country... Pakistan.Why?

However, how should we view a unipolar world? How is power balanced between Great Powers. Is a revisionist or status quo approach required to balance power in Unipoloar world?
Who within China exactly is the threat? CCP, PLA or SOEs?

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The Chinese Communist Party is Beijing, remains highly popular. The legitimacy of the CCP has been improved by Xi's pushing of the four comprehensives. What is interesting is that the challenges to the legitimacy are not the enduring aspects of authoritarian regime but the dissatisfaction with the everyday inconveniences or problems. Access to safe food i.e. baby formula, clean environment - with smog being an issues and employment with the benefits of hukou all seem to present larger challenges to the legitimacy of the Party.

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Within Western societies, civil society and NGOs act as a balance against government and provide an avenue for social issues to become known. With the Chinese Government mandating all foreign NGOs have a party presence, will the CCP gain access to information to build understanding of the broader social issues that the NGO is seeking to address or will movements be suppressed in the name of social harmony?

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China has passed new laws on foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) state media said, amid criticism.

The full text was not immediately available, but previous drafts stated that NGOs would have to submit to police supervision and declare sources of funding.

Critics say the laws amount to a crackdown, but China has argued that such regulation is long overdue.

There are currently more than 7,000 foreign NGOs operating in China.

The bill has undergone several drafts after international criticism that it was too onerous. The White House has said the bill will "further narrow space for civil society" and constrain US-China exchanges.

Amnesty International said on Thursday that the law was aimed at "further smothering civil society", and called on China to scrap it.

"The authorities - particularly the police - will have virtually unchecked powers to target NGOs, restrict their activities, and ultimately stifle civil society," said William Nee, Amnesty's China Researcher.

"The law presents a very real threat to the legitimate work of independent NGOs and should be immediately revoked."

The Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders described the law as "draconian" and said it would have "a profoundly detrimental impact on civil society in China".

The group said police would be allowed to exercise daily supervision and monitoring of foreign NGOs.

Stephen McDonell, BBC News, Beijing

Officials in Beijing say that for too long overseas organisations have been operating in an unregulated environment and that the new system will set clear boundaries governing their behaviour.

However some charities, environmental groups and aid organisations see this as a potential tool to crackdown on civil society in China.

They fear that new regulations could provide a smokescreen for what is actually political decision making by giving officials a range of measures to clamp down on NGOs found to be in breach of various technical requirements.

What was adding to stress levels prior to the introduction of the laws is that many were confused about the details.

People are asking: Who do they cover? What will the laws mean for their day to day operations? What are they really designed to do?

Xinhua reported the law had been passed by the national legislature on Thursday, without giving details of any amendments.

The state news agency reported this week that some restrictions would be eased, such as allowing more than one office on the mainland, and removing a proposed five-year limit on operations.

But other key features were likely to remain, said the Global Times, namely heavy police oversight where foreign NGOs must register with public security departments and must submit to their management.

Previous drafts stated that police would have the right to check the offices of NGOs, seal their offices, question employees and cancel activities judged as threats to national security.

Foreign NGOs would also be banned from recruiting members in mainland China, previous drafts had suggested.

Critics had also raised fears that the definition of what constitutes actions that harm China's national interests was too vague.

Correspondents said the ambiguity largely remained in the final version of the law.

Officials who briefed reporters on Thursday declined to give specific examples of actions by NGOs that could constitute such violations, Reuters reported.

"If there are a few foreign NGOs, holding high the banner of co-operation and exchange, coming to engage in illegal activities or even committing criminal acts, our Ministry of Public Security should stop it, and even enact punishments," said Guo Linmao, of the National People's Congress Standing Committee.

The move comes after January's high profile detention of Peter Dahlin, a Swedish NGO worker who was accused of damaging national security.

He made a state television confession - which is rare for foreign detainees - before he was deported. He and his group were accused of breaking the law by supporting the efforts of Chinese human rights lawyers.

Local NGOs and activists are heavily policed and have been subject to increasing crackdowns under President Xi Jinping's rule. Last summer saw sweeping arrests of nearly 300 lawyers and activists.

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China has passed new laws on foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) state media said, amid criticism. The full text was not immediately available, but previous drafts stated that NGOs would have to submit to police supervision and declare sources of funding. Critics say the laws amount to a crackdown, but China has argued that such regulation is long overdue.

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How can the Party balance, development of a society, political legitimacy and environmental degradation?

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How can the Party balance, development of a society, political legitimacy and environmental degradation?

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Introduction

China's environmental crisis is one of the most pressing challenges to emerge from the country's rapid industrialization. Its economic rise, in which GDP grew on average 10 percent each year for more than a decade, has come at the expense of its environment and public health. China is the world's largest source of carbon emissions, and the air quality of many of its major cities fails to meet international health standards. Life expectancy north of the Huai River is 5.5 years lower than in the south due to air pollution ( life expectancy in China is 75.3 years, according to 2013 UN figures). Severe water contamination and scarcity have compounded land deterioration. Environmental degradation threatens to undermine the country's growth and exhausts public patience with the pace of reform. It has also bruised China's international standing and endangered domestic stability as the ruling party faces increasing scrutiny and public discontent. More recently, amid waning economic growth, leaders in Beijing appear more determined to institute changes to stem further degradation.

A History of Pollution

While China's economic boom has greatly accelerated the devastation of its land and resources, the roots of its environmental problem stretch back centuries. Dynastic leaders who consolidated territory and developed China's economy exploited natural resources in ways that contributed to famines and natural disasters, writes CFR's Elizabeth C. Economy The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. "China's current environmental situation is the result not only of policy choices made today but also of attitudes, approaches, and institutions that have evolved over centuries," Economy writes.

It wasn't until the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment that China began to develop environmental institutions. It dispatched a delegation to the conference in Stockholm, but by then the country's environment was already in dire straits.

Economic reforms in the late 1970s that encouraged development in rural industries further exacerbated the problem.

[Air pollution] mitigation has become a crucial political challenge for the country's political leadership.

Jane Nakano and Hong Yang,

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping implemented a series of reforms that diffused authority to the provinces, creating a proliferation of township and village enterprises (TVEs). By 1997, TVEs generated almost a third of national GDP, though TVEs have since declined in relative importance to the Chinese economy. But local governments were difficult to monitor and seldom upheld environmental standards. Today, with a transitioning Chinese economy fueled by large state-owned enterprises, environmental policies remain difficult to enforce at the local level, where officials often prioritize hitting economic targets over environmental concerns. Despite the government's stated goals, actual change to environmental policies and effective implementation will require revisiting state-society and state-market relations and China's bureaucratic power structure, writes CFR's Yanzhong Huang.

China's modernization has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and created a booming middle class. In some ways, the country's trajectory of industrialization is not unlike those of other modernizing nations, such as the UK in the early nineteenth century. But experts say China's environmental footprint is far greater than that of any other single country.

How Bad Is It?

China is the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, having overtaken the United States in 2007, and was responsible for 27 percent of global emissions in 2014.

Coal is largely to blame for the degradation of air quality. China is the world's largest coal producer and accounts for about half of global consumption. Mostly burned in the north, coal provides around two-thirds of China's energy mix; however, demand for it appears to be declining. China's National Energy Agency claimed that coal use dropped to 64.2 percent of the mix in 2014, down almost two percent from 2012. This drop in coal demand also comes as China's economy is slowing, with its central bank forecasting that annual growth will only expand by 6.8 percent in 2016, down from 6.9 percent a year earlier. Still, doubts linger of China's commitment to wean itself from coal. In 2015, China's coal power plant capacity increased by 55 percent in the first six months, 155 new coal-fired plants were approved, and China admitted that it had underreported its annual coal consumption since 2000.

Industry along China's major water sources has polluted water supplies: In 2014, groundwater supplies in more than 60 percent of major cities were categorized as "bad to very bad," and more than a quarter of China's key rivers are " unfit for human contact." And lack of waste removal and proper processing has exacerbated problems. Combined with negligent farming practices, overgrazing, and the effects of climate change, the water crisis has turned much of China's arable land into desert. About 1.05 million square miles of China's landmass are undergoing desertification, affecting more than 400 million people, according to the deputy head of China's State Forestry Administration. Water scarcity, pollution, and desertification are reducing China's ability to sustain its industrial output and produce food and drinkable water for its large population.

Cost of Environmental Damage

Environmental depredations pose a serious threat to China's economic growth, costing the country roughly 3 to 10 percent of its gross national income, according to various estimates. China's Ministry of Environmental Protection calculates estimates the cost of pollution at around 1.5 trillion RMB ($227 billion), or roughly 3.5 percent of GDP, according to 2010 figures. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the ministry only releases such figures intermittently.

Data on the toll of China's pollution on public health paint a devastating picture. Air pollution contributes to an estimated 1.2 million premature deaths in China annually. Epidemiological studies conducted since the 1980s in northern China suggest that poor air quality in Chinese cities causes significant health complications, including respiratory, cardiovascular, and cerebrovascular diseases. Pollution has also been linked to the proliferation of acute and chronic diseases; estimates suggest that around 11 percent of digestive-system cancers in China may stem from unsafe drinking water.

Recent studies have reported that emissions from China's export industries are worsening air pollution as far as the western United States. China's neighbors, including Japan and South Korea, have also expressed concern over acid rain and smog affecting their populations. Environmental ministers from the three northeast Asian countries agreed to boost cooperative efforts to curb air pollution and to protect water quality and the maritime environment in 2014.

The damage has also affected China's economic prospects as it continues to pursue extractive resources abroad, such as oil and other fossil fuels. Its economic partners, particularly in the developing world, face costly environmental burdens attached with doing business with China, write CFR's Economy and Michael Levi in By All Means Necessary, their book on China's quest for resources.

Citizen Outrage

Environmental damage has cost China dearly, but the greatest collateral damage for the ruling Communist Party has likely been growing social unrest. Demonstrations have proliferated as citizens gain awareness of the health threats and means of organized protest (often using social media). In 2013, Chen Jiping, former leading member of the party's Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs said that environmental issues are a major reason for "mass incidents" in China-unofficial gatherings of one hundred or more that range from peaceful protest to rioting. Environmental protests in rural and urban areas alike-such as those in Guangdong, Shanghai, Ningbo, and Kunming-are increasing in frequency. The number of " abrupt environmental incidents ", including protests, in 2013 rose to 712 cases, a 31 percent uptick from the previous year.

CFR's Economy points out that one of the most important changes in China's environmental protest movement has been a shift, beginning in the late 2000s, from predominantlyrural-based protests to urban-based movements. The issue has worried the top leadership, which views the unrest as a threat to the party's legitimacy. "Air pollution in China has turned into a major social problem and its mitigation has become a crucial political challenge for the country's political leadership," write Center for Strategic and International Studies's Jane Nakano and Hong Yang. Yet the government has responded to public outcries: Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared a "war on pollution" in March 2014; in May of the same year the government strengthened the country's Environmental Protection Law for the first time in twenty-five years. Such moves reflect "a changing understanding within China about the relationship between economic development and societal wellbeing," Economy and Levi write.

The internet has played a crucial role in allowing citizens to spread information about the environment, placing additional political pressure on the government. In March 2015, Under the Dome, a TED Talk-style documentary on China's air pollution, went viral, attracting hundreds of thousands of views before internet censors blocked access, and in 2013 the discovery of thousands of dead pigs in the Huangpu river also spread rapidly online. However, experts say the jury is still out on the current government will implement meaningful reforms, which has shown more resolve in cracking down on public dissent than implementing environmental measures.

What's Being Done?

What we're seeing now is an entirely new administration with an entirely different outlook on climate change.

China is one of the biggest investors in renewables, investing nearly $90 billion in 2014 as part of its pledge to cut its carbon intensity (far outspending the United States' $51.8 billion). Some analysts have predicted that China is on track to overtake the United States as the world's leading producer of wind energy by 2016. Meanwhile, Chinese firms continue to invest in and partner with international companies to develop renewable energy technologies.

Though policy implementation has been inconsistent, the environmental NGO community has grown to push the government to stay on track. Thousands of these groups-often working with U.S. and foreign counterparts-push for transparency, investigate corruption, and head grassroots campaigns. Friends of Nature is one of its oldest; Global Village and Green Home are among other well-known NGOs. Despite state support, these organizations inevitably face constraints from government fear that their activities could catalyze democratic social change.

Despite the political reforms needed to catalyze any real change in the environmental sphere, the response to China's crisis has triggered some optimism about the future. "What we're seeing now is an entirely new administration with an entirely different outlook on climate change," writes Greenpeace East Asia's Li Shuo. China, once reluctant to take a stand on environmental issues and climate change, emerged as a leader in negotiations at the 2015 UN Climate Conference in Paris where 195 countries signed a breakthrough accord. While China deserves due credit for its ambitious efforts to curtail its own environmental crisis, Economy says it cannot be assumed that Beijing will follow through on its promises. "The proof will be on the ground -and of course, in the atmosphere."

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China's environmental crisis is one of the most pressing challenges to emerge from the country's rapid industrialization. Its economic rise, in which GDP grew on average 10 percent each year for more than a decade, has come at the expense of its environment and public health.

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Week 8 - the Party's legitimacy and the environment

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Week 8 - the Party's legitimacy and the environment

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Pollution is one of the largest policy challenges and challenges to the standing of the CCP. This map provides a useful visual of the impacts of coal plant emission on Chinese health.

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China coal plant emissions by health impact

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40th Anniversary of Mao's Death - his legacy lives on

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40th Anniversary of Mao's Death - his legacy lives on

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Reflecting on China 40 years after Mao's death, the anniversary which had in past evoked so much public sympathy and outpouring of devotion to the Red Sun in the Sky, was subdued this year. Yet his image and presence are still a daily component of peoples lives.

As China approaches 2021 and becoming a moderately prosperous society, the CCP remains firmly in control. Leninist political control over the economic means of production. It struck me that Mao's Ten Helpful's remain an indelible guiding influence, appropriating external policies for domestic political purposes is as true of capitalism now, as it was of Mao talking about appropriating the right components of Soviet Unions socialism.

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Four decades after Mao Zedong died, the dictator's life is being marked with solemn pilgrimages, online braised-pork tributes - and little official fanfare.

Chinese government policy dictates that past leaders' birthdays, rather than the anniversary of their passing, get celebrated, and official notice of the date has so far been muted.

In Mao's hometown of Shaoshan, thousands of pilgrims are arriving to pay tribute and lay flowers for him in a public square, said Li Wentao, who works for a local history and e-commerce website devoted to Mao. For those unable to go in person, she said the site is also encouraging people to send virtual chrysanthemums, cigarettes and dishes of red-braised pork (one of Mao's favorites) via a special platform they've built online.

Historians estimate more than 30 million Chinese perished because of Mao's policies during his years in power, which were marked by both man-made famine and mass political persecution. In more recent years, the founder of the People's Republic of China has become a rallying point for leftists within the party discomfited by the country's economic reforms. He also remains beloved by many, with his face emblazoned everywhere from car dashboard decorations to calendars and other paraphernalia-as well as on the Chinese currency, the yuan.

Ms. Li said such adulation is a good thing. "China is a country that lacks faith, not like Western countries," she said. "To have faith in Mao Zedong is something that helps people."

Not all have similarly reverent views. This week, a campaign that allowed people to send electronic flowers in tribute to Mao circulated widely on the Chinese messaging app WeChat, urging users to "Use 0.5kb of data to remember 'Chairman Mao!'"

After scrolling through, viewers were confronted with a variety of ads, including one that appeared to advertise treatment for erectile dysfunction.

It was unclear who produced the campaign. Later versions of the tribute appeared scrubbed of any ad content.

As of Friday morning, more than 1.8 million people had sent virtual flowers.

On Friday, China's censors tamped down online discussion of the anniversary. The Communist Party's People's Daily newspaper circulated a series of Mao photos and some of his quotes via its verified account on the Weibo microblogging platform with the exhortation, "Review it and recall it fondly!" Those attempting to comment on the message received a notice, "Comment is forbidden on this Weibo."

The tight leash on Mao-related commentary didn't go unnoticed. "Today marks the day we observe 40 years since Chairman Mao passed. I searched online for most of the day and couldn't find much commemoration activities," wrote one Weibo user.

Another user contrasted it against the 2014 anniversary of the death of former Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang, a political and economic liberal. "[At the time], all kinds of media and officialdom were paying unbridled tribute. But this year on the 40th anniversary of Mao's death, it's this quiet. Especially today, you don't even see a few comments here or there."

Beijing keeps a careful watch on neo-Maoists, fearful that their critiques might blossom into a more muscular political movement. Ironically, a volunteer with the Hong Kong Society of Mao Zedong Thought said he had the impression it was easier to be a neo-Maoist in the capitalist hub of Hong Kong than in the mainland, which he left in 1995. "There are lots of celebrations that will happen there," said Mr. Li, whose society is convening a symposium on Mao's legacy. "But people won't hear about them, they are censored."

Ever since Mao died, subsequent Chinese leaders have "betrayed the Chinese people," he said. "Now Chinese farmers lose their land, workers are laid off, and the rich steal the wealth of the nation." Still, he said trends have improved under current leader Xi Jinping, whom he credited with taking measures to strengthen the party, including through a vast antigraft campaign.

In Australia, multiple concerts planned to commemorate the anniversary of Mao's death were later canceled following widespread condemnation.

News that a Cantonese opera about Mao's life will be staged next month in a Hong Kong theater has also sparked a backlash. For his part, Hong Kong playwright and feng shui practitioner Li Kui-ming, who penned "Mao," says that the controversy is overblown, and that the production received no government support. "We're not interested in doing something political, we are doing art," he said.

Reached by phone, Fan Jinggang of the popular mainland Maoist site Utopia said the site planned no special commemorations, in accordance with official practice of focusing tribute on past leaders' birthdays. "But of course, Mao Zedong's spirit is eternal," he said.
-Te-Ping Chen with contributions from Olivia Geng. Follow her on Twitter @tepingchen.

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Official Tributes to Mao Subdued on 40th Anniversary of His Death

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Four decades after Mao Zedong died, the dictator's life is being marked with solemn pilgrimages, online braised-pork tributes - and little official fanfare. Chinese government policy dictates that past leaders' birthdays, rather than the anniversary of their passing, get celebrated, and official notice of the date has so far been muted.

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This week is all about the influence of Mao on contemporary China. How does Mao, some 40 years after his death, continue to loom large over society. From his portrait hanging over Tianneman Square to Xi's government control his presence looms large. I mention Xi for several reasons. First, he controls more Leading Small Groups than any leader, including Mao. Second, his sustained education and mass line campaigns have tightened have served to remind Chinese of the importance of the CCP, while reinforcing within the Party the a culture devoted socialist ideals. To me, Xi's campaign of mass line reform has all the hallmarks of Mao's anti-rightist movement. Both are a reaction to a tighten the CCPs control over the political discourse after a period of loosening.

So what is the trajectory the CCP and China? How does Mao Zedong thought factor into current China?

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mao zedong propaganda music Red Sun in the Sky

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There is a changing power balance in the international arena, that is softening the criticisms of China' s human rights imbalances.

Nations are being subjected to a challenging situation in which their rights to participate to Chinese growth is subject to specific conditions.

China's cessation of trade with Australian dairy company Devondale, during a visit by PM Turnbull to china is case in point. Chinese will utilise a range of policy arms to coerce nations.

Human Rights apply to all human beings and China's human rights record is worrisome. Whether it be access to a fair trial or be free from persecution for religious beliefs, for example people have innate rights. How the CCP addresses this as China becomes increasingly powerful is important to the citizens of China.

Interestingly, there is a large focus on civil and political rights in China. Yet, China provides housing, access to education, healthcare and employment at rates that significantly higher than democratic nations such as India. This presented me with a dilemma what would I choose?

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Human Rights, do you know your rights? I didn't.

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Human Rights, do you know your rights? I didn't.

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It's always interesting when discussions emerge about human rights, it invariably focuses on the political system. Freedom of expression and taking part in the government (voting) are rights frequently debated. But what about the right to own property, equality before the law or life, liberty and security of person?

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 Collective rights and the value of an individual to society

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 Collective rights and the value of an individual to society

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report: china mass harvesting organs from prisoners - cnn

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Report: China is still harvesting organs from prisoners

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A new report claims that China is still engaged in the widespread and systematic harvesting of organs from prisoners, and says that people whose views conflict with the ruling Chinese Communist Party are being murdered for their organs.

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How is change brought about? Words of Wisdom from first Dog on the moon.

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How is change brought about? Words of Wisdom from first Dog on the moon.

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This carton for me, highlighted the dilemma of change. How to highlight a problem and then seek a recourse to address that problem.

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The world is full of many terrible things and each one deserves a cartoon | First Dog on the Moon

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How can I save the world if I don't get a cartoon done about every bad thing that is happening in the world?

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Was this model ever going to be sustainable or was the collective need for social stability, in this case, so great that it led to a temporary democratic exception?

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A fishing village in southern Guangdong province, once a standard-bearer for small-time democracy in China, has now become a political disaster - and the most-censored term on Chinese social media.

In September 2011, amid protests over land sales in the village of Wukan, residents closed off roads leading in to the village and expelled local governing officials. Police laid siege as residents stockpiled food. Villagers conspicuously proclaimed their loyalty to the ruling Communist Party during the protest, indicating that they were not rebelling against it, but asking for its intervention. In what is sometimes called the "Wukan model" for handling dissent, the dispute was eventually resolved when the provincial party secretary negotiated with the villagers, granting them the right to elect a local leader.

The sudden detention of that democratically-elected leader, Wukan Communist Party Secretary Lin Zulian, has mobilized Wukan residents to protest once again, and has kicked China's massive online censorship apparatus into high gear. Some time in mid-June, Lin posted a letter to his account on Weibo, China's Twitter-like microblogging platform, announcing his intent to organize a mass demonstration protesting further illegal land sales, a practice endemic in China in which local governments seize land, often held by small farmers, for lucrative resale to commercial ventures.

But days later, on Friday, June 17, dozens of police cars arrived in Wukan; Lin was detained early the next morning. Law enforcement authorities in Lufeng City, which oversees Wukan, released a statement that Lin was suspected of taking bribes. Local residents claim there's been another land grab, and many felt the allegations were a cover for silencing Lin. According to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, 400 police faced off with villagers for several hours on June 18. On June 19, thousands of residents marched to the slogan "Return our secretary," according to one resident's interview with the New York Times.

As often happens during protests, Wukan residents soon took to the internet. They posted videos and pictures of the village surrounded by police, and shared images of recovered surveillance video of Lin being taken away in the middle of the night. But in what has become a common tale pitting netizens against China's increasingly controlled web, many posts were quickly taken down in a swift flurry of censorship. On June 19 and June 20, "Wukan" and "villagers" were the most censored terms on Weibo, according to censorship tracker Weiboscope, operated by the Journalism and Media Studies Center at the University of Hong Kong. Lin's account is now deactivated. After the extensive elimination of Wukan-related posts and comments, only a few news stories from certain media and updates from government accounts are still available on Weibo. In an open letter published online by the local police department, villagers have been asked to cooperate with Lin's investigation and to avoid "extreme actions."

Only a fraction of the hundreds of comments that poured in on social media remain, but what's left evinces support of Lin and the villagers. A user who claimed to be from Wukan wrote, "Secretary Lin is the one we voted for, one person, one vote. Our Wukan needs Secretary Lin." The user also disavowed the strong police showing to arrest a "more than 70-year-old man." Another added, "Everyone in Lufeng knows about this. He is a white-haired old man fighting for his people. He's been laden with trumped-up charges." One Weibo user asked if the act was "revenge" for Lin's previous activism.

While journalists continue to have access to Wukan, netizens widely reposted a video clip of a Wukan government official cursing and threatening Hong Kong reporters on June 20. The official, identified as the deputy mayor of Donghai county, which administers Wukan, barked at reporters, brandished an umbrella threateningly, and used it to shield himself from cameras as if it were a truncheon. One reporter shouted back, "You shouldn't curse ... You're a government official." In a subsequent shot, Zhang Shuijin, appointed by the county as Lin's replacement shortly after his arrest, tried to calm down the villagers but was called out by an unidentified woman in a flowered shirt for "selling out the village."

Local government land grabs are endemic across China, leading to thousands of protests each year as landholders try to obtain fair compensation. Land sales are a major source of income for many local governments, which sometimes aim to boost development through expensive construction or infrastructure projects. In the process of clearing land for such projects, local officials often compensate farmers with only a fraction of the seized land's value. A 2011 survey of 1,791 farmers conducted across 17 provinces revealed that farmers whose land has been taken received an average of $17,850 per acre in compensation - whereas authorities pocketed an average of about $740,000 per acre after resale, largely for commercial ventures. It's unsurprising, then, that Wukan protesters seem to have struck a collective nerve across the country.

The redux in Wukan highlights an irony central to the rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who took power in late 2012. Xi's signature policy has been a sweeping campaign against corruption, as well as harsh crackdowns on dissenting speech. Yet sometimes speech is necessary to highlight corruption, as it was in Wukan several years ago. That's a reality that prevailing authorities don't seem to accept. As a June 20 editorial in party-owned newspaper Global Times stated in response to the Wukan protests, "If the drastic actions of the Wukan villagers are adopted by other people involved in disputes, China will see mess and disturbance at a grass-roots level." In Xi's China, the negotiation that mollified Wukan residents in 2011 may no longer be possible. Yet the corruption there continues.

MARK RALSTON/AFP/Getty Images

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'Wukan,' Once a Byword for Chinese Democracy, Now Censored

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A fishing village in southern Guangdong province, once a standard-bearer for small-time democracy in China, has now become a political disaster - and the most-censored term on Chinese social media. In September 2011, amid protests over land sales in the village of Wukan, residents closed off roads leading in to the village and expelled local governing officials.

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In what is seen as an attempt to rein in Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan (second from the left), President Xi earlier this year asked the Party's disciplinary body (run by Wang Qishan, far right) inspect the Propaganda Department, which reports to Liu.

Academics, journalists and other free-thinking intellectuals have taken the bold step of calling for more freedom of expression and less Internet censorship. Others want to resuscitate long-stalled political reform. For the first time since Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, the official media have also run articles that seem to challenge the supremacy of the President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the Chinese tradition, open expressions of dissent usually occur when major factions of the party are engaged in a power struggle. Given the overall conservative nature of the leadership, however, it is unlikely that a new round of what late patriarch Deng Xiaoping called "thought liberation" is in the offing.

In June, seventy-eight scientists from the elite Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and other top scientific and engineering institutes sent a petition to the CCP calling on General Secretary Xi to lift censorship of the Internet. The petition said Chinese researchers' failure to have access to the Internet would "greatly impede progress of science and technology in China." The official China Science News quoted one academic as saying that "stringent Internet control has resulted in severe losses to people engaged in scientific research" ( Voice of America, June 6; Radio Free Asia, June 2).

This show of defiance is notable as President Xi's power struggle with other factions of the party-particularly the Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction headed by former president Hu Jintao and the Shanghai Faction led by ex-president Jiang Zemin-intensifies in the run-up to the 19th Party Congress scheduled for next year (China Brief, May 11).

Even bolder than the academics' petition was a recent article in People's Daily that was construed as casting indirect aspersions on Xi's dictatorial statecraft. In a piece entitled "Absolutist egomania will bring a nasty demise to top cadres," commentator Hou Lihong appeared to zero in on Xi's power grab and one-upmanship. Although Hou cited mostly regional officials in her article, it is obvious that her critique could also be applied to supreme leader Xi. For example, Hou warned that yibashou ("No. 1 bosses"; 一把手) often made the mistake of "megalomania and the wanton use of power." "If the big boss regards his public authority as private power and looks upon own his words as policy, this egoistic use of power becomes very dangerous and will lead to a dismal end for the top leader," Hou noted ( People's Daily, June 13; Radio French International, June 13).

That the People's Daily dared run such an article has been attributed to behind-the-scenes maneuvers by Politburo Standing Committee (PBOC) member in charge of ideology and propaganda Liu Yunshan, who is considered a protégé of former president Jiang ( Apple Daily [Hong Kong], June 17). Xi's dissatisfaction with Liu was evidenced by the president's visit to the People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV last February, in which party chief called upon the three top media to xingdang (姓党) or "take the CCP as its surname." Xi's implicit criticism was that these mouthpieces had deviated from instructions laid down by the zhongyang, or central party authorities led by the General Secretary ( People's Daily, March 9; Xinhua, February 19).

In what is seen as an attempt to rein in PBSC member Liu, President Xi earlier this year asked the Central Commission for Disciplinary Commission (CCDI) to assign a Central Inspection Team to the Department of Propaganda, which reports to Liu. The CCDI is headed by PBSC member Wang Qishan, a princeling who is considered Xi's closest ally. It is significant that instead of focusing on issues related to corruption, Wang Huaichen, the head of the inspection team, dwelled on the poor ideological standards of propaganda officials. In a report that was carried by most central media in June, Wang noted that cadres in the department "do not have a high political alertness, and there are discrepancies [with central edicts] in implementation of policies." Wang, a former head of the Political-Legal Department of the Sichuan Province Party Committee, also faulted the Propaganda Department for its failure to observe the "four consciousness" ("consciousness about politics; consciousness about the whole situation; consciousness about [obeying] the core [of the party]; and consciousness about seeing eye-to-eye [with the zhongyang]." The last two requirements-about cleaving to the "core" and the zhongyang-are understood to represent Xi's demands that his edicts must be followed ( China.com, June 8; Sina.com, June 8).

Xi's well-documented disagreement with Premier and PBSC member Li Keqiang-who heads the CYL Faction-has also resulted in a rare clash of views in the official media. A case in point is the now-famous interview given by an "authoritative figure" to People's Daily that was splashed across its front page on May 9. The authoritative figure, widely thought to be Liu He, Xi's chief economic adviser, disputed views given by the State Council (China's cabinet, which is headed by Premier Li) that the Chinese economy had attained a "rosy start" in the first quarter of this year. "The entrenched contradictions in the economy have not been defused, while new problems are more than anticipated," the article noted. The authoritative figure was quoted as saying the Chinese economy was headed toward an "L-shaped trajectory" and that this trend would last for "more than one, two years." He then laid into government officials who favored aggressive monetary and fiscal policy to boost the economy through means including infrastructure projects that are bankrolled by loans. "Our economy has sufficient potentials and resilience... the speed of growth will not fall much even without stimulus," he concluded. As to what can be done, the authoritative figure suggested measures recommended by President Xi: "lowering [production] capacity, reducing inventory, deleveraging, cutting production costs and boosting weak sectors" ( People's Daily, May 9; New Beijing Post, May 9).

Li's forces struck back within a week. Guo Tongxin (a collective pen name for the National Statistical Bureau of the State Council) published an article in the May 16 edition of People's Daily arguing that "our economy has attained a relatively good start [and that] it is being run in a stable manner...The economic structure is being optimized and people's livelihood has improved." "The national economy has on the whole followed a steady track and progress has been made in the midst of stability." The piece also denied that economic growth had been attained due to over-leveraging, or excessive debt accumulation. It noted that steady expansion of the economy was due to "the ignition of reform, the boosting of innovation, and the push of [structural] transformation" ( Xinhua, May 16; People's Daily, May 16).

Apparently because of the "struggle between the two lines" at the apex of the party, a number of academics have expressed dissimilar opinions on the future directions of the economy. While some support the stance favored by Xi and Liu He, quite a few experts have faulted the views of the "authoritative figure" as contained in the May 9 People's Daily article. For example, well-known Fudan University economist Zhang Jun pointed out that "boosting economic growth is more important than deleveraging." Yao Yang, an expert on development economics at Peking University, stressed that excessive curtailment of capacity would hurt economic growth: "Lowering production capacity, reducing inventory and deleveraging will depress overall demand and hurt economic expansion" ( Ming Pao [Hong Kong], June 9; Phoenix TV Net, June 8).

Free-thinking intellectuals who were hemmed in by Xi's apparent restoration of Maoist norms have also spoken out. This is true particularly of retired cadres who once worked for former party secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who are still revered as the CCP's icons of liberalization. For example, Li Rui, who once served as Mao's personal secretary, pointed out in an article this spring that without overall political reform, the country would remain backward and it would be unable to claim a leading place in the community of nations. "Reform of the party and improvement in society depends on science and democracy," Li wrote. "These are universal values" ( VOA, April 18; Sohu.com, April 18). In a similar vein, former head of the America Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Zi Zhongxun noted that "when there is absence of freedom of expression and rule of law, coupled with severe social inequality, social elite such as public intellectuals should speak out to uphold justice" ( 360doc.com [Beijing], June 19; Sohu.com, June 17).

Despite the challenges he faces, Xi is still the most powerful CCP leader since Mao Zedong. Political circles in Beijing are watching whether the supreme leader will allow this relatively daring outpouring of opinions to continue. On the one hand, it is in the vested interest of the party General Secretary to at least project a façade of unity within the party as preparations for the Congress are switching into high gear. On the other hand, if Xi succeeds in marginalizing his political foes, he may soon be tempted to reintroduce Chairman Mao's notorious "one voice chamber."

Xi's ambivalence regarding giving more leeway to intellectuals is reflected in two recent talks. In a seminar with intellectuals, model workers and youth representatives in Hebei, Anhui Province last April, Xi sounded a conciliatory note to members of the educated class. "To bravely set trends and to spearhead innovation is the requisite characteristic of the great masses of intellectuals," the President said. "We should enthusiastically welcome the ideas and criticisms of intellectuals provided that they are well motivated," Xi said, adding that the party should adopt the "right" kind of suggestions from the educated classes. "We should be more tolerant and magnanimous toward ideas and criticisms that are off the mark or even wrong," Xi argued. Using a well-known Chinese proverb, Xi said the authorities should not "grab hold of the pigtails [of intellectuals], pin [pejorative] labels on them or hit them with sticks" ( Xinhua, April 30; South China Morning Post, April 30).

That Xi is not prepared to give intellectuals a significantly longer leash, however, is evident from his much-noted speech on the role of philosophy and the social sciences in nation-building. While talking to an elite group of scholars and professors in May, Xi pointed out that they must always regard Marxism as the be-all and end-all of knowledge. "The facts have proven that, irrespective of changing times... Marxism still demonstrates the powerful force of a scientific theory and it still occupies the high ground in terms of truth and morality," Xi said. Academics, researchers and cadres in general should "self-consciously insist upon the guidance of Marxism," Xi noted. "They should have clear-cut theoretical consciousness, resolute political beliefs, and a scientific way of thinking" based on Marxism and socialism with Chinese characteristics, the party chief said ( People's Daily, May 18). Yet taking the old road of orthodoxy could stifle creativity and innovation that the CCP badly needs to inject new momentum to reform, which remains the most potent pillar of legitimacy for the 95-year-old party.
Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Center for China Studies, the History Department and the Program of Master's in Global Political Economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is the author of five books on China, including "Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?," which is available for purchase.

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Intellectuals Lobby For More Freedom As President Xi Faces Pushback From Party Rivals - Jamestown

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Academics, journalists and other free-thinking intellectuals have taken the bold step of calling for more freedom of expression and less Internet censorship. Others want to resuscitate long-stalled political reform. For the first time since Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, the official media have also run articles that seem to challenge the supremacy of the President and General Secretary ...

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As China has economically developed, there has been an uneven development amongst Chinese about the notion of human rights. Land rights in particular is becoming a vexatious issue between local governments seeking to bolster revenue by grabbing land and rural workers whom are trying to block these land grabs disenfranchised.

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Neighbours of Chinese village protesting over land grabs are involved in similar disputes

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Residents of villages near Wukan in southern Guangdong province say they are involved in land disputes similar to their neighbour's, but are not being heard because they lack financial support and competent leadership....

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China's legal tradition is deeply entrenched. However, far from separating judicial and administrative functions their culture has infused the two together. Hong Kong finds itself as a living test case. China's one country 2 systems exposes the rub between China's and British legal tradition.

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British consul general: Hong Kong's 'one country, two systems' has worked 'incredibly well' since 1997 handover to China

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Britain's highest-ranking official in Hong Kong said on Thursday that "one country, two systems" had worked "incredibly well" and any "small challenges" between the city and the mainland could be...

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Idea's from outside the beltway - where are they?

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Idea's from outside the beltway - where are they?

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In evaluating current events in China, I have observed that D.C, is at the forefront of analysis on China. Where are the divergent perspectives on China's contemporary context? Where is Rome, London, Moscow or Sydney ?  And where are the Beijing based English works?

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Looks like the road to rejuvenation has led many young Chinese out of China. The CCP has responded by not promoting "naked officials" those party members whose families reside outside of China. How will the CCP respond to a generation of entrepreneurs living beyond the Great Wall?

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Rudy Rong took a seat at a table in the Commerce Casino's poker hall, his legs jigging with nervous energy.

The 22-year-old son of Chinese video game billionaires hadn't come here to gamble. Rong was launching a virtual reality startup, and he had arrived hours earlier to videotape a musical performance in the casino's ballroom for an investor demo.

But as Ping An, a pop star and former contestant in the singing show Voice of China, took the mic, Rong grew anxious, left the camera running onstage and retreated downstairs to the poker tables.

As he tossed a $100 bill on the green felt, his phone's glow illuminated bags under his eyes. His startup's app would be launching in a month, and he had been pushing himself hard, packing his schedule with coding sessions, media appearances and investor meetings.

As one of China's fuerdai - the scions of the country's new wealthy class famous throughout the world for flashy spending and driving fast cars - Rong wants to prove he can do more than inherit money.

A stack of chips appeared in front of him.

The game is No Limit Texas Hold 'Em, and when it came time for Rong to make his last bet before the dealer showed the final card, he took another look at his cards.

The odds of Rong getting another spade, completing a flush and winning the hand, were low.

But so are the odds of a 22-year-old USC student launching a successful startup. To win at anything, Rong believes, you must gamble.

The dealer flipped a queen of clubs. Another 100 dollars gone.

Rong frowned and reached for his wallet.

In recent years, Porsches, Lamborghinis and Ferraris have become common sights outside certain hotpot restaurants in the San Gabriel Valley.

Behind the wheels of these cars are fuerdai like Rudy, a generation born in the aftermath of China's economic miracle, with every imaginable resource at their disposal.

For many in China, the fuerdai symbolize the values lost in the modernizing country's mad dash for economic growth - diligence, humility and restraint.

Their exploits make headlines across the world and read like a cautionary tale of new wealth - "The Great Gatsby," but with China-sized fortunes:

The son of one of China's richest menbuys two Apple Watches, fastens them around his dog's forepaws, and posts it on social media to wild public outcry.

A local official's son tries to use his father's name as a get-out-of-jail-free card after killing two students in a car crash.

Rumors of wild orgies in coastal cities periodically surface through Weibo, China's Twitter.

And in Los Angeles, where many rich Chinese families send their kids to school, an 18-year-old UC Irvine student from China was arrested in Malibu after leading police on a 122 mph chase across the city in a BMW 750i, unaware that he was being pursued.

The fuerdais' antics have inspired such national anxiety that last year the Chinese government ordered 70 of these second generation nouveau riche to attend an education camp on Chinese values. There's widespread concern in China that wealth is warping the social compass, said Xiaofei Li, a political science professor at York College of Pennsylvania. In the new China, morality is often measured by how much money someone makes, not how they make it.

"There's a saying in China: People will laugh at someone who is poor, but they will not laugh at a prostitute," Li said.

There's a saying in China: People will laugh at someone who is poor, but they will not laugh at a prostitute.

Rong, a second-year student at USC, rents an office in a downtown skyscraper, spends weekends in his family's 5,900-square-foot house in Newport Beach and, depending on his mood, drives a Bentley Continental GT, a Rolls Royce Phantom, a Porsche Turbo Cayenne, a Cadillac, a Mercedes or a Range Rover - a fleet he keeps parked around town, some in spaces that go for up to $2,400 a year at the downtown Los Angeles high-rise where he has his apartment.

He freely identifies as fuerdai, but with one caveat.

"It just defines you as someone's son. We want to be known for ourselves," Rong said.

Five thousand dollars in cash fluttered over the dance floor at Lure, a Hollywood nightclub, like overpriced confetti. Rong raised his phone and hit record.

His video of that night in 2014 shows dancers ignoring the thumping bass beat, crawling after bills and leaping to snatch money from the air.

Beyond the dance floor, he says, bikini-clad models rolled cigars and lay on tables inviting patrons to suck body shots of expensive alcohol from their navels. Outside, late arrivals pulled up in gleaming sports cars and strutted along a red carpet.

When police responded to reports of underage drinking, Rong and his friends rented two buses and moved the festivities down the street to Cosmo, where, he says, actors James Franco and Seth Rogen made an appearance.

The party's chaotic extravagance was the product of Prime Union, a leisure club for young, wealthy, Chinese nationals in the U.S. that Rong and his friends created as college freshmen.

In exchange for a membership fee that eventually swelled to $20,000 a year, Prime Union organized private jets to Las Vegas, threw parties where members could eat sushi off the nude bodies of models and rented out mansions in the Hollywood Hills to show off their flashy cars and throw more parties.

Rong says he started the club because he wanted to "change the image of Chinese people" in America - an image, he believed, that consisted of little more than infrequent, unflattering roles in film and television, like Ken Jeong's turn as Chow in "the Hangover" movies.

Prime Union members, Rong said, didn't need to wait for acceptance and respect - they could buy it, and they could buy the clubs that wouldn't admit them, and throw parties where Chinese guys get all the girls. Their slogan reflected an almost nationalist ethos: "You were born differently. It's in your blood."

But that part of his life, Rong insists, is in the past. He quit the club a year ago. It wasn't making very much money, and after police shut down the October event, the club lost its credibility with members.

The parties had also left Rong jaded. He began to see that many of his friends - the sons and daughters of politicians and industry titans - were unhappy.

"I've seen so many second-generation rich who are craving to fill emptiness inside of them and their hearts," Rong says. "Every day is about the next party and the next girl. I don't want that to happen to me."

Last November, he withdrew $100,000 from an account his parents help fund and launched Magic Cube. He resolved to change his image.

On his Wechat feed, a photo stream of movie premieres, first-class-seat selfies and yacht hangouts has given way to photos of his employees coding late into the night and snaps of his economy class accommodations, a laptop jammed between his knees and the seat. A few weeks ago, working late at his office, he went online to post a late-night view of the dimming lights of downtown L.A. and captioned it with an F. Scott Fitzgerald quote:

"Whenever you feel like criticizing anyone... just remember that all the people in this world haven't had the advantages you've had."

The actresses... loosen up for the day's scenes--a pillow fight and a balloon popping contest.

Soon after coming to the U.S. as a high school student, Rong says he lost faith in the American Dream and began to subscribe to the notion of the Chinese Dream.

If the American Dream is the promise of prosperity in exchange for hard work, the Chinese Dream, in Rong's view, is the chance of immortality - the belief that anyone can become the richest man in the world, so long as he places the right bets.

Rong's bet is Magic Cube. His idea is to merge aspects of virtual reality, reality TV, live streaming video, online gaming, the social-influencer economy and big data for a product that Rong hopes is tailor-made for the Chinese economy: ever-changing, astronomically ambitious, and with a payoff of billions.

Users will participate in live-streamed games and television shows cast with social media stars and bid money in real time to influence the cast's actions. Data scientists will analyze the movements of users wearing 3D goggles to optimize the VR content. Users can buy watches, clothes and jewelry to own in the game, and eventually, virtual reality filmmakers will be able to create their own games and television shows for the platform.

Rong has spent the last few weeks making a demo for investors and trying to model the frugality that is required of a startup founder.

The money once spent on fancy restaurants and flashy clothes he now invests in the company. The last time he went to a club was to gather footage for an investor demo. He's thinking about selling his Bentley.

But Rong also recognizes that a billionaire's son has an image to uphold.

Before a recent shoot, building management tried to stop him from filming on the apartment complex's helipad. He bought 20 minutes by offering to rent another $2,400-a-year parking space.

As the actresses for the shoot arrive, he opens the refrigerator and extracts bottles of Johnnie Walker Black Label and Moet & Chandon champagne.

"Anybody want a drink?" he asks.

Kevin Chen, a longtime friend and co-founder of the startup, sets out glasses and clears away discarded cookie wrappers. The actresses, one of whom played a cheerleader in a Netflix Snoop Dogg movie, take sips to loosen up for the day's scenes - a pillow fight and a balloon popping contest.

The actresses play with Snapchat to pass the time. Ivan, a virtual reality filmmaker and Rong's collaborator, coaches them on their performances.

Rong sets the camera up, and the actresses begin to bash each other with pillows. He drapes an arm around Chen, listens to the thuds and high pitched giggles and gulps champagne.

"They're very good," he says giddily. "This is going to be very good."

Rong still sees his Prime Union friends from time to time. They always ask him if he wants to "get back on top" - rent out the Queen Mary for a party or buy a castle in the Hollywood Hills.

"I don't believe that you can have fun and make billions," he says. "To make a business, you work super hard. You give up your cars, you give up the girls, and you dig into it. Otherwise it'll never get off the ground."

In the final days before his startup's scheduled launch, Rong's flies back to China for his grandfather's funeral and is forced to push back his startup's launch date.

But to his family's dismay, he immediately catches a flight back Los Angeles, skipping some of the traditional mourning rituals so he can take a meeting with a Lionsgate producer about creating a virtual reality promo for the film "Nerve," a video-game thriller starring Dave Franco. He can't miss the opportunity.

He's close with his mother, and he spends much of the flight thinking about how he disappointed her. Before he left, she told him that he was disrespecting his family and his elders - one of the common criticisms of China's elite youth.

But he reminded himself that his mother, a video-game entrepreneur herself, had always taught him that he needed to make something of himself and create his own fortune. And making money, Rong decided, required sacrifice. He could only hope his mother would understand some day.

The Lionsgate meeting, he says, went well, and the next day, he sits down to brunch at Penthouse restaurant in Santa Monica with his girlfriend, Kathy Wang. He's sporting wispy stubble from the traditional three-day temple vigil for his grandfather, fighting a cold and wearing a hoodie and pajamas. He orders hot water.

The couple had a fight the night before, but then Rong changed his Wechat profile picture to include her, and the brunch is part of his apology. Afterward, they stroll along the pier, holding hands.

They pause, and Rong raises his girlfriend's rose gold iPhone and snaps a picture of her with the coastline in the background.

"You only took one picture?" She swats him playfully on the shoulder. "Can you try harder?"

He laughs and retakes the photo several more times before they continue down the pier, leaning into each other

Rong has never had a serious girlfriend. But he says that over the last six months, he has given up parties, gambling and womanizing, and perhaps it is time to try being a good boyfriend.

He has to grow up sometime.

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To be young, rich and Chinese in America: Amid all that flashy spending, a sense of loss

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Rudy Rong took a seat at a table in the Commerce Casino's poker hall, his legs jigging with nervous energy. The 22-year-old son of Chinese video game billionaires hadn't come here to gamble. Rong was launching a virtual reality startup, and he had arrived hours earlier to videotape a musical performance in the casino's ballroom for an investor demo.

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以前中国人走了在大路上，现在他们走在复兴之路上

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以前中国人走了在大路上，现在他们走在复兴之路上

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我们走在大路上　We Walk On the Great Road　[铜管乐版　Brass Instrumental]

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1967年毛主席第二次接见红卫兵。 Chairman Mao's second receiving of the Red Guards in 1967.

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This little video on youtube about Xi, got me thinking about how China crafts it's image at home and abroad

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Barack Obama Rap Song Dissing Donald Trump

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How should I address you- An affectionate song for our Xi Dada

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Recently a song goes viral on the Chinese social media platforms, affectionately singing about our President Xi Jinping. "How should I address you? You came from afar to our Miao ethnic village. How should I address you? You came to my house despite of the wind and rain." the lyric reads.

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Weekly Wrap Up - Is China Buying the world

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Weekly Wrap Up - Is China Buying the world

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First, it's important to define "China". With 1.3 Billion people, SOEs, private corporations and the CCP - there is not one single perspective or monolithic actor. But a diverse range of perspectives within China. Some dominant, some emerging and many more on the fringes.

Not all SOE's are equal, some seek to maximise profit and ignore the CCP, while others comply more readily with CCP.

Similarly there is not a monolithic perspective of the CCP. CCP differences between Shanghai vs Beijing spring to mind.

Second, geographic challenges also exist between the regions, whose local government are going into debt, and the centre who are trying to rein in spending.

Third, but what about the international stage? Well, internationally the CCP is struggling to make friends and influence people. Check out Goh's article on Chinese inability to convert economic influence into power in the South China Sea.

To undertand the fractured nature of CCP Foreign Policy, Linda Jackobson details how domestic power struggles, fractures China's capability to act coherently on the international stage.

Finally, what does it mean for citizens of foreign nations when SOEs come into the nation or an OFI occur? Does it affect their daily lives? Why does it matter? Japanese companies behaved similarly in the 1980's and 1990's, yet we are all here to write about it.

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Thinking about essay questions "How has this political party has changed but remained the same?"

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Thinking about essay questions "How has this political party has changed but remained the same?"

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Damien Ma on China's Political Transition

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Foreign Affairs Focus: China's Political Transition with Damien Ma Managing Editor Jonathan Tepperman interviews Eurasia Group analyst Damien Ma on China's upcoming political transition, economic slowdown, and social inequality. Mr. Ma discusses U.S.-China relations, the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute, and whether the political handover will have a negative effect on China's economy, endorsing a "New Deal with Chinese characteristics" to fix China's social ills.

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Representing their constituents interests, playing dog-whistle politics, or is this a matter of realpolitik?

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Representing their constituents interests, playing dog-whistle politics, or is this a matter of realpolitik?

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To me these comments by US presidential candidates have all the hallmarks of the 1980s and early 1990s when Japanese out manufactured the USA. Neither then nor now, could the US administration turn its back on its largest trading partner.

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A container ship tied up at a Chinese-financed port in Sri Lanka. Millions of jobs in China and across the region rely on the willingness of the United States to buy imports from China. Credit Credit Dinuka Liyanawatte/Reuters

HONG KONG - For Asia, the bad news this week was not that Donald J. Trump detailed a seven-point plan to toughen American trade policy, especially toward China. It was that Hillary Clinton's campaign accused Mr. Trump a few hours later of purloining her ideas, noting that she favored similar action on those issues.

A strong dose of economic populism, with an occasional sprinkling of geopolitics, has suffused the trade plans of the leading American presidential candidates this year. Vying for votes, Mr. Trump and Mrs. Clinton are each promising to do more to preserve American jobs at a time of slowing global economic growth. And China - with its vast trade, rising international influence and authoritarian government - is a natural target.

Presidential candidates vow every four years to do more to help American workers facing competition from abroad. After taking office, they have consistently pursued more conciliatory trade policies toward China, seeing a strategic benefit to warm relations with Beijing.

But broad political distress this year over the loss of well-paid working class jobs to global competition, coupled with mounting concern about China's increasingly assertive military posture, suggest that the next president could actually follow through on the pledges. If they do, the policies could pose a real predicament for China, and for other Asian countries that depend on its economy.

Millions of jobs in China and across the region require the continued willingness of the United States to rely overwhelmingly on imports to supply American families with everything from the clothes they wear to the smartphones they carry.

Rapid economic growth in China and the development of a strong consumer market had seemed to reduce the country's need for huge exports to the American market. But China's economy has recently slowed, hurting domestic players from small exporters to large steel makers.

Weaker growth at home has made it all the more important for China to maintain a large trade surplus with the United States, selling more to consumers and businesses there than it buys. For years, China has exported four times as much to the United States as it imports, and it continues to do so.

"If there are tougher trade policies from the United States," said Shen Jianguang, an economist at Mizuho Securities Asia, "that will dampen Chinese exports."

The candidates plan to take direct aim at the two countries' trade gap.

They want to label China as a currency manipulator that undervalues the renminbi to help its exporters win sales in overseas markets. They want to file more trade cases against China and impose more tariffs. They want to investigate how the Chinese government subsidizes businesses. They also want to rethink big trade deals.

Mr. Trump wants to scrap the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade agreement between the United States and a group of countries, mostly in Asia. Mrs. Clinton's campaign took a subtly different position, saying that she opposed the agreement in its current form.

The Asian countries involved in the trade pact, notably Vietnam and Japan, made significant concessions to American negotiators because they felt threatened by China's rise. Now, the presidential candidates are lumping them together with China, holding them responsible for killing American jobs.

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Donald J. Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee, in Monessen, Pa., on Tuesday. He wants to scrap the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Credit Hilary Swift for The New York Times

With few exceptions, Chinese officials have tried to steer clear of commenting on the American candidates. Even Chinese academics, the usual pipeline to Beijing's thinking, have been wary of doing so, to avoid being accused of violating China's policy of not interfering publicly in other countries' politics. To the extent that Chinese experts say anything, it is to express hope that this year's talk of getting tough on trade will not be a harbinger of policy shifts ahead.

"There is no big difference from previous presidential campaigns, only more emphasis, due to the poor world trade performances" and weak global economic prospects, said He Weiwen, a co-director of the China-U.S.-E.U. Study Center at the China Association of International Trade in Beijing.

The uncertainty for China, and much of Asia, is whether the candidates will sing the same trade tunes once in office. Mr. Trump's confrontational approach would seem to indicate some follow-through. Mrs. Clinton seems less likely to change American policies, given that she supported President Obama's free trade efforts during his first term of office, when she was secretary of state.

Former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and Mr. Obama, at least initially, all tried to help China become more involved in the world economy. They hoped that more enmeshed trade and financial relationships would mean a more democratic China with closer diplomatic ties to the West.

It seemed to work for a while. But in the last three years, China, under President Xi Jinping, has shifted toward more authoritarian rule.

China has embarked on a wide-ranging military buildup, constructed artificial islands with military-grade runways in the South China Sea and challenged Japan's control of a cluster of islands north of Taiwan. And a combination of strict censorship and comprehensive propaganda has fanned the already strong nationalism of the Chinese public.

Those geopolitics have left American policy makers with two choices, neither of them appetizing. Further trade with China and additional investments there by Western multinationals could strengthen the Chinese economy and help Beijing afford even more ambitious territorial and military policies. Discouraging trade and investment could cause lower economic growth that might slow China's military rise but also might feed anti-Western sentiment and foster public demands for more assertive foreign policy.

If the candidates' ideas became policy, China would almost certainly retaliate in some fashion. American exports, while sharply smaller than those China sends in the other direction, are a potential focus. Beijing has proved especially adept in the past at targeting American exports from swing states in presidential elections and closely fought congressional districts, maximizing its leverage in the political process even if the economic effects were limited.

The biggest immediate casualty of tougher trade policies could be the Obama administration's effort to strengthen relations with countries like Japan, Singapore and Vietnam as a way to balance China's growing muscle in East Asia. The economic centerpiece of the administration's so-called pivot to Asia has been the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. That agreement calls for dismantling barriers to American trade with many of the countries that find themselves increasingly uneasy about China's growing dominance.

Mr. Trump denounced the pact again on Tuesday, saying that it would force American workers to compete with low-paid Vietnamese workers. Mrs. Clinton, after supporting the early negotiations as secretary of state, has come out against the pact since the fall, saying that the deal does not go far enough to address issues like currency manipulation.

Yet canceling the trade pact could actually cause more problems, by pushing American allies in the region into China's arms and preventing American companies from developing in emerging Asian markets.

"If America kills the T.P.P.," said Kishore Mahbubani, the dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, "then China becomes the main center of economic gravity."

A version of this article appears in print on , on Page A17 of the New York edition with the headline: Both Clinton and Trump Signal Chillier Approach to Trading With China. Order Reprints | Today's Paper | Subscribe

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In Trade Stances Toward China, Clinton and Trump Both Signal a Chill

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HONG KONG - For Asia, the bad news this week was not that Donald J. Trump detailed a seven-point plan to toughen American trade policy, especially toward China. It was that Hillary Clinton's campaign accused Mr. Trump a few hours later of purloining her ideas, noting that she favored similar action on those issues.

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What are the military and foreign policy implication of China buying the world. This article highlights a growing consciousness within Chinese academia about Chinese foreign policy.

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Sinosphere

Yan Xuetong, the director of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, argues for a more assertive foreign policy for China in his latest book, "The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition." In the book, which the Chinese state news media has reviewed favorably, he advocates what he calls moral realism as a rising China challenges the United States for world leadership. This approach would combine a greater emphasis on forging military partnerships abroad while building a more humane society at home.

Mr. Yan, 64, holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, and in 2008 was listed among the world's top 100 public intellectuals by Foreign Policy magazine. In an interview, he explained why it is time for China to cut back on economic aid to other countries, why North Korea is not China's ally and why he sees rivalry but not war with the United States:

Q. You say that China should establish military alliances, like the United States does. China already provides military assistance to Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and some members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and is building a naval support installation in Djibouti. Should China have military bases in these countries?

A. For its own interests, China should consider having military bases in countries it considers allies. Unfortunately, the Chinese government insists on a nonalliance principle. It's too early to say where China would build military bases, since China now has only one real ally, Pakistan.

Q. You say that North Korea is not an ally despite the alliance treaty signed between the two countries in 1961. Why?

A. In 2013, China publicly denied that it had an alliance with North Korea and declared that the two simply had " normal relations." The two countries' leaders haven't met for years, and that's not how allies behave. China's relations with North Korea are worse than those with South Korea, which is an ally of the United States.

Q. What's holding China back from forming alliances?

A: Some believe it's due to a lack of military might, but I think it comes from not seeking truth from facts. The nonalliance principle adopted by the Chinese government in 1982 was the right strategy when China was a very weak power and served the country's interests well for two decades. But since then China has become the world's second-largest power, and the nonalliance principle no longer serves its interests. The major obstacle to China abandoning its nonalliance principle is years of propaganda criticizing alliances as part of a Cold War mentality.

Q. How can China acquire more allies? Provide more economic and military aid?

A. It's impossible to change the nature of China's relations with other countries with just economic assistance or loans. So I don't think China's One Belt, One Road initiative for economic development across Eurasia can fundamentally change the nature of the relations.

Q. You said recently that China should reduce its economic assistance to other countries. Why?

A. I think China should limit its economic assistance, including outright aid and loans, to 1 percent of its annual foreign reserves, which amounted to about $35 billion in 2015. The current amount has been way too high given China's capabilities. In most cases, loans to underdeveloped countries end up being written off rather than repaid.

We should scale back this economic assistance and switch to military aid. Military aid should be given to friendly countries to improve strategic cooperation and secure political support. But China should be very cautious about participating in military conflicts in the Middle East. China should learn a lesson from Russia's military involvement in Syria.

Q. How would China abandoning its nonalliance policy change the dynamics between China and United States?

A. Any change would only be positive. The more allies China makes, the more balanced and stable the relationship will be. The more China shies away from alliances, the greater the chance that Washington will contain China, therefore resulting in an unstable relationship.

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Yan Xuetong Credit Courtesy of Yan Xuetong

There won't be a direct war between the two sides, because they're both armed with nuclear weapons. The problem now is that the two are not willing to admit that they're in competition. They're still pretending to be friends.

During U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's visit to China in 2011, Xi Jinping suggested the idea of " healthy competition" between China and the United States, and this was well received by Biden. When both sides define the nature of their relationship as competition rather than cooperation, they have lower expectations of the other's friendly actions and higher tolerance of the other's hostile actions. Thus both sides will be cautious about provoking the other side and will avoid allowing conflicts to escalate to disaster.

Unfortunately, "healthy competition" was later replaced by a " new type of great power relations" [Mr. Xi's proposal of a relationship between equals based on cooperation and avoiding confrontation] and the chance for stabilizing bilateral relations perished.

Q. In recent years, some of China's neighbors seem to have felt less secure because of China's greater assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea. Has the Chinese approach backfired?

A. It's only the Philippines and Vietnam that have major disputes with China in the South China Sea, and they're just two of China's more than 30 neighbors. Singapore and Thailand, two longtime allies of the United States in the region, have become much closer to China in recent years.

China's South China Sea policy is only intended to safeguard its own interests, so I don't think it's overly assertive, but rather that previous policies were not forceful enough.

The South China Sea dispute is just an obstacle on China's path to greater power, which the United States has been unwilling to accept. It is a result, rather than the cause, of the rivalry between China and the United States. It will be up to the United States to decide if it wants to go to war with China for the sake of the Philippines and Vietnam. It's not China's call. The United States recently gave its support to Japan for its involvement in the South China Sea, which means the United States has not decided to confront China directly there.

Q. You say that moral realism means building a better society at home, under a form of leadership based on an ancient Chinese philosophy called humane authority. What does that mean specifically?

A. Moral realism involves leading by example, which means China needs to practice the moral principles it advocates to the world both at home and abroad. The core principles suggested by moral realism are fairness, justice and civility. Equality, democracy and freedom are also important principles advocated by moral realism.

Moral realism suggests that the essence of democracy should be the same for all countries including China, even though it takes different forms. The essence is that political leadership should be corrected by criticism from the people.

In ancient China, remonstration officials enjoyed immunity from punishment while delivering complaints directly to the emperor. Freedom of speech is necessary for a humane authority, but the remonstration official system is more important because it's a more efficient way of correcting strategic mistakes than freedom of speech.

Q. Wouldn't a "humane authority" lead the world by doing what is widely considered right? For example, should China sanction North Korea for its recent nuclear test?

A. That would be a Western hegemonic idea. A humane authority sees everyone on equal terms. If North Korea is not entitled to nuclear weapons, then China and the United States should guarantee North Korea its security in return for denuclearization. That's what we call leading by example and fairness. It's only Western countries that are calling for sanctions without considering a fair solution, and they make up only about 20 percent of the world's 195 countries.

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Q. and A.: Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More Assertive Foreign Policy

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Sinosphere Yan Xuetong, the director of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, argues for a more assertive foreign policy for China in his latest book, "The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition."

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Updated August 11, 2016 22:40:17

Federal Treasurer Scott Morrison has made a preliminary decision to block the sale of New South Wales electricity provider Ausgrid to Chinese and Hong Kong bidders, citing "national security concerns".

The Chinese Government-owned State Grid Corp and Hong Kong-listed Cheung Kong Infrastructure were bothbidding for a 99-year lease of Ausgrid, which supplies power to parts of Sydney, Wollongong and the Hunter region.

The decision is seen as a major setback for NSW Premier Mike Baird and Treasurer Gladys Berejiklian, whose government hopes to lease a 50 per cent stake in the asset for 99 years to help raise funds for infrastructure projects.

Mr Morrison said he could not detail the national security concerns, but said they applied to "all current applications".

"Ausgrid's footprint includes critical power and communications services that Ausgrid provides to business and government," he said.

"The national security concerns are not country-specific and relate to the transaction structure and the nature of the assets."

When pressed on the issue, he said:

"The only person who's security-cleared in this room to be able to hear the answer to that question is me."

Mr Morrison said the bidders would be given a week to respond to the preliminary decision before it was made final.

Last year, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) was criticised by the Government for running an advertising campaign against State Grid Corporation's possible investment in the network.

The ads warned that "selling the electricity network ... to another country is just not on", but then-treasurer Andrew Constance said they represented a "racist rant".

Mr Morrison said the Commonwealth had been actively engaged with the NSW Government as they sought to sell the energy provider.

"That process has not enabled us to identify suitable mitigations to protect against the national security issues in this case. And that, at the end of the day, is paramount," Mr Morrison said.

Former New South Wales premier Bob Carr said the Federal Government's decision may have been driven by xenophobia in the new political climate.

"I don't want to make a negative interpretation about Australia and Australian policy if I can avoid it, but it would appear to be that this is a reaction to that elevation of xenophobia and economic popular sentiment stirred up by the last election result," he told 7.30.

But Federal Energy Minister Josh Frydenberg denied politics was a factor in the move, saying it had not been made in response to concerns from Senate crossbenchers such as Nick Xenophon.

"This is not a political decision. This is a decision based on national security and based on those reasons, more details can't be provided," he told Sky News.

'A valuable asset with lots of interest': NSW Treasurer

The NSW Treasurer has downplayed the decision, saying if the sale falls over, there are plenty of other bidders.

"The [federal] Treasurer has indicated a timeframe for considering the process, and I want to stress this - no matter what the outcome in a week's time - this is a valuable asset with a lot of interest," Ms Berejiklian said.

She said there was no reason for her government to think there was a problem with either bidder.

"There were a number of people who came forward as bidders in December of last year," Ms Berejiklian said.

"At that time the Federal Government gives its indication as to which bidders were OK to proceed from that point in time."

"So along the process the Federal Government and its agencies had given the bidders every indication that they could continue through the process."

The Treasurer said the decision would not affect the Government's infrastructure vision for the state.

"As you know, we don't bank transactions until they happen," Ms Berejiklian said.

"I was very clear when we delivered the last state budget that the proceeds of Transgrid were in that budget, but the proceeds of this transaction were not accounted for.

"I anticipate that the money for this transaction will be banked in the next state budget."

In November, the NSW Government announced a consortium comprising of Canadian, Middle Eastern and local investors had won the 99-year lease for Transgrid, paying $10.3 billion to seal the deal.

Ausgrid was to be the next of the state's energy networks to be sold, followed by Endeavour Energy.

Opposition stages walk-out over issue

The Ausgrid decision was centre stage during question time at NSW Parliament where the Opposition staged a dramatic walk-out.

Six MPs had already been kicked out by the Speaker when all the other Labor MPs vacated the benches.

Opposition Leader Luke Foley used the decision to goad the Government.

"Your entire plan to pay for roads rail schools and hospitals lies in tatters. What on earth is Plan B?" he asked.

Mr Foley said the Premier's infrastructure plan was now in tatters and the alternative bids would leave the state's coffers seriously short changed.

Topics: electricity-energy-and-utilities, government-and-politics, business-economics-and-finance, federal-government, sydney-2000, nsw

First posted August 11, 2016 13:37:10

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Treasurer blocks sale of Ausgrid to Chinese, Hong Kong bidders

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Updated August 11, 2016 22:40:17 Federal Treasurer Scott Morrison has made a preliminary decision to block the sale of New South Wales electricity provider Ausgrid to Chinese and Hong Kong bidders, citing "national security concerns".

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Oversea's education and buying the world. Are their hidden costs for Chinese society?

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Oversea's education and buying the world. Are their hidden costs for Chinese society?

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"I am lucky that I am not forced to make an either/or choice like my friends do, and I can afford to be greedy and try to stay close to both countries. I do, however, have to figure out a way to balance between the cultures and traditions that I was born into at home, and the values and ideas that I picked up abroad. And that might be a task more difficult than deciding if I want to travel with a Chinese or a U.S. passport"

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More than 300,000 Chinese students now study in the United States. China's swift economic growth has created a burgeoning middle class, meaning that more families can afford to send their children abroad to study. Many in China view the U.S. education system as the best in the world, making the United States the top destination for Chinese students leaving home to study abroad. But upon graduation, Chinese students face a choice. Do they remain in the United States to work, or do they return to China? In this ChinaFile conversation, current Chinese students in the United States and recent graduates discuss how family, freedom, and opportunity play into the post-graduation calculus. - The Editors , economics major at Middlebury College:
This is not an either/or question. Many of my Chinese friends in U.S. colleges picture themselves working at jobs that allow them to stay connected to both countries. In fact, many Chinese students recognize this combination of Chinese background and U.S. education as an important competitive advantage over their domestic competitors in the Chinese job market. I also believe people value different things at different stages of life, and for most of us, we are going to feel the need to reconnect with China at one point or another.

A recent development to watch is that as the number of Chinese students in the U.S. increases every year, U.S. education (especially at the undergraduate level) by itself carries much less prestige than it did five or 10 years ago. In response to this change, many Chinese undergraduates have an incentive to stay longer in the United States trying to get into graduate programs in better schools, namely the Ivy League, or to acquire professional experience that enhances their profiles. While many students look for opportunities to work in the United States, things are not always in their control. Working visas for international students are granted through a lottery system. I have heard stories where out of a group of 25 Chinese students applying for working visas, only two or three win the lottery and earn the legal status to work Stateside. In other words, although many Chinese students would like to work in the United States during their early career, only a few succeed due to regulatory constraints.

Beyond employment opportunities, cultural and social factors also matter. Many of my friends find U.S. values and lifestyles very attractive, but also value their Chinese origin and cultural heritage greatly. Sometimes, it is quite difficult to choose or balance between these two very different cultures. An extreme example is that some of my friends in the LGBT community have made up their minds to make every effort to stay in the United States, as they are not willing to go back into an environment where they cannot be comfortable with who they are due to the lack of legal and social support. It breaks my heart to know that their identities have become the primary hindrance that keeps them away from home.

I am lucky that I am not forced to make an either/or choice like my friends do, and I can afford to be greedy and try to stay close to both countries. I do, however, have to figure out a way to balance between the cultures and traditions that I was born into at home, and the values and ideas that I picked up abroad. And that might be a task more difficult than deciding if I want to travel with a Chinese or a U.S. passport.
Jianqing Zhang, ChinaFile intern and former student at Shanghai International Studies University and Dartmouth College:
I agree with Liu that we all are going to reconnect with China at one point or another. It was my trip abroad that made me realize how much I love about China. The twinge first came with the lack of authentic Chinese food abroad. Then the feeling of being unable to stay with my family and close friends, and the impact of cultural differences began to show. I have never given up the option to return to China at some point, but it's becoming harder to decide when.

Recently, the Chinese middle class has been experiencing growing pains. The outflow of capital and people signals insecurity about the future. The slowdown of the economy, the pollution of the air, water, and food, the increasing suppression of civil society, and the undermining of the rule of law are major factors that cause fears and underpin the uncertainty about my going home.

I can't deny that China probably presents more opportunities for my personal career. Stereotypes and prejudices against Chinese people exist here. Moreover, there are many restrictions on foreigners who want to work in the United States. With so much risk entailed in hiring a foreigner, it's not difficult to imagine why most employers don't sponsor work visas.
, Yale College history major and managing editor of the Yale-based China Hands magazine:
The more time I spend in the United States, the more I feel I am in a conundrum. I enjoy the political freedom, the cleaner environment, and the open-minded society here. The overseas experience makes me more humble and tolerant. But I also miss my family and friends in China, where I feel a true sense of belonging. Perhaps for the sake of my young child, I will stay in the United States for now, where he can at least have a clean blue sky.

If people cannot vote by hand, they vote with their feet. This is why people flocked from East to West Berlin before the Berlin Wall was erected and why many Chinese parents send their children to the United States for an education. Of course, such a decision is not overtly political. The act of leaving home almost always entails personal loss and emotional pain, but the collective decision to leave - be it fleeing the borders, going abroad for school, or sending wealth abroad - suggests that the potential benefits abroad outweigh those at home.

Most Chinese students in the United States come from middle class and wealthy backgrounds, and their parents are relatively successful in China. The underlying reason why Chinese parents still choose to send their children abroad is because they do not want their children to copy their success, for they do not want their children to bear the same physical, emotional, and moral costs of that success.

Therefore, if given a choice, most individuals and families from China who prefer a U.S. education to a Chinese one should at least seriously consider further personal developments in the United States in the long term.

In the short run, however, I believe that keeping an open mind is a better decision than choosing to go back to China or remain in the United States before figuring out exactly what to do after graduation. A liberal arts education equips me with few specific pieces of professional know-how but rather gives general skills that can potentially be valuable in many fields. I consider it important to do work that puts my skills to effective use, hopefully benefiting others and shaping my own character. As a rising senior at Yale College, there are many options ahead.

But I do realize that having choices is a luxury. Of the 120 Chinese children in the Qing dynasty's educational mission to the United States in the 1870s, 22 went to Yale, but many of their college careers were cut short by the Qing government's sudden recall of the mission. A few managed to escape and remain in the United States, but most returned to China. Then, instead of valuing this Western education, the Qing court distrusted the Yale students. Although some of them contributed to China's modernization, their potential was far from fully realized.
Jieqian Zhang, Google News Lab Fellow at the Center for Investigative Reporting:
We have reason enough to believe that we live in a much better era, but in terms of choosing the environment we want to be in for our lives and our careers, maybe it will still come down to an either/or question. Fortunately, I don't have to answer this question immediately after graduation.

My answer to this question took a sharp turn over my two years at the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley - from "I will definitely return to China" to "I'd prefer to stay here." My major concern is what is the best for me if I want to tell great stories.

Journalism is all about telling lesser-known stories to the public. As a young journalist, I have always wanted to report on China. Before coming to the United States, I interned at a state-owned media outlet in China and later worked as an associate news producer for foreign media. From my personal experience, I have seen stories about China either misinterpreted or killed by self-censorship. That's the reason why I chose to go to graduate school and study journalism myself, because I believed I could do a better job.

Even though I studied in the United States, my focus has always been on China. I have reported on China's foreign investment, China's human rights situation, and labor rights violations in China. My thesis is about the gay community and HIV in China. After all, I grew up in China and know it well.

I have been amazed by how foreign countries such as the United States are interested in what is happening in China. During my two years here, I was able to get to know many Chinese documentary filmmakers, photographers, videographers, and young journalists like me. They have their documentaries, photo essays, or articles published in U.S. media. Many of these stories are very unlikely to be seen in Chinese media. Media censorship is just one obstacle standing in front of me if I want to go back. Protecting my sources is another. Take my thesis on the HIV epidemic in China as an example. Many of my sources refused to be on camera, or even just talk to me for fear of the story being published in Chinese media. (Foreign media was not a problem for them.) Their main concern was their safety should their identities have been exposed.

I used to think the best way to report on China was being in the country where all the stories happen. Now, I still believe the stories are in China, but I'd rather stay out, maybe in the United States, where I have a better chance to have my work published.

Image credit: MARK RALSTON/AFP/Getty Images

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It's Graduation Season. Time to Go Back to China?

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More than 300,000 Chinese students now study in the United States. China's swift economic growth has created a burgeoning middle class, meaning that more families can afford to send their children abroad to study. Many in China view the U.S.

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Much has been written about China's oversea's investment. China has quickly moved from one of the largest recipients of aid to one of the largest donors. SOE's such as Huawei have made headlines for the wrong reasons in developed nations but have been welcomed with open arms in developing nations for providing competitive financial investment in much needed infrastructure. But in going global the Chinese might actually still be focused on domestic challenges. To quote Andrew Scobell "Thinking locally, demands acting globally". So for what purpose are China, if at all, are they buying the world?

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Weekly Wrap up - Socialism with Chinese Characteristics defines China

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Weekly Wrap up - Socialism with Chinese Characteristics defines China

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Yes China's economy has changed, but they have managed to maintain those changes within a context of "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" in my view. In China's pursuit of wealth and power has been characterised by transforming successful foreign policies to suit their local context. Mao's "On Ten Great Power Relationship" for the CCP was the first text, which sought to learn from the USSR without copying it. Deng's Three Helpful's, Jiang's Three Represents, Hu's Scientific Development and Xi's Four Comprehensives - Have all sought to deliver China wealth and power while maintaining socialist control. SOE's which are integral to the economy and power are retained by the CCP.

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With economic integration inching closer each day, politically and militarily nations are becoming increasingly divided. How to reconcile them both?

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With economic integration inching closer each day, politically and militarily nations are becoming increasingly divided. How to reconcile them both?

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The Chinese defense minister has warned the tense situation in the South China Sea poses the threat of a direct confrontation and has called on the military, police and general population to be ready to defend the country's territorial integrity.

Chang Wanquan made the statement while inspecting military installations in China's eastern coastal Zhejiang Province, state news agency Xinhua reported, without giving the timing of the comments.

The seriousness of the national security situation should be recognized, particularly when it comes to threats posed at sea, Chang said.

The Chinese military, law enforcement and citizens must be ready for mobilization in the event of a "people's war at sea," he added.

The general public should be educated about national defense issues because national sovereignty and territorial integrity are at risk, according to the minister.

Chang's statement comes amid unprecedented tensions over the disputed islands in the South China Sea, where Beijing has been building airstrips and military installations on reclaimed reefs and islands in waters also claimed by a number of other Asian states.

The US Navy has dispatched warships and military planes to the immediate proximity of the disputed islands, claiming it has done so to ensure the principles of freedom of navigation in international waters. Washington has been also involved in a number of military drills in the region.

Beijing has slammed the naval and aerial displays by the US as provocations, and reinforced installation on the islands with anti-ship missile and air-defense complexes.

China's 2.3 million-strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) is "fully confident and capable of addressing various security threats and provocations," Chang said last weekend while addressing a summit dedicated to the 89th anniversary of the PLA's founding.

On Tuesday, China's Supreme Court issued a regulation reaffirming the jurisdiction of national courts over the country's territory, including the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It warned citizens and foreigners alike of criminal liability for violations such as illegal fishing or killing endangered wildlife in the zone.

"People's courts will actively exercise jurisdiction over China's territorial waters, support administrative departments to legally perform maritime management duties, equally protect the legal rights of Chinese and foreign parties involved and safeguard Chinese territorial sovereignty and maritime interests," the regulation stated.

Any fishing boats refusing to leave Chinese waters or caught fishing illegally there more than once in a year are subject to a fine, while the crew could be given a prison term of up to one year.

Foreigners who feel their rights have been violated by the Chinese authorities are free to deliver their claims to Chinese courts, the ruling said.

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Prepare for possible 'war on water' over South China Sea tensions, Beijing tells citizens

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The Chinese defense minister has warned the tense situation in the South China Sea poses the threat of a direct confrontation and has called on the military, police and general population to be ready to defend the country's territorial integrity.

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As China's peaceful development is continually seen as assertive. Who is driving these narratives and why? 

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As China's peaceful development is continually seen as assertive. Who is driving these narratives and why? 

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The Coming War on China is John Pilger's 60th Film for ITV. Pilger reveals what the news doesn't - that the world's greatest military power, the United States, and the world's second economic power, China, both nuclear-armed, are on the road to war. Pilger's film is a warning and an inspiring story of resistance.

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For all the claims China's industry meet global standards, cases like this persist.

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SHANGHAI (Reuters) - Walt Disney Co has taken three Chinese firms to court over concerns local animation "The Autobots" copied elements from Disney's own hit movie "Cars", as the U.S. firm looks to protect its drive into the world's second-largest economy.

A court in Shanghai held a hearing on Tuesday, a Disney spokeswoman confirmed to Reuters. The dispute was over "copyright infringement" and "unfair competition", according to a notice on the Shanghai Pudong New Area People's Court website.

Disney is making a major push into China with the recent opening of a $5.5 billion theme park in Shanghai, its first on the mainland, while its animated movies including "Zootopia" and "Big Hero 6" have been big box office hits in the country.

The iconic U.S. firm, however, faces tough competition in the market from local theme park developers, popular Chinese animations as well as counterfeits from merchandise to fake Disney hotels. Chinese authorities have promised to give Disney "special" trademark protection.

"The Autobots" drew ire from netizens in China when it was released last year, with some pointing out similarities with Disney's 2006 film "Cars" starring Owen Wilson and its sequel in 2011. "Cars 3" is penciled in to be released next year.

Zuo Jianlong, the director of "The Autobots" for production company Blue MTV, told Reuters in an interview on Wednesday he was "relaxed" about a potential ruling.

"Lots of people online have talked about plagiarism, but it seems from the legal side that the matter is quite clear - at root there is no plagiaristic behavior," he said.

"If you put the two films side-by-side to compare them, then you will know they are completely different."

Disney declined to comment further on the case.

The Chinese film is about animated racing cars including main heroes K1 and K2, while Disney's offering follows the story of legendary racing car Lightning McQueen.

The three Chinese firms involved in the suit are production company Blue MTV, media company Beijing G-Point, and online content platform PPLive Inc.

An official for Beijing G-Point, who gave her name only as Ms Cheng, said the firms had hoped to reach a settlement, but Disney had been opposed to this. She added G-Point was not involved in production, but rather in the film's distribution.

Reuters could not immediately reach PPLive for comment.

China's box office hit around 45 billion yuan ($6.8 billion) last year, and is growing fast, a lure for overseas studios to tap into the market despite a cap on imported films, censorship concerns and a rising challenge from locally made movies.

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hotels and entertainment services (trbc)

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judicial process / court cases / court decisions

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Cars vs. Autobots: Disney sues China firms in copyright dispute

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SHANGHAI (Reuters) - Walt Disney Co has taken three Chinese firms to court over concerns local animation "The Autobots" copied elements from Disney's own hit movie "Cars", as the U.S. firm looks to protect its drive into the world's second-largest economy. A court in Shanghai held a hearing on Tuesday, a Disney spokeswoman confirmed to Reuters.

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Improving productivity is  important to China avoiding the middle income trap. What is productivity? Well...

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Improving productivity is  important to China avoiding the middle income trap. What is productivity? Well...

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A CAUTIONARY FABLE

Once upon a time, Western opinion leaders found themselves both impressed and frightened by the extraordinary growth rates achieved by a set of Eastern economies. Although those economies were still substantially poorer and smaller than those of the West, the speed with which they had transformed themselves from peasant societies into industrial powerhouses, their continuing ability to achieve growth rates several times higher than the advanced nations, and their increasing ability to challenge or even surpass American and European technology in certain areas seemed to call into question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology. The leaders of those nations did not share our faith in free markets or unlimited civil liberties. They asserted with increasing self-confidence that their system was superior: societies that accepted strong, even authoritarian governments and were willing to limit individual liberties in the interest of the common good, take charge of their economies, and sacrifice short-run consumer interests for the sake of long-run growth would eventually outperform the increasingly chaotic societies of the West. And a growing minority of Western intellectuals agreed.

The gap between Western and Eastern economic performance eventually became a political issue. The Democrats recaptured the White House under the leadership of a young, energetic new president who pledged to "get the country moving again" - a pledge that, to him and his closest advisers, meant accelerating America's economic growth to meet the Eastern challenge.

The time, of course, was the early 1960s. The dynamic young president was John F. Kennedy. The technological feats that so alarmed the West were the launch of Sputnik and the early Soviet lead in space. And the rapidly growing Eastern economies were those of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations.

While the growth of communist economies was the subject of innumerable alarmist books and polemical articles in the 1950s, some economists who looked seriously at the roots of that growth were putting together a picture that differed substantially from

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Pundits point to the awesome growth of East Asia's economies and fret that the West cannot compete. But there is nothing miraculous about the successes of Asia's "tigers." Their rise was fueled by mobilizing resources - increasing inputs of machinery, infrastructure, and education - just like that of the now-derided Soviet economy.

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In the 1980's Shambaugh described China's reforming cycle as one of periods of relaxing policy control and then tightening. Under Xi, we have seen tightening and more tightening of control. Is this an abboration, is Xi making up for Hu's "lost decade" or is this the "new normal"?

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Xi Jinping and China's New Era of Reform

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Experts discuss Chinese President Xi Jinping's leadership.

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In a diversifying economy, even the PLA must compete for employees - check out this recruitment video

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In a diversifying economy, even the PLA must compete for employees - check out this recruitment video

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‎China‬'s ‪‎PLA‬ army enlists rap-style music video to recruit young soldiers

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The People's Liberation Army has released a rap-style music video filled with masculine lyrics and advanced weaponry in an attempt to attract more young people to join the military. The song, called Battle Declaration, was posted on 81.cn, the PLA Daily's website, on Thursday. It is the first hip-hop video made by the PLA.

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Want to know more about Xi's Four Comprehensives?

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Want to know more about Xi's Four Comprehensives?

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'Four comprehensives' - China’s state-run media rap video

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http://www.hongkongfp.com "Listen to me: four comprehensives, four comprehensives, building a moderately prosperous society is the goal; Repeat after me: four comprehensives, four comprehensives, reform is the impetus; Repeat after me: four comprehensives, four comprehensives, ruling by law is guarantee; Repeat after me: four comprehensives, four comprehensives, party-building is the key.

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Why did Uber fail in China? Was it the invisible hand of the economy or the CCP at play?

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Why did Uber fail in China? Was it the invisible hand of the economy or the CCP at play?

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This is an interesting article that examines the experiences of Uber trying to break into the Chinese market. The SOE competitor proved a fierce rival, and the CCP was more adept than democratic nations in regulating and dealing with Uber. It goes to show that the CCP is still firmly in control of capital.

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Uber-the brash ride-sharing behemoth that has ruthlessly barreled over regulatory hurdles, expanded to nearly every corner of the world in six years, and in 2015 called China its "number-one priority"-did the unthinkable on Monday: it conceded defeat in a costly battle in China to local rival Didi Chuxing. Bloomberg reports that Didi Chuxing will buy Uber China and create a new entity worth $35 billion-the combined valuation of Uber China and Didi, which is worth $28 billion. Didi will retain the Uber brand, and Uber C.E.O. Travis Kalanick and Didi founder Cheng Wei will join each other's companies' boards. Both companies have since confirmed the merger. Uber China shareholders, who had been pushing for the merger, will receive a 20 percent stake in the new company, Bloomberg reports.

The deal represents a major concession by Kalanick that Uber's attempt to win market share in the People's Republic had come up short. "Uber and Didi Chuxing are investing billions of dollars in China, and both companies have yet to turn a profit there," Kalanick wrote in a blog post obtained by Bloomberg that is expected to be published when the companies announce the deal. "Getting to profitability is the only way to build a sustainable business that can best serve Chinese riders, drivers and cities over the long term." This is a far cry from the spend-anything-to-gain-market-share mentality Uber had earlier adopted. Both companies had burned through billions of dollars to defeat the other, with Uber reportedly spending $1 billion a year and Didi offering driver and passenger subsidies to stay dominant in its own country. (Uber is not alone in struggling to expand into China, with its 1.3 billion people and 600 million Internet users. Companies like Google have tried and failed to push into China, which is notoriously hostile toward foreign competitors. Apple's recent $1 billion investment in Didi was seen by some as a way to curry favor with local regulators to help the tech company expand in the country.)

The war to control the Chinese ride-sharing market had been a complex, labyrinthine game with investments from the biggest players in the world. Didi has raised money from giants like Tencent, DST Global, SoftBank, and Alibaba, as well as the aforementioned Apple deal. The company, itself a merger of Chinese ride-hailing companies Didi and Kuaidi, is part of a global ride-hailing alliance with Lyft, Southeast Asia's Grab, and India's Ola. Chinese giant Baidu, meanwhile, has invested in Uber.

Competition from Uber has been a boon for innovation in Chinese ride-hailing; before it existed, the market consisted of taxi-hailing services. With the addition of Uber to the market, Didi and Kuaidi, and later just Didi, was forced to innovate and provide more sophisticated means of ride-hailing to keep up. "Three years ago I traveled to China with a small group of people to see if we might be able to launch Uber there," Kalanick said in the blog post. "Most of the people we asked for advice thought we were naive, crazy-or both." Now Uber is part of a ride-hailing monopoly, though not the one it set out to create itself when it entered China a couple years ago.

Abandoning the costly battle over China also frees up Uber to pursue more profitable new enterprises. Last week, the Financial Times reported that Uber wants to "pour $500m into an ambitious global mapping project," which would let Uber break ties with Google's mapping technology. Without having to rely on Google, Uber could ostensibly move forward with creating its own detailed maps as it heads toward its stated goal of creating self-driving vehicles. Cutting its losses in China, shifting to focus on autonomous vehicles and more easily winnable markets, and joining forces with Didi to stop bleeding cash appears to help pave a path for an Uber I.P.O. in the near future. More than anything, it seems Uber has accepted the fact that even companies with rocket-ship growth trajectories reach their limits and are forced to cut costs at some point.

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Uber Surrenders China in $35 Billion Deal

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Uber-the brash ride-sharing behemoth that has ruthlessly barreled over regulatory hurdles, expanded to nearly every corner of the world in six years, and in 2015 called China its "number-one priority"-did the unthinkable on Monday: it conceded defeat in a costly battle in China to local rival Didi Chuxing.

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Week 3 - "It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice." Deng Xiaoping

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Week 3 - "It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice." Deng Xiaoping

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This week is all about China's economy.

Is China a capitalist country now? Does it matter how China's economy is characterised?

Whether it's Deng's call "To get rich is glorious" or Xi's Comprehensive to build a "Moderately prosperous society" by 2021, the 'China Dream' is built on economic prosperity and self-described as "socialism with Chinese characteristics."

Why is it important for the CCP to adhere to this narrative? Who stands to benefit from an alternative narrative - that China is now a capitalist economy?

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Weekly wrap-up - A roller coaster of emotions

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Weekly wrap-up - A roller coaster of emotions

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Challenging my thinking on democratic policy virtues has been confronting. Can a democracy enfranchise or deliver a policy outcome that exceed those delivered by an authoritarian regime? Yes, but the process can be protracted. Rationale being the enfranchisement that occurs through active participation is important.

Ultimately, there is no substitute for checks and balances which are institutionalised.

However, we need to recognise the utility and effectiveness of a well run authoritarian regime in delivering effective policy outcomes for the people. China demonstrates a deft touch in delivering outcomes that improve the daily lives of its people.

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Will policy development be stifled by CCP tightening its grip on the media?

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Will policy development be stifled by CCP tightening its grip on the media?

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Canberra ACT news, sport and weather | The Canberra Times

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The Canberra Times delivers the latest news from Canberra ACT including sport, weather, entertainment and lifestyle.

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BEIJING (Reuters) - The U.S. and Chinese militaries have reduced the risk of encounters between them having "unintended consequences", a top U.S. official said on Monday, while China reiterated it would not accept interference in the South China Sea.

There have been a series of incidents in recent years, most in the disputed South China Sea, where the United States has accused Chinese military ships and aircraft of coming dangerously close to U.S. forces.

Visiting U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice said confidence-building measures had reduced risks and the United States valued progress in improving military-to-military ties.

"Our military leaders communicate more frequently and more directly than ever before in the past," Rice said in a meeting with a vice chairman of China's powerful Central Military Commission, Fan Changlong.

"While our forces operate in closer proximity to each other, the risk of unintended consequences has gone down thanks to the confidence-building measures that our two sides have put in place."

The United States and China have increasingly been at odds over China's claims to most of the South China Sea, a waterway through which $5 trillion of trade moves annually, where the United States has sought to assert its right to freedom of navigation.

China has stepped up its rhetoric in defense of its claims since an international court ruled this month that China did not have historic rights to the waters, raising concern that China would assert its position more forcefully.

There have been two close contacts between the two militaries since last month alone, with the U.S. accusing China of shadowing an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea and of unsafely intercepting a spy plane in the East China Sea, where China has competing territorial claims with Japan.

China said it was conducting routine operations in line with laws and rules.

Fan also emphasized the need to deepen military-to-military relations with the United States to "avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation".

But he also dismissed any notion that China would bow to pressure when it came to protecting its national sovereignty in the South China Sea.

"The Chinese people will not yield to outside pressure," he said, the defense ministry said in a statement after the meeting.

Fan said relations between their militaries faced "obstacles and challenges", which, if not properly handled, would "disturb and undermine" progress.

He said the deployment of an anti-missile system in South Korea would impact mutual trust. The United States is deploying the system in South Korea to protect it from North Korea.

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U.S. praises confidence-building measures with Chinese military

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BEIJING (Reuters) - The U.S. and Chinese militaries have reduced the risk of encounters between them having "unintended consequences", a top U.S. official said on Monday, while China reiterated it would not accept interference in the South China Sea.

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US/China relations in the South China Sea

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US/China relations in the South China Sea

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Often China is criticised for have multiple policy positions. In posting this article and the next I  demonstrate that  the US too, can have multiple perspectives on relations with China. Notably the difference between the US military and the NSC advisors - civilians who work for the White House over the South China Sea.

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There have been some tense moments between U.S. and Chinese forces in the South China Sea over the past several months, with China's fighters buzzing American surveillance planes and its warships shadowing American aircraft carriers in international waters. And a high-level meeting between top naval officers from the two countries doesn't seem likely to lower tensions.

That's according to the head of the U.S. Navy, Adm. John Richardson. Richardson just returned from a five-day trip to China, where he met in Beijing with Adm. Wu Shengli, who commands the Chinese navy. Speaking with reporters at the Pentagon on Tuesday, Richardson said he "made it absolutely clear" to the Chinese that Washington will look after its "interests in the area and commitments to allies."

Richardson said that Beijing was trying to blame the U.S. for several recent incidents where Chinese fighter planes came dangerously close to American surveillance planes over international waters. "They're trying to posture many of their actions as a responsive measure to things we're doing," Richardson said, lapsing into Pentagon-speak. But he insisted that American activity in the South China Sea "has been relatively constant" over the years and hadn't changed in a way that would warrant an aggressive Chinese response.

The two naval leaders seemed to agree on one cause of confusion: the media.

Wu "made the point there's been an awful lot more media attention" on activities in the South China Sea than there has been in the past, Richardson said. But "we have a free press and they're going to cover where their interests go," the admiral replied. "And their state media is also talking about this as much, if not more, than Western media. So we had a nice discussion about the role of media, how the media is influencing populations, maybe raising expectations or raising emotions."

Richardson's visit was slightly overshadowed by Beijing's announcement last week that it would begin conducting regular military air patrols over the South China Sea, including around a series of man-made islands there. The first flight, featuring Chinese H-6K bombers escorted by fighter jets and cargo planes took place "recently" a Chinese air force spokesman said.

China has said it will ignore a landmark July 12 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, based in The Hague, which handed a major victory to the Philippines by explicitly rejecting China's claims to a huge swath of the South China Sea.

Wu has said China would continue its construction efforts in the critical waterway. During Richardson's visit, Wu said China will "never stop" work on its man-made islands.

Adding to the overall tension was an incident in April when the USS John C. Stennis and four other U.S. warships were denied entry into Hong Kong. Richardson said that the issue was one area where the two sides made some progress. "There's a general agreement between [the] two sides we can increase those mutual port calls overall to each other's benefit," he said.

The U.S. is looking for other ways of building goodwill. Secretary of State John Kerry said Tuesday that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has asked him to throw his support behind the resumption of bilateral talks between Manila and Beijing over claims to several small islands in the South China Sea.

"The foreign minister said the time has come to move away from public tensions and turn the page," Kerry told reporters while in Laos for a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

China scored a small diplomatic victory Monday after conference attendees agreed to delete any reference to the Hague court's ruling from the joint statement that will be delivered at the conclusion of the talks. Kerry is next jetting off to the Philippines, where he'll discuss the issue with newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Duterte had already instructed former President Fidel Ramos to head to Beijing to begin talks over the islands.

Photo Credit: Specialist 3rd Class Jake Greenberg/U.S. Navy via Getty Images

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U.S. Navy Chief Says He'll Keep Sailing in South China Sea

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There have been some tense moments between U.S. and Chinese forces in the South China Sea over the past several months, with China's fighters buzzing American surveillance planes and its warships shadowing American aircraft carriers in international waters. And a high-level meeting between top naval officers from the two countries doesn't seem likely to lower tensions.

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What can a democracy add to solving a policy problem, which could already be solved by an authoritarian country? I look back at the reasons the modern democracies founding fathers gave.

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The Federalist 9 < The Complete Federalist Papers < 1786-1800 < Documents < American History From Revolution To Reconstruction and beyond

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To the People of the State of New York: A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.

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"Power struggle is not a dinner party." 

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"Power struggle is not a dinner party." 

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Despite the claim that the media can play a decisive role in policy development, factional alignment continues to dominate both the policy and political landscape.

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Emblem of the Communist Youth League. The league previously served as a path for aspiring cadres--and a powerbase for Former president Hu Jintao.

Power struggle is not a dinner party. Internecine bickering and back-stabbing among rival factions and personalities are intensifying as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prepares for its 19th Congress next year. Apart from constructing a Maoist-style personality cult around himself, Chinese President Xi Jinping is pulling out all the stops to remove a major threat to his consolidation of power-the Communist Youth League (CYL) Faction ( tuanpai; 团派), which is still one of the CCP's biggest cliques in the Chinese Communist Party.

Cadres affiliated with the CYL Faction, which is led by former President Hu Jintao, form the biggest bloc within the 25-member Politburo that was endorsed at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Hu, a former First Secretary of the CYL, is generally considered a timid, bureaucratic politician. But he served in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) for 20 years until his retirement in 2012, during which he had ample opportunity to boost the clout of his clique and advance the careers of his fellow travelers. CYL alumnae were particularly strong in the regions, leading to the saying that Hu was following the tactic of "the regions surrounding the center" (包围中央) in countering the authoritarian tendencies of his boss, former president Jiang Zemin, who headed the Shanghai Faction ( VOA Chinese, January 12; Oriental Daily [Hong Kong], July 4, 2015).

President Xi's tough tactics for elbowing aside the CYL Faction were summed up by his widely-circulated internal assessment of the League, that it was "paralyzed from the neck down." At a mid-2015 national conference of cadres working in mass organizations such as the CYL, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the All-China Women's Association, Xi warned that the CYL ran the risk of "being marginalized by young people and being marginalized by the party-state [apparatus]" ( VOA Chinese, April 29; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], October 25, 2015). The CYL was also lambasted for being too "bureaucratic, procedurally minded, aristocratic and entertainment-oriented" (机关化、行政化、贵族化、娱乐化). Since late last year, the Central Commission on Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) has stationed a work team in the CYL to look at problems of corruption and infractions of party discipline ( South China Morning Post, February 9; New Beijing Post, July 7, 2015).

In a recent article on the website of the CCDI-which has been interpreted as a full-scale confession of guilt-the CYL Party Committee admitted that League members suffered from "weak party leadership, aberrations in party construction, and failure to run [CYL units] strictly." The League leadership vowed to uphold the "Four-fold Consciousness," (四个意识) meaning "political consciousness, consciousness about the whole situation, consciousness about following the "core" [of the leadership] and consciousness about remaining in unison [with the top party leadership]." The Four-fold Consciousness is understood as a slogan about professing absolute loyalty to President Xi, the putative "core of the leadership" (see China Brief, March 7). Top CYL cadres also made a self-criticism regarding their criteria for grooming up-and-coming officials, which, they said, were marred by "elitism, ignoring the grassroots, lack of representation, and narrow coverage [of disparate sectors in society'" ( Straits Times [Singapore], April 29; CCDI.gov.cn, April 25).

Xi has largely abolished the role of the CYL-which was particularly evident during the Hu Jintao era-as a method for nurturing future party and government leaders. Early this year, Xi gave orders that the personnel establishment of CYL units both at central and regional levels should be cut. The CYL's budget for 2016-306.27 million yuan-represents a cut of some 50 percent compared to that of last year ( Xinmin.cn, May 2; CCYL.org, April 15). Moreover, the China Youth University of Political Studies (CYUPS)-which is responsible for training cadres within the CYL system-is expected to curtail its student enrollment from September this year. Some CYUPS faculty members have expressed fears that the institution, which is sometimes referred as the CYL's equivalent of the Central Party School, will be severely downgraded ( Radio Free Asia, April 23; Radio French International Chinese Service, April 22).
Leverage Against Rival Factions
In their battle against the CYL, Xi and his allies such as Head of the CCDI Wang Qishan, have benefited from graft-related crimes committed by prominent League member Ling Jihua, who used to be the right-hand-man of former president Hu. Investigations into Ling's alleged misdemeanors, which began in late 2012, have exposed similar economic crimes of a number of top CYL Faction affiliates who reportedly included Vice-President Li Yuanchao. The wives of Ling Jinhua and Li Yuanchao were said to be close business partners. Ling's demise has also smothered the voice of former president Hu, who has lost substantial influence due to the perception that he failed to rein in the excesses of Ling and other CYL officials ( Radio Free Asia, August 25, 2015; BBC Chinese, December 23, 2014).

The Ling affair-and Xi's heavy criticism of the CYL-has cast a shadow over the political fortunes of PBSC member and Premier Li Keqiang as well as ordinary Politburo members such as Li Yuanchao; Vice-Premiers Liu Yandong and Wang Yang; Director of the CCP Department Liu Qibao; and Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua (unrelated to former president Hu). Premier Li has been sidelined by Xi and no longer has authority over economic policy. While he might retain his PBSC membership at the 19 Party Congress, it is possible that he would move over to head the National People's Congress. It is likely that Li Yuanchao, Liu Yandong and Liu Qibao will be given post-retirement jobs at the NPC or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. In theory, Wang Yang, the only CYL Faction member with solid reformist inclinations, should be promoted to the PBSC. But it is not certain whether Xi wants two CYL Faction members in this inner most sanctum of power especially when there is a possibility that the membership of the PBSC may be reduced from the current seven to five ( Apple Daily [Hong Kong], November 29, 2015; United Daily News [Taiwan], August 29, 2015).

Of perhaps more significance is the political fortune of Hu Chunhua. Hu and Chongqing Party Secretary Sun Zhengcai, both born in 1963, were put into the Politburo by the out-going PBSC led by former president Hu Jintao and former premier Wen Jiabao. They are the only two Sixth-Generation cadres (those born in the 1960s) in the current Politburo. Similar to the older Hu, Hu Chunhua served as First Secretary of the CYL; like Hu, a former party secretary of Tibet, the younger Hu built up his career in the autonomous region. It is well understood, however, that Xi has a low assessment of Hu's ability. And the possibility of Hu Chunhua making the PBSC next year is deemed very slim ( Radio French International, Chinese Service, November 29, 2015; Radio Free Asia, August 17, 2015).
Stacking the Deck
After doing all he can to eclipse the CYL Faction, President Xi is investing a lot of resources on putting together his own "Xi Jinping Faction," of which the Zhejiang Clique is a major component. Similar to what Jiang Zemin did in grooming the Shanghai Faction, Xi has bent over backwards to elevate officials who had served under him when he was Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province from 2002 to 2007 (See China Brief, February 7, 2014). Other components of the Xi Jinping Faction include the Gang of Princelings; the Shaanxi Clique-officials who served in Xi's home province, including Director of the General Office Li Zhanshu and Director of the Organization Department Zhao Leji; and Xi's cronies including schoolmates Chen Xi, who is Executive Vice-Director of the Organization Department and chief economic advisor Liu He, who heads the General Office of the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economics ( South China Morning Post, March 2; World Affairs Journal [Washington], May 1, 2014). It is evident that Xi wants his Zhejiang Clique to be as powerful as the Shanghai Faction under former president Jiang, one of his major political foes.

Foremost among serving and former Zhejiang Province officials who already possess ministerial status-and are tipped for further promotion at the 19th Party Congress-are Party Secretary of Zhejiang Xia Baolong (born 1952) and Zhejiang Governor Li Qiang (1959). Also prominent are Acting Tianjin Party Secretary Huang Xingguo (1954), who is a former Zhejiang vice-governor; Executive Vice-Director of the Propaganda Department Huang Kunming (1956), who used to head Zhejiang's Propaganda Department; and Guizhou Party Secretary Chen Min'er (1960), another former Zhejiang vice-governor. ( BBC Chinese, July 31, 2015; Apple Daily, December 31, 2014;

Particularly significant is the fact that a disproportionately large number of Zhejiang officials close to Xi have been picked to staff key Central Leading Groups or Central Commissions such as the Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CLGCDR); the Central Leading Group on Finance and Economics (CLGFE) and the Central National Security Commission (CNSC). For example, former deputy secretary-general of the Zhejiang Party Committee Shu Guozeng (1956) is now Deputy Director of the General Office of CLGFE. Former executive vice-governor of Zhejiang Cai Qi (1955) has been promoted Executive Vice-Director of the General Office of the CNSC. Late last year, former member of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Party Committee (SCZPC) and party secretary of Wenzhou Chen Yixin (1959) was named Vice Director of the General Office of the CLGCDR ( Guancha.cn [Beijing], December 3, 2015; Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], December 3, 2014; South China Morning Post, March 24, 2014).

Moreover, Xi has tried to emulate former president Hu's tactic of installing protégés in key provincial slots. Two former SCZPC members and party secretaries of the cosmopolitan city of Ningbo have been elevated to leadership posts in the regions. They are Jilin Party Secretary Bayin Chaolu (1955) and Jiangxi Deputy Party Secretary Liu Qi (1957). Similarly, Lou Yangsheng (1959), a former head of the Zhejiang's Organization Department and United Front Department, was in 2014 promoted Deputy Party Secretary of Shanxi Province. Gong Zheng (1960), a former member of the SCZPC and party secretary of the provincial capital of Hangzhou, was last August promoted Deputy Party Secretary of Shandong Province. Last month, SCZPC member and Head of the provincial Organization Bureau Hu Heping (1962) was made Governor of Shaanxi Province ( People's Daily, April 28; Ming Pao, March 3).

President Xi's Zhejiang protégés have also been assigned to senior military posts. The best example is Zhong Shaojun (1968), who was a right hand man to Xi when Zhong served as Xi's personal secretary and vice-director of the Zhejiang Organization Department. In 2013, Zhong, who had had no military experience, was parachuted to the People's Liberation Army in the capacity of Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission (GOCMC). The power of the GOCMC has been immensely raised in the wake of military structural reforms undertaken in late 2015 (China Brief, March 7).

Particularly noteworthy among Zhejiang Clique neophytes are members of the Six-Generation (6G) leadership, a reference to officials born around 1960 or slightly afterwards. They include Chen Min'er, Li Qiang, Zhong Shaojun, Hu Heping, Gong Zheng, and Chen Yixin.
Conclusion
While none of these 6G upstarts has achieved either a national stature or solid achievements particularly in economic reform. Moreover, establishing power blocs within the party goes against his own injunctions against cadres forming tuantuanhuohuo (团团伙伙; "factions and cliques") ( China News Service, February 16; People's Daily, January 12, 2015). However, Xi seems convinced that as the putative "leadership core," he has the requisite authority to emulate predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao by protecting his legacy through anointing his protégés as successors.

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The Eclipse of the Communist Youth League and the Rise of the Zhejiang Clique - Jamestown

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Power struggle is not a dinner party. Internecine bickering and back-stabbing among rival factions and personalities are intensifying as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prepares for its 19th Congress next year. Apart from constructing a Maoist-style personality cult around himself, Chinese President Xi Jinping is pulling out all the stops to remove a major threat to his consolidation of power-the ...

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If the media is being tightly controlled, how can disaffected government officials and NGOs influence policy in the public sphere?

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A booth for Weibo, a microblogging service created by Sina, at a conference in Beijing in April. Credit Credit Andy Wong/Associated Press

HONG KONG - China has ordered several of the country's most popular internet portals to halt much of their original news reporting, in a move that could confine an even larger share of the journalism in the country to Communist-controlled mouthpieces ahead of an important party meeting next year.

The profit-driven portals, several of which are listed on United States stock exchanges, have in recent years expanded their investigative teams to increase readership among China's more than 600 million internet users by scooping the staid state-owned news media on stories about subjects including industrial pollution, tainted milk powder and even police brutality.

But on Monday, several news organizations reported that the Beijing office of China's internet regulator, the Cyberspace Administration of China, ordered the websites of a number of the companies, including Sina, Sohu, NetEase and Phoenix, to shut down or "clean up" several of their most popular online news features.

The announcement came within weeks of the surprise departure of the Cyberspace Administration's director, Lu Wei, and his replacement by an official who had served under President Xi Jinping in a previous position. Under Mr. Xi, media controls have tightened as the Communist Party has tried to squelch news that might put its governance in an unfavorable light.

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China's order to several popular internet portals that they halt much of their original news reporting came within weeks of the surprise departure of the Cyberspace Administration's director, Lu Wei. Credit Reuters

In February, Mr. Xi visited three of the top state-run news organizations, telling their staffs in a highly choreographed tour that they existed to serve as propaganda messengers for the party. This month, a respected scholarly journal run by retired Communist Party cadres shut down after a quarter-century following the dismissal of its founding publisher.

The edict made public on Monday, which said the web portals were in "serious violation" of a 2005 internet regulation, came before a meeting next year of the Communist Party Congress. The party often puts in place controls on news before important events, such as the party conclave, held once every five years, which will pick a new group of senior leaders.

The news sites are run by China's biggest internet companies, which also operate social media platforms and produce some of the country's most popular online games. Sina, which runs a news aggregation service and publishes original reporting, also created Weibo, China's popular Twitter-like social media site. The companies are roughly the equivalent of the United States' largest internet companies, like Facebook, Twitter and Google, and their news sites combine articles from other outlets with original reporting and investigative journalism.

It is unclear whether the regulation will end all original reporting at the websites, where hundreds of millions of Chinese turn for their news. Monday's announcement mentioned specific features at four internet sites, which in recent years have attracted investigative reporters from newspapers such as Southern Weekend. It was among the first news organizations to face restrictions after Mr. Xi became head of the Communist Party in November 2012.

Wen Tao, who until last year was a reporter for "Serious Reporting" at Phoenix, one of the news features shut down by the new edict, said by telephone that in recent years the news portals had played a cat-and-mouse game with government internet censors, pushing the boundaries of censorship by publishing material without submitting it for approval and waiting to see if it was taken down by the authorities.

But Mr. Wen said that even in China, with its notorious army of censors, it was difficult for the government to control news in a market powered by hundreds of millions of readers hungry for news that goes beyond Communist propaganda.

"The flow of information cannot be stopped - it's like a flood," Mr. Wen said. "You either need to discharge it or it will run rampant. The regulators are trying to use policies to block the holes."

Sun Xuyang, a former investigative reporter for Beijing News and Southern Metropolis Daily, was more pessimistic, saying by telephone that Monday's announcement was a signal that the space for original reporting was being eroded.

"There are no more illusions," Mr. Sun said.

The news sites targeted by the Cyberspace Administration include Sina's "News Geek," which this month published an article, later deleted, about a chemical contamination at a Beijing school, and "Landmark," run by NetEase, that last year scooped the official news media in reporting the arrest of the brother-in-law of a jailed former top official.

On Monday, the media or investor relations departments at Sina, Phoenix and NetEase did not respond to emails asking how the announcement would affect news operations. A spokeswoman for Sohu declined to comment.

Late Monday evening, the Cyberspace Administration said in a statement that it was investigating eight internet companies in all, saying that their "ideological thinking wasn't high enough, and they have blindly chased after economic gains." The statement singled out two companies in particular, Tencent and Phoenix, as having problems with the management of their websites. Tencent did not reply to emailed questions about how the announcement would affect its news coverage.

Follow Michael Forsythe on Twitter @PekingMike.
Kiki Zhao contributed research from Beijing, and Charlotte Yang from Hong Kong.

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China Clamps Down on Online News Reporting

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HONG KONG - China has ordered several of the country's most popular internet portals to halt much of their original news reporting, in a move that could confine an even larger share of the journalism in the country to Communist-controlled mouthpieces ahead of an important party meeting next year.

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Week 2 Policy, authoritarianism and democracy

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Week 2 Policy, authoritarianism and democracy

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This week, I explore how policy development is linked to a media that is able to publicly challenge government policy. Influencing policy does not equate to challenging a regime, rather its about participating in the development of policy in a contested sphere and creating a new consensus. I am focusing on the media, given this weeks reading argued that the media is an essential corner of the iron triangle for changing policy. The other two corners being disgruntled officials and NGOs.

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There are a range of opinions on Xi's leadership. Some observers such as Willy Lam view Xi's political purges as callus power grabs that are coming under increased pressure.

While Chris Johnson views Xi's efforts as calculated power politic manoeuvres with an idealogical end point in mind.

Alice Miller provides a nice summary of the "core" leadership and reform pushback ongoing in political circles.

How to view Xi's leadership style remains a unclear.

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By chance I made these friends (pictured) at Tiananmen Square, on a recent trip to Beijing. They were kind enough to show me and my american flat mate around Beijing and Minzu University.

Through being open to an adventure I was fortunate meet new people and catch a glimpse of China, that can't always be expressed by text.

As I tackle The Big Questions, my goal is to be mentally open to adventure and to see China from more perspectives.

Structured around two themes

1. My evolving analytical perspective of China

2.  Interesting pieces that provoked thought

The posts on here, I hope, will give you a sense of an inquiring mind engaging with a deep history, a vast culture, and, most importantly, people.

Enjoy!