# data[].attributes.body
Overall I've learned that Nuclear Disarmament is a much bigger issue than I previously believed, I always thought it was a solved issue and the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which started nuclear disarmament, however to this day there are about 9 states that may or may not have nuclear weapons. With Israel being the only one experts are unsure about since that nation will neither confirm nor deny if they have the weapons. This being said I've learned that international law is trying to make any use of nuclear weapons illegal. With new treaties being proposed by other states, they are trying to get the five super-powered countries to completely disarm, however, none of them will, because they fear that they would give up too much power. Yet IGOs can't really enforce these laws. The UN makes all these laws and rules involving nuclear weapons and their development. In fact, the NPT is one of the largest disarmament treaties ever, but like I said they have no way to enforce anything they can only make the laws. Which is one of the biggest issues facing disarmament. I think that world leaders should recognize that nuclear weapons do no good for the overall global community and that the most sensible thing to do is to disarm completely. Because at the end of the day there are only a few nations that are putting a hold on complete disarmament.

# data[].attributes.body
In this 2021 article written by Daryl G. Kimball, he points to how tensions have been rising between states with nuclear weapons. With a new summit meeting in January where they will go over the NPT and its articles and what they mean exactly.  Instead, the five nuclear-armed NPT nations should accept their previous disarmament obligations, collaborate with other states-parties on a practical action plan that establishes new benchmarks and timelines, and commit to acting with the priority that the grave nuclear weapons threat necessitates. This has been the main argument and the main point for debate. Nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-weapon states should collaborate on a credible disarmament action plan that might incorporate the major aspects listed below, despite their differing perspectives on how to accomplish those duties.
A request for the US and Russia to complete discussions on New START follow-on agreements by 2025, resulting in additional reductions in nuclear weapons and delivery systems. A vow by the five nuclear-armed NPT members to keep their nuclear arsenals frozen and for all countries to stop producing fissile material for military reasons. A demand on NPT states to initiate bilateral or multilateral disarmament talks no later than 2025. The remaining holdout governments are urged to begin their ratification processes for the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 2025. A appeal for all countries to refrain from developing nuclear-tipped cruise and hypersonic missiles.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Toward a Successful NPT Review | Arms Control Association

# data[].attributes.body
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is up against a number of obstacles. The Treaty has been under significant pressure for some years, owing to the ongoing tension between nuclear weapon nations and non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT's two most difficult issues are disarmament and nonproliferation. Despite the fact that nuclear weapons numbers have dropped dramatically since the height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s, many non-nuclear weapon states feel that disarmament is not proceeding at a fast enough pace. The nonproliferation efforts will surely be harmed as a result of this strain.  Other difficulties confronting the NPT might be seen as a result of the Treaty's age, as well as ambiguity in certain of its articles. The NPT's drafters were unable to forecast contemporary world developments and, as a result, were unable to draft a Treaty that could adapt with the times. The Treaty's current interpretations have created a slew of problems. Many non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) think the NWS have not made a determined effort to abandon their nuclear weapons despite advances achieved via agreements and collaborative activities since the end of the Cold War.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons faces many challenges. Largely due to the perennial tension between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapons states, the Treaty has been under severe strain for some time. The two most daunting challenges facing the NPT are disarmament and n…

# data[].attributes.headline
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at Fifty

# data[].attributes.subject
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at Fifty

# data[].attributes.body
In this 2020 article author Nobuysa Abe, Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, examines the successes and failures of the NPT. He goes on to say, the NPT was successful in its basic goal of avoiding nuclear weapons proliferation to possible proliferators who were judged likely at the time of its inception in 1970. As a result, it aided in the prevention of nuclear weapons spreading to the ten, twenty, and twenty-five countries that President John F. Kennedy had feared. The development of the  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system to oversee the nuclear activities of those nations that agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons as part of the treaty aided it. Over time, the NPT was able to get second-tier countries to join, bringing the pact close to universal acceptance. This was aided by the United States' strong diplomatic efforts and, later, the conclusion of the Cold War. The NPT, on the other hand, has begun to exhibit its limitations in the recent three decades. Iraq, Libya, and South Africa were all developing clandestine nuclear arsenals. The NPT does not have a great track record in terms of encouraging nuclear disarmament. And after 50 years of operation, the treaty's purpose set forth in Article VI still has a long road ahead of it. The IAEA's work in the sector has aided the peaceful use of nuclear energy during the last 50 years.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
ABSTRACT
The NPT succeeded in its initial task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the potential proliferators considered likely at the time of its entry into force in 1970. Thus, it helped prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to the ten, twenty, twenty-five countries that President John F. Kennedy once feared. It was helped by the establishment of the IAEA comprehensive safeguard system to monitor the nuclear activities of those countries that pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons under the treaty. The NPT, over the years, also succeeded in enticing the second tier countries, thus bringing the treaty to a near universal adherence. This was helped by the strong diplomatic efforts by the United States, and subsequently by the end of the Cold War. However, in the last three decades, the NPT started to show its limits. Clandestine nuclear weapons programs were proceeding in Iraq, Libya and South Africa. During the course inability of the IAEA safeguards in uncovering nuclear weapon programs in a timely fashion became evident. In the area of promoting nuclear disarmament, the NPT cannot claim to be very successful. Even after 50 years of its existence, the achievement of the goal set in Article VI of the treaty has a long way to go. Peaceful use of nuclear energy went vibrant in the past 50 years helped by the IAEA works in the field.

Introduction

The NPT succeeded in its initial task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons among potential key players at the time of its entry into force in 1970. Countries with sufficient industrial capability included Canada, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Thus, it helped to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to the numerous countries as President John F. Kennedy once feared. It was helped by the establishment of the IAEA comprehensive safeguard system to monitor the nuclear activities of those countries that pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons under the treaty. The NPT, over the years, also succeeded in enticing second tier countries such as Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea, thus bringing near universal adherence to the treaty. This was helped by the strong diplomatic efforts of the United States, and subsequently by the end of the Cold War. However, in the last three decades, the NPT has started to show its limits. Non-adherents, India and Pakistan, have started building their nuclear weapons and North Korea has claimed to have withdrawn from the treaty and started to build its own nuclear weapons. Clandestine nuclear weapons programs had been proceeding in Iraq, Libya, and South Africa. Some of these have been forcibly abandoned and some were voluntarily abandoned. During this time, the inability of the IAEA safeguards to uncover nuclear weapon programs in a timely fashion became evident. A testing time may come when the NPT faces another challenge to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons, a key area being the Middle East. In terms of promoting nuclear disarmament, the NPT cannot claim to be very successful. Even after 50 years of its existence, there is a long way to go to achieve the goal set out in Article VI of the treaty. As the disappointment of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) about the slow progress of nuclear disarmament intensifies, the adherence of those states to the treaty obligation is under threat of being weakened. The peaceful use of nuclear energy has been animated over the past 50 years, helped by the IAEA works in the field. It was more driven by the desire of those countries to use nuclear energy and helped by the commercial motivation of providers than the originally intended facilitation activities of the nuclear weapon states (NWSs). Major nuclear accidents proved to be a primary brake as far as nuclear power development was concerned. The safety of nuclear operations will remain a supreme challenge to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

How can the world overcome the shortcomings of the NPT so that it can remain a viable tool for the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the promotion of nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy?

Successes of the NPT

Success in Preventing Nuclear Proliferation

The NPT succeeded in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to those industrialized countries that were considered capable of developing nuclear weapons if they decided to at the time the treaty came into existence.

The first wave of ratifications by NNWSs came immediately after the treaty was opened for signing in 1968 and in time for its entry into force in 1970. They were the countries that seriously considered acquiring nuclear weapons but decided at an early stage not to do so. These countries were Canada and Sweden. Together with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, they formed the first cluster of the NPT adherents. Taiwan is a unique and complicated case. It signed the NPT in 1968 as a representative of China, well before the United Nations changed the Chinese representation from the Nationalist government in Taiwan to the Communist government in mainland China. Taiwan maintained its position that it signed the treaty as a NWS as it, though under the Communist government, conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. As the United States moved to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1972 and severed its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, there was concern about the US guarantee regarding Taiwan's national security. Taiwan started a clandestine nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. The program came to the notice of the IAEA and the United States in 1976. Under strong pressure from the United States, Taiwan abandoned the program. It later restarted the program and again abandoned it following pressure from the United States.

The second wave happened from 1973-77 when Australia, South Korea, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, and Switzerland ratified the treaty. They took considerable time to do so. Most of them were offered nuclear security assurance by the United States, often referred to as a "nuclear umbrella." In the case of NATO countries such as West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey, an additional nuclear sharing scheme was provided to store nuclear warheads in the American bases in those countries so their aircraft could deliver the warheads at times of nuclear confrontation. South Korea hosted American tactical nuclear weapons on its soil until the United States decided to withdraw them after the end of the Cold War.

In the case of Japan, due to the strong anti-nuclear sentiment among its population, the government decided not to allow the "introduction" of nuclear weapons in the country while seeking to confirm protection by the US extended nuclear deterrence from time to time. Japan took six years after signing the treaty to ratify the NPT. While a significant majority of the Japanese people were firmly against the Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons, the conservative wing of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was reluctant to abandon future options to acquire them. It took an intensive campaign by the progressive Prime Minister, Takeo Miki, and Foreign Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, to move the treaty through the parliamentary ratification process. One of the arguments that they used to persuade the conservatives was that if the worst happened, Japan could invoke Article X of the treaty to withdraw with three months' notice. One of the major supporters of early ratification, surprisingly, was the Japanese power industry that was eager to build nuclear power plants. It needed to secure American civil nuclear cooperation and wanted to dispel any American suspicions about Japanese intentions.

South Korea was also engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons development program during the 1970s. However, the United States found out and it was abandoned under pressure from the United States.

In this way, nuclear proliferation was prevented, not solely through the legal obligation of the NPT, but it took US diplomatic pressure and persuasion to do so. It is noteworthy that the provision of some kind of security assurance and of civil nuclear cooperation provided leverage to such US diplomatic pressure. Conversely, when the United States could not provide such leverage, or when it became weaker, its diplomatic efforts became less successful.

Converting Potential Proliferators to Active Nonproliferation Supporters

By the end of the Cold War in 1989, as many as 138 states had become party to the NPT. A remarkable achievement during the twenty year period after the coming of the NPT was the fact that the former potential proliferators became active supporters of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Australia, Canada, West Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, for example, campaigned actively to support nonproliferation efforts, export control regimes, IAEA safeguards, and even provided voluntary contributions for these activities. In Japan, as the years went by, the NPT settled well into the Japanese political sphere and anybody who spoke in favor of the nuclear option was immediately sacked.

Establishment of a near International Norm

The third wave of ratifications came after the end of the Cold War. Important players such as South Africa, France, China, Argentina, and Brazil joined the NPT bringing the total number of state parties to 187 by the turn of the century. As accession to the treaty was almost universal, a near international norm against nuclear proliferation was generated. To underscore this, the Security Council has repeatedly affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It decided that Iraq should not acquire nuclear weapons and should abandon its nuclear weapons program (1991). It condemned the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test and called upon them to stop their nuclear weapon programs (1998). Finally, it decided that North Korea should abandon all its nuclear weapons and its nuclear weapons program (2006).

Establishment of Regional Nuclear Weapon-free Zones

Regional nuclear weapon-free zones are not a requirement set out in the NPT. But, at the time the treaty was negotiated, the Tlatelolco Treaty (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean) came into existence. Article VII anticipated this and prepared the way for other regional nuclear weapon-free zones.

Article VII states, "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."

So far, free zones have come into existence in Southeast Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and Central Asia, and in the case of the state of Mongolia. While the basic obligation of not acquiring nuclear weapons overlaps with that of the NPT, such nuclear weapon-free zones reinforce the obligation of Article II of the NPT, put additional restrictions such as the non-introduction or the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the region, and help to provide negative security assurances (not to attack with nuclear weapons) that are otherwise not provided universally to those party to the NPT.

Failures of the NPT and What Needs to Be Done

Still No Prospect of Nuclear Disarmament

A big failure of the NPT is its inability to achieve nuclear disarmament and there being no good prospect of achieving it. From the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ, it is clear that the obligation of Article VI of the treaty is not just conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament but bringing the negotiations to a conclusion and achieving nuclear disarmament in all its forms.

One practical way to move nuclear disarmament forward may be to agree on a formula to reduce the nuclear holdings with a greater margin when the initial holding is greater, and with a smaller margin when it is smaller. In view of the rapid improvement of the Chinese military capability, the United States has proposed to include China in three-way nuclear arms control talks among the United States, Russia, and China. China has refused to join, saying it will only join the process when the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals to the same level as China. This would mean putting China on a par with the United States which the latter would not accept. In the meantime, it would be very difficult for the more powerful China to solidify its current relative strength vis-à-vis the United States. One way to overcome this would be to require the parties to reduce their nuclear holdings in a ratio corresponding to their current holdings. Suppose the United States has 5,000 nuclear warheads while China has only 250, i.e., 5% of those of the United States, and the United States accepts to reduce its holding by 10%, i.e., by 500 warheads. China would be required to reduce by 5% of the 10%, i.e., by 0.5% = by 1.25 warheads. However, you cannot reduce a one quarter of a warhead. Thus, it should be rounded down to one warhead. By accepting such a symbolic reduction, China could claim that it is joining the world process of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, this format assumes that parties would commit to not increasing their nuclear holdings while they are reducing them, and also provide mutual transparency by which each party joining the process can agree on the starting point of the reduction. This format would enable France and Britain, and even India and Pakistan, to join the global reduction process. Some countries may complain that even though they accept the principle of major holders reducing by a bigger margin, asking China to reduce by just one warhead is too small. In this case, you may then adjust the rate of reduction by inserting a variable ( n), e.g., Chinese holding (250) × 0.5% × n (2) = 2.5 warheads (rounded up to 3). What number to put in " n " should be a matter for negotiation.

Another question is what to do with other remaining nuclear weapons possessors, i.e., India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. It would be better to apply different approaches as each case is unique and different. North Korean denuclearization should be realized in the context of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through US-North Korea negotiations or the 6-Party Talks. It may eventually become a greater scheme such as a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone. If there is any chance that Israeli nuclear possession could be eliminated, it would probably be through the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The important first step is to start negotiations without any preconditions from any side. Because of the India-China and India-Pakistan security nexus, India and Pakistan may be dealt with by applying the same formula mentioned above without awarding them the NWS status under the NPT.

Inability to Stop Proliferation

The NPT has failed to achieve its principal purpose of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in a number of countries. Those that have not joined the NPT and went ahead with possession of nuclear weapons are India, Pakistan and, probably, Israel. The only country that had joined the NPT but ended up possessing nuclear weapons is North Korea. Again, the United States tried to stop those countries but failed to do so. Israel is virtually a de facto ally of the United States but still went ahead with acquiring nuclear weapons in the 1960s, perhaps ahead of the impending NPT. It is said that India sought the protection of the United States but the United States declined. Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea cite serious threats from surrounding Arab countries, India, and the United States respectively as reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons.

North Korea and Iraq are cases where NPT parties carried out clandestine nuclear weapon developments. North Korea was found to have discrepancies as regards the IAEA safeguard verification but refused to clarify this and eventually declared that it would withdraw from the NPT. In the case of Iraq, due to its outright invasion of Kuwait, it was found to be conducting a clandestine nuclear weapons program. It was made to abandon it by the Security Council and subjected to powerful verification. If it were not for that, Iraq could have gone further with its clandestine nuclear weapons program.

These incidents revealed the inability of the IAEA safeguard system to detect hidden nuclear activities. Thus, the IAEA came up with a model additional protocol to its safeguard system so that its inspectors could verify a wider range of sites and use such methods as taking soil samples for minute radio isotopic particles. The problem is that even after more than 20 years since its introduction, the additional protocol has not been ratified by key countries of concern such as Iran, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Pakistan, while it has already been ratified by more than 130 countries. India has only ratified an additional protocol regarding limited facilities.

The model additional protocol was designed because the existing safeguard system proved to be not good enough to detect hidden nuclear activities. Logic should tell us that without it, a country cannot fully satisfy the requirement under Article III of the NPT proving that it is not in violation of the rules. However, the additional protocol remains a voluntary requirement, not a legal one, and certain countries resist signing and ratifying it. Some of them argue that while NWS have not fulfilled their obligations under Article VI, they should not be asked to indefinitely fulfill the requirement of Article III. The argument is political and not legal.

While arguments about the additional protocol continue, other potential loopholes have also surfaced. The Iranian crisis about suspected nuclear weapons program activities have presented a new question of the latency of a state to move quickly to acquire nuclear weapons. A country can reach a state of latency while superficially satisfying the IAEA safeguard requirements. This can be done in various ways, for example, by acquiring enough high-enriched uranium (HEU) or high grade plutonium, through bomb design and missiles or other means of delivering nuclear weapons, and even testing them. Iranians sometimes argue that while Japan is allowed to enrich uranium, separate plutonium, and have satellite launching rockets, why are these activities not allowed in Iran? It can be said that Japan has declared in many ways that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, it has fulfilled the IAEA safeguard and additional protocol requirements throughout its history, and it has no nuclear bomb design or ballistic missiles for delivering nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, Iran has been found to have not complied with the safeguard requirements, to have had a nuclear weapons development program, and is testing ballistic missiles that can deliver unspecified warheads. Admittedly, the line is hard to draw between those who have a theoretical latency with no intention to acquire nuclear weapons, and those who are trying to reach a similar latency while hiding their intentions. This presents a serious challenge to the validity of the NPT.

The experience of North Korea and Iran has highlighted another critical issue regarding the NPT: how to enforce compliance with the NPT obligation to not acquire nuclear weapons. The question whether North Korea withdrew from the NPT lawfully and acquired nuclear weapons or not remains a matter for debate and North Korea continues to be free to increase its nuclear warheads. If other NPT parties find that this is a reality, the validity of the NPT will be seriously damaged, and other countries may use it as a way to acquire nuclear weapons when the time comes. During the agonizing debate concerning the Iranian question, the IAEA Board of Governors had considerable difficulty in reporting Iranian non-compliance with the IAEA safeguard requirements to the Security Council. It was revealed that the IAEA does not have the power to enforce secure compliance with the NPT. The ultimate responsibility to punish non-compliance and enforce conformity rests with the Security Council. While the Council had declared proliferation of nuclear and other WMD to be a matter affecting the maintenance of peace and international security, in practice, the Council has very often had difficulty even addressing the issue of specific non-compliance. It seems that Council members, in particular permanent members, tend to have certain countries they favor and resist addressing the question of their non-compliance. A way to overcome this frustration may be to agree beforehand that the IAEA Director-General does not require the IAEA Board consent to report non-compliance, and the Security Council should agree beforehand that any issue of NPT non-compliance or violation should automatically be put on its agenda.

Another issue that has surfaced over the years is the question of acquiring HEU for propulsion purposes, particularly for nuclear-powered submarines. Brazil is working on a program to develop nuclear submarines. There are arguments in Iran and South Korea regarding the acquisition of nuclear submarines. There is no provision in the NPT that prohibits the acquisition of HEU or nuclear submarines. However, this can be used as a convenient loophole to justify uranium enrichment capability and to produce HEU that may be quickly converted to nuclear weapons production.

Further emerging issues concern the deployment of small nuclear reactors to warfronts and using nuclear propulsion for cruise missiles, drones, and other unmanned vehicles. The IAEA interprets the diversion of special nuclear material for "military purposes" as making nuclear bombs but does not include military use for power generation or propulsion purposes. Americans seem to be considering the deployment of small nuclear reactors to the warfront to solve power supply questions in the days when many gadgets and pieces of equipment consume an increasing amount of electricity without interruption. Similarly, small mobile nuclear power plants are deployed by Russia and China close to frontlines or on disputed land. This generates concerns about the heightened possibility that they may be involved in military conflicts, or that the material may be destroyed and cause contamination. Russia boasts about nuclear-powered cruise missiles, drones, and underwater vehicles that can operate for a far longer time than using conventional fuel. But, these activities will increase the likelihood that they may be destroyed in the process of fighting and that they may spread radioactive contamination in the environment. The destruction of ballistic missile nuclear submarines would potentially signal the end of the world. The destruction of small nuclear reactors or small nuclear propulsion devices may become daily events.

Nuclear Weapon-free Zones

Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The resolution adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 called for "the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems." It was adopted as part of a compromise package at a time when Arab countries were not willing to accept the indefinite extension of the NPT. Thus, expectations were generated and lack of progress toward this realization has raised frustration in those countries. The complicated point is that Israel is not bound by the resolution as it is not party to the NPT. Israel, however, has been supporting the UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone. So, theoretically, it should not be opposed to the idea of a Middle East WMD-free zone. In order to make progress toward its realization, practically, both sides have to be flexible in their approach to the negotiation of such a zone. The General Assembly described free zones as those established by a group of states, "in the free exercises of their sovereignty." No country can be forced to accept a free zone. Israel, for example, would not join a free zone with countries that do not even recognize the existence of such a state as Israel. However, it would have to moderate its condition that peace and security have to be established before a free zone is agreed. It would be more realistic to think that the establishment of a WMD-free zone will help bring peace and security to the region, and the emergence of a peaceful and secure region will help the realization of such a free zone. They have to proceed in parallel. Arab countries could not insist that Israel first has to abandon its nuclear weapons, join the NPT as a NNWS and accept the full scope of the IAEA safeguards. That is exactly the objective of a free zone but it would be an end result rather than a precondition.

Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

There have been a number of proposals about a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia. Once, there was a proposal to establish a free zone by drawing concentric circles around the Panmunjom, encompassing the Japanese islands and the Chinese and Russian territories falling within the circle. In a way, this was a very balanced free zone between the West and the East in the context of the Cold War. A more popular idea today is a free zone made up of North Korea, South Korea, and Japan with the United States, China, and Russia providing negative security assurances to the three in-zone countries. Now that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, it would only be this country that would have to give up its nuclear weapons under this scheme. South Korea and Japan will have to reaffirm their non-nuclear status under the NPT. Since North Korea has been demanding a guarantee from the United States of no nuclear use or no aggression, and for South Korea and Japan to give up their nuclear umbrella, the free zone is becoming increasingly synonymous with North Korean denuclearization. Thus, by working hard to realize North Korean denuclearization, a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone will become close to realization. It has to be acknowledged that denuclearization does not just apply to North Korea but to the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the security guarantee offered to North Korea is not just a political declaration but is backed up by other tangible developments, giving it credibility and permanency.

The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy; an Initial Success and Now a Difficult Prospect

The peaceful use of nuclear energy was a major success at the beginning. Major industrial countries made great strides in using nuclear energy for power generation. The IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD played a role providing advice and arranging cooperation for this purpose. Nuclear power generation, however, has been slowed down every time the world has experienced major nuclear accidents: Three Mile Islands in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986, and Fukushima in 2011. Every time, people around the world have become scared of horrific accidents and have demanded strengthened safety measures. Lessons have been learned but every time, nuclear energy has found a different loophole. The argument still continues that to reduce global warming, the world needs to make use of non-carbon emitting nuclear energy, and the IAEA and the NEA project a major increase in nuclear energy use as a result of concerns over global warming. But, unfortunately, the ratio of nuclear energy in power generation remains flat at best or is slightly declining. In fact, many Western industrial countries are moving out of or reducing their dependence on nuclear power generation.

Conclusion

Now that it is well-established, the NPT will remain for years to come. But, if the failures and the shortcomings of the NPT are not addressed, it will gradually lose its relevance. It will increasingly be seen as a weak treaty in the prevention of nuclear proliferation that struggles to impose punishments on those who violate it. Given the basic bargain underlying the treaty, if progress is not made towards nuclear disarmament, the willingness of the NNWSs to strictly adhere to the treaty obligations will continue to decline. Should the NPT continue to be a cornerstone of world nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament has to make steady progress with a good prospect of eliminating nuclear weapons. Negotiations for a Middle East WMD-free zone has to be started and the verification and enforcement mechanisms have to be strengthened to keep pace with the political and technical developments on the ground.

The five year Review cycle, therefore, faces an immense task. Some of the tasks, in the meantime, can be achieved outside the official framework of the NPT. Nuclear disarmament and arms control can be negotiated bilaterally or plurilaterally among the concerned parties. A Middle East free of WMD can be negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations to include Israel which is not party to the NPT. The question of North Korea will best be dealt with in bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea or the regional negotiating framework of the 6-Party Talks. It is not the official nature of the forum but whether it can produce results that is important.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nobuyasu Abe
Nobuyasu Abe is Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs (2003-06). Served as a Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (2014-17), Director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, JIIA (2008-2014), Japanese ambassador to the IAEA and CTBTO (1999-2001), Director-General for Arms Control and Science Affairs, MOFA/GOJ (1997-99). Also served as a member of the Advisory Board to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (2008-09). Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center with its Managing the Atom project (2018-19). Current Senior Advisor, Council on Strategic Risks.

1 The author was inspired by the tariff harmonization formula adopted towards the end of the Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations (1973-78), in which the author participated as a member of the Japanese negotiating team. The formula requires deeper reduction of higher tariffs. Thomas, . http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol12/iss1/1

References

2020. "50 Years of the Non-proliferation Treaty: Strengthening the NPT in the Face of Iranian and North Korean Nonproliferation Challenges." Testimony before US House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, and Asia, the Pacific and Nonproliferation, March 3. . https://www.nti.org/newsroom/news/ntis-richard-johnson-testifies-congress-strengthening-npt/

, , and . 2020. "Time for Leadership: South Korea and Nuclear Nonproliferation." Arms Control Today. . https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-03/time-leadership-south-korea-nuclear-nonproliferation

NTI. 2005. "Taiwan and Nonproliferation." NTI Issue Brief, May 1. . https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/taiwan-and-nonproliferation/

2018. "Conceptual Twist of Japanese Nuclear Policy: Its Ambivalence and Coherence under the US Umbrella." Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (1): 193-208. . https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1459286

1979. "Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the Final Stage." Cornell International Law Journal 12 (1): 1-42. . http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol12/iss1/1

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The NPT at Fifty: Successes and Failures

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
ABSTRACT The NPT succeeded in its initial task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the potential proliferators considered likely at the time of its entry into force in 1970. Thus, it helped prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to the ten, twenty, twenty-five countries that President John F.

# data[].attributes.headline
Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons

# data[].attributes.subject
Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons

# data[].attributes.body
The United Nations General Assembly resolved in resolution 71/258 to hold a conference in 2017 to develop a legally enforceable treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, ultimately to their eventual abolition. The Assembly urged all Member States to attend the Conference, which would also include international organizations and members from civil society. The Conference was held in New York from the 27th to the 31st of March and from the 15th of June to the 7th of July. Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, Costa Rica's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva, presided over the conference. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has a detailed list of limitations on nuclear weapon participation. These commitments include avoiding developing, testing, producing, acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, using, or threatening to use nuclear weapons. The Treaty also forbids the use of nuclear weapons on sovereign territory and the giving of support to nuclear weapons states. Much like I said in the NPR post the countries/ states that did adopt and sign the treaty were states that did not have nuclear weapons, and it could put a hinderance on the treaty being affective.

# data[].attributes.body
Above is the exact text of the treaty and it goes over a lot. To begin the NPT is a historic international agreement whose goal is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, encourage cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear, and advance the goal of nuclear disarmament and total disarmament. The Pact is the only multilateral treaty that contains a legally enforceable commitment to the aim of nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon states. The Treaty was signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The Treaty was renewed indefinitely on May 11, 1995. The Treaty has been signed by 191 countries, including the five nuclear-weapon states. The NPT has been ratified by more nations than any previous arms control and disarmament pact, demonstrating the Treaty's importance.The Treaty is widely recognized as the centerpiece of the worldwide nuclear non-proliferation system and a necessary foundation for nuclear disarmament efforts. It was created to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, advance nuclear disarmament and general and comprehensive disarmament goals, and increase participation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all
time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows: Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage,
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed
or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source
or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board
of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review
the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

Note:
On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3).

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty, Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard

# data[].attributes.headline
New Global Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons

# data[].attributes.subject
New Global Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons

# data[].attributes.body
In this NPR we hear from both Costa Rican Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gomez, and Jeffrey Lewis who is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey when host Geoff Brumfiel, reports on the new treaty. When looking at the new treaty it prohibits nuclear weapons in any form, whether it is possessing them, developing them, transferring them, the use of them, and ave the threat of use this treaty would make all of this illegal. Over 80 countries have signed it, however, none of these countries have been countries that actually possess Nuclear weapons, which is why Prof. Jeffrey Lewis says it is more ceremonial than anything else and would even compete with the current NPT, however, I believe that is the point since this new treaty would be more strict I believe it would be better for the global community. Amb. Whyte says that the best way to combat the nuclear weapons problem is to delegitimize it, it was the way they dealt with slavery and colonialism.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
A new global treaty banning nuclear weapons will go into force on Friday. More than 80 countries have signed on to it - but none of them are countries that have nuclear weapons.

MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST:

A new global treaty banning nuclear weapons goes into effect tomorrow. It aims to make nuclear war obsolete. But as NPR's Geoff Brumfiel reports, some question whether it'll work.

GEOFF BRUMFIEL, BYLINE: It's known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and it does exactly what it says.

ELAYNE WHYTE: For the first time in history, nuclear weapons are going to be illegal in international law.

BRUMFIEL: Elayne Whyte is a former Costa Rican ambassador to the United Nations. She oversaw the drafting of the treaty a few years back. It bans every aspect of nuclear weapons.

WHYTE: The development, the manufacturing, the transfer, the possession, the use, the threat of use.

BRUMFIEL: So far, more than 80 countries have signed up to the new treaty, but none of them are countries that have nuclear weapons. Jeffrey Lewis is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. He says without the nuclear weapons states...

JEFFREY LEWIS: It's mostly symbolic in nature.

BRUMFIEL: In fact, the new treaty is actually designed to send a message to a handful of nuclear nations, including the U.S. Back in the 1960s, they signed another treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to that agreement, those with nuclear weapons had to work towards disarmament, but that hasn't happened. This new treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons is designed to pressure nuclear nations. But Lewis worries it could have unintended consequences.

LEWIS: Because it is created, I would argue, in frustration, it is a competitor to the agreement we do have, which is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

BRUMFIEL: Lewis and others fear that countries could play the two treaties against each other or shop around to see if they could get better concessions for joining one or the other. Ambassador Elayne Whyte says the two treaties are designed to work together and that the new nuclear ban sends a clear message to nuclear weapons states about disarmament.

WHYTE: To remind them they need to be moving forward.

BRUMFIEL: She says this is a first step towards a difficult goal, but the world has grappled with tough issues before.

WHYTE: How did the international community deal with slavery, colonialism? Once you delegitimize that conduct, it completely has an impact on the policy-making process.

BRUMFIEL: Nuclear weapons will be around for a while, she says. But over time, she hopes nations like the U.S. can be convinced and cajoled into giving them up.

Geoff Brumfiel, NPR News, Washington.

(SOUNDBITE OF TO ROCOCO ROT'S "TELEMA")

Copyright © 2021 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information.

NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by Verb8tm, Inc., an NPR contractor, and produced using a proprietary transcription process developed with NPR. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR's programming is the audio record.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
More Than 80 Nations Sign On To A New Global Treaty To Prohibit Nuclear Weapons

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A new global treaty banning nuclear weapons will go into force on Friday. More than 80 countries have signed on to it - but none of them are countries that have nuclear weapons. MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST: A new global treaty banning nuclear weapons goes into effect tomorrow.

# data[].attributes.headline
Countries with and without Nuclear Weapons and what that means

# data[].attributes.subject
Countries with and without Nuclear Weapons and what that means

# data[].attributes.body
In this video done by TLDR News, they dive into the history of Nuclear Disarmament and explain why only five countries are legally recognized to have nuclear weapons, and it is simply because they had the weapons prior to signing the treaty, but have agreed to disband their programs and not move forward with any more nuclear weapons, however, there are other countries who had not signed the treaty and decided to keep up with their programs, and even North Korea had pulled out of the treaty, showing that it was in fact possible and easy to do. There were countries that didn't sign the NPT that had no intentions to develop programs however, countries like Pakistan would have to, in order to fight the Soviets which is why the US did not stop it. This is why some states would grow to develop weapons. Yet much like most International Law issues there is not much to be done to the states that develop or even break International Law, since even a country like North Korea was allowed to exit the NPT.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Why are Some Countries Allowed Nuclear Weapons and Not Others? - TLDR News

# data[].attributes.body
The reason I chose this one was that I found it very interesting that there are zones that have decided to become Nuclear-free. In the NPT there is a section that allows states to decide (along with other states in the same region). This piece was written by the UN, even has a map of the regions of states that chose to go Nuclear-free. It gives guidelines to follow such as letting the states with nuclear weapons know the region is going Nuclear-free and also making sure the state does not prevent any science stemming from nuclear research, it only wants to prohibit weapons. The treaties and their regions are as followed: Treaty of Tlatelolco-Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Treaty of Rarotonga- South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,  Treaty of Bangkok- Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Treaty of Pelindaba- African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories".

General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975) defines a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as

...any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

(b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The UN Disarmament Commission in its report of April 30, 1999, recommended a set of principles and guidelines for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which included, inter alia:

Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.

The initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively from States within the region concerned and be pursued by all States of that region.

The nuclear-weapon States should be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the treaty, through which they undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty.

A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the treaties establishing such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic, scientific and technological development of the States parties.

Treaties Involved in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The following treaties form the basis for the existing NWFZs:

Mongolia's self-declared nuclear-weapon-free status has been recognized internationally through the adoption of UN General Assembly resolution 55/33S on "Mongolia's international security and nuclear weapon free status."

Other treaties that also deal with the denuclearization of certain areas are:

Antarctic Treaty

Outer Space Treaty - Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Moon Agreement - Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Seabed Treaty - Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

The text and status of all the above-mentioned treaties are available on the UNODA Treaty Database.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories".

# data[].attributes.body
In this article by Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,  Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, he recognizes that tensions among states are rising which makes the talk of disarmament only seem even more unstable. However, it does say it can be achieved ultimately it has to be the superpowers who drive the point of cooperation home. They want to make it illegal such as biological and chemical weapons. However, as far as the current rules the article says many rules were to be put into place to ensure no new countries would acquire nuclear weapons, such as the Additional protocol. However, this article brings up the point of terrorism which I found interesting since I wasn't sure how countries but the article makes it clear there is a plan in place if that were to ever happen. The article overall stresses that the easiest way would be to make it completely illegal to have and that doesn't seem to be the case with these countries.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
ERROR: The request could not be satisfied

# data[].attributes.body
In this 2020 article from three experts on foreign policy from the Brookings institute, they look at the NPT to see if after 50 years it was successful. In the article it is stated that Ronald Reagan claimed after the Cold War at least 20 nations will rise with nuclear arms, however thanks to the NPT, this was not the case and in the current day there are only 9 nations that possess nuclear weapons to add to this Russia and the US have gotten rid of about 90% of their nuclear war heads since the Cold War. It even cites that the Additional protocol has helped crack down on nations trying to obtain or get more nuclear weapons. However this success is said to be starting to crumble, with many reasons to look at, one is scholars believe that both Russia and the US do not take the treaty seriously enough. Another reason was that the global leader disagreed with the liberal view of interdependence and began to cut relations with other countries to grow their dominance (namely Russia and China). With these factors its easy to call to questions the lasting success of the treaty, since tensions have only been raised.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
March 5, 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into effect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Five decades on, is the treaty achieving what was originally envisioned? Where is it succeeding in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and where might it be falling short? Four Brookings experts on defense and arms control weigh in to assess the NPT today.

(@MichaelEOhanlon), Director of Research and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program: There are still more than 10,000 nuclear warheads on Earth. But I think the NPT, on balance, has been enormously successful.

Current arsenals are big, but they are only about one-fifth the size of what they were a half-century ago. While superpower arms control, and the end of the Cold War, deserve most of the credit for the reductions (along with restraint by China, in particular, in not building up too much), the NPT created some of the broader political context and moral pressure that led to these reductions. While it sought to prevent non-nuclear states from ever getting the bomb, its main bargain also required the existing nuclear weapons states to reduce and ultimately eliminate their arsenals to hold up their own ends of the bargain.

The arsenals of the United States and Russia still account for more than 90% of the total number of warheads on Earth today. The United Kingdom, France, China, India, and Pakistan each likely possesses between 150 and 300, with Israel's unconfirmed arsenal totaling almost 100 bombs. North Korea probably has a couple dozen nuclear weapons, with enough fissile material to make a few dozen more. That said, the situation is not entirely grim. While nuclear proliferation continues, and nine countries are known to possess nuclear weapons, the fear once expressed by John F. Kennedy that at least a couple dozen countries could have the bomb by the 21st century has not panned out. And of course, nuclear weapons have not been used again in combat.

An additional achievement, for which a few of my colleagues here deserve some of the credit, is the tightening of inspection regimens under the NPT. In particular, the so-called " Additional Protocol " has created the right for inspectors to go to places where they suspect monkey business, even if those sites are not officially declared by the country in question. This arrangement tends to work only if national intelligence capabilities, and/or whistleblowers, provide information about suspicious activities. But at that point, inspectors can be more effective than in the years before the Additional Protocol concept was developed and legitimated. It has helped make the nuclear inspections in the Iran nuclear deal much more effective (even if other aspects of that deal have proven highly controversial). A similar concept would almost surely be used in any nuclear deal with North Korea in the years ahead.

On balance, I would give 2.5 cheers to the NPT!

Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative: As we mark the 50th anniversary of the NPT's entry into force, there is much to celebrate.

Without the treaty, the powerful norm against proliferation it created, its associated controls on exports of sensitive technologies, the rigorous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring system, and the threat of sanctions for violating nonproliferation obligations, we would be living in the world of many nuclear-armed states that President John F. Kennedy predicted. As Mike points out, today there are only nine countries with nuclear weapons, the same number as 25 years ago - a remarkable indication of the NPT's durability and its contribution to international stability.

Without the treaty, and the confidence provided by its IAEA verification system that nuclear equipment and materials would not be diverted to the production of nuclear weapons, the widespread use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would not have been possible - not just for electricity generation, but also for the production of isotopes for use in medicine, agriculture, and industry.

While the NPT's central goal was to prevent additional nuclear-armed states, it sought to assure non-nuclear weapon states (who were required to renounce nuclear arms) that the asymmetry between them and the five original nuclear powers (who were allowed to keep their nuclear weapons) would not last forever. It therefore obligated the five - China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. - to make "good faith" efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

In the last 50 years, the United States and the USSR/Russia have made huge progress toward nuclear disarmament, reducing their nuclear weapons inventories by close to 90% from Cold War levels. Mike is right that they pursued nuclear arms limitations and reductions primarily because they believed such arms agreements would serve their own security interests, not because they were obliged to do so under the NPT. But Mike is also right that the NPT helped create the stable strategic framework in which such agreements were acceptable to the superpowers. And the desire of Washington and Moscow to ensure the success of the treaty and its nonproliferation goal gave them additional incentive to pursue nuclear disarmament.

So the NPT's first 50 years have been remarkably successful. But there are warning signs that its continued success cannot be taken for granted.

The international security environment has become increasingly unsettled. U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese bilateral relations have sharply deteriorated. With the growing strategic capabilities of additional countries, especially China, the bipolar model of stability has become outdated. New technologies and types of weapons - including offensive cyber, counter-space, and hypersonic weapons - could further destabilize the security environment.

There are growing concerns not just that new nuclear arms reduction agreements are very unlikely, but that existing agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, are unraveling and that this could lead to renewed nuclear arms competitions and even increase the risks that nuclear weapons will once again be used.

It is not only the NPT's disarmament goals that are at risk. There are fears that the number of nuclear-armed states could increase.

With U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran rebuilding its enrichment program, the JCPOA is hanging by a thread, and some Iranians are even talking about leaving the NPT. Meanwhile, the Saudi crown prince says the kingdom will acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asks why other countries can have nuclear weapons and Turkey cannot.

In Northeast Asia, U.S.-North Korea negotiations have ground to a halt, raising concerns in South Korea and Japan that Pyongyang's nuclear capability may be permanent at a time when doubts have arisen about the reliability of U.S. alliance commitments and security guarantees, which have been the critical factor enabling those U.S. allies to renounce nuclear weapons of their own.

An additional warning sign is the continued polarization within the NPT membership, with non-nuclear NPT parties - especially among the non-aligned - concerned that that the NPT nuclear powers - particularly the United States and Russia - are not taking their nuclear disarmament commitment seriously. This concern gave impetus to the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which the five NPT nuclear weapons states and most of their allies strongly oppose.

These challenges to the future of the NPT and the broader global nonproliferation regime will be addressed at the upcoming April-May NPT Review Conference, a conference of NPT parties held every five years to review the operation of the treaty and consider means to strengthen it. The review conference is likely to be a contentious one. But given the deep reservoir of members' support for the treaty, it is possible that, despite their differences, they will be able to come together on a conference outcome that reaffirms the essential role of the NPT in strengthening international security and pledges their support for a strong and durable treaty for many years to come.

Nothing could better ensure a positive review conference outcome than a Trump administration decision to join with Russia in extending the New START Treaty for another five years, which would preserve predictability and transparency in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship and provide the breathing space needed to consider how to promote stability and future arms control measures in the increasingly complex and challenging international security environment we are now facing.

(@steven_pifer), Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative: Mike and Bob are correct: The NPT has been largely successful. While President Kennedy in 1963 pessimistically opined that there could be as many as 20 nuclear-armed states by 1975, today there are only nine. As a result of arms reduction agreements and unilateral decisions, both Washington and Moscow have dramatically cut their nuclear arsenals from peaks of over 30,000 and 40,000 weapons respectively to active arsenals today of under 4,500 weapons each.

That's good news, to be sure. But there are reasons for unease as we mark the 50 anniversary of the NPT and approach the treaty's five-year review conference, which begins on April 27. As Bob noted, the international environment has deteriorated, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Iranian nuclear program is in deep trouble, and no progress has been made in persuading North Korea to forgo or even cap its nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, Russia, China, and the United States are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces. The Russians declined a U.S. proposal to follow up the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with a new bilateral negotiation to cover all their nuclear arms, citing concerns about missile defense and conventional strike weapons. The 1987 INF Treaty has collapsed, and New START expires in less than one year unless the United States and Russia agree to its extension. The Trump administration now calls for a trilateral U.S.-Russia-China negotiation to cover all nuclear weapons, but appears unprepared to offer anything that would entice Moscow or Beijing to agree.

The nuclear weapons states - the United States and Russia, in particular - still base their security largely on nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence likely prevented a superpower conflict during the Cold War. It should also be noted, however, that deterrence at several points almost failed, and the consequences would have been catastrophic. The risk of deterrence failure will remain as long as countries maintain nuclear arsenals.

The lack of recent progress by the nuclear weapons states to further reduce their arsenals - with the NPT's ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament nowhere in sight - frustrates many non-nuclear weapons states and gave birth to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Ongoing nuclear modernization programs, the INF Treaty's demise, uncertain status of New START, and lack of progress on bringing the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force will make the review conference a difficult one for the nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States and Russia.

Washington and Moscow could help themselves by agreeing to extend New START to 2026 and launching in-depth strategic stability talks to cover nuclear weapons and the full range of associated issues, including missile defense, long-range conventional strike arms, hypersonic weapons, and the impact of developments in the cyber and space domains. It would be useful to engage China in strategic stability discussions as well.

Unfortunately, there appears little prospect of this in the near future. So, as Bob wrote, the review conference will likely be a rough one.

Frank Rose, Senior Fellow in Security and Strategy: I largely agree with the points that Mike, Bob, and Steve have made regarding the important role that the NPT has played in advancing nonproliferation and international security since it entered into force 50 years ago.

But as the others have noted, disagreements between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states over the future of nuclear disarmament will likely make reaching consensus on a final document at the upcoming NPT Review Conference extremely difficult to achieve. This is due, in part, to the fact that the international security environment has changed fundamentally since the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995.

The international security environment has changed fundamentally.

At the time, relations between the major powers - in particular, the United States, Russia, and China - were trending in a much more positive direction. Indeed, the overarching foreign policy objective of the United States and its partners at the time was to integrate Russia and China into the U.S.-led international order. This relatively benign political environment allowed the international community to make significant progress on numerous bilateral and multilateral arms control disarmament, and risk reduction efforts like the START I, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Moscow Treaty, New START, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

Our colleague Tom Wright has described this as the "era of convergence " in which it was hoped the major powers would stop treating each other as rivals and begin to work together to tackle common challenges like nonproliferation. But as he notes in his excellent book "All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power":

The era of convergence came to an end because Russian and Chinese leaders believed that the liberal international order posed an existential threat to their regimes...And so, as China rose, and Russia regained strength, they began to push back, hard.

As political tensions between the major powers have re-emerged, the prospects for further progress on disarmament have - not unsurprisingly - stalled. This is unlikely to change until the underlying political issues contributing to the re-emergence of major power tension are addressed. That said, the lack of progress on disarmament should not prevent the major powers from taking pragmatic actions to reduce risk, enhance stability, and lay the groundwork for future progress.

As I have written elsewhere, one of the most effective near-term actions the United States could take would be to extend the New START nuclear arms control treaty with Russia, which is scheduled to expire in February 2021. Through its inspections, data exchanges, and notifications, the treaty will help maintain stability and reduce the risk of miscalculation. Extension of New START should be accompanied by the establishment of bilateral U.S.-Russia strategic stability talks that establishes a formal mechanism to: 1) address the strategic concerns of both parties; and 2) lay the foundation to develop a new arms control and strategic stability framework to replace New START when it ultimately expires. Such a framework will most certainly need to include third-parties (e.g. China) and emerging technologies like cyber, anti-satellite, and hypersonic weapons.

Furthermore, the United States should also begin a serious bilateral dialogue with China, with the ultimate objective of including China in a future framework. As I have written previously, there are several practical steps the Trump administration could take to advance the dialogue with China, such as establishing a link between the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and a similar organization in China; negotiating a bilateral missile pre-launch notification regime; and developing norms to ensure the safety, sustainability, and security of the outer space environment.

In conjunction with bilateral efforts, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should continue their efforts to explore ways to reduce risk, especially regarding emerging technologies.

While nuclear disarmament as outlined by Article VI of the NPT remains a long-term goal, it is unlikely to occur in the near term due to the changed international security environment. However, there are several practical steps that the United States and other major powers could take to reduce risk, enhance stability, and lay the groundwork for future progress. It is on these steps that the international community should focus its efforts.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
March 5, 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into effect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Five decades on, is the treaty achieving what was originally envisioned? Where is it succeeding in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and where might it be falling short?