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There's some substantial Stuxnet news coming out of the New York Times today, claiming confirmation of US and Israeli participation in the creation of Stuxnet. According to the Times, the attack was initiated by President Bush and continued by President Obama.
NY Times: Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran
The article answers one serious question, which is how it got into the wild. The implication is that the virus was originally developed in the US and then modified by the Israelis, and that there was a bug in the modification that allowed the virus to replicate outside of its target destination.

The virus, then called "the bug" by the White House, was introduced in stages into the Natanz nuclear facility in the Isfahan Province of Iran. Because the nuclear facility was not directly connected to the Internet, the Times reports that the virus was introduced by thumbdrive, carried in by someone who worked at the facility. A laptop was apparently removed from the Natanz facility, and when that laptop connected to the Internet, the virus was released into the wild.
NY Times: How a Secret Cyberwar Program Worked
For perspective on all of this, you might find an article I wrote back in January 2011 particularly relevant:
ZDNet Government: Special Report: Stuxnet may be the Hiroshima of our time
There is a lot to consider based on this news. First, there is no direct confirmation of these events from the White House or anyone current serving in the administration. That's not to say you shouldn't believe the Times' report, but rather that it would premature to consider this as historical fact until further evidence surfaces.

Second, as I discussed in the article issued above, there is the question of whether this was an appropriate decision on the part of both Presidents Bush and Obama. As I wrote, once unleashed, this new form of weapon will change how our world conducts itself in the digital battlespace.

I've also been working on a detailed, minute-by-minute simulation of a modified Stuxnet attack against the United States for the Idea Economy: Information 2012 Summit. The simulation, which will involve participation by former White House counterterrorism and cyberterrorism defense officials, should be available online sometime shortly after the summit ends next Wednesday.

Stay tuned. I'll have a lot more to say.

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Breaking news: NY Times claims US released Stuxnet with Israel and it accidentally escaped | ZDNet

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There's some substantial Stuxnet news coming out of the New York Times today, claiming confirmation of US and Israeli participation in the creation of Stuxnet. According to the Times, the attack was initiated by President Bush and continued by President Obama.

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This account of the American and Israeli effort to undermine the Iranian nuclear program is based on interviews over the past 18 months with current and former American, European and Israeli officials involved in the program, as well as a range of outside experts. None would allow their names to be used because the effort remains highly classified, and parts of it continue to this day.

These officials gave differing assessments of how successful the sabotage program was in slowing Iran's progress toward developing the ability to build nuclear weapons. Internal Obama administration estimates say the effort was set back by 18 months to two years, but some experts inside and outside the government are more skeptical, noting that Iran's enrichment levels have steadily recovered, giving the country enough fuel today for five or more weapons, with additional enrichment.

Whether Iran is still trying to design and build a weapon is in dispute. The most recent United States intelligence estimate concludes that Iran suspended major parts of its weaponization effort after 2003, though there is evidence that some remnants of it continue.

Iran initially denied that its enrichment facilities had been hit by Stuxnet, then said it had found the worm and contained it. Last year, the nation announced that it had begun its own military cyberunit, and Brig. Gen. Gholamreza Jalali, the head of Iran's Passive Defense Organization, said that the Iranian military was prepared "to fight our enemies" in "cyberspace and Internet warfare." But there has been scant evidence that it has begun to strike back.

The United States government only recently acknowledged developing cyberweapons, and it has never admitted using them. There have been reports of one-time attacks against personal computers used by members of Al Qaeda, and of contemplated attacks against the computers that run air defense systems, including during the NATO-led air attack on Libya last year. But Olympic Games was of an entirely different type and sophistication.

It appears to be the first time the United States has repeatedly used cyberweapons to cripple another country's infrastructure, achieving, with computer code, what until then could be accomplished only by bombing a country or sending in agents to plant explosives. The code itself is 50 times as big as the typical computer worm, Carey Nachenberg, a vice president of Symantec, one of the many groups that have dissected the code, said at a symposium at Stanford University in April. Those forensic investigations into the inner workings of the code, while picking apart how it worked, came to no conclusions about who was responsible.

A similar process is now under way to figure out the origins of another cyberweapon called Flame that was recently discovered to have attacked the computers of Iranian officials, sweeping up information from those machines. But the computer code appears to be at least five years old, and American officials say that it was not part of Olympic Games. They have declined to say whether the United States was responsible for the Flame attack.

Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade. He repeatedly expressed concerns that any American acknowledgment that it was using cyberweapons - even under the most careful and limited circumstances - could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks.

"We discussed the irony, more than once," one of his aides said. Another said that the administration was resistant to developing a "grand theory for a weapon whose possibilities they were still discovering." Yet Mr. Obama concluded that when it came to stopping Iran, the United States had no other choice.

If Olympic Games failed, he told aides, there would be no time for sanctions and diplomacy with Iran to work. Israel could carry out a conventional military attack, prompting a conflict that could spread throughout the region.
A Bush Initiative
The impetus for Olympic Games dates from 2006, when President George W. Bush saw few good options in dealing with Iran. At the time, America's European allies were divided about the cost that imposing sanctions on Iran would have on their own economies. Having falsely accused Saddam Hussein of reconstituting his nuclear program in Iraq, Mr. Bush had little credibility in publicly discussing another nation's nuclear ambitions. The Iranians seemed to sense his vulnerability, and, frustrated by negotiations, they resumed enriching uranium at an underground site at Natanz, one whose existence had been exposed just three years before.

Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, took reporters on a tour of the plant and described grand ambitions to install upward of 50,000 centrifuges. For a country with only one nuclear power reactor - whose fuel comes from Russia - to say that it needed fuel for its civilian nuclear program seemed dubious to Bush administration officials. They feared that the fuel could be used in another way besides providing power: to create a stockpile that could later be enriched to bomb-grade material if the Iranians made a political decision to do so.

Hawks in the Bush administration like Vice President Dick Cheney urged Mr. Bush to consider a military strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities before they could produce fuel suitable for a weapon. Several times, the administration reviewed military options and concluded that they would only further inflame a region already at war, and would have uncertain results.

For years the C.I.A. had introduced faulty parts and designs into Iran's systems - even tinkering with imported power supplies so that they would blow up - but the sabotage had had relatively little effect. General James E. Cartwright, who had established a small cyberoperation inside the United States Strategic Command, which is responsible for many of America's nuclear forces, joined intelligence officials in presenting a radical new idea to Mr. Bush and his national security team. It involved a far more sophisticated cyberweapon than the United States had designed before.

The goal was to gain access to the Natanz plant's industrial computer controls. That required leaping the electronic moat that cut the Natanz plant off from the Internet - called the air gap, because it physically separates the facility from the outside world. The computer code would invade the specialized computers that command the centrifuges.

The first stage in the effort was to develop a bit of computer code called a beacon that could be inserted into the computers, which were made by the German company Siemens and an Iranian manufacturer, to map their operations. The idea was to draw the equivalent of an electrical blueprint of the Natanz plant, to understand how the computers control the giant silvery centrifuges that spin at tremendous speeds. The connections were complex, and unless every circuit was understood, efforts to seize control of the centrifuges could fail.

Eventually the beacon would have to "phone home" - literally send a message back to the headquarters of the National Security Agency that would describe the structure and daily rhythms of the enrichment plant. Expectations for the plan were low; one participant said the goal was simply to "throw a little sand in the gears" and buy some time. Mr. Bush was skeptical, but lacking other options, he authorized the effort.
Breakthrough, Aided by Israel
It took months for the beacons to do their work and report home, complete with maps of the electronic directories of the controllers and what amounted to blueprints of how they were connected to the centrifuges deep underground.

Then the N.S.A. and a secret Israeli unit respected by American intelligence officials for its cyberskills set to work developing the enormously complex computer worm that would become the attacker from within.

The unusually tight collaboration with Israel was driven by two imperatives. Israel's Unit 8200, a part of its military, had technical expertise that rivaled the N.S.A.'s, and the Israelis had deep intelligence about operations at Natanz that would be vital to making the cyberattack a success. But American officials had another interest, to dissuade the Israelis from carrying out their own pre-emptive strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities. To do that, the Israelis would have to be convinced that the new line of attack was working. The only way to convince them, several officials said in interviews, was to have them deeply involved in every aspect of the program.

Soon the two countries had developed a complex worm that the Americans called "the bug." But the bug needed to be tested. So, under enormous secrecy, the United States began building replicas of Iran's P-1 centrifuges, an aging, unreliable design that Iran purchased from Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear chief who had begun selling fuel-making technology on the black market. Fortunately for the United States, it already owned some P-1s, thanks to the Libyan dictator, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.

When Colonel Qaddafi gave up his nuclear weapons program in 2003, he turned over the centrifuges he had bought from the Pakistani nuclear ring, and they were placed in storage at a weapons laboratory in Tennessee. The military and intelligence officials overseeing Olympic Games borrowed some for what they termed "destructive testing," essentially building a virtual replica of Natanz, but spreading the test over several of the Energy Department's national laboratories to keep even the most trusted nuclear workers from figuring out what was afoot.

Those first small-scale tests were surprisingly successful: the bug invaded the computers, lurking for days or weeks, before sending instructions to speed them up or slow them down so suddenly that their delicate parts, spinning at supersonic speeds, self-destructed. After several false starts, it worked. One day, toward the end of Mr. Bush's term, the rubble of a centrifuge was spread out on the conference table in the Situation Room, proof of the potential power of a cyberweapon. The worm was declared ready to test against the real target: Iran's underground enrichment plant.

"Previous cyberattacks had effects limited to other computers," Michael V. Hayden, the former chief of the C.I.A., said, declining to describe what he knew of these attacks when he was in office. "This is the first attack of a major nature in which a cyberattack was used to effect physical destruction," rather than just slow another computer, or hack into it to steal data.

"Somebody crossed the Rubicon," he said.

Getting the worm into Natanz, however, was no easy trick. The United States and Israel would have to rely on engineers, maintenance workers and others - both spies and unwitting accomplices - with physical access to the plant. "That was our holy grail," one of the architects of the plan said. "It turns out there is always an idiot around who doesn't think much about the thumb drive in their hand."

In fact, thumb drives turned out to be critical in spreading the first variants of the computer worm; later, more sophisticated methods were developed to deliver the malicious code.

The first attacks were small, and when the centrifuges began spinning out of control in 2008, the Iranians were mystified about the cause, according to intercepts that the United States later picked up. "The thinking was that the Iranians would blame bad parts, or bad engineering, or just incompetence," one of the architects of the early attack said.

The Iranians were confused partly because no two attacks were exactly alike. Moreover, the code would lurk inside the plant for weeks, recording normal operations; when it attacked, it sent signals to the Natanz control room indicating that everything downstairs was operating normally. "This may have been the most brilliant part of the code," one American official said.

Later, word circulated through the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog, that the Iranians had grown so distrustful of their own instruments that they had assigned people to sit in the plant and radio back what they saw.

"The intent was that the failures should make them feel they were stupid, which is what happened," the participant in the attacks said. When a few centrifuges failed, the Iranians would close down whole "stands" that linked 164 machines, looking for signs of sabotage in all of them. "They overreacted," one official said. "We soon discovered they fired people."

Imagery recovered by nuclear inspectors from cameras at Natanz - which the nuclear agency uses to keep track of what happens between visits - showed the results. There was some evidence of wreckage, but it was clear that the Iranians had also carted away centrifuges that had previously appeared to be working well.

But by the time Mr. Bush left office, no wholesale destruction had been accomplished. Meeting with Mr. Obama in the White House days before his inauguration, Mr. Bush urged him to preserve two classified programs, Olympic Games and the drone program in Pakistan. Mr. Obama took Mr. Bush's advice.
The Stuxnet Surprise
Mr. Obama came to office with an interest in cyberissues, but he had discussed them during the campaign mostly in terms of threats to personal privacy and the risks to infrastructure like the electrical grid and the air traffic control system. He commissioned a major study on how to improve America's defenses and announced it with great fanfare in the East Room.

What he did not say then was that he was also learning the arts of cyberwar. The architects of Olympic Games would meet him in the Situation Room, often with what they called the "horse blanket," a giant foldout schematic diagram of Iran's nuclear production facilities. Mr. Obama authorized the attacks to continue, and every few weeks - certainly after a major attack - he would get updates and authorize the next step. Sometimes it was a strike riskier and bolder than what had been tried previously.

"From his first days in office, he was deep into every step in slowing the Iranian program - the diplomacy, the sanctions, every major decision," a senior administration official said. "And it's safe to say that whatever other activity might have been under way was no exception to that rule."

But the good luck did not last. In the summer of 2010, shortly after a new variant of the worm had been sent into Natanz, it became clear that the worm, which was never supposed to leave the Natanz machines, had broken free, like a zoo animal that found the keys to the cage. It fell to Mr. Panetta and two other crucial players in Olympic Games - General Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Michael J. Morell, the deputy director of the C.I.A. - to break the news to Mr. Obama and Mr. Biden.

An error in the code, they said, had led it to spread to an engineer's computer when it was hooked up to the centrifuges. When the engineer left Natanz and connected the computer to the Internet, the American- and Israeli-made bug failed to recognize that its environment had changed. It began replicating itself all around the world. Suddenly, the code was exposed, though its intent would not be clear, at least to ordinary computer users.

"We think there was a modification done by the Israelis," one of the briefers told the president, "and we don't know if we were part of that activity."

Mr. Obama, according to officials in the room, asked a series of questions, fearful that the code could do damage outside the plant. The answers came back in hedged terms. Mr. Biden fumed. "It's got to be the Israelis," he said. "They went too far."

In fact, both the Israelis and the Americans had been aiming for a particular part of the centrifuge plant, a critical area whose loss, they had concluded, would set the Iranians back considerably. It is unclear who introduced the programming error.

The question facing Mr. Obama was whether the rest of Olympic Games was in jeopardy, now that a variant of the bug was replicating itself "in the wild," where computer security experts can dissect it and figure out its purpose.

"I don't think we have enough information," Mr. Obama told the group that day, according to the officials. But in the meantime, he ordered that the cyberattacks continue. They were his best hope of disrupting the Iranian nuclear program unless economic sanctions began to bite harder and reduced Iran's oil revenues.

Within a week, another version of the bug brought down just under 1,000 centrifuges. Olympic Games was still on.
A Weapon's Uncertain Future
American cyberattacks are not limited to Iran, but the focus of attention, as one administration official put it, "has been overwhelmingly on one country." There is no reason to believe that will remain the case for long. Some officials question why the same techniques have not been used more aggressively against North Korea. Others see chances to disrupt Chinese military plans, forces in Syria on the way to suppress the uprising there, and Qaeda operations around the world. "We've considered a lot more attacks than we have gone ahead with," one former intelligence official said.

Mr. Obama has repeatedly told his aides that there are risks to using - and particularly to overusing - the weapon. In fact, no country's infrastructure is more dependent on computer systems, and thus more vulnerable to attack, than that of the United States. It is only a matter of time, most experts believe, before it becomes the target of the same kind of weapon that the Americans have used, secretly, against Iran.

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Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran

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This account of the American and Israeli effort to undermine the Iranian nuclear program is based on interviews over the past 18 months with current and former American, European and Israeli officials involved in the program, as well as a range of outside experts.

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Post # 10 US assisting Middle Eastern allies against cyber threats from Iran

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Post # 10 US assisting Middle Eastern allies against cyber threats from Iran

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This June, an article revealed how the U.S. is helping our Middle Eastern allies in fight against cyber threats coming from Iranian hackers. Our assistance being provided to the allies consists of computer software and computer security intelligence training.The U.S. decided to help protect allies after Iran was attacking Israel and other allies of the U.S..

Recently, it has been reported that Iran has been hiring hackers from Russia to conduct the cyber attacks. In other words, Russia's involvement in the attacks can only increase conflict between us, by threatening our allies.

The Obama administration is believed to have been involved in cyber warfare against Iran, including sophisticated attacks against Iran's nuclear program. Also, the U.S. has apparently set up a list of potential overseas targets for cyber attacks as precautionary measures to prevent future cyber attacks. Therefore, helping our allies to prevent similar attacks can be useful to us in the future against malicious hackers. If our allies networks are breached, hackers could potentially steal confidential information about allied strategies.

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The US is assisting Middle East allies in building up cyber defences to counter growing attacks from Iran, it was reported on Sunday.

The New York Times, citing senior American officials, said computer software, hardware and training was being provided to pro-Washington countries in the Persian Gulf to diffuse the growing threat from Tehran.

Plans to bolster the computer defences of US allies will be extended to parts of Asia in a bid to blunt the perceived threat of network attacks from North Korea.

The Obama administration has long been believed to have been involved in cyberwarfare against Tehran, with earlier reports suggesting the president ordered a series of sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run the country's nuclear programme.

On Friday, the Guardian further revealed that Obama had set up a list of potential overseas targets for US cyber-attacks. The leaked directive authorises the use of cyber-attacks on foreign nations whenever "US nationals interests and equities" are at stake, and specifies that cyber warfare can be used as "anticipatory action" against "imminent threats".

The New York Times article suggests that accompanying a more aggressive approach to conducting cyberwarfare, Washington is looking to thwart attacks from regimes hostile to the US.

The catalyst to boosting the defences of allies seems to have been two recent high-profile attacks - one against Saudi Arabia's oil industry, thought have been conducted from Iran, and an alleged North Korean hack of banks and media companies in South Korea.

A US official told the New York Times that the Iranian attack was "a real wake-up call" which prompted the Pentagon to draw up proposals to provide allies with better computer defences.

It comes as Iran attempts to hire computer programmers associated with illegal hacking, some from Russia.

The US is not the only country to express concern over Tehran's apparent increased attack on cyber security.

On Sunday, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Iran of carrying out "non-stop" attacks on its computer systems.

"In the past few months, we have identified a significant increase in the scope of cyber-attacks on Israel by Iran. These attacks are carried out directly by Iran and through its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah," he told a conference in Tel Aviv.

He added that "vital national systems" had been targeted and that water, power and banking sites were under threat from the attacks.
Topics

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US assisting Middle Eastern allies against cyber threats from Iran

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The US is assisting Middle East allies in building up cyber defences to counter growing attacks from Iran, it was reported on Sunday. The New York Times, citing senior American officials, said computer software, hardware and training was being provided to pro-Washington countries in the Persian Gulf to diffuse the growing threat from Tehran.

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Could be as much as 150 million, Photoshop giant warned

Remember that Adobe security breach earlier this month that leaked the account records of some 3 million customers? Scratch that: the actual number hacked was at least 38 million, it has emerged.

In early October, Adobe warned of "sophisticated attacks" on its network in which hackers gained access to data for what was then believed to be about 2.9 million customers: that data included names, encrypted credit or debit card numbers, expiration dates, and other information relating to customer orders.

In addition, the company said, the cyber-crooks had managed to abscond with source code for "numerous Adobe products."

But in a blog post on Tuesday, investigative journalist Brian Krebs said those early estimates were far too low, and that the actual list of accounts that had been compromised numbered in the tens of millions.

How does Krebs know? Because he's seen the list. Over the weekend, he says, AnonNews.org posted a 3.8GB file called "users.tar.gz" that contained more than 150 million user and password pairs that had apparently been lifted from Adobe.

Adobe spokeswoman Heather Edell has since confirmed the breach to Krebs, adding that the company has contacted the owners of the affected accounts and has reset the passwords for all of the Adobe IDs that it believes were involved in the hacking incident.

"So far, our investigation has confirmed that the attackers obtained access to Adobe IDs and (what were at the time valid) encrypted passwords for approximately 38 million active users," Edell said. "We are still in the process of investigating the number of inactive, invalid and test accounts involved in the incident."

Edell also said that the attackers were able to gain access to at least some of the source code for Adobe Photoshop. Krebs was able to confirm that, too - a second, 2.56GB file posted to AnonNews.org contained what appeared to be Photoshop code.

Source code for Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and the ColdFusion web application server software is also believed to have leaked during the incident, but at least some of this data appears to have been password protected and may not be readily accessible.

Adobe seems to be taking its customer data breach seriously. The company has offered one year's worth of free credit monitoring by Experian to any customer whose account was compromised in the attack. But as Krebs points out, this kind of service isn't guaranteed to spot all of the forms of identity theft that might arise from such incidents, so Adobe customers are advised to place fraud alerts on their accounts and monitor their credit reports closely. ®

Sponsored: Minds Mastering Machines - Call for papers now open

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Three million Adobe accounts hacked? Sorry, make that 38 MILLION

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Remember that Adobe security breach earlier this month that leaked the account records of some 3 million customers? Scratch that: the actual number hacked was at least 38 million, it has emerged.

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An Internet security firm says a limousine software company has been hacked, exposing credit card numbers and potentially embarrassing details about close to 1 million customers, including politicians, star athletes and corporate executives.

Alex Holden, chief information security officer of Milwaukee-based Hold Security, says he discovered the breach at Corporatecaronline more than a month ago. He said he informed the owner of the Kirkwood, Mo.-based software company that customers' credit card numbers, pickup and drop-off information, and other personal details had been stolen.

"The privacy implications of this are very disturbing," Holden said Monday.

Car services buy software from Corporatecaronline and use it to streamline reservations, dispatching and payments. Owner Dan Leonard did not return a call to his company for comment Monday from The Associated Press.

Cybersecurity blogger Brian Krebs, working with Hold Security, first reported the hack on his website krebsonsecurity.com, including details dispatchers gave to drivers heading out to pick up celebrity passengers. For example, Krebs reported a chauffeur driving Tom Hanks to a Chicago restaurant for dinner was advised the client was a "VVIP" who required "No cell/radio use" by the driver.

A chauffeur meeting Latin American textile magnate Josue Christiano Gomes da Silva inside an airport luggage claim area with a printed sign was warned: "SUPER VIP CLIENT. EVERYTHING MUST BE PERFECT!"

Other customers include Donald Trump, who required a new car with a clear front seat; LeBron James, who was picked up at an entrance for athletes at a Las Vegas sports arena; and Colorado Sen. Mark Udall, who was traveling to Boston with golf clubs.

The stolen files also include records about what took place in the vehicles, including sex, vomiting and smoking marijuana, Krebs reports.

Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich., whose data was among those breached, declined to comment Monday. But his spokesman Andrew Schreiber said he was appreciative that the matter was brought it to his attention.

Other members of Congress also said they were uninformed.

"This is the first we have heard about this. We were never notified, but we are looking into the claim," said Leslie Shedd, spokeswoman for Rep. Lynn Westmoreland, R-Ga.

Holden said he found the information from Corporatecaronline customers stored on the same computer server where he earlier found stolen usernames and passwords from PR Newswire, Adobe Systems and about 100 other firms. He said most firms took immediate action when informed; Adobe and PR Newswire went public when they learned of the breaches, warning millions of customers affected.

Holden declined to name dozens of other companies whose customers' data also appeared to have been hacked.

"If we start mentioning the names, there might be widespread panic," he said, noting that those companies are trying to deal with the breaches. But Holden said he was concerned that Corporatecaronline was failing to act, and that he contacted credit card companies himself.

Corporatecaronline's website boasts of robust data protection. "The only point of access to the servers is through our firewall, which is managed by our data center, 24/7, 365 days a year," it says.

But Jonathan Mayer, a cybersecurity fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, did some poking Monday and found the website runs on outdated software prone to vulnerabilities. He said it has code dating back to Macromedia, which was acquired by Adobe nearly eight years ago; Internet Explorer 4, which rolled out in 1997; and 13-year-old Netscape 6.

"The point here is that you don't have to be a big target to be at risk online anymore," Mayer said. "This is the new normal, and it underscores the need for improving the regulatory framework."

The FBI did not immediately return a call seeking comment.

Cybersecurity firm McAfee's chief technology officer Raj Samani said Monday the hack underscores how vulnerable customers can be, even if they're trying to use complex passwords and take precautions with their privacy.

"You can do anything you want, but in many cases you entrust your data with multiple third parties, and it's out of your hands," he said.

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Limo firm hacked; politician, celeb data breached

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An Internet security firm says a limousine software company has been hacked, exposing credit card numbers and potentially embarrassing details about close to 1 million customers, including politicians, star athletes and corporate executives. Alex Holden, chief information security officer of Milwaukee-based Hold Security, says he discovered the breach at Corporatecaronline more than a month ago.

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Pacemakers that connect to the Internet may be vulnerable to hacking, researchers say.

Credit: Pacemaker x-ray via Shutterstock

In the second season of the TV show "Homeland," terrorists assassinated the vice president of the United States (played by Jamey Sheridan) by hacking into his Wi-Fi-enabled pacemaker, and inducing a heart attack.

That isn't just fiction, researchers say: Many pacemakers and other implantable medical devices (IMDs), such as insulin pumps, connect to the Internet via Wi-Fi to share important medical data with doctors. But very few of these devices use secure connections.

Although there are no known instances of someone hacking a pacemaker or similar device to harm another person in real life, the danger is real: Security experts have demonstrated for years that hackers could easily steal medical data from IMDs, or even take control of the devices, causing pacemakers to emit shocks, insulin pumps to overdose their wearers, and ventilators to stop working.

That's why researchers at Rice University in Houston decided to look for a better way to protect people's IMDs. [ 9 Odd Ways Your Tech Devices May Injure You]

You could say their solution "beats" the competition: They use a patient's heartbeat as a constantly changing password.

"We use the heartbeat as a random-number generator," said Farinaz Koushanfar, an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering at the university. "Your heart generates pulses, and the timing of these pulses has a good amount of randomness to them.... This is a true random number generator."

An uncrackable code

Random numbers are an essential part of any encryption system, and the more random, the better the encryption. The randomness of the human heartbeat, combined with the fact that a doctor or potential attacker would need to physically touch a patient to measure the heartbeat in order to access the IMD, forms the basis of the researchers' device.

Most companies that make IMDs choose not to encrypt their devices' wireless connections because an IMD's most important job is to save its wearer's life, Koushanfar said. If companies have to choose between reliable, easy access and security against intruders, they'll always choose the former, she told LiveScience.

Even if developers could find a way to balance security and ease of access, strong encryption requires additional processing power, which means a bigger drain on the IMD's battery, Koushanfar explained. Because changing an IMD's battery usually means operating on a patient, developers are hesitant to do anything that will significantly shorten the battery life.

The researchers say their program would only minimally drain an IMD's battery, while still ensuring a high degree of security.

It works like this: Using a Wi-Fi-enabled electrocardiogram reader, or EKG, the doctor will initiate a connection with a patient's IMD. But the devices don't actually share until both the doctor's EKG reader and the patient's IMD take a 12-second reading of the patient's heartbeat.

Once the doctor's EKG reader and the patient's IMD have been connected, the two devices will then generate a number based on the patient's unique heartbeat pattern, and then, like poker players simultaneously showing each other their hands, the two devices will show each other their numbers.

Pacemakers

The researchers say their program would work best with pacemakers, but could also be used in any IMD that can reliably detect the pulse.

Koushanfar said the next step in the research , which she completed with graduate student Mahmoud Rostami, is to get the program approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration.

To treat a person with an IMD secured in this way, all doctors have to do is download the program to their EKG device, she said.

Many researchers have developed algorithms for generating numbers that seem to be random to humans. But there's no such thing as a true random number generator because computers are inherently logical machines, and always use some sort of process to generate the numbers that, without extremely close scrutiny, only appear to be random.

The Rice researchers may have gotten around that problem.

"Those mathematical versions are pseudorandom generators," Rostami said. "This is a real random number generator."

Email jscharr@techmedianetwork.com or follow her @JillScharr. Follow us @livescience, Facebook & Google+. Original article on LiveScience.

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Hack-Proof Pacemakers: Code Based on Heartbeat Could Thwart Disruption

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In the second season of the TV show "Homeland," terrorists assassinated the vice president of the United States (played by Jamey Sheridan) by hacking into his Wi-Fi-enabled pacemaker, and inducing a heart attack. That isn't just fiction, researchers say: Many pacemakers and other implantable medical devices (IMDs), such as insulin pumps, connect to the Internet via Wi-Fi to share important medical data with doctors.

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The former United States vice-president Dick Cheney was so fearful of assassination by terrorists sending an electronic shock to his implanted heart defibrillator that he ordered doctors to fit a new device without a wi-fi capability.

The extraordinary admission comes in the 72-year-old's new book Heart: An American Medical Odyssey, in which he also reveals that two months after his 2001 inauguration he prepared a letter of resignation to President George W Bush that he carried with him almost constantly, which he could hand over if he felt his health deteriorating.

Cheney, a fiercely loyal deputy during both terms of Bush's administration, has suffered five heart attacks since the age of 37 and had a heart transplant last year. In an interview to support his book on the CBS show 60 Minutes, due to air on Sunday night, he describes his current health as "a miracle".

But it is Cheney's fear of assassination that will provide a major talking point from the interview and book, which was written in conjunction with his longtime cardiologist, Dr Jonathan Reiner.

A fictional vice-president in the hit US television drama Homeland was murdered by terrorists sending an electronic signal to his pacemaker, in an episode several years after Cheney had his device fitted, in June 2001. It was an alarming plotline, he said.

"I was aware of the danger that existed, I found it credible because I knew from the experience we had and the necessity for adjusting my own device that it was an accurate portrayal of what was possible," he said in the CBS interview.

Reiner said Cheney asked him in 2007 to remove the defibrillator and replace it with one that had no wireless capability.

"It seemed to be a bad idea for the vice-president of the United States to have a device that maybe somebody in the next hotel room or downstairs might be able to hack into," he said.

Cheney said his resignation letter was written as a precaution early in 2001, weeks after Bush took office and as he recuperated from an angioplasty to reopen an artery that surgeons had worked on four months previously.

"Basically what I did was I resigned the United States vice-presidency effective March 28th 2001," Cheney said, adding that Bush "was a little surprised but he thought it was a good idea."

The letter remained in an envelope with him throughout his terms of office and he said he was thankful never to have to deliver it.

Cheney insists his health issues never interfered with his decision making during his lengthy career in Washington politics, which began in 1968 as an aide to a Wisconsin congressman and saw him become chief of staff to President Gerald Ford as a chain-smoking 34-year-old in 1975. Even during the most stressful period of his time as vice-president, the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 and their aftermath, he said his condition did not affect his thinking.

"No, not at all. I was as good as I could be given that I was 60-something years old at that point and a heart patient," he said. "I didn't think about my health. I was thinking about the problem we were dealing with."

Reiner, however, said he feared that Cheney would become another victim of the fateful day, revealing that tests on the morning of September 11 showed that the vice-president had hyperkalaemia, an elevated level of potassium in the bloodstream that can lead to cardiac arrest.

"Oh, great, the vice-president is going to die tonight from hyperkalaemia," Reiner said he recalled thinking as he watched a television round-up of the day's events.

Ultimately, Cheney said, a heart transplant last year saved his life, 20 months after he was fitted with a ventricular assist device that regulated his heartbeat as he waited. He said it transformed him from a sallow and very sick man who could walk only with a cane to a more robust and healthy character today. "I feel fantastic," he said.

Medical advances had helped him, he said, along with a little luck along the way. In the interview he tells of how Reiner once likened him to somebody who gets up late for work and drives to work with every set of traffic lights turning green just as he approached them.

"That's a pretty good description," Cheney said.
Topics

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Dick Cheney feared assassination by shock to implanted heart defibrillator

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The former United States vice-president Dick Cheney was so fearful of assassination by terrorists sending an electronic shock to his implanted heart defibrillator that he ordered doctors to fit a new device without a wi-fi capability.

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Iran's Revolutionary Guard said it was investigating the death of an officer in a "horrific incident," but denied media reports it was an assassination.

Alborz, an Iranian website, reported earlier this week that Mojtaba Ahmadi, an official of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was found shot dead near Karaj, a town northwest of the capital Tehran.

He had left his house on Monday morning and was found a few hours later with a bullet in his heart, it said.

The London-based Daily Telegraph reported that Ahmadi was a commander of the unit's Cyber War Headquarters and quoted a local police commander as saying it was an assassination.

It speculated that the death could have been an assassination, similar to those of five Iranian nuclear scientists since 2007.

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"In the wake of a horrific incident involving one of the IRGC officials the matter is being investigated and the main reason of the event and the motive of the attacker have not been specified," said an IRGC statement, quoted by Sepah news.

Sepah, which is operated by the Revolutionary Guard, ran its report under the headline "Denial of news reports of the assassination of one of IRGC's officials."

The statement did not identify Ahmadi but a local news website published pictures on Wednesday showing his funeral procession, along with text excerpts of the IRGC communique.

"The result of investigation will be announced through official channels and any speculation will not be appropriate before the investigation is over," an Iranian official said late on Wednesday. Western officials have not commented on the incident.

Iran has been accused of mounting cyber attacks against Western targets in recent years, and has itself been the target of suspected Western attacks on computer systems at its nuclear facilities using a virus called Stuxnet.

For their part, authorities in Tehran have accused Israel and its Western allies of carrying out a series of assassinations against Iranian nuclear scientists. The last such attack happened in January 2012 when one man was killed by a car bomb.

Israel regards Iran's nuclear activities as an existential threat and has applied diplomatic pressure on the West to force Iran to curb its nuclear program. Tehran maintains it has only peaceful goals.

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Iran investigates 'horrific' death of alleged cyber warfare officer

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Iran's Revolutionary Guard said it was investigating the death of an officer in a "horrific incident," but denied media reports it was an assassination. Alborz, an Iranian website, reported earlier this week that Mojtaba Ahmadi, an official of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was found shot dead near Karaj, a town northwest of the capital Tehran.

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Israel has said it was "not necessarily" involved in the death of the head of Iranian cyber warfare, Mojtaba Ahmadi. He was killed north of Tehran on Saturday or early this week, becoming the latest in a string of Iranian nuclear and war effort experts to meet an untimely end.

"The fact that a cyber commander or this or that scientist was wiped out or killed in this or that assassination does not necessarily mean that Israel's hand is in the matter," Science and Technology Minister - and former head of Israel's internal security agency, the Shin Bet - Yaacov Peri told Israel Radio. "At the same time, it's definitely the type of operation that can slow the danger in the Iranian issue both in the nuclear realm and in the realm of cyber."

But, he added, the death of the head of the Cyber Warfare Command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard would not necessarily have a lasting impact since a replacement would be found.

Details of the death, including its precise timing, remain shrouded in mystery. The Iranian Albarz website reported that Mr Ahmadi was found dead in a wooded area near Karaj, northwest of Tehran and quoted a witness saying he had been shot. He was last seen on Saturday.

A statement on the website of the Revolutionary Guard denied the death was an assassination, terming it instead a "horrific incident" that was being investigated.

Working in nuclear development or advanced warfare systems has proven a dangerous job in Iran. Five Iranian nuclear scientists as well as the country's ballistic missile programme director have been assassinated since 2007, with Iran blaming Israel. Israel has in the past declined comment on whether it is involved, yet sometimes has voiced satisfaction with the results.

Israel believes Iran, its arch-foe and main rival for primacy in the region, is working on a nuclear bomb that could threaten its existence or at least increase Iran's power dramatically.

The election of the more moderate Iranian President, Hasan Rouhani, has done nothing to alleviate Israel's worries and the Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu pointedly warned the international community during an address at the UN on Tuesday that Iran is still working towards a nuclear bomb and that Israel would stop it even if it has to act alone.

At least four of the slain Iranian scientists were ambushed with a magnetic bomb affixed to their vehicle as they commuted to work, according to press reports. In January 2012, Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, an expert on uranium enrichment, was killed by a bomb affixed by a motorcyclist. Scientist Darush Rezaei-Nejad was killed by shots fired from a motorcycle a year earlier. The country's top physicist, Majid Shahriari, was killed by a magnetised bomb in October 2010.

Last year US officials said Israel's Mossad intelligence agency was providing an Iranian opposition group, the People's Mujahideen of Iran, with logistical and financial support to assassinate the scientists.

Israeli news reports indicated that Israel will not soften the tone on Iran following Mr Netanyahu's speech. Even as the United States begins to conduct talks with Iran over its nuclear programme, Israel will continue to say that Iran is trying to dupe the international community.

But not all Israeli commentators are comfortable with the strident approach Mr Netanyahu has adopted, including calling for heightening sanctions.

"If Rouhani does show concrete compromise, I believe imposing more sanctions could be detrimental," Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli, who is one of the country's leading specialists on Iran, wrote on his website. "There should be a reciprocal system whereupon for each concrete compromise, Iran is rewarded, not punished."

Mr Javedanfar took exception to Mr Netanyahu's terming during his UN speech of Mr Rouhani as a "wolf in sheep's clothing" saying that "in Iranian culture comparing someone to an animal in any way is deeply offensive."

Mr Javedanfar concludes: "Israel has a very legitimate case against the Iranian regime's nuclear programme - it is just unfortunate Netanyahu has to present it."
Killer rivalry? The experts who have lost their lives
Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan Nuclear scientist in Tehran - killed, January 2012.

Majid Shahriari Senior Iranian nuclear physicist - killed by a bomb attached to his car, November 2010; Iran blamed the West.

Masoud Alimohammodi Particle physicist - killed by a bomb strapped to a motorcycle, January 2010.

Shahram Amiri Nuclear scientist - disappeared, October 2009; Iran blames the US.

Ali Reza Asghari General of the Islamic Revolutionary Republican Guards Corps and Cabinet Minister - kidnapped, February 2007; widely reported to have been taken by Mossad.

Hamid Hajizadeh Teacher and poet - stabbed to death alongside his son, September 1998.

Hussein Baraxandeh Engineer and close aide of the Iranian revolutionary, Dr Ali Shariati - disappeared and found dead the next day, January 1995; initial cause of death was claimed to be heart problems but was later confirmed as suffocation.

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Iran claims cyber warfare expert not assassinated, as Israel remains

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Israel has said it was "not necessarily" involved in the death of the head of Iranian cyber warfare, Mojtaba Ahmadi. He was killed north of Tehran on Saturday or early this week, becoming the latest in a string of Iranian nuclear and war effort experts to meet an untimely end.

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Black Hat is the most technical and relevant global information security event series in the world. These high-profile global events and Trainings are driven by the needs of the security community, striving to bring together the best minds in the industry.

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Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines Redux

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Black Hat USA 2013 Keynote - Gen. Alexander

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nccdc ccdc cyber defense competition cyberpatriot national collegiate cyber defense competition

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National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition

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National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition

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Towson University Cyber Security Program

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Division of Innovation and Applied Research, Towson University

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Stories of Espionage and Counterintelligence

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APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units

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This video shows actual attacker sessions and intrusion activities conducted by one specific Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group, which Mandiant has named APT1. This group has systematically stolen confidential data from at least 141 organizations across multiple industries. A full report, published by Mandiant, details APT1's multi-year cyber espionage campaign and is available at www.mandiant.com/apt1.

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The nation's critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of our nation's economy, security, and health. We know it as the power we use in our homes, the water we drink, the transportation that moves us, the stores we shop in, and the communication systems we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family.

Overall, there are 16 critical infrastructure sectors that compose the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. The National Protection and Programs Directorate's Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) leads the coordinated national effort to manage risks to the nation's critical infrastructure and enhance the security and resilience of America's physical and cyber infrastructure. Read more about how IP leads this national effort.

Critical Infrastructure Community

Just as we all rely on critical infrastructure, we all play a role in keeping it strong, secure, and resilient. Securing and making critical infrastructure resilient is a shared responsibility-shared by Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; private companies; and individual citizens.

Because the vast majority of our nation's critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated, both the government and private sector have formed vital partnerships to fulfill our shared responsibility to prevent and reduce the risks of disruptions to critical infrastructure. Together, public-private efforts to strengthen critical infrastructure help the public sector to enhance security and rapidly respond to and recover from all-hazards events and assist the private sector to restore business operations and minimize losses in the face of such an event.

Critical Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships

The protection of the nation's critical infrastructure requires effective partnerships that foster integrated, collaborative engagement and interaction among public and private sector partners across all 16 critical infrastructure sectors.

Office of Cybersecurity and Communications

The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C), within the National Protection and Programs Directorate, is responsible for enhancing the security, resilience, and reliability of the nation's cyber and communications infrastructure.

Office of Infrastructure Protection

The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), within the National Protection and Programs Directorate, leads and coordinates national programs and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience and has established strong partnerships between the government and the private sector.

Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month

Observed in November, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month recognizes the vital role that critical infrastructure plays in our nation's way of life and why it is important to expand and reinforce critical infrastructure security and resilience. By raising awareness of the importance of security the assets, systems, and networks we count on every day, we can build on the great work of this public-private partnership and further enhance security and resilience of our critical infrastructure.

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The nation's critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of our nation's economy, security, and health. We know it as the power we use in our homes, the water we drink, the transportation that moves us, the stores we shop in, and the communication systems we rely on to stay in touch with friends and family.

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The National Security State: Why it's Important to Understand the Nature of the Beast

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In two recent posts I argued that it is useful to think of the national security establishment as a thoughtless organism prone to certain predictable behaviors such as self-preservation, expansion, and secrecy. But what are the policy implications, exactly, of that way of conceptualizing things?

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Post #9 Hackers take Limo Service Firms for a Ride

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Post #9 Hackers take Limo Service Firms for a Ride

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This month, it has been reported that malicious hackers have breached an American limo and car service for wealthy customers. These customers consist of CEOs, lawmakers/politicians, and A-list celebrities. The breach exposed personal and financial data for more than 850,000 high end customers.

Due to the breach, financial and personal information was stolen from the VIP customers of the limo service including LeBron James, Tom Hanks, and Donald Trump. The list also included Kevin Mandia. Mandia is the CEO if Mandiant, which was the security company that uncovered the APT1 attacks that originated in China (discussed in a previous article below). Out of the 850,000 credit card numbers, more than a quarter of these credit cards were high or no limit American Express cards. These particular credit cards could be sold in cybercrime underground and would have a very high resale value.

The information that was stolen by the hackers could provide hackers with information needed for a targeted attack because it included personal information such as recurring travel habits, pick up and/or drop off addresses.

I believe that it is scary for intelligent hackers to attack weaknesses in services that wealthy people use in order to steal their personal and financial information. If the result of attacking a limo service provided a high amount of wealthy clients' personal and financial information, imagining what information could be stolen to perhaps, a private jet company could be detrimental and high profile in the media. These cyber security hackers are discovering more and more ways to hack our data, and as consumers and customers to various companies that work with electronic devices and files, we must be more aware and careful with who we provide our credit card data to.

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A hacker break in at a U.S. company that brokers reservations for limousine and Town Car services nationwide has exposed the personal and financial information on more than 850,000 well-heeled customers, including Fortune 500 CEOs, lawmakers, and A-list celebrities.

The high-value data cache was found on the same servers where hackers stashed information stolen from PR Newswire, as well as huge troves of source code data lifted from Adobe Systems Inc. - suggesting that the same attacker(s) may have been involved in all three compromises.

In this case, the name on the file archive reads " CorporateCarOnline." That name matches a company based in Kirkwood, Missouri which bills itself as "the leading provider of on-demand software management solutions for the limousine and ground transportation industry."

I reached out several times over almost two weeks seeking comment from CorporateCarOnline.com. At length, I reached owner Dan Leonard, whoseemed to know what I was calling about, but declined to discuss the matter, saying only that "I'd prefer not to talk to anybody about that."

It's understandable why the company would decline to comment: Inside the plain text archive apparently stolen from the firm are more than 850,000 credit card numbers, expiry dates and associated names and addresses. More than one-quarter (241,000) of all compromised card numbers were high- or no-limit American Express accounts, card numbers that have very high resale value in the cybercrime underground.

Alex Holden, chief information security officer at Hold Security LLC and a key collaborator on the research in this post, said CorporateCarOnline confirmed to him that the data was stolen from its systems.

"While the target is not a household name, it is, arguably, the highest socially impacting target yet," Holden said. "By its nature, limo and corporate transportation caters to affluent individuals and VIPs."

Further pointing to a compromise at the site is the presence of a vulnerability in its implementation of ColdFusion, a Web application platform that has become a favorite target of the attackers thought to be responsible for this and other aforementioned breaches of late.

Below are some of the rich and famous whose pick up and drop-off information - and in some cases credit card data - was in the stolen archive. Nearly all of these individual records were marked with "VIP" or "SuperVIP!" notations. Included in quotes are notes left for the chauffeur.

LeBron James - Thomas & Mack Center sports arena, athlete entrance, July 22, 2007; "Call Lynn upon arrival."

Tom Hanks - Chicago Midway, June 19, 2013; "VVIP. No cell/radio use with passenger/prepaid. 1500 W. Taylor Street Chicago, Rosebud, Dinner Reser @8pm"

Aaron Rodgers - Duncan Aviation, Kalamazoo, Mich., June 26, 2010; " Kregg Lumpkin and wife. 3 Bottle Waters. Greg Jennings Foundation."

-House Judiciary Committee Chairman Rep. John Conyers, (D-Mich.), July 4, 2011, Indianapolis International Airport; "Meet and Greet Baggage Claim. US Congressman. A DFTU situation" [not quite sure what this stands for, but my guess is "Don't F*** This Up"]

- Sen. Mark Udall (D-Colo.), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Boston Logan Intl. Airport, Sept. 14, 2009; "Contact if need be Yolanda Magallanes [link added]. Client will have golf clubs with him."

Other current members of Congress whose information appears in this database include Rep. Joe Garcia (D-Fla.); Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-Fla.); Rep. Jim Matheson (D-Utah); Rep. Lynn Westmoreland, Rep. Joe Baca (D-Calif.), Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.).

A number of former lawmakers were passengers with limo companies that gave their customer data to CorporateCarOneline, including:

- Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD), Des Moines, Iowa, July 21, 2010; "Ag Innovation Committee. Passengers plus luggage. Passengers: Lori Captain, Mary Langowski, Jonathan Sallet, Tom West, Jim Collins, Senator Tom Daschle, JB Penn, Anthony Farina."

- Sen. John Breaux (D-La.), Aug. 27, 2010; "Ambassador Steven Green & Senator Breaux. ***VIP***DO NOT COLLECT"

- Rep. James Saxton (R-NJ), Rep. William Delahunt (D-Mass.), Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-La.),

- Donald Trump, Wynn Hotel, Las Vegas, Feb. 12, 2007: "Must be new car, clean, and front seat must be clear."

- Michael D. Grimes, co-head of global technology investment banking for Morgan Stanley. Jan. 30, 2013; "Always wants 'Michael David' for name sign. Do not use last name! Always wants inside meet. VIP, co-head of worldwide technology."

- Bruce Chesley, director, advanced space and intelligence systems, Boeing; LAX, July 5, 2013.

- Josue Christiano Gomes da Silva, chairman and CEO of Companhia de Tecidos Norte de Minas, the largest textile group in Latin America, June 2, 2013: "Cheauffeur meets inside luggage claim with printed name sign. SUPER VIP CLIENT. EVERYTHING MUST BE PERFECT!"

- Patrick M. Prevost, president and CEO, Cabot Corp. June 2, 2013; "SUPER VIP he is CEO of Cabot Corp!"

- Kjeld Kirk Kristiansen and Jorgen Vig Knudstorp, the former and current CEOs of Lego Corp.
AMMO FOR TARGETED ATTACKS?
This database would be a gold mine of information for would-be corporate spies or for those engaged in other types of espionage. Records in the limo reservation database telegraphed the future dates and locations of travel for many important people. A ridiculously large number of entries provide the tail number of a customer's plane, indicating they were to be picked up immediately upon disembarking a private jet.

Such information would be extremely useful in the hands of nation-state level attackers. For a very relevant and timely example of this, consider the cyber spying story printed last month by Foreign Policy magazine. That piece featured an interview with Kevin Mandia, the chief executive of Mandiant, an Alexandria, Va. based firm that specializes in helping companies defend against cyber espionage attacks. In the FP story, Mandia said he recently was the target of a targeted cyber attack that tried to foist malicious spyware on him via an email with a booby-trapped PDF copy of a recent limo invoice.

"I've been receiving PDF invoices not from them, but from an [advanced hacking] group back in China; that's awesome," Foreign Policy quoted Mandia as saying. According to the story, Mandia only caught the attack when the hackers sent receipts on days when he hadn't used the car service. "I forwarded them to our security service, and they said, 'Yup, that's got a [malicious] payload," Mandia said.

Incredibly, this purloined limo database may have played a part in those attacks. Among the 850,000+ records in the stolen CorporateCarOnline data are several travel records for Mandiant employees, including Kevin's. Other Mandiant employees who used limo services via CorporateCarOnline include David Swanson, manager of strategic solutions at Mandiant, and Andrew Williams, a sales account executive. I shared the Mandiant data with a representative for the company, which declined to comment for this story.
TABLOID FODDER
Any two-bit tabloid would have an absolute field day with this database. Simple text searches for certain words ("sex," "puke," "arrest," "police," "smoking pot") reveal dozens of records detailing misbehavior and all kinds of naughtiness by executives, celebrities and people you might otherwise expect to behave civilly.

For example, the following is an explanation taken from a limo reservation made back in May 2006 by a woman working for MTV. The limo in question was actually a stretch Hummer with capacity to seat 14 passengers, and was rented for the occasion of visiting a series of wineries in Long Island, NY. When the stretch Hummer returned to the shop after disgorging its passengers, the fleet's owners discovered that the vehicle had been plastered with cheese slices and crackers, and that someone had left behind a sex toy:

"We would like to apologize for the inconvenience that was caused at the beginning of Your rental and we hope that by giving You 2 hours free of overtime we made it up to You. The power problem was out of our control and could not be foreseen since right before dispatching the car everything was properly working. After the vehicle returned to base we discovered that it was left in a complete mess. Slices of cheese were all over the seats, windows and the bars. On top of that, crackers were left on the floor and seats crushed by people sitting and walking all over it. We are transportation company not a restaurant and we specifically put in our terms and conditions that we do not allow any food in our limousines. Also we do not allow any sexual activities in the car and we have found sex toy while cleaning the car. We have charged your card for cleaning fee of $100 since we had to send limousine to the car wash to get it detailed after all the activities during your rental."

Tags: Aaron Rodgers, American Express, Bruce Chesley, ColdFusion, Corporatecaronline.com, Dan Leonard, Donald Trump, Jorgen Vig Knudstorp, Josue Christiano Gomes da Silva, Kevin Mandia, Kjeld Kirk Kristiansen, LeBron James, Mandiant, Michael D. Grimes, Morgan Stanley, MTV, Patrick M. Prevost, Rep. Billy Tauzin, Rep. Gus Bilirakis, Rep. James Saxton, Rep. Jim Matheson, Rep. Joe Baca, Rep. Joe Garcia, Rep. John Conyers, Rep. Lynn Westmoreland, Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, Rep. William Delahunt, Sen. John Breaux, Sen. Tom Daschle, Tom Hanks

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A hacker break in at a U.S. company that brokers reservations for limousine and Town Car services nationwide has exposed the personal and financial information on more than 850,000 well-heeled customers, including Fortune 500 CEOs, lawmakers, and A-list celebrities.

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Post #8 Hackers Have their Eyes on Energy Companies

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Post #8 Hackers Have their Eyes on Energy Companies

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A recent study claims that oil and energy companies are a huge target to foreign governments and foreign rival companies. Cyber attacks of oil and energy companies are on the rise due to their significance in society by foreign hackers. Energy security company, AlertLogic, reported that 67% of its customers in the energy industry were victims of password cracking attacks. Also, a whopping 61% of customers were affected by malicious malware on their computers.

The range of attacks vary. It has been reported that hackers have gone from stealing critical information as to knowing where oil companies will drill in the future to attempts to shut down customer payment systems for utility companies. The media is not aware of these attacks because the energy companies are fearful of negative publicity if they report the attacks. For example, a real attack was on the massive energy company called Telvent, where foreign hackers who are believed to attack from China, hacked into and had details of their electrical grid infrastructure.

I do not doubt that foreign hackers are going for the critical oil and energy companies of the U.S. It is a scary thought to think that hackers target energy companies more than we hear about in the media. It causes a sense of uncertainty in the information that is shared over the internet every day by so many Americans. Also, a hit to our critical infrastructure is a serious threat to the regulation of any country. If foreign hackers were to one day, successful hack into our energy and oil companies, it would send our country into chaos. If hackers take down our electrical grid, it means no power, which would have a negative cascading effect on our society involving food, money, transportation, etc. If hackers take down any oil companies, it means oil shortages, higher gas prices, and overall stress and frustration within our country.

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When you think of cloak-and-dagger online attacks, you don't normally think of the energy and oil industries. However, a new study claims that energy companies are a huge target for hackers.

Alert Logic's paper on the state of the cloud claims 67% of its customers in the energy industry experienced brute force attacks and 61% had malware/bot attacks between April 1 and September 30, 2012. Between January and May 23, 2013, their energy customers observed 8,840 incidents. Attacks on oil and energy companies range from attempted theft of proprietary information-like where oil companies are planning to drill next-to puzzling attempts to shut down the online payment systems of large public utilities.

Energy companies are sensitive about reporting attacks to the authorities or shareholders because they're afraid of negative ramifications. However, we occasionally learn about digital espionage against energy companies when information leaks into the hands of the public. Among other attacks, Anonymous stole 1.41 GB of data related to Azerbaijan's state oil company, energy giant Telvent had details of its electrical grid infrastructure stolen by hackers believed to originate in China, and several public utilities had their users' bank information allegedly stolen.

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Hackers Have Their Eyes On Energy Companies

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When you think of cloak-and-dagger online attacks, you don't normally think of the energy and oil industries. However, a new study claims that energy companies are a huge target for hackers. Alert Logic's paper on the state of the cloud claims 67% of its customers in the energy industry experienced brute force attacks and 61% had malware/bot attacks between April 1 and September 30, 2012.

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Post #7 Staged Cyber Attack Teachers Wall Street Some Survival Tactics

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Post #7 Staged Cyber Attack Teachers Wall Street Some Survival Tactics

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Last July, a staged cyber attack on Wall Street was simulated in order to prepare the banks for real cyber attacks and test their reaction and response techniques. The staged attack named, "Quantum Dawn 2" was issued to some of the largest banks in the world. The goal of the "Quantum Dawn 2" was to test security leaders within the banks with different attack scenarios. During the staged attack, each bank was presented with a different scenario. For example, one bank experienced trouble with their stock trading systems, which could potentially cause million of dollars in losses.

A huge benefit within the staged attack allowed open communication and collaboration between banks to share defense and response strategies with each other. The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI also participated. It is essential for these types of drills to take place because our country relies so much on the banks they store their money in. If people are unable to access their bank accounts to get to their money, our economy could take an enormous hit and be detrimental to our country's revenue.

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REUTERS/ Brendan McDermid
NEW YORK (Reuters) - A few months ago, a group of Wall Street banks fashioned a risk-manager's worst nightmare to determine how they would survive. Luckily, it was all pretend.

In a staged simulation called Quantum Dawn 2, bank executives in charge of operations, technology and crisis planning were tasked with detecting how a massive cyber attack was unfolding in the markets - but each one only got to see a tiny red flag waving in a sea of information.

In some cases, a blue-chip stock started to plummet inexplicably. Soon, shocking news about the company hit the market, but unbeknownst to the participant, the news was fake.

For others, trading systems were on the fritz, or government websites stopped functioning. Even basic technology such as telephones and printers stopped working properly for some.

Individually, any of these problems would be reason to worry. The challenge for Quantum Dawn 2's victims was not only spotting a problem, but communicating with rivals, exchanges and government authorities to conclude that markets were in the throes of a systemic crisis and needed to be shut down.

"It didn't all happen at once - each attack affected firms differently," said Karl Schimmeck,vice president of Financial Services Operations at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), a Wall Street trade group that oversaw the event in conjunction with Deloitte & Touche LLP.

"Some firms would see a problem, some firms wouldn't, and some firms only 'see' it second-hand because they're communicating with each other."

Banks are one of the biggest targets for cyber attacks, which have occurred more frequently over the past two years, security experts said.

The most visible attacks affect customers' access to websites through a distributed denial of service - or "DDOS" - attack. But banks are also worried about more insidious attacks, in which hackers quietly infiltrate systems to swipe valuable data, or lie in wait to plow across the entire industry with a systemic attack - the doomsday scenario Quantum Dawn 2 participants want to avoid.

One key lesson from the drill was that the private sector and government authorities must share information more freely and quickly, said Ed Powers, the national managing principal of Deloitte & Touche's security and privacy practice. While firms have detailed information about individual attacks, authorities can help prevent a crisis by sharing information about broader threats when appropriate, he said.

"Cyber attacks that manifest in different organizations can become a systemic issue," said Powers.

The industry also needs to put in place better guidelines to determine whether risks are systemic, and to formalize procedures for deciding whether to close markets, he added.

Quantum Dawn 2 took place on July 18 after being delayed to accommodate the large number of firms that wanted to participate. It was the second time the industry had organized such an event, which required 10 months of planning and tens of thousands of dollars to orchestrate. SIFMA plans to perform an industry-wide drill every two years, with more limited attack simulations in the interim, said Schimmeck.

In addition to big banks such as Bank of America Corp and Goldman Sachs Group Inc , there were 50 participants, including major exchanges, clearinghouses, the U.S. Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Representatives from SIFMA and Deloitte were stationed at three hubs in New York, Washington and Chicago, where attacks were being deployed and amplified at different times during the day, and where conference calls were hosted for participants to decide how to react to various threats.

The SIFMA staff member who came up with the name Quantum Dawn did so after being inspired by a movie, said Schimmeck. People involved in Quantum Dawn drills said its name was a big selling point, because it evoked the adrenaline rush of watching an action movie.

"For a simulation, it did a very good job of creating the sense of urgencythat you'd expect to see in a real-world cyber attack," said Powers.

(Editing by Ken Wills and Eric Walsh)

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Staged Cyber Attack Teaches Wall Street Some Survival Tactics

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NEW YORK (Reuters) - A few months ago, a group of Wall Street banks fashioned a risk-manager's worst nightmare to determine how they would survive. Luckily, it was all pretend.

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Post #6 Doctors Disabled Wireless in Dick Cheney's Pacemaker to Thwart Hacking.

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Post #6 Doctors Disabled Wireless in Dick Cheney's Pacemaker to Thwart Hacking.

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Former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney recently revealed that doctors had disabled the wireless (wifi) capabilities of his pacemaker. After suffering 5 heart attacks and undergoing a quadruple bypass surgery, Cheney had to implant a pacemaker to regulate his heartbeat in 2007.

Due to recent findings of professional security researchers, potential assassinations are possible through means of hacking medical devices. Famous hacker Barnaby Jack demonstrated his ability to hack into pacemakers. In October of 2011, Jack succeeded in overriding an insulin pump's radio control and its vibrating alert safety feature. The hack demonstrated the dumping of a lethal dose of insulin without alerting the wearer.

The medical device's manufacturers have recognized the possible devastating effects of hacking and have started focusing their efforts on improving their security to prevent potential disasters.

The severity of the information in this article is extremely alarming. I believe Cheney made the right decision to remain as safe and unharmed as possible by removing the (wifi) connection on his pacemaker. The ability to hack into a device that is inside someone's body and regulating their pulse is beyond me. However, the risks of potential assassinations are not to be ignored. It is my hope that security researchers are able to develop an "unbreakable" type of lock on pacemaker connections, and any other device that effects one's health.

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Former US Vice President Dick Cheney's doctors disabled his pacemaker's wireless capabilities to thwart possible assassination attempts, he said in an interview with CBS's "60 Minutes" that aired on Sunday.

Cheney's heart problems were bad: between 1978 and 2010, he suffered five heart attacks, underwent quadruple bypass surgery, and had a pump implanted directly to his heart. A defibrillator was implanted to regulate his heartbeat in 2007.

Cheney told his 60 Minutes interviewer, CNN Chief Medical Correspondent Dr. Sanjay Gupta, that at the time of the pacemaker implant, he was concerned about reports that attackers could hack the devices and kill their owners:

"I was aware of the danger, if you will, that existed."

The TV show "Homeland" wasn't even on the air yet, but a pacemaker assassination attempt was depicted at the end of last season.

Cheney found the assassination plot all too realistic, he said:

"I found [the depiction] credible because I knew from the experience that we had assessing the need for my own device that it was an accurate portrayal of what was possible."

Cheney's concerns were based on reality.

A year ago, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), prodded by Congress, took the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to task for ignoring the possibility that medical devices are susceptible to malware, unauthorized access and denial of service.

As the GAO's report stated at the time, researchers had demonstrated the potential for incidents resulting from intentional threats in insulin pumps and implantable cardioverter defibrillators.

One example is the work done by the late Barnaby Jack.

In October 2011, Jack succeeded in overriding an insulin pump's radio control and its vibrating alert safety feature, demonstrating the dumping of a potentially lethal dose of insulin without the pump alerting a wearer.

The FDA in June complied with the GAO's marching orders, telling medical device makers and hospitals to strengthen security to prevent an intentional version of such hacking, unencrypted data transfer that can be manipulated or a host of other threat vectors.

Center for Internet Security President and CEO William F. Pelgrin told me that to date, there haven't been any documented cases of successful attacks on mobile medical devices (other than those demonstrated in a research environment).

Nonetheless, he said, "the risk is real. Unsecured wireless devices are vulnerable to attack."

Cheney's revelation highlights the importance of protecting the devices, Pelgrin said.

In fact, these types of potential scenarios prompted the Center for Internet Security to launch a mobile medical device benchmark initiative earlier this year to develop solutions.

The resulting benchmarks will be recommended guidance for device makers, he said, focused on the detailed, step-by-step guidance of hardening a given device.

I asked Pelgrin why the effort to harden the devices has taken so long, and he remarked that the industry is actually getting ahead of the curve in proactively addressing these complex issues now, before a catastrophic event takes place.

Compare that with the auto or airline industries, for example, he said: in either industry, many accidents had to occur before changes were made to improve safety.

The changes certainly didn't happen overnight, Pelgrin said:

What's so encouraging to me in terms of mobile medical device security is that we are on the cusp of tremendous positive change, and we are doing it before accidents happen.

Besides, he said, when you're dealing with mobile medical devices, availability is crucial. It's one thing to hack a computer and knock it offline. That's disruptive, but not necessarily fatal, he said.

But if a mobile medical device is hacked and unavailable - or altered - it can be "devastating":

We must approach this process in a careful manner, with the input of many organizations and individuals, in order to develop security solutions without compromising the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the devices.

The Center is encouraging anyone who wants to join in the effort to contact them.

It plans on hosting a working session webinar later this month. To register and find more details, click here.
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Image of Dick Cheney courtesy of CBS's "60 Minutes".

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Doctors disabled wireless in Dick Cheney's pacemaker to thwart hacking

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Former US Vice President Dick Cheney's doctors disabled his pacemaker's wireless capabilities to thwart possible assassination attempts, he said in an interview with CBS's "60 Minutes" that aired on Sunday. Cheney's heart problems were bad: between 1978 and 2010, he suffered five heart attacks, underwent quadruple bypass surgery, and had a pump implanted directly to his heart.

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Post #5  Iranian cyber warfare commander shot dead in suspected assassination

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Post #5  Iranian cyber warfare commander shot dead in suspected assassination

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Take a minute to think about how much a cyber security expert or nuclear scientist actually knows about highly confidential information of a particular country. Knowledge is power and countries want as much power as possible to strengthen their homelands as a threat to other foreign associations.

A vital Iranian cyber warfare commander named Mojtaba Ahmadi was found dead in the woods with two distinct bullet wounds to the heart. The Revolutionary Guard Corps are still unaware of who specifically did this to the commander. However, the Iranian government seems to be pointing fingers at Israel's external Intelligence Agency due to the strange coincidence of the five Iranian murders of security officials that have occurred since 2007.

This article describes the first act of physical war that can be tied to a cyber war. The article explains how Iran's Revolutionary Guard has been accused of helping the "Syrian Electronic Army" attack high profile companies in the U.S. Events that revolve around the cyber world can cause major consequences for foreign relations worldwide. It is a scary thought. Five Iranians have died. Who is responsible? Who is next?

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Mojtaba Ahmadi, who served as commander of the Cyber War Headquarters, was found dead in a wooded area near the town of Karaj, north-west of the capital, Tehran. Five Iranian nuclear scientists and the head of the country's ballistic missile programme have been killed since 2007. The regime has accused Israel's external intelligence agency, the Mossad, of carrying out these assassinations.

Ahmadi was last seen leaving his home for work on Saturday. He was later found with two bullets in the heart, according to Alborz, a website linked to the Revolutionary Guard Corps. "I could see two bullet wounds on his body and the extent of his injuries indicated that he had been assassinated from a close range with a pistol," an eyewitness told the website.

The commander of the local police said that two people on a motorbike had been involved in the assassination.

The Facebook page of the officers of the Cyber War Headquarters confirmed that Ahmadi had been one of their commander and posted messages of condolence. But Alborz users warned that the openly accessible book of condolence could harm Iran's national security.

"Stop giving more information about him. The counter-revolutionaries will take advantage of his murder," said one post. "It sounds like a hit job for a security officer of this importance".

Subsequently, a statement from the Imam Hassan Mojtaba division of the Revolutionary Guard Corps said that Ahmadi's death was being investigated. It warned against speculating "prematurely about the identity of those responsible for the killing".

Western officials said the information was still being assessed, but previous deaths have been serious blows to Iran's security forces. Tighter security measures around leading commanders and nuclear scientists have instilled a culture of fear in some of the most sensitive parts of the security establishment.

The last victim of a known assassination was Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a chemist who worked in the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, who died when an explosive device blew up on his car in January last year.

The death of Ahmadi, a leading specialist in cyber defences, could be an extension of this campaign of subterfuge. Iran has been accused of carrying out a number of cyber attacks detected in the West. Shashank Joshi, an expert at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), said this was seen as a lesser threat than the nuclear programme. "Iran's cyber attacks on Israel and elsewhere in the region are a rising threat and a growing threat, but it hasn't yet been seen as a major and sustained onslaught, so it would be pretty novel and significant to take this step in the field of cyber-warfare at this time," he said.

The Revolutionary Guard has also been accused of lending its expertise to Syria's regime, helping it to hack Western targets through a body known as the Syrian Electronic Army.

The killing of Ahmadi coincides with a new diplomatic effort by President Hassan Rouhani, Iran's newly elected leader. He has voiced the hope that Iran's confrontation with America and the leading Western powers over its nuclear ambitions can be settled within months.

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Iranian cyber warfare commander shot dead in suspected assassination

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Mojtaba Ahmadi, who served as commander of the Cyber War Headquarters, was found dead in a wooded area near the town of Karaj, north-west of the capital, Tehran. Five Iranian nuclear scientists and the head of the country's ballistic missile programme have been killed since 2007.

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Black Hat event highlights vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure

This July, the most advanced hackers and cyber security researchers gathered in Las Vegas for the largest cyber security conference in the world, better known as Black Hat. During the week long conference, a presentation was given, which highlighted the fact of U.S. critical infrastructure's vulnerability to intelligent hackers. The presentation showed faulty sensors used by the gas and oil industry that could be manipulated by a hacker from up to 39 miles away in order to display incorrect readings, which could result in a total shutdown of plants or even potential explosions. The presenters explained that it would take extremely specialized knowledge to perform such a destructive act, yet that it was not impossible. The change of a single senor among thousands in one plant can cost up to $1000-$2000. Therefore, the gas and oil industry are hesitant to spend the money to prevent this potential disaster. However, researchers are working with the companies who manufacture the sensors to help come to some sort of solution in order to resist such attacks.

My opinion of this article was that it was extremely frightening to believe that via the internet, our infrastructure could come to a screeching halt by a single sensor. What is enlightening is that researchers of the U.S. have already identified the possibly of this happening, and are working on every preventable factor involved in the attack. The more "backup" plans our cyber security experts create, the safer our infrastructure system will remain.

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CybersecurityBlack Hat event highlights vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure

Cybersecurity researchers at the Black Hat conference now going on in Las Vegas, will demonstrate how hackers can gain access to U.S. critical infrastructure, and even cause explosions in oil and gas facilities, by altering the readings on wireless sensors used by the oil and gas industry. The faulty sensors typically cost between $1,000 and $2,000 each, and hundreds or even thousands of them are used at a single oil, gas, or water facility.

Recently-deceased hacker Barnaby Jack demonstrates hacking ATM machines // Source: thongtincongnghe.com

Cybersecurity researchers at the Black Hat conference now going on in Las Vegas, will demonstrate how hackers can gain access to U.S. critical infrastructure, and even cause explosions in oil and gas facilities, by altering the readings on wireless sensors used by the oil and gas industry.

WAToday reports that, among other things, presenters at the event show companies the cost of refusing to replace expensive equipment and install new standards. "We've got this cancer that is growing inside our critical infrastructure. When are we going to go under the knife instead of letting this fester?" Patrick Miller, founder of the non-profit Energy Sector Security Consortium said. "We need to restructure some relations and incentives."

The faulty sensors typically cost between $1,000 and $2,000 each, and hundreds or even thousands of them are used at a single oil, gas, or water facility.

Lucas Apa and Carlos Mario Penagos of security consulting firm IOActive say the wireless sensors have flaws in the way they handle encryption.

Apa and Penagos were able to contact the sensors with radio transmissions from as far as thirty-nine miles away, and change the pressure and volume readings the sensor displayed. If the facility's control system would change in accordance with the inaccurate readings, a pipeline, pump, or even an entire plant would be disabled.

Eric Forner and Brian Meixell of the consulting firm Cimation will simulate an attack and force a tank to be overfilled, causing a spill or blowout. The two said that even a modest effort by hackers with malicious intent could cause random problems for a facility, but that a focused attack would take more of an effort.

Apa and Penagos added that it would take a fair amount of specialized experience for a hacker to conduct a destructive attack, but that it would also take a long time for patches to be applied.

The researchers have found the encryption flaws in the devices supplied by three of the largest vendors in the field, but they did not identify the companies involved.

Currently, DHS issues warnings on attacks and advisories on how to fix flaws. Apa and Penagos are working with the agency and equipment makers to correct the problem. A DHS spokesperson declined to comment on the issue.

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Cybersecurity | Homeland Security Newswire

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Cybersecurity researchers at the Black Hat conference now going on in Las Vegas, will demonstrate how hackers can gain access to U.S. critical infrastructure, and even cause explosions in oil and gas facilities, by altering the readings on wireless sensors used by the oil and gas industry.

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February 18, 2013 marked the date for one of the most pivotal cyber threats for the United States: being targeted by the Chinese government's Unit 61398, or better known as "cyber warriors" located in the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army. An American security company named Mandiant produced the Advanced Persistent Threat 1 (APT1) report, which tracked 141 alleged attacks back to a 12-story government building in Shanghai, China.

"Mandiant has watched the group as it has stolen technology blueprints, manufacturing processes, clinical trial results, pricing documents, negotiation strategies and other proprietary information from more than 100 of its clients, mostly in the United States. Mandiant identified attacks on 20 industries, from military contractors to chemical plants, mining companies and satellite and telecommunications corporations."
American security researchers are afraid that the latest attacks are not only focused on stealing confidential information, but are also potentially trying to gain access to U.S. infrastructure, which could be incredibly detrimental to our nation.
A few government officials feel that it is crucial that we respond to these attacks in a strong and effective manner, whereas other officials have stated the theft of intellectual property in the past as an "annoyance". Although, confronting Unit 61398 could cause an unpleasant confrontation between the United States and China, security experts feel attacks will not stop until our infrastructure is out of our control.
My opinion of this article was that it was definitely eye opening to the fact that our nation's cyber security is constantly at risk due to the consistent breaches launched every day by intelligent, yet devious hackers. I feel that the government should stop Unit 61398 in their tracks by necessary actions in order to keep American infrastructure properly regulated. We do not have billions of dollars of revenue to lose and can't afford to turn our backs to these attacks. It will sink our country further into our recession. I agree with the ending quote of the article stating, "“If we don’t create a high price, it’s only going to keep accelerating.”

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Mandiant provided an advance copy of its report to The New York Times, saying it hoped to "bring visibility to the issues addressed in the report." Times reporters then tested the conclusions with other experts, both inside and outside government, who have examined links between the hacking groups and the army (Mandiant was hired by The New York Times Company to investigate a sophisticated Chinese-origin attack on its news operations, but concluded it was not the work of Comment Crew, but another Chinese group. The firm is not currently working for the Times Company but it is in discussions about a business relationship.)

While Comment Crew has drained terabytes of data from companies like Coca-Cola, increasingly its focus is on companies involved in the critical infrastructure of the United States - its electrical power grid, gas lines and waterworks. According to the security researchers, one target was a company with remote access to more than 60 percent of oil and gas pipelines in North America. The unit was also among those that attacked the computer security firm RSA, whose computer codes protect confidential corporate and government databases.

Contacted Monday, officials at the Chinese embassy in Washington again insisted that their government does not engage in computer hacking, and that such activity is illegal. They describe China itself as a victim of computer hacking, and point out, accurately, that there are many hacking groups inside the United States. But in recent years the Chinese attacks have grown significantly, security researchers say. Mandiant has detected more than 140 Comment Crew intrusions since 2006. American intelligence agencies and private security firms that track many of the 20 or so other Chinese groups every day say those groups appear to be contractors with links to the unit.

And the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Tuesday that the allegations were ''unprofessional.''

''Making unfounded accusations based on preliminary results is both irresponsible and unprofessional, and is not helpful for the resolution of the relevant problem,'' said Hong Lei, a ministry spokesman. ''China resolutely opposes hacking actions and has established relevant laws and regulations and taken strict law enforcement measures to defend against online hacking activities.''

While the unit's existence and operations are considered a Chinese state secret, Representative Mike Rogers of Michigan, the Republican chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said in an interview that the Mandiant report was "completely consistent with the type of activity the Intelligence Committee has been seeing for some time."

The White House said it was "aware" of the Mandiant report, and Tommy Vietor, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said, "We have repeatedly raised our concerns at the highest levels about cybertheft with senior Chinese officials, including in the military, and we will continue to do so."

The United States government is planning to begin a more aggressive defense against Chinese hacking groups, starting on Tuesday. Under a directive signed by President Obama last week, the government plans to share with American Internet providers information it has gathered about the unique digital signatures of the largest of the groups, including Comment Crew and others emanating from near where Unit 61398 is based.

But the government warnings will not explicitly link those groups, or the giant computer servers they use, to the Chinese army. The question of whether to publicly name the unit and accuse it of widespread theft is the subject of ongoing debate.

"There are huge diplomatic sensitivities here," said one intelligence official, with frustration in his voice.

But Obama administration officials say they are planning to tell China's new leaders in coming weeks that the volume and sophistication of the attacks have become so intense that they threaten the fundamental relationship between Washington and Beijing.

The United States government also has cyberwarriors. Working with Israel, the United States has used malicious software called Stuxnet to disrupt Iran 's uranium enrichment program. But government officials insist they operate under strict, if classified, rules that bar using offensive weapons for nonmilitary purposes or stealing corporate data.

The United States finds itself in something of an asymmetrical digital war with China. "In the cold war, we were focused every day on the nuclear command centers around Moscow," one senior defense official said recently. "Today, it's fair to say that we worry as much about the computer servers in Shanghai."
A Shadowy Unit
Unit 61398 - formally, the 2nd Bureau of the People's Liberation Army's General Staff Department's 3rd Department - exists almost nowhere in official Chinese military descriptions. Yet intelligence analysts who have studied the group say it is the central element of Chinese computer espionage. The unit was described in 2011 as the "premier entity targeting the United States and Canada, most likely focusing on political, economic, and military-related intelligence" by the Project 2049 Institute, a nongovernmental organization in Virginia that studies security and policy issues in Asia.

While the Obama administration has never publicly discussed the Chinese unit's activities, a secret State Department cable written the day before Barack Obama was elected president in November 2008 described at length American concerns about the group's attacks on government sites. (At the time American intelligence agencies called the unit "Byzantine Candor," a code word dropped after the cable was published by WikiLeaks.)

The Defense Department and the State Department were particular targets, the cable said, describing how the group's intruders send e-mails, called "spearphishing" attacks, that placed malware on target computers once the recipient clicked on them. From there, they were inside the systems.

American officials say that a combination of diplomatic concerns and the desire to follow the unit's activities have kept the government from going public. But Mandiant's report is forcing the issue into public view.

For more than six years, Mandiant tracked the actions of Comment Crew, so named for the attackers' penchant for embedding hidden code or comments into Web pages. Based on the digital crumbs the group left behind - its attackers have been known to use the same malware, Web domains, Internet protocol addresses, hacking tools and techniques across attacks - Mandiant followed 141 attacks by the group, which it called "A.P.T. 1" for Advanced Persistent Threat 1.

"But those are only the ones we could easily identify," said Mr. Mandia. Other security experts estimate that the group is responsible for thousands of attacks.

As Mandiant mapped the Internet protocol addresses and other bits of digital evidence, it all led back to the edges of Pudong district of Shanghai, right around the Unit 61398 headquarters. The group's report, along with 3,000 addresses and other indicators that can be used to identify the source of attacks, concludes "the totality of the evidence" leads to the conclusion that "A.P.T. 1 is Unit 61398."

Mandiant discovered that two sets of I.P. addresses used in the attacks were registered in the same neighborhood as Unit 61398's building.

"It's where more than 90 percent of the attacks we followed come from," said Mr. Mandia.

The only other possibility, the report concludes with a touch of sarcasm, is that "a secret, resourced organization full of mainland Chinese speakers with direct access to Shanghai-based telecommunications infrastructure is engaged in a multiyear enterprise-scale computer espionage campaign right outside of Unit 61398's gates."

The most fascinating elements of the Mandiant report follow the keystroke-by-keystroke actions of several of the hackers who the firm believes work for the P.L.A. Mandiant tracked their activities from inside the computer systems of American companies they were invading. The companies had given Mandiant investigators full access to rid them of the Chinese spies.

One of the most visible hackers it followed is UglyGorilla, who first appeared on a Chinese military forum in January 2004, asking whether China has a "similar force" to the "cyber army" being set up by the American military.

By 2007 UglyGorilla was turning out a suite of malware with what the report called a "clearly identifiable signature." Another hacker, called "DOTA" by Mandiant, created e-mail accounts that were used to plant malware. That hacker was tracked frequently using a password that appeared to be based on his military unit's designation. DOTA and UglyGorilla both used the same I.P. addresses linked back to Unit 61398's neighborhood.

Mandiant discovered several cases in which attackers logged into their Facebook and Twitter accounts to get around China's firewall that blocks ordinary citizen's access, making it easier to track down their real identities.

Mandiant also discovered an internal China Telecom memo discussing the state-owned telecom company's decision to install high-speed fiber-optic lines for Unit 61398's headquarters.

China's defense ministry has denied that it is responsible for initiating attacks. "It is unprofessional and groundless to accuse the Chinese military of launching cyberattacks without any conclusive evidence," it said last month, one of the statements that prompted Mandiant to make public its evidence.
Escalating Attacks
Mandiant believes Unit 61398 conducted sporadic attacks on American corporate and government computer networks; the earliest it found was in 2006. Two years ago the numbers spiked. Mandiant discovered some of the intrusions were long-running. On average the group would stay inside a network, stealing data and passwords, for a year; in one case it had access for four years and 10 months.

Mandiant has watched the group as it has stolen technology blueprints, manufacturing processes, clinical trial results, pricing documents, negotiation strategies and other proprietary information from more than 100 of its clients, mostly in the United States. Mandiant identified attacks on 20 industries, from military contractors to chemical plants, mining companies and satellite and telecommunications corporations.

Mandiant's report does not name the victims, who usually insist on anonymity. A 2009 attack on Coca-Cola coincided with the beverage giant's failed attempt to acquire the China Huiyuan Juice Group for $2.4 billion, according to people with knowledge of the results of the company's investigation.

As Coca-Cola executives were negotiating what would have been the largest foreign purchase of a Chinese company, Comment Crew was busy rummaging through their computers in an apparent effort to learn more about Coca-Cola's negotiation strategy.

The attack on Coca-Cola began, like hundreds before it, with a seemingly innocuous e-mail to an executive that was, in fact, a spearphishing attack. When the executive clicked on a malicious link in the e-mail, it gave the attackers a foothold inside Coca-Cola's network. From inside, they sent confidential company files through a maze of computers back to Shanghai, on a weekly basis, unnoticed.

Two years later, Comment Crew was one of at least three Chinese-based groups to mount a similar attack on RSA, the computer security company owned by EMC, a large technology company. It is best known for its SecurID token, carried by employees at United States intelligence agencies, military contractors and many major companies. (The New York Times also uses the firm's tokens to allow access to its e-mail and production systems remotely.) RSA has offered to replace SecurID tokens for customers and said it had added new layers of security to its products.

As in the Coca-Cola case, the attack began with a targeted, cleverly fashioned poisoned e-mail to an RSA employee. Two months later, hackers breached Lockheed Martin, the nation's largest defense contractor, partly by using the information they gleaned from the RSA attack.

Mandiant is not the only private firm tracking Comment Crew. In 2011, Joe Stewart, a Dell SecureWorks researcher, was analyzing malware used in the RSA attack when he discovered that the attackers had used a hacker tool to mask their true location.

When he reverse-engineered the tool, he found that the vast majority of stolen data had been transferred to the same range of I.P. addresses that Mandiant later identified in Shanghai.

Dell SecureWorks says it believed Comment Crew includes the same group of attackers behind Operation Shady RAT, an extensive computer espionage campaign uncovered in 2011 in which more than 70 organizations over a five-year period, including the United Nations, government agencies in the United States, Canada, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam were targeted.
Infrastructure at Risk
What most worries American investigators is that the latest set of attacks believed coming from Unit 61398 focus not just on stealing information, but obtaining the ability to manipulate American critical infrastructure: the power grids and other utilities.

Staff at Digital Bond, a small security firm that specializes in those industrial-control computers, said that last June Comment Crew unsuccessfully attacked it. A part-time employee at Digital Bond received an e-mail that appeared to come from his boss, Dale Peterson. The e-mail, in perfect English, discussed security weaknesses in critical infrastructure systems, and asked the employee to click a link to a document for more information. Mr. Peterson caught the e-mail and shared it with other researchers, who found the link contained a remote-access tool that would have given the attackers control over the employee's computer and potentially given them a front-row seat to confidential information about Digital Bond's clients, which include a major water project, a power plant and a mining company.

Jaime Blasco, a security researcher at AlienVault, analyzed the computer servers used in the attack, which led him to other victims, including the Chertoff Group. That firm, headed by the former secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, has run simulations of an extensive digital attack on the United States. Other attacks were made on a contractor for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association, a lobbying group that represents companies that make components for power grids. Those organizations confirmed they were attacked but have said they prevented attackers from gaining access to their network.

Mr. Blasco said that, based on the forensics, all the victims had been hit by Comment Crew. But the most troubling attack to date, security experts say, was a successful invasion of the Canadian arm of Telvent. The company, now owned by Schneider Electric, designs software that gives oil and gas pipeline companies and power grid operators remote access to valves, switches and security systems.

Telvent keeps detailed blueprints on more than half of all the oil and gas pipelines in North and South America, and has access to their systems. In September, Telvent Canada told customers that attackers had broken into its systems and taken project files. That access was immediately cut, so that the intruders could not take command of the systems.

Martin Hanna, a Schneider Electric spokesman, did not return requests for comment, but security researchers who studied the malware used in the attack, including Mr. Stewart at Dell SecureWorks and Mr. Blasco at AlienVault, confirmed that the perpetrators were the Comment Crew.

"This is terrifying because - forget about the country - if someone hired me and told me they wanted to have the offensive capability to take out as many critical systems as possible, I would be going after the vendors and do things like what happened to Telvent," Mr. Peterson of Digital Bond said. "It's the holy grail."

Mr. Obama alluded to this concern in the State of the Union speech, without mentioning China or any other nation. "We know foreign countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets," he said. "Now our enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air-traffic control systems. We cannot look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing."

Mr. Obama faces a vexing choice: In a sprawling, vital relationship with China, is it worth a major confrontation between the world's largest and second largest economy over computer hacking?

A few years ago, administration officials say, the theft of intellectual property was an annoyance, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars of revenue. But clearly something has changed. The mounting evidence of state sponsorship, the increasing boldness of Unit 61398, and the growing threat to American infrastructure are leading officials to conclude that a far stronger response is necessary.

"Right now there is no incentive for the Chinese to stop doing this," said Mr. Rogers, the House intelligence chairman. "If we don't create a high price, it's only going to keep accelerating."

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David E. Sanger, David Barboza and Nicole Perlroth

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China's Army Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S.

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Mandiant provided an advance copy of its report to The New York Times, saying it hoped to "bring visibility to the issues addressed in the report."

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Post #1 The Department of Homeland Security

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Post #1 The Department of Homeland Security

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What role does cyber security play in the United States? Who ultimately is the domain of safety protectors within the American cyber ecosystem? The Department of Homeland Security. As such a broad yet, fined tuned topic targeting many aspects of American stability, it must not go unrecognized that cyber intrusions and attacks are increasing with time.

The Department of Homeland Security is located in Washington D.C., and its employees are very dedicated to educating the public to help our society remain secure while online. The official website of DHS provides many different informational topic pages to keep the people informed about the severity of cyber criminals.

Something I found really interesting about this website was learning about the Stop.Think.Connect Campaign, created in 2010.

"DHS works to safeguard and secure cyberspace through programs such as the Stop.Think.Connect.™ Campaign, a national public awareness effort. Stop.Think.Connect. aims to ensure the public both recognizes cybersecurity challenges and is empowered to address them by providing resources and actionable tips."

I  believe that educating the American people and raising awareness of cyber threats is the best way for the citizens of our country to protect themselves from the many crimes that cyber criminals commit daily. As I continue following the current events of cyber security, I predict I will learn more about the DHS, and its significant role in the regulation of internet safety here in the United States and around the world.

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Our daily life, economic vitality, and national security depend on a stable, safe, and resilient cyberspace.

Cyberspace and its underlying infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of risk stemming from both physical and cyber threats and hazards. Sophisticated cyber actors and nation-states exploit vulnerabilities to steal information and money and are developing capabilities to disrupt, destroy, or threaten the delivery of essential services.

On November 16, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018. This landmark legislation elevates the mission of the former National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS and establishes the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA builds the national capacity to defend against cyber attacks and works with the federal government to provide cybersecurity tools, incident response services and assessment capabilities to safeguard the '.gov' networks that support the essential operations of partner departments and agencies.

With regards to cybersecurity, CISA's main focus areas include:

Additional Information

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Our daily life, economic vitality, and national security depend on a stable, safe, and resilient cyberspace. Cyberspace and its underlying infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of risk stemming from both physical and cyber threats and hazards.

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While furthering my research in cyber security, I came across a number of videos describing an up roaring popularity in cyber security programs at universities and colleges nationwide. This video features University of Maryland's Cyber Security Club, and their growing success as the team competes with other cyber security college teams across the country hacking for success.

The competition leader of the club, David Wasser explains the exponential popularity of the club and attendance of the computer science majors interested in a security track. He mentioned that he was surprised by how "easy" it was to "break into things" once he started the computer science major. Last fall, the UMD cyber security club took first place at the Maryland Cyber Challenge, and continue to be recognized at other competitions state and nationwide. The club enables its members to take part in real-life and staged cyber attacks, which is something Professor Robert Maxwell says is not available to the students in the classroom.

The interest in cyber security at UMD is increasing due to the campus' prime location. The NSA, NASA, and the FBI are all within an hour of the university. These vital corporations are always looking for upcoming cyber warriors to fill security expert positions to keep American infrastructure properly regulated. UMD established a program called ACSES (Advanced Cyber Security Experience for Students) this semester, which is the first undergraduate honors program specifically for computer security in the country. As Maryland grows into a security-focused epicenter, Maxwell stated, "It is an ideal place for students to be".

Prior to identifying this video, I came across a video that describes Towson University's computer science and security program. The program on our "turf" is increasingly growing, similar to UMD's program. The directors hope to educate the next generation of cyber security professionals in the field.

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TerpVision 10: Competing for Cybersecurity

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Computers are such an essential part of our daily lives, and so it's natural to worry about our accounts being hacked. But imagine the national security threat if government files fell into the wrong hands. That's exactly why cybersecurity is an exploding industry and with its proximity to DC and key federal agencies, the University of Maryland is at the forefront of this field.