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The Federalist Papers, the Commerce Clause, and federal tort reform

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The Federalist Papers, the Commerce Clause, and federal tort reform

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Paul Taylor

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The Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 under the pen name "Publius." The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.

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The Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 under the pen name "Publius." The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.

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http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html

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http://slideplayer.com/slide/7010844/24/images/54/2.6+What+was+the+purpose+of+the+Federalist+Papers.jpg

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This section of seven chapters analyzes the many problems involved in setting up a just and equitable system of taxation, and in reconciling the conflicting claims of various taxing authorities at all levels of government — federal, state, and local.In Chapter 30, the national government under the Articles of Confederation lacked the revenues necessary for carrying out its purposes because a faulty fiscal system made it dependent on quotas and requisitions from the thirteen individual states. A national, government, properly constituted, should have the power to raise its own revenues by the methods of taxation ordinarily used in every well-ordered "civil government."Adequate national revenues, as some argued, could not be raised by external" taxes alone, that is, by customs duties on foreign imports. The central government should be empowered to levy "internal" taxes also, as necessity required.In Chapter 31, opening this essay with a disquisition on the eternal verities of geometry and other sciences, Hamilton observed that politics was not an exact science because it dealt with the "unruly passions of the human heart," and therefore tended to be rather irrational. Among the more irrational, Hamilton added, were those who opposed the proposed constitution from fear that the national government by its "unlimited" taxing measures might deprive the states of the means of providing for their own needs.It would be the other way around if this point came into contest, said Hamilton. It was probable that the states, being closer to the people, would encroach more on the revenue-raising plans of the central government than otherwise.In Chapter 32, states should retain their "independent and uncontrollable authority" to levy taxes for their own purposes, with the exception of laying customs duties on foreign imports and exports, or tariffs on any articles in interstate commerce. There was to be absolutely free trade among the states, which would stimulate the national economy.In Chapter 33, opponents of ratification were raising objections to several clauses in the proposed constitution. The first of these clauses empowered the national government to "make all laws" deemed necessary and proper for executing the powers vested in the national government under the Constitution. The second clause declared that all laws passed and all treaties signed by the national government were to be "the supreme law of the land; any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Anti-ratificationists cited these clauses as "pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated."Hamilton dismissed such views as gross "misrepresentation." Power was the ability or faculty of doing a thing, and the ability to do a thing rested on the power to employ means necessary for its execution. This was true in the matter of laying and collecting taxes: though a law laying a tax for the use of the United States would be a supreme law that could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a law preventing the states from collecting a tax would not be supreme law because it would be unconstitutional.Chapter 34 takes up the subject of "CONCURRENT JURISDICTION" in the matter of taxes. Under the proposed constitution, the right of the national government to raise necessary revenues would be "altogether unlimited," while the revenue-raising power of individual states would be only moderately circumscribed under the plan of concurrent jurisdiction. Each would have its field, and there would not be any "sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States."In Chapter 35, Hamilton posed a question here: What if the national government, as some proposed, should be empowered to raise revenue only through customs duties on foreign imports and exports? In want of any other source of revenue, such duties would undoubtedly have to be raised higher and higher. This would encourage smuggling to the detriment of law-abiding merchants and other businessmen. Higher tariffs would bring higher prices on many essentials and would adversely affect consumers. Protected by a high tariff wall, domestic manufacturers would enjoy an improper and "premature monopoly of the markets," which would unbalance the economy at the expense of other interests.The idea of actual representation of all classes and interests in the legislature was "altogether visionary," said Hamilton. It was impossible to have members of each different trade and occupation seated in the legislature. Nor did mechanics and others wish to be seated. In general, such people were inclined to cast their votes for merchants, knowing "that the merchant is their natural patron and friend. . . . We must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the community."All landowners, "from the wealthiest landlord to the poorest tenant," had one bond between them — to keep taxes on land as low as possible. So what did it matter whom they chose to represent them, whether "men of large fortunes or of moderate property or of no property at all"? From all of the above Hamilton concluded that the spirit of government would be best served if legislatures were composed, as most were, "of land-holders, merchants, and men of the learned professions," by which he meant lawyers in particular.In Chapter 36, the author continued to develop his thesis that, in the political nature of things, the national legislatures, like the state legislatures, would consist almost entirely of landowners, merchants, and members of the learned professions, who would "truly represent" the desires and interests of all the different classes and groups in the community.It had been objected, Hamilton noted, that the national government's power of internal taxation could not be exercised with advantage from lack of sufficient knowledge of local circumstances. That supposition was "entirely destitute of foundation." All that was required of "inquisitive and enlightened Statesmen" was a general acquaintance with the resources and the different kinds of wealth, property, and industry in various parts of the country.Also, in collecting internal taxes, the national government could make use of the tax apparatus already operating in the individual states. This would avoid the need for double sets of revenue officers and "duplication of their burthens by double taxations," which the people might resent. State revenue officers could be attached closely to the union by having the national government supplement their salaries.As to poll taxes, which were in force in many states, Hamilton confessed his "disappointments" in them, adding that he would "lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government." On the other hand, the national government should have the power to impose poll taxes in case of need, for such taxes could become an "inestimable resource" of revenue for the nation as a whole.AnalysisHamilton's ideas about a proper national tax structure are interesting, especially in view of the fact that he soon began putting them in effect when President Washington appointed him our first secretary of the treasury.In this section of essays, Hamilton was ingenious, if not always convincing, in arguing his main thesis that the national government, as proposed under the new constitution, should have "altogether unlimited" authority to levy taxes on all things, and in whatever ways it thought best. But the government should use prudence and caution in exercising that authority.Anti-Federalists objected that such blanket authority would place the states and the general public at the mercy of the national government. Hamilton denied this, saying that the authority would be exercised by the people's representatives in the Congress who could be trusted to act with discretion. If one set of representatives did not, the people could elect another set. But this, as Hamilton failed to mention, was easier said than done.Few disagreed with Hamilton's view that, in the beginning at least, national revenues should come largely from "external" taxes (customs duties) and "internal" taxes in the form of excises on specified articles. Hamilton suggested that an excise on the making of "ardent spirits" would be not only profitable but socially desirable, for it would tend to curb the drinking of hard liquor, notoriously a "national extravagance." In one of his first acts at the Treasury, Hamilton proposed and Congress approved an excise tax on makers of "ardent spirits," which soon led to the Whiskey Rebellion by small distillers in western Pennsylvania and neighboring areas, a rebellion that Hamilton, as a major general, helped to put down.Hamilton did rather well in explaining (Chapter 34) that no conflict could arise between the national government and the state governments about taxation because of "concurrent jurisdiction," a rather complicated concept. The national government's tax laws were to be the supreme law of the land, and not to be contravened in any way. At the same time the states would retain, with two minor exceptions, "independent and uncontrolled" authority to levy taxes as they saw fit for their own purposes. The somewhat complex plan of "concurrent jurisdiction," it must be said, has worked rather well, with relatively little conflict or confusion.Hamilton took a patrician view about the proper management of public affairs when he declared (Chapter 35) that the national legislature not only would but should be composed predominantly of merchants, landowners, and men of the learned professions. These groups were experienced in large affairs and would "truly represent" all classes and interests in the country, said Hamilton, who went on to ask several rhetorical questions: would not the landholder know best how to promote the interests of all landed property, large and small? Would not the merchant be disposed to cultivate, "as far as may be proper," the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing groups with whom he did business? Would not the man of the learned professions, being neutral between contending economic groups, be ready to promote the general interests of society? Thus, everybody's interests and problems would be taken care of. This was the British concept of "virtual representation."All of this may seem politically naive, but it was not. Hamilton believed in rule by a propertied elite and, throughout his career, worked to keep it that way.

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This section of seven chapters analyzes the many problems involved in setting up a just and equitable system of taxation, and in reconciling the conflicting claims of various taxing authorities at all levels of government — federal, state, and local.In Chapter 30, the national government under the Articles of Confederation lacked the revenues necessary for carrying out its purposes because a faulty fiscal system made it dependent on quotas and requisitions from the thirteen individual states. A national, government, properly constituted, should have the power to raise its own revenues by the methods of taxation ordinarily used in every well-ordered "civil government."Adequate national revenues, as some argued, could not be raised by external" taxes alone, that is, by customs duties on foreign imports. The central government should be empowered to levy "internal" taxes also, as necessity required.In Chapter 31, opening this essay with a disquisition on the eternal verities of geometry and other sciences, Hamilton observed that politics was not an exact science because it dealt with the "unruly passions of the human heart," and therefore tended to be rather irrational. Among the more irrational, Hamilton added, were those who opposed the proposed constitution from fear that the national government by its "unlimited" taxing measures might deprive the states of the means of providing for their own needs.It would be the other way around if this point came into contest, said Hamilton. It was probable that the states, being closer to the people, would encroach more on the revenue-raising plans of the central government than otherwise.In Chapter 32, states should retain their "independent and uncontrollable authority" to levy taxes for their own purposes, with the exception of laying customs duties on foreign imports and exports, or tariffs on any articles in interstate commerce. There was to be absolutely free trade among the states, which would stimulate the national economy.In Chapter 33, opponents of ratification were raising objections to several clauses in the proposed constitution. The first of these clauses empowered the national government to "make all laws" deemed necessary and proper for executing the powers vested in the national government under the Constitution. The second clause declared that all laws passed and all treaties signed by the national government were to be "the supreme law of the land; any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Anti-ratificationists cited these clauses as "pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated."Hamilton dismissed such views as gross "misrepresentation." Power was the ability or faculty of doing a thing, and the ability to do a thing rested on the power to employ means necessary for its execution. This was true in the matter of laying and collecting taxes: though a law laying a tax for the use of the United States would be a supreme law that could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a law preventing the states from collecting a tax would not be supreme law because it would be unconstitutional.Chapter 34 takes up the subject of "CONCURRENT JURISDICTION" in the matter of taxes. Under the proposed constitution, the right of the national government to raise necessary revenues would be "altogether unlimited," while the revenue-raising power of individual states would be only moderately circumscribed under the plan of concurrent jurisdiction. Each would have its field, and there would not be any "sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States."In Chapter 35, Hamilton posed a question here: What if the national government, as some proposed, should be empowered to raise revenue only through customs duties on foreign imports and exports? In want of any other source of revenue, such duties would undoubtedly have to be raised higher and higher. This would encourage smuggling to the detriment of law-abiding merchants and other businessmen. Higher tariffs would bring higher prices on many essentials and would adversely affect consumers. Protected by a high tariff wall, domestic manufacturers would enjoy an improper and "premature monopoly of the markets," which would unbalance the economy at the expense of other interests.The idea of actual representation of all classes and interests in the legislature was "altogether visionary," said Hamilton. It was impossible to have members of each different trade and occupation seated in the legislature. Nor did mechanics and others wish to be seated. In general, such people were inclined to cast their votes for merchants, knowing "that the merchant is their natural patron and friend. . . . We must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the community."All landowners, "from the wealthiest landlord to the poorest tenant," had one bond between them — to keep taxes on land as low as possible. So what did it matter whom they chose to represent them, whether "men of large fortunes or of moderate property or of no property at all"? From all of the above Hamilton concluded that the spirit of government would be best served if legislatures were composed, as most were, "of land-holders, merchants, and men of the learned professions," by which he meant lawyers in particular.In Chapter 36, the author continued to develop his thesis that, in the political nature of things, the national legislatures, like the state legislatures, would consist almost entirely of landowners, merchants, and members of the learned professions, who would "truly represent" the desires and interests of all the different classes and groups in the community.It had been objected, Hamilton noted, that the national government's power of internal taxation could not be exercised with advantage from lack of sufficient knowledge of local circumstances. That supposition was "entirely destitute of foundation." All that was required of "inquisitive and enlightened Statesmen" was a general acquaintance with the resources and the different kinds of wealth, property, and industry in various parts of the country.Also, in collecting internal taxes, the national government could make use of the tax apparatus already operating in the individual states. This would avoid the need for double sets of revenue officers and "duplication of their burthens by double taxations," which the people might resent. State revenue officers could be attached closely to the union by having the national government supplement their salaries.As to poll taxes, which were in force in many states, Hamilton confessed his "disappointments" in them, adding that he would "lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government." On the other hand, the national government should have the power to impose poll taxes in case of need, for such taxes could become an "inestimable resource" of revenue for the nation as a whole.AnalysisHamilton's ideas about a proper national tax structure are interesting, especially in view of the fact that he soon began putting them in effect when President Washington appointed him our first secretary of the treasury.In this section of essays, Hamilton was ingenious, if not always convincing, in arguing his main thesis that the national government, as proposed under the new constitution, should have "altogether unlimited" authority to levy taxes on all things, and in whatever ways it thought best. But the government should use prudence and caution in exercising that authority.Anti-Federalists objected that such blanket authority would place the states and the general public at the mercy of the national government. Hamilton denied this, saying that the authority would be exercised by the people's representatives in the Congress who could be trusted to act with discretion. If one set of representatives did not, the people could elect another set. But this, as Hamilton failed to mention, was easier said than done.Few disagreed with Hamilton's view that, in the beginning at least, national revenues should come largely from "external" taxes (customs duties) and "internal" taxes in the form of excises on specified articles. Hamilton suggested that an excise on the making of "ardent spirits" would be not only profitable but socially desirable, for it would tend to curb the drinking of hard liquor, notoriously a "national extravagance." In one of his first acts at the Treasury, Hamilton proposed and Congress approved an excise tax on makers of "ardent spirits," which soon led to the Whiskey Rebellion by small distillers in western Pennsylvania and neighboring areas, a rebellion that Hamilton, as a major general, helped to put down.Hamilton did rather well in explaining (Chapter 34) that no conflict could arise between the national government and the state governments about taxation because of "concurrent jurisdiction," a rather complicated concept. The national government's tax laws were to be the supreme law of the land, and not to be contravened in any way. At the same time the states would retain, with two minor exceptions, "independent and uncontrolled" authority to levy taxes as they saw fit for their own purposes. The somewhat complex plan of "concurrent jurisdiction," it must be said, has worked rather well, with relatively little conflict or confusion.Hamilton took a patrician view about the proper management of public affairs when he declared (Chapter 35) that the national legislature not only would but should be composed predominantly of merchants, landowners, and men of the learned professions. These groups were experienced in large affairs and would "truly represent" all classes and interests in the country, said Hamilton, who went on to ask several rhetorical questions: would not the landholder know best how to promote the interests of all landed property, large and small? Would not the merchant be disposed to cultivate, "as far as may be proper," the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing groups with whom he did business? Would not the man of the learned professions, being neutral between contending economic groups, be ready to promote the general interests of society? Thus, everybody's interests and problems would be taken care of. This was the British concept of "virtual representation."All of this may seem politically naive, but it was not. Hamilton believed in rule by a propertied elite and, throughout his career, worked to keep it that way.

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https://www.cliffsnotes.com/literature/f/the-federalist/summary-and-analysis/section-v-powers-of-taxation-federalists-no-3036-hamilton

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The Federalist Papers were written and published to urge New Yorkers to ratify the proposed United States Constitution, which was drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. In lobbying for adoption of the Constitution over the existing Articles of Confederation, the essays explain particular provisions of the Constitution in detail. For this reason, and because Hamilton and Madison were each members of the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers are often used today to help interpret the intentions of those drafting the Constitution.

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The Federalist Papers were written and published to urge New Yorkers to ratify the proposed United States Constitution, which was drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. In lobbying for adoption of the Constitution over the existing Articles of Confederation, the essays explain particular provisions of the Constitution in detail. For this reason, and because Hamilton and Madison were each members of the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers are often used today to help interpret the intentions of those drafting the Constitution.

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https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/About+the+Federalist+Papers

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https://paragraphica.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/TheFederalistPapersWrittenin1787byJamesMadisonJohnJayandAlexanderHamiltonunderthepennameofPublius..jpg

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    After the Revolutionary War, many Americans realized that the government established by the Articles of Confederation was not working. America needed a new form of government. It had to be strong enough to maintain national unity over a large geographic area, but not so strong as to become a tyranny. Unable to find an exact model in history to fit America's unique situation, delegates met at Philadelphia in 1787 to create their own solution to the problem. Their creation was the United States Constitution.Before the Constitution could become "the supreme law of the land," it had to be ratified or approved by at least nine of the thirteen states. When the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention signed the Constitution on September 17, 1787, they knew ratification would not be easy. Many people were bitterly opposed to the proposed new system of government. A public debate soon erupted in each of the states over whether the new Constitution should be accepted. More important, it was a crucial debate on the future of the United States.

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    After the Revolutionary War, many Americans realized that the government established by the Articles of Confederation was not working. America needed a new form of government. It had to be strong enough to maintain national unity over a large geographic area, but not so strong as to become a tyranny. Unable to find an exact model in history to fit America's unique situation, delegates met at Philadelphia in 1787 to create their own solution to the problem. Their creation was the United States Constitution.Before the Constitution could become "the supreme law of the land," it had to be ratified or approved by at least nine of the thirteen states. When the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention signed the Constitution on September 17, 1787, they knew ratification would not be easy. Many people were bitterly opposed to the proposed new system of government. A public debate soon erupted in each of the states over whether the new Constitution should be accepted. More important, it was a crucial debate on the future of the United States.

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http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/the-federalist-papers.html

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In this Federalist Paper, James Madison explains and defends the checks and balances system in the Constitution. Each branch of government is framed so that its power checks the power of the other two branches; additionally, each branch of government is dependent on the people, who are the source of legitimate authority.“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks and balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”Madison also discusses the way republican government can serve as a check on the power of factions, and the tyranny of the majority. “[I]n the federal republic of the United States… all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.” All of the Constitution’s checks and balances, Madison concludes, serve to preserve liberty by ensuring justice. Madison explained, “Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.”Madison’s political theory as expressed in this Federalist Paper demonstrated the influence of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws on the Founders.

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In this Federalist Paper, James Madison explains and defends the checks and balances system in the Constitution. Each branch of government is framed so that its power checks the power of the other two branches; additionally, each branch of government is dependent on the people, who are the source of legitimate authority.“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks and balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”Madison also discusses the way republican government can serve as a check on the power of factions, and the tyranny of the majority. “[I]n the federal republic of the United States… all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.” All of the Constitution’s checks and balances, Madison concludes, serve to preserve liberty by ensuring justice. Madison explained, “Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.”Madison’s political theory as expressed in this Federalist Paper demonstrated the influence of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws on the Founders.

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https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/primary-source-documents/the-federalist-papers/federalist-papers-no-51/

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The Federalist is a polemical defense of the proposed 1787 Constitutionof the United States.' The series of eighty-five essays composed byJames Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay was first publishedin New York newspapers under the collective pseudonym Publius.Through his original reading of The Federalist, Professor Tushnet chartsunexplored connections among theories of judicial selection and tenure,judicial accountability, and constitutional interpretation.

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The Federalist is a polemical defense of the proposed 1787 Constitutionof the United States.' The series of eighty-five essays composed byJames Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay was first publishedin New York newspapers under the collective pseudonym Publius.Through his original reading of The Federalist, Professor Tushnet chartsunexplored connections among theories of judicial selection and tenure,judicial accountability, and constitutional interpretation.

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http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/scal61&div=54&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals#

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One of the most popular contemporary interpretations of Paper 10 takes the advice on factions to extend to political parties in general. By this token, Madison suggests that political parties are dangerous because they can work against the public, but he sees no way to halt them from forming. Instead, he suggests a representative republic form of government (where men vote for representatives who vote for laws). Choosing that form instead of a direct, true democracy ensures that the factions that gain power will not have the ability to harm the rights of others.

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One of the most popular contemporary interpretations of Paper 10 takes the advice on factions to extend to political parties in general. By this token, Madison suggests that political parties are dangerous because they can work against the public, but he sees no way to halt them from forming. Instead, he suggests a representative republic form of government (where men vote for representatives who vote for laws). Choosing that form instead of a direct, true democracy ensures that the factions that gain power will not have the ability to harm the rights of others.

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https://www.enotes.com/homework-help/what-summary-federalist-10-821050

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Seventy-seven of the essays were published as a series in The Independent Journal, The New York Packet, and The Daily Advertiser between October of 1787 and August 1788. They weren't originally known as the "Federalist Papers," but just "The Federalist." The final 8 were added in after. Alexander Hamilton author of the Federalist PapersAlexander Hamilton, Portrait by John TrumbullAt the time of publication, the authorship of the articles was a closely guarded secret. It wasn't until Hamilton's death in 1804 that a list crediting him as one of the authors became public. It claimed fully two-thirds of the essays for Hamilton. Many of these would be disputed by Madison later on, who had actually written a few of the articles attributed to Hamilton.Once the Federal Convention sent the Constitution to the Confederation Congress in 1787, the document became the target of criticism from its opponents. Hamilton, a firm believer in the Constitution, wrote in Federalist No. 1 that the series would "endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention."

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Seventy-seven of the essays were published as a series in The Independent Journal, The New York Packet, and The Daily Advertiser between October of 1787 and August 1788. They weren't originally known as the "Federalist Papers," but just "The Federalist." The final 8 were added in after. Alexander Hamilton author of the Federalist PapersAlexander Hamilton, Portrait by John TrumbullAt the time of publication, the authorship of the articles was a closely guarded secret. It wasn't until Hamilton's death in 1804 that a list crediting him as one of the authors became public. It claimed fully two-thirds of the essays for Hamilton. Many of these would be disputed by Madison later on, who had actually written a few of the articles attributed to Hamilton.Once the Federal Convention sent the Constitution to the Confederation Congress in 1787, the document became the target of criticism from its opponents. Hamilton, a firm believer in the Constitution, wrote in Federalist No. 1 that the series would "endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention."

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Federalist Papers, Articles about the Constitution written by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton

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The Federalist was originally planned to be a series of essays for publication in New York City newspapers, but ultimately expanded into a collection of 85 essays, which were published as two volumes in March and May 1788. They did not become known as "The Federalist Papers" until the 20th century. The essays were aimed at convincing opponents of the US Constitution to ratify it so that it would take effect as the nation’s fundamental governing document. (Opponents of the Constitution drafted their own series of essays, which became known collectively as the Anti-Federalist Papers.)^2​2​​

# data[].attributes.subject
The Federalist was originally planned to be a series of essays for publication in New York City newspapers, but ultimately expanded into a collection of 85 essays, which were published as two volumes in March and May 1788. They did not become known as "The Federalist Papers" until the 20th century. The essays were aimed at convincing opponents of the US Constitution to ratify it so that it would take effect as the nation’s fundamental governing document. (Opponents of the Constitution drafted their own series of essays, which became known collectively as the Anti-Federalist Papers.)^2​2​​

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https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ap-us-history/period-3/apush-creating-a-nation/a/the-federalist-papers

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The Federalist Papers are a collection of 85 political essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay between 1787 and 1788. Though both Jay and Madison contributed articles to this publication, Alexander Hamilton was responsible for the majority of the content. Hamilton is credited with authoring 59 essays, Madison with 29, and Jay with 5.

# data[].attributes.subject
The Federalist Papers are a collection of 85 political essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay between 1787 and 1788. Though both Jay and Madison contributed articles to this publication, Alexander Hamilton was responsible for the majority of the content. Hamilton is credited with authoring 59 essays, Madison with 29, and Jay with 5.

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https://constitution.laws.com/federalist-papers/federalist-papers-authorship-purpose

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-the Federalist Papers. Written to urge ratification of the Constitution, the eighty-five essays--trenchant in thought and graceful in expression--defended the Constitution not merely as a theoretical statement but as a practical instrument of rule. 

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-the Federalist Papers. Written to urge ratification of the Constitution, the eighty-five essays--trenchant in thought and graceful in expression--defended the Constitution not merely as a theoretical statement but as a practical instrument of rule. 

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https://usna.summon.serialssolutions.com/?#!/search/document?ho=t&fvf=ContentType,Book%20Review,t&l=en&q=purpose%20of%20federalist%20papers&id=FETCHMERGED-usna_catalog_b109643812

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The Federalist Papers was a collection of essays written by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton in 1788.The essays urged the ratification of the United States Constitution, which had been debated and drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.The Federalist Papers is considered one of the most significant American contributions to the field of political philosophy and theory and is still widely considered to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

# data[].attributes.subject
The Federalist Papers was a collection of essays written by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton in 1788.The essays urged the ratification of the United States Constitution, which had been debated and drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.The Federalist Papers is considered one of the most significant American contributions to the field of political philosophy and theory and is still widely considered to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ap-us-history/period-3/apush-creating-a-nation/a/the-federalist-papers

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Liberty's blueprint: how Madison and Hamilton wrote the Federalist papers, defined the constitution, and made democracy safe for the world

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Liberty's blueprint: how Madison and Hamilton wrote the Federalist papers, defined the constitution, and made democracy safe for the world

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by Meyerson, Michael

2008

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The Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 under the pen name "Publius." The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.

# data[].attributes.subject
The Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 under the pen name "Publius." The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.

# data[].attributes.body
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html

# data[].attributes.headline
In sum, the Federalist Papers describe how Congress's Commerce Clause power is necessary to grow the Union "in a commercial light" to promote "the supply of reciprocal wants at home" among all the states and allow "[t]he veins of commerce in every part [to] be replenished" through "a free circulation of the commodities of every part" (32) so goods and services could get where they were needed among the states, when they were needed.

# data[].attributes.subject
In sum, the Federalist Papers describe how Congress's Commerce Clause power is necessary to grow the Union "in a commercial light" to promote "the supply of reciprocal wants at home" among all the states and allow "[t]he veins of commerce in every part [to] be replenished" through "a free circulation of the commodities of every part" (32) so goods and services could get where they were needed among the states, when they were needed.

# data[].attributes.body
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&u=anna82201&id=GALE|A286827262&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon&authCount=1

# data[].attributes.headline
The Federalist was originally planned to be a series of essays for publication in New York City newspapers, but ultimately expanded into a collection of 85 essays, which were published as two volumes in March and May 1788. They did not become known as "The Federalist Papers" until the 20th century. The essays were aimed at convincing opponents of the US Constitution to ratify it so that it would take effect as the nation’s fundamental governing document.Newspaper advertisement for The Federalist, which reads "In the press, and speedily will be published, The Federalist, a collection of essays written in favor of the new Constitution. By a citizen of New-York. Corrected by the author with additions and alterations.This work will be printed on a fine paper and good type, is one handsome volume duo-decimo, and delivered to subscribers at the moderate price of one dollar. A few copies will be printed on superfine royal writing paper, price ten shillings. No money required till delivery. To render this work more complete, will be added, without any additional expence, Philo-Publius, and the Articles of the Convention, as agreed upon at Philadelphia, September 17, 1787. "A 1787 newspaper advertisement for The Federalist. Image credit: Wikimedia CommonsThe essays comprising the Federalist Papers were authored by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, three of the most influential nationalist thinkers. The nationalists urged the creation of a stronger central government that would be sufficiently empowered to confront the many challenges facing the young nation. Though the authors primarily sought to influence the vote in favor of ratifying the Constitution, Federalist No. 1 framed the debate in much broader terms, by questioning “whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”Portrait of John Jay.Portrait of John Jay, one of the authors of the Federalist Papers. Painted by Gilbert Stuart in 1794. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons.Many of the most influential essays in The Federalist were penned by either Hamilton or Madison:In Federalist No. 10, Madison reflects on how to prevent rule by majority faction and advocates the expansion of the United States into a large, commercial republic.In Federalist No. 39 and Federalist 51, Madison seeks to “lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,” emphasizing the need for checks and balances through the separation of powers into three branches of the federal government and the division of powers between the federal government and the states.In Federalist No. 84, Hamilton advances the case against the Bill of Rights, expressing the fear that explicitly enumerated rights could too easily be construed as comprising the only rights to which American citizens were entitled.Although the primary purpose of The Federalist was to convince New Yorkers to send to the Constitutional Convention delegates who would vote to ratify the Constitution, fully two-thirds of New York’s delegates initially opposed ratification. These delegates refused to ratify the document unless it was amended by a Bill of Rights. Thus, the authors of The Federalist failed in their original objective.Nevertheless, The Federalist Papers is widely considered to be the most significant American contribution to the field of political philosophy and theory and is held up by scholars, lawyers, and judges to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

# data[].attributes.subject
The Federalist was originally planned to be a series of essays for publication in New York City newspapers, but ultimately expanded into a collection of 85 essays, which were published as two volumes in March and May 1788. They did not become known as "The Federalist Papers" until the 20th century. The essays were aimed at convincing opponents of the US Constitution to ratify it so that it would take effect as the nation’s fundamental governing document.Newspaper advertisement for The Federalist, which reads "In the press, and speedily will be published, The Federalist, a collection of essays written in favor of the new Constitution. By a citizen of New-York. Corrected by the author with additions and alterations.This work will be printed on a fine paper and good type, is one handsome volume duo-decimo, and delivered to subscribers at the moderate price of one dollar. A few copies will be printed on superfine royal writing paper, price ten shillings. No money required till delivery. To render this work more complete, will be added, without any additional expence, Philo-Publius, and the Articles of the Convention, as agreed upon at Philadelphia, September 17, 1787. "A 1787 newspaper advertisement for The Federalist. Image credit: Wikimedia CommonsThe essays comprising the Federalist Papers were authored by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, three of the most influential nationalist thinkers. The nationalists urged the creation of a stronger central government that would be sufficiently empowered to confront the many challenges facing the young nation. Though the authors primarily sought to influence the vote in favor of ratifying the Constitution, Federalist No. 1 framed the debate in much broader terms, by questioning “whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”Portrait of John Jay.Portrait of John Jay, one of the authors of the Federalist Papers. Painted by Gilbert Stuart in 1794. Image credit: Wikimedia Commons.Many of the most influential essays in The Federalist were penned by either Hamilton or Madison:In Federalist No. 10, Madison reflects on how to prevent rule by majority faction and advocates the expansion of the United States into a large, commercial republic.In Federalist No. 39 and Federalist 51, Madison seeks to “lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,” emphasizing the need for checks and balances through the separation of powers into three branches of the federal government and the division of powers between the federal government and the states.In Federalist No. 84, Hamilton advances the case against the Bill of Rights, expressing the fear that explicitly enumerated rights could too easily be construed as comprising the only rights to which American citizens were entitled.Although the primary purpose of The Federalist was to convince New Yorkers to send to the Constitutional Convention delegates who would vote to ratify the Constitution, fully two-thirds of New York’s delegates initially opposed ratification. These delegates refused to ratify the document unless it was amended by a Bill of Rights. Thus, the authors of The Federalist failed in their original objective.Nevertheless, The Federalist Papers is widely considered to be the most significant American contribution to the field of political philosophy and theory and is held up by scholars, lawyers, and judges to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ap-us-history/period-3/apush-creating-a-nation/a/the-federalist-papers

# data[].attributes.headline
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.HAMILTON OR MADISONTo the People of the State of New York:TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.PUBLIUS.

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The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.HAMILTON OR MADISONTo the People of the State of New York:TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.PUBLIUS.

# data[].attributes.body
The Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 under the pen name "Publius." The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.

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bibliography guide virtual program service digital reference section library of congress primary documents federalist papers

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Federalist Papers: Primary Documents of American History (Virtual Programs & Services, Library of Congress)

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Federalist Papers: Primary Documents of American History (Virtual Services and Programs, Digital Reference Section, Library of Congress)

# data[].attributes.headline
rs were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 under the pen name "Publius." The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.

# data[].attributes.subject
rs were a series of eighty-five essays urging the citizens of New York to ratify the new United States Constitution. Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, the essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers in 1787 and 1788 under the pen name "Publius." The Federalist Papers are considered one of the most important sources for interpreting and understanding the original intent of the Constitution.

# data[].attributes.body
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html

# data[].attributes.headline
The Federalist Papers are a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison in defense of the Constitution during the ratification debate in New York.  In arguing for the ratification of the Constitution, the Federalist Papers serve as an invaluable guide to the provisions of the Constitution as well as the original intent of the Founders.  The Constitution Caucus encourages all citizens to read the Federalist Papers in order to understand what our founding document was understood to mean when it was ratified.

# data[].attributes.subject
The Federalist Papers are a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison in defense of the Constitution during the ratification debate in New York.  In arguing for the ratification of the Constitution, the Federalist Papers serve as an invaluable guide to the provisions of the Constitution as well as the original intent of the Founders.  The Constitution Caucus encourages all citizens to read the Federalist Papers in order to understand what our founding document was understood to mean when it was ratified.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of "The Federalist" and Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation on JSTOR

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Courts, lawyers, and scholars have long assumed that The Federalist Papers supply important information for use in constitutional argument and interpretation. I...

# data[].attributes.body
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040551?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=federalist&searchText=papers&searchText=purpose&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoAdvancedSearch%3Ff2%3Dall%26amp%3Bf6%3Dall%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%26amp%3Bisbn%3D%26amp%3Bq3%3D%26amp%3Bpt%3D%26amp%3Bq2%3D%26amp%3Bq4%3D%26amp%3Bc1%3DAND%26amp%3Bf5%3Dall%26amp%3Bc4%3DAND%26amp%3Bq1%3D%26amp%3Bq6%3D%26amp%3Bla%3D%26amp%3Bf0%3Dall%26amp%3Bf3%3Dall%26amp%3Bq5%3D%26amp%3Bc5%3DAND%26amp%3Bsd%3D%26amp%3Bq0%3Dfederalist%2Bpapers%2Bpurpose%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone%26amp%3Bed%3D%26amp%3Bc6%3DAND%26amp%3Bc3%3DAND%26amp%3Bf1%3Dall%26amp%3Bf4%3Dall%26amp%3Bc2%3DAND&refreqid=search%3Ad451e6ee20934589f58512c1d941e931&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

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In the aftermath of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, three of its most gifted participants--Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay--wrote a series of eighty-five essays, published in newspapers throughout the nation, defending the proposed new government against its opponents. Those essays, known today as the Federalist Papers, explain the philosophical basis of the Constitution and defend the idea of republican government against charges that it would lead to tyranny.Today's political controversies call into question some of the principles that have shaped government through most of this century. New Federalist Papers, written by three constitutional experts, defends the representative democracy put in place by the framers of the Constitution. Like Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, the authors of New Federalist Papers see danger in the effort to diminish and relocate federal power. They recognize that it is the task of public discourse to bring about reasoned consideration of such issues as gun control, term limits, flag burning, the balanced budget amendment, and campaign finance reform.

https://usna.summon.serialssolutions.com/?#!/search/document?ho=t&fvf=ContentType,Book%20Review,t&l=en&q=purpose%20of%20federalist%20papers&id=FETCHMERGED-usna_catalog_b139014122

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PRINTCITEThe Federalist Papers consist of eighty-five letters written to newspapers in the late 1780s to urge ratification of the U.S. Constitution. With the Constitution needing approval from nine of thirteen states, the press was inundated with letters about the controversial document. Celebrated statesmen Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay weighed in with a series of essays under the pseudonym “Publius,” arguing that the proposed system would preserve the Union and empower the federal government to act firmly and coherently in the national interest. These articles, written in the spirit both of propaganda and of logical argument, were published in book form as The Federalist in 1788.

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PRINTCITEThe Federalist Papers consist of eighty-five letters written to newspapers in the late 1780s to urge ratification of the U.S. Constitution. With the Constitution needing approval from nine of thirteen states, the press was inundated with letters about the controversial document. Celebrated statesmen Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay weighed in with a series of essays under the pseudonym “Publius,” arguing that the proposed system would preserve the Union and empower the federal government to act firmly and coherently in the national interest. These articles, written in the spirit both of propaganda and of logical argument, were published in book form as The Federalist in 1788.

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History.com

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The Federalist Papers consist of eighty-five letters written to newspapers in the late 1780s to urge ratification of the U.S. Constitution. With the Constitution needing approval from nine of thirteen states, the press was inundated with letters about the controversial document. Celebrated statesmen Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay weighed in with a series of essays under the pseudonym “Publius,” arguing that the proposed system would preserve the Union and empower the federal government to act firmly and coherently in the national interest. These articles, written in the spirit both of propaganda and of logical argument, were published in book form as The Federalist in 1788.

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The Federalist Papers consist of eighty-five letters written to newspapers in the late 1780s to urge ratification of the U.S. Constitution. With the Constitution needing approval from nine of thirteen states, the press was inundated with letters about the controversial document. Celebrated statesmen Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay weighed in with a series of essays under the pseudonym “Publius,” arguing that the proposed system would preserve the Union and empower the federal government to act firmly and coherently in the national interest. These articles, written in the spirit both of propaganda and of logical argument, were published in book form as The Federalist in 1788.

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http://www.history.com/topics/federalist-papers

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Fearful that the cause for the Constitution might be lost in his home state, Alexander Hamilton devised a plan to write a series of letters or essays rebutting the critics. It is not surprising that Hamilton, a brilliant lawyer, came forward at this moment to defend the new Constitution. At Philadelphia, he was the only New Yorker to have signed the Constitution. The other New York delegates had angrily left the Convention convinced that the rights of the people were being abandoned.

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Fearful that the cause for the Constitution might be lost in his home state, Alexander Hamilton devised a plan to write a series of letters or essays rebutting the critics. It is not surprising that Hamilton, a brilliant lawyer, came forward at this moment to defend the new Constitution. At Philadelphia, he was the only New Yorker to have signed the Constitution. The other New York delegates had angrily left the Convention convinced that the rights of the people were being abandoned.

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http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/the-federalist-papers.html

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Federalist papers, formally The Federalist, series of 85 essays on the proposed new Constitution of the United States and on the nature of republican government, published between 1787 and 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in an effort to persuade New York state voters to support ratification. Seventy-seven of the essays first appeared serially in New York newspapers, were reprinted in most other states, and were published in book form as The Federalist on May 28, 1788; the remaining eight papers appeared in New York newspapers between June 14 and August 16.

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Federalist papers, formally The Federalist, series of 85 essays on the proposed new Constitution of the United States and on the nature of republican government, published between 1787 and 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in an effort to persuade New York state voters to support ratification. Seventy-seven of the essays first appeared serially in New York newspapers, were reprinted in most other states, and were published in book form as The Federalist on May 28, 1788; the remaining eight papers appeared in New York newspapers between June 14 and August 16.

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https://www.britannica.com/topic/Federalist-papers

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The Federalist (later known as The Federalist Papers) is a collection of 85 articles and essays written under the pseudonym "Publius" by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution. Seventy-seven of these essays were published serially in the Independent Journal, the New York Packet, and The Daily Advertiser between October 1787 and August 1788. 

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The Federalist (later known as The Federalist Papers) is a collection of 85 articles and essays written under the pseudonym "Publius" by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution. Seventy-seven of these essays were published serially in the Independent Journal, the New York Packet, and The Daily Advertiser between October 1787 and August 1788. 

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Federalist_Papers