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As a future K12 administrator, it is evident that college preparation proves to be a necessity for the success of most students, and for some, can be the determining factor into whether or not they are educationally ready for college.

With this in mind, the state of Texas mandated, under the requirement of § 28.014 of the Texas Education Code, that all Texas school districts are required to partner with an institution of higher education (IHE) to offer college preparatory courses in mathematics and English language arts for any student failing to meet college readiness standards. This law, in conjunction with several others, outline the framework and legal requirements of college preparation in K12 schools.

This padlet will be an overview for K12 administrators of the legal and ethical requirements of college preparation, such as the requirement outlined in the Texas Education Code § 28.014, and how the requirement of college preparation will affect the K12 setting.

As a current higher education administrator, who may potentially work as a K12 administrator, I can see the benefit and necessity of college preparation from both sides. I chose this topic because the laws and regulations for college preparation in the state of Texas are still relatively new with some, such as Texas HB 3, only beginning in 2019. The padlet will give administrators an easy access to the pertinent laws that not only impact their students, but also their districts.

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Renee Jacinto, College, Career, & Military Readiness Specialist at University High School in Waco, Texas was interviewed about the topic of college preparation. Ms. Jacinto noted that the mandate of college preparatory courses as outlined in TEC § 28.014 has impacted the district in a big way. She said the courses have not created major challenges, but have added additional work for the district because of the necessary tracking for each student to determine if they meet the qualifications to need the course. She said other challenges, although minimal, have been finding instructors and locations for the courses because many district campuses are already maxed out on staffing and available rooms. Renee noted that the rollout of the courses was a challenge, but the additional work has since become routine, and the courses prove to be a major benefit to students.

Ms. Jacinto outlined the following best practices of ways to offer additional college preparatory resources to students:

The school offers a college preparatory resource, called College Cafe, twice a week for students to come by and meet with counselors and volunteers of local colleges to receive guidance on filling out FAFSA, learning to write entrance exams, and receiving preparation for the PSAT/SAT/ACT.

The district has become a satellite testing site for the Texas Success Initiative assessment (TSI) and prepares and tests every student in the district. Renee said it is a major benefit for students because it helps students learn about assessment testing and reduces  test anxiety for college entrance testing because students become more comfortable with taking the tests.

The most important best practice Ms. Jacinto listed was leaning on the outside agencies who provide resources. She referenced the district's higher education partner McLennan, the CAP Program, and the AVID teachers on campus as major assets of college preparation for her students.

A major emerging issue in college preparation for Ms. Jacinto was the new mandate in HB 3 that requires all students complete a financial aid application. She said the bill provides specific concerns for her district because she has a large undocumented student population. She noted that although she understands the desire for ensuring students have the financial college preparation in place to be successful, many of her student's families are concerned about how it could negatively affect them because of their undocumented status.

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Padlet Slide #3 Professional Association

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Padlet Slide #3 Professional Association

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The Texas Association for School Administrators (TASA) has expanded their training material of House Bill 5, which later became TEC § 28.014, to include iTunes U. The training tool allows educators from around the state to submit audio and video resources related to the mandated college preparatory courses to be considered for inclusion in TASA's iTunes U training material. The training tool provides district administrators and teachers a means for professional development in the field, as well as, an alternate teaching method for students taking the courses.

TASA. (n.d.). Expansion of TASA on iTunes U to assist districts with HB 5 requirement. Retrieved from https://tx01923126.schoolwires.net/site/Default.aspx?PageType=3&DomainID=4&PageID=1&ViewID=6446ee88-d30c-497e-9316-3f8874b3e108&FlexDataID=871

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AUSTIN-The Texas Association of School Administrators (TASA) today announced the expansion of digital content resources in TASA on iTunes U to include content for college preparatory courses in mathematics and English language arts that school districts may use to satisfy requirements in House Bill 5.

In addition to changes made to testing and graduation requirements, HB 5 requires school districts to partner with at least one institution of higher education to develop and provide college preparatory courses in math and English language arts for 12th grade students who do not meet college readiness standards on either a STAAR end-of-course exam, a college entrance exam, a higher education screener, or in their coursework, indicating that they are not ready to perform entry-level college coursework.

The bill requires the college preparatory courses to be developed in collaboration with faculty from both the high school and partnering college or university to ensure the courses are aligned with college readiness expectations. In addition, each district, in consultation with their higher education partner, is required to develop or purchase instructional materials for the courses. The college preparatory courses must be made available to students by the 2014-2015 school year.

To assist districts, TASA will be working with experienced teachers, high school content specialists, and higher education faculty to create a collection of digital resources in TASA on iTunes U that districts may use in developing their college preparatory courses. This collection of digital resources is expected to be available by late spring.

"The digital resources we are creating in TASA on iTunes U will provide a road map for districts as they begin the process of developing college preparatory courses in math and English," said TASA Executive Director Johnny Veselka.

iTunes U is the world's largest online catalog of free educational content that helps educators quickly and easily share their courses with their class or to a global audience, allowing teachers the ability to integrate their own documents, content from the Internet, hundreds of thousands of books on the iBooks Store, over 750,000 materials from existing iTunes U collections, or any of the more than one million iOS apps available on the App StoreSM.

These free college preparatory resources will accompany the currently existing TASA on iTunes U digital content for 18 high school courses in the four core content areas (math, science, social studies, and English language arts) that were created by classroom teachers and that are fully aligned to the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (TEKS). A total of 58 classroom teachers and content specialists, across 14 Texas school districts, have collaborated with TASA in the iTunes U content development.

The desire to integrate and leverage technology in the classroom, coupled with the need for teachers to redesign instruction so that it engages students and facilitates their learning, prompted TASA to launch this initiative last March. TASA is now expanding the collection to help districts satisfy the requirements of HB 5.

"We hope the digital resources in TASA on iTunes U will help facilitate the work of our school districts and educators giving them a reliable, vetted collection of interactive, online content to ensure compliance with HB 5," said Veselka.

As we expand the resources available in TASA on iTunes U, we are also inviting teachers, content specialists and other educators to submit digital resources to be considered for inclusion in one of the existing 18 high school course resource collections. Any Texas educator or leader with a valid Independent School District email address can now engage in the expansion of this project to further enhance the teaching and learning process.

Content experts affiliated with the TASA on iTunes U project will review all submitted digital resources to ensure the end result is a vetted collection of the highest quality, interactive online content-created by teachers for teachers-to foster creativity, collaboration, and critical thinking skills in an engaging, digitally rich learning environment. Submit your audio or video files, apps, podcasts, web links, PDFs, and other digital resources for consideration.

The statute that requires school districts to develop and provide college preparatory mathematics and English language arts courses can be found in the Texas Education Code, chapter 28.014 (TEC 28.014).

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Expansion of TASA on iTunes U to Assist Districts with HB 5 Requirement

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AUSTIN-The Texas Association of School Administrators (TASA) today announced the expansion of digital content resources in TASA on iTunes U to include content for college preparatory courses in mathematics and English language arts that school districts may use to satisfy requirements in House Bill 5.

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With the ever growing demands in college admission, many students are looking for innovative ways to increase college preparatory activities outside the structure of their traditional school day. Some options, such as newly popular paid summer programs, create ethical dilemmas in regard to college preparation.

The programs typically cost thousands of dollars which puts students from low-income households at an academic disadvantage because they may not be able to afford to go.

The programs typically emphasize that they are designed for high-achieving students which is a potential disadvantage to first-generation students, students from families of low-socio economic status, and students with learning disabilities because they are deemed at-risk students and traditionally produce lower grades.

School districts should be adequately equipped to provide equal opportunities to students who do not have the ability to pay for them.

Roth, K. (2020). For some high-schoolers, summer camp is for college prep. Retrieved from https://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/wireStory/high-schoolers-summer-camp-college-prep-68747924

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Some summer camps are for unwinding, getting outdoors, playing sports or music, or doing crafts. And then there are those that offer kids - most of them heading into junior or senior year of high school - intensive study sessions focused on upping SAT scores, working on college applications and essays, getting help navigating the admissions process and, in some cases, experiencing a taste of college life.

``Our goal is to give them tools for success, and access to high-level instruction and materials that they may not otherwise have access to," says Nermin Fraser, director of admissions at the Berkeley, California-based Education Unlimited.

The organization runs college admission prep camps on the campuses of the University of California at Berkeley, UCLA, Yale and Georgetown. Kids stay in dorms and eat in the campus cafeteria.

The camps are a lot of work (sometimes accompanied by a little play), and aren't for everyone, administrators say.

Kids who are struggling academically might not be a good fit.

"Kids should have an A or B average and be academically motivated. The nice thing about it is that there are no grades. Some kids work super hard and seek out extra work. Other kids may not be there yet in terms of their mindset. They can benefit from the process in either case," says Fraser, a former high school principal.

"Because we work in small groups with personalized attention, we are able to help kids make incremental growth from wherever they are starting,'' she says.

Most students in the program are rising juniors, getting ready to take SAT and ACT exams. Rising seniors tend to focus on college applications and essays.

While the focus is on academics, Fraser says campers also go on field trips and tours of local college campuses.

Command Education runs college-prep summer programs in New York and Los Angeles. They cater mainly to kids entering senior year.

"A lot of students tend to procrastinate during the school year, when there isn't a lot of time to focus on college essays and applications anyway," says Christopher Rim, who runs the program.

"We structure the camp so that they're working independently. But it's easier to focus on working on the essay because they are surrounded by other kids who are working, too. We have them from 10 to 5. They submit their essay before they go to sleep. It's looked at at night, and in the morning they get it back and start on it again," Rim says.

"It's an intense camp, and is really for students ready to put in the hard work," he says.

If that sounds like a grueling way to spend part of the summer, Rim says the camps sell out quickly.

The hard work put in during the summer makes the college application process less stressful in the long run, he says, since students can enter senior year with application and essay completed.

The camps tend to have hefty price tags, though.

Education Unlimited's summer camps range from around $3,000 for a 7-day college admissions camp to $8,000 for a 21-day version. Command Education's offerings cost an eye-popping $20,000 for a weeklong camp, including counseling before and after camp to help navigate the college admissions process.

Many camps offer discounts or, in some cases, full scholarships for qualified students in need.

Nevertheless, for-profit college-prep camps give wealthier kids a leg up, says Rick Mayfield, director of learning and achievement at the San Luis Coastal Unified School District in San Luis Obispo, California.

``A low-income family would not consider something like this, even at a discounted rate,'' he says.

He said high schools must try hard to provide such support themselves to students.

``What we have tried to create in schools are resources that kids and families can tap into to help them with the process that do not cost money,'' he says. ``There are adults that can show how to go about the application process, help with letter writing, and applying for scholarship funding. The playing field is anything but leveled and it is an uphill battle for those of lower socio-economic status.''

Rim notes that because wealthier communities tend to have better schools, the entire process is unfair from the start of a student's education. But he says colleges tend to set aside a certain number of places for qualified students in need, as well as for international students, so wealthy U.S. applicants are competing with each other for slots, not with those with fewer resources or those from overseas.

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For some high-schoolers, summer camp is for college prep

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Some summer camps are for unwinding, getting outdoors, playing sports or music, or doing crafts. And then there are those that offer kids - most of them heading into junior or senior year of high school - intensive study sessions focused on upping SAT scores, working on college applications and essays, getting help navigating the admissions process and, in some cases, experiencing a taste of college life.

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As outlined in the interview with Renee Jacinto, Texas' mandate that all students fill out financial aid applications is a college preparation requirement necessary for high school graduation as of the 2021-2022 school year.

When the requirement was first rolled out in Louisiana, the state's FAFSA completion ratio increased by 25% making a quarter of the state's seniors more financially prepared for college than in years past.

Financial college preparation in Texas has not been high in recent years, with only around 55% of students taking advantage of financial aid applications.

The states of Texas and Louisiana both feel as though the college preparatory requirement will increase higher education enrollment in their respective states.

Kreighbaum, A. (2019). Texas becomes second state to require FAFSA completion. Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/10/texas-becomes-second-state-require-fafsa-completion

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In a bid to boost the number of students receiving financial support for college, Texas will soon become the second state to require high school seniors to complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid before graduating.

A handful of states have looked at making FAFSA completion mandatory for graduating high school students. Beginning with the 2021-22 academic year, Texas will provide a serious test case for the policy after big successes in Louisiana, which enacted the requirement last year.

Completing the form is a leading indicator of college enrollment. And there's ample evidence that more financial aid is associated with outcomes like college completion. Actually achieving big gains in FAFSA completion, though, requires significant investment and outreach by schools and state officials.

During the past academic year, Louisiana saw FAFSA completions by high school students climb by more than 25 percent. College access groups say high school seniors leave millions of aid dollars on the table each year by not completing the form -- often because it's too difficult or they don't believe they'll qualify for aid.

"As the forerunner of this kind of policy, the early successes that Louisiana has seen with mandatory FAFSA has to be encouraging for other states," said Bill DeBaun, director of data and evaluation at the National College Access Network. "We shouldn't assume Texas will see the same effects Louisiana did. But given the scale of the state, even a modest effect could make a big splash on the FAFSA completion cycle."

If Texas has 25 percent of the growth Louisiana saw in FAFSA completions, that would mean an additional 12,700 students submit the application, DeBaun said.

According to numbers from NCAN, Louisiana ranks first among all states this financial aid cycle, with a completion rate of 78.7 percent. Texas ranks a distant 31, with a completion rate of 55.2 percent.

The complexity of the FAFSA application has come under increasing scrutiny at the federal level. Senate lawmakers negotiating a reauthorization of the Higher Education Act have identified a streamlined application as a top priority.

The Education Department in recent years has rolled out changes designed to simplify FAFSA completion, like the IRS data retrieval tool and the use of prior-prior year family income. But only Congress could alter the application itself.

Sujuan Boutté​, executive director of the Louisiana Office of Student Financial Assistance, said the complexity of the form remains the biggest obstacle for students and parents, whether or not a state requires completion.

"It's not just going to happen. There are going to have to be strategies in place," she said.

In Louisiana, that meant a multipronged approach to FAFSA completion backed by funding from the Kresge Foundation. The organization worked one on one with students during the school day and with parents in the evening on completing separate portions of the application. It also launched a peer support program where current college students assisted high school seniors in completing the form.

The organization also used automated phone messages to remind parents about completing the form. And it offered financial vouchers for students to purchase items like a graduation cap and gown if they completed the form.

Boutte said school officials also have to be there to assist students even after the FAFSA is submitted -- many need assistance making sense of financial aid offers when deciding on a college.

In Louisiana, students can get certain waivers to the requirement. The same is true under the Texas law. A parent or student aged 18 or older can opt out. A school counselor can grant a waiver for good cause. And students can also fulfill the obligation by completing the Texas Application for State Financial Aid.

There are still details to be worked out in how the requirement would work in practice on Texas high school campuses. The Texas Education Agency will appoint an advisory committee to that will make recommendations on carrying out the new FAFSA requirement by January of 2021.

High school counselors for the most part don't track whether students have submitted a FAFSA, said Lesa Pritchard, president-elect of the Texas School Counselor Association and executive director of student support services at Boerne Independent School District outside San Antonio.

"I don't know what tool there is going to be for tracking it," she said.

Colleges in the state can currently track individual FAFSA completion. And counselors at some school districts can access that information through an agreement with the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.
(Note: this story previously stated that counselors are unable to track FAFSA completion.)
They're also already tasked with a number of compliance activities -- students in the state must receive CPR instruction and training on how to interact with a police officer before graduating high school. Both requirements must be documented on a student's transcript.

"We need a lot more students to get a postsecondary education," said Pritchard. "If this will help, obviously we're game for that."

Some states, like Colorado, have begun sharing FAFSA completion records with high school counselors, noted Nick Hillman, an associate professor of educational leadership at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. With few states seriously scaling up their student aid programs, boosting FAFSA completion may be the most effective way to get more financial support to college students who need it, he said.

Research strongly suggests more financial aid can lead to improvements in graduation rates and other outcomes.

"I prefer states do this over financial literacy requirements," Hillman said. "There's a lot of good evidence behind this."

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Texas becomes second state to require FAFSA completion

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In a bid to boost the number of students receiving financial support for college, Texas will soon become the second state to require high school seniors to complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid before graduating. A handful of states have looked at making FAFSA completion mandatory for graduating high school students.

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College Preparatory Courses

College Preparatory Courses, Texas Education Code § 28.014

Statutory Law

https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/ED/htm/ED.28.htm

The law was designed as a way to provide more opportunity for high school students to focus on college preparation and career interests, and less time on end of course exams by altering curriculum requirements. The law provided specific endorsement achievements that students could receive by taking more credits in subject fields like science and math. The law also mandated the requirement of a college preparatory course in the subject fields of English language arts and math for students not meeting the benchmark requirements of college readiness. The purpose and drive for the law was to develop student interest in careers and prepare them for college.

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EDUCATION CODE



TITLE 2. PUBLIC EDUCATION



SUBTITLE F. CURRICULUM, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES



CHAPTER 28. COURSES OF STUDY; ADVANCEMENT



SUBCHAPTER A. ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS; CURRICULUM



Sec. 28.001. PURPOSE. It is the intent of the legislature that the essential knowledge and skills developed by the State Board of Education under this subchapter shall require all students to demonstrate the knowledge and skills necessary to read, write, compute, problem solve, think critically, apply technology, and communicate across all subject areas. The essential knowledge and skills shall also prepare and enable all students to continue to learn in postsecondary educational, training, or employment settings.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Sec. 28.002. REQUIRED CURRICULUM. (a) Each school district that offers kindergarten through grade 12 shall offer, as a required curriculum:


(1) a foundation curriculum that includes:


(A) English language arts;


(B) mathematics;


(C) science; and


(D) social studies, consisting of Texas, United States, and world history, government, economics, with emphasis on the free enterprise system and its benefits, and geography; and


(2) an enrichment curriculum that includes:


(A) to the extent possible, languages other than English;


(B) health, with emphasis on:


(i) physical health, including the importance of proper nutrition and exercise;


(ii) mental health, including instruction about mental health conditions, substance abuse, skills to manage emotions, establishing and maintaining positive relationships, and responsible decision-making; and


(iii) suicide prevention, including recognizing suicide-related risk factors and warning signs;


(C) physical education;


(D) fine arts;


(E) career and technology education;


(F) technology applications;


(G) religious literature, including the Hebrew Scriptures (Old Testament) and New Testament, and its impact on history and literature; and


(H) personal financial literacy.


(b) The State Board of Education by rule shall designate subjects constituting a well-balanced curriculum to be offered by a school district that does not offer kindergarten through grade 12.


(b-1) In this section, "common core state standards" means the national curriculum standards developed by the Common Core State Standards Initiative.


(b-2) The State Board of Education may not adopt common core state standards to comply with a duty imposed under this chapter.


(b-3) A school district may not use common core state standards to comply with the requirement to provide instruction in the essential knowledge and skills at appropriate grade levels under Subsection (c).


(b-4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, a school district or open-enrollment charter school may not be required to offer any aspect of a common core state standards curriculum.


(c) The State Board of Education, with the direct participation of educators, parents, business and industry representatives, and employers shall by rule identify the essential knowledge and skills of each subject of the required curriculum that all students should be able to demonstrate and that will be used in evaluating instructional materials under Chapter 31 and addressed on the assessment instruments required under Subchapter B, Chapter 39. As a condition of accreditation, the board shall require each district to provide instruction in the essential knowledge and skills at appropriate grade levels and to make available to each high school student in the district an Algebra II course.


(c-1) The State Board of Education shall adopt rules requiring students enrolled in grade levels six, seven, and eight to complete at least one fine arts course during those grade levels as part of a district's fine arts curriculum.


(c-2) Each time the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board revises the Internet database of the coordinating board's official statewide inventory of workforce education courses, the State Board of Education shall by rule revise the essential knowledge and skills of any corresponding career and technology education curriculum as provided by Subsection (c).


(c-3) In adopting the essential knowledge and skills for the technology applications curriculum for kindergarten through grade eight, the State Board of Education shall adopt essential knowledge and skills that include coding, computer programming, computational thinking, and cybersecurity. The State Board of Education shall review and revise, as needed, the essential knowledge and skills of the technology applications curriculum every five years to ensure the curriculum:


(1) is relevant to student education; and


(2) aligns with current or emerging professions.


(d) The physical education curriculum required under Subsection (a)(2)(C) must be sequential, developmentally appropriate, and designed, implemented, and evaluated to enable students to develop the motor, self-management, and other skills, knowledge, attitudes, and confidence necessary to participate in physical activity throughout life. Each school district shall establish specific objectives and goals the district intends to accomplish through the physical education curriculum. In identifying the essential knowledge and skills of physical education, the State Board of Education shall ensure that the curriculum:


(1) emphasizes the knowledge and skills capable of being used during a lifetime of regular physical activity;


(2) is consistent with national physical education standards for:


(A) the information that students should learn about physical activity; and


(B) the physical activities that students should be able to perform;


(3) requires that, on a weekly basis, at least 50 percent of the physical education class be used for actual student physical activity and that the activity be, to the extent practicable, at a moderate or vigorous level;


(4) offers students an opportunity to choose among many types of physical activity in which to participate;


(5) offers students both cooperative and competitive games;


(6) meets the needs of students of all physical ability levels, including students who have a chronic health problem, disability, including a student who is a person with a disability described under Section 29.003(b) or criteria developed by the agency in accordance with that section, or other special need that precludes the student from participating in regular physical education instruction but who might be able to participate in physical education that is suitably adapted and, if applicable, included in the student's individualized education program;


(7) takes into account the effect that gender and cultural differences might have on the degree of student interest in physical activity or on the types of physical activity in which a student is interested;


(8) teaches self-management and movement skills;


(9) teaches cooperation, fair play, and responsible participation in physical activity;


(10) promotes student participation in physical activity outside of school; and


(11) allows physical education classes to be an enjoyable experience for students.


(e) American Sign Language is a language for purposes of Subsection (a)(2)(A). A public school may offer an elective course in the language.


(f) A school district may offer courses for local credit in addition to those in the required curriculum. The State Board of Education shall:


(1) be flexible in approving a course for credit for high school graduation under this subsection; and


(2) approve courses in cybersecurity for credit for high school graduation under this subsection.


(g) A local instructional plan may draw on state curriculum frameworks and program standards as appropriate. Each district is encouraged to exceed minimum requirements of law and State Board of Education rule. Each district shall ensure that all children in the district participate actively in a balanced curriculum designed to meet individual needs. Before the adoption of a major curriculum initiative, including the use of a curriculum management system, a district must use a process that:


(1) includes teacher input;


(2) provides district employees with the opportunity to express opinions regarding the initiative; and


(3) includes a meeting of the board of trustees of the district at which:


(A) information regarding the initiative is presented, including the cost of the initiative and any alternatives that were considered; and


(B) members of the public and district employees are given the opportunity to comment regarding the initiative.


(g-1) A district may also offer a course or other activity, including an apprenticeship or training hours needed to obtain an industry-recognized credential or certificate, that is approved by the board of trustees for credit without obtaining State Board of Education approval if:


(1) the district develops a program under which the district partners with a public or private institution of higher education and local business, labor, and community leaders to develop and provide the courses; and


(2) the course or other activity allows students to enter:


(A) a career or technology training program in the district's region of the state;


(B) an institution of higher education without remediation;


(C) an apprenticeship training program; or


(D) an internship required as part of accreditation toward an industry-recognized credential or certificate for course credit.


(g-2) Each school district shall annually report to the agency the names of the courses, programs, institutions of higher education, and internships in which the district's students have enrolled under Subsection (g-1) and the names of the courses and institutions of higher education in which the district's students have enrolled under Subsection (g-3). The agency shall make available information provided under this subsection to other districts.


(g-3) A district may also offer a course in cybersecurity that is approved by the board of trustees for credit without obtaining State Board of Education approval if the district partners with a public or private institution of higher education that offers an undergraduate degree program in cybersecurity to develop and provide the course.


(h) The State Board of Education and each school district shall foster the continuation of the tradition of teaching United States and Texas history and the free enterprise system in regular subject matter and in reading courses and in the adoption of instructional materials. A primary purpose of the public school curriculum is to prepare thoughtful, active citizens who understand the importance of patriotism and can function productively in a free enterprise society with appreciation for the basic democratic values of our state and national heritage.


(i) The State Board of Education shall adopt rules for the implementation of this subchapter. Except as provided by Subsection (j), the board may not adopt rules that designate the methodology used by a teacher or the time spent by a teacher or a student on a particular task or subject.


(j) The State Board of Education by rule may require laboratory instruction in secondary science courses and may require a specific amount or percentage of time in a secondary science course that must be laboratory instruction.


(k) The State Board of Education, in consultation with the Department of State Health Services and the Texas Diabetes Council, shall develop a diabetes education program that a school district may use in the health curriculum under Subsection (a)(2)(B).


(l) A school district shall require a student enrolled in full-day prekindergarten, in kindergarten, or in a grade level below grade six to participate in moderate or vigorous daily physical activity for at least 30 minutes throughout the school year as part of the district's physical education curriculum or through structured activity during a school campus's daily recess. To the extent practicable, a school district shall require a student enrolled in prekindergarten on less than a full-day basis to participate in the same type and amount of physical activity as a student enrolled in full-day prekindergarten. A school district shall require students enrolled in grade levels six, seven, and eight to participate in moderate or vigorous daily physical activity for at least 30 minutes for at least four semesters during those grade levels as part of the district's physical education curriculum. If a school district determines, for any particular grade level below grade six, that requiring moderate or vigorous daily physical activity is impractical due to scheduling concerns or other factors, the district may as an alternative require a student in that grade level to participate in moderate or vigorous physical activity for at least 135 minutes during each school week. Additionally, a school district may as an alternative require a student enrolled in a grade level for which the district uses block scheduling to participate in moderate or vigorous physical activity for at least 225 minutes during each period of two school weeks. A school district must provide for an exemption for:


(1) any student who is unable to participate in the required physical activity because of illness or disability; and


(2) a middle school or junior high school student who participates in an extracurricular activity with a moderate or vigorous physical activity component that is considered a structured activity under rules adopted by the commissioner.


(l-1) In adopting rules relating to an activity described by Subsection (l)(2), the commissioner may permit an exemption for a student who participates in a school-related activity or an activity sponsored by a private league or club only if the student provides proof of participation in the activity.


(l-2) To encourage school districts to promote physical activity for children through classroom curricula for health and physical education, the agency, in consultation with the Department of State Health Services, shall designate nationally recognized health and physical education program guidelines that a school district may use in the health curriculum under Subsection (a)(2)(B) or the physical education curriculum under Subsection (a)(2)(C).


(l-3)(1) This subsection may be cited as "Lauren's Law."


(2) The State Board of Education, the Department of State Health Services, or a school district may not adopt any rule, policy, or program under Subsections (a), (k), (l), (l-1), or (l-2) that would prohibit a parent or grandparent of a student from providing any food product of the parent's or grandparent's choice to:


(A) children in the classroom of the child of the parent or grandparent on the occasion of the child's birthday; or


(B) children at a school-designated function.


(m) Section 2001.039, Government Code, as added by Chapter 1499, Acts of the 76th Legislature, Regular Session, 1999, does not apply to a rule adopted by the State Board of Education under Subsection (c) or (d).


(n) The State Board of Education may by rule develop and implement a plan designed to incorporate foundation curriculum requirements into the career and technology education curriculum under Subsection (a)(2)(E).


(o) In approving career and technology courses, the State Board of Education must determine that at least 50 percent of the approved courses are cost-effective for a school district to implement.


(p) The State Board of Education, in conjunction with the office of the attorney general, shall develop a parenting and paternity awareness program that a school district shall use in the district's high school health curriculum. A school district may use the program developed under this subsection in the district's middle or junior high school curriculum. At the discretion of the district, a teacher may modify the suggested sequence and pace of the program at any grade level. The program must:


(1) address parenting skills and responsibilities, including child support and other legal rights and responsibilities that come with parenthood;


(2) address relationship skills, including money management, communication skills, and marriage preparation; and


(3) in district middle, junior high, or high schools that do not have a family violence prevention program, address skills relating to the prevention of family violence.


(p-2) A school district may develop or adopt research-based programs and curriculum materials for use in conjunction with the program developed under Subsection (p). The programs and curriculum materials may provide instruction in:


(1) child development;


(2) parenting skills, including child abuse and neglect prevention; and


(3) assertiveness skills to prevent teenage pregnancy, abusive relationships, and family violence.


(p-3) The agency shall evaluate programs and curriculum materials developed under Subsection (p-2) and distribute to other school districts information regarding those programs and materials.


(p-4) A student under 14 years of age may not participate in a program developed under Subsection (p) without the permission of the student's parent or person standing in parental relation to the student.


(q) Repealed by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211, Sec. 78(b)(1), eff. September 1, 2014.


(r) In adopting the essential knowledge and skills for the health curriculum under Subsection (a)(2)(B), the State Board of Education shall adopt essential knowledge and skills that address the science, risk factors, causes, dangers, consequences, signs, symptoms, and treatment of substance abuse, including the use of illegal drugs, abuse of prescription drugs, abuse of alcohol such as by binge drinking or other excessive drinking resulting in alcohol poisoning, inhaling solvents, and other forms of substance abuse. The agency shall compile a list of evidence-based substance abuse awareness programs from which a school district shall choose a program to use in the district's middle school, junior high school, and high school health curriculum. In this subsection, "evidence-based substance abuse awareness program" means a program, practice, or strategy that has been proven to effectively prevent substance abuse among students, as determined by evaluations that are evidence-based.


(s) In this subsection, "bullying" has the meaning assigned by Section 37.0832 and "harassment" has the meaning assigned by Section 37.001. In addition to any other essential knowledge and skills the State Board of Education adopts for the health curriculum under Subsection (a)(2)(B), the board shall adopt for the health curriculum, in consultation with the Texas School Safety Center, essential knowledge and skills that include evidence-based practices that will effectively address awareness, prevention, identification, self-defense in response to, and resolution of and intervention in bullying and harassment.


(t) The State Board of Education, in consultation with the commissioner of higher education and business and industry leaders, shall develop an advanced language course that a school district may use in the curriculum under Subsection (a)(2)(A) to provide students with instruction in industry-related terminology that prepares students to communicate in a language other than English in a specific professional, business, or industry environment.


(w) Repealed by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 352 (H.B. 18), Sec. 4.01(2), eff. December 1, 2019.


(z) The State Board of Education by rule shall require each school district to incorporate instruction in digital citizenship into the district's curriculum, including information regarding the potential criminal consequences of cyberbullying. In this subsection:


(1) "Cyberbullying" has the meaning assigned by Section 37.0832.


(2) "Digital citizenship" means the standards of appropriate, responsible, and healthy online behavior, including the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, create, and act on all forms of digital communication.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1285, Sec. 4.02, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 907, Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2001; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 925, Sec. 3, eff. June 14, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 61, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1264, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1275, Sec. 2(14), eff. Sept. 1, 2003.


Amended by:


Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 784 (S.B. 42), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2005.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 254 (H.B. 2176), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2007.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 856 (H.B. 1287), Sec. 3, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1377 (S.B. 530), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 529 (S.B. 1344), Sec. 2, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 773 (S.B. 891), Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 25, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1419 (H.B. 3076), Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1421 (S.B. 1219), Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 91 (S.B. 1303), Sec. 27.001(5), eff. September 1, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 776 (H.B. 1942), Sec. 4, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., Ch. 6 (S.B. 6), Sec. 13, eff. July 19, 2011.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 8(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 78(b)(1), eff. September 1, 2014.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 796 (S.B. 1474), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 861 (H.B. 462), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1026 (H.B. 2662), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 89 (H.B. 440), Sec. 1, eff. May 23, 2015.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 729 (H.B. 1431), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2015.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1175 (S.B. 968), Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 2015.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1088 (H.B. 3593), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 352 (H.B. 18), Sec. 1.07, eff. December 1, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 352 (H.B. 18), Sec. 4.01(2), eff. December 1, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 464 (S.B. 11), Sec. 7, eff. June 6, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1149 (H.B. 2984), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2019.


Sec. 28.0021. PERSONAL FINANCIAL LITERACY. (a) The Texas essential knowledge and skills and, as applicable, Section 28.025 shall include instruction in personal financial literacy, including instruction in methods of paying for college and other postsecondary education and training, in:


(1) mathematics instruction in kindergarten through grade eight; and


(2) one or more courses offered for high school graduation.


(b) Each school district and each open-enrollment charter school that offers a high school program shall provide an elective course in personal financial literacy that meets the requirements for a one-half elective credit under Section 28.025, using materials approved by the State Board of Education. The instruction in personal financial literacy must include instruction on completing the application for federal student aid provided by the United States Department of Education. In fulfilling the requirement to provide financial literacy instruction under this section, a school district or open-enrollment charter school may use an existing state, federal, private, or nonprofit program that provides students without charge the instruction described under this section.


Added by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 494 (H.B. 492), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005.


Amended by:


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 214 (H.B. 34), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 885 (S.B. 290), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1026 (H.B. 2662), Sec. 2, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1026 (H.B. 2662), Sec. 3, eff. June 14, 2013.


Sec. 28.0023. CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION AND AUTOMATED EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATOR INSTRUCTION. (a) Repealed by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1269, Sec. 3, eff. June 14, 2013.


(b) The State Board of Education by rule shall require instruction in cardiopulmonary resuscitation for students in grades 7 through 12.


(c) A school district or open-enrollment charter school shall provide instruction to students in grades 7 through 12 in cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a manner consistent with the requirements of this section and State Board of Education rules adopted under this section. The instruction may be provided as a part of any course. A student shall receive the instruction at least once before graduation.


(d) A school administrator may waive the curriculum requirement under this section for an eligible student who has a disability.


(e) Cardiopulmonary resuscitation instruction must include training that has been developed:


(1) by the American Heart Association or the American Red Cross; or


(2) using nationally recognized, evidence-based guidelines for emergency cardiovascular care and incorporating psychomotor skills to support the instruction.


(f) For purposes of Subsection (e), "psychomotor skills" means hands-on practice to support cognitive learning. The term does not include cognitive-only instruction and training.


(g) A school district or open-enrollment charter school may use emergency medical technicians, paramedics, police officers, firefighters, representatives of the American Heart Association or the American Red Cross, teachers, other school employees, or other similarly qualified individuals to provide instruction and training under this section. Instruction provided under this section is not required to result in certification in cardiopulmonary resuscitation. If instruction is intended to result in certification in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the course instructor must be authorized to provide the instruction by the American Heart Association, the American Red Cross, or a similar nationally recognized association.


Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1371 (S.B. 7), Sec. 4, eff. June 15, 2007.


Amended by:


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1269 (H.B. 897), Sec. 2, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1269 (H.B. 897), Sec. 3, eff. June 14, 2013.


Sec. 28.0024. SCHOOL-BASED SAVINGS PROGRAM. (a) A school district or open-enrollment charter school may establish a school-based savings program to facilitate increased awareness of the importance of saving for higher education and facilitate personal financial literacy instruction. A district or school may offer the program in conjunction with a personal financial literacy course under Section 28.0021.


(b) A school-based savings program may, through partnerships with appropriate institutions, promote:


(1) general savings, by offering savings accounts or certificates of deposit through partner financial institutions; or


(2) savings dedicated for higher education, by offering through partner institutions the following accounts or bonds the primary purpose of which must be to pay expenses associated with higher education:


(A) an account authorized under Section 529, Internal Revenue Code of 1986;


(B) a Coverdell education savings account established under 26 U.S.C. Section 530;


(C) a certificate of deposit;


(D) a savings account; and


(E) a Series I savings bond.


(c) A district or school establishing a program under this section:


(1) shall seek to establish partnerships with appropriate institutions that are able to offer an account or bond under Subsection (b); and


(2) may seek to establish partnerships with public sector partners, private businesses, nonprofit organizations, and philanthropic organizations in the community.


(d) A partnership established under Subsection (c) between a district or school and:


(1) an appropriate institution may allow a student in the program or the student and an adult in the student's family jointly to have an opportunity to establish an account or purchase a bond under Subsection (b); and


(2) an appropriate institution, public sector partner, private business, or nonprofit or philanthropic organization may provide:


(A) a structure for the management of the program; and


(B) incentives that encourage contribution to a school-based account or purchase of a bond under Subsection (b), including incentives that provide matching funds or seed funding.


Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1265 (H.B. 3987), Sec. 1, eff. June 20, 2015.


Sec. 28.0027. DISTRICT CURRICULUM SCOPE AND SEQUENCE. (a) In adopting a recommended or designated scope and sequence for a subject in the required curriculum under Section 28.002(a) in a particular grade level, a school district shall ensure sufficient time is provided for teachers to teach and students to learn the essential knowledge and skills for that subject and grade level.


(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), a school district may not penalize a teacher who does not follow a recommended or designated scope and sequence for a subject in the required curriculum under Section 28.002(a) in a particular grade level based on the teacher's determination that the teacher's students need more or less time in a specific area to demonstrate proficiency in the essential knowledge and skills for that subject and grade level.


(c) A school district may take appropriate action with respect to a teacher for conduct described by Subsection (b) based on documented evidence of a deficiency in classroom instruction obtained through observation or substantiated and documented third-party information.


Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1324 (H.B. 4310), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2019.


Sec. 28.003. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM ACCESS. (a) If the parents or guardians of at least 22 students at a school request a transfer for the same school year to another school in the district for the purpose of enrolling in an educational program offered at that school, beginning with the following school year the district shall:


(1) offer the program at the school from which the transfers were requested; or


(2) offer the program at the school from which the transfers were requested by teleconference, if available to the district.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Amended by:


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., Ch. 6 (S.B. 6), Sec. 15, eff. July 19, 2011.


Sec. 28.004. LOCAL SCHOOL HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL AND HEALTH EDUCATION INSTRUCTION. (a) The board of trustees of each school district shall establish a local school health advisory council to assist the district in ensuring that local community values are reflected in the district's health education instruction.


(b) A school district must consider the recommendations of the local school health advisory council before changing the district's health education curriculum or instruction.


(c) The local school health advisory council's duties include recommending:


(1) the number of hours of instruction to be provided in:


(A) health education in kindergarten through grade eight; and


(B) if the school district requires health education for high school graduation, health education, including physical health education and mental health education, in grades 9 through 12;


(2) policies, procedures, strategies, and curriculum appropriate for specific grade levels designed to prevent physical health concerns, including obesity, cardiovascular disease, Type 2 diabetes, and mental health concerns, including suicide, through coordination of:


(A) health education, which must address physical health concerns and mental health concerns to ensure the integration of physical health education and mental health education;


(B) physical education and physical activity;


(C) nutrition services;


(D) parental involvement;


(E) instruction on substance abuse prevention;


(F) school health services, including mental health services;


(G) a comprehensive school counseling program under Section 33.005;


(H) a safe and healthy school environment; and


(I) school employee wellness;


(3) appropriate grade levels and methods of instruction for human sexuality instruction;


(4) strategies for integrating the curriculum components specified by Subdivision (2) with the following elements in a coordinated school health program for the district:


(A) school health services, including physical health services and mental health services, if provided at a campus by the district or by a third party under a contract with the district;


(B) a comprehensive school counseling program under Section 33.005;


(C) a safe and healthy school environment; and


(D) school employee wellness;


(5) if feasible, joint use agreements or strategies for collaboration between the school district and community organizations or agencies; and


Text of subdivision as added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 464 (S.B. 11), Sec. 8



(6) strategies to increase parental awareness regarding:


(A) risky behaviors and early warning signs of suicide risks and behavioral health concerns, including mental health disorders and substance use disorders; and


(B) available community programs and services that address risky behaviors, suicide risks, and behavioral health concerns


Text of subdivision as added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 331 (S.B. 435), Sec. 1



(6) appropriate grade levels and curriculum for instruction regarding opioid addiction and abuse and methods of administering an opioid antagonist, as defined by Section 483.101, Health and Safety Code.


(d) The board of trustees shall appoint at least five members to the local school health advisory council. A majority of the members must be persons who are parents of students enrolled in the district and who are not employed by the district. One of those members shall serve as chair or co-chair of the council. The board of trustees also may appoint one or more persons from each of the following groups or a representative from a group other than a group specified under this subsection:


(1) classroom teachers employed by the district;


(2) school counselors certified under Subchapter B, Chapter 21, employed by the district;


(3) school administrators employed by the district;


(4) district students;


(5) health care professionals licensed or certified to practice in this state, including medical or mental health professionals;


(6) the business community;


(7) law enforcement;


(8) senior citizens;


(9) the clergy;


(10) nonprofit health organizations; and


(11) local domestic violence programs.


(d-1) The local school health advisory council shall meet at least four times each year.


(e) Any course materials and instruction relating to human sexuality, sexually transmitted diseases, or human immunodeficiency virus or acquired immune deficiency syndrome shall be selected by the board of trustees with the advice of the local school health advisory council and must:


(1) present abstinence from sexual activity as the preferred choice of behavior in relationship to all sexual activity for unmarried persons of school age;


(2) devote more attention to abstinence from sexual activity than to any other behavior;


(3) emphasize that abstinence from sexual activity, if used consistently and correctly, is the only method that is 100 percent effective in preventing pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, infection with human immunodeficiency virus or acquired immune deficiency syndrome, and the emotional trauma associated with adolescent sexual activity;


(4) direct adolescents to a standard of behavior in which abstinence from sexual activity before marriage is the most effective way to prevent pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and infection with human immunodeficiency virus or acquired immune deficiency syndrome; and


(5) teach contraception and condom use in terms of human use reality rates instead of theoretical laboratory rates, if instruction on contraception and condoms is included in curriculum content.


(f) A school district may not distribute condoms in connection with instruction relating to human sexuality.


(g) A school district that provides human sexuality instruction may separate students according to sex for instructional purposes.


(h) The board of trustees shall determine the specific content of the district's instruction in human sexuality, in accordance with Subsections (e), (f), and (g).


(i) Before each school year, a school district shall provide written notice to a parent of each student enrolled in the district of the board of trustees' decision regarding whether the district will provide human sexuality instruction to district students. If instruction will be provided, the notice must include:


(1) a summary of the basic content of the district's human sexuality instruction to be provided to the student, including a statement informing the parent of the instructional requirements under state law;


(2) a statement of the parent's right to:


(A) review curriculum materials as provided by Subsection (j); and


(B) remove the student from any part of the district's human sexuality instruction without subjecting the student to any disciplinary action, academic penalty, or other sanction imposed by the district or the student's school; and


(3) information describing the opportunities for parental involvement in the development of the curriculum to be used in human sexuality instruction, including information regarding the local school health advisory council established under Subsection (a).


(i-1) A parent may use the grievance procedure adopted under Section 26.011 concerning a complaint of a violation of Subsection (i).


(j) A school district shall make all curriculum materials used in the district's human sexuality instruction available for reasonable public inspection.


(k) A school district shall publish in the student handbook and post on the district's Internet website, if the district has an Internet website:


(1) a statement of the policies and procedures adopted to promote the physical health and mental health of students, the physical health and mental health resources available at each campus, contact information for the nearest providers of essential public health services under Chapter 121, Health and Safety Code, and the contact information for the nearest local mental health authority;


(2) a statement of the policies adopted to ensure that elementary school, middle school, and junior high school students engage in at least the amount and level of physical activity required by Section 28.002(l);


(3) a statement of:


(A) the number of times during the preceding year the district's school health advisory council has met;


(B) whether the district has adopted and enforces policies to ensure that district campuses comply with agency vending machine and food service guidelines for restricting student access to vending machines; and


(C) whether the district has adopted and enforces policies and procedures that prescribe penalties for the use of e-cigarettes, as defined by Section 38.006, and tobacco products by students and others on school campuses or at school-sponsored or school-related activities;


(4) a statement providing notice to parents that they can request in writing their child's physical fitness assessment results at the end of the school year; and


(5) for each campus in the district, a statement of whether the campus has a full-time nurse or full-time school counselor.


(l) The local school health advisory council shall consider and make policy recommendations to the district concerning the importance of daily recess for elementary school students. The council must consider research regarding unstructured and undirected play, academic and social development, and the health benefits of daily recess in making the recommendations. The council shall ensure that local community values are reflected in any policy recommendation made to the district under this subsection.


(l-1) The local school health advisory council shall establish a physical activity and fitness planning subcommittee to consider issues relating to student physical activity and fitness and make policy recommendations to increase physical activity and improve fitness among students.


(m) In addition to performing other duties, the local school health advisory council shall submit to the board of trustees, at least annually, a written report that includes:


(1) any council recommendation concerning the school district's health education curriculum and instruction or related matters that the council has not previously submitted to the board;


(2) any suggested modification to a council recommendation previously submitted to the board;


(3) a detailed explanation of the council's activities during the period between the date of the current report and the date of the last prior written report; and


(4) any recommendations made by the physical activity and fitness planning subcommittee.


(n) Any joint use agreement that a school district and community organization or agency enter into based on a recommendation of the local school health advisory council under Subsection (c)(5) must address liability for the school district and community organization or agency in the agreement.


(o) The local school health advisory council shall make policy recommendations to the district to increase parental awareness of suicide-related risk factors and warning signs and available community suicide prevention services.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995. Amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 907, Sec. 2, eff. June 14, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 944, Sec. 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.


Amended by:


Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 784 (S.B. 42), Sec. 2, eff. June 17, 2005.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1377 (S.B. 530), Sec. 2, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 729 (S.B. 283), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2009.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1235 (S.B. 736), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 892 (H.B. 1018), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1321 (S.B. 460), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2013.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 181 (S.B. 97), Sec. 37, eff. October 1, 2015.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (S.B. 489), Sec. 1, eff. May 28, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 331 (S.B. 435), Sec. 1, eff. May 31, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 352 (H.B. 18), Sec. 1.08, eff. December 1, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 464 (S.B. 11), Sec. 8, eff. June 6, 2019.


Sec. 28.005. LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION. (a) Except as provided by this section, English shall be the basic language of instruction in public schools.


(b) It is the policy of this state to ensure the mastery of English by all students, except that bilingual instruction may be offered or permitted in situations in which bilingual instruction is necessary to ensure students' reasonable proficiency in the English language and ability to achieve academic success.


(c) A school district may adopt a dual language immersion program for students enrolled in elementary school grades as provided by Section 28.0051.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995. Amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 925, Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2001.


Sec. 28.0051. DUAL LANGUAGE IMMERSION PROGRAM. (a) A dual language immersion program should be designed to produce students with a demonstrated mastery, in both English and one other language, of the required curriculum under Section 28.002(a).


(b) The commissioner by rule shall adopt:


(1) minimum requirements for a dual language immersion program implemented by a school district;


(2) standards for evaluating:


(A) the success of a dual language immersion program; and


(B) the performance of schools that implement a dual language immersion program; and


(3) standards for recognizing:


(A) schools that offer an exceptional dual language immersion program; and


(B) students who successfully complete a dual language immersion program.


(c) A school district may implement a dual language immersion program in a manner and at elementary grade levels consistent with rules adopted by the commissioner under this section.


Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 925, Sec. 2, eff. June 14, 2001.


Sec. 28.006. READING DIAGNOSIS. (a) The commissioner shall develop recommendations for school districts for:


(1) administering reading instruments to diagnose student reading development and comprehension;


(2) training educators in administering the reading instruments; and


(3) applying the results of the reading instruments to the instructional program.


(b) The commissioner shall adopt a list of reading instruments that a school district may use to diagnose student reading development and comprehension. For use in diagnosing the reading development and comprehension of kindergarten students, the commissioner shall adopt a multidimensional assessment tool that includes a reading instrument and tests at least three developmental skills, including literacy. A multidimensional assessment tool administered as provided by this subsection is considered to be a reading instrument for purposes of this section. A district-level committee established under Subchapter F, Chapter 11, may adopt a list of reading instruments for use in the district in a grade level other than kindergarten in addition to the reading instruments on the commissioner's list. Each reading instrument adopted by the commissioner or a district-level committee must be based on scientific research concerning reading skills development and reading comprehension. A list of reading instruments adopted under this subsection must provide for diagnosing the reading development and comprehension of students participating in a program under Subchapter B, Chapter 29.


(b-1) The commissioner may approve an alternative reading instrument for use in diagnosing the reading development and comprehension of kindergarten students that complies with the requirements under Subsection (b).


(c) Each school district shall administer, at the first and second grade levels, a reading instrument on the list adopted by the commissioner or by the district-level committee. The district shall administer the reading instrument in accordance with the commissioner's recommendations under Subsection (a)(1).


(c-1) Each school district shall administer at the beginning of the seventh grade a reading instrument adopted by the commissioner to each student whose performance on the assessment instrument in reading administered under Section 39.023(a) to the student in grade six did not demonstrate reading proficiency, as determined by the commissioner. The district shall administer the reading instrument in accordance with the commissioner's recommendations under Subsection (a)(1).


(c-2) Each school district shall administer at the kindergarten level a reading instrument adopted by the commissioner under Subsection (b) or approved by the commissioner under Subsection (b-1). The district shall administer the reading instrument in accordance with the commissioner's recommendations under Subsection (a)(1).


(c-3) The commissioner by rule shall determine the performance on the reading instrument adopted under Subsection (b) that indicates kindergarten readiness.


(d) The superintendent of each school district shall:


(1) report to the commissioner and the board of trustees of the district the results of the reading instruments;


(2) not later than the 60th calendar day after the date on which a reading instrument was administered report, in writing, to a student's parent or guardian the student's results on the instrument; and


(3) using the school readiness certification system provided to the school district in accordance with Section 29.161(e), report electronically each student's raw score on the reading instrument to the agency for use in the school readiness certification system.


(d-1) Repealed by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 4.001(a)(11), eff. September 1, 2019.


(e) Repealed by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 4.001(a)(11), eff. September 1, 2019.


(f) The agency shall ensure at least one reading instrument for each grade level for which a reading instrument is required to be administered under this section is available to school districts at no cost.


(g) A school district shall notify the parent or guardian of each student in kindergarten or first or second grade who is determined, on the basis of reading instrument results, to be at risk for dyslexia or other reading difficulties. The district shall implement an accelerated reading instruction program that provides reading instruction that addresses reading deficiencies to those students and shall determine the form, content, and timing of that program. The admission, review, and dismissal committee of a student who participates in a district's special education program under Subchapter B, Chapter 29, and who does not perform satisfactorily on a reading instrument under this section shall determine the manner in which the student will participate in an accelerated reading instruction program under this subsection.


(g-1) A school district shall provide additional reading instruction and intervention to each student in seventh grade assessed under Subsection (c-1), as appropriate to improve the student's reading skills in the relevant areas identified through the assessment instrument. Training and support for activities required by this subsection shall be provided by regional education service centers and teacher reading academies established under Section 21.4551, and may be provided by other public and private providers.


(g-2) In accordance with a notification program developed by the commissioner by rule, a school district shall notify the parent or guardian of each student determined, on the basis of a screening under Section 38.003 or other basis, to have dyslexia or a related disorder, or determined, on the basis of reading instrument results, to be at risk for dyslexia or other reading difficulties, of the program maintained by the Texas State Library and Archives Commission providing students with reading disabilities the ability to borrow audiobooks free of charge.


(h) The school district shall make a good faith effort to ensure that the notice required under this section is provided either in person or by regular mail and that the notice is clear and easy to understand and is written in English and in the parent or guardian's native language.


(i) The commissioner shall certify, not later than July 1 of each school year or as soon as practicable thereafter, whether sufficient funds have been appropriated statewide for the purposes of this section. A determination by the commissioner is final and may not be appealed. For purposes of certification, the commissioner may not consider Foundation School Program funds.


(k) The provisions of this section relating to parental notification of a student's results on the reading instrument and to implementation of an accelerated reading instruction program may be implemented only if the commissioner certifies that funds have been appropriated during a school year for administering the accelerated reading instruction program specified under this section.


Text of subsection as added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 450 (S.B. 2075), Sec. 2



(l) The agency by rule shall develop procedures designed to allow the agency to:


(1) effectively audit and monitor and periodically conduct site visits of all school districts to ensure that districts are complying with this section;


(2) identify any problems school districts experience in complying with this section; and


(3) develop reasonable and appropriate remedial strategies to address school district noncompliance and ensure the purposes of this section are accomplished.


Text of subsection as added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 2.012



(l) The commissioner may adopt rules as necessary to implement this section. Section 2001.0045, Government Code, does not apply to rules adopted under this subsection.


Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 397, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1997. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 396, Sec. 2.11, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.


Amended by:


Acts 2006, 79th Leg., 3rd C.S., Ch. 5 (H.B. 1), Sec. 3.05, eff. May 31, 2006.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1058 (H.B. 2237), Sec. 6, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1340 (S.B. 1871), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 26, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1314 (S.B. 172), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 324 (S.B. 1488), Sec. 21.003(16), eff. September 1, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 450 (S.B. 2075), Sec. 2, eff. June 4, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 2.012, eff. June 12, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 4.001(a)(11), eff. September 1, 2019.


For expiration of this section, see Subsection (e).



Sec. 28.0061. READING EXCELLENCE TEAM PILOT PROGRAM. (a) Using funds appropriated for that purpose, the commissioner shall establish a reading excellence team pilot program in accordance with this section.


(b) A school district is eligible to participate in the pilot program if, as determined by the commissioner, the district has low student performance on:


(1) a reading instrument administered in accordance with Section 28.006(c) or (c-2); or


(2) a third grade reading assessment instrument administered under Section 39.023(a).


(c) The pilot program must:


(1) establish reading excellence teams composed of reading instruction specialists;


(2) allow an eligible school district to request the assistance of a reading excellence team; and


(3) provide a reading excellence team to a requesting eligible school district to:


(A) review with the district the results of the assessments described under Subsection (b) to determine campuses and classrooms for kindergarten through third grade with the greatest need of assistance; and


(B) work with teachers on campuses and in classrooms identified under Paragraph (A) to provide training necessary to improve student reading outcomes.


(d) The commissioner shall adopt rules to administer this section, including rules establishing qualifications and criteria for selecting reading instruction specialists for a reading excellence team.


(e) This section expires September 1, 2021.


Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 203 (S.B. 935), Sec. 1, eff. May 28, 2015.


Amended by:


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 3.021, eff. September 1, 2019.


Sec. 28.0062. READING STANDARDS FOR KINDERGARTEN THROUGH THIRD GRADE. (a) Each school district and open-enrollment charter school shall:


(1) provide for the use of a phonics curriculum that uses systematic direct instruction in kindergarten through third grade to ensure all students obtain necessary early literacy skills;


(2) ensure that:


(A) not later than the 2021-2022 school year, each classroom teacher in kindergarten or first, second, or third grade and each principal at a campus with kindergarten or first, second, or third grade has attended a teacher literacy achievement academy developed under Section 21.4552; and


(B) each classroom teacher and each principal initially employed in a grade level or at a campus described by Paragraph (A) for the 2021-2022 school year or a subsequent school year has attended a teacher literacy achievement academy developed under Section 21.4552 before the teacher's or principal's first year of placement in that grade level or campus; and


(3) certify to the agency that the district or school:


(A) prioritizes placement of highly effective teachers in kindergarten through second grade; and


(B) has integrated reading instruments used to diagnose reading development and comprehension to support each student in prekindergarten through third grade.


(b) The agency shall provide assistance to school districts and open-enrollment charter schools in complying with the requirements under this section.


(c) The agency shall:


(1) monitor the implementation of this section; and


(2) periodically report to the legislature on the implementation of this section and the effectiveness of this section in improving educational outcomes.


(d) The commissioner shall establish an advisory board to assist the agency in fulfilling the agency's duties under this section. Chapter 2110, Government Code, does not apply to the advisory board.


(e) The commissioner may adopt rules to implement this section.


Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 2.013, eff. June 12, 2019.


Sec. 28.007. MATHEMATICS DIAGNOSIS. (a) Using funds appropriated for the purpose, the commissioner shall develop and make available or contract for the development and dissemination of assessment instruments that a school district may use to diagnose student mathematics skills. In developing the assessment instruments, all assessment methods available through advanced technology, including methods using the Internet or other computer resources to provide immediate assessment of a student's skills, shall be considered.


Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 834, Sec. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.


Amended by:


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 324 (S.B. 1488), Sec. 21.003(17), eff. September 1, 2017.


Sec. 28.008. ADVANCEMENT OF COLLEGE READINESS IN CURRICULUM. (a) To ensure that students are able to perform college-level course work at institutions of higher education, the commissioner of education and the commissioner of higher education shall establish vertical teams composed of public school educators and institution of higher education faculty.


(b) The vertical teams shall:


(1) recommend for approval by the commissioner of education and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board college readiness standards and expectations that address what students must know and be able to do to succeed in entry-level courses offered at institutions of higher education;


(2) evaluate whether the high school curriculum requirements under Section 28.002 and other instructional requirements serve to prepare students to successfully perform college-level course work;


(3) recommend how the public school curriculum requirements can be aligned with college readiness standards and expectations;


(4) develop instructional strategies for teaching courses to prepare students to successfully perform college-level course work;


(5) develop or establish minimum standards for curricula, professional development materials, and online support materials in English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies, designed for students who need additional assistance in preparing to successfully perform college-level course work; and


(6) periodically review and revise the college readiness standards and expectations developed under Subdivision (1) and recommend revised standards for approval by the commissioner of education and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.


(c) The commissioner of education and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board by rule shall:


(1) establish the composition and duties of the vertical teams established under this section; and


(2) establish a schedule for the periodic review required under Subsection (b)(6), giving consideration to the cycle of review and identification under Section 28.002 of the essential knowledge and skills of subjects of the required curriculum.


(d) The State Board of Education shall incorporate college readiness standards and expectations approved by the commissioner of education and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board under Subsection (b) into the essential knowledge and skills identified by the board under Section 28.002(c). The State Board of Education shall develop and by rule adopt a chart that clearly indicates the alignment of the college readiness standards and expectations with the essential knowledge and skills identified by the board under Section 28.002(c).


(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the State Board of Education retains its authority under Section 28.002 concerning the required curriculum.


(g) The agency shall coordinate with the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board as necessary in administering this section.


Added by Acts 2006, 79th Leg., 3rd C.S., Ch. 5 (H.B. 1), Sec. 5.01, eff. May 31, 2006.


Amended by:


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1058 (H.B. 2237), Sec. 7, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1014 (H.B. 2549), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1036 (H.B. 1613), Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 2015.


Sec. 28.009. COLLEGE CREDIT PROGRAM. (a) Each school district shall implement a program under which students may earn the equivalent of at least 12 semester credit hours of college credit in high school. On request, a public institution of higher education in this state shall assist a school district in developing and implementing the program. The college credit may be earned through:


(1) international baccalaureate, advanced placement, or dual credit courses;


(2) articulated postsecondary courses provided for local credit or articulated postsecondary advanced technical credit courses provided for state credit; or


(3) any combination of the courses described by Subdivisions (1) and (2).


(a-1) A program implemented under this section may provide a student the opportunity to earn credit for a course or activity, including an apprenticeship or training hours:


(1) that:


(A) satisfies a requirement necessary to obtain an industry-recognized credential or certificate or an associate degree; and


(B) is approved by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board; and


(2) for which a student may earn credit concurrently toward both the student's high school diploma and postsecondary academic requirements.


(a-2) A school district is not required to pay a student's tuition or other associated costs for taking a course under this section.


(a-4) A dual credit course offered under this section must be:


(1) in the core curriculum of the public institution of higher education providing college credit;


(2) a career and technical education course; or


(3) a foreign language course.


(a-5) Subsection (a-4) does not apply to a dual credit course offered as part of the early college education program established under Section 29.908 or any other early college program that assists a student in earning a certificate or an associate degree while in high school.


Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 90 (H.B. 505), Sec. 1



(b) The agency shall coordinate with the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board as necessary in administering this section. The commissioner may adopt rules as necessary concerning the duties under this section of a school district. The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board may adopt rules as necessary concerning the duties under this section of a public institution of higher education. A rule may not limit:


(1) the number of dual credit courses or hours in which a student may enroll while in high school;


(2) the number of dual credit courses or hours in which a student may enroll each semester or academic year; or


(3) the grade levels at which a high school student may be eligible to enroll in a dual credit course.


Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 988 (H.B. 18), Sec. 2



(b) The agency shall coordinate with the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board as necessary in administering this section. The commissioner may adopt rules as necessary concerning the duties under this section of a school district. The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board may adopt rules as necessary concerning the duties under this section of a public institution of higher education. A rule may not limit the number of dual credit courses or semester credit hours in which a student may enroll while in high school or limit the number of dual credit courses or semester credit hours in which a student may enroll each semester or academic year.


(b-1) The agency and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board jointly shall develop statewide goals for dual credit programs, including early college high school programs, career and technical education dual credit programs, and joint high school and college credit programs provided under Section 130.008, to provide uniform standards for evaluating those programs. The goals must address, at a minimum:


(1) a dual credit program's achievement of enrollment in and acceleration through postsecondary education;


(2) performance in college-level coursework; and


(3) the development of an effective bridge between secondary and postsecondary education in the state.


Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 264 (S.B. 1276), Sec. 1



(b-2) Any agreement, including a memorandum of understanding or articulation agreement, between a school district and public institution of higher education to provide a dual credit program described by Subsection (b-1) must:


(1) include specific program goals aligned with the statewide goals developed under Subsection (b-1);


(2) establish common advising strategies and terminology related to dual credit and college readiness;


(3) provide for the alignment of endorsements described by Section 28.025(c-1) offered by the district, and dual credit courses offered under the agreement that apply towards those endorsements, with postsecondary pathways and credentials at the institution and industry certifications;


(4) identify tools, including tools developed by the agency, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, or the Texas Workforce Commission, to assist school counselors, students, and families in selecting endorsements offered by the district and dual credit courses offered under the agreement;


(5) establish, or provide a procedure for establishing, the course credits that may be earned under the agreement, including by developing a course equivalency crosswalk or other method for equating high school courses with college courses and identifying the number of credits that may be earned for each course completed through the program;


(6) describe the academic supports and, if applicable, guidance that will be provided to students participating in the program;


(7) establish the district's and the institution's respective roles and responsibilities in providing the program and ensuring the quality and instructional rigor of the program;


(8) state the sources of funding for courses offered under the program, including, at a minimum, the sources of funding for tuition, transportation, and any required fees or textbooks for students participating in the program; and


(9) be posted each year on the district's and the institution's respective Internet websites.


Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 901 (H.B. 3650), Sec. 1



(b-2) Any agreement, including a memorandum of understanding or articulation agreement, between a school district and public institution of higher education to provide a dual credit program described by Subsection (b-1) must:


(1) include specific program goals aligned with the statewide goals developed under Subsection (b-1);


(2) establish, or provide a procedure for establishing, the course credits that may be earned under the agreement, including by developing a course equivalency crosswalk or other method for equating high school courses with college courses and identifying the number of credits that may be earned for each course completed through the program;


(3) describe the academic supports and, if applicable, guidance that will be provided to students participating in the program;


(4) establish the district's and the institution's respective roles and responsibilities in providing the program and ensuring the quality and instructional rigor of the program;


(5) state the sources of funding for courses offered under the program, including, at a minimum, the sources of funding for tuition, transportation, and any required fees or textbooks for students participating in the program;


(6) require the district and the institution to consider the use of free or low-cost open educational resources in courses offered under the program; and


(7) be posted each year on the district's and the institution's respective Internet websites.


(b-3) The agency and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall coordinate as necessary to adopt rules for the implementation of Subsections (a-4) and (a-5). In adopting those rules, the agency and the coordinating board shall use the negotiated rulemaking procedures under Chapter 2008, Government Code, and consult with relevant stakeholders.


(c) The commissioner and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall share data as necessary to enable school districts to comply with this subsection. Each school district shall annually report to the agency:


(1) the number of district students, including career and technical students, who have participated in the program and earned college credit; and


(2) the cumulative number of courses in which participating district students have enrolled and college credit hours the students have earned.


(c-1) The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall collect student course credit data from public institutions of higher education as necessary for purposes of Subsection (c).


(d) In this section:


(1) "Career and technical student" means:


(A) a secondary education student who has entered the first course in a sequence of two or more technical courses for three or more credits in a career and technical education program; or


(B) a student who:


(i) is enrolled in an academic or workforce course that is part of a sequence of courses leading to an industry-recognized credential, certificate, or degree; and


(ii) has declared that sequence of courses as the student's major course of study.


(2) "Sequence of courses" means career and technical education courses approved by the State Board of Education or innovative courses approved by the State Board of Education that are provided for local credit.


Added by Acts 2006, 79th Leg., 3rd C.S., Ch. 5 (H.B. 1), Sec. 5.01, eff. May 31, 2006.


Amended by:


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 763 (H.B. 3485), Sec. 2, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1328 (H.B. 3646), Sec. 15, eff. September 1, 2009.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 369 (S.B. 149), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 369 (S.B. 149), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 369 (S.B. 149), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2013.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 369 (S.B. 149), Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2013.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1104 (S.B. 1619), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 213 (H.B. 842), Sec. 1, eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 424 (S.B. 435), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 90 (H.B. 505), Sec. 1, eff. May 23, 2015.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 988 (H.B. 18), Sec. 2, eff. June 19, 2015.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 93 (H.B. 1638), Sec. 1, eff. May 23, 2017.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 189 (S.B. 22), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2017.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 729 (S.B. 1091), Sec. 1, eff. June 12, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 264 (S.B. 1276), Sec. 1, eff. May 28, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 467 (H.B. 4170), Sec. 21.001(6), eff. September 1, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 901 (H.B. 3650), Sec. 1, eff. June 10, 2019.


Sec. 28.010. NOTIFICATION REGARDING COLLEGE CREDIT PROGRAMS. (a) Each school year, a school district shall notify the parent of each district student enrolled in grade nine or above of the availability of programs in the district under which a student may earn college credit, including advanced placement programs, dual credit programs, joint high school and college credit programs, and international baccalaureate programs.


(b) A school district may provide the notification required by this section on the district's Internet website. The notification must include the name and contact information of any public or private entity offering a program described by this section in the district.


Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 973 (S.B. 282), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2007.


Section effective beginning with the 2009-2010 school year.



Sec. 28.011. ELECTIVE COURSES ON THE BIBLE'S HEBREW SCRIPTURES (OLD TESTAMENT) AND NEW TESTAMENT AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE HISTORY AND LITERATURE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION. (a) A school district may offer to students in grade nine or above:


(1) an elective course on the Hebrew Scriptures (Old Testament) and its impact and an elective course on the New Testament and its impact; or


(2) an elective course that combines the courses described by Subdivision (1).


(b) The purpose of a course under this section is to:


(1) teach students knowledge of biblical content, characters, poetry, and narratives that are prerequisites to understanding contemporary society and culture, including literature, art, music, mores, oratory, and public policy; and


(2) familiarize students with, as applicable:


(A) the contents of the Hebrew Scriptures or New Testament;


(B) the history of the Hebrew Scriptures or New Testament;


(C) the literary style and structure of the Hebrew Scriptures or New Testament; and


(D) the influence of the Hebrew Scriptures or New Testament on law, history, government, literature, art, music, customs, morals, values, and culture.


(c) A student may not be required to use a specific translation as the sole text of the Hebrew Scriptures or New Testament and may use as the basic instructional material a different translation of the Hebrew Scriptures or New Testament from that chosen by the board of trustees of the student's school district or the student's teacher.


(d) A course offered under this section shall follow applicable law and all federal and state guidelines in maintaining religious neutrality and accommodating the diverse religious views, traditions, and perspectives of students in their school district. A course under this section shall not endorse, favor, or promote, or disfavor or show hostility toward, any particular religion or nonreligious faith or religious perspective. Nothing in this statute is intended to violate any provision of the United States Constitution or federal law, the Texas Constitution or any state law, or any rules or guidelines provided by the United States Department of Education or the Texas Education Agency.


(e) Before adopting rules identifying the essential knowledge and skills of a course offered under this section, the State Board of Education shall submit the proposed essential knowledge and skills to the attorney general. The attorney general shall review the proposed essential knowledge and skills to ensure that the course complies with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the board may not adopt rules identifying the essential knowledge and skills of a course offered under this section without the attorney general's approval under this subsection.


(f) A teacher of a course offered under this section must hold a minimum of a High School Composite Certification in language arts, social studies, or history with, where practical, a minor in religion or biblical studies. A teacher selected to teach a course under this section shall successfully complete staff development training outlined in Section 21.459. A course under this section may only be taught by a teacher who has successfully completed training under Section 21.459.


(g) For the purpose of a student earning credit for high school graduation, a school district shall grant one-half academic elective credit for satisfactory completion of a course on the Hebrew Scriptures, one-half academic elective credit for satisfactory completion of a course on the New Testament, and one-half academic elective credit for satisfactory completion of a combined course on both the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament. This subsection applies only to a course that is taught in strict compliance with this section.


(h) If, for a particular semester, fewer than 15 students at a school district campus register to enroll in a course required by this section, the district is not required to offer the course at that campus for that semester.


(i) This section does not prohibit the board of trustees of a school district from offering an elective course based on the books of a religion other than Christianity. In determining whether to offer such a course, the board may consider various factors, including student and parent demand for such a course and the impact such books have had on history and culture.


(j) This section does not prohibit a school district from offering a course, other than the course authorized by this section, in the academic study of the Hebrew Scriptures, the New Testament, or both for local credit or for state elective credit towards high school graduation.


Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 856 (H.B. 1287), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2007.


Amended by:


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., Ch. 6 (S.B. 6), Sec. 16, eff. July 19, 2011.


Sec. 28.012. INSTRUCTION ON INTERACTION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT. (a) In this section:


(1) "Board" means the State Board of Education.


(2) "Commission" means the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement.


(3) "Driver training school" has the meaning assigned by Section 1001.001.


(b) The board and the commission shall enter into a memorandum of understanding that establishes each agency's respective responsibilities in developing instruction, including curriculum and instructional modules, on proper interaction with peace officers during traffic stops and other in-person encounters. The instruction must include information regarding:


(1) the role of law enforcement and the duties and responsibilities of peace officers;


(2) a person's rights concerning interactions with peace officers;


(3) proper behavior for civilians and peace officers during interactions;


(4) laws regarding questioning and detention by peace officers, including any law requiring a person to present proof of identity to a peace officer, and the consequences for a person's or officer's failure to comply with those laws; and


(5) how and where to file a complaint against or a compliment on behalf of a peace officer.


(c) In developing the instruction under this section, the board and the commission may consult with any interested party, including a volunteer work group convened for the purpose of making recommendations regarding the instruction.


(d) Before finalizing any instruction under this section, the board and the commission shall provide a reasonable period for public comment.


(e) Subject to rules adopted by the board, a school district or open-enrollment charter school may tailor the instruction developed under this section as appropriate for the district's or school's community. In tailoring the instruction, the district or school shall solicit input from local law enforcement agencies, driver training schools, and the community.


Added by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 513 (S.B. 30), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2017.


Sec. 28.013. NATURE SCIENCE CURRICULUM PROJECT. (a) The State Board of Education shall assist in developing a nature science curriculum, in accordance with this section, the following entities, acting jointly:


(1) the Outdoor School at Texas Tech University Center at Junction;


(2) the Texas Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (T-STEM) Center of Texas Tech University; and


(3) South Llano River State Park.


(b) The nature science curriculum must:


(1) be designed for instruction of students in grades six through 12;


(2) provide for grade-level appropriate instruction in essential knowledge and skills identified by the State Board of Education under Section 28.002 for:


(A) science; and


(B) mathematics, social studies, and language arts, to the extent practicable and relevant to nature science studies;


(3) through participation in outdoor experiential learning projects in state parks, provide for the scientific study by students of:


(A) conservation, wildlife or aquatic biology, range ecology, or other areas of nature science; and


(B) problems affecting nature, such as threats to the watershed, and possible solutions to those problems; and


(4) be designed to:


(A) be capable of implementation in any state park;


(B) use state park resources in providing instruction; and


(C) be presented by classroom teachers and state park employees.


(c) The Texas Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (T-STEM) Center of Texas Tech University shall make the nature science curriculum available through the university's Internet website or through a separate Internet website developed by the center for that purpose.


(d) The Texas Tech University Center at Junction, with assistance from South Llano River State Park, shall present to classroom teachers and state park employees staff development courses in providing instruction in the nature science curriculum.


(e) The nature science curriculum project must be implemented and maintained using money appropriated for those purposes.


Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 300 (H.B. 1700), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2007.


Sec. 28.014. COLLEGE PREPARATORY COURSES. (a) Each school district shall partner with at least one institution of higher education to develop and provide courses in college preparatory mathematics and English language arts. The courses must be designed:


(1) for students at the 12th grade level whose performance on:


(A) an end-of-course assessment instrument required under Section 39.023(c) does not meet college readiness standards; or


(B) coursework, a college entrance examination, or an assessment instrument designated under Section 51.334 indicates that the student is not ready to perform entry-level college coursework; and


(2) to prepare students for success in entry-level college courses.


(b) A course developed under this section must be provided:


(1) on the campus of the high school offering the course; or


(2) through distance learning or as an online course provided through an institution of higher education with which the school district partners as provided by Subsection (a).


(c) Appropriate faculty of each high school offering courses under this section and appropriate faculty of each institution of higher education with which the school district partners shall meet regularly as necessary to ensure that each course is aligned with college readiness expectations. The commissioner of education, in coordination with the commissioner of higher education, may adopt rules to administer this subsection.


(d) Each school district shall provide a notice to each district student to whom Subsection (a) applies and the student's parent or guardian regarding the benefits of enrolling in a course under this section.


(f) A course provided under this section may be offered for dual credit at the discretion of the institution of higher education with which a school district partners under this section.


(g) Each school district, in consultation with each institution of higher education with which the district partners, shall develop or purchase instructional materials for a course developed under this section consistent with Chapter 31. The instructional materials must include technology resources that enhance the effectiveness of the course and draw on established best practices.


Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1058 (H.B. 2237), Sec. 8(a), eff. June 15, 2007.


Amended by:


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 27, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 10(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 842 (H.B. 2223), Sec. 2.01, eff. June 15, 2017.


For expiration of this section, see Subsection (c).



Sec. 28.015. PUBLIC OUTREACH MATERIALS TO PROMOTE CURRICULUM CHANGE AWARENESS. (a) The agency shall develop uniform public outreach materials that explain the importance and outline the details of public school curriculum changes under Chapter 211 (H.B. 5), Acts of the 83rd Legislature, Regular Session, 2013, and subsequent associated decisions by the State Board of Education. The agency shall make the materials available to school districts.


(b) The materials developed under this section must:


(1) be available in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese;


(2) be in a form that would allow school districts to mail the information to students and parents; and


(3) include an explanation of:


(A) the basic career and college readiness components of each endorsement under Section 28.025(c-1);


(B) the curriculum requirements to gain automatic college admission under Section 51.803; and


(C) applicable course, graduation plan, and endorsement requirements for financial aid authorized under Title 3, including curriculum requirements for:


(i) the TEXAS grant as provided under Subchapter M, Chapter 56; and


(ii) the Texas Educational Opportunity Grant Program as provided under Subchapter P, Chapter 56.


(c) This section expires September 1, 2020.


Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 988 (H.B. 18), Sec. 3(a), eff. June 19, 2015.


Amended by:


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 327 (H.B. 264), Sec. 1, eff. June 1, 2017.


Sec. 28.016. INSTRUCTION IN HIGH SCHOOL, COLLEGE, AND CAREER PREPARATION. (a) Each school district shall provide instruction to students in grade seven or eight in preparing for high school, college, and a career.


(b) The instruction must include information regarding:


(1) the creation of a high school personal graduation plan under Section 28.02121;


(2) the distinguished level of achievement described by Section 28.025(b-15);


(3) each endorsement described by Section 28.025(c-1);


(4) college readiness standards; and


(5) potential career choices and the education needed to enter those careers.


(c) A school district may:


(1) provide the instruction as part of an existing course in the required curriculum;


(2) provide the instruction as part of an existing career and technology course designated by the State Board of Education as appropriate for that purpose; or


(3) establish a new elective course through which to provide the instruction.


(d) Each school district shall ensure that at least once in grade seven or eight each student receives the instruction under this section.


Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 988 (H.B. 18), Sec. 4, eff. June 19, 2015.


See note following this section.



Sec. 28.017. INSTRUCTION ON PREVENTION OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND SEX TRAFFICKING. (a) The commissioner, in cooperation with the human trafficking prevention task force created under Section 402.035, Government Code, and any other persons the commissioner considers appropriate, shall develop one or more sexual abuse and sex trafficking instructional modules that a school district may use in the district's health curriculum. The modules may include:


(1) information on the different forms of sexual abuse and assault, sex trafficking, and risk factors for sex trafficking;


(2) the procedures for reporting sexual abuse and sex trafficking or suspected sexual abuse or sex trafficking;


(3) strategies for sexual abuse and assault prevention and overcoming peer pressure;


(4) information on establishing healthy boundaries for relationships, recognizing potentially abusive or harmful relationships, and avoiding high-risk activities;


(5) the recruiting tactics of sex traffickers and peer recruiters, including recruitment through the Internet;


(6) the legal aspects of sexual abuse and sex trafficking under state and federal law; and


(7) the influence of culture and mass media on perceptions of sexual abuse and sex trafficking, including stereotypes and myths about victims and abusers, victim blaming, and the role of language.


(b) The module or modules developed under Subsection (a) must emphasize compassion for victims of sexual abuse or sex trafficking and the creation of a positive reentry experience for survivors of sexual abuse or sex trafficking into schools.


(c) Before the beginning of each school year, a school district that elects to use a module developed under Subsection (a) in the district's health curriculum shall provide written notice to the parent of each student enrolled in the district that includes the following:


(1) a statement that the district will provide instruction relating to sexual abuse and sex trafficking awareness to students enrolled in the district;


(2) a description of the material that will be used in providing instruction to students; and


(3) a statement that the parent has the right to review the material and remove the parent's student from the instruction.


(d) If a school district does not comply with the requirements of Subsection (c), a parent of a student enrolled in the district may file a complaint in accordance with the district's grievance procedure developed under Section 26.011.


Text of section effective on June 12, 2017, but only if a specific appropriation is provided as described by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 762 (S.B. 2039), Sec. 5, which states: This Act takes effect only if a specific appropriation for the implementation of the Act is provided in a general appropriations act of the 85th Legislature.


Added by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 762 (S.B. 2039), Sec. 1, eff. June 12, 2017.


Sec. 28.018. ADVANCED COMPUTER SCIENCE PROGRAM. (a) The State Board of Education by rule shall develop and implement a program under which:


(1) students in participating school districts may comply with the curriculum requirements for an advanced mathematics credit under Section 28.025(b-1)(2) or an advanced science credit under Section 28.025(b-1)(3) by successfully completing an advanced computer science course; and


(2) participating school districts implement rigorous standards, as developed by the State Board of Education, for advanced computer science courses that are focused on the creation and use of software and computing technologies.


(b) The commissioner shall adopt rules as necessary to administer this section.


Added by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 123 (H.B. 728), Sec. 1, eff. May 26, 2017.


For expiration of this section, see Subsection (k).



Sec. 28.0181. COMPUTER SCIENCE STRATEGIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE. (a) In this section, "advisory committee" means the computer science strategic advisory committee established under this section.


(b) The agency shall establish the computer science strategic advisory committee to develop and provide recommendations for increasing computer science instruction and participation in public schools.


(c) The advisory committee is composed of at least 11 members. The members must include:


(1) two members appointed by the governor;


(2) two members appointed by the lieutenant governor;


(3) two members appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives;


(4) one member appointed by the chair of the senate committee with primary jurisdiction over primary and secondary education;


(5) one member appointed by the chair of the senate committee with primary jurisdiction over higher education;


(6) one member appointed by the chair of the house of representatives committee with primary jurisdiction over primary and secondary education;


(7) one member appointed by the chair of the house of representatives committee with primary jurisdiction over higher education;


(8) one member appointed by the chair of the State Board of Education; and


(9) any other members added by the advisory committee in a manner determined by the committee in the committee's discretion.


(d) In appointing members to the advisory committee, the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of the house of representatives shall coordinate appointments to ensure that the six individuals appointed to the advisory committee collectively by those officers include:


(1) three educators who teach in a public school and are certified in computer science;


(2) one parent or person standing in parental relation to a student enrolled in a public school;


(3) one person employed in the technology industry; and


(4) one faculty member of an institution of higher education.


(e) The governor shall designate a member of the advisory committee as the presiding officer of the advisory committee to serve in that capacity at the pleasure of the governor.


(f) The advisory committee may hold public meetings.


(g) Members of the advisory committee are not entitled to compensation but are entitled to reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses incurred in fulfilling committee duties.


(h) Staff members of the agency shall provide administrative support for the advisory committee.


(i) Funding for the administrative and operational expenses of the advisory committee shall be provided by appropriation to the agency for that purpose.


(j) Not later than September 1, 2020, the advisory committee shall submit to the governor and the legislature a report that includes recommended changes to state law, including funding proposals and timelines for the implementation of the recommended changes. The report shall include recommendations that are intended to:


(1) increase the number of certified computer science teachers;


(2) increase the number of public high schools offering computer science courses;


(3) increase the number of high school students enrolled in computer science courses;


(4) encourage the enrollment of diverse student populations in computer science courses; and


(5) expand computer science learning opportunities, including computer programming, computer coding, cybersecurity, and computational thinking, in public schools.


(k) The advisory committee is abolished and this section expires January 1, 2021.


Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1149 (H.B. 2984), Sec. 2, eff. June 14, 2019.


Sec. 28.020. MATHEMATICS INNOVATION ZONES. (a) The commissioner may:


(1) on application of a school district or open-enrollment charter school, designate a campus of the district or school as a mathematics innovation zone; and


(2) from funds appropriated or donated for purposes of this section, award a grant to support implementation of innovative mathematics instruction at the campus in accordance with this section.


(b) A campus designated as a mathematics innovation zone must:


(1) implement with fidelity an innovative mathematics instructional program approved by the commissioner for purposes of this section that addresses the essential knowledge and skills of the mathematics curriculum required by Section 28.002;


(2) comply with objectives, metrics, and other mathematics innovation zone requirements imposed by the commissioner through rules adopted under Subsection (g); and


(3) provide all data relating to the mathematics innovation zone requested by the agency.


(c) A campus designated as a mathematics innovation zone is not subject to interventions under the state accountability system described by Section 39.107(a) or (e) for the first two years of the designation, provided that the campus implements the instructional program with fidelity and complies with each mathematics innovation zone requirement to the satisfaction of the commissioner. The period that a campus is exempt from interventions as provided by this subsection is not:


(1) included in calculating consecutive school years under Section 39.107(a) or (e); or


(2) considered a break in consecutive school years of unacceptable ratings for purposes of determining the need for intervention under Section 39.107(a) or (e).


(d) The commissioner may revoke designation of a campus as a mathematics innovation zone and suspend associated grant funding if the commissioner determines that the campus has failed to implement the instructional program with fidelity or comply with any requirement imposed under this section.


(e) A school district or open-enrollment charter school may use a pay for success program approved by the commissioner under Section 44.904 to pay costs associated with designation of a campus as a mathematics innovation zone.


(f) The commissioner may accept gifts, grants, or donations from any public or private source for purposes of this section.


(g) The commissioner may adopt rules as necessary to administer this section.


(h) A decision or determination by the commissioner under this section is final and may not be appealed.


Added by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 424 (S.B. 1318), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2017.


SUBCHAPTER B. ADVANCEMENT, PLACEMENT, CREDIT, AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT RECORD



Sec. 28.021. STUDENT ADVANCEMENT. (a) A student may be promoted only on the basis of academic achievement or demonstrated proficiency of the subject matter of the course or grade level.


(b) In measuring the academic achievement or proficiency of a student who is dyslexic, the student's potential for achievement or proficiency in the area must be considered.


(c) In determining promotion under Subsection (a), a school district shall consider:


(1) the recommendation of the student's teacher;


(2) the student's grade in each subject or course;


(3) the student's score on an assessment instrument administered under Section 39.023(a), (b), or (l), to the extent applicable; and


(4) any other necessary academic information, as determined by the district.


(d) By the start of the school year, a district shall make public the requirements for student advancement under this section.


(e) The commissioner shall provide guidelines to districts based on best practices that a district may use when considering factors for promotion.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Amended by:


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 28, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 307 (H.B. 2135), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Sec. 28.0211. SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE ON ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS REQUIRED; ACCELERATED INSTRUCTION. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b) or (e), a student may not be promoted to:


(1) the sixth grade program to which the student would otherwise be assigned if the student does not perform satisfactorily on the fifth grade mathematics and reading assessment instruments under Section 39.023; or


(2) the ninth grade program to which the student would otherwise be assigned if the student does not perform satisfactorily on the eighth grade mathematics and reading assessment instruments under Section 39.023.


(a-1) Each time a student fails to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument administered under Section 39.023(a) in the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth grade, the school district in which the student attends school shall provide to the student accelerated instruction in the applicable subject area. Accelerated instruction may require participation of the student before or after normal school hours and may include participation at times of the year outside normal school operations.


(a-2) A student who fails to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a) and who is promoted to the next grade level must complete accelerated instruction required under Subsection (a-1) before placement in the next grade level. A student who fails to complete required accelerated instruction may not be promoted.


(a-3) The commissioner shall provide guidelines to districts on research-based best practices and effective strategies that a district may use in developing an accelerated instruction program.


(b) A school district shall provide to a student who initially fails to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a) at least two additional opportunities to take the assessment instrument. A school district may administer an alternate assessment instrument to a student who has failed an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a) on the previous two opportunities. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a student may be promoted if the student performs at grade level on an alternate assessment instrument under this subsection that is appropriate for the student's grade level and approved by the commissioner.


(c) Each time a student fails to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a), the school district in which the student attends school shall provide to the student accelerated instruction in the applicable subject area, including reading instruction for a student who fails to perform satisfactorily on a reading assessment instrument. After a student fails to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument a second time, a grade placement committee shall be established to prescribe the accelerated instruction the district shall provide to the student before the student is administered the assessment instrument the third time. The grade placement committee shall be composed of the principal or the principal's designee, the student's parent or guardian, and the teacher of the subject of an assessment instrument on which the student failed to perform satisfactorily. The district shall notify the parent or guardian of the time and place for convening the grade placement committee and the purpose of the committee. An accelerated instruction group administered by a school district under this section may not have a ratio of more than 10 students for each teacher.


(d) In addition to providing accelerated instruction to a student under Subsection (c), the district shall notify the student's parent or guardian of:


(1) the student's failure to perform satisfactorily on the assessment instrument;


(2) the accelerated instruction program to which the student is assigned; and


(3) the possibility that the student might be retained at the same grade level for the next school year.


(e) A student who, after at least three attempts, fails to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a) shall be retained at the same grade level for the next school year in accordance with Subsection (a). The student's parent or guardian may appeal the student's retention by submitting a request to the grade placement committee established under Subsection (c). The school district shall give the parent or guardian written notice of the opportunity to appeal. The grade placement committee may decide in favor of a student's promotion only if the committee concludes, using standards adopted by the board of trustees, that if promoted and given accelerated instruction, the student is likely to perform at grade level. A student may not be promoted on the basis of the grade placement committee's decision unless that decision is unanimous. The commissioner by rule shall establish a time line for making the placement determination. This subsection does not create a property interest in promotion. The decision of the grade placement committee is final and may not be appealed.


(f) A school district shall provide to a student who, after three attempts, has failed to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a) accelerated instruction during the next school year as prescribed by an educational plan developed for the student by the student's grade placement committee established under Subsection (c). The district shall provide that accelerated instruction regardless of whether the student has been promoted or retained. The educational plan must be designed to enable the student to perform at the appropriate grade level by the conclusion of the school year. During the school year, the student shall be monitored to ensure that the student is progressing in accordance with the plan. The district shall administer to the student the assessment instrument for the grade level in which the student is placed at the time the district regularly administers the assessment instruments for that school year.


(g) This section does not preclude the retention at a grade level, in accordance with state law or school district policy, of a student who performs satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a).


(h) In each instance under this section in which a school district is specifically required to provide notice to a parent or guardian of a student, the district shall make a good faith effort to ensure that such notice is provided either in person or by regular mail and that the notice is clear and easy to understand and is written in English or the parent or guardian's native language.


(i) The admission, review, and dismissal committee of a student who participates in a district's special education program under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, and who does not perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a) and administered under Section 39.023(a) or (b) must meet before the student is administered the assessment instrument for the second time. The committee shall determine:


(1) the manner in which the student will participate in an accelerated instruction program under this section; and


(2) whether the student will be promoted in accordance with Subsection (i-1) or retained under this section.


(i-1) At a meeting of the admission, review, and dismissal committee of a student under Subsection (i), the committee may promote the student to the next grade level if the committee concludes that the student has made sufficient progress in the measurable academic goals contained in the student's individualized education program developed under Section 29.005. A school district that promotes a student under this subsection is not required to provide an additional opportunity for the student to perform satisfactorily on the assessment instrument.


(i-2) Not later than September 1 of each school year, a school district must notify the parent or person standing in parental relation to a student enrolled in the district's special education program under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, of the options of the admission, review, and dismissal committee under Subsections (i) and (i-1) if the student does not perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument.


(j) A school district or open-enrollment charter school shall provide students required to attend accelerated programs under this section with transportation to those programs if the programs occur outside of regular school hours.


(k) The commissioner shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this section, including rules concerning when school districts shall administer assessment instruments required under this section and which administration of the assessment instruments will be used for purposes of Section 39.054.


(l) Repealed by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1058, Sec. 17, eff. June 15, 2007.


(l-1) The commissioner may adopt rules requiring a school district that receives federal funding under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. Section 6301 et seq.) to use that funding to provide supplemental educational services under 20 U.S.C. Section 6316 in conjunction with the accelerated instruction provided under this section, provided that the rules may not conflict with federal law governing the use of that funding.


(m) The commissioner shall certify, not later than July 1 of each school year or as soon as practicable thereafter, whether sufficient funds have been appropriated statewide for the purposes of this section and Section 28.0217. A determination by the commissioner is final and may not be appealed. For purposes of certification, the commissioner shall consider:


(1) the average cost per student per assessment instrument administration;


(2) the number of students that require accelerated instruction because the student failed to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument;


(3) whether sufficient funds have been appropriated to provide support to students in grades three through 12 identified as being at risk of dropping out of school, as defined in Section 29.081(d); and


(4) whether sufficient funds have been appropriated to provide instructional materials that are aligned with the assessment instruments under Sections 39.023(a) and (c).


(m-1) For purposes of certification under Subsection (m), the commissioner may not consider Foundation School Program funds except for compensatory education funds under Section 48.104. This section may be implemented only if the commissioner certifies that sufficient funds have been appropriated during a school year for administering the accelerated instruction programs specified under this section and Section 28.0217, including teacher training for that purpose.


(n) A student who is promoted by a grade placement committee under this section must be assigned in each subject in which the student failed to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument specified under Subsection (a) to a teacher who meets all state and federal qualifications to teach that subject and grade.


(o) This section does not require the administration of a fifth or eighth grade assessment instrument in a subject under Section 39.023(a) to a student enrolled in the fifth or eighth grade, as applicable, if the student:


(1) is enrolled in a course in the subject intended for students above the student's grade level and will be administered an assessment instrument adopted or developed under Section 39.023(a) that aligns with the curriculum for the course in which the student is enrolled; or


(2) is enrolled in a course in the subject for which the student will receive high school academic credit and will be administered an end-of-course assessment instrument adopted under Section 39.023(c) for the course.


(p) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a student described by Subsection (o) may not be denied promotion on the basis of failure to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument not required to be administered to the student in accordance with that subsection.


Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 396, Sec. 2.12, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.


Amended by:


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1058 (H.B. 2237), Sec. 9, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1058 (H.B. 2237), Sec. 17, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 29, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 91 (S.B. 1303), Sec. 7.006, eff. September 1, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 307 (H.B. 2135), Sec. 2, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 11, eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 242 (H.B. 657), Sec. 1, eff. May 29, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 3.022, eff. September 1, 2019.


Sec. 28.0212. JUNIOR HIGH OR MIDDLE SCHOOL PERSONAL GRADUATION PLAN. (a) A principal of a junior high or middle school shall designate a school counselor, teacher, or other appropriate individual to develop and administer a personal graduation plan for each student enrolled in the junior high or middle school who:


(1) does not perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument administered under Subchapter B, Chapter 39; or


(2) is not likely to receive a high school diploma before the fifth school year following the student's enrollment in grade level nine, as determined by the district.


(b) A personal graduation plan under this section must:


(1) identify educational goals for the student;


(2) include diagnostic information, appropriate monitoring and intervention, and other evaluation strategies;


(3) include an intensive instruction program described by Section 28.0213;


(4) address participation of the student's parent or guardian, including consideration of the parent's or guardian's educational expectations for the student; and


(5) provide innovative methods to promote the student's advancement, including flexible scheduling, alternative learning environments, on-line instruction, and other interventions that are proven to accelerate the learning process and have been scientifically validated to improve learning and cognitive ability.


(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b), a student's individualized education program developed under Section 29.005 may be used as the student's personal graduation plan under this section.


(d) The agency shall establish minimum standards for a personal graduation plan under this section.


(e) Repealed by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211, Sec. 78(b)(2), eff. September 1, 2014.


(g) Repealed by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 78(b)(2), eff. September 1, 2014.


Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1212, Sec. 7, eff. June 20, 2003.


Amended by:


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 763 (H.B. 3485), Sec. 3, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1058 (H.B. 2237), Sec. 10, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 12(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 13(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 78(b)(2), eff. September 1, 2014.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 443 (S.B. 715), Sec. 19, eff. June 14, 2013.


Sec. 28.02121. HIGH SCHOOL PERSONAL GRADUATION PLAN. (a) The agency, in consultation with the Texas Workforce Commission and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, shall prepare and make available to each school district in English and Spanish information that explains the advantages of the distinguished level of achievement described by Section 28.025(b-15) and each endorsement described by Section 28.025(c-1). The information must contain an explanation:


(1) concerning the benefits of choosing a high school personal graduation plan that includes the distinguished level of achievement under the foundation high school program and includes one or more endorsements to enable the student to achieve a class rank in the top 10 percent for students at the campus; and


(2) that encourages parents, to the greatest extent practicable, to have the student choose a high school personal graduation plan described by Subdivision (1).


(b) A school district shall publish the information provided to the district under Subsection (a) on the Internet website of the district and ensure that the information is available to students in grades nine and above and the parents or legal guardians of those students in the language in which the parents or legal guardians are most proficient. A district is required to provide information under this subsection in the language in which the parents or legal guardians are most proficient only if at least 20 students in a grade level primarily speak that language.


(c) A principal of a high school shall designate a school counselor or school administrator to review personal graduation plan options with each student entering grade nine together with that student's parent or guardian. The personal graduation plan options reviewed must include the distinguished level of achievement described by Section 28.025(b-15) and the endorsements described by Section 28.025(c-1). Before the conclusion of the school year, the student and the student's parent or guardian must confirm and sign a personal graduation plan for the student.


(d) A personal graduation plan under Subsection (c) must identify a course of study that:


(1) promotes:


(A) college and workforce readiness; and


(B) career placement and advancement; and


(2) facilitates the student's transition from secondary to postsecondary education.


(e) A school district may not prevent a student and the student's parent or guardian from confirming a personal graduation plan that includes pursuit of a distinguished level of achievement or an endorsement.


(f) A student may amend the student's personal graduation plan after the initial confirmation of the plan under this section. If a student amends the student's personal graduation plan, the school shall send written notice to the student's parents regarding the change.


Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 14(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Sec. 28.02122. INCLUSION OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS IN HEALTH SCIENCE CAREER INFORMATION. The agency shall ensure that any information provided to students relating to health science careers includes information regarding mental health professions. To the extent that the public services endorsement includes information on health science career pathways, the information must include mental health careers as a possible pathway.


Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 96 (H.B. 1430), Sec. 1, eff. May 23, 2015.


Sec. 28.02123. NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS. (a) Not later than September 1 of each school year, a school district shall notify by regular mail or e-mail the parent of or other person standing in parental relation to each student enrolled in grade nine or above that the student is not required to complete an Algebra II course to graduate under the foundation high school program.


(b) The notification must include information regarding the potential consequences to a student of not completing an Algebra II course, including the impact on eligibility for:


(1) automatic college admission under Section 51.803; and


(2) certain financial aid authorized under Title 3, including:


(A) the TEXAS grant program under Subchapter M, Chapter 56; and


(B) the Texas Educational Opportunity Grant Program under Subchapter P, Chapter 56.


Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 960 (S.B. 232), Sec. 1, eff. June 14, 2019.


Sec. 28.0213. INTENSIVE PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION. (a) A school district shall offer an intensive program of instruction to a student who:


(1) does not perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument administered under Subchapter B, Chapter 39; or


(2) is not likely to receive a high school diploma before the fifth school year following the student's enrollment in grade nine, as determined by the district.


(b) A school district shall design the intensive program of instruction described by Subsection (a) to:


(1) enable the student to:


(A) to the extent practicable, perform at the student's grade level at the conclusion of the next regular school term; or


(B) attain a standard of annual growth specified by the school district and reported by the district to the agency; and


(2) if applicable, carry out the purposes of Section 28.0211.


(c) A school district shall use funds appropriated by the legislature for an intensive program of instruction to plan and implement intensive instruction and other activities aimed at helping a student satisfy state and local high school graduation requirements. The commissioner shall distribute funds to districts that implement a program under this section based on the number of students identified by the district who:


(1) do not perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument administered under Subchapter B, Chapter 39; or


(2) are not likely to receive a high school diploma before the fifth school year following the student's enrollment in grade nine, as determined by the district.


(d) A school district's determination of the appropriateness of a program for a student under this section is final and does not create a cause of action.


(e) For a student in a special education program under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, who does not perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument administered under Section 39.023(a), (b), or (c), the student's admission, review, and dismissal committee shall design the program to:


(1) enable the student to attain a standard of annual growth on the basis of the student's individualized education program; and


(2) if applicable, carry out the purposes of Section 28.0211.


Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1212, Sec. 7, eff. June 20, 2003.


Amended by:


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1354 (S.B. 1404), Sec. 3, eff. June 14, 2013.


Sec. 28.0214. FINALITY OF GRADE. (a) An examination or course grade issued by a classroom teacher is final and may not be changed unless the grade is arbitrary, erroneous, or not consistent with the school district grading policy applicable to the grade, as determined by the board of trustees of the school district in which the teacher is employed.


(b) A determination by a school district board of trustees under Subsection (a) is not subject to appeal. This subsection does not prohibit an appeal related to a student's eligibility to participate in extracurricular activities under Section 33.081.


Added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 194, Sec. 1, effective June 2, 2003.


Renumbered from Education Code, Section 28.0212 by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 728 (H.B. 2018), Sec. 23.001(14), eff. September 1, 2005.


Sec. 28.0216. DISTRICT GRADING POLICY. A school district shall adopt a grading policy, including provisions for the assignment of grades on class assignments and examinations, before each school year. A district grading policy:


(1) must require a classroom teacher to assign a grade that reflects the student's relative mastery of an assignment;


(2) may not require a classroom teacher to assign a minimum grade for an assignment without regard to the student's quality of work; and


(3) may allow a student a reasonable opportunity to make up or redo a class assignment or examination for which the student received a failing grade.


Added by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1236 (S.B. 2033), Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 2009.


Sec. 28.0217. ACCELERATED INSTRUCTION FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS. Each time a student fails to perform satisfactorily on an assessment instrument administered under Section 39.023(c), the school district in which the student attends school shall provide to the student accelerated instruction in the applicable subject area, using funds appropriated for accelerated instruction under Section 28.0211. Accelerated instruction may require participation of the student before or after normal school hours and may include participation at times of the year outside normal school operations.


Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 15, eff. June 10, 2013.


Sec. 28.022. NOTICE TO PARENT OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. (a) The board of trustees of each school district shall adopt a policy that:


(1) provides for a conference between parents and teachers;


(2) requires the district, at least once every 12 weeks, to give written notice to a parent of a student's performance in each class or subject; and


(3) requires the district, at least once every three weeks, or during the fourth week of each nine-week grading period, to give written notice to a parent or legal guardian of a student's performance in a subject included in the foundation curriculum under Section 28.002(a)(1) if the student's performance in the subject is consistently unsatisfactory, as determined by the district.


(b) The notice required under Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) must:


(1) provide for the signature of a student's parent; and


(2) be returned to the district.


(c) A policy adopted under this section does not apply to a student who:


(1) is 18 years of age or older and who is living in a different residence than the student's parents;


(2) is married; or


(3) has had the disabilities of minority removed for general purposes.


(d) In this section, "parent" includes a guardian, conservator, or other person having lawful control of a student.


(e) A district that uses an electronic platform for communicating student grade and performance information to parents may permit a parent to sign a notice required under Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) electronically, so long as the district retains a record verifying the parent's acknowledgment of the required notice. A district that accepts electronic signatures under this subsection must offer parents the option to provide a handwritten signature as provided under Subsection (b).


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1237, Sec. 1, eff. Aug. 30, 1999.


Amended by:


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 166 (H.B. 1993), Sec. 1, eff. May 28, 2015.


Sec. 28.023. CREDIT BY EXAMINATION. (a) Using guidelines established by the State Board of Education, a school district shall develop or select for review by the district board of trustees examinations for acceleration for each primary school grade level and for credit for secondary school academic subjects. The guidelines must provide for the examinations to thoroughly test comprehension of the information presented in the applicable grade level or subject. The board of trustees shall approve for each subject, to the extent available, at least four examinations that satisfy State Board of Education guidelines. The examinations approved by the board of trustees must include:


(1) advanced placement examinations developed by the College Board; and


(2) examinations administered through the College-Level Examination Program.


(b) A school district shall give a student in a primary grade level credit for a grade level and advance the student one grade level on the basis of an examination for acceleration approved by the board of trustees under Subsection (a) if:


(1) the student scores in the 80th percentile or above on each section of the examination;


(2) a district representative recommends that the student be advanced; and


(3) the student's parent or guardian gives written approval of the advancement.


(c) A school district shall give a student in grade level six or above credit for a subject on the basis of an examination for credit in the subject approved by the board of trustees under Subsection (a) if the student scores in the 80th percentile or above on the examination or if the student achieves a score as provided by Subsection (c-1). If a student is given credit in a subject on the basis of an examination, the district shall enter the examination score on the student's transcript and the student is not required to take an end-of-course assessment instrument adopted under Section 39.023(c) for that subject.


(c-1) A school district shall give a student in grade level six or above credit for a subject if the student scores:


(1) a three or higher on an advanced placement examination approved by the board of trustees under Subsection (a) and developed by the College Board; or


(2) a scaled score of 50 or higher on an examination approved by the board of trustees under Subsection (a) and administered through the College-Level Examination Program.


(d) Each district shall administer each examination approved by the board of trustees under Subsection (a) not fewer than four times each year, at times to be determined by the State Board of Education.


(e) Subsection (d) does not apply to an examination that has an administration date that is established by an entity other than the school district.


(f) A student may not attempt more than two times to receive credit for a particular subject on the basis of an examination for credit in that subject.


(g) If a student fails to achieve the designated score described by Subsection (c) or (c-1) on an applicable examination described by Subsection (c) or (c-1) for a subject before the beginning of the school year in which the student would ordinarily be required to enroll in a course in that subject in accordance with the school district's prescribed course sequence, the student must satisfactorily complete the course to receive credit for the course.


(h) This subsection applies only to a school district surrounded by a school district described by Section 11.065(a). Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a school district's board of trustees may establish a minimum required score for each section of an examination for acceleration or an examination for credit approved by the board under Subsection (a) that is higher than the minimum required scores under Subsections (b) and (c), respectively. A minimum required score established by a board of trustees under this subsection:


(1) may be no greater than a score in the 90th percentile;


(2) must be established before the beginning of a school year for examinations to be administered in the school year; and


(3) must apply for at least the entire school year.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Amended by:


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1029 (H.B. 2694), Sec. 2, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1203 (S.B. 1365), Sec. 2, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1146 (S.B. 453), Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 2015.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 813 (H.B. 789), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2017.


Sec. 28.024. CREDIT FOR ENROLLMENT IN CERTAIN ACADEMIES. A school district shall grant to a student credit toward the academic course requirements for high school graduation, up to a maximum of two years of credit, for courses the student successfully completes at:


(1) the Texas Academy of Leadership in the Humanities under Section 96.707;


(2) the Texas Academy of Mathematics and Science under Subchapter G, Chapter 105;


(3) the Texas Academy of Mathematics and Science under Section 78.10; or


(4) the Texas Academy of International Studies under Section 87.505.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Amended by:


Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 887 (S.B. 1452), Sec. 3, eff. June 17, 2005.


Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 1339 (S.B. 151), Sec. 7, eff. June 18, 2005.


Reenacted and amended by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 921 (H.B. 3167), Sec. 4.004, eff. September 1, 2007.


Sec. 28.025. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA AND CERTIFICATE; ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT RECORD. (a) The State Board of Education by rule shall determine curriculum requirements for the foundation high school program that are consistent with the required curriculum under Section 28.002. The State Board of Education shall designate the specific courses in the foundation curriculum under Section 28.002(a)(1) required under the foundation high school program. Except as provided by this section, the State Board of Education may not designate a specific course or a specific number of credits in the enrichment curriculum as requirements for the program.


(b) A school district shall ensure that each student, on entering ninth grade, indicates in writing an endorsement under Subsection (c-1) that the student intends to earn. A district shall permit a student to choose, at any time, to earn an endorsement other than the endorsement the student previously indicated. A student may graduate under the foundation high school program without earning an endorsement if, after the student's sophomore year:


(1) the student and the student's parent or person standing in parental relation to the student are advised by a school counselor of the specific benefits of graduating from high school with one or more endorsements; and


(2) the student's parent or person standing in parental relation to the student files with a school counselor written permission, on a form adopted by the agency, allowing the student to graduate under the foundation high school program without earning an endorsement.


(b-1) The State Board of Education by rule shall require that the curriculum requirements for the foundation high school program under Subsection (a) include a requirement that students successfully complete:


(1) four credits in English language arts under Section 28.002(a)(1)(A), including one credit in English I, one credit in English II, one credit in English III, and one credit in an advanced English course authorized under Subsection (b-2);


(2) three credits in mathematics under Section 28.002(a)(1)(B), including one credit in Algebra I, one credit in geometry, and one credit in any advanced mathematics course authorized under Subsection (b-2);


(3) three credits in science under Section 28.002(a)(1)(C), including one credit in biology, one credit in any advanced science course authorized under Subsection (b-2), and one credit in integrated physics and chemistry or in an additional advanced science course authorized under Subsection (b-2);


(4) three credits in social studies under Section 28.002(a)(1)(D), including one credit in United States history, at least one-half credit in government and at least one-half credit in economics, and one credit in world geography or world history;


(5) except as provided under Subsections (b-12), (b-13), and (b-14), two credits in the same language in a language other than English under Section 28.002(a)(2)(A);


(6) five elective credits;


(7) one credit in fine arts under Section 28.002(a)(2)(D); and


(8) except as provided by Subsection (b-11), one credit in physical education under Section 28.002(a)(2)(C).


(b-2) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall:


(1) provide for a student to comply with the curriculum requirements for an advanced English course under Subsection (b-1)(1), for an advanced mathematics course under Subsection (b-1)(2), and for any advanced science course under Subsection (b-1)(3) by successfully completing a course in the appropriate content area that has been approved as an advanced course by board rule or that is offered as an advanced course for credit without board approval as provided by Section 28.002(g-1); and


(2) allow a student to comply with the curriculum requirements for the third and fourth mathematics credits under Subsection (b-1)(2) or the third and fourth science credits under Subsection (b-1)(3) by successfully completing an advanced career and technical course designated by the State Board of Education as containing substantively similar and rigorous academic content.


(b-3) In adopting rules for purposes of Subsection (b-2), the State Board of Education must approve a variety of advanced English, mathematics, and science courses that may be taken to comply with the foundation high school program requirements, provided that each approved course prepares students to enter the workforce successfully or postsecondary education without remediation.


(b-4) A school district may offer the curriculum described in Subsections (b-1)(1) through (4) in an applied manner. Courses delivered in an applied manner must cover the essential knowledge and skills, and the student shall be administered the applicable end-of-course assessment instrument as provided by Sections 39.023(c) and 39.025.


(b-5) A school district may offer a mathematics or science course to be taken by a student after completion of Algebra II and physics. A course approved under this subsection must be endorsed by an institution of higher education as a course for which the institution would award course credit or as a prerequisite for a course for which the institution would award course credit.


(b-6) A school district may allow a student to enroll concurrently in Algebra I and geometry.


(b-8) Repealed by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211, Sec. 78(b)(3), eff. September 1, 2014.


(b-9) A school district, with the approval of the commissioner, may allow a student to satisfy the fine arts credit required under Subsection (b-1)(7) by participating in a community-based fine arts program not provided by the school district in which the student is enrolled. The fine arts program must provide instruction in the essential knowledge and skills identified for fine arts by the State Board of Education under Section 28.002(c). The fine arts program may be provided on or off a school campus and outside the regular school day.


(b-10) A school district, with the approval of the commissioner, may allow a student to comply with the curriculum requirements for the physical education credit required under Subsection (b-1)(8) by participating in a private or commercially sponsored physical activity program provided on or off a school campus and outside the regular school day.


(b-11) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall allow a student who is unable to participate in physical activity due to disability or illness to substitute one credit in English language arts, mathematics, science, or social studies, one credit in a course that is offered for credit as provided by Section 28.002(g-1), or one academic elective credit for the physical education credit required under Subsection (b-1)(8). A credit allowed to be substituted under this subsection may not also be used by the student to satisfy a graduation requirement other than completion of the physical education credit. The rules must provide that the determination regarding a student's ability to participate in physical activity will be made by:


(1) if the student receives special education services under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, the student's admission, review, and dismissal committee;


(2) if the student does not receive special education services under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, but is covered by Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. Section 794), the committee established for the student under that Act; or


(3) if each of the committees described by Subdivisions (1) and (2) is inapplicable, a committee established by the school district of persons with appropriate knowledge regarding the student.


(b-12) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall adopt criteria to allow a student to comply with the curriculum requirements for the two credits in a language other than English required under Subsection (b-1)(5) by substituting two credits in computer programming languages, including computer coding.


(b-13) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall allow a student to substitute credit in another appropriate course for the second credit in the same language in a language other than English otherwise required by Subsection (b-1)(5) if the student, in completing the first credit required under Subsection (b-1)(5), demonstrates that the student is unlikely to be able to complete the second credit. The board rules must establish:


(1) the standards and, as applicable, the appropriate school personnel for making a determination under this subsection; and


(2) appropriate substitute courses for purposes of this subsection.


(b-14) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall allow a student who, due to disability, is unable to complete two courses in the same language in a language other than English, as provided under Subsection (b-1)(5), to substitute for those credits two credits in English language arts, mathematics, science, or social studies or two credits in career and technology education, technology applications, or other academic electives. A credit allowed to be substituted under this subsection may not also be used by the student to satisfy a graduation credit requirement other than credit for completion of a language other than English. The rules must provide that the determination regarding a student's ability to participate in language-other-than-English courses will be made by:


(1) if the student receives special education services under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, the student's admission, review, and dismissal committee; or


(2) if the student does not receive special education services under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, but is covered by Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. Section 794), the committee established for the student under that Act.


(b-15) A student may earn a distinguished level of achievement under the foundation high school program by successfully completing:


(1) four credits in mathematics, which must include Algebra II and the courses described by Subsection (b-1)(2);


(2) four credits in science, which must include the courses described by Subsection (b-1)(3);


(3) the remaining curriculum requirements under Subsection (b-1); and


(4) the curriculum requirements for at least one endorsement under Subsection (c-1).


(b-16) A student may satisfy an elective credit required under Subsection (b-1)(6) with a credit earned to satisfy the additional curriculum requirements for the distinguished level of achievement under the foundation high school program or an endorsement under Subsection (c-1). This subsection may apply to more than one elective credit.


(b-17) The State Board of Education shall adopt rules to ensure that a student may comply with the curriculum requirements under Subsection (b-1)(6) by successfully completing an advanced career and technical course, including a course that may lead to an industry-recognized credential or certificate or an associate degree.


(b-18) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall allow a student to comply with the curriculum requirements under Subsection (b-1) by successfully completing a dual credit course.


(b-19) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall adopt criteria to allow a student to comply with curriculum requirements for the world geography or world history credit under Subsection (b-1)(4) by successfully completing a combined world history and world geography course developed by the State Board of Education.


(b-20) The State Board of Education shall adopt rules to include the instruction developed under Section 28.012 in one or more courses in the required curriculum for students in grade levels 9 through 12.


(b-21) In adopting rules under Subsection (b-1), the State Board of Education shall adopt criteria to allow a student to comply with the curriculum requirement for one credit under Subsection (b-1)(5) by successfully completing at an elementary school either a dual language immersion program under Section 28.0051 or a course in American Sign Language.


(c) A person may receive a diploma if the person is eligible for a diploma under Section 28.0251. In other cases, a student may graduate and receive a diploma only if:


(1) the student successfully completes the curriculum requirements identified by the State Board of Education under Subsection (a) and complies with Sections 28.0256 and 39.025; or


(2) the student successfully completes an individualized education program developed under Section 29.005.


(c-1) A student may earn an endorsement on the student's transcript by successfully completing curriculum requirements for that endorsement adopted by the State Board of Education by rule. The State Board of Education by rule shall provide students with multiple options for earning each endorsement, including, to the greatest extent possible, coherent sequences of courses. The State Board of Education by rule must permit a student to enroll in courses under more than one endorsement curriculum before the student's junior year. An endorsement under this subsection may be earned in any of the following categories:


(1) science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), which includes courses directly related to science, including environmental science, technology, including computer science, cybersecurity, and computer coding, engineering, and advanced mathematics;


(2) business and industry, which includes courses directly related to database management, information technology, communications, accounting, finance, marketing, graphic design, architecture, construction, welding, logistics, automotive technology, agricultural science, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning;


(3) public services, which includes courses directly related to health sciences and occupations, mental health, education and training, law enforcement, and culinary arts and hospitality;


(4) arts and humanities, which includes courses directly related to political science, world languages, cultural studies, English literature, history, and fine arts; and


(5) multidisciplinary studies, which allows a student to:


(A) select courses from the curriculum of each endorsement area described by Subdivisions (1) through (4); and


(B) earn credits in a variety of advanced courses from multiple content areas sufficient to complete the distinguished level of achievement under the foundation high school program.


(c-2) In adopting rules under Subsection (c-1), the State Board of Education shall:


(1) require a student in order to earn any endorsement to successfully complete:


(A) four credits in mathematics, which must include:


(i) the courses described by Subsection (b-1)(2); and


(ii) an additional advanced mathematics course authorized under Subsection (b-2) or an advanced career and technology course designated by the State Board of Education;


(B) four credits in science, which must include:


(i) the courses described by Subsection (b-1)(3); and


(ii) an additional advanced science course authorized under Subsection (b-2) or an advanced career and technology course designated by the State Board of Education; and


(C) two elective credits in addition to the elective credits required under Subsection (b-1)(6); and


(2) develop additional curriculum requirements for each endorsement with the direct participation of educators and business, labor, and industry representatives, and shall require each school district to report to the agency the categories of endorsements under Subsection (c-1) for which the district offers all courses for curriculum requirements, as determined by board rule.


(c-3) In adopting rules under Subsection (c-1), the State Board of Education shall adopt criteria to allow a student participating in the arts and humanities endorsement under Subsection (c-1)(4), with the written permission of the student's parent or a person standing in parental relation to the student, to comply with the curriculum requirements for science required under Subsection (c-2)(1)(B)(ii) by substituting for an advanced course requirement a course related to that endorsement.


(c-4) Each school district must make available to high school students courses that allow a student to complete the curriculum requirements for at least one endorsement under Subsection (c-1). A school district that offers only one endorsement curriculum must offer the multidisciplinary studies endorsement curriculum.


(c-5) A student may earn a performance acknowledgment on the student's transcript by satisfying the requirements for that acknowledgment adopted by the State Board of Education by rule. An acknowledgment under this subsection may be earned:


(1) for outstanding performance:


(A) in a dual credit course;


(B) in bilingualism and biliteracy;


(C) on a college advanced placement test or international baccalaureate examination;


(D) on an established, valid, reliable, and nationally norm-referenced preliminary college preparation assessment instrument used to measure a student's progress toward readiness for college and the workplace; or


(E) on an established, valid, reliable, and nationally norm-referenced assessment instrument used by colleges and universities as part of their undergraduate admissions process; or


(2) for earning a state recognized or nationally or internationally recognized business or industry certification or license.


(c-6) Notwithstanding Subsection (c), a person may receive a diploma if the person is eligible for a diploma under Section 28.0258. This subsection expires September 1, 2023.


(c-7) Subject to Subsection (c-8), a student who is enrolled in a special education program under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, may earn an endorsement on the student's transcript by:


(1) successfully completing, with or without modification of the curriculum:


(A) the curriculum requirements identified by the State Board of Education under Subsection (a); and


(B) the additional endorsement curriculum requirements prescribed by the State Board of Education under Subsection (c-2); and


(2) successfully completing all curriculum requirements for that endorsement adopted by the State Board of Education:


(A) without modification of the curriculum; or


(B) with modification of the curriculum, provided that the curriculum, as modified, is sufficiently rigorous as determined by the student's admission, review, and dismissal committee.


(c-8) For purposes of Subsection (c-7), the admission, review, and dismissal committee of a student in a special education program under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, shall determine whether the student is required to achieve satisfactory performance on an end-of-course assessment instrument to earn an endorsement on the student's transcript.


(c-10) In adopting rules under Subsection (c-1), the State Board of Education shall adopt or select five technology applications courses on cybersecurity to be included in a cybersecurity pathway for the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics endorsement.


(d) A school district may issue a certificate of coursework completion to a student who successfully completes the curriculum requirements identified by the State Board of Education under Subsection (a) but who fails to comply with Section 39.025. A school district may allow a student who receives a certificate to participate in a graduation ceremony with students receiving high school diplomas.


(e) Each school district shall report the academic achievement record of students who have completed the foundation high school program on transcript forms adopted by the State Board of Education. The transcript forms adopted by the board must be designed to clearly identify whether a student received a diploma or a certificate of coursework completion.


(e-1) A school district shall clearly indicate a distinguished level of achievement under the foundation high school program as described by Subsection (b-15), an endorsement described by Subsection (c-1), and a performance acknowledgment described by Subsection (c-5) on the transcript of a student who satisfies the applicable requirements. The State Board of Education shall adopt rules as necessary to administer this subsection.


(e-2) At the end of each school year, each school district shall report through the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) the number of district students who, during that school year, were:


(1) enrolled in the foundation high school program;


(2) pursuing the distinguished level of achievement under the foundation high school program as provided by Subsection (b-15); and


(3) enrolled in a program to earn an endorsement described by Subsection (c-1).


(e-3) Information reported under Subsection (e-2) must be disaggregated by all student groups served by the district, including categories of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, sex, and populations served by special programs, including students in special education programs under Subchapter A, Chapter 29.


(f) A school district shall issue a certificate of attendance to a student who receives special education services under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, and who has completed four years of high school but has not completed the student's individualized education program. A school district shall allow a student who receives a certificate to participate in a graduation ceremony with students receiving high school diplomas. A student may participate in only one graduation ceremony under this subsection. This subsection does not preclude a student from receiving a diploma under Subsection (c)(2).


(g) Repealed by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211, Sec. 78(b)(3), eff. September 1, 2014.


(h) Expired.


(i) If an 11th or 12th grade student who is homeless or in the conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services transfers to a different school district and the student is ineligible to graduate from the district to which the student transfers, the district from which the student transferred shall award a diploma at the student's request, if the student meets the graduation requirements of the district from which the student transferred.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 767, Sec. 8, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 397, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 187, Sec. 2, eff. May 19, 2001; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 834, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 365, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1276, Sec. 6.003, eff. Sept. 1, 2003; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1317, Sec. 10, eff. Sept. 1, 2003.


Amended by:


Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 164 (H.B. 25), Sec. 4, eff. May 27, 2005.


Acts 2006, 79th Leg., 3rd C.S., Ch. 5 (H.B. 1), Sec. 5.02, eff. May 31, 2006.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 46 (S.B. 673), Sec. 1, eff. May 28, 2007.


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 763 (H.B. 3485), Sec. 4, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 30, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 714 (H.B. 692), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 926 (S.B. 1620), Sec. 3, eff. June 17, 2011.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1163 (H.B. 2702), Sec. 9, eff. September 1, 2011.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 16(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 78(b)(3), eff. September 1, 2014.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 214 (H.B. 2201), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1354 (S.B. 1404), Sec. 4, eff. June 14, 2013.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 5 (S.B. 149), Sec. 2, eff. May 11, 2015.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 7 (H.B. 181), Sec. 1, eff. May 13, 2015.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 96 (H.B. 1430), Sec. 2, eff. May 23, 2015.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 934 (H.B. 2349), Sec. 1, eff. June 18, 2015.


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1206 (S.B. 1494), Sec. 4, eff. June 19, 2015.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 63 (S.B. 671), Sec. 1, eff. May 22, 2017.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 307 (S.B. 826), Sec. 1, eff. May 29, 2017.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 513 (S.B. 30), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2017.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 549 (S.B. 463), Sec. 2, eff. June 9, 2017.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1088 (H.B. 3593), Sec. 2, eff. June 15, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 14 (S.B. 213), Sec. 2, eff. May 7, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 597 (S.B. 668), Sec. 1.05, eff. June 10, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 625 (S.B. 1374), Sec. 1, eff. June 10, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 711 (H.B. 165), Sec. 1, eff. June 10, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 739 (H.B. 678), Sec. 1, eff. June 10, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 2.014, eff. June 12, 2019.


Sec. 28.0251. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA FOR CERTAIN VETERANS. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, a school district may issue a high school diploma to a person who:


(1) is an honorably discharged member of the armed forces of the United States;


(2) was scheduled to graduate from high school:


(A) after 1940 and before 1975; or


(B) after 1989; and


(3) left school after completing the sixth or a higher grade, before graduating from high school, to serve in:


(A) World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the Iraq War, or the war in Afghanistan; or


(B) any other war formally declared by the United States, military engagement authorized by the United States Congress, military engagement authorized by a United Nations Security Council resolution and funded by the United States Congress, or conflict authorized by the president of the United States under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (50 U.S.C. Section 1541 et seq.).


(b) A school district may issue a diploma to a person otherwise eligible under Subsection (a) notwithstanding the fact that the person holds a high school equivalency certificate or is deceased.


(c) The commissioner by rule shall adopt a form for a diploma application to be used by a veteran or a person acting on behalf of a deceased veteran under this section. The commissioner shall specify acceptable evidence of eligibility for a diploma under this section.


Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 187, Sec. 1, eff. May 19, 2001.


Amended by:


Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 540 (H.B. 1058), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2005.


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 642 (S.B. 966), Sec. 1, eff. June 17, 2011.


Sec. 28.0252. COMPUTATION OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADE POINT AVERAGE. (a) The commissioner may develop a standard method of computing a student's high school grade point average that provides for additional weight to be given to each honors course, advanced placement course, international baccalaureate course, or dual credit course completed by a student.


(b) If the commissioner develops a standard method under this section, a school district shall use the standard method to compute a student's high school grade point average.


(b-1) Expired.


(c) The commissioner may adopt rules necessary to implement this section.


Added by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 293 (S.B. 111), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005.


Amended by:


Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1369 (H.B. 3851), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2007.


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 31, eff. June 19, 2009.


Sec. 28.0253. PILOT PROGRAM: HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMAS FOR STUDENTS WHO DEMONSTRATE EARLY READINESS FOR COLLEGE. (a) In this section:


(1) "Institution of higher education" has the meaning assigned by Section 61.003.


(2) "Research university" means an institution of higher education that is designated as a research university under the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board's accountability system.


(b) A research university that chooses to participate in the pilot program shall:


(1) not later than September 1 of each year, make available on the university's Internet website detailed standards for use in the program regarding:


(A) the specific competencies that demonstrate a student's mastery of each subject area for which the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and the commissioner have adopted college readiness standards;


(B) the specific competencies that demonstrate a student's mastery of a language other than English; and


(C) acceptable assessments or other means by which a student may demonstrate the student's early readiness for college with respect to each subject area and the language described by this subdivision, subject to Subsection (c);


(2) partner with at least 10 school districts that reflect the geographic diversity of this state and the student compositions of which reflect the socioeconomic diversity of this state; and


(3) assist school administrators, school counselors, and other educators in each of those school districts in designing the specific requirements of and implementing the program in the district.


(c) The assessments or other means filed by a research university under Subsection (b)(1)(C) must be equivalent to the assessments or other means the university uses to place students at the university in courses that may be credited toward a degree requirement.


(d) A research university that partners with a school district under this section shall enter into an agreement with the district under which the university and district agree that the district will assess a student's mastery of the subject areas described by Subsection (b)(1) and a language other than English in accordance with the standards the university filed under Subsection (b)(1). The district may issue a high school diploma to a student under the program if, using the standards, the student demonstrates mastery of and early readiness for college in each of those subject areas and in a language other than English, notwithstanding any other local or state requirements.


(e) A student who receives a high school diploma through the pilot program is considered to have earned a distinguished level of achievement under the foundation high school program adopted under Section 28.025. The student is not guaranteed admission to any institution of higher education or to any academic program at an institution of higher education solely on the basis of having received the diploma through the program. The student may apply for admission to an institution of higher education for the first semester or other academic term after the semester or other academic term in which the student earns a diploma through the pilot program.


(f) A research university that participates in the pilot program shall enter into an agreement with an education research center established under Section 1.005 to conduct an evaluation of the program with respect to that university and the school districts with which the university partners. Not later than January 1, 2013, the education research center shall provide a written report of the evaluation to the commissioner and the commissioner of higher education and make the report available on the center's Internet website. The report may include an analysis of the effects of the program on the university's admissions review process.


Added by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 895 (H.B. 3), Sec. 32, eff. June 19, 2009.


Amended by:


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 17(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Sec. 28.0254. POSTHUMOUS HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA FOR CERTAIN STUDENTS. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, but subject to Subsection (b), on request of the student's parent, a school district shall issue a high school diploma posthumously to each student who died while enrolled in the district at the end of the school year in which the student was expected to graduate under the regular schedule of school attendance. The high school diploma may not be issued before the graduation date of the class in which the student was enrolled at the time of death.


(b) A school district is not required to issue a high school diploma to a student described by Subsection (a) if the student at any time before the student's death was convicted of a felony offense under Title 5 or 6, Penal Code, or adjudicated as having engaged in conduct constituting a felony offense under Title 5 or 6, Penal Code.


Added by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 871 (H.B. 1563), Sec. 1, eff. June 15, 2007.


Amended by:


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 122 (H.B. 638), Sec. 1, eff. May 23, 2019.


For expiration of this section, see Subsection (g).



Sec. 28.02541. DIPLOMA FOR CERTAIN STUDENTS WHO ENTERED NINTH GRADE BEFORE 2011-2012 SCHOOL YEAR. (a) This section applies only to a student who:


(1) entered the ninth grade before the 2011-2012 school year;


(2) successfully completed the curriculum requirements for high school graduation applicable to the student when the student entered the ninth grade;


(3) has not performed satisfactorily on an assessment instrument or a part of an assessment instrument required for high school graduation, including an alternate assessment instrument offered under Section 39.025(c-2); and


(4) has been administered the assessment instrument or the part of the assessment instrument for which the student has not performed satisfactorily at least three times.


(b) Notwithstanding the requirements under this subchapter, the commissioner by rule shall establish a procedure to determine whether a student subject to this section may qualify to graduate and receive a high school diploma as provided by this section.


(c) In adopting rules under this section, the commissioner:


(1) shall designate the school district in which a student is enrolled or was last enrolled to make the decision regarding whether the student qualifies to graduate and receive a high school diploma; and


(2) shall establish criteria for school districts to develop recommendations for alternative requirements by which a student subject to this section may qualify to graduate and receive a high school diploma.


(d) In adopting rules under Subsection (c)(2), the commissioner may authorize as an alternative requirement:


(1) an alternative assessment instrument and performance standard for that assessment instrument;


(2) work experience; or


(3) military or other relevant life experience.


(e) A school district's decision regarding whether the student qualifies to graduate and receive a high school diploma is final and may not be appealed.


(f) The commissioner shall adopt rules to administer this section.


(g) This section expires September 1, 2023.


Added by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 549 (S.B. 463), Sec. 3, eff. June 9, 2017.


Amended by:


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 14 (S.B. 213), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2019.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 14 (S.B. 213), Sec. 4, eff. May 7, 2019.


For expiration of this section, see Subsection (l).



Sec. 28.0255. PILOT PROGRAM: THREE-YEAR HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA PLAN. (a) In this section, "certificate program," "public junior college," "public state college," and "public technical institute" have the meanings assigned by Section 61.003.


(b) This section applies only to a school district:


(1) with an enrollment of more than 150,000 students and located primarily in a county with a population of 2.2 million or more that is adjacent to a county with a population of more than 600,000; or


(2) with an enrollment of more than 5,000 but less than 7,000 students and located primarily in a county that contains the headwaters of the San Gabriel River.


(c) A school district to which this section applies may develop and implement a pilot program for students who wish to obtain a high school diploma after completion of three years of secondary school attendance as an alternative to the traditional four-year period of attendance. The program must include partnerships between the school district and public junior colleges, public technical institutes, public state colleges, and any other public postsecondary institutions in this state offering academic or technical education or vocational training under a certificate program or an associate degree program to facilitate the prompt enrollment of students in those institutions after high school graduation under the program.


(d) Participation by a student in the program must be voluntary, with approval of the student's parent. A student who agrees to participate in the program may, on request, discontinue participation and resume taking courses under a high school program based on a traditional four-year period of attendance.


(e) Notwithstanding Section 28.025, the school district shall specify the curriculum requirements for receiving a high school diploma under the program. The curriculum requirements must ensure that a student who graduates under the program possesses sufficient knowledge and skills in English language arts and mathematics to be capable of performing successfully in public junior college-level courses.


(f) The school district shall submit to the commissioner for approval the district's proposal regarding the scope of the program and the program curriculum requirements. The school district shall also submit the proposed curriculum requirements to the State Board of Education for comment. The district may not implement the program before obtaining the commissioner's approval of the scope of the program and the program curriculum requirements.


(g) A student is entitled to a high school diploma if the student:


(1) successfully complies with the curriculum requirements specified under Subsection (e); and


(2) performs satisfactorily, as determined by the commissioner under Subsection (h), on end-of-course assessment instruments listed under Section 39.023(c) for courses in which the student was enrolled.


(h) For purposes of Subsection (g)(2), the commissioner shall determine the level of satisfactory performance on applicable end-of-course assessment instruments administered to a student.


(i) The school district shall report the academic achievement record of students who have completed the program on a transcript that clearly identifies the program and distinguishes the program from the other high school programs based on a traditional four-year period of attendance.


(j) A student who has received a diploma under the program is exempt from the compulsory school attendance requirements under Section 25.085.


(k) To the extent this section conflicts with any other provision of this code or rule adopted under this code, this section prevails.


(l) This section expires September 1, 2023.


Added by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 660 (H.B. 1122), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2013.


Amended by:


Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 548 (H.B. 2025), Sec. 1, eff. June 16, 2015.


For expiration of Subsections (f) and (g), see Subsection (g).



Sec. 28.0256. FINANCIAL AID APPLICATION REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION. (a) Before graduating from high school, each student must complete and submit a free application for federal student aid (FAFSA) or a Texas application for state financial aid (TASFA).


(b) A student is not required to comply with Subsection (a) if:


(1) the student's parent or other person standing in parental relation submits a signed form indicating that the parent or other person authorizes the student to decline to complete and submit the financial aid application;


(2) the student signs and submits the form described by Subdivision (1) on the student's own behalf if the student is 18 years of age or older or the student's disabilities of minority have been removed for general purposes under Chapter 31, Family Code; or


(3) a school counselor authorizes the student to decline to complete and submit the financial aid application for good cause, as determined by the school counselor.


(c) A school district or open-enrollment charter school shall adopt a form to be used for purposes of Subsection (b). The form must be:


(1) approved by the agency; and


(2) made available in English, Spanish, and any other language spoken by a majority of the students enrolled in a bilingual education or special language program under Subchapter B, Chapter 29, in the district or school.


(d) If a school counselor notifies a school district whether a student has complied with this section for purposes of determining whether the student meets high school graduation requirements under Section 28.025, the school counselor may only indicate whether the student has complied with this section and may not indicate the manner in which the student complied.


(e) The commissioner shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this section, including rules to:


(1) establish:


(A) a timeline for:


(i) the distribution to students of the free application for federal student aid or Texas application for state financial aid and the form adopted under Subsection (c); and


(ii) the submission of a form under Subsection (b);


(B) standards regarding the information that a school district or open-enrollment charter school must provide to students regarding:


(i) in accordance with Section 33.007(b)(5), instructions for filling out the free application for federal student aid or Texas application for state financial aid; and


(ii) the options available to a student under Subsection (b) if the student wishes to decline to complete and submit a financial aid application; and


(C) the method by which a student must provide to a school district or open-enrollment charter school proof that the student has completed and submitted the free application for federal student aid or Texas application for state financial aid as required by this section;


(2) require each school district to report to the agency:


(A) the number of students who completed and submitted a financial aid application under Subsection (a); and


(B) the number of students who received an exception from complying with Subsection (a) under Subsection (b); and


(3) ensure compliance with federal law regarding confidentiality of student educational information, including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. Section 1232g), and any state law relating to the privacy of student information.


(f) The agency shall establish an advisory committee to assist the agency in adopting rules under Subsection (e) to implement this section and to develop recommendations for that purpose. The advisory committee is composed of:


(1) school counselors;


(2) school administrators; and


(3) stakeholders to represent the needs of interested students.


(g) Not later than January 1, 2021, the agency shall report the advisory committee's recommendations to the standing committee of each house of the legislature with jurisdiction over public education. Subsection (f) and this subsection expire January 1, 2023.


Added by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 943 (H.B. 3), Sec. 2.015, eff. June 12, 2019.


For expiration of this section, see Subsection (l).



Sec. 28.0258. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA AWARDED ON BASIS OF INDIVIDUAL GRADUATION COMMITTEE REVIEW. (a) This section applies only to an 11th or 12th grade student who has failed to comply with the end-of-course assessment instrument performance requirements under Section 39.025 for not more than two courses.


(b) For each student to whom this section applies, the school district that the student attends shall establish an individual graduation committee at the end of or after the student's 11th grade year to determine whether the student may qualify to graduate as provided by this section. A student may not qualify to graduate under this section before the student's 12th grade year. The committee shall be composed of:


(1) the principal or principal's designee;


(2) for each end-of-course assessment instrument on which the student failed to perform satisfactorily, the teacher of the course;


(3) the department chair or lead teacher supervising the teacher described by Subdivision (2); and


(4) as applicable:


(A) the student's parent or person standing in parental relation to the student;


(B) a designated advocate described by Subsection (c) if the person described by Paragraph (A) is unable to serve; or


(C) the student, at the student's option, if the student is at least 18 years of age or is an emancipated minor.


(c) The commissioner by rule shall establish a procedure for appointing an alternative committee member if a person described by Subsection (b) is unable to serve, including appointing a designated advocate for the student if the student's parent or person standing in parental relation to the student is unable to serve. The superintendent of each school district shall establish procedures for the convening of an individual graduation committee.


(c-2) A school district shall provide an appropriate translator, if available, for the appropriate person described under Subsection (b)(4) who is unable to speak English.


(d) The school district shall ensure a good faith effort is made to timely notify the appropriate person described under Subsection (b)(4) of the time and place for convening the individual graduation committee and the purpose of the committee. The notice must be:


(1) provided in person or by regular mail or e-mail;


(2) clear and easy to understand; and


(3) written in English, in Spanish, or, to the extent practicable, in the native language of the appropriate person described by Subsection (b)(4).


(e) To be eligible to graduate and receive a high school diploma under this section, a student must successfully complete the curriculum requirements required for high school graduation identified by the State Board of Education under Section 28.025(a).


(f) Notwithstanding any other law, a student's individual graduation committee established under this section shall recommend additional requirements by which the student may qualify to graduate, including:


(1) additional remediation; and


(2) for each end-of-course assessment instrument on which the student failed to perform satisfactorily:


(A) the completion of a project related to the subject area of the course that demonstrates proficiency in the subject area; or


(B) the preparation of a portfolio of work samples in the subject area of the course, including work samples from the course that demonstrate proficiency in the subject area.


(g) For purposes of Subsection (f), a student may submit to the individual graduation committee coursework previously completed to satisfy a recommended additional requirement.


(h) In determining whether a student for whom an individual graduation committee is established is qualified to graduate, the committee shall consider:


(1) the recommendation of the student's teacher in each course for which the student failed to perform satisfactorily on an end-of-course assessment instrument;


(2) the student's grade in each course for which the student failed to perform satisfactorily on an end-of-course assessment instrument;


(3) the student's score on each end-of-course assessment instrument on which the student failed to perform satisfactorily;


(4) the student's performance on any additional requirements recommended by the committee under Subsection (f);


(5) the number of hours of remediation that the student has attended, including:


(A) attendance in a college preparatory course required under Section 39.025(b-2), if applicable; or


(B) attendance in and successful completion of a transitional college course in reading or mathematics;


(6) the student's school attendance rate;


(7) the student's satisfaction of any of the Texas Success Initiative (TSI) college readiness benchmarks prescribed by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board;


(8) the student's successful completion of a dual credit course in English, mathematics, science, or social studies;


(9) the student's successful completion of a high school pre-advanced placement, advanced placement, or international baccalaureate program course in English, mathematics, science, or social studies;


(10) the student's rating of advanced high on the most recent high school administration of the Texas English Language Proficiency Assessment System;


(11) the student's score of 50 or greater on a College-Level Examination Program examination;


(12) the student's score on the ACT, the SAT, or the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test;


(13) the student's completion of a sequence of courses under a career and technical education program required to attain an industry-recognized credential or certificate;


(14) the student's overall preparedness for postsecondary success; and


(15) any other academic information designated for consideration by the board of trustees of the school district.


(i) After considering the criteria under Subsection (h), the individual graduation committee may determine that the student is qualified to graduate. Notwithstanding any other law, a student for whom an individual graduation committee is established may graduate and receive a high school diploma on the basis of the committee's decision only if the student successfully completes all additional requirements recommended by the committee under Subsection (f), the student meets the requirements of Subsection (e), and the committee's vote is unanimous. The commissioner by rule shall establish a timeline for making a determination under this subsection. This subsection does not create a property interest in graduation. The decision of a committee is final and may not be appealed.


(j) Notwithstanding any action taken by an individual graduation committee under this section, a school district shall administer an end-of-course assessment instrument to any student who fails to perform satisfactorily on an end-of-course assessment instrument as provided by Section 39.025(b). For purposes of Section 39.053(c)(1), an assessment instrument administered as provided by this subsection is considered an assessment instrument required for graduation retaken by a student.


(k) The commissioner shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this section not later than the 2015-2016 school year.


(l) This section expires September 1, 2023.


Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 5 (S.B. 149), Sec. 3, eff. May 11, 2015.


Amended by:


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 549 (S.B. 463), Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2018.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 549 (S.B. 463), Sec. 5, eff. June 9, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 14 (S.B. 213), Sec. 5, eff. May 7, 2019.


For expiration of this section, see Subsection (e).



Sec. 28.0259. SCHOOL DISTRICT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDENTS GRADUATING BASED ON INDIVIDUAL GRADUATION COMMITTEE REVIEW PROCESS. (a) Each school district shall report through the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) the number of district students each school year for which an individual graduation committee is established under Section 28.0258 and the number of district students each school year who are awarded a diploma based on the decision of an individual graduation committee as provided by Section 28.0258.


(b) A school district shall report the information required by Subsection (a) not later than December 1 of the school year following the school year the student is awarded a diploma.


(c) The agency shall make the information reported under this section available on the agency's Internet website.


(d) The commissioner shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this section not later than the 2015-2016 school year.


(e) This section expires September 1, 2023.


Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., Ch. 5 (S.B. 149), Sec. 3, eff. May 11, 2015.


Amended by:


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 549 (S.B. 463), Sec. 6, eff. June 9, 2017.


Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 549 (S.B. 463), Sec. 7, eff. June 9, 2017.


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 14 (S.B. 213), Sec. 6, eff. May 7, 2019.


Sec. 28.02591. TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION COORDINATING BOARD REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR STUDENTS GRADUATING BASED ON INDIVIDUAL GRADUATION COMMITTEE REVIEW PROCESS. (a) The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, in coordination with the agency, shall collect longitudinal data relating to the post-graduation pursuits of each student who is awarded a diploma based on the determination of an individual graduation committee under Section 28.0258, as that section existed before September 1, 2023, including whether the student:


(1) enters the workforce;


(2) enrolls in an associate degree or certificate program at a public or private institution of higher education;


(3) enrolls in a bachelor's degree program at a public or private institution of higher education; or


(4) enlists in the armed forces of the United States or the Texas National Guard.


(b) Not later than December 1 of each even-numbered year, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall provide a report to the legislature that includes a summary compilation of the data collected under Subsection (a) that is presented in a manner that does not identify an individual student.


(c) The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and the agency shall adopt rules as necessary to implement this section.


Added by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 549 (S.B. 463), Sec. 8, eff. June 9, 2017.


Amended by:


Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 14 (S.B. 213), Sec. 7, eff. May 7, 2019.


Sec. 28.026. NOTICE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTOMATIC COLLEGE ADMISSION AND FINANCIAL AID. (a) The board of trustees of a school district and the governing body of each open-enrollment charter school that provides a high school shall require each high school in the district or provided by the charter school, as applicable, to post appropriate signs in each school counselor's office, in each principal's office, and in each administrative building indicating the substance of Section 51.803 regarding automatic college admission and stating the curriculum requirements for financial aid authorized under Title 3. To assist in the dissemination of that information, the district or charter school shall:


(1) require that each school counselor and class advisor at a high school be provided a detailed explanation of the substance of Section 51.803 and the curriculum requirements for financial aid authorized under Title 3;


(2) provide each district or school student, at the time the student first registers for one or more classes required for high school graduation, with a written notification, including a detailed explanation in plain language, of the substance of Section 51.803, the curriculum requirements for financial aid authorized under Title 3, and the benefits of completing the requirements for that automatic admission and financial aid;


(3) require that each school counselor and senior class advisor at a high school explain to eligible students the substance of Section 51.803; and


(b) The commissioner shall adopt forms, including specific language, to use in providing notice under Subsections (a)(2) and (4). In providing notice under Subsection (a)(2) or (4), a school district or open-enrollment charter school shall use the appropriate form adopted by the commissioner. The notice to a student and the student's parent or guardian under Subsections (a)(2) and (4) must be on a single form that contains signature lines to indicate receipt of notice by the student and the student's parent or guardian. The notice under Subsection (a)(2) must be signed by the student's counselor in addition to being signed by the student and the student's parent or guardian.


Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1511, Sec. 1, eff. June 19, 1999.


Amended by:


Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 1342 (S.B. 175), Sec. 3, eff. June 19, 2009.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 18(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 443 (S.B. 715), Sec. 20, eff. June 14, 2013.


Sec. 28.027. APPLIED SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS COURSES. (a) In this section, "applied STEM course" means an applied science, technology, engineering, or mathematics course offered as part of a school district's career and technology education or technology applications curriculum.


Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 19



(b) The State Board of Education shall establish a process under which an applied STEM course may be reviewed and approved for purposes of satisfying the mathematics and science curriculum requirements for the foundation high school program under Section 28.025 through substitution of the applied STEM course for a specific mathematics or science course otherwise required under the foundation high school program. The State Board of Education may only approve a course to substitute for a science course taken after successful completion of biology.


Text of subsection as amended by Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 214 (H.B. 2201), Sec. 3



(b) The State Board of Education shall establish a process under which an applied STEM course may be reviewed and approved for purposes of satisfying the mathematics and science curriculum requirements for the recommended high school program imposed under Section 28.025(b-1)(1)(A) through substitution of the applied STEM course for a specific mathematics or science course otherwise required under the recommended high school program. The State Board of Education may only approve a course to substitute for a mathematics course taken after successful completion of Algebra I and geometry. The State Board of Education may only approve a course to substitute for a science course taken after successful completion of biology.


(c) The process must provide that an applied STEM course is entitled to be approved for the purpose described by Subsection (b) if the course meets the following requirements:


(1) the applied STEM course is part of a curriculum created by a recognized national or international business and industry group to prepare a student for a national or international business and industry certification or license;


(2) the applied STEM course qualifies as:


(A) a dual credit course; or


(B) an articulated postsecondary course provided for local credit or articulated postsecondary advanced technical credit course provided for state credit;


(3) the essential knowledge and skills covered in the applied STEM course are equivalent to the essential knowledge and skills covered in the mathematics or science course for which the applied STEM course is proposed to be approved for substitution; and


(4) the applied STEM course:


(A) provides substantial mathematics content or science content, as applicable, taught in an applied or symbolic format, that enables a student to develop relevant critical thinking skills necessary for preparation for employment or additional training in a career identified by the Texas Workforce Commission as a high-demand or emerging occupation; and


(B) incorporates college and career readiness skills.


(d) If an applied STEM course approved under this section is part of a coherent sequence of career and technology courses, a student is eligible to enroll in the applied STEM course for the purpose described in Subsection (b) only if the student has completed the prerequisite course work, if any, for the applied STEM course.


Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 926 (S.B. 1620), Sec. 2, eff. June 17, 2011.


Amended by:


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 211 (H.B. 5), Sec. 19(a), eff. June 10, 2013.


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 214 (H.B. 2201), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2013.


SUBCHAPTER C. ADVANCED PLACEMENT INCENTIVES



Sec. 28.051. DEFINITIONS. In this subchapter:


(1) "Board" means the State Board of Education.


(2) "College advanced placement course" means a board-approved high-school-level preparatory course for a college advanced placement test that incorporates all topics specified by the college board on its standard syllabus for a given subject area.


(3) "College advanced placement test" means the advanced placement test administered by the College Board and Educational Testing Service.


(4) "College board" means the College Board and Educational Testing Service.


(5) "International baccalaureate course" means a high-school-level preparatory course for an international baccalaureate examination that incorporates each topic specified by the International Baccalaureate Organization on its standard syllabus for a particular subject area.


(6) "International baccalaureate examination" means the international baccalaureate examination administered by the International Baccalaureate Organization.


(7) "Program" means the Texas Advanced Placement Incentive Program.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Sec. 28.052. PROGRAM; PURPOSE. (a) The purpose of the Texas Advanced Placement Incentive Program is to recognize and reward those students, teachers, and schools that demonstrate success in achieving the state's educational goals.


(b) Awards and subsidies granted under the program are for the public purpose of promoting an educated citizenry.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Sec. 28.053. TYPES OF AWARDS. (a) A school participating in the program may be awarded:


(1) a one-time $3,000 equipment grant for providing a college advanced placement course or international baccalaureate course to be paid to a school based on need as determined by the commissioner; and


(2) $100 for each student who scores a three or better on a college advanced placement test or four or better on an international baccalaureate examination.


(b) Funds awarded under Subsection (a) shall be used in the manner determined by the campus team established, by the principal, under Subsection (c).


(c) The principal of each school participating in the program shall convene, at least annually, a team composed of not more than five members, with not fewer than three teachers, to include at least one teacher participating in the program and at least one teacher who teaches students in preparation for their participation in the program, for the purpose of determining the use of funds awarded under Subsection (a). Nothing in this section limits the authority of the team to direct expenditure of funds awarded under Subsection (a)(2) for awards to individual teachers participating in the program.


(d) A teacher participating in the program may be awarded:


(1) subsidized teacher training, not to exceed $450 for each teacher, for a college advanced placement course or an international baccalaureate course;


(2) a one-time award of $250 for teaching a college advanced placement course or an international baccalaureate course for the first time; and


(3) a share of the teacher bonus pool, which shall be distributed by the teacher's school in shares proportional to the number of courses taught.


(e) To be eligible for an award under Subsection (d), a teacher must teach a college advanced placement course or an international baccalaureate course.


(f) Fifty dollars may be deposited in the teacher bonus pool for each student enrolled in the school that scores a three or better on a college advanced placement test or four or better on an international baccalaureate examination.


(g) A student receiving a score of three or better on a college advanced placement test or four or better on an international baccalaureate examination may receive reimbursement, not to exceed $65, for the testing fee. The reimbursement shall be reduced by the amount of any subsidy awarded by the college board or the International Baccalaureate Organization or under Section 28.054.


(h) The commissioner may enter into agreements with the college board and the International Baccalaureate Organization to pay for all examinations taken by eligible public school students. An eligible student is a student who:


(1) takes a college advanced placement or international baccalaureate course at a public school or who is recommended by the student's principal or teacher to take the test; and


(2) demonstrates financial need as determined in accordance with guidelines adopted by the board that are consistent with the definition of financial need adopted by the college board or the International Baccalaureate Organization.


(i) The commissioner shall analyze and adjust, as needed, the sum of and number of awards to ensure that the purpose of the program is realized.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995. Amended by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 854, Sec. 1, eff. June 20, 2003.


Amended by:


Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., Ch. 4 (S.B. 1), Sec. 49.01, eff. September 28, 2011.


Sec. 28.054. SUBSIDIES FOR COLLEGE ADVANCED PLACEMENT TEST OR INTERNATIONAL BACCALAUREATE EXAMINATION. (a) A student is entitled to a subsidy for a fee paid by the student to take a college advanced placement test or an international baccalaureate examination if the student demonstrates financial need. The board shall adopt guidelines for determining financial need consistent with the definition of financial need adopted by the college board or the International Baccalaureate Organization.


(b) To obtain a subsidy under this section, a student must:


(1) pay the fee for each test or examination for which the student seeks a subsidy; and


(2) submit to the board through the student's school counselor a written application on a form prescribed by the commissioner demonstrating financial need and the amount of the fee paid by the student for each test or examination.


(c) On approval by the board, the agency may pay each eligible applicant an equal amount, not to exceed $25 for each applicant.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Amended by:


Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 443 (S.B. 715), Sec. 21, eff. June 14, 2013.


Sec. 28.055. USE OF SCHOOL AWARDS; APPLICATION. (a) A school shall give priority to academic enhancement purposes in using an award received under the program. The award may not be used for any purpose related to athletics.


(b) To obtain an award under the program, a school must submit to the board a written application in a form, manner, and time prescribed by the commissioner.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Sec. 28.056. APPLICATION FOR TEACHER AWARDS AND REIMBURSEMENTS. To obtain an award or reimbursement for training expenses under the program, a teacher must submit to the board a written application in a form, manner, and time prescribed by the commissioner.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Sec. 28.057. FUNDING. (a) An award or subsidy granted under this subchapter may be funded by donations, grants, or legislative appropriations. The commissioner may solicit and receive grants and donations for making awards under this subchapter. The agency shall account for and distribute the donations, grants, or legislative appropriations.


(b) The agency shall apply to the program any available funds from its appropriations that may be used for purposes of the program.


(c) The grant of any award or subsidy under the program is subject to the availability of funds.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.


Sec. 28.058. CONFIDENTIALITY. All information regarding an individual student received by the commissioner under this subchapter from a school district or student is confidential under Chapter 552, Government Code.


Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 30, 1995.

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EDUCATION CODE CHAPTER 28. COURSES OF STUDY; ADVANCEMENT

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EDUCATION CODE TITLE 2. PUBLIC EDUCATION SUBTITLE F. CURRICULUM, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES CHAPTER 28. COURSES OF STUDY; ADVANCEMENT SUBCHAPTER A. ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS; CURRICULUM Sec. 28.001. PURPOSE.

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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1 (1973)

Judicial Law

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/411/1/#tab-opinion-1950219

The case was the foundational drive for creating financial equality among school districts in Texas. Rodriguez argued that the states educational funding system was unconstitutional, and violated the rights of at-risk students in low-income districts because they had less access to materials and resources that would adequately prepare them for career or college. The court ordered that the state's funding system was not unconstitutional because it does not    "systematically discriminate" against all poor people.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
U.S. Supreme Court
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez No. 71-1332 Argued October 12, 1972 Decided March 21, 1973 411 U.S. 1 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation. Almost half of the revenues are derived from a largely state-funded program designed to provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each district supplements state aid through an ad valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class action on behalf of school children said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas system's reliance on local property taxation favors the more affluent and violates equal protection requirements because of substantial inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable property among the districts. The District Court, finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that education is a "fundamental" right, concluded that the system could be upheld only upon a showing, which appellants failed to make, that there was a compelling state interest for the system. The court also concluded that appellants failed even to

Page 412 U. S. 2

demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State's system.

1. This is not a proper case in which to examine a State's laws under standards of strict judicial scrutiny, since that test is reserved for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. Pp. -44.

(a) The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect class. It has not been shown to discriminate against any definable class of "poor" people or to occasion discriminations depending on the relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as the financing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their individual income characteristics, reside in comparatively poor school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect. Pp. -28.

(b) Nor does the Texas school financing system impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental" right or liberty. Though education is one of the most important services performed by the State, it is not within the limited category of rights recognized by this Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if some identifiable quantum of education is arguably entitled to constitutional protection to make meaningful the exercise of other constitutional rights, here there is no showing that the Texas system fails to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for that purpose. Pp. -39.

(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to invoke strict scrutiny, since it involves the most delicate and difficult questions of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and federalism, considerations counseling a more restrained form of review. Pp. -44.

2. The Texas system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though concededly imperfect, the system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages participation in and significant control of each district's schools at the local level. Pp. -53.

337 F. Supp. 280, reversed.

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.

Page 411 U. S. 3

Page 411 U. S. 4

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit attacking the Texas system of financing public education was initiated by Mexican-American parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary

Page 411 U. S. 5

schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. [ Footnote 1] They brought a class action on behalf of school children throughout the State who are members of minority groups or who are poor and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants [ Footnote 2] were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The complaint

Page 411 U. S. 6
I
The first Texas State Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of free schools. [ Footnote 6] Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its schools, relying on mutual participation by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883, the state

Page 411 U. S. 7

constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection . . . of school buildings" and for the "further maintenance of public free schools." [ Footnote 7] Such local funds as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds. [ Footnote 8] The Permanent School Fund, its predecessor established in 1854 with $2,000,000 realized from an annexation settlement, [ Footnote 9] was thereafter endowed with millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source of income for school support. [ Footnote 10] The Available School Fund, which received income from the Permanent School Fund as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and other designated taxes, [ Footnote 11] served as the disbursing arm for most state educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 1918, an increase in state property taxes was used to finance a program providing free textbooks throughout the State. [ Footnote 12]

Until recent times, Texas was a predominantly rural State, and its population and property wealth were spread

Page 411 U. S. 8

relatively evenly across the State. [ Footnote 13] Sizable differences in the value of assessable property between local school districts became increasingly evident as the State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population shifts became more pronounced. [ Footnote 14] The location of commercial and industrial property began to play a significant role in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school district. These growing disparities in population and taxable property between districts were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for education. [ Footnote 15] In due time, it became apparent to those concerned with financing public education that contributions from the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities. [ Footnote 16] Prior to 1939, the Available School Fund contributed money to every school district at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. [ Footnote 17] Although the amount was increased several times in the early 1940's, [ Footnote 18]

Page 411 U. S. 9

the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1945. [ Footnote 19]

Recognizing the need for increased state funding to help offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legislature, in the late 1940's, undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an eye toward major reform. In 1947, an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore alternative systems in other States and to propose a funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or basic educational offering to each child and that would help overcome inter-district disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer-Aikin bills, named for the Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. [ Footnote 20] Today, this Program accounts for approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas. [ Footnote 21]

The Program calls for state and local contributions to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general revenues, finances approximately 80% of the Program, and the school districts are responsible -- as a unit -- for providing the remaining 20%. The districts' share, known as the Local Fund Assignment, is apportioned among the school districts

Page 411 U. S. 10

under a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative value of each county's contribution to the State's total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers each county's relative share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property in the State. [ Footnote 22] Each county's assignment is then divided among its school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable property within the county. [ Footnote 23] The district, in turn, finances its share of the Assignment out of revenues from local property taxation.

The design of this complex system was twofold. First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts by placing the heaviest burden on the school districts most capable of paying. Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school district to contribute to the education of its children, [ Footnote 24] but that would not, by itself, exhaust any district's resources. [ Footnote 25] Today every school district does impose a property tax from which it derives locally expendable

Page 411 U. S. 11

funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.

In the years since this program went into operation in 1949, expenditures for education -- from state as well as local sources -- have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967, expenditures increased approximately 500%. [ Footnote 26] In the last decade alone, the total public school budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion, [ Footnote 27] and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per-pupil expenditures throughout the State. [ Footnote 28] Teacher salaries, by far the largest item in any school's budget, have increased dramatically -- the state supported minimum salary for teachers possessing college degrees has risen from $2,400 to $6,000 over the last 20 years. [ Footnote 29]

The school district in which appellees reside, the Edgewood Independent School District, has been compared throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights Independent School District. This comparison between the least and most affluent districts in the San Antonio area serves to illustrate the manner in which the dual system of finance operates, and to indicate the extent to which substantial disparities exist despite the State's impressive progress in recent years. Edgewood is one of seven public school districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in its 25 elementary

Page 411 U. S. 12

Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly "Anglo," having only 18% Mexican-Americans

Page 411 U. S. 13

and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil exceeds $49,000, [ Footnote 33] and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled with the $225 provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by a $36 per-pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil.

Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide the only complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid, [ Footnote 34] more recent partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been significant. For the 1970-1971 school year, the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was $356 per pupil, a 62% increase over the 1967-1968 school year. Indeed, state aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-1968 school budget from local, state, and federal sources. Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil in 1970-1971. [ Footnote 35] These recent figures

Page 411 U. S. 14

also reveal the extent to which these two districts' allotments were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. Alamo Heights, because of its relative wealth, was required to contribute out of its local property tax collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its grant. [ Footnote 36] It appears then that, at least as to these two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential of each. [ Footnote 37]

Page 411 U. S. 15

Despite these recent increases, substantial inter-district disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State [ Footnote 38] still exist. And it was

Page 411 U. S. 16

these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual system of public school financing violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court held that the Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in the manner in which education is provided for its people. 337 F. Supp. at 282. Finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification, and that education is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show that it was premised upon some compelling ate interest. Id. at 282-284. On this issue the court concluded that

"[n]ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state interests . . . they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."

Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted dual system of financing education could not withstand the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental constitutional rights [ Footnote 39] or that involve suspect classifications. [ Footnote 40] If, as previous decisions have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State, rather than the complainants, must carry a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must

Page 411 U. S. 17

demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with "precision," and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "less drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, [ Footnote 41] the Texas financing system and its counterpart in virtually every other State will not pass muster. The State candidly admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." [ Footnote 42] Apart from its concession that educational financing in Texas has "defects" [ Footnote 43] and "imperfections," [ Footnote 44] the State defends the system's rationality with vigor, and disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable basis."

This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose, and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school financing. In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required,

Page 411 U. S. 18

We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect classification nor the fundamental interest analysis persuasive.

The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court in this case, and by several other courts that have recently struck down school financing laws in other States, [ Footnote 48] is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination

Page 411 U. S. 19

heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the traditional systems of financing public schools, some poorer people receive less expensive educations than other more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference, for purposes of consideration under the Constitution, that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and whether the relative -- rather than absolute -- nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed more closely than they were in the court below.

The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which the discrimination claimed here might be described. The Texas system of school financing might be regarded as discriminating (1) against "poor" persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally "indigent," [ Footnote 49] or

Page 411 U. S. 20

(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others [ Footnote 50] or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts. [ Footnote 51] Our task must be to ascertain whether, in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the resulting classification may be regarded as suspect.

Page 411 U. S. 21

(1956), and its progeny, [ Footnote 52] the Court invalidated state laws that prevented an indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the trial and appeal process. The payment requirements in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were totally unable to pay for transcripts. And the Court in each case emphasized that no constitutional violation would have been shown if the State had provided some "adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript. Britt v. North Carolina, , (1971); Gardner v. California, (1969); Draper v. Washington, (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, (1958).

Page 411 U. S. 22

of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class was composed only of persons who were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those cases do not touch on the question whether equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The Court has not held that fines must be structured to reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but, in such circumstances, they are guided by sound judicial discretion, rather than by constitutional mandate.

Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the class disadvantaged by the Texas school financing system -- discrimination against a class of definably "poor" persons -- might arguably meet the criteria established in these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any

Page 411 U. S. 23

designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded that

"[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to contend that the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts. . . . Thus, the major factual assumption of Serrano -- that the educational financing system discriminates against the 'poor' -- is simply false in Connecticut. [ Footnote 53]"

Defining "poor" families as those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," [ Footnote 54] the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the poor were clustered around commercial and industrial areas -- those same areas that provide the most attractive sources of property tax income for school districts. [ Footnote 55] Whether a similar pattern would be discovered in Texas is not known, but there is no basis on the record in this case for assuming that the poorest people -- defined by reference to any level of absolute impecunity -- are concentrated in the poorest districts.

Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may be determined by the amount of money

Page 411 U. S. 24

expended for it, [ Footnote 56] a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. [ Footnote 57] Nor, indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate" education for all children in the State. By providing 12 years of free public school education, and by assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to

"guarantee, for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.' [ Footnote 58]"

The State repeatedly asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled this desire, and that it now assures "every child in every school district an adequate education." [ Footnote 59] No proof was offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the State's assertion.

Page 411 U. S. 25

For these two reasons -- the absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of "poor" people or that it results in the absolute deprivation of education -- the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of identification in traditional terms. [ Footnote 60]

As suggested above, appellees and the District Court may have embraced a second or third approach, the second of which might be characterized as a theory of relative or comparative discrimination based on family income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each district and the expenditures therein for education. That is, along a continuum, the poorer the family, the lower the dollar amount of education received by the family's children.

The principal evidence adduced in support of this comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joel S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory,

Page 411 U. S. 26

noted, first, a positive correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. Second, the court found a similar correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. Supp. at 282 n. 3.

If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then it might be argued that expenditures on education -- equated by appellees to the quality of education -- are dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered questions, including whether a bare positive correlation or some higher degree of correlation [ Footnote 61] is necessary to provide a basis for concluding that the financing system is designed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor, [ Footnote 62] and whether a class of this size and diversity could ever claim the special protection accorded "suspect" classes. These questions need not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' proof fails to support their allegations or the District Court's conclusions.

Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His findings, previously set out in the margin, [ Footnote 63] show only

Page 411 U. S. 27

that the wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest family incomes and devote the least amount of money to education. For the remainder of the districts -- 96 districts composing almost 90% of the sample -- the correlation is inverted, i.e., the districts that spend next to the most money on education are populated by families having next to the lowest median family incomes, while the districts spending the least have the highest median family incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees, no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of comparative wealth discrimination. [ Footnote 64]

This brings us, then, to the third way in which the classification scheme might be defined -- district wealth discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be

Page 411 U. S. 28

viewed as encompassing every child in every district except the district that has the most assessable wealth and spends the most on education. [ Footnote 65] Alternatively, as suggested in MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion, post at , the class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property which falls below the state-wide average, or median, or below some other artificially defined level.

However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. [ Footnote 66] The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.

We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class.

Page 411 U. S. 29

But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have not relied solely on this contention. [ Footnote 67] They also assert that the State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a "fundamental" right, and that, accordingly, the prior decisions of this Court require the application of the strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richardson, , -376 (1971); Kramer v. Union School District, (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, (1969). It is this question -- whether education is a fundamental right, in the sense that it is among the rights and liberties protected by the Constitution -- which has so consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent years. [ Footnote 68]

"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our

Page 411 U. S. 30

recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms."

Ibid. This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, , (BURGER, C.J.), , -239 (WHITE, J.), (1972); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, , (1963) (BRENNAN, J.); McCollum v. Board of Education, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923); Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, (1907).

Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to public education. We are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society" cannot be doubted. [ Footnote 69] But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice

Page 411 U. S. 31

Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate travel, admonished that "[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at , . In his view, if the degree of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated, depending on a majority's view of the importance of the interest affected, we would have gone "far toward making this Court a super-legislature.'" Ibid. We would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative role, and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence. But MR. JUSTICE STEWART s response in Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the fundamental rights rationale employed in the Court's equal protection decisions:

"The Court today does not "pick out particular human activities, characterize them as fundamental,' and give them added protection. . . ." To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands."

MR. JUSTICE STEWART's statement serves to underline what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained:

"[I]n moving from State to State . . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."

Page 411 U. S. 32

The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of constitutional significance, [ Footnote 70] and the Court's decision, therefore, did not require an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance of that right. [ Footnote 71]

Lindsey v. Normet, (1972), decided only last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." Id. at . The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are particularly important to the poor," such as the " need for decent shelter'" and the "`right to retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid. MR. JUSTICE WHITE's analysis, in his opinion for the Court, is instructive:

"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access

Page 411 U. S. 33

to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions."

Id. at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, (1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration of public welfare assistance . . . involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," id. at , [ Footnote 72] provided no basis for departing from the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative classifications involving questions of economic and social policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. Hackney, (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, (1971).

The lesson of these cases in addressing the question now before the Court is plain. It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education, as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.

Page 411 U. S. 34

Page 411 U. S. 35

Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not, alone, cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation. It is appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided by the State, because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is itself a fundamental personal right, because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the corollary right to receive information [ Footnote 77] becomes little more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available knowledge.

A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the right to vote. [ Footnote 78] Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from the educational foundation

Page 411 U. S. 36

of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately developed.

We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubted. [ Footnote 79] These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.

Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures

Page 411 U. S. 37

in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and where -- as is true in the present case -- no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.

Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 80] If so, appellees' thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority of Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v. Normet, supra.

We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty, and have found those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect, we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has

Page 411 U. S. 38

applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," "infringed," or "interfered" with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at ; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at ; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at -343. A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, (1966), expresses well the salient point: [ Footnote 81]

"This is not a complaint that Congress . . . has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to vote, but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others similarly situated]. . . ."

"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or deny the franchise, but, in effect, extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law. . . . We need only decide whether the challenged limitation on the relief effected . . . was permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is

Page 411 U. S. 39

inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,' . . . that a legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' . . . and that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . .'"

Id. at -657. (Emphasis in original.) The Texas system of school financing is not unlike the federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. Every step leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes today -- including the decisions permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and continuously expanding state aid -- was implemented in an effort to extend public education and to improve its quality. [ Footnote 82] Of course, every reform that benefits some more than others may be criticized for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory, and, therefore, should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the Constitution. [ Footnote 83]

Page 411 U. S. 40

It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.

We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which Texas provides for the education of its children. We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. [ Footnote 84] This Court has often admonished against such interferences with the State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause:

"The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has only served to underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . .

Page 411 U. S. 41

It has . . . been pointed out that in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. . . ."

Thus, we stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. [ Footnote 85]

Page 411 U. S. 42

Page 411 U. S. 43

sources of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education [ Footnote 86] -- an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case. Related to the questioned relationship between cost and quality is the equally unsettled controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public education. [ Footnote 87] And the question regarding the most effective relationship between state boards of education and local school boards, in terms of their respective responsibilities and degrees of control, is now undergoing searching reexamination. The ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.

Page 411 U. S. 44

It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and state power under our federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. While

"[t]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under which this Court examines state action, [ Footnote 88]"

it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every State.

The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These same considerations are relevant to the determination whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. It is to this question that we next turn our attention.
III
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will now describe in more detail that system and how it operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.

Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its funds from the State and from its local school

Page 411 U. S. 45

district. On a state-wide average, a roughly comparable amount of funds is derived from each source. [ Footnote 89] The State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school in the State. Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher -- compensated at the state supported minimum salary -- for every 25 students. [ Footnote 90] Each school district's other supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for every 30 teachers; [ Footnote 91] one "special service" teacher -- librarian, nurse, doctor, etc. -- for every 20 teachers; [ Footnote 92] superintendents, vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are also provided. [ Footnote 93] Additional funds are earmarked for current operating expenses, for student transportation, [ Footnote 94] and for free textbooks. [ Footnote 95]

Page 411 U. S. 46

has been content to rely alone on funds from the Foundation Program.

By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its Local Fund Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem tax on property located within its borders. The Fund Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to assure that each district would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational program. [ Footnote 99] Every district supplements its Foundation grant in this manner. In some districts, the local property tax contribution is insubstantial, as in Edgewood, where the supplement was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts, the local share may far exceed even the total Foundation grant. In part, local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category of property varies from its assessed value. [ Footnote 100] The greatest inter-district disparities, however, are attributable to differences in the amount of assessable property available within any district. Those districts that have more property, or more valuable property, have a greater capability for supplementing state funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher salaries to more teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools in property-affluent districts are lower pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules. [ Footnote 101]

Page 411 U. S. 47

This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas school financing structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The District Court found that the State had failed even "to establish a reasonable basis" for a system that results in different levels of per-pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp. at 284. We disagree.

In its reliance on state, as well as local, resources, the Texas system is comparable to the systems employed

Page 411 U. S. 48

in virtually every other State. [ Footnote 102] The power to tax local property for educational purposes has been recognized in Texas at least since 1883. [ Footnote 103] When the growth of commercial and industrial centers and accompanying shifts in population began to create disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable investment of state funds.

The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas legislators and educators based the Gilmer-Aikin bills was a product of the pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig. [ Footnote 104] Their efforts were devoted to establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum state-wide educational program without sacrificing the vital element of local participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis

Page 411 U. S. 49

represented an accommodation between these two competing forces. As articulated by Professor Coleman:

"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces: the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children. [ Footnote 105]"

"[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as well."

The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity

Page 411 U. S. 50

it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments." [ Footnote 106] No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public education.

Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, they attack the school financing system precisely because, in their view, it does not provide the same level of local control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in more equality in educational expenditures. While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, [ Footnote 107]

Page 411 U. S. 51

the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. McGowan v. Maryland, , -426 (1961). It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at . Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfying the State's interest, which occasion "less drastic" disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at ; Shelton v. Tucker, , (1960). It is also well to remember that even those districts that have reduced ability to make free decisions with respect to how much they spend on education still retain, under the present system, a large measure of authority as to how available funds will be allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous other decisions with respect to the operation of the schools. [ Footnote 108] The people of Texas may be

Page 411 U. S. 52

justified in believing that other systems of school financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local autonomy. That is, they may believe

Page 411 U. S. 53

that along with increased control of the purse strings at the state level will go increased control over local policies. [ Footnote 109]

Appellees further urge that the Texas system is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." They see no justification for a system that allows, as they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines of political subdivisions and the location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of

Page 411 U. S. 54

local taxation -- indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental units -- requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. It is equally inevitable that some localities are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than others. [ Footnote 110] Nor is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level of taxable wealth within any district may result from any number of events, some of which local residents can and do influence. For instance, commercial and industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within a district by various actions -- public and private.

Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of providing for education, then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and control as would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify state-wide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live.

In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school financing results in unequal expenditures between children

Page 411 U. S. 55

Page 411 U. S. 56
IV
In light of the considerable attention that has focused on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the District Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in public education. Some commentators have concluded that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs that might be devised and approved, the result could not avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or certain about predicting the consequences of massive change in the financing and control of public education. Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of these cases have found no clear or dependable answers, and their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the desirability of completely uprooting the existing system.

The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be said with any assurance that the poor, the racial minorities, or the children in overburdened core-city school districts would be benefited by abrogation of traditional modes of financing education. Unless there is to be a substantial increase in state expenditures on education across the board -- an event the likelihood of which is open to considerable question [ Footnote 111] -- these groups stand to

Page 411 U. S. 57

realize gains in terms of increased per-pupil expenditures only if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively low levels, i.e., in those districts that would benefit from the redistribution of existing resources. Yet recent studies have indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered in the most impecunious school districts. [ Footnote 112] Nor does it now appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial minorities are concentrated in property-poor districts. [ Footnote 113] Additionally,

Page 411 U. S. 58

several research projects have concluded that any financing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of expenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the major urban centers, [ Footnote 114] a result that would exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, existing conditions in those areas.

These practical considerations, of course, play no role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already

Page 411 U. S. 59

have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.

Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school. One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School District." Third Amended Complaint, App. 14.

The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name this case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio metropolitan area that were originally named as defendants. After a pretrial conference, the District Court issued an order dismissing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San Antonio Independent School District joined in the plaintiffs' challenge to the State's school finance system and filed an amicus curiae brief in support of that position in this Court.

A three-judge court was properly convened, and there are no questions as to the District Court's jurisdiction or the direct appealability of its judgment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281.

The trial was delayed for two years to permit extensive pretrial discovery and to allow completion of a pending Texas legislative investigation concerning the need for reform of its public school finance system. 337 F. Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Tex.1971).

337 F. Supp. 280. The District Court stayed its mandate for two years to provide Texas an opportunity to remedy the inequities found in its financing program. The court, however, retained jurisdiction to fashion its own remedial order if the State failed to offer an acceptable plan. Id. at 286.

Tex.Const., Art. X, § 1 (1845):

"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of this State to make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of public schools."

"The Legislature shall as early as practicable establish free schools throughout the State, and shall furnish means for their support, by taxation on property. . . ."

Tex.Const. of 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug. 14, 1883.

Id. Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5.

3 Gammel's Laws of Texas 1847-1854, p. 1461. See Tex.Const. Art. 7, §§ 1, 2, 5 (interpretive commentaries); 1 Report of Governor's Committee on Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 27 (1969) (hereinafter Governor's Committee Report).

[ Footnote 10]

Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 5 ( see also the interpretive commentary); 5 Governor's Committee Report 11-12.

[ Footnote 11]

The various sources of revenue for the Available School Fund are cataloged in A Report of the Adequacy of Texas Schools, prepared by Texas State Board of Education, 7-15 (1938) (hereinafter Texas State Bd. of Educ.).

[ Footnote 12]

Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Nov. 5, 1918 ( see interpretive commentary).

[ Footnote 13]

l Governor's Committee Report 35; Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11, at 5-7; J. Coons, W. Clune, & S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education 48-49 (1970); E. Cubberley, School Funds and Their Apportionment 21-27 (1905).

[ Footnote 14]

By 1940, one-half of the State's population was clustered in its metropolitan centers. 1 Governor's Committee Report 35.

[ Footnote 15]

Gilmer-Aikin Committee, To Have What We Must 13 (1948).

[ Footnote 16]

R. Still, The Gilmer-Aikin Bills 11-13 (1950); Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11.

[ Footnote 17]

Still, supra, n. 16 at 12. It should be noted that, during this period, the median per-pupil expenditure for all schools with an enrollment of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year. During this same period, a survey conducted by the State Board of Education concluded that,

"in Texas, the best educational advantages offered by the State at present may be had for the median cost of $52.67 per year per pupil in average daily attendance."

Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11, at 56.

[ Footnote 18]

General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg.Sess.1939, c. 7, pp. 274-275 ($22.50 per student); General & Spec.Laws of Texas, 48th Legis., Reg.Sess.1943, c. 161, pp. 262-263 ($25 per student).

[ Footnote 19]

General & Spec.Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg.Sess.1945, c. 52, pp. 74-75; Still, supra, n 16, at 12.

[ Footnote 20]

For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of a foundation program, see Still, supra, n 16. See also 5 Governor's Committee Report 14; Texas Research League, Public School Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972).

[ Footnote 21]

For the 1970-1971 school year, this state aid program accounted for 48% of all public school funds. Local taxation contributed 41.1%, and 10.9% was provided in federal funds. Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 9.

[ Footnote 22]

5 Governor's Committee Report 44-48.

[ Footnote 23]

At present, there are 1,161 school districts in Texas. Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 12.

[ Footnote 24]

In 1948, the Gilmer-Aikin Committee found that some school districts were not levying any local tax to support education. Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 16. The Texas State Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and independent school districts were levying no local property tax in 1935-1936. Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11, at 392.

[ Footnote 25]

Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 15.

[ Footnote 26]

1 Governor's Committee Report 51-53.

[ Footnote 27]

Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 2.

[ Footnote 28]

In the years between 1949 and 1967, the average per-pupil expenditure for all current operating expenses increased from $206 to $493. In that same period, capital expenditures increased from $44 to $102 per pupil. 1 Governor's Committee Report 53-54.

[ Footnote 29]

Acts 1949, 51st Legis., p. 625, c. 334, Art. 4, Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 16.302 (1972); see generally 3 Governor's Committee Report 113-146; Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, The Texas School Finance Case: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L.Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972).

[ Footnote 30]

The family income figures are based on 1960 census statistics.

[ Footnote 31]

The Available School Fund, technically, provides a second source of state money. That Fund has continued as in years past (see text accompanying nn 16-19, supra) to distribute uniform per-pupil grants to every district in the State. In 1968, this Fund allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the Available School Fund contribution is always subtracted from a district's entitlement under the Foundation Program, it plays no significant role in educational finance today.

[ Footnote 32]

While federal assistance has an ameliorating effect on the difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor districts, the District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that court that it should consider the effect of the federal grant in assessing the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp. at 284. The State has not renewed that contention here.

[ Footnote 33]

A map of Bexar County included in the record shows that Edgewood and Alamo Heights are among the smallest districts in the county, and are of approximately equal size. Yet, as the figures above indicate, Edgewood's student population is more than four times that of Alamo Heights. This factor obviously accounts for a significant percentage of the differences between the two districts in per-pupil property values and expenditures. If Alamo Heights had as many students to educate as Edgewood does (22,000) its per pupil assessed property value would be approximately $11,100 rather than $49,000, and its per-pupil expenditures would therefore have been considerably lower.

[ Footnote 34]

The figures quoted above vary slightly from those utilized in the District Court opinion. 337 F. Supp. at 282. These trivial differences are apparently a product of that court's reliance on slightly different statistical data than we have relied upon.

[ Footnote 35]

Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greater contributions to both school districts over the last several years, it is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Higher salaries are guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and possessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Heights, which has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced degrees, receives more state support. In this regard, the Texas Program is not unlike that presently in existence in a number of other States. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, n 13, at 63-125. Because more dollars have been given to districts that already spend more per pupil, such Foundation formulas have been described as "anti-equalizing." Ibid. The formula, however, is anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms. The percentage disparity between the two Texas districts is diminished substantially by state aid. Alamo Heights derived in 1967-1968 almost 13 times as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The state aid grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approximately two to one, i.e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice as much money to spend per pupil from its combined state and local resources.

[ Footnote 36]

Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 13.

[ Footnote 37]

The Economic Index, which determines each county's share of the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a complex formula conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was instituted. See text, supra at -10. It has frequently been suggested by Texas researchers that the formula be altered in several respects to provide a more accurate reflection of local taxpaying ability, especially of urban school districts. 5 Governor's Committee Report 48; Texas Research League, Texas Public School Finance: A Majority of Exceptions 31-32 (2d Interim Report 1972); Berke, Carnevale, Morgan White, supra, n 29, at 680-681.

[ Footnote 38]

The District Court relied on the findings presented in an affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse University. His sampling of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct correlation between the amount of a district's taxable property and it level of per-pupil expenditures. But his study found only a partial correlation between a district's median family income and per-pupil expenditures. The study also shows, in the relatively few districts at the extremes, an inverse correlation between percentage of minorities and expenditures.

Categorized by Equalized Property Values,

Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue

Market Value Median State &

of Taxable Family Per Cent Local

Property Income Minority Revenues

Per Pupil From 1960 Pupils Per Pupil

Above $100,000 $5,900 8% $815

(10 districts)

$100,000-$50,000 $4,425 32% $544

(26 districts)

$50,00$30,000 $4,900 23% $483

(30 districts)

$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 31% $462

(40 districts)

Below $10,000 $3,325 79% $305

(4 districts)

Although the correlations with respect to family income and race appear only to exist at the extremes, and although the affiant's methodology has been questioned ( see Goldstein, Inter-district Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 504, 523-525, nn. 67, 71 (1972)), insofar as any of these correlations is relevant to the constitutional thesis presented in this case, we may accept its basic thrust. But see infra at -27. For a defense of the reliability of the affidavit, see Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, supra, n 29.

[ Footnote 39]

[ Footnote 40]

[ Footnote 41]

[ Footnote 42]

Brief for Appellants 11.

[ Footnote 43]

[ Footnote 44]

Tr. of Oral Arg. 3; Reply Brief for Appellants 2.

[ Footnote 45]

[ Footnote 46]

[ Footnote 47]

[ Footnote 48]

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (Minn.1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), rehearing granted, Jan., 1973.

[ Footnote 49]

In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a class composed of persons who are "poor" and who reside in school districts having a "low value of . . . property." Third Amended Complaint, App. 15. Yet appellees have not defined the term "poor" with reference to any absolute or functional level of impecunity. See text, infra at -23. See also Brief for Appellees 1, 3; Tr. of Oral Arg. 221.

[ Footnote 50]

[ Footnote 51]

At oral argument, and in their brief, appellees suggest that description of the personal status of the residents in districts that spend less on education is not critical to their case. In their view, the Texas system is impermissibly discriminatory even if relatively poor districts do not contain poor people. Brief for Appellees 43-44; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. There are indications in the District Court opinion that it adopted this theory of district discrimination. The opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative financial status of districts, and, early in the opinion, it describes appellees' class as being composed of "all . . . children throughout Texas who live in school districts with low property valuations." 337 F. Supp. at 281.

[ Footnote 52]

Mayer v. City of Chicago, (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, (1969); Gardner v. California, (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, (1966); Draper v. Washington, (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, (1958).

[ Footnote 53]

Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L.J. 1303, 1328-1329 (1972).

[ Footnote 54]

Id. at 1324 and n. 102

[ Footnote 55]

[ Footnote 56]

Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth discrimination is founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies directly with the amount of funds expended on it, and that, therefore, the difference in quality between two schools can be determined simplistically by looking at the difference in per-pupil expenditures. This is a matter of considerable dispute among educators and commentators. See nn.

[ Footnote 57]

[ Footnote 58]

Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 13. Indeed, even though local funding has long been a significant aspect of educational funding, the State has always viewed providing an acceptable education as one of its primary functions. See Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11, at 1, 7.

[ Footnote 59]

Brief for Appellants 35; Reply Brief for Appellants 1.

[ Footnote 60]

An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State only to those able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people -- definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum -- who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would present a far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good deal more than provide an education to those who can afford it. It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base education for all children, and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate by state funding and by the local assessment program the disparities in local tax resources.

[ Footnote 61]

Also it should be recognized that median income statistics may not define with any precision the status of individual families within any given district. A more dependable showing of comparative wealth discrimination would also examine factors such as the average income, the mode, and the concentration of poor families in any district.

[ Footnote 62]

[ Footnote 63]

[ Footnote 64]

Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured in terms of assessable property and the collective wealth of families residing in the district measured in terms of median family income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan.L.Rev. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation: districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per pupil, and districts with high assessed value per pupil have low income per pupil"); Davis, Taxpaying Ability: A Study of the Relationship Between Wealth and Income in California Counties, in The Challenge of Change in School Finance, 10th Nat. Educational Assn. Conf. on School Finance 199 (1967). Note, 81 Yale L.J., supra, n 53. See also Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 522-527.

[ Footnote 65]

Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest defined the class they purported to represent:

"Plaintiff children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school pupils in California, 'except children in that school district . . . which . . . affords the greatest educational opportunity of all school districts within California.'"

5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244. See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. at 873.

[ Footnote 66]

Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texas system as one resulting merely in discrimination between districts per se, since this Court has never questioned the State's power to draw reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions within its borders. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, , -231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, , (1961); Salsbury v. Maryland, , (1954).

[ Footnote 67]

E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, (1966); United States v. Kras, (1973). See MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion, post at .

[ Footnote 68]

See Serrano v. Priest, supra; Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, supra; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, n 13, at 339-393; Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo.L.Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich.L.Rev. 1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases: Inter-district Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 Ariz.L.Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).

[ Footnote 69]

337 F. Supp. at 283.

[ Footnote 70]

E.g., United States v. Guest, , -759 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, , , -238 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.).

[ Footnote 71]

After Dandridge v. Williams, (1970), there could be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge, the Court applied the rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family grant provision under its AFDC program. A federal district court held the provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter standard of review. In the course of reversing the lower court, the Court distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that, in that case, "the Court found state interference with the constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel." Id. at n. 16.

[ Footnote 72]

[ Footnote 73]

"[I]f we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, (1965)], the statutory classification would have to be not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose, but necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest."

Ibid. (emphasis in original).

[ Footnote 74]

Dunn fully canvasses this Court's voting rights cases, and explains that

"this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."

405 U.S. at (emphasis supplied). The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted, even though, as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. at , "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned." See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at , -44 (DOUGLAS, J.), , -242 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at -144; Kramer v. Union School District, , -630 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, , , -31 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, , -562 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, , -381 (1963).

[ Footnote 75]

[ Footnote 76]

Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a state law permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals." Implicit in the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation is among the rights of personal privacy protected under the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade, , (1973).

[ Footnote 77]

[ Footnote 78]

Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right, we assume that appellees' references to that right are simply shorthand references to the protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population. See n 74, supra.

[ Footnote 79]

The States have often pursued their entirely legitimate interest in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise," Katzenbach v. Morgan, , (1966), through such devices as literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to vote. See ibid.; Oregon v. Mitchell, (1970). And, where those restrictions have been found to promote intelligent use of the ballot without discriminating against those racial and ethnic minorities previously deprived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has upheld their use. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, (1959), with Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at (Black, J.), , -147 (DOUGLAS, J.), , -217 (Harlan, J.), , -236 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), , -284 (STEWART, J.), and Gaston County v. United States, (1969).

[ Footnote 80]

[ Footnote 81]

Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of education at an "American-flag" school in that country even though the language of instruction was other than English. This Court upheld the questioned provision of the 1965 Act over the claim that it discriminated against those with a sixth-grade education obtained in non-English-speaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal legislation.

[ Footnote 82]

Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, (1925); Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (MD Fla.1970), vacated, (1971).

[ Footnote 83]

[ Footnote 84]

See, e.g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1890); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., , -509 (1937); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, (1959).

[ Footnote 85]

Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace it. The most likely result of rejection of the existing system would be state-wide financing of all public education with funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or expansion of sale and income taxes. See Simon, supra, n 62. The authors of Private Wealth and Public Education, supra, n 13, at 201-242, suggest an alternative scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In simplest terms, the State would guarantee that, at any particular rate of property taxation the district would receive a stated number of dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier" districts that, because of their higher property values, collect more than the stated amount at any given rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and against "district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators are in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory underlying appellees' case. President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People & Money 32-33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 706-708 (1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan.L.Rev. 591, 594-596 (1971); Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 542-543; Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc.Action 123, 125 (1971); Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis.L.Rev. 7, 29-30.

[ Footnote 86]

The quality-cost controversy has received considerable attention. Among the notable authorities on both sides are the following: C. Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (1970); U.S. Office of Education, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966) (the Coleman Report); On Equality of Educational Opportunity (F. Mosteller 8 D. Moynihan eds.1972); J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorfer, H. Levin R. Stout, Schools and Inequality (1971); President's Commission on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swanson, The Cost-Quality Relationship, in The Challenge of Change in School Finance, 10th Nat. Educational Assn. Conf. on School Finance 151 (1967).

[ Footnote 87]

See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's state-wide survey on the goals of education in that State. 1 Governor's Committee Report 59-68. See also Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 519-522; Schoettle, supra, n 80, authorities cited in n 86, supra.

[ Footnote 88]

Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, , , (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at , (Harlan, J., dissenting).

[ Footnote 89]

In 1970 Texas expended approximately $2.1 billion for education and a little over $1 billion came from the Minimum Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 2

[ Footnote 90]

Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 16.13 (1972).

[ Footnote 91]

[ Footnote 92]

[ Footnote 93]

Id. §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19.

[ Footnote 94]

Id., §§ 16.45, 16.51-16.63.

[ Footnote 95]

Id. §§ 12.01-12.04.

[ Footnote 96]

[ Footnote 97]

[ Footnote 98]

[ Footnote 99]

Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 15.

[ Footnote 100]

There is no uniform state-wide assessment practice in Texas. Commercial property, for example, might be assessed at 30% of market value in one county and at 50% in another. 5 Governor' Committee Report 25-26; Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, supra, n 29, at 666-667, n. 16.

[ Footnote 101]

Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 18. Texas, in this regard, is not unlike most other States. One commentator has observed that "disparities in expenditures appear to be largely explained by variations in teacher salaries." Simon, supra, n 62, at 413.

As previously noted, see text accompanying n 86, supra, the extent to which the quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public education. While all would agree that there is a correlation up to the point of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic opportunities, the issues of greatest disagreement include the effect on the quality of education of pupil-teacher ratios and of higher teacher salary schedules. E.g., Office of Education, supra, n 86, at 316-319. The state funding in Texas is designed to assure, on the average, one teacher for every 25 students, which is considered to be a favorable ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary of $6,000 per year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers may be more debatable, depending in major part upon the location of the school district. But there appear to be few empirical data that support the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that document the existence of a dependable correlation between the level of public school teachers' salaries and the quality of their classroom instruction. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the absence, up to this time, of satisfactory techniques for judging their ability or performance. Relatively few school systems have merit plans of any kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are usually increased across the board in a way which tends to reward the least deserving on the same basis as the most deserving. Salaries are usually raised automatically on the basis of length of service and according to predetermined "steps," extending over 10- to 12-year periods.

[ Footnote 102]

President's Commission on School Finance, supra, n 85, at 9. Until recently, Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely state-funded educational program. In 1968, however, that State amended its educational finance statute to permit counties to collect additional funds locally and spend those amounts on its schools. The rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on the question before the Court today:

"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educational facilities as good as the people of the counties want and are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above and beyond established minimums to provide for their people encourages the best features of democratic government."

Haw.Sess.Laws 1968, Act 38, § 1.

[ Footnote 103]

[ Footnote 104]

G. Strayer & R. Haig, The Financing of Education in the State of New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of educational finance, see Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, n 13, at 39-95.

[ Footnote 105]

J. Coleman, Foreword to Strayer & Haig, supra, at vii.

[ Footnote 106]

[ Footnote 107]

MR. JUSTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas system violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee complete freedom of choice to every district. He places special emphasis on the statutory provision that establishes a maximum rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local school district may tax for school maintenance. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.04(d) (1972). The maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case was litigated in the District Court was $.55 per $100, barely one-third of the allowable rate. (The tax rate of $1.05 per $100, see supra at , is the equalized rate for maintenance and for the retirement of bonds.) Appellees do not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax increases in Edgewood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality of that statutory provision is not before us, and must await litigation in a case in which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (MD Fla.1970), vacated, (1971).

[ Footnote 108]

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL states in his dissenting opinion that the State's asserted interest in local control is a "mere sham," post, at , and that it has been offered not as a legitimate justification, but "as an excuse . . . for inter-district inequality." Id. at . In addition to asserting that local control would be preserved and possibly better served under other systems -- a consideration that we find irrelevant for the purpose of deciding whether the system may be said to be supported by a legitimate and reasonable basis -- the dissent suggests that Texas' lack of good faith may be demonstrated by examining the extent to which the State already maintains considerable control. The State, we are told, regulates "the most minute details of local public education," ibid., including textbook selection, teacher qualifications, and the length of the school day. This assertion, that genuine local control does not exist in Texas, simply cannot be supported. It is abundantly refuted by the elaborate statutory division of responsibilities set out in the Texas Education Code. Although policy decisionmaking and supervision in certain areas are reserved to the State, the day-to-day authority over the "management and control" of all public elementary and secondary schools is squarely placed on the local school boards. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 17.01, 23.26 (1972). Among the innumerable specific powers of the local school authorities are the following: the power of eminent domain to acquire land for the construction of school facilities, id. §§ 17.26, 23.26; the power to hire and terminate teachers and other personnel, id. §§ 13.101-13.103; the power to designate conditions of teacher employment and to establish certain standards of educational policy, id. § 13.901; the power to maintain order and discipline, id. § 21.305, including the prerogative to suspend students for disciplinary reasons, id. § 21.301; the power to decide whether to offer a kindergarten program, id. §§ 21.131-21.135, or a vocational training program, id. § 21.111, or a program of special education for the handicapped, id. § 11.16; the power to control the assignment and transfer of students, id. §§ 21.074-21.080; and the power to operate and maintain a school bus program, id. § 16.52. See also Pervis v. LaMarque Ind. School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 638, 642-643 (SD Tex.1971), reversed, 466 F.2d 1054 (CA5 1972); Nichols v. Aldine Ind. School Dist., 356 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962). Local school boards also determine attendance zones, location of new schools, closing of old ones, school attendance hours (within limits), grading and promotion policies subject to general guidelines, recreational and athletic policies, and a myriad of other matters in the routine of school administration. It cannot be seriously doubted that, in Texas, education remains largely a local function, and that the preponderating bulk of all decisions affecting the schools is made and executed at the local level, guaranteeing the greatest participation by those most directly concerned.

[ Footnote 109]

This theme -- that greater state control over funding will lead to greater state power with respect to local educational programs and policies -- is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public education. Professor Simon, in his thoughtful analysis of the political ramifications of this case, states that one of the most likely consequences of the District Court's decision would be an increase in the centralization of school finance and an increase in the extent of collective bargaining by teacher unions at the state level. He suggests that the subjects for bargaining may include many "non-salary" items, such as teaching loads, class size, curricular and program choices, questions of student discipline, and selection of administrative personnel -- matters traditionally decided heretofore at the local level. Simon, supra, n 62, at 434-436. See, e.g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of Education, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64, 77-79 (C. Bowers, I. Housego & D. Dyke eds.1970); J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and The State 27 (1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school board, has some control over the purse, there can be little real feeling in the community that the schools are in fact, local schools. . . ."); Howe, Anatomy of a Revolution, in Saturday Review 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971) ("It is an axiom of American politics that control and power follow money. . . ."); R. Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally Shared Taxes 21 (1931) ("[S]tate administration of taxation is the first step toward state control of the functions supported by these taxes. . . ."). Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as detrimental or whether he agrees that the consequence is inevitable, it certainly cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on the part of parents, educators, and legislators.

[ Footnote 110]

This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of "territorial uniformity." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at . See also Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. at -231; Salsbury v. Maryland, (1954). Cf. Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F.2d 665, 668 (CA10 1969).

[ Footnote 111]

Any alternative that calls for significant increases in expenditures for education, whether financed through increases in property taxation or through other sources of tax dollars, such as income and sales taxes, is certain to encounter political barriers. At a time when nearly every State and locality is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers already resisting tax increases, there is considerable reason to question whether a decision of this Court nullifying present state taxing systems would result in a marked increase in the financial commitment to education. See Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Toward Equal Educational Opportunity 339-345 (Comm.Print 1972); Berke & Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or Millstone for School Finance, 21 J.Pub.L. 23, 25-26 (1972); Simon, supra, n. 62 at 420-421. In Texas, it has been calculated that $2.4 billion of additional school funds would be required to bring all schools in that State up to the present level of expenditure of all but the wealthiest districts -- an amount more than double that currently being spent on education. Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 16-18. An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of almost 30 States, focusing on these practical consequences, claims with some justification that "each of the undersigned states . . . would suffer severe financial stringency." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants 2 (filed by Montgomery County, Md. et al.).

[ Footnote 112]

[ Footnote 113]

See Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 526; Jencks, supra, n 86, at 27; U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Inequality in School Financing: The Role of the Law 37 (1972). Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, n 13, at 356-357, n. 47, have noted that, in California, for example, "[f]ifty-nine percent . . . of minority students live in districts above the median [average valuation per pupil.]" In Bexar County, the largest district by far -- the San Antonio Independent School District -- is above the local average in both the amount of taxable wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yet 72% of its students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968, it spent only a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and North Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18% Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, supra, n 29, at 673.

[ Footnote 114]

See Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Issues in School Finance 129 (Comm.Print 1972) (monograph entitled Inequities in School Finance prepared by Professors Berke and Callahan); U.S. Office of Education, Finances of Large-City School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW publication); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra, n 113 at 33-36; Simon, supra, n 62, at 410-411, 418.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.

The method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every other State, has resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust. [ Footnote 2/1] It does not follow, however, and I cannot find, that this system violates the Constitution of the United States. I join the opinion and judgment of the Court because I am convinced that any other course would mark an extraordinary departure from principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The uncharted directions of such a departure are suggested, I think, by the imaginative dissenting opinion my Brother MARSHALL has filed today.

Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties. [ Footnote 2/2] The function of the Equal Protection Clause, rather, is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws.

Page 411 U. S. 60

There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some people differently from others. But the basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes. [ Footnote 2/3] And, with respect to such legislation, it has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended only by laws that are invidiously discriminatory -- only by classifications that are wholly arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, . This settled principle of constitutional law was compendiously stated in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in McGowan v. Maryland, , -426, in the following words:

"Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."

This doctrine is no more than a specific application of one of the first principles of constitutional adjudication -- the basic presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv.L.Rev. 129 (1893).

Page 411 U. S. 61

Under the Equal Protection Clause, this presumption of constitutional validity disappears when a State has enacted legislation whose purpose or effect is to create classes based upon criteria that, in a constitutional sense, are inherently "suspect." Because of the historic purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the prime example of such a "suspect" classification is one that is based upon race. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, ; McLaughlin v. Florida, . But there are other classifications that, at least in some settings, are also "suspect" -- for example, those based upon national origin, [ Footnote 2/4] alienage, [ Footnote 2/5] indigency, [ Footnote 2/6] or illegitimacy. [ Footnote 2/7]

Moreover, quite apart from the Equal Protection Clause, a state law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law's purpose or effect is to create any classifications. For example, a law that provided that newspapers could be published only by people who had resided in the State for five years could be superficially viewed as invidiously discriminating against an identifiable class in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. But, more basically, such a law would be invalid simply because it abridged the freedom of the press. Numerous cases in this Court illustrate this principle. [ Footnote 2/8]

Page 411 U. S. 62

In refusing to invalidate the Texas system of financing its public schools, the Court today applies with thoughtfulness and understanding the basic principles I have so sketchily summarized. First, as the Court points out, the Texas system has hardly created the kind of objectively identifiable classes that are cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. [ Footnote 2/9] Second, even assuming the existence of such discernible categories, the classifications are in no sense based upon constitutionally "suspect" criteria. Third, the Texas system does not rest "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." Finally, the Texas system impinges upon no substantive constitutional rights or liberties. It follows, therefore, under the established principle reaffirmed in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in McGowan v. Maryland, supra, that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed.

[ Footnote 2/1]

See New York Times, Mar. 11, 1973, p. 1, col. 1.

[ Footnote 2/2]

There is one notable exception to the above statement: it has been established in recent years that the Equal Protection Clause confers the substantive right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an electoral process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, ; Kramer v. Union School District, ; Dunn v. Blumstein, , . But there is no constitutional right to vote, as such. 21 Wall. 162. If there were such a right, both the Fifteenth Amendment and the Nineteenth Amendment would have been wholly unnecessary.

[ Footnote 2/3]

[ Footnote 2/4]

[ Footnote 2/5]

[ Footnote 2/6]

See Griffin v. Illinois, . "Indigency" means actual or functional indigency; it does not mean comparative poverty vis-a-vis comparative affluence. See James v. Valtierra, .

[ Footnote 2/7]

[ Footnote 2/8]

[ Footnote 2/9]

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

"[a]s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional

Page 411 U. S. 63

interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly."

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting.

The Texas public schools are financed through a combination of state funding, local property tax revenue, and some federal funds. [ Footnote 3/1] Concededly, the system yields wide disparity in per-pupil revenue among the various districts. In a typical year, for example, the Alamo Heights district had total revenues of $594 per pupil, while the Edgewood district had only $356 per pupil. [ Footnote 3/2] The majority and the State concede, as they must, the existence

Page 411 U. S. 64

of major disparities in spendable funds. But the State contends that the disparities do not invidiously discriminate against children and families in districts such as Edgewood, because the Texas scheme is designed

"to provide an adequate education for all, with local autonomy to go beyond that as individual school districts desire and are able. . . . It leaves to the people of each district the choice whether to go beyond the minimum and, if so, by how much. [ Footnote 3/3]"

The majority advances this rationalization:

"While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and control of each district's schools at the local level."

The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that it provides a meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like school districts, but almost none to Edgewood and those other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these latter districts, no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use of the

Page 411 U. S. 65

real estate property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is the only revenue-raising mechanism extended to school districts, is practically and legally unavailable. That this is the situation may be readily demonstrated.

Local school districts in Texas raise their portion of the Foundation School Program -- the Local Fund Assignment -- by levying ad valorem taxes on the property located within their boundaries. In addition, the districts are authorized, by the state constitution and by statute, to levy ad valorem property taxes in order to raise revenues to support educational spending over and above the expenditure of Foundation School Program funds.

Both the Edgewood and Alamo Heights districts are located in Bexar County, Texas. Student enrollment in Alamo Heights is 5,432, in Edgewood 22,862. The per-pupil market value of the taxable property in Alamo Heights is $49,078, in Edgewood $5,960. In a typical, relevant year, Alamo Heights had a maintenance tax rate of $1.20 and a debt service (bond) tax rate of 20 per $100 assessed evaluation, while Edgewood had a maintenance rate of 52 and a bond rate of 67. These rates, when applied to the respective tax bases, yielded Alamo Heights $1,433,473 in maintenance dollars and $236,074 in bond dollars, and Edgewood $223,034 in maintenance dollars and $279,023 in bond dollars. As is readily apparent, because of the variance in tax bases between the districts, results, in terms of revenues, do not correlate with effort, in terms of tax rate. Thus, Alamo Heights, with a tax base approximately twice the size of Edgewood's base, realized approximately six times as many maintenance dollars as Edgewood by using a tax rate only approximately two and one-half times larger. Similarly, Alamo Heights realized slightly fewer bond

Page 411 U. S. 66

dollars by using a bond tax rate less than one-third of that used by Edgewood.

Nor is Edgewood's revenue-raising potential only deficient when compared with Alamo Heights. North East District has taxable property with a per-pupil market value of approximately $31,000, but total taxable property approximately four and one-half times that of Edgewood. Applying a maintenance rate of $1, North East yielded $2,818,148. Thus, because of its superior tax base, North East was able to apply a tax rate slightly less than twice that applied by Edgewood and yield more than 10 times the maintenance dollars. Similarly, North East, with a bond rate of 45, yielded $1,249,159 -- more than four times Edgewood's yield with two-thirds the rate.

Plainly, were Alamo Heights or North East to apply the Edgewood tax rate to its tax base, it would yield far greater revenues than Edgewood is able to yield applying those same rates to its base. Conversely, were Edgewood to apply the Alamo Heights or North East rates to its base, the yield would be far smaller than the Alamo Heights or North East yields. The disparity is, therefore, currently operative, and its impact on Edgewood is undeniably serious. It is evident from statistics in the record that show that, applying an equalized tax rate of 85 per $100 assessed valuation, Alamo Heights was able to provide approximately $330 per pupil in local revenues over and above the Local Fund Assignment. In Edgewood, on the other hand, with an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation, $26 per pupil was raised beyond the Local Fund Assignment. [ Footnote 3/4] As previously noted, in Alamo Heights,

Page 411 U. S. 67

total per-pupil revenues from local, state, and federal funds was $594 per pupil, in Edgewood $356. [ Footnote 3/5]

In order to equal the highest yield in any other Bexar County district, Alamo Heights would be required to tax at the rate of 68 per $100 of assessed valuation. Edgewood would be required to tax at the prohibitive rate of $5.76 per $100. But state law places a $1.50 per $100 ceiling on the maintenance tax rate, a limit that would surely be reached long before Edgewood attained an equal yield. Edgewood is thus precluded in law, as well a in fact, from achieving a yield even close to that of some other district.

Page 411 U. S. 68

Neither Texas nor the majority heeds this rule. If the State aims at maximizing local initiative and local choice, by permitting school districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose to do so, it utterly fails in achieving its purpose in districts with property tax bases so low that there is little if any opportunity for interested parents, rich or poor, to augment school district revenues. Requiring the State to establish only that unequal treatment is in furtherance of a permissible goal, without also requiring the State to show that the means chosen to effectuate that goal are rationally related to its achievement, makes equal protection analysis no more than an empty gesture. [ Footnote 3/6] In my view, the parents and children in Edgewood, and in like districts, suffer from an invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This does not, of course, mean that local control may not be a legitimate goal of a school financing system. Nor does it mean that the State must guarantee each district an equal per-pupil revenue from the state school financing system. Nor does it mean, as the majority appears to believe, that, by affirming the decision below,

Page 411 U. S. 69

this Court would be

"imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions."

On the contrary, it would merely mean that the State must fashion a financing scheme which provides a rational basis for the maximization of local control, if local control is to remain a goal of the system, and not a scheme with

"different treatment be[ing] accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute."

Perhaps the majority believes that the major disparity in revenues provided and permitted by the Texas system is inconsequential. I cannot agree, however, that the difference of the magnitude appearing in this case can sensibly be ignored, particularly since the State itself considers it so important to provide opportunities to exceed the minimum state educational expenditures.

Page 411 U. S. 70

Texas candidate filing fee on equal protection grounds was upheld, we noted that the victims of alleged discrimination wrought by the filing fee

"cannot be described by reference to discrete and precisely defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities challenged under the Equal Protection Clause,"

but concluded that

"we would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic status."

[ Footnote 3/1]

The heart of the Texas system is embodied in an intricate series of statutory provisions which make up Chapter 16 of the Texas Education Code, Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 16.01 et seq. See also Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01 et seq., and § 20.10 et seq.

[ Footnote 3/2]

The figures discussed are from Plaintiffs' Exhibits 7, 8, and 12. The figures are from the 1967-1968 school year. Because the various exhibits relied upon different attendance totals, the per-pupil results do not precisely correspond to the gross figures quoted. The disparity between districts, rather than the actual figures, is the important factor.

[ Footnote 3/3]

Brief for Appellants 11-13, 35.

[ Footnote 3/4]

Variable assessment practices are also revealed in this record. Appellants do not, however, contend that this factor accounts, even to a small extent, for the inter-district disparities.

[ Footnote 3/5]

The per-pupil funds received from state, federal, and other sources, while not precisely equal, do not account for the large differential and are not directly attacked in the present case.

[ Footnote 3/6]

The State of Texas appears to concede that the choice of whether or not to go beyond the state-provided minimum

"is easier for some districts than for others. Those districts with large amounts of taxable property can produce more revenue at a lower tax rate and will provide their children with a more expensive education."

Brief for Appellants 35. The State nevertheless insists that districts have a choice and that the people in each district have exercised that choice by providing some real property tax money over and above the minimum funds guaranteed by the State. Like the majority, however, the State fails to explain why the Equal Protection Clause is not violated, or how its goal of providing local government with realistic choices as to how much money should be expended on education is implemented, where the system makes it much more difficult for some than for others to provide additional educational funds and where, as a practical and legal matter, it is impossible for some districts to provide the educational budgets that other districts can make available from real property tax revenues.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting.

The Court today decides, in effect, that a State may constitutionally vary the quality of education which it offers its children in accordance with the amount of taxable wealth located in the school districts within which they reside. The majority's decision represents an abrupt departure from the mainstream of recent state and federal court decisions concerning the unconstitutionality of state educational financing schemes dependent upon taxable local wealth. [ Footnote 4/1] More unfortunately, though, the

Page 411 U. S. 71

majority's holding can only be seen as a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens. The Court does this despite the absence of any substantial justification for a scheme which arbitrarily channels educational resources in accordance with the fortuity of the amount of taxable wealth within each district.

In my judgment, the right of every American to an equal start in life, so far as the provision of a state service as important as education is concerned, is far too vital to permit state discrimination on grounds as tenuous as those presented by this record. Nor can I accept the notion that it is sufficient to remit these appellees to the vagaries of the political process which, contrary to the majority's suggestion, has proved singularly unsuited to the task of providing a remedy for this discrimination. [ Footnote 4/2] I, for one, am unsatisfied with the hope of an ultimate "political" solution sometime in the indefinite future while, in the meantime, countless children unjustifiably receive inferior educations that "may affect their hearts

Page 411 U. S. 72
I
Funds to support public education in Texas are derived from three sources: local ad valorem property taxes; the Federal Government; and the state government. [ Footnote 4/3] It is enlightening to consider these in order.

Page 411 U. S. 73

Under Texas law, the only mechanism provided the local school district for raising new, unencumbered revenues is the power to tax property located within its boundaries. [ Footnote 4/4] At the same time, the Texas financing scheme effectively restricts the use of monies raised by local property taxation to the support of public education within the boundaries of the district in which they are raised, since any such taxes must be approved by a majority of the property-taxpaying voters of the district. [ Footnote 4/5]

The significance of the local property tax element of the Texas financing scheme is apparent from the fact that it provides the funds to meet some 40% of the cost of public education for Texas as a whole. [ Footnote 4/6] Yet the amount of revenue that any particular Texas district can raise is dependent on two factors -- its tax rate and its amount of taxable property. The first factor is determined by the property-taxpaying voters of the district. [ Footnote 4/7] But, regardless of the enthusiasm of the local voters for public

Page 411 U. S. 74

education, the second factor -- the taxable property wealth of the district -- necessarily restricts the district's ability to raise funds to support public education. [ Footnote 4/8] Thus, even though the voters of two Texas districts may be willing to make the same tax effort, the results for the districts will be substantially different if one is property rich, while the other is property poor. The necessary effect of the Texas local property tax is, in short, to favor property-rich districts and to disfavor property-poor ones.

The seriously disparate consequences of the Texas local property tax, when that tax is considered alone, are amply illustrated by data presented to the District Court by appellees. These data included a detailed study of a sample of 110 Texas school districts [ Footnote 4/9] for the 1967-1968 school year conducted by Professor Joel S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. Among other things, this study revealed that the 10 richest districts examined, each of which had more than $100,000 in taxable property per pupil, raised through local effort an average of $610 per pupil, whereas the four poorest districts studied, each of which had less than $10,000 in taxable property per pupil, were able

Page 411 U. S. 75

to raise only an average of $63 per pupil. [ Footnote 4/10] And, as the Court effectively recognizes, ante at , this correlation between the amount of taxable property per pupil and the amount of local revenues per pupil holds true for the 96 districts in between the richest and poorest districts. [ Footnote 4/11]

It is clear, moreover, that the disparity of per-pupil revenues cannot be dismissed as the result of lack of local effort -- that is, lower tax rates by property-poor districts. To the contrary, the data presented below indicate that the poorest districts tend to have the highest tax rates and the richest districts tend to have the lowest tax rates. [ Footnote 4/12] Yet, despite the apparent extra effort being made by the poorest districts, they are unable even to begin to match the richest districts in terms of the production of local revenues. For example, the 10 richest districts studied by Professor Berke were able to produce $585 per pupil with an equalized tax rate of 31

Page 411 U. S. 76

on $100 of equalized valuation, but the four poorest districts studied, with an equalized rate of 70 on $100 of equalized valuation, were able to produce only $60 per pupil. [ Footnote 4/13] Without more, this state-imposed system of educational funding presents a serious picture of widely varying treatment of Texas school districts, and thereby of Texas school children, in terms of the amount of funds available for public education.

Nor are these funding variations corrected by the other aspects of the Texas financing scheme. The Federal Government provides funds sufficient to cover only some 10% of the total cost of public education in Texas. [ Footnote 4/14] Furthermore, while these federal funds are not distributed in Texas solely on a per-pupil basis, appellants do not here contend that they are used in such a way as to ameliorate significantly the widely varying consequences for Texas school districts and school children of the local property tax element of the state financing scheme. [ Footnote 4/15]

State funds provide the remaining some 50% of the monies spent on public education in Texas. [ Footnote 4/16] Technically, they are distributed under two programs. The first is the Available School Fund, for which provision is made in the Texas Constitution. [ Footnote 4/17] The Available

Page 411 U. S. 77

School Fund is composed of revenues obtained from a number of sources, including receipts from the state ad valorem property tax, one-fourth of all monies collected by the occupation tax, annual contributions by the legislature from general revenues, and the revenues derived from the Permanent School Fund. [ Footnote 4/18] For the 1970-1971 school year, the Available School Fund contained $296,000,000. The Texas Constitution requires that this money be distributed annually on a per capita basis [ Footnote 4/19] to the local school districts. Obviously, such a flat grant could not alone eradicate the funding differentials attributable to the local property tax. Moreover, today the Available School Fund is in reality simply one facet of the second state financing program, the Minimum Foundation School Program, [ Footnote 4/20] since each district's annual share of the Fund is deducted from the sum to which the district is entitled under the Foundation Program. [ Footnote 4/21]

The Minimum Foundation School Program provides funds for three specific purposes: professional salaries, current operating expenses, and transportation expenses. [ Footnote 4/22] The State pays, on an overall basis, for approximately 80% of the cost of the Program; the remaining 20% is distributed among the local school districts under the

Page 411 U. S. 78

Local Fund Assignment. [ Footnote 4/23] Each district's share of the Local Fund Assignment is determined by a complex "economic index" which is designed to allocate a larger share of the costs to property-rich districts than to property-poor districts. [ Footnote 4/24] Each district pays its share with revenues derived from local property taxation.

The stated purpose of the Minimum Foundation School Program is to provide certain basic funding for each local Texas school district. [ Footnote 4/25] At the same time, the Program was apparently intended to improve, to some degree, the financial position of property-poor districts relative to property-rich districts, since -- through the use of the economic index -- an effort is made to charge a disproportionate share of the costs of the Program to rich districts. [ Footnote 4/26] It bears noting, however, that substantial criticism has been leveled at the practical effectiveness of the economic index system of local cost allocation. [ Footnote 4/27] In theory, the index is designed to ascertain the relative ability of each district to contribute to the Local Fund Assignment from local property taxes. Yet the index is not developed simply on the basis of each district's taxable wealth. It also takes into account the district's relative income from manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, its payrolls, and its scholastic population. [ Footnote 4/28]

Page 411 U. S. 79

It is difficult to discern precisely how these latter factors are predictive of a district's relative ability to raise revenues through local property taxes. Thus, in 1966, one of the consultants who originally participated in the development of the Texas economic index adopted in 1949 told the Governor's Committee on Public School Education: "The Economic Index approach to evaluating local ability offers a little better measure than sheer chance, but not much." [ Footnote 4/29]

Moreover, even putting aside these criticisms of the economic index as a device for achieving meaningful district wealth equalization through cost allocation, poor districts still do not necessarily receive more state aid than property-rich districts. For the standards which currently determine the amount received from the Foundation School Program by any particular district [ Footnote 4/30] favor property-rich districts. [ Footnote 4/31] Thus, focusing on the same

Page 411 U. S. 80

Page 411 U. S. 81

the Program while Edgewood received only $356 per pupil, hardly suggest that the wealth gap between the districts is being narrowed by the State Program. To the contrary, whereas, in 1967-1968, Alamo Heights received only $3 per pupil, or about 1%, more than Edgewood in state aid, by 1970-1971, the gap had widened to a difference of $135 per pupil, or about 38%. [ Footnote 4/35] It was data of this character that prompted the District Court to observe that "the current [state aid] system tends to subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor, rather than the other way around." [ Footnote 4/36] 337 F. Supp. 280, 282. And even the appellants go no further here than to venture that the Minimum Foundation School Program has "a mildly equalizing effect." [ Footnote 4/37]

Despite these facts, the majority continually emphasizes how much state aid has, in recent years, been given

Page 411 U. S. 82

to property-poor Texas school districts. What the Court fails to emphasize is the cruel irony of how much more state aid is being given to property-rich Texas school districts on top of their already substantial local property tax revenues. [ Footnote 4/38] Under any view, then, it is apparent that the state aid provided by the Foundation School Program fails to compensate for the large funding variations attributable to the local property tax element of the Texas financing scheme. And it is these stark differences in the treatment of Texas school districts and school children inherent in the Texas financing scheme, not the absolute amount of state aid provided to any particular school district, that are the crux of this case. There can, moreover, be no escaping the conclusion that the local property tax which is dependent upon taxable district property wealth is an essential feature of the Texas scheme for financing public education. [ Footnote 4/39]

The appellants do not deny the disparities in educational funding caused by variations in taxable district property wealth. They do contend, however, that whatever the differences in per-pupil spending among Texas districts, there are no discriminatory consequences for the children of the disadvantaged districts. They recognize that what is at stake in this case is the quality of the

Page 411 U. S. 83

public education provided Texas children in the districts in which they live. But appellants reject the suggestion that the quality of education in any particular district is determined by money -- beyond some minimal level of funding which they believe to be assured every Texas district by the Minimum Foundation School Program. In their view, there is simply no denial of equal educational opportunity to any Texas school children as a result of the widely varying per-pupil spending power provided districts under the current financing scheme.

In my view, though, even an unadorned restatement of this contention is sufficient to reveal its absurdity. Authorities concerned with educational quality no doubt disagree as to the significance of variations in per-pupil spending. [ Footnote 4/40] Indeed, conflicting expert testimony was presented to the District Court in this case concerning the effect of spending variations on educational achievement. [ Footnote 4/41] We sit, however, not to resolve disputes over educational theory, but to enforce our Constitution. It is an inescapable fact that, if one district has more funds available per pupil than another district, the

Page 411 U. S. 84

"[W]e cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the [whites-only] Law School is superior. . . . It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question close. "

Page 411 U. S. 85

See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, (1950). Likewise, it is difficult to believe that, if the children of Texas had a free choice, they would choose to be educated in districts with fewer resources, and hence with more antiquated plants, less experienced teachers, and a less diversified curriculum. In fact, if financing variations are so insignificant to educational quality, it is difficult to understand why a number of our country's wealthiest school districts, which have no legal obligation to argue in support of the constitutionality of the Texas legislation, have nevertheless zealously pursued its cause before this Court. [ Footnote 4/42]

Page 411 U. S. 86

approximately 80% of Alamo Heights'. [ Footnote 4/46] And, not surprisingly, the teacher-student ratio varies significantly between the two districts. [ Footnote 4/47] In other wards, as might be expected, a difference in the funds available to districts results in a difference in educational inputs available for a child's public education in Texas. For constitutional purposes, I believe this situation, which is directly attributable to the Texas financing scheme, raises a grave question of state-created discrimination in the provision of public education. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, , -294 (1969).

At the very least, in view of the substantial inter-district disparities in funding and in resulting educational inputs shown by appellees to exist under the Texas financing scheme, the burden of proving that these disparities do not, in fact, affect the quality of children's education must fall upon the appellants. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 860-861 (DC 1971). Yet appellants made no effort in the District Court to demonstrate that educational quality is not affected by variations in funding and in resulting inputs. And, in this Court, they have argued no more than that the relationship is ambiguous. This is hardly sufficient to overcome appellees' prima facie showing of state-created discrimination between the school children of Texas with respect to objective educational opportunity.

Nor can I accept the appellants' apparent suggestion that the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program effectively eradicates any discriminatory effects otherwise resulting from the local property tax element of the

Page 411 U. S. 87

Texas financing scheme. Appellants assert that, despite its imperfections, the Program "does guarantee an adequate education to every child." [ Footnote 4/48] The majority, in considering the constitutionality of the Texas financing scheme, seems to find substantial merit in this contention, for it tells us that the Foundation Program "was designed to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school in the State," ante at , and that the Program "assur[es] a basic education for every child," ante at . But I fail to understand how the constitutional problems inherent in the financing scheme are eased by the Foundation Program. Indeed, the precise thrust of the appellants' and the Court's remarks are not altogether clear to me.

The suggestion may be that the state aid received via the Foundation Program sufficiently improves the position of property-poor districts vis-a-vis property-rich districts -- in terms of educational funds -- to eliminate any claim of inter-district discrimination in available educational resources which might otherwise exist if educational funding were dependent solely upon local property taxation. Certainly the Court has recognized that to demand precise equality of treatment is normally unrealistic, and thus minor differences inherent in any practical context usually will not make out a substantial equal protection claim. See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, , -195 (1971); Draper v. Washington, , -496 (1963); Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, , (1931). But, as has already been seen, we are hardly presented here with some de minimis claim of discrimination resulting from the play necessary in any functioning system; to the contrary, it is clear that the Foundation Program utterly fails to

Page 411 U. S. 88

ameliorate the seriously discriminatory effects of the local property tax. [ Footnote 4/49]

Alternatively, the appellants and the majority may believe that the Equal Protection Clause cannot be offended by substantially unequal state treatment of persons who are similarly situated so long as the State provides everyone with some unspecified amount of education which evidently is "enough." [ Footnote 4/50] The basis for such a novel view is far from clear. It is, of course, true that the Constitution does not require precise equality in the treatment of all persons. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:

"The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. . . . The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same."

Page 411 U. S. 89

Page 411 U. S. 90

Foundation School Program cannot obscure the constitutional implications of the discrimination in educational funding and objective educational inputs resulting from the local property tax -- particularly since the appellees offered substantial uncontroverted evidence before the District Court impugning the now much-touted "adequacy" of the education guaranteed by the Foundation Program. [ Footnote 4/51]

In my view, then, it is inequality -- not some notion of gross inadequacy -- of educational opportunity that raises a question of denial of equal protection of the laws. I find any other approach to the issue unintelligible, and without directing principle. Here, appellees have made a substantial showing of wide variations in educational funding and the resulting educational opportunity afforded to the school children of Texas. This discrimination is, in large measure, attributable to significant disparities in the taxable wealth of local Texas school districts. This is a sufficient showing to raise a substantial question of discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. [ Footnote 4/52]

Page 411 U. S. 91

Despite the evident discriminatory effect of the Texas financing scheme, both the appellants and the majority raise substantial questions concerning the precise character of the disadvantaged class in this case. The District Court concluded that the Texas financing scheme draws "distinction between groups of citizens depending upon the wealth of the district in which they live," and thus creates a disadvantaged class composed of persons living in property-poor districts. See 337 F. Supp. at 282. See also id. at 281. In light of the data introduced before the District Court, the conclusion that the school children of property-poor districts constitute a sufficient class for our purposes seems indisputable to me.

Appellants contend, however, that, in constitutional terms, this case involves nothing more than discrimination against local school districts, not against individuals, since, on its face, the state scheme is concerned only with the provision of funds to local districts. The result of the Texas financing scheme, appellants suggest, is merely that some local districts have more available revenues for education; others have less. In that respect,

Page 411 U. S. 92

But this Court has consistently recognized that, where there is, in fact, discrimination against individual interests, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not inapplicable simply because the discrimination is based upon some group characteristic such as geographic location. See Gordon v. Lance, , (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, , 377 U.S. 565-566 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, , (1963). Texas has chosen to provide free public education for all its citizens, and it has embodied that decision in its constitution. [ Footnote 4/53] Yet, having established public education for its citizens, the State, as a direct consequence of the variations in local property wealth endemic to Texas' financing scheme, has provided some Texas school children with substantially less resources for their education than others. Thus, while, on its face, the Texas scheme may merely discriminate between local districts, the impact of that discrimination falls directly upon the children whose educational opportunity is dependent upon where they happen to live. Consequently, the District Court correctly concluded that the Texas financing scheme discriminates, from a constitutional perspective, between school children on the basis of the amount of taxable property located within their local districts.

In my Brother STEWART's view, however, such a description of the discrimination inherent in this case is apparently not sufficient, for it fails to define the "kind of objectively identifiable classes" that he evidently perceives

Page 411 U. S. 93

to be necessary for a claim to be "cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause," ante at . He asserts that this is also the view of the majority, but he is unable to cite, nor have I been able to find, any portion of the Court's opinion which remotely suggests that there is no objectively identifiable or definable class in this case. In any event, if he means to suggest that an essential predicate to equal protection analysis is the precise identification of the particular individuals who compose the disadvantaged class, I fail to find the source from which he derives such a requirement. Certainly such precision is not analytically necessary. So long as the basis of the discrimination is clearly identified, it is possible to test it against the State's purpose for such discrimination -- whatever the standard of equal protection analysis employed. [ Footnote 4/54] This is clear from our decision only last Term in Bullock v. Carter, (1972), where the Court, in striking down Texas' primary filing fees as violative of equal protection, found no impediment to equal protection analysis in the fact that the members of the disadvantaged class could not be readily identified. The Court recognized that the filing fee system tended

"to deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing; at the same time it gives the affluent the power to place on the ballot their own names or the names of persons they favor."

Page 411 U. S. 94

Court also recognized that

"[t]his disparity in voting power based on wealth cannot be described by reference to discrete and precisely defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. . . ."

Ibid. Nevertheless it concluded that

"we would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters . . . according to their economic status."

A number of theories of discrimination have, to be sure, been considered in the course of this litigation. Thus, the District Court found that, in Texas, the poor and minority group members tend to live in property-poor districts, suggesting discrimination on the basis of both personal wealth and race. See 337 F. Supp. at 282 and n. 3. The Court goes to great lengths to discredit the data upon which the District Court relied, and thereby its conclusion that poor people live in property-poor districts. [ Footnote 4/55]

Page 411 U. S. 95

Although I have serious doubts as to the correctness of the Court's analysis in rejecting the data submitted below, [ Footnote 4/56] I have no need to join issue on these factual disputes.

Page 411 U. S. 96

I believe it is sufficient that the overarching form of discrimination in this case is between the school children of Texas on the basis of the taxable property wealth of the districts in which they happen to live. To understand both the precise nature of this discrimination and the parameters of the disadvantaged class, it is sufficient to consider the constitutional principle which appellees contend is controlling in the context of educational financing. In their complaint, appellees asserted that the Constitution does not permit local district wealth to be determinative of educational opportunity. [ Footnote 4/57] This is simply another way of saying, as the District Court concluded, that, consistent with the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, "the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a whole." 337 F. Supp. at 284. Under such a principle, the children of a district are excessively advantaged if that district has more taxable property per pupil than the average amount of taxable property per pupil considering the State as a whole. By contrast, the children of a district are disadvantaged if that district has less taxable property per pupil than the state average. The majority attempts to disparage such a definition of the disadvantaged class as the product of an "artificially defined level" of district wealth. Ante at . But such is clearly not the case, for this is the

Page 411 U. S. 97

definition unmistakably dictated by the constitutional principle for which appellees have argued throughout the course of this litigation. And I do not believe that a clearer definition of either the disadvantaged class of Texas school children or the allegedly unconstitutional discrimination suffered by the members of that class under the present Texas financing scheme could be asked for, much less needed. [ Footnote 4/58] Whether this discrimination, against the school children of property-poor districts, inherent in the Texas financing scheme, is violative of the Equal Protection Clause is the question to which we must now turn.
II
To avoid having the Texas financing scheme struck down because of the inter-district variations in taxable property wealth, the District Court determined that it was insufficient for appellants to show merely that the State's scheme was rationally related to some legitimate state purpose; rather, the discrimination inherent in the scheme had to be shown necessary to promote a "compelling state interest" in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The basis for this determination was twofold: first, the financing scheme divides citizens on a wealth basis, a classification which the District Court viewed as highly suspect; and second, the discriminatory scheme directly affects what it considered to be a "fundamental interest," namely, education.

Page 411 U. S. 98

(1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, , -192 (1964), must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the scheme is necessary to promote a substantial, legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at -343; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at . The majority today concludes, however, that the Texas scheme is not subject to such a strict standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, in its view, the Texas scheme must be tested by nothing more than that lenient standard of rationality which we have traditionally applied to discriminatory state action in the context of economic and commercial matters. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at -426; Morey v. Doud, , -466 (1957); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. at ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., , -79 (1911). By so doing, the Court avoids the telling task of searching for a substantial state interest which the Texas financing scheme, with its variations in taxable district property wealth, is necessary to further. I cannot accept such an emasculation of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of this case.

Page 411 U. S. 99

Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. I find, in fact, that many of the Court's recent decisions embody the very sort of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I previously argued -- that is, an approach in which

"concentration [is] placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification."

I therefore cannot accept the majority's labored efforts to demonstrate that fundamental interests, which call for strict scrutiny of the challenged classification, encompass only established rights which we are somehow bound to recognize from the text of the Constitution itself. To be sure, some interests which the Court has deemed to be fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis are themselves constitutionally protected rights. Thus, discrimination against the guaranteed right of freedom of speech has called for strict judicial scrutiny. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, (1972). Further, every citizen's right to travel interstate, although nowhere expressly mentioned in the Constitution, has long been recognized as implicit in the premises underlying that document: the right "was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created." United States v. Guest, , (1966). See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, (1868). Consequently, the Court has required that a state classification affecting the constitutionally

Page 411 U. S. 100

protected right to travel must be "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at . But it will not do to suggest that the "answer" to whether an interest is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis is always determined by whether that interest "is a right . . . explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," ante at -34. [ Footnote 4/59]

Thus, in Buck v. Bell, (1927), the Court refused to recognize a substantive constitutional guarantee of the right to procreate. Nevertheless, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at the Court, without impugning the continuing validity of Buck v. Bell, held that "strict scrutiny" of state discrimination affecting procreation "is essential," for "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Recently, in Roe v. Wade, , -154 (1973),

Page 411 U. S. 101

Similarly, the right to vote in state elections has been recognized as a "fundamental political right," because the Court concluded very early that it is "preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, , (1886); see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at -562. For this reason,

"this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at (emphasis added). The final source of such protection from inequality in the provision of the state franchise is, of course, the Equal Protection Clause. Yet it is clear that whatever degree of importance has been attached to the state electoral process when unequally distributed, the right to vote in state elections has itself never been accorded the stature of an independent constitutional guarantee. [ Footnote 4/60] See Oregon v. Mitchell, (1970); Kramer v. Union School District, , -629 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, , (1966).

Page 411 U. S. 102

Finally, it is likewise "true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at . Nevertheless, discrimination adversely affecting access to an appellate process which a State has chosen to provide has been considered to require close judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, supra; Douglas v. California, (1963). [ Footnote 4/61]

Page 411 U. S. 103

more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly. Thus, it cannot be denied that interests such as procreation, the exercise of the state franchise, and access to criminal appellate processes are not fully guaranteed to the citizen by our Constitution. But these interests have nonetheless been afforded special judicial consideration in the face of discrimination because they are, to some extent, interrelated with constitutional guarantees. Procreation is now understood to be important because of its interaction with the established constitutional right of privacy. The exercise of the state franchise is closely tied to basic civil and political rights inherent in the First Amendment. And access to criminal appellate processes enhances the integrity of the range of rights [ Footnote 4/62] implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process of law. Only if we closely protect the related interests from state discrimination do we ultimately ensure the integrity of the constitutional guarantee itself. This is the real lesson that must be taken from our previous decisions involving interests deemed to be fundamental.

Page 411 U. S. 104

purported to test the statute under its traditional standard whether there is some rational basis for the discrimination effected. Id. at -447. In the context of commercial regulation, the Court has indicated that the Equal Protection Clause "is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at ; Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, , (1947). And this lenient standard is further weighted in the State's favor by the fact that "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived [by the Court] to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at . But, in Baird, the Court clearly did not adhere to these highly tolerant standards of traditional rational review. For although there were conceivable state interests intended to be advanced by the statute -- e.g., deterrence of premarital sexual activity and regulation of the dissemination of potentially dangerous articles -- the Court was not prepared to accept these interests on their face, but instead proceeded to test their substantiality by independent analysis. See 405 U.S. at -454. Such close scrutiny of the State's interests was hardly characteristic of the deference shown state classifications in the context of economic interests. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, supra. Yet I think the Court's action was entirely appropriate, for access to and use of contraceptives bears a close relationship to the individual's constitutional right of privacy. See 405 U.S. at -454; id. at -464 (WHITE, J., concurring in result). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at -153.

A similar process of analysis with respect to the invidiousness of the basis on which a particular classification is drawn has also influenced the Court as to the

Page 411 U. S. 105

appropriate degree of scrutiny to be accorded any particular case. The highly suspect character of classifications based on race, [ Footnote 4/63] nationality, [ Footnote 4/64] or alienage [ Footnote 4/65] is well established. The reasons why such classifications call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recognized as "discrete and insular minorities" who are relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political process. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at ; cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., , -153, n. 4 (1938). Moreover, race, nationality, or alienage is,

Page 411 U. S. 106

afforded civil judgment debtors. [ Footnote 4/66] The Court suggested that, in reviewing the statute under the Equal Protection Clause, it was merely applying the traditional requirement that there be " some rationality'" in the line drawn between the different types of debtors. I.d. at . Yet it then proceeded to scrutinize the statute with less than traditional deference and restraint. Thus, the Court recognized "that state recoupment statutes may betoken legitimate state interests" in recovering expenses and discouraging fraud. Nevertheless, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, speaking for the Court, concluded that

"these interests are not thwarted by requiring more even treatment of indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors to whom the statute itself repeatedly makes reference. State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state interests they may serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and self-respect."

Page 411 U. S. 107

"[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."

404 U.S. at . This Court, in other words, was unwilling to consider a theoretical and unsubstantiated basis for distinction -- however reasonable it might appear -- sufficient to sustain a statute discriminating on the basis of sex.

James and Reed can only be understood as instances in which the particularly invidious character of the classification caused the Court to pause and scrutinize with more than traditional care the rationality of state discrimination. Discrimination on the basis of past criminality and on the basis of sex posed for the Court the specter of forms of discrimination which it implicitly recognized to have deep social and legal roots without necessarily having any basis in actual differences. Still,

Page 411 U. S. 108

In Weber, the Court struck down a portion of a state workmen's compensation statute that relegated unacknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased to a lesser status with respect to benefits than that occupied by legitimate children of the deceased. The Court acknowledged the true nature of its inquiry in cases such as these: "What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" Id. at . Embarking upon a determination of the relative substantiality of the State's justifications for the classification, the Court rejected the contention that the classifications reflected what might be presumed to have been the deceased's preference of beneficiaries as "not compelling . . . where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to anyone's recovery. . . ." Ibid. Likewise, it deemed the relationship between the State's interest in encouraging legitimate family relationships and the burden placed on the illegitimates too tenuous to permit the classification to stand. Ibid. A clear insight into the basis of the Court's action is provided by its conclusion:

"[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection

Page 411 U. S. 109

Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth. . . ."

In summary, it seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently adjusted the care with which it will review state discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification. In the context of economic interests, we find that discriminatory state action is almost always sustained, for such interests are generally far removed from constitutional guarantees. Moreover,

"[t]he extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up rational bases for state regulation in that area may in many instances be ascribed to a healthy revulsion from the Court's earlier excesses in using the Constitution to protect interests that have more than enough power to protect themselves in the legislative halls."

Page 411 U. S. 110

the Court itself will be open to the criticism raised by the majority so long as it continues on its present course of effectively selecting in private which cases will be afforded special consideration without acknowledging the true basis of its action. [ Footnote 4/67] Opinions such as those in Reed and James seem drawn more as efforts to shield, rather than to reveal, the true basis of the Court's decisions. Such obfuscated action may be appropriate to a political body such as a legislature, but it is not appropriate to this Court. Open debate of the bases for the Court's action is essential to the rationality and consistency of our decisionmaking process. Only in this way can we avoid the label of legislature and ensure the integrity of the judicial process.

Nevertheless, the majority today attempts to force this case into the same category for purposes of equal protection analysis as decisions involving discrimination affecting commercial interests. By so doing, the majority ingles this case out for analytic treatment at odds with what seems to me to be the clear trend of recent decisions in this Court, and thereby ignores the constitutional importance of the interest at stake and the invidiousness of the particular classification, factors that call for far more than the lenient scrutiny of the Texas financing scheme which the majority pursues. Yet if the discrimination inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized with the care demanded by the interest and classification present in this case, the unconstitutionality of that scheme is unmistakable.

Since the Court now suggests that only interests guaranteed by the Constitution are fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis, and since it rejects

Page 411 U. S. 111

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. . . ."

Page 411 U. S. 112

of our 50 States, the provision of public education is mandated by the state constitution. [ Footnote 4/68] No other state function is so uniformly recognized [ Footnote 4/69] as an essential element of our society's wellbeing. In large measure, the explanation for the special importance attached to education must rest, as the Court recognized in Yoder, id. at , on the facts that "some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system . . . ," and that "education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Both facets of this observation are suggestive of the substantial relationship which education bears to guarantees of our Constitution.

Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First Amendment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of information and ideas, whatever interests he may pursue in life. This Court's decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, , (1957), speaks of the right of students "to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding. . . ." Thus, we have not casually described the classroom as the " marketplace of ideas.'" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, , (1967). The opportunity for formal education may not necessarily be the essential determinant of an individual's ability to enjoy throughout his life the rights of free speech and association

Page 411 U. S. 113

guaranteed to him by the First Amendment. But such an opportunity may enhance the individual's enjoyment of those rights not only during, but also following, school attendance. Thus, in the final analysis,

"the pivotal position of education to success in American society and its essential role in opening up to the individual the central experiences of our culture lend it an importance that is undeniable. [ Footnote 4/70]"

Of particular importance is the relationship between education and the political process. "Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, , (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Education serves the essential function of instilling in our young an understanding of and appreciation for the principles and operation of our governmental processes. [ Footnote 4/71] Education may instill the interest and provide the tools necessary for political discourse and debate. Indeed, it has frequently been suggested that education is the dominant factor affecting political consciousness and participation. [ Footnote 4/72] A system of

"[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental

Page 411 U. S. 114

policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."

Williams v. Rhodes, , (1968). But of most immediate and direct concern must be the demonstrated effect of education on the exercise of the franchise by the electorate. The right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution, and access to the state franchise has been afforded special protection because it is "preservative of other basic civil and political rights," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at . Data from the Presidential Election of 1968 clearly demonstrate a direct relationship between participation in the electoral process and level of educational attainment, [ Footnote 4/73] and, as this Court recognized in Gaston County v. United States, , (1969), the quality of education offered may

Page 411 U. S. 115

influence a child's decision to "enter or remain in school." It is this very sort of intimate relationship between a particular personal interest and specific constitutional guarantees that has heretofore caused the Court to attach special significance, for purposes of equal protection analysis, to individual interests such as procreation and the exercise of the state franchise. [ Footnote 4/74]

While ultimately disputing little of this, the majority seeks refuge in the fact that the Court has

"never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice."

Page 411 U. S. 116

do not now seek the best education Texas might provide. They do seek, however, an end to state discrimination resulting from the unequal distribution of taxable district property wealth that directly impairs the ability of some districts to provide the same educational opportunity that other districts can provide with the same or even substantially less tax effort. The issue is, in other words, one of discrimination that affects the quality of the education which Texas has chosen to provide its children; and, the precise question here is what importance should attach to education for purposes of equal protection analysis of that discrimination. As this Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. at , the opportunity of education, "where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." The factors just considered, including the relationship between education and the social and political interests enshrined within the Constitution, compel us to recognize the fundamentality of education and to scrutinize with appropriate care the bases for state discrimination affecting equality of educational opportunity in Texas' school districts [ Footnote 4/75] -- a conclusion

Page 411 U. S. 117

which is only strengthened when we consider the character of the classification in this case.

The District Court found that, in discriminating between Texas school children on the basis of the amount of taxable property wealth located in the district in which they live, the Texas financing scheme created a form of wealth discrimination. This Court has frequently recognized that discrimination on the basis of wealth may create a classification of a suspect character, and thereby call for exacting judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, (1956); Douglas v. California, (1963); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, , (1969). The majority, however, considers any wealth classification in this case to lack certain essential characteristics which it contends are common to the instances of wealth discrimination that this Court has heretofore recognized. We are told that, in every prior case involving a wealth classification, the members of the disadvantaged class have

"shared two distinguishing characteristics: because

Page 411 U. S. 118

of their impecunity, they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit."

Ante at . I cannot agree. The Court's distinctions may be sufficient to explain the decisions in Williams v. Illinois, (1970); Tate v. Short, (1971); and even Bullock v. Carter, (1972). But they are not, in fact, consistent with the decisions in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, (1966), or Griffin v. Illinois, supra, or Douglas v. California, supra.

In Harper, the Court struck down, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, an annual Virginia poll tax of $1.50, payment of which by persons over the age of 21 was a prerequisite to voting in Virginia elections. In part, the Court relied on the fact that the poll tax interfered with a fundamental interest -- the exercise of the state franchise. In addition, though, the Court emphasized that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property . . . are traditionally disfavored." 383 U.S. at . Under the first part of the theory announced by the majority, the disadvantaged class in Harper, in terms of a wealth analysis, should have consisted only of those too poor to afford the $1.50 necessary to vote. But the Harper Court did not see it that way. In its view, the Equal Protection Clause "bars a system which excludes [from the franchise] those unable to pay a fee to vote or who fail to pay." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) So far as the Court was concerned, the "degree of the discrimination [was] irrelevant." Ibid. Thus, the Court struck down the poll tax in toto; it did not order merely that those too poor to pay the tax be exempted; complete impecunity clearly was not determinative of the limits of the disadvantaged class, nor was it essential to make an equal protection claim.

Page 411 U. S. 119

Similarly, Griffin and Douglas refute the majority's contention that we have in the past required an absolute deprivation before subjecting wealth classifications to strict scrutiny. The Court characterizes Griffin as a case concerned simply with the denial of a transcript or an adequate substitute therefor, and Douglas as involving the denial of counsel. But, in both cases, the question was, in fact, whether "a State that [grants] appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty." Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at (emphasis added). In that regard, the Court concluded that inability to purchase a transcript denies "the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance," ibid. (emphasis added), and that "the type of an appeal a person is afforded . . . hinges upon whether or not he can pay for the assistance of counsel," Douglas v. California, supra, at -356 (emphasis added). The right of appeal itself was not absolutely denied to those too poor to pay, but, because of the cost of a transcript and of counsel, the appeal was a substantially less meaningful right for the poor than for the rich. [ Footnote 4/76] It was on these terms that the Court found a denial of equal protection, and those terms clearly encompassed degrees of discrimination on the

Page 411 U. S. 120

basis of wealth which do not amount to outright denial of the affected right or interest. [ Footnote 4/77]

This is not to say that the form of wealth classification in this case does not differ significantly from those recognized in the previous decisions of this Court. Our prior eases have dealt essentially with discrimination on the basis of personal wealth. [ Footnote 4/78] Here, by contrast, the

Page 411 U. S. 121

children of the disadvantaged Texas school districts are being discriminated against not necessarily because of their personal wealth or the wealth of their families, but because of the taxable property wealth of the residents of the district in which they happen to live. The appropriate question, then, is whether the same degree of judicial solicitude and scrutiny that has previously been afforded wealth classifications is warranted here.

As the Court points out, ante at -29, no previous decision has deemed the presence of just a wealth classification to be sufficient basis to call forth rigorous judicial scrutiny of allegedly discriminatory state action. Compare, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, with, e.g., James v. Valtierra, (1971). That wealth classifications alone have not necessarily been considered to bear the same high degree of suspectness as have classifications based on, for instance, race or alienage may be explainable on a number of grounds. The "poor" may not be seen as politically powerless as certain discrete and insular minority groups. [ Footnote 4/79] Personal poverty may entail much the same social stigma as historically attached to certain racial or ethnic groups. [ Footnote 4/80] But personal poverty is not a permanent disability; its shackles may be escaped. Perhaps most importantly, though, personal wealth may not necessarily share the general irrelevance as a basis for legislative action that race or nationality is recognized to have. While the "poor" have frequently been a

Page 411 U. S. 122

legally disadvantaged group, [ Footnote 4/81] it cannot be ignored that social legislation must frequently take cognizance of the economic status of our citizens. Thus, we have generally gauged the invidiousness of wealth classifications with an awareness of the importance of the interests being affected and the relevance of personal wealth to those interests. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra.

When evaluated with these considerations in mind, it seems to me that discrimination on the basis of group wealth in this case likewise calls for careful judicial scrutiny. First, it must be recognized that, while local district wealth may serve other interests, [ Footnote 4/82] it bears no relationship whatsoever to the interest of Texas school children in the educational opportunity afforded them by the State of Texas. Given the importance of that interest, we must be particularly sensitive to the invidious characteristics of any form of discrimination that is not clearly intended to serve it, as opposed to some other distinct state interest. Discrimination on the basis of group wealth may not, to be sure, reflect the social stigma frequently attached to personal poverty. Nevertheless, insofar as group wealth discrimination involves wealth over which the disadvantaged individual has no significant control, [ Footnote 4/83] it represents in fact, a more serious basis of discrimination than does personal wealth. For such discrimination

Page 411 U. S. 123

The disability of the disadvantaged class in this case extends as well into the political processes upon which we ordinarily rely a adequate for the protection and promotion of all interests. Here legislative reallocation of the State's property wealth must be sought in the face of inevitable opposition from significantly advantaged districts that have a strong vested interest in the preservation of the status quo, a problem not completely dissimilar to that faced by underrepresented districts prior to the Court's intervention in the process of reapportionment, [ Footnote 4/84] see Baker v. Carr, , -192 (1962).

Nor can we ignore the extent to which, in contrast to our prior decisions, the State is responsible for the wealth discrimination in this instance. Griffin, Douglas, Williams, Tate, and our other prior cases have dealt with discrimination on the basis of indigency which was attributable to the operation of the private sector. But we have no such simple de facto wealth discrimination here. The means for financing public education in Texas are selected and specified by the State. It is the State that has created local school districts, and tied educational funding to the local property tax, and thereby to local district wealth. At the same time, governmentally

Page 411 U. S. 124

imposed land use controls have undoubtedly encouraged and rigidified natural trends in the allocation of particular areas for residential or commercial use, [ Footnote 4/85] and thus determined each district's amount of taxable property wealth. In short, this case, in contrast to the Court's previous wealth discrimination decisions, can only be seen as "unusual in the extent to which governmental action is the cause of the wealth classifications." [ Footnote 4/86]

In the final analysis, then, the invidious characteristics of the group wealth classification present in this case merely serve to emphasize the need for careful judicial scrutiny of the State's justifications for the resulting inter-district discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded to the school children of Texas.

Page 411 U. S. 125

or "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at , state interest to justify discrimination affecting individual interests of constitutional significance. Whatever the differences, if any, in these descriptions of the character of the state interest necessary to sustain such discrimination, basic to each is, I believe, a concern with the legitimacy and the reality of the asserted state interests. Thus, when interests of constitutional importance are at stake, the Court does not stand ready to credit the State's classification with any conceivable legitimate purpose, [ Footnote 4/87] but demands a clear showing that there are legitimate state interests which the classification was in fact, intended to serve. Beyond the question of the adequacy of the State's purpose for the classification, the Court traditionally has become increasingly sensitive to the means by which a State chooses to act as its action affects more directly interests of constitutional significance. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, , (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, , (1960). Thus, by now, "less restrictive alternatives" analysis is firmly established in equal protection jurisprudence. See Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at ; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. at . It seems to me that the range of choice we are willing to accord the State in selecting the means by which it will act, and the care with which we scrutinize the effectiveness of the means which the State selects, also must reflect the constitutional importance of the interest affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification. Here, both the nature of the interest and the classification dictate close judicial scrutiny of the purposes which Texas seeks to serve with its present educational financing

Page 411 U. S. 126

scheme and of the means it has selected to serve that purpose.

The only justification offered by appellants to sustain the discrimination in educational opportunity caused by the Texas financing scheme is local educational control. Presented with this justification, the District Court concluded that

"[n]ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state interests for their classifications based upon wealth, they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications."

337 F. Supp. at 284. I must agree with this conclusion.

At the outset, I do not question that local control of public education, as an abstract matter, constitutes a very substantial state interest. We observed only last Term that "[d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our society." Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, , (1972). See also id. at -478 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). The State's interest in local educational control -- which certainly includes questions of educational funding -- has deep roots in the inherent benefits of community support for public education. Consequently, true state dedication to local control would present, I think, a substantial justification to weigh against simply inter-district variations in the treatment of a State's school children. But I need not now decide how I might ultimately strike the balance were we confronted with a situation where the State's sincere concern for local control inevitably produced educational inequality. For, on this record, it is apparent that the State's purported concern with local control is offered primarily as an excuse, rather than as a justification for inter-district inequality.

In Texas, state-wide laws regulate in fact, the most minute details of local public education. For example,

Page 411 U. S. 127

the State prescribes required courses. [ Footnote 4/88] All textbooks must be submitted for state approval, [ Footnote 4/89] and only approved textbooks may be used. [ Footnote 4/90] The State has established the qualifications necessary for teaching in Texas public schools and the procedures for obtaining certification. [ Footnote 4/91] The State has even legislated on the length of the school day. [ Footnote 4/92] Texas' own courts have said:

"As a result of the acts of the Legislature, our school system is not of mere local concern, but it is state-wide. While a school district is local in territorial limits, it is an integral part of the vast school system which is coextensive with the confines of the State of Texas."

Treadaway v. Whitney Independent School District, 205 S.W.2d 97, 99 Tex.Ct. Civ.App. (1947). See also El Dorado Independent School District v. Tisdale, 3 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).

Page 411 U. S. 128

to the level of sacrifice they wish to make for public education. In fact, the Texas scheme produces precisely the opposite result. Local school districts cannot choose to have the best education in the State by imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the educational opportunity offered by any particular district is largely determined by the amount of taxable property located in the district -- a factor over which local voters can exercise no control.

The study introduced in the District Court showed a direct inverse relationship between equalized taxable district property wealth and district tax effort with the result that the property-poor districts making the highest tax effort obtained the lowest per-pupil yield. [ Footnote 4/93] The implications of this situation for local choice are illustrated by again comparing the Edgewood and Alamo Heights School Districts. In 1967-1968, Edgewood, after contributing its share to the Local Fund Assignment, raised only $26 per pupil through its local property tax, whereas Alamo Heights was able to raise $333 per pupil. Since the funds received through the Minimum Foundation School Program are to be used only for minimum professional salaries, transportation costs, and operating expenses, it is not hard to see the lack of local choice with respect to higher teacher salaries to attract more and better teachers, physical facilities, library books, and facilities, special courses, or participation in special state and federal matching funds programs -- under which a property-poor district such as Edgewood is forced to labor. [ Footnote 4/94] In fact, because of the difference in taxable local property wealth, Edgewood would have to tax itself almost nine times as heavily to obtain the same

Page 411 U. S. 129

yield as Alamo Heights. [ Footnote 4/95] At present, then, local control is a myth for many of the local school districts in Texas. As one district court has observed,

"rather than reposing in each school district the economic power to fix its own level of per pupil expenditure, the State has so arranged the structure as to guarantee that some districts will spend low (with high taxes) while others will spend high (with low taxes)."

Van Dusatz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 876 (Minn.1971).

In my judgment, any substantial degree of scrutiny of the operation of the Texas financing scheme reveals that the State has selected means wholly inappropriate to secure its purported interest in assuring its school districts local fiscal control. [ Footnote 4/96] At the same time, appellees have pointed out a variety of alternative financing schemes which may serve the State's purported interest in local control as well as, if not better than, the present scheme without the current impairment of the educational opportunity of vast numbers of Texas school children. [ Footnote 4/97] I see no need, however, to explore the practical or constitutional merits of those suggested alternatives at this time, for, whatever their positive or negative features, experience

Page 411 U. S. 130

with the present financing scheme impugns any suggestion that it constitutes a serious effort to provide local fiscal control. If, for the sake of local education control, this Court is to sustain inter-district discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded Texas school children, it should require that the State present something more than the mere sham now before us.
III
In conclusion, it is essential to recognize that an end to the wide variations in taxable district property wealth inherent in the Texas financing scheme would entail none of the untoward consequences suggested by the Court or by the appellants.

First, affirmance of the District Court's decisions would hardly sound the death knell for local control of education. It would mean neither centralized decisionmaking nor federal court intervention in the operation of public schools. Clearly, this suit has nothing to do with local decisionmaking with respect to educational policy or even educational spending. It involves only a narrow aspect of local control -- namely, local control over the raising of educational funds. In fact, in striking down inter-district disparities in taxable local wealth, the District Court took the course which is most likely to make true local control over educational decisionmaking a reality for all Texas school districts.

Nor does the District Court's decision even necessarily eliminate local control of educational funding. The District Court struck down nothing more than the continued inter-district wealth discrimination inherent in the present property tax. Both centralized and decentralized plans for educational funding not involving such inter-district discrimination have been put forward. [ Footnote 4/98] The choice

Page 411 U. S. 131

among these or other alternatives would remain with the State, not with the federal courts. In this regard, it should be evident that the degree of federal intervention

Page 411 U. S. 132

Still, we are told that this case requires us "to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests." Ante at . Yet no one in the course of this entire litigation has ever questioned the constitutionality of the local property tax as a device for raising educational funds. The District Court's decision, at most, restricts the power of the State to make educational funding dependent exclusively upon local property taxation so long as there exists inter-district disparities in taxable property wealth. But it hardly eliminates the local property tax as a source of educational funding or as a means of providing local fiscal control. [ Footnote 4/99]

The Court seeks solace for its action today in the possibility of legislative reform. The Court's suggestions of legislative redress and experimentation will doubtless be of great comfort to the school children of Texas' disadvantaged districts, but, considering the vested interests of wealthy school districts in the preservation of the status quo, they are worth little more. The possibility of legislative action is, in all events, no answer to this Court's duty under the Constitution to eliminate unjustified state discrimination. In this case, we have been presented with an instance of such discrimination, in a particularly invidious form, against an individual interest of large constitutional and practical importance. To support the demonstrated discrimination in the provision

Page 411 U. S. 133

of educational opportunity the State has offered a justification which, on analysis, takes on, at best, an ephemeral character. Thus, I believe that the wide disparities in taxable district property wealth inherent in the local property tax element of the Texas financing scheme render that scheme violative of the Equal Protection Clause. [ Footnote 4/100]

I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Page 411 U. S. 134

| 411 U.S. 1 app1|

bwm:

APPENDIX I TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

REVENUES OF TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED

BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS

CATEGORIES Total Revenues

State and Local Per Pupil

Market Value of Revenues Per Federal (State-Local-

Taxable Property Local Revenues State Revenues Pupil (Columns Revenues Federal, Columns

Per Pupil Per Pupil Per Pupil 1 and 2) Per Pupil 1, 2 and 4)

Above $100,000 $610 $205 $815 $ 41 $856

(10 districts)

$100,000-$50,000 287 257 544 66 610

(26 districts)

$50,000-$30,000 224 260 484 45 529

(30 districts)

$30,000-$10,000 166 295 461 85 546

(40 districts)

Below $10,000 63 243 306 135 441

(4 districts)

ewm:

Based on Table V to affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App. 208, which was prepared on the basis of a sample of 110 selected Texas school districts from data for the 1967-1968 school year.

Page 411 U. S. 135

| 411 U.S. 1 app2|

APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY

EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES, EQUALIZED

TAX RATES, AND YIELD OF RATES

CATEGORIES EQUALIZED YIELD PER PUPIL

Market Value of TAX (Equalized Rate

Taxable Property RATES Applied to District

Per Pupil ON $100 Market Value)

Above $100,000 $.31 $585

(10 districts)

$100,000-$50,000 .38 262

(26 districts)

$50,000-$30,000 .55 213

(30 districts)

$30,000-$10,000 .72 162

(40 districts)

Below $10,000 .70 60

(4 districts)

Based on Table II to affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App. 205, which was prepared on the basis of a sample of 110 selected Texas school districts from data for the 1967-1968 school year.

Page 411 U. S. 136

| 411 U.S. 1 app3|

bwm:

APPENDIX III TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

SELECTED BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS

CATEGORIZED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUATION AND

SELECTED INDICATORS OF EDUCATIONAL QUALITY

Selected Districts Per Cent of Per Cent of

From High to Low by Professional Teachers With Total Staff Student- Professional

Market Valuation Salaries Per College Masters With Emergen- Counselor Personnel

Per Pupil Pupil Degrees Degrees cy Permits Ratios Per 100 Pupils

ALAMO HEIGHTS $372 100% 40% 11% 645 4.80

NORTH EAST 288 99 24 7 1,516 4.50

SAN ANTONIO 251 98 29 17 2,320 4.00

NORTH SIDE 258 99 20 17 1,493 4.30

HARLANDALE 243 94 21 22 1,800 4.00

EDGEWOOD 209 96 15 47 3,098 4.06

ewm:

Based on Table XI to affidavit of Joel S. Berke,App. 220, which was prepared on the basis of a sample of six selected school districts located in Bexar County, Texas, from data for the 1967-1968 school year.

Page 411 U. S. 137

| 411 U.S. 1 app4|

APPENDIX IV TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS RANKED BY

EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUE AND TAX RATE REQUIRED TO

GENERATE HIGHEST YIELD IN ALL DISTRICTS

Districts Ranked from Tax Rate Per $100

High to Low Market Needed to Equal

Valuation Per Pupil Highest Yield

ALAMO HEIGHTS $0.68

JUDSON 1.04

EAST CENTRAL 1.17

NORTH EAST 1.21

SOMERSET 1.32

SAN ANTONIO 1.56

NORTH SIDE 1.65

SOUTH WEST 2.10

SOUTH SIDE 3.03

HARLANDALE 3.20

SOUTH SAN ANTONIO 5.77

EDGEWOOD 5.76

Based on Table IX to affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App. 218, which was prepared on the basis of the 12 school districts located in Bexar County, Texas, from data from the 1967-1968 school year.

[ Footnote 4/1]

See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (Minn.1971); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), rehearing granted, Jan.1973; Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 119 N.J.Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972); Hollins v. Shofstall, Civil No. C-253652 (Super.Ct. Maricopa County, Ariz. July 7, 1972). See also Sweetwater County Planning Com. for the Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo.1971), juris. relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo.1972).

[ Footnote 4/2]

The District Court in this case postponed decision for some two years in the hope that the Texas Legislature would remedy the gross disparities in treatment inherent in the Texas financing scheme. It was only after the legislature failed to act in its 1971 Regular Session that the District Court, apparently recognizing the lack of hope for self-initiated legislative reform, rendered its decision. See Texas Research League, Public School Finance Problems in Texas 13 (Interim Report 1972). The strong vested interest of property-rich districts in the existing property tax scheme poses a substantial barrier to self-initiated legislative reform in educational financing. See N.Y. Times, Dec.19, 1972, p. 1, col. 1.

[ Footnote 4/3]

Texas provides its school districts with extensive bonding authority to obtain capital both for the acquisition of school sites and "the construction and equipment of school buildings," Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.01 (1972), and for the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of "gymnasia, stadia, or other recreational facilities," id. §§ 20.21-20.22. While such private capital provides a fourth source of revenue, it is, of course, only temporary in nature, since the principal and interest of all bonds must ultimately be paid out of the receipts of the local ad valorem property tax, see id. §§ 20.01, 20.04, except to the extent that outside revenues derived from the operation of certain facilities, such as gymnasia, are employed to repay the bonds issued thereon, see id. §§ 20.22, 20.25.

[ Footnote 4/4]

See Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 3; Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 20.01-20.02. As a part of the property tax scheme, bonding authority is conferred upon the local school districts, see

[ Footnote 4/5]

See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.04.

[ Footnote 4/6]

For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 41.1%. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S. 1fn4/2|>n. 2, at 9.

[ Footnote 4/7]

See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.04.

[ Footnote 4/8]

Under Texas law, local districts are allowed to employ differing bases of assessment -- a fact that introduces a third variable into the local funding. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.03. But neither party has suggested that this factor is responsible for the disparities in revenues available to the various districts. Consequently, I believe we must deal with this case on the assumption that differences in local methods of assessment do not meaningfully affect the revenue-raising power of local districts relative to one another. The Court apparently admits as much. See ante at . It should be noted, moreover, that the main set of data introduced before the District Court to establish the disparities at issue here was based upon "equalized taxable property" values which had been adjusted to correct for differing methods of assessment. See App. C to Affidavit of Professor Joel S. Berke.

[ Footnote 4/9]

Texas has approximately 1,200 school districts.

[ Footnote 4/10]

[ Footnote 4/11]

See ibid. Indeed, appellants acknowledge that the relevant data from Professor Berke's affidavit show "a very positive correlation, 0.973, between market value of taxable property per pupil and state and local revenues per pupil." Reply Brief for Appellants 6 n. 9.

While the Court takes issue with much of Professor Berke's data and conclusions, ante at -16, n. 38, and -27, I do not understand its criticism to run to the basic finding of a correlation between taxable district property per pupil and local revenues per pupil. The critique of Professor Berke's methodology upon which the Court relies, see Goldstein, Inter-district Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 504, 523-525, nn. 67, 71 (1972), is directed only at the suggested correlations between family income and taxable district wealth and between race and taxable district wealth. Obviously, the appellants do not question the relationship in Texas between taxable district wealth and per-pupil expenditures; and there is no basis for the Court to do so, whatever the criticisms that may be leveled at other aspects of Professor Berke's study, see infra, 411 U.S. 1fn4/56|>n. 56.

[ Footnote 4/12]

[ Footnote 4/13]

[ Footnote 4/14]

For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 10.9%. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S. 1fn4/2|>n. 2, at 9.

[ Footnote 4/15]

Appellants made such a contention before the District Court but apparently have abandoned it in this Court. Indeed, data introduced in the District Court simply belie the argument that federal funds have a significant equalizing effect. See Appendix I, post, p. . And, as the District Court observed, it does not follow that remedial action by the Federal Government would excuse any unconstitutional discrimination effected by the state financing scheme. 337 F. Supp. 280, 284.

[ Footnote 4/16]

For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 48%. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S. 1fn4/2|>n. 2, at 9.

[ Footnote 4/17]

See Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 5 (Supp. 1972). See also Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01(b).

[ Footnote 4/18]

See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01(b).

The Permanent School Fund is, in essence, a public trust initially endowed with vast quantities of public land, the sale of which has provided an enormous corpus that, in turn, produces substantial annual revenues which are devoted exclusively to public education. See Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 5 (Supp. 1972). See also 5 Report of Governor's Committee on Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 11 (1969) (hereinafter Governor's Committee Report).

[ Footnote 4/19]

This is determined from the average daily attendance within each district for the preceding year. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01(c).

[ Footnote 4/20]

See id. §§ 16.01-16.975.

[ Footnote 4/21]

See id. §§ 16.71(2), 16.79.

[ Footnote 4/22]

See id. §§ 16.301-16.316, 16.45, 16.51-16.63.

[ Footnote 4/23]

See id., §§ 16.72-16.73, 16.76-16.77.

[ Footnote 4/24]

See id. §§ 16.74-16.76. The formula for calculating each district's share is described in 5 Governor's Committee Report 448.

[ Footnote 4/25]

See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 16.01.

[ Footnote 4/26]

See 5 Governor's Committee Report 401.

[ Footnote 4/27]

See id. at 45 67; Texas Research League, Texas Public Schools Under the Minimum Foundation Program -- An Evaluation: 1949-1954, pp.67-68 (1954).

[ Footnote 4/28]

Technically, the economic index involves a two-step calculation. First, on the basis of the factors mentioned above, each Texas county's share of the Local Fund Assignment is determined. Then each county's share is divided among its school districts on the basis of their relative shares of the county's assessable wealth. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 16.74-16.76; 5 Governor's Committee Report 43-44; Texas Research League, Texas Public School Finance: A Majority of Exceptions 6-8 (2d Interim Report 1972).

[ Footnote 4/29]

5 Governor's Committee Report 48, quoting statement of Dr. Edgar Morphet.

[ Footnote 4/30]

The extraordinarily complex standards are summarized in 5 Governor's Committee Report 41-43.

[ Footnote 4/31]

The state salary standards focus upon two factors: the educational level and the experience of the district's teachers. See id. §§ 16.30116.316. The higher these two factors are, the more funds the district will receive from the Foundation Program for professional salaries.

[ Footnote 4/32]

In 1967-1968, Alamo Heights School District had $49,478 in taxable property per pupil. See Berke Affidavit, Table VII, App. 216.

[ Footnote 4/33]

In 1967-1968, Edgewood Independent School District had $5,960 in taxable property per pupil. Ibid.

[ Footnote 4/34]

[ Footnote 4/35]

In the face of these gross disparities in treatment which experience with the Texas financing scheme has revealed, I cannot accept the Court's suggestion that we are dealing here with a remedial scheme to which we should accord substantial deference because of its accomplishments, rather than criticize it for its failures. Ante at -39. Moreover, Texas' financing scheme is hardly remedial legislation of the type for which we have previously shown substantial tolerance. Such legislation may in fact, extend the vote to "persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law," Katzenbach v. Morgan, , (1966), or it may eliminate the evils of the private bail bondsman, Schilb v. Kuebel, (1971). But those are instances in which a legislative body has sought to remedy problems for which it cannot be said to have been directly responsible. By contrast, public education is the function of the State in Texas, and the responsibility for any defect in the financing scheme must ultimately rest with the State. It is the State's own scheme which has caused the funding problem, and, thus viewed, that scheme can hardly be deemed remedial.

[ Footnote 4/36]

[ Footnote 4/37]

Brief for Appellants 3.

[ Footnote 4/38]

Thus, in 1967-1968, Edgewood had a total of $248 per pupil in state and local funds, compared with a total of $558 per pupil for Alamo Heights. See Berke Affidavit, Table X, App. 219. For 1970-1971, the respective totals were $418 and $913. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S. 1fn4/2|>n. 2, at 14.

[ Footnote 4/39]

Not only does the local property tax provide approximately 40% of the funds expended on public education, but it is the only source of funds for such essential aspects of educational financing as the payment of school bonds, see 411 U.S. 1fn4/3|>n. 3, supra, and the payment of the district's share of the Local Fund Assignment, as well as for nearly all expenditures above the minimums established by the Foundation School Program.

[ Footnote 4/40]

[ Footnote 4/41]

Compare Berke Answers to Interrogatories 10 ("Dollar expenditures are probably the best way of measuring the quality of education afforded students . . ."), with Graham Deposition 39 ("[I]t is not just necessarily the money, no. It is how wisely you spend it"). It warrants noting that even appellants' witness, Mr. Graham, qualified the importance of money only by the requirement of wise expenditure. Quite obviously, a district which is property poor is powerless to match the education provided by a property-rich district, assuming each district allocates its funds with equal wisdom.

[ Footnote 4/42]

[ Footnote 4/43]

Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, App. 115.

[ Footnote 4/44]

Ibid. Moreover, during the same period, 37.17% of the teachers in Alamo Heights had advanced degrees, while only 14.98% of Edgewood's faculty had such degrees. See id. at 116.

[ Footnote 4/45]

[ Footnote 4/46]

[ Footnote 4/47]

In the 1967-1968 school year, Edgewood had 22,862 students and 864 teachers, a ratio of 26.5 to 1. See id. at 110, 114. In Alamo Heights, for the same school year, there were 5,432 students and 265 teachers, for a ratio of 20.5 to 1. Ibid.

[ Footnote 4/48]

Reply Brief for Appellant 17. See also id. at 5, 15-16.

[ Footnote 4/49]

Indeed, even apart from the differential treatment inherent in the local property tax, the significant inter-district disparities in state aid received under the Minimum Foundation School Program would seem to raise substantial equal protection questions.

[ Footnote 4/50]

I find particularly strong intimations of such a view in the majority's efforts to denigrate the constitutional significance of children in property-poor districts "receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth" with the assertion "that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." Ante at , . The Court, to be sure, restricts its remark to "wealth" discrimination. But the logical basis for such a restriction is not explained by the Court, nor is it otherwise apparent, see infra at -120 and n. 77.

[ Footnote 4/51]

See Answers to Interrogatories by Dr. Joel S. Berke, Ans. 17, p. 9; Ans. 48-51, pp. 22-24; Ans. 88-89, pp. 41-42; Deposition of Dr. Daniel C. Morgan, Jr., at 52-55; Affidavit of Dr. Daniel C. Morgan, Jr., App. 242-243.

[ Footnote 4/52]

It is true that, in two previous cases, this Court has summarily affirmed district court dismissals of constitutional attacks upon other state educational financing schemes. See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (ND Ill.1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, (1969); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (WD Va.1969), aff'd per curiam, (1970). But those decisions cannot be considered dispositive of this action, for the thrust of those suits differed materially from that of the present case. In McInnis, the plaintiffs asserted that

"only a financing system which apportions public funds according to the educational needs of the students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment."

293 F. Supp. at 331. The District Court concluded that

"(1) the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that public school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs, and (2) the lack of judicially manageable standards makes this controversy nonjusticiable."

Id. at 329. The Burruss District Court dismissed that suit essentially in reliance on McInnis, which it found to be "scarcely distinguishable." 310 F. Supp. at 574. This suit involves no effort to obtain an allocation of school funds that considers only educational need. The District Court ruled only that the State must remedy the discrimination resulting from the distribution of taxable local district wealth which has heretofore prevented many districts from truly exercising local fiscal control. Furthermore, the limited holding of the District Court presents none of the problems of judicial management which would exist if the federal courts were to attempt to ensure the distribution of educational funds solely on the basis of educational need, see infra at -132.

[ Footnote 4/53]

Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 1.

[ Footnote 4/54]

Problems of remedy may be another matter. If provision of the relief sought in a particular case required identification of each member of the affected class, as in the case of monetary relief, the need for clarity in defining the class is apparent. But this involves the procedural problems inherent in class action litigation, not the character of the elements essential to equal protection analysis. We are concerned here only with the latter. Moreover, it is evident that, in cases such as this, provision of appropriate relief, which takes the injunctive form, is not a serious problem, since it is enough to direct the action of appropriate officials. Cf. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288-290 (CA5 1963).

[ Footnote 4/55]

I assume the Court would lodge the same criticism against the validity of the finding of a correlation between poor districts and racial minorities.

[ Footnote 4/56]

Furthermore, the article upon which the Court relies to discredit the statistical procedures employed by Professor Berke to establish the correlation between poor people and poor districts, see 411 U.S. 1fn4/11|>n. 11, supra, based its criticism primarily on the fact that only four of the 110 districts studied were in the lowest of the five categories, which were determined by relative taxable property per pupil, and most districts clustered in the middle three groups. See Goldstein, Inter-district Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 504, 524 n. 67 (1972). See also ante at -27. But the Court fails to note that the four poorest districts in the sample had over 50,000 students, which constituted 10% of the students in the entire sample. It appears, moreover, that even when the richest and the poorest categories are enlarged to include in each category 20% of the students in the sample, the correlation between district and individual wealth holds true. See Brief for the Governors of Minnesota, Maine, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Michigan as amici curiae 17 n. 21.

Finally, it cannot be ignored that the data introduced by appellees went unchallenged in the District Court. The majority's willingness to permit appellants to litigate the correctness of those data for the first time before this tribunal -- where effective response by appellees is impossible -- is both unfair and judicially unsound.

[ Footnote 4/57]

Third Amended Complaint App. 23. Consistent with this theory, appellees purported to represent, among others, a class composed of

"all . . . school children in independent school districts . . . who . . . have been deprived of the equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to public school education because of the low value of the property lying within the independent school districts in which they reside."

[ Footnote 4/58]

The degree of judicial scrutiny that this particular classification demands is a distinct issue which I consider in infra.

[ Footnote 4/59]

[ Footnote 4/60]

[ Footnote 4/61]

It is true that Griffin and Douglas also involved discrimination against indigents, that is, wealth discrimination. But, as the majority points out, ante at -29, the Court has never deemed wealth discrimination alone to be sufficient to require strict judicial scrutiny; rather, such review of wealth classifications has been applied only where the discrimination affects an important individual interest, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, (1966). Thus, I believe Griffin and Douglas can only be understood as premised on a recognition of the fundamental importance of the criminal appellate process.

[ Footnote 4/62]

[ Footnote 4/63]

[ Footnote 4/64]

[ Footnote 4/65]

[ Footnote 4/66]

The Court noted that the challenged

"provision strips from indigent defendants the array of protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil judgment debtors, including restrictions on the amount of disposable earnings subject to garnishment, protection of the debtor from wage garnishment at times of severe personal or family sickness, and exemption from attachment and execution on a debtor's personal clothing, books, and tools of trade."

[ Footnote 4/67]

See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972).

[ Footnote 4/68]

See Brief of the National Education Association et al. as Amici Curiae App. A. All 48 of the 50 States which mandate public education also have compulsory attendance laws which require school attendance for eight years or more. Id. at 20-21.

[ Footnote 4/69]

[ Footnote 4/70]

Developments in the Law -- Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1129 (1969).

[ Footnote 4/71]

The President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People, & Money: The Need for Educational Reform 11 (1972), concluded that "[l]iterally, we cannot survive as a nation or as individuals without [education]." It further observed that:

"[I]n a democratic society, public understanding of public issues is necessary for public support. Schools generally include in their courses of instruction a wide variety of subjects related to the history, structure and principles of American government at all levels. In so doing, schools provide students with a background of knowledge which is deemed an absolute necessity for responsible citizenship."

[ Footnote 4/72]

See J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorfer, H. Levin, & R. Stout, Schools and Inequality 103-105 (1971); R. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children 217-218 (1967); Campbell, The Passive Citizen, in 6 Acta Sociologica, Nos. 1-2, p. 9, at 20-21 (1962).

That education is the dominant factor in influencing political participation and awareness is sufficient, I believe, to dispose of the Court's suggestion that, in all events, there is no indication that Texas is not providing all of its children with a sufficient education to enjoy the right of free speech and to participate fully in the political process. Ante at -37. There is, in short, no limit on the amount of free speech or political participation that the Constitution guarantees. Moreover, it should be obvious that the political process, like most other aspects of social intercourse, is to some degree competitive. It is thus of little benefit to an individual from a property-poor district to have "enough" education if those around him have more than "enough." Cf. Sweatt v. Painter, , -634 (1950).

[ Footnote 4/73]

See United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1968, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No.192, Table 4, p. 17. See also Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Levin, The Costs to the Nation of Inadequate Education 46-47 (Comm.Print 1972).

[ Footnote 4/74]

[ Footnote 4/75]

The majority's reliance on this Court's traditional deference to legislative bodies in matters of taxation falls wide of the mark in the context of this particular case. See ante at -41. The decisions on which the Court relies were simply taxpayer suits challenging the constitutionality of a tax burden in the face of exemptions or differential taxation afforded to others. See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, (1959), Madden v. Kentucky, (1940); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., (1937); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1890). There is no question that, from the perspective of the taxpayer, the Equal Protection Clause

"imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and may vary the rate of excise upon various products."

[ Footnote 4/76]

[ Footnote 4/77]

Even if I put aside the Court's misreading of Griffin and Douglas, the Court fails to offer any reasoned constitutional basis for restricting cases involving wealth discrimination to instances in which there is an absolute deprivation of the interest affected. As I have already discussed, see supra at -89, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees equality of treatment of those persons who are similarly situated; it does not merely bar some form of excessive discrimination between such persons. Outside the context of wealth discrimination, the Court's reapportionment decisions clearly indicate that relative discrimination is within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, in Reynolds v. Sims, , -563 (1964), the Court recognized:

"It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of the State's voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only once. . . . Of course, the effect of state legislative districting schemes which give the same number of representatives to unequal numbers of constituents is identical. Overweighting and over-valuation of the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the votes of those living there. . . . Their right to vote is simply not the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. . . . One must be ever aware that the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.'"

[ Footnote 4/78]

[ Footnote 4/79]

But cf. M. Harrington, The Other America 13-17 (Penguin ed.1963).

[ Footnote 4/80]

See E. Banfield, The Unheavenly City 63, 75-76 (1970); cf. R. Lynd & H. Lynd, Middletown in Transition 450 (1937).

[ Footnote 4/81]

[ Footnote 4/82]

[ Footnote 4/83]

[ Footnote 4/84]

Indeed, the political difficulties that seriously disadvantaged districts face in securing legislative redress are augmented by the fact that little support is likely to be secured from only mildly disadvantaged districts. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, (1963). See also

[ Footnote 4/85]

[ Footnote 4/86]

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1254. See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. at 875-876.

[ Footnote 4/87]

[ Footnote 4/88]

Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 21.101-21.117. Criminal penalties are provided for failure to teach certain required courses. Id. §§ 4.15-4.16.

[ Footnote 4/89]

Id., §§ 12.11-12.35.

[ Footnote 4/90]

[ Footnote 4/91]

Id., §§ 13 031-13.046

[ Footnote 4/92]

[ Footnote 4/93]

[ Footnote 4/94]

See Affidavit of Dr. Joe Cardenas, Superintendent of School, Edgewood Independent School District, App. 234-238.

[ Footnote 4/95]

[ Footnote 4/96]

My Brother WHITE, in concluding that the Texas financing scheme runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, likewise finds on analysis that the means chosen by Texas -- local property taxation dependent upon local taxable wealth -- is completely unsuited in its present form to the achievement of the asserted goal of providing local fiscal control. Although my Brother WHITE purports to reach this result by application of that lenient standard of mere rationality traditionally applied in the context of commercial interests, it seems to me that the care with which he scrutinizes the practical effectiveness of the present local property tax as a device for affording local fiscal control reflects the application of a more stringent standard of review, a standard which at the least is influenced by the constitutional significance of the process of public education.

[ Footnote 4/97]

[ Footnote 4/98]

A second possibility is the much-discussed theory of district power equalization put forth by Professors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman in their seminal work, Private Wealth and Public Education 201-242 (1970). Such a scheme would truly reflect a dedication to local fiscal control. Under their system, each school district would receive a fixed amount of revenue per pupil for any particular level of tax effort regardless of the level of local property tax base. Appellants criticize this scheme on the rather extraordinary ground that it would encourage poorer districts to overtax themselves in order to obtain substantial revenues for education. But, under the present discriminatory scheme, it is the poor districts that are already taxing themselves at the highest rates, yet are receiving the lowest returns.

District wealth reapportionment is yet another alternative which would accomplish directly essentially what district power equalization would seek to do artificially. Appellants claim that the calculations concerning state property required by such a scheme would be impossible, as a practical matter. Yet Texas is already making far more complex annual calculations -- involving not only local property values, but also local income and other economic factors -- in conjunction with the Local Fund Assignment portion of the Minimum Foundation School Program. See 5 Governor's Committee Report 43-44.

A fourth possibility would be to remove commercial, industrial, and mineral property from local tax rolls, to tax this property on a state-wide basis, and to return the resulting revenues to the local districts in a fashion that would compensate for remaining variations in the local tax bases.

None of these particular alternatives is necessarily constitutionally compelled; rather, they indicate the breadth of choice which would remain to the State if the present inter-district disparities were eliminated.

[ Footnote 4/99]

[ Footnote 4/100]

Of course, nothing in the Court's decision today should inhibit further review of state educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions. See Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), rehearing granted, Jan.1973; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, 119 N.J.Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972); cf. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).

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San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)

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San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez No. 71-1332 Argued October 12, 1972 Decided March 21, 1973 411 U.S. 1 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation.

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Curriculum Requirements

Curriculum Requirements, 19. Tex. Admin. Code §74.6

Administrative Law

http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/rules/tac/chapter074/ch074a.html

19 TAC §74.6 was a result of the 79th Texas Legislature’s requirement that the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and the Texas Education Agency create an alignment between the knowledge and skills learned in secondary education and the standards necessary for a student to be successful in college-level work. The purpose of the administrative law was to improve student success in college.

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Chapter 74. Curriculum Requirements
Subchapter A. Required Curriculum

Statutory Authority: The provisions of this Subchapter A issued under the Texas Education Code, 7.102, 28.002, 28.023, 28.025, 28.054, and 38.003, unless otherwise noted.

74.1. Essential Knowledge and Skills.

(a) A school district that offers kindergarten through Grade 12 must offer the following as a required curriculum:

(1) a foundation curriculum that includes:

(A) English language arts;

(B) mathematics;

(C) science; and

(D) social studies, consisting of Texas, United States and world history, government, geography, and economics, with emphasis on the free enterprise system and its benefits; and

(2) an enrichment curriculum that includes:

(A) to the extent possible, languages other than English;

(B) health, with emphasis on:

(i) physical health, including the importance of proper nutrition and exercise;

(ii) mental health, including instruction about mental health conditions, substance abuse, skills to manage emotions, establishing and maintaining positive relationships, and responsible decision-making; and

(iii) suicide prevention, including recognizing suicide-related risk factors and warning signs;

(C) physical education;

(D) fine arts;

(E) career and technical education;

(F) technology applications;

(G) religious literature, including the Hebrew Scriptures (Old Testament) and New Testament, and its impact on history and literature; and

(H) personal financial literacy.

(b) A school district must provide instruction in the essential knowledge and skills of the appropriate grade levels in the foundation and enrichment curriculum as specified in paragraphs (1)-(12) of this subsection. A school district may add elements at its discretion but must not delete or omit instruction in the foundation and enrichment curriculum specified in subsection (a) of this section.

(1) Chapter 110 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for English Language Arts and Reading).

(2) Chapter 111 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Mathematics).

(3) Chapter 112 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Science).

(4) Chapter 113 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Social Studies).

(5) Chapter 114 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Languages Other Than English).

(6) Chapter 115 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Health Education).

(7) Chapter 116 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Physical Education).

(8) Chapter 117 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Fine Arts).

(9) Chapter 126 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Technology Applications).

(10) Chapter 127 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Career Development).

(11) Chapter 128 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Spanish Language Arts and English as a Second Language).

(12) Chapter 130 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Career and Technical Education).

Statutory Authority: The provisions of this §74.1 issued under the Texas Education Code, §§7.102(c)(4), 28.002, and 28.025.

Source: The provisions of this §74.1 adopted to be effective September 1, 1996, 21 TexReg 4311; amended to be effective September 1, 1998, 23 TexReg 5675; amended to be effective October 3, 2004, 29 TexReg 9185; amended to be effective January 9, 2007, 32 TexReg 80; amended to be effective April 21, 2010, 35 TexReg 3028; amended to be effective May 30, 2012, 37 TexReg 3808; amended to be effective June 18, 2014, 39 TexReg 4652; amended to be effective October 25, 2020, 45 TexReg 7421.

74.2. Description of a Required Elementary Curriculum.

(a) A school district that offers kindergarten through Grade 5 must provide instruction in the required curriculum as specified in 74.1 of this title (relating to Essential Knowledge and Skills). The district must ensure that sufficient time is provided for teachers to teach and for students to learn English language arts and reading, mathematics, science, social studies, fine arts, health, physical education, technology applications, and to the extent possible, languages other than English. The school district may provide instruction in a variety of arrangements and settings, including mixed-age programs designed to permit flexible learning arrangements for developmentally appropriate instruction for all student populations to support student attainment of course and grade level standards.

(b) A school district that provides instruction for Grade 6 in a self-contained elementary class as part of elementary school shall provide instruction for students in Grade 6 in all of the Middle School 1 Texas essential knowledge and skills for art, dance, music, and theatre as specified in Chapter 117 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Fine Arts).

Statutory Authority: The provisions of this 74.2 issued under the Texas Education Code, 7.102(c)(4) and 28.002.

Source: The provisions of this 74.2 adopted to be effective September 1, 1996, 21 TexReg 4311; amended to be effective September 1, 1998, 23 TexReg 5675; amended to be effective January 9, 2007, 32 TexReg 80; amended to be effective August 24, 2015, 40 TexReg 5328.

74.3. Description of a Required Secondary Curriculum.

(a) Middle Grades 6-8.

(1) A school district that offers Grades 6-8 must provide instruction in the required curriculum as specified in §74.1 of this title (relating to Essential Knowledge and Skills). The district must ensure that sufficient time is provided for teachers to teach and for students to learn English language arts, mathematics, science, social studies, at least one of the four disciplines in fine arts (art, dance, music, theatre), health, physical education, technology applications, and to the extent possible, languages other than English. The school district may provide instruction in a variety of arrangements and settings, including mixed-age programs designed to permit flexible learning arrangements for developmentally appropriate instruction for all student populations to support student attainment of course and grade level standards.

(2) The school district must ensure that, beginning with students who enter Grade 6 in the 2010-2011 school year, each student completes one Texas essential knowledge and skills-based fine arts course in Grade 6, Grade 7, or Grade 8.

(3) A district shall offer and maintain evidence that students have the opportunity to take courses in at least three of the four disciplines in fine arts. The requirement to offer three of the four disciplines in fine arts may be reduced to two by the commissioner of education upon application of a school district with a total middle school enrollment of less than 250 students.

(b) Secondary Grades 9-12.

(1) A school district that offers Grades 9-12 must provide instruction in the required curriculum as specified in §74.1 of this title. The district must ensure that sufficient time is provided for teachers to teach and for students to learn the subjects in the required curriculum. The school district may provide instruction in a variety of arrangements and settings, including mixed-age programs designed to permit flexible learning arrangements for developmentally appropriate instruction for all student populations to support student attainment of course and grade level standards.

(2) The school district must offer the courses listed in this paragraph and maintain evidence that students have the opportunity to take these courses:

(A) English language arts--English I, II, III, and IV and at least one additional advanced English course;

(B) mathematics--Algebra I, Algebra II, Geometry, Precalculus, and Mathematical Models with Applications;

(C) science--Integrated Physics and Chemistry, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, and at least two additional science courses selected from Aquatic Science, Astronomy, Earth and Space Science, Environmental Systems, Advanced Animal Science, Advanced Biotechnology, Advanced Plant and Soil Science, Anatomy and Physiology, Engineering Design and Problem Solving, Food Science, Forensic Science, Medical Microbiology, Pathophysiology, Scientific Research and Design, and Engineering Science. The requirement to offer two additional courses may be reduced to one by the commissioner of education upon application of a school district with a total high school enrollment of less than 500 students. Science courses shall include at least 40% hands-on laboratory investigations and field work using appropriate scientific inquiry;

(D) social studies--United States History Studies Since 1877, World History Studies, United States Government, World Geography Studies, Personal Financial Literacy, and Economics with Emphasis on the Free Enterprise System and Its Benefits;

(E) physical education--at least two courses selected from Foundations of Personal Fitness, Adventure/Outdoor Education, Aerobic Activities, or Team or Individual Sports;

(F) fine arts--courses selected from at least two of the four fine arts areas (art, music, theatre, and dance)--Art I, II, III, IV; Music I, II, III, IV; Theatre I, II, III, IV; or Dance I, II, III, IV;

(G) career and technical education-- three or more career and technical education courses for four or more credits with at least one advanced course aligned with a specified number of Texas Education Agency-designated programs of study determined by enrollment as follows:

(i) one program of study for a district with fewer than 500 students enrolled in high school;

(ii) two programs of study for a district with 501-1,000 students enrolled in high school;

(iii) three programs of study for a district with 1,001-2,000 students enrolled in high school;

(iv) four programs of study for a district with 1,001-5,000 students enrolled in high school;

(v) five programs of study for a district with 5,001-10,000 students enrolled in high school; and

(vi) six programs of study for a district with more than 10,000 students enrolled in high school.

(H) languages other than English--Levels I, II, and III or higher of the same language;

(I) computer science--one course selected from Fundamentals of Computer Science, Computer Science I, or Advanced Placement (AP) Computer Science Principles; and

(J) speech--Communication Applications.

(3) Districts may offer additional courses from the complete list of courses approved by the State Board of Education to satisfy graduation requirements as referenced in this chapter.

(4) The school district must provide each student the opportunity to participate in all courses listed in subsection (b)(2) of this section. The district must provide students the opportunity each year to select courses in which they intend to participate from a list that includes all courses required to be offered in subsection (b)(2) of this section. If the school district will not offer the required courses every year, but intends to offer particular courses only every other year, it must notify all enrolled students of that fact. A school district must teach a course that is specifically required for high school graduation at least once in any two consecutive school years. For a subject that has an end-of-course assessment, the district must either teach the course every year or employ options described in Subchapter C of this chapter (relating to Other Provisions) to enable students to earn credit for the course and must maintain evidence that it is employing those options.

(5) For students entering Grade 9 beginning with the 2007-2008 school year, districts must ensure that one or more courses offered in the required curriculum for the recommended and advanced high school programs include a research writing component.

(c)Courses in the foundation and enrichment curriculum in Grades 6-12 must be provided in a manner that allows all grade promotion and high school graduation requirements to be met in a timely manner. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require a district to offer a specific course in the foundation and enrichment curriculum except as required by this subsection.

Statutory Authority: The provisions of this §74.3 issued under the Texas Education Code, §§7.102(c)(4), 28.002, and 28.0021.

Source: The provisions of this §74.3 adopted to be effective September 1, 1996, 21 TexReg 4311; amended to be effective October 13, 1997, 22 TexReg 10129; amended to be effective September 1, 1998, 23 TexReg 5675; amended to be effective September 1, 2001, 25 TexReg 7691; amended to be effective October 3, 2004, 29 TexReg 9185; amended to be effective January 9, 2007, 32 TexReg 80; amended to be effective December 23, 2009, 34 TexReg 9198; amended to be effective April 21, 2010, 35 TexReg 3028; amended to be effective May 30, 2012, 37 TexReg 3808; amended to be effective June 18, 2014, 39 TexReg 4652; amended to be effective August 24, 2015, 40 TexReg 5328; amended to be effective October 23, 2016, 41 TexReg 8196; amended to be effective October 25, 2020, 45 TexReg 7421.

74.4. English Language Proficiency Standards.

(a) Introduction.

(1) The English language proficiency standards in this section outline English language proficiency level descriptors and student expectations for English language learners (ELLs). School districts shall implement this section as an integral part of each subject in the required curriculum. The English language proficiency standards are to be published along with the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (TEKS) for each subject in the required curriculum.

(2) In order for ELLs to be successful, they must acquire both social and academic language proficiency in English. Social language proficiency in English consists of the English needed for daily social interactions. Academic language proficiency consists of the English needed to think critically, understand and learn new concepts, process complex academic material, and interact and communicate in English academic settings.

(3) Classroom instruction that effectively integrates second language acquisition with quality content area instruction ensures that ELLs acquire social and academic language proficiency in English, learn the knowledge and skills in the TEKS, and reach their full academic potential.

(4) Effective instruction in second language acquisition involves giving ELLs opportunities to listen, speak, read, and write at their current levels of English development while gradually increasing the linguistic complexity of the English they read and hear, and are expected to speak and write.

(5) The cross-curricular second language acquisition skills in subsection (c) of this section apply to ELLs in Kindergarten-Grade 12.

(6) The English language proficiency levels of beginning, intermediate, advanced, and advanced high are not grade-specific. ELLs may exhibit different proficiency levels within the language domains of listening, speaking, reading, and writing. The proficiency level descriptors outlined in subsection (d) of this section show the progression of second language acquisition from one proficiency level to the next and serve as a road map to help content area teachers instruct ELLs commensurate with students' linguistic needs.

(b) School district responsibilities. In fulfilling the requirements of this section, school districts shall:

(1) identify the student's English language proficiency levels in the domains of listening, speaking, reading, and writing in accordance with the proficiency level descriptors for the beginning, intermediate, advanced, and advanced high levels delineated in subsection (d) of this section;

(2) provide instruction in the knowledge and skills of the foundation and enrichment curriculum in a manner that is linguistically accommodated (communicated, sequenced, and scaffolded) commensurate with the student's levels of English language proficiency to ensure that the student learns the knowledge and skills in the required curriculum;

(3) provide content-based instruction including the cross-curricular second language acquisition essential knowledge and skills in subsection (c) of this section in a manner that is linguistically accommodated to help the student acquire English language proficiency; and

(4) provide intensive and ongoing foundational second language acquisition instruction to ELLs in Grade 3 or higher who are at the beginning or intermediate level of English language proficiency in listening, speaking, reading, and/or writing as determined by the state's English language proficiency assessment system. These ELLs require focused, targeted, and systematic second language acquisition instruction to provide them with the foundation of English language vocabulary, grammar, syntax, and English mechanics necessary to support content-based instruction and accelerated learning of English.

(c) Cross-curricular second language acquisition essential knowledge and skills.

(1) Cross-curricular second language acquisition/learning strategies. The ELL uses language learning strategies to develop an awareness of his or her own learning processes in all content areas. In order for the ELL to meet grade-level learning expectations across the foundation and enrichment curriculum, all instruction delivered in English must be linguistically accommodated (communicated, sequenced, and scaffolded) commensurate with the student's level of English language proficiency. The student is expected to:

(A) use prior knowledge and experiences to understand meanings in English;

(B) monitor oral and written language production and employ self-corrective techniques or other resources;

(C) use strategic learning techniques such as concept mapping, drawing, memorizing, comparing, contrasting, and reviewing to acquire basic and grade-level vocabulary;

(D) speak using learning strategies such as requesting assistance, employing non- verbal cues, and using synonyms and circumlocution (conveying ideas by defining or describing when exact English words are not known);

(E) internalize new basic and academic language by using and reusing it in meaningful ways in speaking and writing activities that build concept and language attainment;

(F) use accessible language and learn new and essential language in the process;

(G) demonstrate an increasing ability to distinguish between formal and informal English and an increasing knowledge of when to use each one commensurate with grade-level learning expectations; and

(H) develop and expand repertoire of learning strategies such as reasoning inductively or deductively, looking for patterns in language, and analyzing sayings and expressions commensurate with grade-level learning expectations.

(2) Cross-curricular second language acquisition/listening. The ELL listens to a variety of speakers including teachers, peers, and electronic media to gain an increasing level of comprehension of newly acquired language in all content areas. ELLs may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in listening. In order for the ELL to meet grade-level learning expectations across the foundation and enrichment curriculum, all instruction delivered in English must be linguistically accommodated (communicated, sequenced, and scaffolded) commensurate with the student's level of English language proficiency. The student is expected to:

(A) distinguish sounds and intonation patterns of English with increasing ease;

(B) recognize elements of the English sound system in newly acquired vocabulary such as long and short vowels, silent letters, and consonant clusters;

(C) learn new language structures, expressions, and basic and academic vocabulary heard during classroom instruction and interactions;

(D) monitor understanding of spoken language during classroom instruction and interactions and seek clarification as needed;

(E) use visual, contextual, and linguistic support to enhance and confirm understanding of increasingly complex and elaborated spoken language;

(F) listen to and derive meaning from a variety of media such as audio tape, video, DVD, and CD ROM to build and reinforce concept and language attainment;

(G) understand the general meaning, main points, and important details of spoken language ranging from situations in which topics, language, and contexts are familiar to unfamiliar;

(H) understand implicit ideas and information in increasingly complex spoken language commensurate with grade-level learning expectations; and

(I) demonstrate listening comprehension of increasingly complex spoken English by following directions, retelling or summarizing spoken messages, responding to questions and requests, collaborating with peers, and taking notes commensurate with content and grade-level needs.

(3) Cross-curricular second language acquisition/speaking. The ELL speaks in a variety of modes for a variety of purposes with an awareness of different language registers (formal/informal) using vocabulary with increasing fluency and accuracy in language arts and all content areas. ELLs may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in speaking. In order for the ELL to meet grade-level learning expectations across the foundation and enrichment curriculum, all instruction delivered in English must be linguistically accommodated (communicated, sequenced, and scaffolded) commensurate with the student's level of English language proficiency. The student is expected to:

(A) practice producing sounds of newly acquired vocabulary such as long and short vowels, silent letters, and consonant clusters to pronounce English words in a manner that is increasingly comprehensible;

(B) expand and internalize initial English vocabulary by learning and using high-frequency English words necessary for identifying and describing people, places, and objects, by retelling simple stories and basic information represented or supported by pictures, and by learning and using routine language needed for classroom communication;

(C) speak using a variety of grammatical structures, sentence lengths, sentence types, and connecting words with increasing accuracy and ease as more English is acquired;

(D) speak using grade-level content area vocabulary in context to internalize new English words and build academic language proficiency;

(E) share information in cooperative learning interactions;

(F) ask and give information ranging from using a very limited bank of high-frequency, high-need, concrete vocabulary, including key words and expressions needed for basic communication in academic and social contexts, to using abstract and content-based vocabulary during extended speaking assignments;

(G) express opinions, ideas, and feelings ranging from communicating single words and short phrases to participating in extended discussions on a variety of social and grade-appropriate academic topics;

(H) narrate, describe, and explain with increasing specificity and detail as more English is acquired;

(I) adapt spoken language appropriately for formal and informal purposes; and

(J) respond orally to information presented in a wide variety of print, electronic, audio, and visual media to build and reinforce concept and language attainment.

(4) Cross-curricular second language acquisition/reading. The ELL reads a variety of texts for a variety of purposes with an increasing level of comprehension in all content areas. ELLs may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in reading. In order for the ELL to meet grade-level learning expectations across the foundation and enrichment curriculum, all instruction delivered in English must be linguistically accommodated (communicated, sequenced, and scaffolded) commensurate with the student's level of English language proficiency. For Kindergarten and Grade 1, certain of these student expectations apply to text read aloud for students not yet at the stage of decoding written text. The student is expected to:

(A) learn relationships between sounds and letters of the English language and decode (sound out) words using a combination of skills such as recognizing sound-letter relationships and identifying cognates, affixes, roots, and base words;

(B) recognize directionality of English reading such as left to right and top to bottom;

(C) develop basic sight vocabulary, derive meaning of environmental print, and comprehend English vocabulary and language structures used routinely in written classroom materials;

(D) use prereading supports such as graphic organizers, illustrations, and pretaught topic-related vocabulary and other prereading activities to enhance comprehension of written text;

(E) read linguistically accommodated content area material with a decreasing need for linguistic accommodations as more English is learned;

(F) use visual and contextual support and support from peers and teachers to read grade-appropriate content area text, enhance and confirm understanding, and develop vocabulary, grasp of language structures, and background knowledge needed to comprehend increasingly challenging language;

(G) demonstrate comprehension of increasingly complex English by participating in shared reading, retelling or summarizing material, responding to questions, and taking notes commensurate with content area and grade level needs;

(H) read silently with increasing ease and comprehension for longer periods;

(I) demonstrate English comprehension and expand reading skills by employing basic reading skills such as demonstrating understanding of supporting ideas and details in text and graphic sources, summarizing text, and distinguishing main ideas from details commensurate with content area needs;

(J) demonstrate English comprehension and expand reading skills by employing inferential skills such as predicting, making connections between ideas, drawing inferences and conclusions from text and graphic sources, and finding supporting text evidence commensurate with content area needs; and

(K) demonstrate English comprehension and expand reading skills by employing analytical skills such as evaluating written information and performing critical analyses commensurate with content area and grade-level needs.

(5) Cross-curricular second language acquisition/writing. The ELL writes in a variety of forms with increasing accuracy to effectively address a specific purpose and audience in all content areas. ELLs may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in writing. In order for the ELL to meet grade-level learning expectations across foundation and enrichment curriculum, all instruction delivered in English must be linguistically accommodated (communicated, sequenced, and scaffolded) commensurate with the student's level of English language proficiency. For Kindergarten and Grade 1, certain of these student expectations do not apply until the student has reached the stage of generating original written text using a standard writing system. The student is expected to:

(A) learn relationships between sounds and letters of the English language to represent sounds when writing in English;

(B) write using newly acquired basic vocabulary and content-based grade-level vocabulary;

(C) spell familiar English words with increasing accuracy, and employ English spelling patterns and rules with increasing accuracy as more English is acquired;

(D) edit writing for standard grammar and usage, including subject-verb agreement, pronoun agreement, and appropriate verb tenses commensurate with grade-level expectations as more English is acquired;

(E) employ increasingly complex grammatical structures in content area writing commensurate with grade-level expectations, such as:

(i) using correct verbs, tenses, and pronouns/antecedents;

(ii) using possessive case (apostrophe s) correctly; and

(iii) using negatives and contractions correctly;

(F) write using a variety of grade-appropriate sentence lengths, patterns, and connecting words to combine phrases, clauses, and sentences in increasingly accurate ways as more English is acquired; and

(G) narrate, describe, and explain with increasing specificity and detail to fulfill content area writing needs as more English is acquired.

(d) Proficiency level descriptors.

(1)Listening, Kindergarten-Grade 12. ELLs may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in listening. The following proficiency level descriptors for listening are sufficient to describe the overall English language proficiency levels of ELLs in this language domain in order to linguistically accommodate their instruction.

(A)Beginning. Beginning ELLs have little or no ability to understand spoken English in academic and social settings. These students:

(i) struggle to understand simple conversations and simple discussions even when the topics are familiar and the speaker uses linguistic supports such as visuals, slower speech and other verbal cues, and gestures;

(ii) struggle to identify and distinguish individual words and phrases during social and instructional interactions that have not been intentionally modified for ELLs; and

(iii) may not seek clarification in English when failing to comprehend the English they hear; frequently remain silent, watching others for cues.

(B)Intermediate. Intermediate ELLs have the ability to understand simple, high-frequency spoken English used in routine academic and social settings. These students:

(i) usually understand simple or routine directions, as well as short, simple conversations and short, simple discussions on familiar topics; when topics are unfamiliar, require extensive linguistic supports and adaptations such as visuals, slower speech and other verbal cues,simplified language,gestures,and preteaching to preview or build topic-related vocabulary;

(ii) often identify and distinguish key words and phrases necessary to understand the general meaning during social and basic instructional interactions that have not been intentionally modified for ELLs; and

(iii) have the ability to seek clarification in English when failing to comprehend the English they hear by requiring/requesting the speaker to repeat, slow down, or rephrase speech.

(C) Advanced. Advanced ELLs have the ability to understand, with second language acquisition support, grade-appropriate spoken English used in academic and social settings. These students:

(i) usually understand longer, more elaborated directions, conversations, and discussions on familiar and some unfamiliar topics, but sometimes need processing time and sometimes depend on visuals, verbal cues, and gestures to support understanding;

(ii) understand most main points, most important details, and some implicit information during social and basic instructional interactions that have not been intentionally modified for ELLs; and

(iii) occasionally require/request the speaker to repeat, slow down, or rephrase to clarify the meaning of the English they hear.

(D) Advanced high. Advanced high ELLs have the ability to understand, with minimal second language acquisition support, grade-appropriate spoken English used in academic and social settings. These students:

(i) understand longer, elaborated directions, conversations, and discussions on familiar and unfamiliar topics with occasional need for processing time and with little dependence on visuals, verbal cues, and gestures; some exceptions when complex academic or highly specialized language is used;

(ii) understand main points, important details, and implicit information at a level nearly comparable to native English-speaking peers during social and instructional interactions; and

(iii) rarely require/request the speaker to repeat, slow down, or rephrase to clarify the meaning of the English they hear.

(2)Speaking, Kindergarten-Grade 12. ELLs may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in speaking. The following proficiency level descriptors for speaking are sufficient to describe the overall English language proficiency levels of ELLs in this language domain in order to linguistically accommodate their instruction.

(A) Beginning. Beginning ELLs have little or no ability to speak English in academic and social settings. These students:

(i) mainly speak using single words and short phrases consisting of recently practiced, memorized, or highly familiar material to get immediate needs met; may be hesitant to speak and often give up in their attempts to communicate;

(ii) speak using a very limited bank of high-frequency, high-need, concrete vocabulary, including key words and expressions needed for basic communication in academic and social contexts;

(iii) lack the knowledge of English grammar necessary to connect ideas and speak in sentences; can sometimes produce sentences using recently practiced, memorized, or highly familiar material;

(iv) exhibit second language acquisition errors that may hinder overall communication, particularly when trying to convey information beyond memorized, practiced, or highly familiar material; and

(v) typically use pronunciation that significantly inhibits communication.

(B)Intermediate. Intermediate ELLs have the ability to speak in a simple manner using English commonly heard in routine academic and social settings. These students:

(i) are able to express simple, original messages, speak using sentences, and participate in short conversations and classroom interactions; may hesitate frequently and for long periods to think about how to communicate desired meaning;

(ii) speak simply using basic vocabulary needed in everyday social interactions and routine academic contexts; rarely have vocabulary to speak in detail;

(iii) exhibit an emerging awareness of English grammar and speak using mostly simple sentence structures and simple tenses; are most comfortable speaking in present tense;

(iv) exhibit second language acquisition errors that may hinder overall communication when trying to use complex or less familiar English; and

(v) use pronunciation that can usually be understood by people accustomed to interacting with ELLs.

(C) Advanced. Advanced ELLs have the ability to speak using grade-appropriate English, with second language acquisition support, in academic and social settings. These students:

(i) are able to participate comfortably in most conversations and academic discussions on familiar topics, with some pauses to restate, repeat, or search for words and phrases to clarify meaning;

(ii) discuss familiar academic topics using content-based terms and common abstract vocabulary; can usually speak in some detail on familiar topics;

(iii) have a grasp of basic grammar features, including a basic ability to narrate and describe in present, past, and future tenses; have an emerging ability to use complex sentences and complex grammar features;

(iv) make errors that interfere somewhat with communication when using complex grammar structures, long sentences, and less familiar words and expressions; and

(v) may mispronounce words, but use pronunciation that can usually be understood by people not accustomed to interacting with ELLs.

(D) Advanced high. Advanced high ELLs have the ability to speak using grade-appropriate English, with minimal second language acquisition support, in academic and social settings. These students:

(i) are able to participate in extended discussions on a variety of social and grade-appropriate academic topics with only occasional disruptions, hesitations, or pauses;

(ii) communicate effectively using abstract and content-based vocabulary during classroom instructional tasks, with some exceptions when low-frequency or academically demanding vocabulary is needed; use many of the same idioms and colloquialisms as their native English-speaking peers;

(iii) can use English grammar structures and complex sentences to narrate and describe at a level nearly comparable to native English-speaking peers;

(iv) make few second language acquisition errors that interfere with overall communication; and

(v) may mispronounce words, but rarely use pronunciation that interferes with overall communication.

(3) Reading, Kindergarten-Grade 1. ELLs in Kindergarten and Grade 1 may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in reading. The following proficiency level descriptors for reading are sufficient to describe the overall English language proficiency levels of ELLs in this language domain in order to linguistically accommodate their instruction and should take into account developmental stages of emergent readers.

(A) Beginning. Beginning ELLs have little or no ability to use the English language to build foundational reading skills. These students:

(i) derive little or no meaning from grade-appropriate stories read aloud in English, unless the stories are:

(I) read in short "chunks;"

(II) controlled to include the little English they know such as language that is high frequency, concrete, and recently practiced; and

(III) accompanied by ample visual supports such as illustrations, gestures, pantomime, and objects and by linguistic supports such as careful enunciation and slower speech;

(ii) begin to recognize and understand environmental print in English such as signs, labeled items, names of peers, and logos; and

(iii) have difficulty decoding most grade-appropriate English text because they:

(I) understand the meaning of very few words in English; and

(II) struggle significantly with sounds in spoken English words and with sound-symbol relationships due to differences between their primary language and English.

(B) Intermediate. Intermediate ELLs have a limited ability to use the English language to build foundational reading skills. These students:

(i) demonstrate limited comprehension (key words and general meaning) of grade-appropriate stories read aloud in English, unless the stories include:

(I) predictable story lines;

(II) highly familiar topics;

(III) primarily high-frequency, concrete vocabulary;

(IV) short, simple sentences; and

(V) visual and linguistic supports;

(ii) regularly recognize and understand common environmental print in English such as signs, labeled items, names of peers, logos; and

(iii) have difficulty decoding grade-appropriate English text because they:

(I) understand the meaning of only those English words they hear frequently; and

(II) struggle with some sounds in English words and some sound-symbol relationships due to differences between their primary language and English.

(C) Advanced. Advanced ELLs have the ability to use the English language, with second language acquisition support, to build foundational reading skills. These students:

(i) demonstrate comprehension of most main points and most supporting ideas in grade-appropriate stories read aloud in English, although they may still depend on visual and linguistic supports to gain or confirm meaning;

(ii) recognize some basic English vocabulary and high-frequency words in isolated print; and

(iii) with second language acquisition support, are able to decode most grade-appropriate English text because they:

(I) understand the meaning of most grade-appropriate English words; and

(II) have little difficulty with English sounds and sound-symbol relationships that result from differences between their primary language and English.

(D) Advanced high. Advanced high ELLs have the ability to use the English language, with minimal second language acquisition support, to build foundational reading skills. These students:

(i) demonstrate, with minimal second language acquisition support and at a level nearly comparable to native English-speaking peers, comprehension of main points and supporting ideas (explicit and implicit) in grade-appropriate stories read aloud in English;

(ii) with some exceptions, recognize sight vocabulary and high-frequency words to a degree nearly comparable to that of native English-speaking peers; and

(iii) with minimal second language acquisition support, have an ability to decode and understand grade-appropriate English text at a level nearly comparable to native English-speaking peers.

(4)Reading, Grades 2-12. ELLs in Grades 2-12 may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in reading. The following proficiency level descriptors for reading are sufficient to describe the overall English language proficiency levels of ELLs in this language domain in order to linguistically accommodate their instruction.

(A) Beginning. Beginning ELLs have little or no ability to read and understand English used in academic and social contexts. These students:

(i) read and understand the very limited recently practiced, memorized, or highly familiar English they have learned; vocabulary predominantly includes:

(I) environmental print;

(II) some very high-frequency words; and

(III) concrete words that can be represented by pictures;

(ii) read slowly, word by word;

(iii) have a very limited sense of English language structures;

(iv) comprehend predominantly isolated familiar words and phrases; comprehend some sentences in highly routine contexts or recently practiced, highly familiar text;

(v) are highly dependent on visuals and prior knowledge to derive meaning from text in English; and

(vi) are able to apply reading comprehension skills in English only when reading texts written for this level.

(B) Intermediate. Intermediate ELLs have the ability to read and understand simple, high-frequency English used in routine academic and social contexts. These students:

(i) read and understand English vocabulary on a somewhat wider range of topics and with increased depth; vocabulary predominantly includes:

(I) everyday oral language;

(II) literal meanings of common words;

(III) routine academic language and terms; and

(IV) commonly used abstract language such as terms used to describe basic feelings;

(ii) often read slowly and in short phrases; may re-read to clarify meaning;

(iii) have a growing understanding of basic, routinely used English language structures;

(iv) understand simple sentences in short, connected texts, but are dependent on visual cues, topic familiarity, prior knowledge, pretaught topic-related vocabulary, story predictability, and teacher/peer assistance to sustain comprehension;

(v) struggle to independently read and understand grade-level texts; and

(vi) are able to apply basic and some higher-order comprehension skills when reading texts that are linguistically accommodated and/or simplified for this level.

(C) Advanced. Advanced ELLs have the ability to read and understand, with second language acquisition support, grade-appropriate English used in academic and social contexts. These students:

(i) read and understand, with second language acquisition support, a variety of grade-appropriate English vocabulary used in social and academic contexts:

(I) with second language acquisition support, read and understand grade-appropriate concrete and abstract vocabulary, but have difficulty with less commonly encountered words;

(II) demonstrate an emerging ability to understand words and phrases beyond their literal meaning; and

(III) understand multiple meanings of commonly used words;

(ii) read longer phrases and simple sentences from familiar text with appropriate rate and speed;

(iii) are developing skill in using their growing familiarity with English language structures to construct meaning of grade-appropriate text; and

(iv) are able to apply basic and higher-order comprehension skills when reading grade-appropriate text, but are still occasionally dependent on visuals, teacher/peer assistance, and other linguistically accommodated text features to determine or clarify meaning, particularly with unfamiliar topics.

(D) Advanced high. Advanced high ELLs have the ability to read and understand, with minimal second language acquisition support, grade-appropriate English used in academic and social contexts. These students:

(i) read and understand vocabulary at a level nearly comparable to that of their native English-speaking peers, with some exceptions when low-frequency or specialized vocabulary is used;

(ii) generally read grade-appropriate, familiar text with appropriate rate, speed, intonation, and expression;

(iii) are able to, at a level nearly comparable to native English-speaking peers, use their familiarity with English language structures to construct meaning of grade-appropriate text; and

(iv) are able to apply, with minimal second language acquisition support and at a level nearly comparable to native English-speaking peers, basic and higher-order comprehension skills when reading grade-appropriate text.

(5) Writing, Kindergarten-Grade 1. ELLs in Kindergarten and Grade 1 may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in writing. The following proficiency level descriptors for writing are sufficient to describe the overall English language proficiency levels of ELLs in this language domain in order to linguistically accommodate their instruction and should take into account developmental stages of emergent writers.

(A) Beginning. Beginning ELLs have little or no ability to use the English language to build foundational writing skills. These students:

(i) are unable to use English to explain self-generated writing such as stories they have created or other personal expressions, including emergent forms of writing (pictures, letter-like forms, mock words, scribbling, etc.);

(ii) know too little English to participate meaningfully in grade-appropriate shared writing activities using the English language;

(iii) cannot express themselves meaningfully in self-generated, connected written text in English beyond the level of high-frequency, concrete words, phrases, or short sentences that have been recently practiced and/or memorized; and

(iv) may demonstrate little or no awareness of English print conventions.

(B) Intermediate. Intermediate ELLs have a limited ability to use the English language to build foundational writing skills. These students:

(i) know enough English to explain briefly and simply self-generated writing, including emergent forms of writing, as long as the topic is highly familiar and concrete and requires very high-frequency English;

(ii) can participate meaningfully in grade-appropriate shared writing activities using the English language only when the writing topic is highly familiar and concrete and requires very high-frequency English;

(iii) express themselves meaningfully in self-generated, connected written text in English when their writing is limited to short sentences featuring simple, concrete English used frequently in class; and

(iv) frequently exhibit features of their primary language when writing in English such as primary language words, spelling patterns, word order, and literal translating.

(C) Advanced. Advanced ELLs have the ability to use the English language to build, with second language acquisition support, foundational writing skills. These students:

(i) use predominantly grade-appropriate English to explain, in some detail, most self-generated writing, including emergent forms of writing;

(ii) can participate meaningfully, with second language acquisition support, in most grade-appropriate shared writing activities using the English language;

(iii) although second language acquisition support is needed, have an emerging ability to express themselves in self-generated, connected written text in English in a grade-appropriate manner; and

(iv) occasionally exhibit second language acquisition errors when writing in English.

(D) Advanced high. Advanced high ELLs have the ability to use the English language to build, with minimal second language acquisition support, foundational writing skills. These students:

(i) use English at a level of complexity and detail nearly comparable to that of native English-speaking peers when explaining self-generated writing, including emergent forms of writing;

(ii) can participate meaningfully in most grade-appropriate shared writing activities using the English language; and

(iii) although minimal second language acquisition support may be needed, express themselves in self-generated, connected written text in English in a manner nearly comparable to their native English-speaking peers.

(6)Writing, Grades 2-12. ELLs in Grades 2-12 may be at the beginning, intermediate, advanced, or advanced high stage of English language acquisition in writing. The following proficiency level descriptors for writing are sufficient to describe the overall English language proficiency levels of ELLs in this language domain in order to linguistically accommodate their instruction.

(A) Beginning. Beginning ELLs lack the English vocabulary and grasp of English language structures necessary to address grade-appropriate writing tasks meaningfully. These students:

(i) have little or no ability to use the English language to express ideas in writing and engage meaningfully in grade-appropriate writing assignments in content area instruction;

(ii) lack the English necessary to develop or demonstrate elements of grade-appropriate writing such as focus and coherence, conventions, organization, voice, and development of ideas in English; and

(iii) exhibit writing features typical at this level, including:

(I) ability to label, list, and copy;

(II) high-frequency words/phrases and short, simple sentences (or even short paragraphs) based primarily on recently practiced, memorized, or highly familiar material; this type of writing may be quite accurate;

(III) present tense used primarily; and

(IV) frequent primary language features (spelling patterns, word order, literal translations, and words from the student's primary language) and other errors associated with second language acquisition may significantly hinder or prevent understanding, even for individuals accustomed to the writing of ELLs.

(B) Intermediate. Intermediate ELLs have enough English vocabulary and enough grasp of English language structures to address grade-appropriate writing tasks in a limited way. These students:

(i) have a limited ability to use the English language to express ideas in writing and engage meaningfully in grade-appropriate writing assignments in content area instruction;

(ii) are limited in their ability to develop or demonstrate elements of grade-appropriate writing in English; communicate best when topics are highly familiar and concrete, and require simple, high-frequency English; and

(iii) exhibit writing features typical at this level, including:

(I) simple, original messages consisting of short, simple sentences; frequent inaccuracies occur when creating or taking risks beyond familiar English;

(II) high-frequency vocabulary; academic writing often has an oral tone;

(III) loosely connected text with limited use of cohesive devices or repetitive use, which may cause gaps in meaning;

(IV) repetition of ideas due to lack of vocabulary and language structures;

(V) present tense used most accurately; simple future and past tenses, if attempted, are used inconsistently or with frequent inaccuracies;

(VI) undetailed descriptions, explanations, and narrations; difficulty expressing abstract ideas;

(VII) primary language features and errors associated with second language acquisition may be frequent; and

(VIII) some writing may be understood only by individuals accustomed to the writing of ELLs; parts of the writing may be hard to understand even for individuals accustomed to ELL writing.

(C) Advanced. Advanced ELLs have enough English vocabulary and command of English language structures to address grade-appropriate writing tasks, although second language acquisition support is needed. These students:

(i) are able to use the English language, with second language acquisition support, to express ideas in writing and engage meaningfully in grade-appropriate writing assignments in content area instruction;

(ii) know enough English to be able to develop or demonstrate elements of grade-appropriate writing in English, although second language acquisition support is particularly needed when topics are abstract, academically challenging, or unfamiliar; and

(iii) exhibit writing features typical at this level, including:

(I) grasp of basic verbs, tenses, grammar features, and sentence patterns; partial grasp of more complex verbs, tenses, grammar features, and sentence patterns;

(II) emerging grade-appropriate vocabulary; academic writing has a more academic tone;

(III) use of a variety of common cohesive devices, although some redundancy may occur;

(IV) narrations, explanations, and descriptions developed in some detail with emerging clarity; quality or quantity declines when abstract ideas are expressed, academic demands are high, or low-frequency vocabulary is required;

(V) occasional second language acquisition errors; and

(VI) communications are usually understood by individuals not accustomed to the writing of ELLs.

(D) Advanced high. Advanced high ELLs have acquired the English vocabulary and command of English language structures necessary to address grade-appropriate writing tasks with minimal second language acquisition support. These students:

(i) are able to use the English language, with minimal second language acquisition support, to express ideas in writing and engage meaningfully in grade-appropriate writing assignments in content area instruction;

(ii) know enough English to be able to develop or demonstrate, with minimal second language acquisition support, elements of grade-appropriate writing in English; and

(iii) exhibit writing features typical at this level, including:

(I) nearly comparable to writing of native English-speaking peers in clarity and precision with regard to English vocabulary and language structures, with occasional exceptions when writing about academically complex ideas, abstract ideas, or topics requiring low-frequency vocabulary;

(II) occasional difficulty with naturalness of phrasing and expression; and

(III) errors associated with second language acquisition are minor and usually limited to low-frequency words and structures; errors rarely interfere with communication.

(e) Effective date. The provisions of this section supersede the ESL standards specified in Chapter 128 of this title (relating to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills for Spanish Language Arts and English as a Second Language) upon the effective date of this section.

Source: The provisions of this 74.4 adopted to be effective December 25, 2007, 32 TexReg 9615.

74.5. Academic Achievement Record (Transcript).

(a) The commissioner of education shall develop and distribute to each school district and institution of higher education the state guidelines for a common academic achievement record and coding system for courses and instructions for recording information on the academic achievement record. Each school district must use the coding system provided by the commissioner.

(b) Following guidelines developed by the commissioner, each school district must use an academic achievement record (transcript) form that includes the following:

(1) student demographics;

(2) school data;

(3) student data; and

(4) the record of courses and credits earned.

(c) The academic achievement record shall serve as the academic record for each student and must be maintained permanently by the district. Each district must ensure that copies of the record are made available for a student transferring from one district to another. To ensure appropriate placement of a transfer student, a district must respond promptly to each request for student records from a receiving school district.

(d) Any credit earned by a student must be recorded on the academic achievement record, regardless of when the credit was earned.

(e) A student who completes high school graduation requirements shall have attached to the academic achievement record a seal approved by the SBOE.

(f) A student who completes the requirements for an endorsement shall have the endorsement clearly indicated on the academic achievement record.

(g) A student who earns a performance acknowledgment shall have the performance acknowledgment clearly indicated on the academic achievement record.

(h) A student who earns the distinguished level of achievement shall have the distinguished level of achievement clearly indicated on the academic achievement record.

(i) A student who demonstrates proficiency in speech as specified in §74.11(a)(3) of this title (relating to High School Graduation Requirements) shall have completion of the speech requirement clearly indicated on the academic achievement record.

(j) A student who completes the required instruction in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) as specified in §74.38 of this title (relating to Requirements for Instruction in Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR)) in Grade 9, 10, 11, or 12 shall have completion of the CPR instruction clearly indicated on the academic achievement record.

(k) A student who completes the required instruction on proper interaction with peace officers shall have completion of the instruction clearly indicated on the academic achievement record.

(l) A student who satisfies a languages other than English graduation credit requirement by successfully completing a dual language immersion program at an elementary school in accordance with §74.12(b)(5)(F) of this title (relating to Foundation High School Program) shall have the credit clearly indicated on the academic achievement record.

(m) A student who completes all graduation requirements except for required end-of-course assessment instruments may be issued a certificate of coursework completion. The academic achievement record will include a notation of the date such a certificate was issued to the student.

Statutory Authority: The provisions of this §74.5 issued under the Texas Education Code, §§7.102(c)(13), 28.0023, and 28.025.

Source: The provisions of this §74.5 adopted to be effective June 18, 2014, 39 TexReg 4652; amended to be effective May 24, 2016, 41 TexReg 3689; amended to be effective August 27, 2018, 43 TexReg 4188.

74.6. College and Career Readiness and Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills Alignment.

(a) In accordance with the Texas Education Code, §28.008, the State Board of Education shall incorporate College and Career Readiness Standards approved by the commissioner of education and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board into the essential knowledge and skills and indicate the alignment of the College and Career Readiness Standards with the essential knowledge and skills.

(b) The figure in this subsection identifies the alignment of the College and Career Readiness Standards for mathematics with the essential knowledge and skills.
Figure: 19 TAC §74.6(b)
(c) The figure in this subsection identifies the alignment of the College and Career Readiness Standards for science with the essential knowledge and skills.
Figure: 19 TAC §74.6(c)
(d) The figure in this subsection identifies the alignment of the College and Career Readiness Standards for social studies with the essential knowledge and skills.
Figure: 19 TAC §74.6(d)
(e) The figure in this subsection identifies the alignment of the College and Career Readiness Standards for cross-disciplinary studies with the essential knowledge and skills.
Figure: 19 TAC §74.6(e)
(f) The figure in this subsection identifies the alignment of the College and Career Readiness Standards for English language arts with the essential knowledge and skills.
Figure: 19 TAC §74.6(f)
Statutory Authority: The provisions of this §74.6 issued under the Texas Education Code, §28.008.

Source: The provisions of this §74.6 adopted to be effective April 6, 2016, 41 TexReg 2479; amended to be effective November 24, 2019, 44 TexReg 7049.

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Chapter 74. Curriculum Requirements Subchapter A. Required Curriculum Statutory Authority: The provisions of this Subchapter A issued under the Texas Education Code, 7.102, 28.002, 28.023, 28.025, 28.054, and 38.003, unless otherwise noted. 74.1. Essential Knowledge and Skills.

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Texas House Bill 3

Texas School Finance, HB 3, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019)

Statutory Law

https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/pdf/HB00003F.pdf#navpanes=0

The law outlines a new state mandate in financial college preparatory practices. With Texas HB 3, all high school seniors are required to complete a financial aid application as a requirement of high school graduation. The law allows students to use FAFSA, TAFSA, or a signed opt-out option to meet the requirement. The law was designed as a tool to help students utilize available funding  by providing mandated financial college preparation in hopes of increasing enrollment in higher education.

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Padlet Slide #10 Local Administrative Law/Policy/Rule

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Padlet Slide #10 Local Administrative Law/Policy/Rule

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Waco ISD, although not an official Early College High School, offers an accelerated program for high school students that allows them to earn up to a full associate degree by high school graduation. As a requirement for entry into the program, the ISD created a rule that requires all students joining the program to take part in a two week summer camp that is designed to prepare them for the Texas Success Initiative (TSI), a college exam that determines each student's ability to successfully complete college-level work. Attendance for the camp is mandatory to ensure that all students are receiving the college preparatory materials necessary for the students to not only perform well on the exam, but also in their college coursework.

Waco Independent School District. (n.d.). Advanced Academics / Accelerate: Early Degree Program. Retrieved from https://www.wacoisd.org/Page/6493

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Advanced Academics / Accelerate: Early Degree Program

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The ACCELERATE Early Degree Program selection committee will be comprised of a group of educators and administrators who will meet at the beginning of February to review the applications of students interested in participation in the program. Students will be chosen to ensure that the group of participants accurately reflect the demographics of Waco Independent School District as a whole.

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Sub-section (d) under section A.3 of the ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors states that data will be used to “determine needed interventions, which are then delivered to help close the information, attainment, achievement and opportunity gaps” (ASCA, 2016). This specific ethical standard directly aligns with the legal requirements of college preparatory coursework in the state of Texas because the state uses benchmarks to determine each student’s ability to be successful in college, also known as college readiness, and then uses the data to make educational improvements for those students. Data is gathered to determine which students failed to meet the college readiness standards and those students are then placed in a college preparatory course, as mandated by TEC § 28.014, that provides intervention to make college readiness attainable.

ASCA. (2016). ASCA ethical standards for school counselors. Alexandria, VA. Retrieved from https://www.schoolcounselor.org/asca/media/asca/Ethics/EthicalStandards2016.pdf

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The Texas Education Agency (TEA) has created a guide that is designed as a way to explain all of the pertinent information regarding House Bill 5, which later became TEC § 28.014, so administrators can gain an in-depth understanding of the law and know how to best implement it in their districts. The guide provides information about how and who can receive credit for the state mandated college preparatory courses, who is eligible to take them, and the impact of assessment testing on the determination of successful course completion.

Texas Education Agency. (n.d.). HB 5: Other frequently asked questions. Retrieved from https://tx01923126.schoolwires.net/cms/lib/TX01923126/Centricity/Domain/175/external/collegeprep-faq.pdf

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Padlet Slide #13 Bulleted list of Recommendations / Best Practices for Compliance

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Padlet Slide #13 Bulleted list of Recommendations / Best Practices for Compliance

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With the requirements of TEC §28.014, Texas HB 3, and 19 TAC §74.6 it is evident that school districts have distinct requirements of college preparation. Districts can use these outlined best practices as a way to ensure they are meeting the requirements of educational and financial college preparation.

1.   Develop a strong relationship with the district's institution of higher education (IHE) partner. This partner will be able to help align college course standards with the knowledge and skills of secondary education as outlined in 19 TAC §74.6, provide resources like FAFSA workshops to meet the requirements in Texas HB 3, and help develop college preparatory courses as required by TEC §28.014.

2. Take the necessary steps to become a TSI testing site. This will allow the district to not only determine "college readiness" through the TSI benchmark as outlined in TEC §28.014, but also potentially reduce test anxiety for students anxious about collegiate testing.

3. Host FAFSA and TAFSA workshops on evenings to allow student and parent participation. With the graduation requirement of financial aid applications in Texas HB 3, it will be a necessity to provide families with a means to complete the requirement on campus because all families may not have access to computers or internet at home.

4. Develop tracking instruments to ensure that all students required to take college preparatory courses, as outline in TEC §28.014, are meeting the requirement. Electronic tracking instruments such as Excel spreadsheets or district databases would allow for easier access to information.

5. Gain access to the financial aid data of your district students in College Board (Kreighbaum, 2019). Although the financial aid application requirement does not go into effect until the 2021-2022 school year, it may be beneficial for districts to start monitoring the percentage of completion for their districts now. This would give valuable information into how much work the district will need to do to be in compliance with the law, and ensure that all students will be eligible to graduate in the 21-22 school year.

6. Host PSAT/ACT/SAT camps for free on high school campuses. This would reduce the achievement gap between high and low-income families on these tests, and provide all students with equal opportunities of educational success.