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by Lita Cosner

© iStockphoto/kamisok

The evolutionary ideas of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) destructively influenced many of the Western world's leaders in the early 20 th century. In particular, intellectuals in Germany were among the earliest to embrace Darwinism enthusiastically, and to apply its concept of the survival of the fittest to human society. That is, they applied the subtitle of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859). The most infamous result of this was the Holocaust, but social Darwinism was also a major influence in the events leading up to World War One.

In the decades leading up to World War One, intellectuals embraced Darwinism and its ethical implications as a welcome alternative to Christian belief and ethics. Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), the most famous German Darwinist of the time, and notorious forger of embryo diagrams, believed that evolution would "bring forth a complete revolution in the entire world view of humanity." He argued that Darwinism required the abandonment of Christian morals.

Until the advent of Darwinism, the sanctity of human life was taken for granted in European law and thought. But many German intellectuals began to argue that some had a greater right to life than others, namely, those who are deemed more valuable to society. This inequality was mainly based on race, but the Darwinists argued that there were inferior individuals within a race as well. For instance, zoologist and politician Karl Vogt (1817-1895) argued that a mentally handicapped child was closer in value to an ape than to his own parents. It should thus not be surprising that the world's first eugenics society was founded in Germany, promoting the concept founded by Darwin's cousin Francis Galton (1822-1911).

While the belief in German superiority led the Nazis to exterminate 'undesirable' individuals, during WW1 German Darwinists used the same idea to justify war on states which they deemed inferior.

German social Darwinists were enamoured with the vision of the "master race", which in their mind was the Nordic or Germanic race. Eugenicist Alfred Ploetz (1860-1940) coined the term "racial hygiene" ( Rassenhygiene), and later welcomed the Nazis as the ones who would put this into practice. While the belief in German superiority led the Nazis to exterminate "undesirable" individuals, during WW1 German Darwinists used the same idea to justify war on states which they deemed inferior. They believed that the destiny of the master race was to dominate or eliminate "inferior" races, and the most obvious way to accomplish this was through war. In their view, all races and states were in competition for survival, and those who would not wage war would perish. In other words "war is inevitable and peace is merely an armistice in the continuous battle between races and groups for survival."

The concept of Lebensraum or "living space" was one of the justifications for the Germans in both World Wars to take over their neighbouring countries. While Germany was not actually overcrowded, they believed that since one side or the other was always advancing, "without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow." Max Weber emphasized this racial competition:

"Our descendants will not hold us responsible primarily for the kind of economic organization that we pass on to them, but rather for the extent of elbow-room [Ellbogenraum], that we obtain through struggle and leave behind"

Because of the view of war as an evolutionary instrument, the German leaders regarded war as a desirable option, even though they could not be sure of a victory.

Interestingly, German Darwinists were divided about whether war was beneficial for the master race. Some were pacifists, including Haeckel, because they believed that war would kill off mainly the best members of the master race, but anthropologist Otto Ammon (1842-1916) believed that war was the only way to test which nation was stronger and to grant victory to the fittest opponent. Of course, there was the problem of undesirable individuals in the German population as well; Ploetz suggested sending them to the front lines so they would be killed before those who were deemed to be more fit.

Because of this view of war as an evolutionary instrument, the German leaders regarded war as a desirable option, even though they could not be sure of a victory. There was also a fatalistic element; they believed that it was their destiny and that they were fulfilling their "preordained role in the development of the world."

Some argue that because Darwin did not directly apply the principles of social Darwinism, the term, and its connection to evolutionary thought, is invalid. But Darwin himself said that killing in the animal kingdom was a way for evolution to progress:

"It may be difficult, but we ought to admire the savage instinctive hatred of the queen-bee, which urges her to instantly destroy the young queens her daughters as soon as born, or to perish herself in the combat; for undoubtedly this is for the good of the community; and maternal love and maternal hatred, though the latter fortunately is most rare, is all the same to the inexorable principle of natural selection."

Darwin simply was reluctant to apply this principle to humans, but the German social Darwinists did not share his disinclination. While there were other factors that caused World War 1, the German leadership's universal belief in social Darwinism and its anti-Christian ethical system justified their militarism and made it into a moral good.

Related Articles

Further Reading

References and notes

1. Weikart, R., From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, USA, 2004; reviewed at creation.com/weikart. Dr Richard Weikart is professor of modern European history at California State University, Stanislaus. Return to text.

2. Grigg, R., Ernst Haeckel: Evangelist for evolution and apostle of deceit, Creation 18(2):33-36, 1996; creation.com/Haeckel; Fraud rediscovered, Creation 20(2):49-51, 1998; creation.com/fraud. Return to text.

3. Weikart, R., Darwinism and death: devaluing human life in Germany 1859-1920, Journal of the History of Ideas 63(2):323-344, 2002; p. 325. Return to text.

4. Weikart, ref. 3, p. 333. Return to text.

5. Greek: εὐ- (eu-) meaning "well" and γένος (genos) meaning "kind" or "offspring". Return to text.

6. Grigg, R., Eugenics ... death of the defenceless: The legacy of Darwin's cousin Galton, Creation 28(1):18-22, 2005; creation.com/eugenics. Return to text.

7. Hamilton, R. and Herwig, H., "World wars: definitions and causes", in: Hamilton, R. and Herwig, H., eds., The Origins of World War One, p. 26, Cambridge University Press, 2003. Return to text.

8. Weikart, R., The origins of social Darwinism in Germany: 1859-1895, Journal of the History of Ideas 54(3): 469-489; p. 485. Return to text.

9. Evans, R., The Coming of the Third Reich, p. 35, Penguin, 2005. Return to text.

10. Weikart, ref. 8, p. 482. Return to text.

11. Weikart, ref. 8, p. 482. Return to text.

12. Evans, ref. 9, p. 35. Return to text.

13. Herwig, H., "Germany" in: The Origins of World War One, Ref. 7; p. 186. Return to text.

14. Quoted from Weikart, ref. 3, pp. 331-332. See also Muehlenberg, B., "Darwin and eugenics: Darwin was indeed a 'Social Darwinist'", creation.com/darwin-and-eugenics, 18 March 2009. Return to text.

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by Lita Cosner The evolutionary ideas of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) destructively influenced many of the Western world's leaders in the early 20 th century. In particular, intellectuals in Germany were among the earliest to embrace Darwinism enthusiastically, and to apply its concept of the survival of the fittest to human society.

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Hague Convention, any of a series of international treaties that issued from international conferences held at The Hague in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907.

The first conference was convened at the invitation of Count Mikhail Nikolayevich Muravyov, the minister of foreign affairs of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. In his circular of Jan. 11, 1899, Count Muravyov proposed specific topics for consideration: (1) a limitation on the expansion of armed forces and a reduction in the deployment of new armaments, (2) the application of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864 to naval warfare, and (3) a revision of the unratified Brussels Declaration of 1874 regarding the laws and customs of land warfare. The conference met from May 18 to July 29, 1899; 26 nations were represented. Only two American countries participated, the United States and Mexico.

Although the conference of 1899 failed to achieve its primary objective, the limitation on armaments, it did adopt conventions defining the conditions of a state of belligerency and other customs relating to war on land and sea. Further, three declarations were accepted-one prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases, another prohibiting the use of expanding bullets ( dumdums), and another prohibiting the discharges of projectiles or explosives from balloons. Last, and most important, was the adoption of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, creating the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The conference of 1907, though first proposed by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, was officially convened by Nicholas II. This conference sat from June 15 to Oct. 18, 1907, and was attended by the representatives of 44 states. Again the proposal for the limitation of armaments was not accepted. The conference did, however, adopt several conventions relating to such matters as the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts; the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land and sea; the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; the status of enemy merchant ships; bombardment by naval forces in wartime; and the establishment of an international prize court. The conference of 1907 renewed the declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles from balloons but did not reaffirm the declarations prohibiting asphyxiating gas and expanding bullets. The final acts of the conference were the unanimous acceptance by the delegates of the principle of compulsory arbitration and the stating of a number of voeux (resolutions), the first of which was the recommendation that another conference be summoned in eight years, thus establishing the concept that the best way to handle international problems was through a series of successive conferences.

Although the conference scheduled for 1915 failed to meet because of the outbreak of World War I, the conference idea strongly influenced the creation of the more highly organized League of Nations after the war.

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Hague Convention | International Law, Humanitarianism & Peacekeeping

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Hague Convention, any of a series of international treaties that issued from international conferences held at The Hague in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907. The first conference was convened at the invitation of Count Mikhail Nikolayevich Muravyov, the minister of foreign affairs of Tsar Nicholas

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Italo-Turkish War: Italo-Turkish War, (1911-12), war undertaken by Italy to gain colonies in North Africa by conquering the Turkish provinces of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica (modern Libya). The conflict upset the precarious international balance of power just prior to World War I by revealing the weakness of Turkey and,

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How World War I Started: Crash Course World History 209

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Who Started World War I: Crash Course World History 210

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Crisis In Morocco 1905 and 1911 - How Did It Help Start WW1? - GCSE History

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http://imstuck.wix.com/imstuckgcserevision Crisis In Morocco 1906 and 1911 - How Did It Help Start WW1? - GCSE History In this video, we look at both the Morocco Crises in both Tangiers and Agadir.

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Citation: C N Trueman "The Algeciras Conference of 1906"
historylearningsite.co.uk. The History Learning Site, 31 Mar 2015. 1 Mar 2018.

The Algeciras Conference was held as a result of the First Moroccan Crisis that started in 1905. The conference at Algeciras started on January 16 th 1906 and all the major European powers were represented there as well as the Americans. The Algeciras Conference had one aim: to decide what was to be done with regards to Morocco, one of the few African nations that had not been taken over by a European power.

The two main protagonists at Algeciras were France and Germany. However, it soon became very clear to Germany that other European powers had sided with France - Britain, Spain and Italy had all come to a prior agreement as to what should happen to Morocco. These four nations had decided which Moroccan cities would be governed by which European power: Casablanca, Rabat and Larache. For example, Tangier was to be governed by a Franco-Spanish military force commanded by a Frenchman. None of this had been put before the Germans and their delegation felt as if it had been deliberately left out of the discussions - which, in fact, it had.

Ironically, this did nothing to harm European relations as Wilhelm II had a new idea as to how Europe should diplomatically proceed. Despite the obvious delicate relationship between Germany and France, Wilhelm wanted to bring France into an alliance. While Wilhelm may have had a huge ego which some in Europe knew how to play on, he was not a complete fool with regards to diplomatic niceties. Wilhelm's plan was simple. By agreeing to many of the French demands in Morocco, he would bring them into a full alliance with Germany. Coupled with this would be a third nation - Russia. At this time Russia had recently lost a war to Japan and had experienced the 1905 Revolution. Wilhelm believed, with some justification, that Nicholas II of Russia needed to be seen as a European 'big player' and that an alliance between Germany, France and Russia would satiate this desire and give the impression to the Tsar that Russia was still seen as an important ally by the major European players. So Wilhelm's conciliatory gestures at Algeciras had a purpose to them. But what was that purpose? Wilhelm wanted to diplomatically isolate Great Britain, which he believed was Germany's biggest rival in Europe - economically and militarily. If France and Russia were tied to Germany, Great Britain would be left with Spain and Italy - neither of whom were seen as major powers in the same league as France and Russia.

The German delegation at Algeciras was encouraged by Berlin to offer more than the French had asked for with regards to Morocco. Or they were ordered to agree to suggestions made by Rouvier. For example, Rouvier suggested that after three to four years after a signed agreement at Algeciras, France should get a police mandate over the whole of Morocco. The German delegation agreed with this but German Chancellor von Bülow did not as he was not privy to the fact that it had come from Rouvier. In fact, Wilhelm II criticised von Bülow when the Chancellor openly spoke out in favour of a more hard-line approach to France over the Morocco issue. By now Wilhelm was looking for a quadruple alliance as he wanted to bring Turkey into his plans. He did not want anything to endanger his plans and he believed that von Bülow's remarks about the French would do just this.

The Algeciras Conference became a lot more than a conference on Morocco. The historian D C Watt believes that Morocco actually became of secondary importance as the major powers jockeyed to get alliances wrapped up. On paper, Wilhelm's plan of either a triple or quadruple alliance made sound sense as if either of them ever came to fruition, Great Britain would have undoubtedly become diplomatically isolated. However, the plan had two weaknesses. The first was the constant lack of trust between the players; after the numerous verbal battles between France and Germany, it must have come as something of a shock for the French to find that they had a prospective ally in Germany and that Germany was actively courting this. The second was Great Britain who in January 1906 got a new Liberal government. The new Foreign Secretary was Sir Edward Grey, who from 1892 to 1895 had gained great experience as to how German foreign policy worked when he was an Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.

Grey realised that Britain would be isolated from the European great powers if Germany's plan worked out. Grey also knew that France was the key player in the plan. Therefore he approached the French ambassador in London, Jules Cambon, and told him that France could expect British help if the Algeciras Conference broke down with all issues unresolved and Germany threatened France. Grey would not give a specific statement that this support equated to military support but he did inform Cambon about the secret contacts between the British and French military staffs that had been occurring - meetings that were kept secret from the whole British Cabinet until 1911. Cambon informed Paris that France could expect full British support throughout the negotiations at Algeciras. This was the first breakdown in the German plan to bring France into an alliance.

The conference itself did not go well. Three camps appeared: France, Britain, Russia and Spain against Austria-Hungary and Italy while Germany appeared isolated by herself. Wilhelm's plan disappeared during the conference. Even Austria-Hungary told Germany to act less like a bully as to them the Germans wanted every decision on their terms.

It is now known the von Bülow believed as early as February 1906 that there would be no successful outcome at Algeciras and that the only thing he had to do was to save Germany's prestige. On March 27 th, he accepted an Austrian proposal that the policing of Moroccan ports should be left to the French and Spanish who, in turn, would be overseen by a Swiss inspector who would report back to the Sultan. The Algeciras Conference ended on April 7 th 1906.

The Germans got very little out of the conference. The plan to create a triple alliance or even a quadruple alliance to isolate Great Britain failed. Arguably, by the end of the conference, Britain and France had even closer ties to one another. A German presence in North Africa had also failed to materialise. In France, many nationalists saw Algeciras as a triumph. The French media portrayed Germany as an inferior nation, much to the concern of the more experienced politicians in Paris. In Germany, there was a belief that they had been outplayed by the British and French and blame was heaped on von Bülow. The German High Command revised the Schlieffen Plan accordingly and pushed for the government in Berlin to adopt a more aggressive stance if only to redeem Germany within Europe. It is probable that the failure of the German politicians at Algeciras led to an increase in the influence the military had over the Kaiser at the expense of politicians. Great Britain realised that she had to continue cultivating relations not only with France but with other European powers.

The Algeciras Conference may have 'resolved' the crisis in Morocco but it had another far more important impact: the outcome clearly defined Europe into certain camps. At this conference Germany publicly lost out. There were many in Berlin who promised that it would be the last time that this would happen. In future a diplomatic resolution would not even be considered as there were those who believed that Germany's military strength was such that diplomacy would not be needed in any future European disagreements.
May 2012

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The Algeciras Conference of 1906 - History Learning Site

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The Algeciras Conference was held as a result of the First Moroccan Crisis that started in 1905. The conference at Algeciras started on January 16th 1906 and all the major European powers were represented there as well as the Americans. The Algeciras Conference had one aim: to decide what was to be done with regards ...

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On this day in 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany arrives in Tangiers to declare his support for the sultan of Morocco, provoking the anger of France and Britain in what will become known as the First Moroccan Crisis, a foreshadowing of the greater conflict between Europe's great nations still to come, the First World War.

The kaiser did not have any substantive interest in Morocco; neither did the German government. The central purpose of his appearance was to disrupt the Anglo-French Entente, formed in April 1904. The Entente Cordiale, as it was known, was originally intended not as an alliance against Germany but as a settlement of long-standing imperialist rivalries between Britain and France in North Africa. By its terms, Britain could pursue its interests in Egypt, while France was free to expand westward from Algeria into Morocco, the last territory that remained independent in the region. France subsequently signed an agreement with Spain dividing Morocco into spheres of influence, with France receiving the greater part.

Angered by its exclusion from the decisions made about North Africa, Germany believed that the Anglo-French Entente went a long way towards the creation of a new diplomatic balance in Europe itself. An international convention had guaranteed the independence of Morocco in 1880; Germany now saw that the friendship between two of Europe's most powerful nations threatened to override this, and thus also posed a challenge to Germany's own influence in Europe and the world.

With much pomp and circumstance, Wilhelm-whose ship had faced gale-force winds on its passage to North Africa-arrived in Tangiers on March 31, 1905. In what would be known as the open door speech, he announced that he looked upon the sultan of Morocco as the ruler of a free and independent empire subject to no foreign control and that he himself would always negotiate with the sultan. He also stated that he expected Germany to have advantages in trade and commerce with Morocco equal to that of other countries. Wilhelm's sensational appearance marked an aggressive departure from the German foreign policy under the legendary Otto von Bismarck, who as chancellor had united the German empire in 1871 and had advocated conciliatory gestures towards France and other European rivals as a key part of German foreign policy.

Although Germany had intended aggressive action in Morocco to place a wedge between France and Britain, it in fact had the opposite effect, strengthening the bond between the two countries due to their mutual suspicion of Germany. What began as mere friendship turned, after the First Moroccan Crisis, into a type of informal military alliance, including conversations between the British and French governments and military staffs and later, a mutual defense agreement with a third country, Russia.

In the wake of the kaiser's appearance, an international conference convened in Algeciras, Spain, in January 1906 to conclude an agreement about Morocco. The resulting convention awarded France a controlling interest in Moroccan affairs, but guaranteed equality of trade and economic freedom for every nation and limited any colonial action by any nation without consultation with the other signatories. A Second Moroccan Crisis flared in April 1911, when the French pushed troops into the country, claiming to be defending the sultan against riots that had erupted in Fez but actually violating the terms of the Algeciras convention. In response, Germany sent its own warship, the Panther, which arrived in the port of Agadir on May 21, intensifying the enmity between the two nations and, by extension, their allies.

Slightly more than two years before the outbreak of World War I, then, the two Moroccan crises left no doubt that the traditional power balance in Europe had shifted into large blocs of power, with Germany relatively isolated on one side-enjoying only lukewarm support from Austria-Hungary and Italy-and Britain, France, and Russia on the other.

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The First Moroccan Crisis - Mar 31, 1905 - HISTORY.com

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On this day in 1905, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany arrives in Tangiers to declare his support for the sultan of Morocco, provoking the anger of France and Britain in what will become known as the First Moroccan Crisis, a foreshadowing of the greater...

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Citation: C N Trueman "The Russo Japanese War"
historylearningsite.co.uk. The History Learning Site, 22 May 2015. 11 May 2018.

The Russo-Japanese War was a disaster for Russia in many senses - not just military. The Russo-Japanese War showed up Russia as it was - as a nation living on past glories and blind to the chronic problems that were developing in agriculture and industry.

The concept of diverting your people's attention away from difficult domestic issues with a successful war is nothing new. In Russia, such a war was to have the opposite effect - the war against Japan was meant to rally the people around the Tsar in a display of patriotic fervour. Ultimately, it was to create a divide between Nicholas and his people.

The war was never popular in Russia. The public had not been prepared for war. It suddenly happened and it did not lead to an outbreak of spontaneous patriotism. Why?

The war was fought in the very far eastern reaches of the country. The bulk of the population lived many hundreds of miles from the war and must have felt removed from it. Those in Moscow and St. Petersburg were 7,500 miles from the war zone. As news was slow to reach from one side of the nation to the other, there was little public enthusiasm for it as it felt too remote.

The new political parties felt that there was no justification for the war. The Social Revolutionaries indulged in terrorism while the Social Democrats agitated in the factories for strikes. The Liberals restricted their actions to petitions and verbal protests.

The acts of violence reached a climax on July 28th 1904, when Plehve was assassinated. Shortly after this, Grand Duke Sergius was also murdered.

The actual war was a disaster for Russia. Even a successful long drawn campaign was likely to be disastrous for Nicholas. However, the campaign was long but it was also a military disaster.

The Russian's naval 'might' was destroyed at Tsushima Bay and Port Arthur, Russia's only all year naval base in the Far East was captured in January 1905.

When news of these disasters did reach the likes of Moscow and St. Petersburg, it acted as a stimulus for further social unrest. Years of repression combined with a failed military campaign could only be bad for Nicholas. A strong and decisive leader may have coped with this scenario. Nicholas appointed Prince Mirsky to be Minister of the Interior. It was a disastrous appointment. Mirsky's only claim to fame was that he had been one of the favourites of Alexandra. He believed in his own importance - he must, in his mind, be able to be appointed by the tsar to such an important position. In Mirsky's first press conference, he asked for the people to be confident in the government and to those present seemed to offer the chance of reform. This led to him being reprimanded by the tsar but the damage had been done. Many now expected reform and would accept nothing less. Ironically, Mirsky's statement seemed to unite the political parties that were opposed to the government. In Paris, the leadership of the Social Revolutionaries and the Liberals met in the self-titled Union of Liberation. They decided on a common programme of action. Their programme would best be headed, they decided, by the zemstvo. On their behalf, the president of the Moscow zemstvo, Shipov, called for a national conference of all zemstvo. Mirsky agreed to this. He informed Nicholas that he saw no harm in allowing people to talk:

In fact, Mirsky's lack of political experience was exploited here. In the past, a tsar had refused all calls for any form of a national meeting to discuss "issues". Such a meeting might lead to calls for a national assembly. The fact that Mirsky did allow such a meeting to go ahead, was a sign that autocracy was starting to be challenged - and effectively challenged.

The national conference of zemstvo met from November 19th to the 22nd in 1904. It called for nothing unusual: freedom of speech, freedom of person, freedom of the press, civil rights etc. Nothing of this was new.

Nicholas responded to these demands in two ways. First, he asked the men in the zemstvo to keep out of politics. Secondly, Nicholas announced his own intention to introduce reforms. However, he announced no time limit to these suggested reforms and he made no mention of a national assembly which could discuss national issues.

What he said pleased no-one. Those who believed in autocracy saw what he said as a sign of weakness. Those who believed in reform were not impressed with what they heard.

The national conference dispersed after its allotted three days. However, it had set a marker. Those in professions (lawyers, journalists etc) started to organise themselves. They were excluded from the zemstvo and many of them also failed to get into government as they were not from the right background. Industrial workers also started to organise themselves. Small cells of Social Democrats had started to organise the workers in places such as the Putilov steelworks in St. Petersburg. Combined with a 35% increase in bread prices in 1904-1905, the ingredients were there for turmoil.

The workers were still disastrously organised. Curiously, they could be in a trade union called the Zubatov Unions, after Zubatov, the prefect of Moscow's police. He believed that if the workers wanted to be in a trade union, they should be in one - a state trade union! Any union founded by the state was bound to be infiltrated by Zubatov's spies, so it was an obvious tool for keeping a close eye on revolutionary movements within industry. Despite the fact that the Zabatov unions were an obvious tool of the government, the workers seemed blind to this. Zabatov had a simple formula. Plehve would condemn trade unions, and he would create them. When they were banned, he would resurrect them under a different name. The public side of the government was one of condemnation; the covert side of it was the creation of that said unions in an attempt to find out who was doing what in the revolutionary movements. Zabatov occasionally had to arrest union leaders in a show of government strength, but the Zabatov unions continued, despite their change of names. The main link Zabatov had with the unions was Father Gapon. His role in 1905 is still far from clear and it is likely that it will never be clarified. Was he a man of the workers? Or was he a government agitator who gave information to Zubatov?

Gapon did lead the 1905 Revolution. He was a well-respected man at the Putilov steelworks and it seemed fitting that he should lead a protest in front of those he represented. The protestors called for a fair wage and more bread. As they marched to the Winter's Palace they sang patriotic songs. Soldiers at the Winter's Palace, confronted with such a large crowd, understandably panicked and fired on the protestors. Over 200 were killed and many more were wounded. After this event, Nicholas II was no longer called the 'father of his people'

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The Russo Japanese War - History Learning Site

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The Russo Japanese War The Russo-Japanese War was a disaster for Russia in many senses - not just military. The Russo-Japanese War showed up Russia as it was - as a nation living on past glories and blind to the chronic problems that were developing in agriculture and industry.

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What caused the Russo-Japanese War?

Who won the Russo-Japanese war?

Where was the Russo-Japanese War fought?

What was the significance of the Russo-Japanese War?

How did the Russo-Japanese War end?

This article was most recently revised and updated by

Russo-Japanese War, (1904-05), military conflict in which a victorious Japan forced Russia to abandon its expansionist policy in East Asia, thereby becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European power.

Origins of the Russo-Japanese War

By the early 17th century, Russia had established its authority over all of Siberia, but its attempts to move southward were consistently blocked by China. Fully engaged in western Europe and against Turkey during the 18th century, Russia could not press its interests in East Asia. As the settlement of Siberia developed, however, it realized its need for outlets to the sea, and, because China continued to deny it access to the Amur region, it resorted to force toward the end of the reign of Emperor Nicholas I (1825-55).

Russo-Japanese War events

In the 1850s, Russian towns and settlements appeared along the left bank of the Amur (Heilong) River. The Chinese government made repeated protests but, because of its ongoing struggle against Great Britain and France and the internal turmoil of the Taiping Rebellion, was unable to resist Russian pressure. Finally, by the Treaty of Aigun (1858, confirmed by the Beijing Convention, 1860), China ceded to Russia all the territory north of the Amur, together with the maritime region east of the Ussuri (Wusuli) River from the mouth of the Amur to the boundary of Korea. This included the splendid site where Vladivostok was soon to be founded. Russian expansionist policy was now alarming other European powers, however, and in 1861 Great Britain thwarted a Russian attempt to establish a naval base on the island of Tsushima, lying between Korea and Japan. For the next 30 years Russia was content to consolidate its gains.

The reign of Emperor Alexander III (1881-94) witnessed a revival of interest in the development of the Asian parts of the Russian Empire. In 1891 Alexander sent his son, soon to reign as Nicholas II, on a much-publicized tour of East Asia, and at this time work began on the Trans-Siberian Railway. After the accession of Nicholas II in 1894, Russian expansionist policy became more active and pronounced. However, the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in that year demonstrated that Japan was an ascendant new power in Asia.

The emergence of Japan

The transformation of Japan from an isolationist feudal state into a vigorous modern power had begun in 1868 with the demise of the Tokugawa shogunate and the restoration of the Meiji emperor. The reforms of that era had been carried through with such dramatic speed that within a quarter of a century Japan was ready to assert itself against China. Although the rulers of the Qing dynasty controlled a vast empire, China entered the latter half of the 19th century fighting a losing battle against European encroachment and weakened by internal corruption.

In its foreign policy, Japan aimed first at extending its authority into Korea, a state over which China had long claimed suzerainty. Its struggle with China for predominance in Korea gave rise to several crises and finally, in 1894, to war. Japan, with its modernized army and navy, at once won a series of striking victories against the Chinese, who, in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), ceded to Japan the Kwantung (Liaodong) Peninsula, on which Port Arthur (now Dalian) stands, together with Formosa ( Taiwan) and the Pescadores (P'eng-hu) Islands, and agreed to pay a heavy indemnity.

This display of Japanese power and its decisive victory over China threatened to close the door on Russia in East Asia, and it made conflict between Russia and Japan inevitable. The Russian government was quick to react to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. On the initiative of Nicholas II, Russia, Germany, and France conducted the so-called Triple Intervention, compelling Japan to give up its territorial gains in return for an increased indemnity. Nicholas, guided by Sergey Yulyevich, Count Witte, his minister of communications and finance, at once obtained a loan for China, enabling it to pay the large indemnity to Japan. In 1896 Russia concluded an alliance with China against Japan, guaranteeing the integrity of Chinese territory. Under the terms of this alliance, Russia also obtained the right to lay the eastern section of the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria by way of Harbin to Vladivostok, to extend a branch line from Harbin to Mukden (now Shenyang) and Dalian, and to administer and patrol with Russian troops a strip of territory on either side of the railway.

European colonialism in China

An era of European rivalry had now begun in East Asia. German Emperor William II, during a visit to Russia in 1897, secured the support of his cousin Nicholas II for the German annexation of Kiaochow (now Qingdao). Subsequently, Nicholas II himself decided to seize Port Arthur, in spite of his own guarantees of the integrity of Chinese territory and over the strong objections of his minister Witte. Witte nevertheless managed to win Chinese agreement to a lease of Port Arthur for 25 years (April 8, 1898). Russia thus entered into the occupation of the Kwantung Peninsula, from which only three years earlier it had excluded Japan.

The seizure of Chinese territory by Germany and Russia was followed by British demands for Weihai and French claims on Kwangchow (now Guangzhou). The response to the steady erosion of Chinese sovereignty was the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900), an officially sanctioned peasant uprising against foreigners. Japan and the European powers intervened to suppress the revolt, and Russia used the rebellion as an excuse to pour troops into Manchuria. From there it planned to invade Korea, the independence of which had been "guaranteed" by Japan since the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

As Japan prepared to assert its power in East Asia, it built up a modern and efficient army and navy. As a result of its recruiting law of 1896, by January 1904 its frontline army numbered 270,000 highly trained troops. Although its reserves amounted only to some 200,000 men, Japan had gained a distinct advantage over Russia in East Asia. Including all patrols on the Manchurian railways and the small garrisons at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, Russia had only some 80,000 troops in the region. At the other end of the Trans-Siberian Railway, however, it had almost overwhelming manpower available, as the peacetime strength of the Russian army was approximately 1,000,000 men. The Japanese, of course, entertained no thought of attacking Russia itself but were concerned wholly with winning an early and decisive victory that would securely establish their hegemony in East Asia. In this strategy, they were counting on the Trans-Siberian Railway to prove inadequate to the task of bringing up timely Russian reinforcements, and their miscalculation on this score might have involved them in disaster.

Russian policy in East Asia

The Russian government was confused and unrealistic in its policy leading up to the war with Japan and, indeed, in the conduct of the war itself. This fact, combined with the ineffective leadership of its troops, was, more than any other factor, responsible for its defeat. Gen. Aleksey Kuropatkin, Nicholas II's minister of war, had watched with anxiety the growth of Japanese armed strength. Realizing that Japan had gained preponderance in East Asia, in the summer of 1903 he recommended that Russia should abandon its projects in Manchuria and restore Port Arthur to China in return for concessions in the Vladivostok region. His proposals were accepted, but extremists at the imperial court and the powerful commercial interests behind the Russian expansionist movement in East Asia nullified Kuropatkin's policy. Meanwhile, nothing was done to strengthen Russian forces, and the Russian government simply ignored Japan's preparations and obvious intentions.

The outbreak of war

On the night of February 8-9, 1904, without a declaration of war, the main Japanese fleet, under the command of Adm. Tōgō Heihachirō, took the Russian squadron at Port Arthur by surprise, inflicting serious losses and imposing a blockade on the harbour. Adm. Yevgeny Alekseyev was viceroy and first commander in chief of the Russian forces in East Asia. Alekseyev, though a favourite of the emperor, possessed questionable judgment, and he gave the demoralizing order that the navy was not to risk proceeding to sea.

When Adm. Stepan Osipovich Makarov, a brave and able officer, assumed command of the navy, he took his ships to sea daily and seriously harassed the Japanese fleet. Unfortunately for the Russian military effort, Makarov was killed on April 13, barely two months into the war, when his flagship Petropavlovsk struck a mine and sank. The Russian squadron was thereafter kept in harbour for months while the Japanese fleet lay off Port Arthur unchallenged. Thus, the Japanese fleet, although about equal in strength to the Russian Far Eastern Fleet, kept the enemy fleet divided and confined in Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

Without waiting to gain command of the sea, the Japanese had begun in March transporting their First Army (under the command of Gen. Tamemoto Kuroki) across the sea to Korea, landing it at Inch'ŏn, not far from Seoul, and at Namp'o, in the north. The spring thaw had made the roads virtually impassible, and it took many days before the Japanese army was in position before the town of Ŭiju (now Sinŭiju) on the Yalu River. On May 1 the Japanese attacked and, after bitter fighting, defeated the Russians. Japanese losses were about 1,100 men out of a force of 40,000, while Russian losses were 2,500 out of a force of 7,000 troops engaged in this action. It was a victory of tremendous significance, for, although the outnumbered Russians made an orderly withdrawal, it was Japan's first victorious engagement against a Western country.

Russian strategy

A public outcry against Alekseyev as commander in chief compelled Nicholas to send Kuropatkin to take over the command, although Alekseyev remained as viceroy. Kuropatkin had proved a competent minister of war but was to show himself sadly irresolute and passive as a commander in the field. His policy was to avoid action wherever possible until he had significant superiority in numbers. He placed his forces so that they could delay the enemy and then retire to positions prepared in the rear.

During May the Japanese Second Army, under Gen. Yasukata Oku, landed on the Kwantung Peninsula. On May 26 this force, outnumbering the Russians 10 to 1, won the Battle of Nanshan, cutting off the Port Arthur garrison from Russia's main forces in Manchuria. Two more Japanese divisions landed on the eastern Korean coast to form the Third Army, under Gen. Nogi Maresuke, which was to operate against Port Arthur. A further division, to form the nucleus of the Fourth Army, under Gen. Michitsura Nodzu, was landed on the Manchurian coast.

Kuropatkin was disturbed by this enemy concentration. He ordered preparations to make Mukden a stronghold to which he could retreat, but at this time he received an order, signed by the emperor himself, impressing on him that the fate of Port Arthur was his direct responsibility. Kuropatkin therefore disposed his main forces south of Mukden around Liaoyang. But at Fu-hsien (now Wafangdian) on June 14 the Japanese, with 35,000 men, decisively defeated a 25,000-strong Russian army. The Japanese then advanced in three columns on Liaoyang, where the main Russian force, under Kuropatkin, had retired and taken up strong positions.

Even an unexpected sortie of the Russian naval squadron at Port Arthur, which for a time paralyzed the Japanese land offensive, and then the sudden appearance of the Russian Vladivostok squadron in the straits of Tsushima, which added to the anxieties of the Japanese high command, did not embolden the Russian command to adopt more aggressive tactics. Toward the end of July Kuropatkin engaged Kuroki's First Army, after which Kuropatkin fell back on Liaoyang and there remained on the defensive, although he had considerable opportunities to attack the advancing enemy columns.

On August 25 the Battle of Liaoyang was joined, and, after nine days of stubborn fighting, the Japanese won a significant victory in spite of inferior numbers: 130,000 against 180,000 Russians. Nevertheless, their loss of some 23,000 men faced them with serious difficulties, for they had limited trained reserves. The Russians, meanwhile, had withdrawn in good order toward Mukden, where they were now receiving reinforcements via the Trans-Siberian Railway at the rate of 30,000 men per month.

Realizing that the Japanese were nearing the end of their resources while the Russian army was gaining in strength, Kuropatkin resolved now to take the offensive. Despite this new, more assertive strategy, Kuropatkin made careful preparations to hold Mukden, which, as the capital of Manchuria, had special political importance. The first battle resulting from Kuropatkin's offensive was fought on the Shaho River (October 5-17, 1904), and a subsequent battle took place at Sandepu (January 26-27, 1905). Both might have been decisive victories for Russia had Kuropatkin and his senior officers been more resolute and aggressive, but, in the event, both battles proved indecisive.

The capture of Port Arthur

Meanwhile, at Port Arthur the Japanese found the Russian garrison much stronger than they had expected. The Russian defenders had done much to fortify their position with breastworks and barbed wire, and they possessed several machine guns. After making several very costly attempts to take the fortress, the Japanese abandoned general assaults and resorted to siege tactics. The dragging-on of these operations distressed the Japanese command, for it not only tied down their Third Army, which they needed urgently in the main theatre of war, but it also lowered the morale of their troops in Manchuria. The news of the sailing of the Russian Baltic Fleet for East Asia made the Japanese redouble their efforts to take Port Arthur. Russian machine guns took a vicious toll on the Japanese attackers, who suffered very heavy casualties as a result of the storming tactics to which they had once again resorted. Observers from the armies of western Europe and the United States were embedded with both the Japanese and the Russians, and the effect of machine gun fire on massed infantry assaults was gruesomely apparent to all. However, the lessons of Port Arthur would go largely unheeded by European commanders, who would replicate the same sanguinary tactics on the Western Front during World War I.

Among the Russian commanders at Port Arthur there was serious disagreement. Some urged surrender, while others insisted that the garrison must resist to the end. On January 2, 1905, Lieut. Gen. Anatoly Stessel, the commander of the fortress, sent out the white flag without conferring with his officers and thus surrendered Port Arthur. The surrender was regarded as an act of either incompetence or treachery, for the fortress contained provisions for over three months and adequate supplies of ammunition.

The final and greatest land battle of the war was fought for Mukden (February 19-March 10, 1905). Again Kuropatkin decided to attack, but this time the Japanese forestalled him. Three Russian armies faced the Japanese-from right to left, the Second (under Gen. Alexander von Kaulbars), the Third (under Gen. Alexander Bilderling), and the First (under Gen. Nikolai Linevich)-comprising 330,000 men and 1,475 guns in all. This force held firm against three Japanese armies under the command of Marshal Iwao Oyama, who had 270,000 men and 1,062 guns. After long and stubborn fighting and heavy casualties, Kuropatkin decided to draw off his troops to the north, a movement he carried out successfully, but it left Mukden to fall into the hands of the Japanese. Losses in this battle were exceptionally heavy, approximately 89,000 Russians and 71,000 Japanese having fallen. Japan was now exhausted and could not hope to pursue the land war to a successful conclusion. Its salvation would come with a stunning naval victory at Tsushima, along with increasing internal unrest throughout Russia.

The Japanese had been unable to secure the complete command of the sea on which their campaign depended. The Russian squadrons at Port Arthur and Vladivostok had made sorties, and both sides had suffered losses in engagements. Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg it was decided to send the Baltic Fleet to East Asia under the command of Adm. Zinovi Petrovich Rozhestvensky, for it was assumed that once the Russians had gained command of the sea, the Japanese campaign would collapse.

The Baltic Fleet spent the entire summer of 1904 preparing to sail, and it set out from Libava (now Liepāja, Latvia) on October 15, 1904. On October 21, off the Dogger Bank, several Russian ships opened fire on British civilian trawlers in the mistaken belief that they were Japanese torpedo boats. This incident inflamed the British to such a degree that war between Britain and Russia was avoided only by an immediate apology and promise of full compensation made by the Russian government. At Nossi-Bé, near Madagascar, Rozhestvensky learned of the surrender of Port Arthur and proposed returning to Russia. However, naval reinforcements were already en route from the Baltic via Suez in early March 1905, and he decided to proceed.

Rozhestvensky linked up with these reinforcements at Cam Ranh Bay (now in Vietnam), and his full fleet appeared to be a formidable armada. In reality, however, many of the ships were old and unserviceable. Early in May the fleet reached the China Sea, and Rozhestvensky made for Vladivostok via the Tsushima Strait. Tōgō lay in wait for him off the southern Korean coast near Pusan ( Busan), and, on May 27, as the Russian fleet approached, he attacked. The Japanese ships were superior in speed and armament, and, in the course of the two-day battle, two-thirds of the Russian fleet was sunk, six ships were captured, four reached Vladivostok, and six took refuge in neutral ports. It was a dramatic and decisive defeat; after voyaging seven months to within a few hundred miles of its destination, the Baltic Fleet was shattered. With it Russia's hope of regaining mastery of the sea was crushed.

The Treaty of Portsmouth

For Russia the disastrous course of the war had seriously aggravated unrest inside the country, and the surrender of Port Arthur, followed by the loss of Mukden and the devastating defeat at Tsushima, made the emperor accept the proffered mediation of U.S. Pres. Theodore Roosevelt. It was, however, the Japanese government that had taken the initiative in proposing peace negotiations. Exhausted financially and fearing a long, drawn-out war of attrition far from their bases, the Japanese hoped that the acute unrest in Russia would compel the government to discuss terms, and their hopes proved justified.

Roosevelt served as mediator at the peace conference, which was held at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, U.S. (August 9-September 5, 1905). In the resulting Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan gained control of the Liaodong Peninsula (and Port Arthur) and the South Manchurian Railway (which led to Port Arthur) as well as half of Sakhalin Island. Russia agreed to evacuate southern Manchuria, which was restored to China, and Japan's control of Korea was recognized. Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in ending the conflict.

Aftermath

The Treaty of Portsmouth effectively ended Russia's expansionist East Asian policy directed toward establishing hegemony over the whole of Asia. Furthermore, the humiliating defeat at the hands of an Asian power that had until so recently been preindustrial and isolationist added to the national anger and disgust. Within two months the Revolution of 1905 compelled Nicholas II to issue the October Manifesto, which ostensibly transformed Russia from an unlimited autocracy into a constitutional monarchy. Russia's defeat also had profound repercussions throughout Asia and Europe. Russia nevertheless remained an Asian power, possessing as it did the railways across Siberia and northern Manchuria to Vladivostok and being closely allied with China.

Japan, for its part, formalized its hold on Korea by forcing Kojong, the final monarch of the Chosŏn (Yi) dynasty, to abdicate in 1907. Korean language and culture were violently suppressed, and Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910. Japanese militarists found their domestic political power greatly enhanced, and, by the outbreak of World War I, Japan was in a position to treat with its European allies as a fully equal partner. While the Japanese contribution to the war in Europe was negligible, Japanese troops were quick to occupy German colonial possessions in East Asia. World War I left the great powers of Europe shattered, but it reinforced Japan's status as the strongest military and imperialist power in East Asia.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica
Michael Ray.

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Russo-Japanese War | Causes, Summary, Maps, & Significance

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Russo-Japanese War, (1904-05), military conflict in which a victorious Japan forced Russia to abandon its expansionist policy in East Asia, thereby becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European power. By the early 17th century, Russia had established its authority over all of Siberia, but its attempts to move southward were consistently blocked by China.

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Milestones: 1899-1913 - Office of the Historian

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Colonial Congress at Berlin, 1884-1885 #2

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Colonial Congress at Berlin, 1884-1885 #2

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The Berlin Conference was Africa's undoing in more ways than one. The colonial powers superimposed their domains on the African continent. By the time independence returned to Africa in 1950, the realm had acquired a legacy of political fragmentation that could neither be eliminated nor made to operate satisfactorily. (de Blij, p.340)

In 1884 at the request of Portugal, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck called together the major western powers of the world to negotiate questions and end confusion over the control of Africa. Bismarck appreciated the opportunity to expand Germany's sphere of influence over Africa and desired to force Germany's rivals to struggle with one another for territory.

At the time of the conference, 80% of Africa remained under traditional and local control. What ultimately resulted was a hodgepodge of geometric boundaries that divided Africa into fifty irregular countries. This new map of the continent was superimposed over the one thousand indigenous cultures and regions of Africa. The new countries lacked rhyme or reason and divided coherent groups of people and merged together disparate groups who really did not get along.

Fourteen countries were represented by a plethora of ambassadors when the conference opened in Berlin on November 15, 1884. The countries represented at the time included Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway (unified from 1814-1905), Turkey, and the United States of America. Of these fourteen nations, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Portugal were the major players in the conference, controlling most of colonial Africa at the time.

The initial task of the conference was to agree that the Congo River and Niger River mouths and basins would be considered neutral and open to trade. Despite its neutrality, part of the Congo Basin became a personal kingdom for Belgium's King Leopold II and under his rule, over half of the region's population died.

At the time of the conference, only the coastal areas of Africa were colonized by the European powers. At the Berlin Conference the European colonial powers scrambled to gain control over the interior of the continent. The conference lasted until February 26, 1885 - a three month period where colonial powers haggled over geometric boundaries in the interior of the continent, disregarding the cultural and linguistic boundaries already established by the indigenous African population.

The Berlin conference managed to form a set of rules for the "orderly extension of European influence" in Africa. First, the fourteen nations agreed there would be freedom of trade and navigation in the Congo Basin. Second, they agreed that any power that annexed territory or established a protectorate from that day forward would let every other country know immediately. At the same time, that country was responsible for establishing political stability, thereby guaranteeing effective occupation of those regions. They also agreed to put a stop to the slave trade, that "these territories may not serve as a market or means of transit for the trade in slaves, of whatever race they may be"

Following the conference, the give and take continued. By 1914, the conference participants had fully divided Africa among themselves into fifty countries.

Major colonial holdings included:

de Blij, H.J. and Peter O. Muller Geography: Realms, Regions, and Concepts. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997.
The National Geographic Desk Reference. National Geographic, 1999.

Because of its size, surface features, climate, resources, and strategic importance, Africa became a prime candidate for conquest by ambitious European empires. Although Africa is physically remote from the power centers of Europe, North America, and Asia, it is surrounded by water and can therefore be reached easily from the other continents. This meant that the Europeans needed to establish rules for dealing with one another if they were to avoid constant bloodshed and competition for African resources. The Berlin Conference established those ground rules.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Europeans had established colonies all along the African coast and competed for control. The push for overseas territories was made even more intense by the Industrial Revolution and the need for cheap labor, raw material, and new markets. The competition between the Europeans often lead to violent conflict.

The conference was held in Berlin between November 15, 1884 and November 26, 1885, under the leadership of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Although controlling the slave trade and promoting humanitarian idealism were promoted as the focus of the conference, the conference only passed empty resolutions about the ending of slave trade and providing for the welfare of Africa. In truth, the result of the Conference was a method of dividing the continent of Africa between the European powers.

Article 34 of the Berlin Act states that any European nation that took possession of an African coast, or named themselves as "protectorate" of one, had to inform the other powers of the Berlin Act of this action. If this was not done then their claim would not be recognized. This article introduced the "spheres of influence" doctrine, the control of a coast also meant that they would control the hinterland to an almost unlimited distance.

Article 35 determined that in order to occupy a coastal possession, the nation also had to prove that they controlled sufficient authority there to protect existing rights such as freedom of trade and transit. This was called the doctrine of "effective occupation" and it made the conquest of Africa a less bloody process.

The Berlin Act was an important change in international affairs. It created the rules for "effective occupation" of conquered lands, ensuring that the division of Africa would take place without war among the European powers. Through the Berlin Act, the European powers justified dividing a continent among themselves without considering the desires of the indigenous peoples.

While this appears extremely arrogant to us now, it seemed to them to be the obvious extension of their imperialism. The Berlin Conference is one of the most clear examples of the assumptions and preconceptions of this era, and its effects on Africa can still be seen today.

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The Berlin Conference was Africa's undoing in more ways than one. The colonial powers superimposed their domains on the African continent. By the time independence returned to Africa in 1950, the realm had acquired a legacy of political fragmentation that could neither be eliminated nor made to operate satisfactorily.

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The Three Emperors League ( Drekaiserbund ) -1873

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Drekaiserbund 1873 THE THREE EMPERORS LEAGUE Germany: Kaiser Wilhem I Austria-Hungary: Franz Joseph Russia: Czar Alexander II -Maintain the existing territorial arrangements in Europe -Resist the spread of revolution (socialist movements) -Consult one another if any international difficulties appeared Terms of the Alliance: German Aims: Isolate France by becoming allies

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After a months-long hostile standoff over territorial influence in Africa, France, and Britain were brought to the brink of an imperial war, and eventually, an entente that lasts to this day, during the Fashoda Incident, on this day in history in 1898.

The 19th century saw European colonial powers, especially France and Britain, struggle for imperial dominance in Africa, a period known as the Scramble for Africa. Each country wanted to link its far-flung African colonies with a system of railroads. France wanted to extend its empire east-to-west, from the Niger River in West Africa to the Nile in East Africa, in order to control all trade to and from the Sahel region. Britain wanted to link its territory north-to-south, from present-day Cape Town, South Africa, to Cairo, Egypt, in order to establish a railroad over the entire length of the African continent.

These two imperial powers' ambitions intersected, literally, in the town of Fashoda, in present day Kodok, Sudan. Both countries understood that whoever controlled Fashoda, the intersection point of the east-west and north-south axes of France and Britain's plans, respectively, controlled Africa.

In an attempt to exert French dominance, France sent an expedition of 150 men under Major Jean-Baptiste Marchand, on an epic, 14-month trek across central Africa to secure Fashoda. Marchand and his men arrived 10 July 1898. At the same time, British forces moved to secure the strategic town under Sir Herbert Kitchener who, after reconquering Sudan in the Battle of Omdurman, arrived in Fashoda with a flotilla of British gunboats on 18 September 1898.

There, the two military leaders insisted on their respective country's right to Fashoda, and neither power backed down. Back in Europe, outrage grew in both countries, the crisis grew, and both sides prepared for war.

But the French fleet was out-powered by superior British naval prowess and France was eager to have Britain's support in future conflicts against Germany. The reopening of the Dreyfus Affair also distracted the French from the Fashoda dispute. Seeing no advantage in a colonial war with Britain, the French ultimately decided to withdraw its soldiers from Fashoda on 3 November 1898. France and Britain agreed that the watershed of the Nile and the Congo, respectively, should mark the boundaries between their spheres of influence.

The Fashoda Incident marked the last serious colonial dispute between France and Britain. And the classic diplomatic solution the two imperial powers pursued is widely considered the precursor of the Entente Cordiale, an agreement that ended almost a millennium of conflict between Britain and France.

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Britain and France Face Off in the Fashoda Incident | History Channel on Foxtel

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After a months-long hostile standoff over territorial influence in Africa, France, and Britain were brought to the brink of an imperial war, and eventually, an entente that lasts to this day, during the Fashoda Incident, on this day in history in 1898.

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The Dual Alliance Between Austria-Hungary and Germany - World War I Document Archive

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ARTICLE 1. Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.

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The Berlin Conference Was Where an Entire Continent Was Colonized

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It was during the Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885 that Africa was divided to allow European powers to colonize the continent.

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