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International crises and diplomatic rivalries played key roles in the rush to war in Europe. Leaders and citizens were encouraged by nationalism and wide-spread militarism, and international relationships were seen as an arena for testing national power, even waging war if necessary.
The Great Powers of Europe all built up their armed forces, and designed plans for the mobilisation of men and weapons to a possible field of battle. Only Great Britain still relied on a volunteer army, all other countries had introduced conscription before the war.
There was a belief that war was heroic and glorious, it was portrayed as a test of strength that would lead to unity and renewal. The expression of any anti-war sentiments was therefore seen as the betrayal of country in a time of need.
In Great Britain, leaders faced not only war in Europe, but also civil war in Northern Ireland and a vocal and increasingly radical women's movement.

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"I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria."

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"I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria."

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28 June, 1914
Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary is assassinated by Gavrilo Princip

Between 1900 and 1914, Western powers had successfully forced the Ottoman rulers to give up their European territories. These changing state boundaries inspired ethnic nationalism in the countries freed from Ottoman influence, and led to the two Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913. Serbia and its allies attacked the crumbling Ottoman empire, in order to expand its own territory. After the Second Balkan War, however, Austria-Hungary intervened and forced Serbia to give up Albania. This only increased the antipathy for Austria-Hungary in Balkan nationalists, who increased their demands for freedom from Austrian control.

On the 28th of June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was in Sarajevo for a state visit, when he was shot and killed by the Serbian revolutionary Gavrilo Princip. Princip was caught and put on trial, but he never showed any remorse. He believed Serbia should be free from Austrian influence, in his own words: "I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria."

Austria believed that Serbia should be punished for Princip's actions and, with the promise of unconditional support from Germany, mobilised its armies and declared war on Serbia on the 28th of July 1914. Tsar Nicholas II of Russia declared war a day later; in a little over a month the Austrian-Serbian conflict had become European-wide, and the First World War had begun.

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"The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."

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"The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."

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4 August 1914
Britain declares war on Germany

In 1839, the European powers, including Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, and Russia, signed the Treaty of London. With this treaty, the Kingdom of Belgium was officially recognised, and its neutrality protected.

On the 3rd of August 1914, however, the German army violated the treaty and invaded Belgium on its way to France. The British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, headed to the House of Commons to make a case for war.

He stated that, according to the Treaty of London, Great Britain was obligated to help Belgium in the case of an invasion. This was not necessarily true, as the Treaty declared that the neutrality of Belgium must be protected; not that military help was obligatory.

Grey, however, acted like this was the case, in order to convince the British people that a declaration of war was morally and legally the right thing to do. He was successful in this regard; the British people united behind their leaders. When Herbert Kitchener, the War Secretary, started a recruitment campaign, over a million men volunteered to fight.

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§
The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House 1814 of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free and, a fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France-a dispute which concerned France and France primarily-a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence-no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with 1815 Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. [An HON. MEMBER: "And with Germany!"] I remember well the feeling in the House-and my own feeling-for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France-the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation-it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations-how far that entails an obligation let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years 1816 been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing! I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her Fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her Northern and Western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it. Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences-which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace-in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war-let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war and let us assume-which is quite possible-that 1817 Italy, who is now neutral-[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"]-because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise-let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen-and which perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests-make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country?

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a Fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk, I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know-and to know at once!-whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected Northern and Western Coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:-

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Govern 1818 ment to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would cot attack the Northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration-becoming more serious every hour-there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a Treaty with a history-a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that, confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the Treaty in existence-that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these Treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on the 8th of August, 1870, used these words. He said:-

"We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound 1819 either morally or internationally or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium, though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests."

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:-

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."

The Treaty is an old Treaty-1839-and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those Treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and 1820 interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy-a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:-

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was:-

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor." Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be-too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of then-plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian 1821 Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:-

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the communication, and replies that Belgium will, to the utmost of her power, maintain neutrality, and expects and desires other Powers to observe and uphold it. He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the neighbouring Powers were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but that the Belgian Government believe, in the case of violation, they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day-which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form-that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgium integrity would be preserved that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King-King George:-

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the Diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and 1822 vital interests in the independence-and integrity is the least part-of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do sounder duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no-action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," Volume 203, Page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no-context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:-

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle 1823 of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself-eon-sequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often-still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

4.0 P.M.

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that whatever happened in the course of this war at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful Fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war-all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle-they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment, that at the end 1824 of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us-if that had been the result of the war-falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an Expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the Fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the Army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I do feel that in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an Expeditionary Force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The generai feeling throughout Ireland-and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad-does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

1825 What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions-the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France-if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment-we know not how soon-to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the 1826 First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those Forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the Navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed from which no country in Europe will escape and from which no abdication or neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week, the House will see from the Papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has 1827 been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

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The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir Edward Grey)

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STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY. (Hansard, 3 August 1914)

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STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY. (Hansard, 3 August 1914)

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"We are enforcing the blockade with rigour. We have strong Armies ready to advance at the shortest notice. Germany is very near starvation."

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"We are enforcing the blockade with rigour. We have strong Armies ready to advance at the shortest notice. Germany is very near starvation."

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3 November 1914 - 12 July 1919
The British naval blockade

In the early 1900s, the British government started to worry about the massive economic growth in Germany, and the fast development of the German navy only increased this worry.

An investigation was launched, and it became clear that, should Germany succeed in blocking the naval trade lines between Great Britain and the Commonwealth, it would be a disaster. It was decided that, in case of war with Germany, the British navy would establish a blockade on the North Sea. Even though this plan was a violation of the Declaration of London (1909), which protected the right of neutral convoy, it was deemed militarily necessary.

The plan was put into action on 3 November 1914, and the North Sea was declared a war zone.

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"Damn the Dardanelles, they will be our graves."

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"Damn the Dardanelles, they will be our graves."

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19 February 1915 - 9 January 1916
Battle of Gallipoli

Near the end of 1914, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, made the decision to expand the British fleet with two ships that had been promised to Turkey. This was decided without consultation with or compensation for Turkey, which created bad blood between the two countries. Up until then, Turkey had been neutral, but sided with Germany after being offered two German ships.

After joining the Triple Alliance, Turkey established a blockade in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, cutting off the supply lines between between the allies and Russia. The British government decided to lift this blockade with a short, strong attack, starting in February of 1915.

The plan was to occupy the peninsula of Gallipoli. The navy was to weaken the Turkish defence, but British forces were only given a few days to prepare. This led to grave losses: over 700 men were wounded or killed, and a third of British ships were lost. It became clear that the Turkish navy was too strong, and an attack on land was planned. This became an even bigger disaster; thousands of soldiers were killed or wounded, and the peninsula remained in Turkish hands. It would be months before the order to retreat would be given.

The last allied troops finally retreated on 8 January 1916. The battle, that should have been decided in 48 hours, lasted almost a year. Ultimately, 205,000 British soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing.

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"Twice torpedoed off Irish Coast; sinks in 15 minutes"

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"Twice torpedoed off Irish Coast; sinks in 15 minutes"

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7 May 1915
German submarine sinks the British passenger liner Lusitania

On 3 November 1914, the British navy established a blockade of German ports, and declared the North Sea a war zone. All supplies meant for Germany were confiscated.

In response to this blockade, Germany declared the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, as well as The Channel, a war zone. Germany declared all-out submarine war: all enemy merchant ships, without exception, would be torpedoed.

However, this submarine war did not just affect the merchant ships, and on 7 May 1915 a German submarine torpedoed the British passenger liner Lusitania. Almost 1200 passengers were killed, and the American government demanded that Germany stop the submarine war. Germany complied, and did not resume the submarine war until 1 February 1917.

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"More men and still more until the enemy is crushed."

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"More men and still more until the enemy is crushed."

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2 March 1916
The Military Service Act

At the start of the war, over a million men volunteered to fight for their country. Two years later, after the massacres at Verdun, Gallipoli, and the river Somme, the enthusiasm had disappeared. The British army needed to use conscription to replace the losses, and the Military Service Act was put into action on 2 March 1916.

Because of the Easter Rising, conscription was not applied to Ireland, although many Irishmen volunteered to fight.

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"Whoever controls Dublin, controls Ireland."

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"Whoever controls Dublin, controls Ireland."

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24 April 1916
Easter Rising

On the outbreak of the First World War, the opposing Unionists and Nationalists in Ireland both offered their support to the British government; over 210,000 Irishmen fought in the war.

Three groups, each with their own motives, participated in the Easter Rising: the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), the Irish Volunteers, and the Irish Citizen Army. The IRB was a secret, revolutionary organisation. This group planned the rebellion; they felt that a heroic gesture was needed to reawaken the spirit of Irish nationalism, and were motivated by frustration and pessimism. They did not necessarily believe that the revolution would be successful, but to them, failure was preferable to inaction.

Most moderate Irish Volunteers opposed the idea of unprovoked rebellion, because they felt it had no realistic change of succes; they wanted to fight in self-defence. Their leader, Patrick Pearse, became the face of the Easter Rising, and his distinctive ideas came to be identified with the rebellion as a whole, which is where the idea or martyrdom comes from.

The third group to participate in the Easter Rising, the Irish Citizen Army, was a small, socialist paramilitary organisation. Their participation in the Rising was an attempt to reconcile Marxism with nationalism. They also had a strong belief that working-class solidarity would have prevented a world war.

The preparation for the Easter Rising had completely gone wrong, and by Easter Sunday it had become clear that a rising no longer had any chance of success. At this point, the rebels had little to lose, as they would have been arrested anyway, and decided to go through with their plans. The rebels occupied prominent buildings in the city centre of Dublin, and managed to hold their positions for six days. By the end of the rising, large parts of the city centre had been destroyed, with many civilian casualties.

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1 July 1916 - 18 November 1916
Battle of the Somme

The Battle of the Somme was a British offensive in northern France, which exemplified the horrors of trench warfare. On 25 June 1916 the British started their attack on German trenches: for seven days and seven nights, the artillery fired non-stop on the German lines, firing over three million shells. The aim was to prevent the Germans from making an effective defence, and to destroy the barbed wire around the German trenches.

On 1 July, at precisely 7:30 am, commanders ordered the attack. The British troops 'went over the top', they climbed out of the trenches and moved in the direction of German lines. However, the German defence had not been weakened enough, which stopped British soldiers from reaching the German trenches. The Germans had set up their machine guns, and mowed down the approaching troops. On that first day of battle, 21,392 British soldiers were killed, and around 35,500 were wounded.

General Douglas Haig, the commander during the battle of the Somme, after learning about the massacre that had taken place, decided to continue the attacks. Ultimately, 420,000 British soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing.

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With proud thanksgiving, a mother for her children,

England mourns for her dead across the sea.

Flesh of her flesh they were, spirit of her spirit,

Fallen in the cause of the free.

Solemn the drums thrill; Death august and royal

Sings sorrow up into immortal spheres,

There is music in the midst of desolation

And a glory that shines upon our tears.

They went with songs to the battle, they were young,

Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.

They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted;

They fell with their faces to the foe.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:

Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.

At the going down of the sun and in the morning

We will remember them.

They mingle not with their laughing comrades again;

They sit no more at familiar tables of home;

They have no lot in our labour of the day-time;

They sleep beyond England's foam.

But where our desires are and our hopes profound,

Felt as a well-spring that is hidden from sight,

To the innermost heart of their own land they are known

As the stars are known to the Night;

As the stars that shall be bright when we are dust,

Moving in marches upon the heavenly plain;

As the stars that are starry in the time of our darkness,

To the end, to the end, they remain.

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For the Fallen by Laurence Binyon | Poetry Foundation

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With proud thanksgiving, a mother for her children,

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6 April 1917
The United States declare war on Germany

From the start of the war, the US had claimed to be neutral. However, the American government accepted the British blockade of German ports, despite this being a violation of the Declaration of London (1909). This, among other things, implied that the American government was on the side of the Triple Entente.

However, president Woodrow Wilson remained of the opinion that the United States should stay out of the war. "He has kept us out of war" was his slogan for re-election in 1916.

After Germany torpedoed the British passenger ship Lusitania, killing almost 200 Americans, the US started to move closer to the allies in Europe. When, in February 1917, Germany announced that the submarine war would be resumed, the American government severed all diplomatic ties with the country. A few weeks later, a declaration of war followed.

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"At the eleventh hour, on the eleventh day, of the eleventh month."

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"At the eleventh hour, on the eleventh day, of the eleventh month."

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11 November 1918
Armistice Day

On 11 November 1918, at 11:00 am, after nearly three days since the negotiations began, the armistice was signed by the German delegation, and the First World War had come to an end. A total of 40 million people were wounded or killed.

It was a day of jubilation; people gathered in large groups, cheering and singing. It was described by some as "the greatest day in history".

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"Done at Versailles, the twenty-eight day of June."

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"Done at Versailles, the twenty-eight day of June."

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28 June 1919
The Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty of Versailles, which established the peace terms between the allied forces and Germany, was signed on 28 June 1919; exactly five years after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, and over 7 months after the armistice was signed.

Germany was held responsible for starting the war, as its promise of support to Austria had pushed Vienna towards war. The terms of the Treaty were negotiated by Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy. These countries imposed harsh terms on Germany, forcing it to give up much of its territory. The German army was reduced, and Germany was forced to pay for war losses.

The Treaty of Versailles did receive criticism; the US Congress never ended up approving the Treaty and later negotiated their own peace with Germany. The Germans were angry about being considered the sole country responsible for the war, and the total sum of the reparations Germany was forced to pay was so great, that no one expected them to be able to. The last payment was only made in 2010.