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1. Why were NATO’s military procurements  of crucial importance?
2. Who was Forsberg and what did he do?
3. What were some frictions and conflicts between Japan and the U.S.?

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Joseph Halevi teaches political economy at the University of Sydney, and is associated with the center of development studies, IREPD, at the Université Pierre Mendès France in Grenoble, France. With Jean-Marc Fontaine he edited Restoring Demand in the World Economy: Trade, Finance and Technology, (Edward Elgar Publisher, 1998).

Aaron Forsberg, America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival, 1950-1960(Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 332 pages, $45.

Historical research on postwar Japan and East Asia has produced a number of high quality studies that have contributed to the formation of a political and economic perspective not too distant from the Monthly Review conception of the transformation of modern capitalism. These works point out that the conditions for Japanese economic recovery were found not only in the willingness of Japan's capitalist elites to reignite the process of industrial accumulation, but also in the propulsive role played by military spending and by actual wars. This sort of spending was not done by Japan, but by the United States-thereby helping Japanese capitalism, which had lost all its areas of imperialistic influence, to find an anchor on which to start a new wave of accumulation. It is legitimate to say that without such U.S. spending, Japan's economic recovery would have been much more problematic and may not have happened in any sustained way. 1

In this context, the view that Japan and Europe grew faster than the United States because they had a comparatively smaller military budget is misleading. 2 American military expenditure fueled the production and profits of the most advanced components of U.S. monopoly capital as well as the economic expansion of Europe and Japan. The links between American armament expenditures and capital accumulation in Europe and Japan are manifold. Consider, for example, the formation of NATO. The bulk of its costs were borne by the United States, generating a flow of dollars to Europe that helped ease the dollar shortage of the 1950s. At the same time, NATO's military procurements were of crucial importance for the modernization of, at least, the electronic and aviation industries of the European countries. In the Japanese case, beginning with the Korean War, the links are much clearer. American war orders uplifted the whole industrial sector of the shattered Japanese economy. A decade later, the American escalation in Vietnam "actually helped Japan reenter the Southeast Asian economy." 3

America and the Japanese Miracle reveals additional evidence of this process but, as we shall see, the historical role of the United States is interpreted in a way that obscures the contradictions inherent in the system of monopolistic capitalism. Forsberg starts by addressing Washington's postwar strategic objective of "keeping Japan on our side." He correctly points out, as Noam Chomsky and Gabriel Kolko did several years earlier, that the other side was not the Soviet Union or China, but simply a neutralism similar to that of Nehru in India. He does not tell us why such a path should have been regarded as a threat. But Forsberg's work is entirely constructed on the premise that the Cold War was a response to a threat, which sharpened the wit of U.S. policy makers in international relations. The restoration of the power of Japan's monopolistic groups ( Zaibatsus) is seen, in this context, as the product of the Cold War. Yet there is evidence that salvaging Japan's powerful monopolies was already on the agenda of influential figures and bodies in Washington even before Japan's surrender.

U.S. strategy involved a special economic sponsorship of Japan, which Forsberg illustrates very well, and with approval. The Washington-imposed embargo on trade with the People's Republic of China provided a major justification for the all-embracing support given to Japan. The picture that emerges is that the United States took unilateral actions, requiring unilateral measures of protection, because Japan would otherwise have ceased to function. Thus, contrary to the author's own claim, Washington's policies did not stem from an enlightened attitude but were the logical corollary of the hegemonic view of the world which matured within the U.S. government during the Second World War. Sponsoring Japan entailed, however, a number of frictions and conflicts. Japan's desire to keep some trade relations with China could not be altogether ignored, and had to be offset by other arrangements. The substantial decline in the ties with China meant that an anchor for Japan could be found only by opening up export markets in the United States, and possibly elsewhere. The urgency of finding such outlets increased as the Korean War approached its end, engendering a slow down in the demand for military related supplies.

Domestically, therefore, the U.S. government had to mediate with business groups, at the time mostly in the textile and apparel industry, which feared Japanese competition. Internationally, the strategy required U.S. authorities to coordinate with their allies, especially Britain and France. These countries were reluctant to open their markets because of the perceived lack of reciprocity from Tokyo. The diplomatic pressure became particularly intense during the negotiations leading to Japan's membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955. A similar pressure, we may add, occurred when Japan applied to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1964. In the first instance, Washington signed a dozen trilateral treaties allowing third countries greater access to U.S. markets-provided they waived the right to use GATT's clause thirty-five against Japan. This clause enabled a contracting nation to deny GATT privileges to another when trade could injure domestic producers.

The discussion of the legal and political procedures of the GATT case is most interesting. It illustrates how U.S. activities in support of Japan's entry into the organization constituted yet another step in the weakening of the British position both in Asia and in the world. Japan's membership in GATT contributed to the demolition of the imperial system of preferences, which was the pillar of British hegemony in the Commonwealth. Although not explicitly stated by the author, the narrative of the book shows that shoring up Japan implied extending American influence at the expense of Britain. The discussion of Japan's laws limiting foreign investment is informative, well written, and one of the best sections of the book. The laws were passed when the country was still under occupation. But why did the United States allow regulations that ultimately discriminated against American multinationals? Unfortunately, the explanation given by Forsberg is particularly weak. He maintains that Japan's precarious balance of payment position throughout the 1950s prevented the United States from pressuring Tokyo. However, it can be as easily argued that Japan should have opened its doors to American multinational companies, precisely because it was suffering from a dollar shortage. More realistically, we can say that salvaging Japanese capitalism from within demanded that the cohesion of Japan's dominant classes be safeguarded. Without the network of the yen area, and with a shattered country, the opening up of the economy to foreign direct investment would have jeopardised the solidity of the ruling groups and further diminished their legitimacy.

Forsberg's analysis is weakened by the interpretative angle through which he views the policies that ushered in Japan's economic recovery and, later, the process of accelerated growth. According to the author, the Cold War and the need to guarantee security, enhanced the leadership capacity of the American administration. Eisenhower, Dulles, and Acheson battled, not always successfully, against protectionist tendencies at home as well as sectional interests abroad. According to Forsberg, American authorities provided global guidance that remains valid in the light of contemporary economic problems. Thus the author concludes that "[T]he world will do well if it can match the record of the United States and Japan during the years after the Pacific-War." 4

The hegemonic function of the United States nowhere implied stability and enlightened leadership. From a capitalist perspective the need to put the Japanese ruling classes firmly back on their feet was understood by Herbert Hoover before the end of the war. After 1945, the former President counselled Truman, Marshall, and Patterson against undoing the power of the Zaibatsus and pleaded for a swift transformation of Japan into a faithful ally. The international role of the United States did not stem from the urgency imposed by the external event called the Cold War. On the contrary, the Cold War was constructed to enforce the rule of international capitalist relations, especially on the Third World.

Thus began a path that led to a large number of conflicts, most notably in Asia, culminating in the Vietnam War. It follows that it is impossible to separate the American support of Japanese recovery from the road that led to Vietnam. This connection has been captured by Michael Schaller, who in his seminal study wrote: "The protracted effort to assure Japan access to Southeast Asia, and to isolate China trapped the United States in a 'dead end alley' of its own device in Vietnam." 5

Forsberg is not alone in providing an undialectical reading of the postwar period where war and military spending are viewed in terms of enlightened guidance. 6 This romantic conception of the Cold War era involves two misunderstandings. The first is historical: the long boom supported by wars was not viable in the long run. Indeed, during the Vietnam War, economic expansion began to deteriorate first and foremost through instability in international monetary relations. Paradoxically, while enriching our knowledge of the period with important institutional and political information, Forsberg prevents us from grasping the human and political gravity of the policies that brought the people of Asia at least two additional decades of destruction. The second misunderstanding is theoretical. The fact that the imperialist powers maintained a prolonged phase of prosperity by means of external military stimuli, and imperialist wars, should make people aware of the fundamental weakness of profit-based economic and political regimes.

Notes

1. ↩ In relation to Japan the most significant books are those by William Borden, The Pacific Alliance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); and Andrew Rotter, The Path to Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

2. ↩ R. P. Smith, "Military Expenditures and Capitalism," Cambridge Journal of Economics 1, March 1977, 61-76.

3. ↩ Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 239.

4. ↩ Forsberg, America and the Japanese Miracle, 239.

5. ↩ Schaller, American Occupation of Japan, 297.

6. ↩ Diane Kuntz, Butter and Guns (New York: Free Press, 1997).

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Monthly Review | U.S. Militarism and Imperialism and the Japanese "Miracle"

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Joseph Halevi teaches political economy at the University of Sydney, and is associated with the center of development studies, IREPD, at the Université Pierre Mendès France in Grenoble, France. With Jean-Marc Fontaine he edited Restoring Demand in the World Economy: Trade, Finance and Technology, (Edward Elgar Publisher, 1998).

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1. If the Philippines hadn't been annexed by the American government would they have been colonized by another country?
2. What did president McKinley believe?
3. What is the Jones Act and when was it established?

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1.What does the pizza symbolize?
2.Who are the people around the pizza and who is the frantic man looking down on everyone?
3. what are they fighting for?

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1.Who did United States purchase Alaska from? For how much?
2. Why was the purchase dubbed as a “Seward’s Folly” and “Andrew Johnson’s Polar Bear Garden"?
3.Why did public opinion turn favorable after the purchase?

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1. Why was Panama purchased?
2.What did the Panama Canal contribute to the U.S.?
3. What was the disease that killed many? How did it start and spread?

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Considered one of the wonders of the modern world, the Panama Canal opened for business 100 years ago this Friday, linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and providing a new route for international trade and military transport.

At the time it was built, the canal was an engineering marvel, relying on a series of locks that lift ships - and their thousands of pounds of cargo - above mountains.

But thousands of workers died during its construction, and its history has seen no shortage of controversy, including a contentious transference of authority from the US to Panama in the 1970s.

Work recently began on a substantial expansion effort that will allow the canal to accommodate modern cargo needs.

PBS NewsHour recently interviewed several regional experts to discuss the canal's first 100 years, and to get a sense of what's ahead.

Ovidio Diaz-Espino grew up in Panama and trained as a lawyer. He is the author of How Wall Street Created a Nation: J.P. Morgan, Teddy Roosevelt, and the Panama Canal.

Richard Feinberg is a professor of International Political Economy at the University of California, San Diego, and a nonresident Senior Fellow with the Latin America Initiative of the Bookings Institution. He served as special assistant to President Clinton and senior director of the National Security Council's Office of Inter-American Affairs.

Julie Greene is a professor of History at the University of Maryland, specializing in United States labor and working-class history, and co-directs the University's Center for the History of the New America. She is the author of The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal, and serves as President of the Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.

Noel Maurer is an associate professor of business administration at Harvard University, and the author of The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran, and Ultimately Gave Away the Panama Canal.

Orlando Pérez is Associate Dean, School of Humanities & Social Sciences at Millersville University in Pennsylvania. He is the author of Political Culture in Panama: Democracy after Invasion, and a member of the Scientific Support Group for the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University.

PBS NewsHour: Why did the U.S. build the Panama Canal?

Richard Feinberg: This is about Teddy Roosevelt, the great nationalist, the imperialist. The canal is built in the early part of the 20th century, right after the US-Spanish war. It was when the US was sowing its oats. They had expanded their power over Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Caribbean, but also the Philippines, so the US is becoming a Pacific power, and the Panama Canal was about linking our growing Pacific power to more traditional Atlantic relationships. It was linked to the idea of the rise of the US as a global power, with both commercial and military potential.

Ovidio Diaz-Espino: The US for the first time was going to be able to gain control of both oceans. That was critical in times of war. There was no air power, so the way you fought an enemy was through the sea. World power was consistent with maritime power. Americans knew they needed this to move ships from east to west quickly. If they did that, they would control power because they would control the oceans. The Canal was a geopolitical strategy to make the United States the most powerful nation on earth.

Also, the economic impact was massive. Now you could unite the trade between the two oceans. Starting in the 1890s, and until WWI, global trade was just as significant as it is now, so it was important to have a commute route across the continent. This is why Wall Street was very supportive and helped fund it.

Julie Greene:
In part, the Canal was central to the US vision of itself as a beneficent power in the world. As the US was emerging as a global power, it was important to distinguish themselves from the old powers of Europe, which they saw as more crassly seeking power and control and colonialism. The US wanted to frame a vision of itself as more selfless, more a help to the world, more advancing civilization. Of course there's the other side to that: often the US was, despite its self-image, imposing its power. In Panama, it asserted its power over the republic and dominated the county's history for 100 years. But nonetheless the canal has remained central to American national identity, in part because it's seen to exemplify that beneficent self-image.

PBS NewsHour: What did it take to get the Panama Canal built? What was the cost of this project?

Julie Greene: It was in incredible project, the largest public construction project in US history. The engineering, technical, medical, and scientific challenges were incredible, first having to get disease under control and then figure out whether it should be a sea-level or a lock canal. It was 40 miles long and literally cut through the continental divide, so it was extremely difficult.

Orlando Pérez: The idea of an interoceanic canal dates back to the Spanish colonial period. The French attempted to do this and failed. After that failure, the US came in. The American ingenuity was of building, rather than a sea level canal, a lock canal. The way the terrain is, a sea-level canal would flood, it was prone to landslides and the terrain was not stable enough. You had to accommodate different levels. It was lower on one side than on the other side, with mountains in between. The systems of locks is what made it possible.

Noel Maurer: A key thing the US did, was they used railroads to truck out the dirt. The French were piling it up, which led to landslides. Also, when it rained, the dirt would turn to puddles, which attracted mosquitos, which meant malaria rips through your workforce. The US established medical innovations to control malaria and yellow fever.

Ovidio Diaz-Espino: The construction itself was so significant that at one point one-third of the city of Pittsburgh was working to build the canal. Every lock of the canal, and there are four, has more steel, more concrete, and took more work than the Empire State Building. Something like six Empire State Building constructions are here. There was massive steel, provided by US Steel. Massive concrete provided by Portland Cement. GE had to invent new type of machineries to be able to move the ships, these huge tankards that only had a few inches on either side needed to be controlled. Railroad had to be developed with minute precision. Dredging techniques used to dredge the Port of New York had to be much more precise.

With such a massive body of work it probably employed one-third of Central America and the Caribbean, and the US was heavily influenced by it and by the money that was flowing through Wall Street, the banks, the insurance companies.

Richard Feinberg: Congress was raising questions of, "Do we need this, is it worth it?" So in 1906 when it was under construction, Teddy Roosevelt travelled down, the first time a sitting US president ever left the continental United States while in office. He staged a successful PR stunt: he sat in a big earth moving machine wearing a Panama hat, made a speech that America could and needed to do this, and when he returned to the US the Senate supported its construction.

Julie Greene: But on top of that had to do with the human challenges involved. The chief engineer said at one point that the real challenge of this canal, and what allowed the US to succeed, was in figuring out how to manage and discipline the humans. "That was my contribution," he said. By that, he meant they had to build a whole society: a police force, dorms, cafeterias, a judicial system. Forty-five thousand women and men, mostly men, came from dozens of different countries, and then thousands of women and children came to be with their menfolk. To create a world for them and then to keep it orderly was a challenge.

PBS NewsHour: What was the human toll?

Julie Greene: The United States built the Canal between 1904 and 1914, picking up the ball from the disastrous efforts by the French. The loss of life during the French era was much greater because disease was more widespread. The US managed to get yellow fever completely under control, and malaria largely under control. By the official US statistics, the mortality rate was about 10,000 people, maybe a little less. But it's hard to gauge: one historian who looked more closely argued that the death rate was probably 15,000 - or 1/10 of all men who worked on the project.

Richard Feinberg: Panama had not existed before this. There were some independence movements which the US decided to support, creating a new country in order to construct this canal. So Panamanians who welcomed independence welcomed the canal. But the canal was built mostly by foreign workers. They imported tens of thousands of Caribbean workers, many of whom died from disease or accidents.

Ovidio Diaz-Espino: 27,000 people died building the Panama Canal during those two periods. Can you imagine an infrastructure project today that cost 27,000 lives?
PBS NewsHour: What were some of the controversies surrounding its construction? How was it seen on the ground in Panama and by its neighbors?
Julie Greene: The chief engineer had extensive powers thanks to an executive order. Anyone in the Canal Zone not productive could be deported. Many were. Workers who refused to show up would be, if not deported, sentenced to jail time. They had a massive police force, and did not allow strikes. Workers who might try to organize could be and were quickly deported. In the end, this kind of careful system of rules and regulations allowed order.

The US relied on a vast system of racial and ethnic segregation, the Gold and Silver Rolls. American, white workers were paid in gold, and they had better housing and conditions. Most workers of African descent in the Caribbean were on "silver rolls." They lived in hovels and ate outside or under porches during the torrential rainfalls. It's not surprising they'd rely on segregation, but the demographics of the Canal Zone weren't black and white. Thousands of Spaniards came in and found that they were referred to as the "semi-white Europeans," and excluded from the white hotels and cafeterias. They were pretty ticked off, and built up a vast network of anarchist politics and would go on strike even though they weren't allowed to. So the US found it constantly had to manage problems resulting from its own policies.

Noel Maurer: Bringing in all these black laborers created a bit of a stink in Panama, and contributed to racial tensions that lasted a long time. A big chunk of the country today is descended from those workers, creating tensions.

Orlando Pérez: For Panamanian nationals at the time, this was the accomplishment of their dreams, to position Panama at the heart of a global commercial enterprise or system, to use the geographic location of Panama to its commercial advantage. Geography has always determined Panamanian politics and the economy. The problem was how that accomplishment came about, which was essentially by subordinating a chunk of their territory to an extraterritorial power, through a treaty that no Panamanians signed. The payment [to Panamanians] was substantial, but it wasn't anywhere near the benefits that the US would accrue. So the Panamanians started with the great hope that it would place Panama at the center of world commerce, but also resenting that they achieved this victory at the cost of ceding sovereignty over the Canal itself.

PBS NewsHour: In 1977, President Carter signed a treaty with General Omar Torrijos, then Commander of the Panamanian National Guard, ceding control of the Canal to Panama beginning in 1999. What impact did this shift in authority have?

Ovidio Diaz-Espino: The Canal was administered exclusively by Americans for the interest of American military and geopolitical concerns. Panamanians felt they were not benefitting from the canal. And there was a fence. As a child growing up, I could not go into the Canal Zone because I was Panamanian. It was pure American land. This was the most valuable piece of land in the country, and it was being exploited by somebody else. There was a lot of conflict leading to massacres, students killed by soldiers because they tried to raise a Panamanian flag at the Canal. It was an unstable situation.

Richard Feinberg: I wasn't in the Clinton administration during the handover but I was part of the negotiations leading up to it, and I was also in the Carter administration for the treaty. The treaty was a huge political debate. Reagan enhanced his reputation as a strong nationalist by opposing the treaties, and it cost Carter dearly, in terms of creating a narrative that he was somehow retreating from American power abroad, which was later compounded by crises in Iran and elsewhere. But it was extremely important for relations with Panama and Latin America.

Noel Maurer: By the time the treaty came along, the US benefits from the Canal were almost gone. This wasn't charity, it wasn't Carter being nice to the Latin Americans. This was strategy. By the 1970s, American farmers shipping food to Asia could railroad to Seattle and ship from there because railroad costs was much cheaper post-WWII. Militarily, the Canal turned out to be strategically useless, and totally indefensible. Truman tried to hand it over the UN. It was losing money under Johnson. The only reason for the political opposition to the Carter treaties was that it was a symbol of American national pride, especially after Vietnam.

Ovidio Diaz-Espino: The political consequence in Panama was felt immediately. Within two years, the Canal Zone came down. The Americans were still managing it, and the military bases were still here, so the security was still in the hands of the Americans, but it was now Panamanian land. That defused a lot of tensions not just in Panama but throughout Latin America, as it had been the poster child of American colonialism in Latin America.

Orlando Pérez: The Panamanians have done a marvelous job at running it. It's efficient and profitable. It's run independent of the Panamanian government. There have been very few reported or alleged cases of corruption within management. It's a very efficient, moneymaking enterprise, and I think everyone that looks at how Panamanians have handled the management, creating an authority for it, they wish the national government was run as efficiently and effectively as that.

Ovidio Diaz-Espino: Beginning in 1999, the effect for Panama has been massive. It was as if we suddenly discovered oil, except it's a more stable commodity than oil, and it will become even more stable as there is more dependence on the Canal as a result of the expected growth in global trade between Asia and America. And it's not just the revenues, but everything around it: 3 major ports creating thousands of jobs. A whole industry devoted to shipping services as a result. Sixty percent of all world cargo has a Panamanian flag. There's a burgeoning residential market in the former Canal Zone, and a huge part around the canal is this untouched rainforest, a watershed, so it's becoming is a hotbed of ecotourism. Now they're planning for cruise ships to drop off in Panama City. This is all because of the canal.

And there's something more important, which I call the peace element. The canal gives us something no neighbor has, and that's political stability. The neutrality clause in the Torrijos-Carter treaty says that the US has the right to intervene in Panamanian internal affairs if the security of the canal is ever threatened. Why is there no corruption, why does the canal operate with the precision of a Swiss watch factory? Because Americans always have their eyes on it. You know it's not going to be ruined.

PBS NewsHour: Expansion of the Panama Canal is due to begin soon. What should we know about this project?

Richard Feinberg: It's a modernization. As container ships have gotten bigger and bigger, the canal needs to be larger. There's no doubt that commercially the expansion is important and it will pay off over time with the increased traffic that will result, as more and bigger ships pass through.

Julie Greene: It's a huge undertaking being run efficiently. It's behind schedule, but that's not surprising. What they're doing is building another set of lock basins, and they've designed it in a very green, environmental way. Instead of using fresh water every time the locks have to be filled, because that would have been stressful on water supply, they devised an engineering system that allows them to recycle the water.

There are nonetheless challenges even though green ideals were in mind. For ships to go through quickly, that will put pressure on the Gatun Lake and hurt its environment a bit, so there's some debating going on as to whether they should slow down the speed to protect the lake.

Orlando Pérez: The expansion project has generated a huge amount of employment, and has been the catalyst for high economic growth. Some Panamanians see a problem with this growth, that it's not well shared across the nation. Panama is still a dual economy. Economic growth is centered mostly in the urban areas, tied to commercial enterprises, tied to tourism and to the Canal. But if you go to rural areas, poverty is much higher.

Julie Greene: Certainly it's an important part of the US political economy, and will be more so with the expansion once it's complete in 2015. In fact lots of changes are happening across the US as different port cities prepare for the larger ships that will be able to come through.

Ovidio Diaz-Espino: The expansion is important for Panama, but it's much more important for the United States. I can't imagine how much is being invested in the US. No port was ready to take those ships, so every major port has to expand. So New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, Miami, Galveston, New Orleans, all have to do major dredging. Then you need to expand the highways, and you'll need more container space locally. The expense is massive, and all are racing to prepare. The delay in finishing the project means the US has more time to get ready.

The other thing is that it is going to change patterns of trade. Right now, most Asia-US trade comes through Long Beach. That will change. Most trade by water will go to southern and northeastern ports. That has implications for railroad companies, truck companies, and entire cities. Joe Biden said this may make inflation go down, which will make the US more competitive in its exports to China.
These interviews have been edited for clarity and brevity.

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How the Panama Canal helped make the U.S. a world power

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At the time it was built, the canal was an engineering marvel, relying on a series of locks that lift ships - and their thousands of pounds of cargo - above mountains. But thousands of workers died during its construction, and its history has seen no shortage of controversy, including a contentious transference of authority from the US to Panama in the 1970s.

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1. What caused an Anti- American government to power in Mexico?
2. When did the first battle in Mexico against the United States commence? Where?
3. How did the battle affect civilians?

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"A Hungery Savage Look which was Truly Fearful": Samuel Chamberlain's Recollections of the Mexican War, 1846

In the mid-nineteenth century, many Americans were eager to acquire the Mexican land of California and New Mexico, enough to provoke a war with Mexico. In 1845 U.S. President James K. Polk sent envoys who offered to buy Mexican territory and stationed federal troops in the border areas. Naval forces patrolled the Gulf coast and American consuls in California stirred up annexation fever. When the presence of those troops brought an anti-American government to power in Mexico in 1846, Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor and his troops to the Rio Grande and declared war. Taylor pursued retreating Mexican forces 100 miles into Mexico to the heavily fortified city of Monterrey. New Englander Samuel Chamberlain was eager to do battle against the Mexicans and expand the American empire. This excerpt from his illustrated manuscript, "My Confessions: Recollections of a Rogue," described his participation in the fierce house-to-house battle for Monterrey in September 1846.

THE FALL OF MONTEREY.

At daylight on the morning of the 23rd. the column to assault the northern part of the town was formed inside the "Half Moon Battery." They presented a strange and terrific appearance, faces, and clothes all covered with a mixture of mud, morter, powder and blood, eyes bloodshot, with a hungery savage look which was truly fearful. Their costumes and arms added to the Banditti like effect of the command. There was Rangers dressed in the mountain-man suits of buckskin, in Red shirts, Blue shirts, Mexican leather jackets, and serapas; Louisiana volunteers, each clothed as his fancy dictated, regular Dragoons, Artillery, and Infantry armed with "Kentucky Rifles," double-barrelled shot Guns, Winsor Rifles, Harper's Ferry Muskets, Carbines, Revolvers, Holster Pistols, Sabres, Swords, Axes, and Bowie Knives. A look of determination was on each countenance, as they gazed on the City lying so quiet below. Rumors had reached us of defeat and disaster to our forces that attacked the eastern part of town, that we had met with terrible loss, and that Gen Taylor was even in full retreat for Camargo, leaving us to our Fate. What gave apparrent credence to this rumor, was the quietness that reigned in town and non-appearence of our army toward Walnut Springs. Not a tent or a wagon was in sight. The green, white and red Banner of Mexico floated over the Black Fort, the Cathedral and other places. In the plain to our left near the Rancho San Jeromino we could see a large force of the Enemy's Lancers, and their pickets extended as far as we could see beyond the Citadel. All remained quiet for hours! waiting, waiting, hungry and savage. Gen. Worth appeared anxious and nervious; he ascended the tower of the Palace, and with his glass scanned the defiant stronghold below. About nine o'cl'k A.M., the nine Pounder captured in Fort Soldado opened on the town, and at ten o'clock a heavy firing that commenced on the eastern side of Monterey informed us that rumor lied! that Taylor was still there! We were organized in two columns, one to take the right hand street Calle de Monterey under the command of Col. Hays, the other to enter the city to the left by the Calle de Iturbide under Lieut Col. Walker. I was with the latter. Finally the word was given and with a roar like that of wild beasts, the two columns dashed down the hill and entered the city. Our column penetrated as far as the square "Plazuela de la Came," and then we found ourselves in a hornet's nest; every house was a fort that belched forth a hurricane of ball; the flat roofs surmounted by breastworks of sand bags were covered with soldiers who could pour down a distructive fire in safety; the windows of iron barred "Rejas" were each vomiting forth fire and death. On we went at a run, stung to madness at not being able to retaliate on our hidden foes, we gained a large square, the "Plaza de la Capella," when artillery opened on us with canester! The heavy stone wall of a churchyard was embrasured for their guns, while a scaffold was erected from which infantry were posted who kept up a constant fire. Our men were falling fast, and not a Mexican hit; they were all under cover, our fire was only waisted on their stone walls. I was close to Col. Walker when a column of Mexican Infantry came round the corner of the church and at double quick charged us with the bayonet. We were in a tight fix, not twenty rangers were in the square. Fortuneatly our arms were all loaded and we made every shot tell, but we were compelled to give ground; our men flocked in, and two six P'drs of McCall's Battery came up at a gal-lop, unlimbered within twenty yard[s] of the Mexican line, and gave them double doses of canister. This proved too much for our brave foes; they gave back and soon run, we close at their heels, and in the rush we captured the church of Santer Maria and the fortified yard. The enemy succeeded in hauling off their guns, their infantry charge was probably made to cover this movement.

We halted under shelter of the walls of the church, and could hear the explosion of firearms and shouts on the street to our right, giving us to understand the resis-tance that the other column was meeting with. Our wounded were taken care of by surgeons who kept with us, the Mexican's were quietly disposed of by those humane fellows, the Texan Rangers.

Reforming, we dashed around the church, and found the street barracaded, and the same infernal fire was again poured in to us; we rushed over the breast-work, and wild yells charged up the street, men drop-ping every moment. It would have required Salamanders to withstand the fire that scorch [ed] us on every side. Our run came down to a walk, our walk to a general seeking of shelter in doors and passages. I stuck to Walker, who had gained my boyish esteem in speaking a kind and cheerful word to me in the terrible storming of Independence Hill. About a dozzen of us with Col. Walker were hugging a door mighty close, when a volly was fired through it from the inside. Three of our party fell. By order of the Colonel, two men with axes hewed away at the stout oak plank. Another volly was fired, when one of the axemen with a deep curse dropped his axe, a ball had broke the bone of his arm. Walker took his place, and soon the barrier gave way, and we rushed in. Some eight or ten hard looking "hombres" tried to escape through a back way, but they were cut down to a man. No quarter was given. In a back room we found some women and children who were not molested. Pickaxes and Crowbars were sent to us, also some six P'dr shells. A house on the other side of the street was forced and our men were all soon under cover. Our advance was now systematized; one party composed of the best shots ascended to the roof, and now on equal terms renewed the fight. The rest tore holes in the limestone partitions that divided the blocks into houses, then a lighted shell was thrown in, an explosion would follow, when we would rush and we generaly left from two to six dead greassers. We found plenty of eatables and large quantities of wine, and one house was a "Pulque" Fonda, or liquor store. To pre-vent us from getting drunk, the liquor was reported as poisoned, but we were not to be beat in that way; we would make a greasser drink some of each kind, no ill effects appearing, we would imbibe, while the "assayer" would be dispatched by a sabre thrust. When Mexicans were scarce, we used a Dutch artilleryman whose imperfect knowledge of our language prevented him from understanding why we gave him the first drink! and why we watched his countenance with so much anxiety. But the only bad effect it had was to get the Dutchman dead drunk, and the glorious so-so....

We reached a corner house of a block, as usual it was a "corner grocery" full of wine, aquadenta and Mescal. On the opposite side of the street we had to cross, was another of those infernal fortified stone walls, enclosing a house a fort in its self. It was now 3. P.M., all firing had ceased in the eastern part of the town, and from the loud cries of defiance, and increased boldness of our foes, we were sattisfied that they had been largely re-enforced. Things were getting desperate, the men were all getting crazy drunk and unmanagble. With words of cheer, Walker orderd the door of the Shop to be thrown open and a dash made for the wall. The fire was so blinding that we held our heads down and shut our eyes, "going it blind." One fine young fellow, a Texan named Lockridge, had been with me all day, in this affair he wraped a Mexican blanket around his head, and Bowieknife in hand led the charge. Our foes met the rush with so heavy a fire that the air seemd to rain balls. Bullets striking on the stone pavements and walls, ricochet and glancing from side to side, as we staggerd on. At least a regiment of infantry came up a side street, poured their fire in our flank, and then charged us with the bayonet. All fought now on his own hook, and fought more like devils, than human beings, with axes, club'd rifles, sabre and Bowieknife. We held them for a moment, then, inch-by-inch we gave ground. My Carbine and Hoster pistol were lost in the Bishop's Palace, and I fought with my sabre alone. I was no doubt badly scarte, but I laid about me in great fury, yelling like a fiend, and when a soldier run on to the point of my weapon, which came out at his back, I considered myself quite a hero. Lockridge, whose huge knife was driping with gore, noticing the act, cried out "Well done honey! nothing like the cold steel for greassers." I had now that tiger thirst for blood that will take possession of a man when engaged in close conflict, a desire to slay, to destroy life, that is a frenzy amounting almost to insanity, making men demons, indifferent alike to danger, wounds and death. I was in this state when a severe blow, dealt by a Mexican on my head with his clubbed musket, brought me to the ground and somewhat cooled my ardour. I with other wounded were dragged in to the "Fonda" in which all that was left of our party retreated, leaving over fifty of our men "toes up" in the street. The door was hastily barred, and a fire opened from the windows on the black devils, who were bayoneting our wounded left in the street. My head was coverd with blood, it was bathed in "muscal" which made it smart as if fire had been put on it, and bound up in a "rebosa."

I soon felt better and full of fight. The cries of our wounded as they were butcherd drove the men perfectly frantic. They howled like wild beasts, such oaths! such fearful imprecations! Walker cried out "My hoses! I have sworn to sleep in the Post office tonight or in hell! Thar is no time to spare, try them again." The door was thrown open, when tremendous explosions of artillery shook the house and the street was swept by a tempest. Canister and bags of musket balls were fired into the ranks of our foes by our two six pounders, one of which had been brought along and mounted on the roof of the house in which we were; the other gun was unlimberd in the street, while a twelve P'dr, with the other column in the "Calle de Monterey" had been mounted on a roof of a tower facing on the "Plazuela de la Carne," and threw shells in to the fortified yard in our front. The enemy fire soon slackened, and we gained their position without further loss. The other column advanced no farther then the church of Sante Maria, where they entrenched and sent us re-enforcements. For four hours untill dark, Hell reigned in this part of the city. The air was filled with the roar of artillery, the rattle of musketry, the bursting of shells, the dull heavy blows on doors and walls, the shouts and yells of the Rangers, mingled with cries of children and shrieks of women, made it a scene in which a Demon would delight. House after house we gained, cutting through the longitudinal walls, bursting in to the presence of terrified groups of feamales and children. We must have seemd to them like fiends from another world, our appearence was certainly terrific enough to daunt the boldest, with faces and bare arms encrusted with black blood, hair and beards mattened and stuck full of bits of mortar, garments torn, wit ha variety of articles found in the houses fastened on their person, weapons all smeared with gore, and all yelling and shouting. What fearful apparitions to meet the gaze of a quite nervous family!

In one house showing unmistakeable sign of wealth, I came upon a group of laides before a crucifix on a small alter situated in an alcove; three were young and quite beautiful, and dressed in pure white, two middle-aged women, their companions, rent the air with their shrill cries. Lockridge who was with me spoke Spanish like a native. He tried to calm them, but they threw themselves on the floor rolling over and over, the younger ones made no outcries but remained with their eyes fixed on the cross. One of the rollers sat up and in Spanish begged us to "spare the Senoreitas, and use them as we wished." This drove us out and Col. Walker, placed an old mountain man as a safeguard over them.

In another house lay a mother killed by a random shot, with a little child crying beside her. In every house fearful sights told of the horrors of a town taken by storm! To add to the woe of the defenceless inhabitants, the garison in the Black Fort, finding that we were in possession of the northwestern part of the city, opened with morters, throwing huge bombs high in air that fell in the streets and crashed through houses exploding with great violence. We pushed on, and one hour after dark, Walker with some fifty others gained a lodgement in the Post Office, a high stone building within one hun-dred yards and overlooking the Grande Plaza. Walker, when a "Meer prisoner," was confined in this house, and the knowledge then acquired, was of great benefit to him now. Among those who staid by Walker was Lockridge and myself, and we ascended to the top of the builden with the gallant Ranger, who had accomplished his oath.

The scene from the roof was magnificent, the rattle of small arms, the shouts and cries of combatants had ceased, darkness had settled over the city and shroud-ed its scenes of carnage in deep gloom, the dead horses and men laying in the streets looked black and uncanny in the darkness; to the north camp fires mapped out the position of our reserve, Gen. Worth's Head Quarters, the Bishop's Palace, was one blaze of light from the fires built inside. The occasional shout of a drunken stormer or the bray of Donkeys in the Plaza was the only sounds we heard. Silence fell on city and camp. Our wounded were stupefied with stimulants and lay unconscious of their pains. This silence was broken by a roar in our rear, and a stream of fire shot up from the "Plaza de la Capella" showing in bold relief the dark towers of the Church of Sante Maria, and rushed over our heads with a strange roaring scream, and burst in the Grande Plaza beyond. Old Maj. Munroe had got his nine inch Morter in position and was trying its range! Another Bomb followed and broke through the roof of the Cathedral, and exploded inside. Tons and tons of ammunition were stored in the Church, and we were not two hundred yards off! The Major only fired these two, but the Black Fort opened and fired at intervals for hours. I made a bed of clothes found in the house, and slept sound until! daylight on the 24th.

Source: Samuel Chamberlain, My Confession: Recollections of a Rogue, ed. By William H. Goetzmann (Austin, Texas: Texas State Historical Association, 1965), 92-98.

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"A Hungery Savage Look which was Truly Fearful": Samuel Chamberlain's Recollections of the Mexican War, 1846

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In the mid-nineteenth century, many Americans were eager to acquire the Mexican land of California and New Mexico, enough to provoke a war with Mexico. In 1845 U.S. President James K. Polk sent envoys who offered to buy Mexican territory and stationed federal troops in the border areas.