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Battle of Issus

Part of the Wars of Alexander the Great

Alexander battling Darius at the Battle of Issus ( Naples National Archaeological Museum)

Belligerents

Macedon
League of Corinth

Achaemenid Empire

Commanders and leaders

Alexander the Great
Parmenion
Craterus
Hephaestion
Ptolemy
Pantordanus
Sitalces II
Menes
Balacrus

Darius III
Arsames †
Rheomithres †
Atizyes †
Bubaces †
Sabaces †

Strength

13,000 peltasts,[1]
22,000 heavy infantry,[2]
5,850 cavalry[2]
Total: 40,850

30,000-80,000 light infantry (Babylonian spears, Ionian peltasts)[3]
11,000 cavalry[2]
10,000 Persian Immortals
10,000 Greek mercenaries[4]

Total: 50,000-60,000[5] (modern sources)
250,000-600,000 (ancient sources)

Casualties and losses

452 killed
5,000 wounded[6][7]

~20,000-40,000 casualties[7]

The Battle of Issus (also Issos) occurred in southern Anatolia, on November 5, 333 BC between the Hellenic League led by Alexander the Great and the Achaemenid Empire, led by Darius III, in the second great battle of Alexander's conquest of Asia. The invading Macedonian troops defeated Persia. After the Hellenic League soundly defeated the Persian satraps of Asia Minor (led by Greek mercenary Memnon of Rhodes) at the Battle of the Granicus, Darius took personal command of his army. He gathered reinforcements and led his men in a surprise march behind the Hellenic advance to cut their line of supply. This forced Alexander to countermarch, setting the stage for the battle near the mouth of the Pinarus River and the town of Issus.

The battle took place south of the ancient town Issus, which is close to the present-day Turkish town of Iskenderun (the Turkish equivalent of "Alexandria", founded by Alexander to commemorate his victory), on either side of a small river called Pinarus. At that location, the distance from the Gulf of Issus to the surrounding mountains is only 2.6 km (2 mi), a place where Darius could not take advantage of his superiority in numbers. Speculation on the location of the Pinarus has taken place for over 80 years. Older historians believed it to be the Deli Tchai river, but historians N.G.L. Hammond and A. M. Devine claim that the Pinarus is actually the Payas River, the latter using his own examination of the course of the river, which he considered would not have drastically changed since antiquity. Their evidence is based on Callisthenes' accounts of the measurements of the battlefield and distances marched by both sides' armies in the prelude to the battle and distance given by Diodorus after the battle.

Background

Alexander set out into Asia in 334 BC and defeated the local Persian satraps at the Battle of the Granicus. He then proceeded to occupy all of Asia Minor, with the idea of capturing all coastal settlements so as to negate the power of the vastly superior Persian fleet. He captured several important settlements such as Miletus in 334 BC and Halicarnassus, a siege lasting four months, starting in late December the same year. While Alexander was in Tarsus, he heard of Darius massing a great army in Babylon. If Darius were to reach the Gulf of Issus, he could use the support from the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus still operating in the Mediterranean Sea, thus easing his supply and possibly landing troops behind the enemy. Alexander kept his main army at Tarsus but sent Parmenion ahead to occupy the coast around Issus. In November, Alexander received reports that the great Persian army had advanced into Syria to a town named Sochoi. Alexander decided to mass his scattered army and advance south from Issus through the Pass of Jonah.

Darius knew that Parmenion held the Pass of Jonah and thus chose a northern route of advance. The Persians captured Issus without opposition and cut off the hands of all the sick and wounded that Alexander had left behind. Now Darius found out he had placed his army behind the Hellenic League and had cut their supply lines. He then advanced to the south and got no further than the river Pinarus before his scouts spotted Alexander marching north. Darius had to set up camp on this narrow coastal plain.

There is much debate as to the motives of Alexander and Darius preceding Issus. One modern perspective, based on Curtius, is that Darius was forced to move camp to terrain that favored Alexander because Alexander was fighting defensively due to a recommendation by his war council and Parmenion.[citation needed ] Darius' large army could not be supported in the field during winter and his cities in Phoenicia were already in unrest at the arrival of Alexander. Darius was forced to move his large army to a small battlefield, greatly to the advantage of Alexander's smaller force.

Alexander was waiting for Darius to come south around the Amanus Mountain range because the pass Darius would have used, the Belen Pass, was much closer to Sochi and offered the quickest access to the area Alexander defended. Alexander was waiting 15 km (9.3 mi) to the west of the Belen Pass at Myriandus to spring a trap on Darius as he crossed through the Belen Pass or through the Pillar of Jonah if he moved north, where Darius' army would be disorganized and disjointed in the narrow crossing. Darius instead moved north from Sochi and around the mountains, emerging behind Alexander's position and on his supply and communication lines. Thus Alexander was forced to march to Darius, who had caught him off guard in a large flanking maneuver. This gives the illusion that Darius was the one acting defensively, since Alexander was forced to march to him.

Combatants

Persian army

Some ancient sources ( Arrian and Plutarch), who based their accounts on earlier Greek sources, estimated 600,000 Persian soldiers in total, while Diodorus and Justin estimated 400,000, and Curtius Rufus estimated 250,000.

Modern historians find Arrian's count of 600,000 men highly unlikely. They argue that the logistics of fielding more than 100,000 soldiers in battle was extremely difficult at the time. Hans Delbrück gives an estimate as small as 25,000, although most (including Engels and Green) estimate the total size of Darius' army to be no larger than 100,000 at Issus, including 11,000 cavalry, 10,000 Persian Immortals, and 10,000 Greek mercenaries. Warry estimates 108,000 in total.

Macedonian army

The size of the Hellenic army may not have exceeded 40,000 men, including their other allies, led by Alexander. Alexander's army may have consisted of about 22,000 phalangites and hoplites, 13,000 peltasts, and 5,850 cavalry.

The Greeks advanced through the Pillar of Jonah. Alexander led his Companion cavalry on the right flank and he set his Thessalian allied cavalry on the left of the phalanx with Parmenion in command.

Darius formed his line with his heavy cavalry concentrated next to the coast on his right, followed by the Greek mercenary phalanx (historian A. M. Devine places them at a strength of 12,000, comparable to Alexander's Greek phalanx). Next to the Greek phalanx Darius spread his Persian infantry, the Cardaces, along the river and into the foothills, where they wrapped around to the other bank and threatened Alexander's right flank (the formation resembled gamma, Γ). Arrian gives an inflated figure of 20,000 to these troops. Darius positioned himself in the centre with his best infantry, the Greek mercenaries, and his royal cavalry guard. According to some historians, like P. Stratikis, he was trying to replicate the Hellenic battle formation of the Battle of the Granicus.

The Persian cavalry first charged Parmenion and the allied cavalry, crossing the river to open battle. Alexander's right wing became the crux of the battle, as at Gaugamela two years later, where Parmenion held the left wing long enough against superior Persian numbers for Alexander to make his calculated cavalry strike against Darius and break the Persian army. The infantry of the Greek left flank was commanded by the general Craterus, in a promotion from his position commanding a single brigade of pezhetairoi infantry at the Granicus.

Things did not go well for the Macedonians in the beginning. Their center phalanx, having to advance across a river and up a fortified bank, suffered severely against the Greek mercenaries waiting for them on the other side. Arrian noted that a hundred and twenty Macedonians "of note" (probably meaning officers) were slain here, and the Macedonians were forced to retreat across the river. In the left flank, the Thessalian struggled against the outnumbering mass of Persian heavy horse that faced them, delivering charges and retreating again to buy time.

Then the Hypaspists led by Alexander on foot delivered an assault on the Cardaces, and managed to punch a hole through the Persian line. The Agrianians too drove back a mass of Persian skirmishers menacing Alexander's far right, securing the flank of the Companions. Alexander then mounted a horse at the head of his Companions and led a direct assault against Darius and his bodyguards, causing them to flee from the battlefield. Alexander then saw his left flank and center in trouble, and allowing Darius to flee, he crashed into the rear of the Greek mercenaries. The Greek mercenaries broke up and started retreating from the battlefield as well. The Persians saw that their Great King had gone and that the battle was being lost, and they abandoned their positions and fled in full rout. The Hellenic cavalry pursued the fleeing Persians for as long as there was light. As with most ancient battles, significant carnage occurred after the battle as the pursuing Greeks slaughtered their crowded, disorganized foe. Arrian notes Ptolemy mentioning that while pursuing Darius, Alexander and his bodyguards came upon a ravine which they easily crossed on the piled up bodies of dead Persians. It was a decisive victory for Alexander.

The Battle of Issus was a decisive Hellenic victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King ( Darius III at the time) present. After the battle, the Hellenes captured Darius' wife, Stateira I, his daughters, Stateira II and Drypetis, and his mother, Sisygambis, all of whom had accompanied Darius on his campaign. Alexander, who later married Stateira II, treated the captured women with great respect.

Later, the Spartan king Agis III recruited the Greek mercenary survivors of the Battle of Issus who had served in the Persian army, a force of 8,000 veterans, and used them in his fight against the Macedonians. In the summer of 331 BC, Agis defeated Coragus, the Macedonian general in command of the Peloponnese and the garrison of Corinth, but was finally defeated at the Battle of Megalopolis.

Depictions of the battle

References

Delbrück, Hans (1920). History of the Art of War. University of Nebraska Press. Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.

Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.

Fuller, John F. C. (1960). The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New Jersey: De Capo Press.

Green, Peter (1974). Alexander of Macedon: A Historical Biography.

Moerbeek, Martijn (1997). The battle of Issus, 333 BC. Universiteit Twente.

Rogers, Guy (2004). Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness. New York: Random House.

Warry, J. (1998), Warfare in the Classical World. ISBN 1-84065-004-4.

Welman, Nick. Army. Fontys University.

External links

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Battle of Issus Part of the Wars of Alexander the Great Alexander battling Darius at the Battle of Issus ( Naples National Archaeological Museum) Belligerents Macedon League of Corinth Achaemenid Empire Commanders and leaders Alexander the Great Parmenion Craterus Hephaestion Ptolemy Pantordanus Sitalces II Menes Balacrus Darius III Arsames †

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The Battle of Granicus

Part of the Wars of Alexander the Great

The Battle of the Granicus River
by Charles Le Brun

Belligerents

Macedonia
Hellenic League

Achaemenid Empire

Commanders and leaders

Alexander the Great
Parmenion
Cleitus the Black
Hephaestion
Calas
Hegelochus
Ptolemy

Arsames
Rheomithres
Niphates †
Petenes †
Spithridates †
Mithrobuzanes †
Arbupales †
Mithridates †
Pharnaces †
Omares †
Arsites
Rhoesaces †
Memnon of Rhodes

Strength

32,000 infantry (12,000 Macedonians, 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 Greeks, 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians, and 1,000 archers)
5,100 cavalry (1,800 Macedonians, 1,800 Thessalians, 600 other Greeks, and 900 Thracians and Paeonians)
Total: 37,100

10,000-20,000 cavalry[1][2]
5,000-20,000 Greek hoplite mercenaries[1][2]
Total: 20,000-30,000[3] (modern estimate)

Casualties and losses

300 to 400 killed[4]
1,150-1,380 to 3,500-4,200 wounded[4]

3,000 infantry killed[5]
1,000 cavalry killed[5]
2,000 captured[5]

The Battle of the Granicus River in May 334 BC was the first of three major battles fought between Alexander the Great and the Persian Empire. Fought in northwestern Asia Minor, near the site of Troy, it was here that Alexander defeated the forces of the Persian satraps of Asia Minor, including a large force of Greek mercenaries led by Memnon of Rhodes.

The battle took place on the road from Abydos to Dascylium (near modern-day Ergili, Turkey), at the crossing of the Granicus River (modern-day ).

Background

After the death of Phillip of Macedon, many of his newly conquered territories desired to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the new young king. These nations included the Illyrians, Thracians, and some southern Greek city-states. Alexander had to prove the strength of his rule before leaving for his Persian expedition, and crushed several nascent rebellions within Greece and the northern tribes. After extensive planning in Macedonia, Alexander started to prepare for his next major conquest: the invasion of Asia. Before leaving Macedon, Alexander appointed his father's experienced general Antipater as regent in his absence, leaving him with 9,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry to maintain control over Macedonia's holdings in Europe. In the spring of 334 BC, Alexander took 2,600 cavalry and went on a 20-day march from Macedon to Hellespont, to join Parmenion in Asia.

Deployment of Persian troops

Before Alexander and his army were able to cross at Hellespont, the Persian provincial governors, and others in power at that time in Persia, assembled their forces of 10-20,000 cavalry and 5-20,000 infantry to the town of Zelea. Memnon was a high-ranking Greek mercenary employed by the Persians, and he advised the Persians to lay waste to the land that Alexander would have to pass, depriving his army of food and supplies. This would make it harder for Alexander and his army to survive on their long journey before the battle. The satraps did not trust Memnon because of his nationality, and did not ravage their territories. The Persians had two major objectives; first, they would try to force Alexander toward a position of their choosing before he could continue inland, and second, the Persians hoped to be able to be in a defensive position that would minimize Alexander's advantage in infantry. The Persians advanced from Zelea to the Granicus River, which would be an obstacle for Alexander and his army. The Persians hoped that his army would not be able to hold formation, which would severely cripple its effectiveness, as maintaining the closely packed and mutually supportive formation typically employed by the Greeks was central to their strategy. The Persians awaited the arrival of the Macedonians with all their cavalry in the front line. Alexander, after crossing into Asia at the Hellespont, then marched 100 km back to the north to meet the Persian armies.

According to Alexander's biographer Arrian, Alexander's army met the Persians on the third day of May from Abydos. Alexander's second-in-command, Parmenion, suggested crossing the river upstream and attacking at dawn the next day, but Alexander attacked immediately. This tactic caught the Persians off guard. The Macedonian line was arrayed with the heavy phalanxes in the middle, and cavalry on either side. Alexander was with the Companions on the right flank. The Persians expected the main assault to come from Alexander's position and moved units from their center to that flank.

The battle started with a cavalry and light infantry feint from the Macedonian left, from Parmenion's side of the battle line. The cavalry squadron was led by the officer Ptolemy, son of Philip. The Persians heavily reinforced that side, and the feint was driven back, but at that point, Alexander led the horse companions in their classic wedge-shaped charge, and smashed into the center of the Persian line. The Persians countercharged with a squadron of nobles on horse, and accounts show that in the melee, several high-ranking Persian nobles were killed by Alexander himself or his bodyguards, although Alexander was stunned by an axe-blow from a Persian nobleman named Rhoisakes. A second Persian nobleman named Spithridates attempted to attack Alexander from behind while he was still reeling; however, he was himself killed by Cleitus the Black, who severed his outstretched arm. Alexander quickly recovered.

Eventually the Macedonian horse were able to gain the advantage over their Persian counterpart, owing to the superiority of their lance over the Persian javelin for melee fighting, as well as the close support of the light infantry interspersed among their squadrons. The Greek cavalry then turned left and started rolling up the Persian cavalry, which was engaged with the left side of the Macedonian line after a general advance. A hole opened in the recently vacated place in the battle line, and the Macedonian infantry charged through to engage the poor-quality Persian infantry in the rear. The Macedonian phalanx then attacked the Greek mercenaries. With many of their leaders already dead, and their infantry routed, both flanks of the Persian cavalry retreated, seeing the collapse of the center. The infantry routed too, many being cut down as they fled.

That account of the battle is directly contradicted by Diodorus Siculus who states "When Alexander learned of the concentration of the Persian forces, he advanced rapidly and encamped opposite the enemy, so that the Granicus flowed between the encampments. The Persians, resting on high ground, made no move, intending to fall upon the foes as he crossed the river, for they supposed they could easily carry the day when the Macedonian phalanx was divided. But Alexander at dawn boldly brought his army across the river and deployed in good order before they could stop him. In return, they posted their mass of horsemen all along the front of the Macedonians since they had decided to press the battle with these. Memnon of Rhodes and satrap Arsamenes held the left wing each with his own cavalry; Arsites was stationed next with the horsemen from Paphlagonia; then came Spithrobates satrap of Ionia at the head of the Hyrcanian cavalry. The right wing was held by a thousand Medes and two thousand horsemen with Rheomithres as well as Bactrians of like number. Other national contingents occupied the centre, numerous and picked for their valour. In all, the cavalry amounted to more than ten thousand. The Persian foot soldiers were not fewer than one hundred thousand, but they were posted behind the line and did not advance since the cavalry was thought to be sufficient to crush the Macedonians." The record of Arrian and Diodorus on the battle of Granicus can't be reconciled so historians usually prefer Arrian, although some revisionists try to reconcile the two accounts.

Revisionist view

Historian Peter Green, in his 1974 book Alexander of Macedon, proposed a way to reconcile the accounts of Diodorus and Arrian. According to Green's interpretation, the riverbank was guarded by infantry, not cavalry, and Alexander's forces sustained heavy losses in the initial attempt to cross the river and were forced to retire. Alexander then grudgingly accepted Parmenion's advice and crossed the river during the night in an uncontested location, and fought the battle at dawn the next day. The Persian army hurried to the location of Alexander's crossing, with the cavalry reaching the scene of the battle first before the slower infantry, and then the battle continued largely as described by the Arrian and Plutarch accounts. Green accounts for the differences between his account and the ancient sources by suggesting that Alexander later covered up his initial failed crossing. Green devotes an entire appendix in support of his interpretation, taking the view that for political reasons, Alexander could not admit even a temporary defeat. Thus, the initial defeat was covered up by his propagandists by a very heroic (and Homeric) charge into the now well-deployed enemy. In his preface to the 2012 reprint, Green states: "on the evidence as it stands that theory remains untenable and the contradiction inexplicable."

Total casualties for the Greeks were between 300 and 400. The Persians had roughly 1,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry killed, mostly in the rout. Towards the end of this battle, Alexander buried the Persian commanders and the Greek mercenaries who were killed fighting on the side of the enemy. The Greek mercenaries, under the command of Memnon of Rhodes, who fought for the Persians, were abandoned after the cavalry retreat. They attempted to broker a peace with Alexander but to no avail, because, although they were Greeks, they were fighting against Greece on behalf of the foreigners, in opposition to decrees which the Greeks had made in their federal council.. As a result, after the battle Alexander ordered the mercenaries to be enslaved. Out of the 18,000 Greek mercenaries, half were killed and 8,000 enslaved and sent back to Macedon to till the soil.

To Athens, he also sent 300 suits of Persian armour to be hung up in the Parthenon of the Acropolis as a votive offering or oblation to Athena, and ordered this inscription to be fixed over them so as to mark the absence of the Spartans in his united Greek army: " Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except of Lacedaemonians, present this offering of the spoils taken from the barbarians who live in Asia". ("Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες, πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικούντων"-"Alexandros Philippou kai hoi Hellēnes plēn Lakedaimoniōn apo tōn barbarōn tōn tēn Asian katoikountōn").

References

Delbrück, Hans (1920). History of the Art of War. University of Nebraska Press. Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.

Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.

Fuller, John F. C. (1960). The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New Jersey: De Capo Press.

Green, Peter (1974). Alexander of Macedon: A Historical Biography.

Moerbeek, Martijn (1997). The battle of Granicus, 333 BC. Universiteit Twente.

Rogers, Guy (2004). Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness. New York: Random House.

Thompson, M. (2007) Granicus 334 BC. Alexander's first Persian Victory. Osprey Publishing

Warry, J. (1998), Warfare in the Classical World. ISBN 1-84065-004-4.

Welman, Nick. Battles (Major) and Army. Fontys University.

"Wars of Alexander the Great: Battle of the Granicus." HistoryNet.com Live the History. www.historynet.com/wars-of-alexander-the-great-battle-of-the-granicus.htm (accessed April 15, 2013).

"Battle of Granicus." Ancient Babylon. (accessed April 10, 2013).

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The Battle of Granicus Part of the Wars of Alexander the Great The Battle of the Granicus Riverby Charles Le Brun Belligerents Macedonia Hellenic League Achaemenid Empire Commanders and leaders Alexander the Great Parmenion Cleitus the Black Hephaestion Calas Hegelochus Ptolemy Arsames Rheomithres Niphates † Petenes † Spithridates † Mithrobuzanes

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The phalanx ( Ancient Greek: φάλαγξ; plural phalanxes or phalanges, φάλαγγες, phalanges) was a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears, pikes, sarissas, or similar pole weapons. The term is particularly (and originally) used to describe the use of this formation in Ancient Greek warfare, although the ancient Greek writers used it to also describe any massed infantry formation, regardless of its equipment. Arrian uses the term in his Array against the Alans when he refers to his legions. In Greek texts, the phalanx may be deployed for battle, on the march, or even camped, thus describing the mass of infantry or cavalry that would deploy in line during battle. They marched forward as one entity.

The term itself, as used today, does not refer to a distinctive military unit or division (e.g., the Roman legion or the contemporary Western-type battalion), but to the type of formation of an army's troops. Therefore, this term does not indicate a standard combat strength or composition but includes the total number of infantry, which is deployed in a single formation known as a "phalanx".

Many spear-armed troops historically fought in what might be termed phalanx-like formations. This article focuses on the use of the military phalanx formation in Ancient Greece, the Hellenistic world, and other ancient states heavily influenced by Greek civilization.

The earliest known depiction of a phalanx-like formation occurs in a Sumerian stele from the 25th century BC. Here the troops seem to have been equipped with spears, helmets, and large shields covering the whole body. Ancient Egyptian infantry were known to have employed similar formations. The first usage of the term phalanx comes from Homer's "φαλαγξ", used to describe hoplites fighting in an organized battle line. Homer used the term to differentiate the formation-based combat from the individual duels so often found in his poems.

Historians have not arrived at a consensus about the relationship between the Greek formation and these predecessors of the hoplites. The principles of shield wall and spear hedge were almost universally known among the armies of major civilizations throughout history, and so the similarities may be related to convergent evolution instead of diffusion.

Traditionally, historians date the origin of the hoplite phalanx of ancient Greece to the 8th century BC in Sparta, but this is under revision. It is perhaps more likely that the formation was devised in the 7th century BC after the introduction of the aspis by the city of Argos, which would have made the formation possible. This is further evidenced by the Chigi vase, dated to 650 BC, identifying hoplites armed with aspis, spear and panoply.

Another possible theory as to the birth of Greek phalanx warfare stems from the idea that some of the basic aspects of the phalanx were present in earlier times yet were not fully developed due to the lack of appropriate technology. Two of the basic strategies seen in earlier warfare include the principle of cohesion and the use of large groups of soldiers. This would suggest that the Greek phalanx was rather the culmination and perfection of a slowly developed idea that originated many years earlier. As weaponry and armour advanced through the years in different city-states, the phalanx became complex and effective.

The hoplite phalanx of the Archaic and Classical periods in Greece (c. 800-350 BC) was the formation in which the hoplites would line up in ranks in close order. The hoplites would lock their shields together, and the first few ranks of soldiers would project their spears out over the first rank of shields. The phalanx therefore presented a shield wall and a mass of spear points to the enemy, making frontal assaults against it very difficult. It also allowed a higher proportion of the soldiers to be actively engaged in combat at a given time (rather than just those in the front rank).

Battles between two phalanxes usually took place in open, flat plains where it was easier to advance and stay in formation. Rough terrain or hilly regions would have made it difficult to maintain a steady line and would have defeated the purpose of a phalanx. As a result, battles between Greek city-states would not take place in just any location, nor would they be limited to sometimes obvious strategic points. Rather, many times, the two opposing sides would find the most suitable piece of land where the conflict could be settled. Typically, the battle ended with one of the two fighting forces fleeing to safety.

The phalanx usually advanced at a walking pace, although it is possible that they picked up speed during the last several yards. One of the main reasons for this slow approach was to maintain formation. The formation would be rendered useless if the phalanx was lost as the unit approached the enemy and could even become detrimental to the advancing unit, resulting in a weaker formation that was easier for an enemy force to break through. If the hoplites of the phalanx were to pick up speed toward the latter part of the advance, it would have been for the purpose of gaining momentum against the enemy in the initial collision. Herodotus states of the Greeks at the Battle of Marathon, that "They were the first Greeks we know of to charge their enemy at a run". Many historians believe that this innovation was precipitated by their desire to minimize their losses from Persian archery. The opposing sides would collide, possibly severing many of the spears of the row in front and killing the front part of the enemy army due to the bone-breaking collision.

The "physical pushing match" theory is one where the battle would rely on the valour of the men in the front line, whilst those in the rear maintained forward pressure on the front ranks with their shields, and the whole formation would consistently press forward trying to break the enemy formation. This is the most widely accepted interpretation of the ancient sources thus when two phalanx formations engaged, the struggle essentially became a pushing match. Historians such as Victor Davis Hanson point out that it is difficult to account for exceptionally deep phalanx formations unless they were necessary to facilitate the physical pushing depicted by this theory, as those behind the first two ranks could not take part in the actual spear thrusting.

No Greek art ever depicts anything like a phalanx pushing match, so this hypothesis is a product of educated speculation rather than explicit testimony from contemporary sources and is far from being academically resolved. The Greek term for "push" was used in the same metaphorical manner as the English word is (for example it was also used to describe the process of rhetorical arguments) and so does not necessarily describe a literal physical push, although it is possible that it did.

For instance, if Othismos were to accurately describe a physical pushing match, it would be logical to state that the deeper phalanx would always win an engagement since the physical strength of individuals would not compensate for even one additional rank on the enemy side. However, there are numerous examples of shallow phalanxes holding off an opponent. For instance, at Delium in 424 BC, the Athenian left flank, a formation eight men deep, held off a formation of Thebans 25 deep without immediate collapse. It is difficult with the physical pushing model to imagine eight men withstanding the pushing force of 25 opponents for a matter of seconds, let alone half the battle.

Such arguments have led to a wave of counter-criticism to physical shoving theorists. Adrian Goldsworthy, in his article "The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The nature of Hoplite Battle", argues that the physical pushing match model does not fit with the average casualty figures of hoplite warfare nor the practical realities of moving large formations of men in battle. This debate has yet to be resolved amongst scholars.

Practical difficulties with this theory also include the fact that, in a shoving match, an eight-foot spear is too long to fight effectively or even parry attacks. Spears enable a formation of men to keep their enemies at a distance, parry attacks aimed at them and their comrades, and give the necessary reach to strike multiple men in the opposite formation. A pushing match would put enemies so close together that a quick stabbing with a knife would kill the front row almost instantly. The crush of men would also prevent the formation from withdrawing or retreating, which would result in much higher casualties than is recorded. The speed at which this would occur would also end the battle very quickly, instead of prolonging it for hours.

Each individual hoplite carried his shield on his left arm, protecting not only himself but also the soldier to the left. This meant that the men at the extreme right of the phalanx were only half-protected. In battle, opposing phalanxes would try to exploit this weakness by attempting to overlap the enemy's right flank. It also meant that, in battle, a phalanx would tend to drift to the right (as hoplites sought to remain behind the shield of their neighbor). The most experienced hoplites were often placed on the right side of the phalanx to avoid these problems. Some groups, such as the Spartans at Nemea, tried to use this phenomenon to their advantage. In this case, the phalanx would sacrifice its left side, which typically consisted of allied troops, in an effort to overtake the enemy from the flank. It is unlikely that this strategy worked very often, as it is not mentioned frequently in ancient Greek literature.

There was a leader in each row of a phalanx, and a rear rank officer, the ouragos (meaning tail-leader), who kept order in the rear. The hoplites had to trust their neighbours to protect them and in turn be willing to protect their neighbors; a phalanx was thus only as strong as its weakest elements. The effectiveness of the phalanx therefore depended on how well the hoplites could maintain this formation in combat and how well they could stand their ground, especially when engaged against another phalanx. For this reason, the formation was deliberately organized to group friends and family close together, thus providing a psychological incentive to support one's fellows, and a disincentive, through shame, to panic or attempt to flee. The more disciplined and courageous the army, the more likely it was to win - often engagements between the various city-states of Greece would be resolved by one side fleeing before the battle. The Greek word dynamis, the "will to fight", expresses the drive that kept hoplites in formation.

Now of those, who dare, abiding one beside another, to advance to the close fray, and the foremost champions, fewer die, and they save the people in the rear; but in men that fear, all excellence is lost. No one could ever in words go through those several ills, which befall a man, if he has been actuated by cowardice. For 'tis grievous to wound in the rear the back of a flying man in hostile war. Shameful too is a corpse lying low in the dust, wounded behind in the back by the point of a spear.

Each hoplite provided his own equipment. The primary hoplite weapon was a spear around 2.4 metres (7.9 ft) in length called a . Although accounts of its length vary, it is usually now believed to have been seven to nine feet long (~2.1-2.7 m). It was held one-handed, with the other hand holding the hoplite's shield (aspis). The spearhead was usually a curved leaf shape, while the rear of the spear had a spike called a sauroter ('lizard-killer') which was used to stand the spear in the ground (hence the name). It was also used as a secondary weapon if the main shaft snapped or to kill enemies lying on the ground. This was a common problem, especially for soldiers who were involved in the initial clash with the enemy. Despite the snapping of the spear, hoplites could easily switch to the sauroter without great consequence. The rear ranks used the secondary end to finish off fallen opponents as the phalanx advanced over them.

Throughout the hoplite era, the standard hoplite armour went through many cyclical changes. An Archaic hoplite typically wore a bronze breastplate, a bronze helmet with cheekplates, as well as greaves and other armour. Later, in the classical period, the breastplate became less common, replaced instead with a corselet that some claim was made of linothorax (layers of linen glued together), or perhaps of leather, sometimes covered in whole or in part with overlapping metal scales. Eventually, even greaves became less commonly used, although degrees of heavier armour remained, as attested by Xenophon as late as 401 BC.

These changes reflected the balancing of mobility with protection, especially as cavalry became more prominent in the Peloponnesian War and the need to combat light troops, which were increasingly used to negate the hoplite's role as the primary force in battle. Yet bronze armour remained in some form until the end of the hoplite era. Some archaeologists have pointed out that bronze armour does not actually provide as much protection from direct blows as more extensive corselet padding, and have suggested its continued use was a matter of status for those who could afford it. In the classical Greek dialect, there is no word for swordsmen; yet hoplites also carried a short sword called the xiphos. The short sword was a secondary weapon, used if the dory was broken or lost. Samples of the xiphos recovered at excavation sites typically were found to be around 60 cm in length. These swords were double-sided and could therefore be used in both the swinging and thrusting motion. These short swords were usually used to slice the enemy's throat during close combat.

Hoplites carried a circular shield called a hoplon (often referred to as an aspis) made from wood and covered in bronze, measuring roughly 1 metre (3.3 ft) in diameter. It spanned from chin to knee and was very heavy (8-15 kg). This medium-sized shield (and indeed, large for the time considering the average male height) was made possible partly by its dish-like shape, which allowed it to be supported with the rim on the shoulder. This was quite an important feature of the shield, especially for the hoplites that remained in the latter ranks. While these soldiers continued to help press forward, they did not have the added burden of holding up their shield. But the circular shield was not without its disadvantages. Despite its mobility, protective curve, and double straps the circular shape created gaps in the shield wall at both its top and bottom. (Top gaps were somewhat reduced by the one or two spears jutting out of the gap. In order to minimize the bottom gaps, thick leather 'curtains' were used but only by an [unknown] percentage of the hoplites, possibly mostly in the first row only since there were disadvantages as well: considerable added weight on an already heavy shield and a certain additional cost.) These gaps left parts of the hoplite exposed to potentially lethal spear thrusts and were a persistent vulnerability for hoplites controlling the front lines.

The phalanx of the Ancient Macedonian kingdom and the later Hellenistic successor states was a development of the hoplite phalanx. The 'phalangites' were armed with a much longer spear, the sarissa, and less heavily armoured. The sarissa was the pike used by the ancient Macedonian army. Its actual length is unknown, but apparently it was twice as long as the dory. This makes it at least 14 feet (4.3 m), but 18 feet (5.5 m) appears more likely. (The cavalry xyston was 12.5 feet (3.8 m) by comparison.) The great length of the pike was balanced by a counterweight at the rear end, which also functioned as a butt-spike, allowing the sarissa to be planted into the ground. Because of its great length, weight and different balance, a sarissa was wielded two-handed. This meant that the aspis was no longer a practical defence. Instead, the phalangites strapped a smaller pelte shield (usually reserved for peltasts, light skirmishers) to their left forearm. Recent theories, including examination of ancient frescoes depicting full sets of weapons and armor, claim that the shields used were actually larger than the pelte but smaller than the aspis, hanging by leather strap(s) from the left shoulder or from both shoulders. The shield would retain handling straps in the inner curve, to be handled like a (smaller) aspis if the fight progressed to sword-wielding. Although in both shield size assumptions this reduced the shield wall, the extreme length of the spear kept the enemy at a greater distance, as the pikes of the first three to five ranks could all be brought to bear in front of the front row. This pike had to be held underhand, as the shield would have obscured the soldier's vision had it been held overhead. It would also be very hard to remove a sarissa from anything it stuck in (the earth, shields, and soldiers of the opposition) if it were thrust downwards, due to its length. The Macedonian phalanx was much less able to form a shield wall, but the lengthened spears would have compensated for this. Such a phalanx formation also reduced the likelihood that battles would degenerate into a pushing match.

The basic combat element of the Greek armies was either the stichos (meaning "file"; usually 8-16 men strong) or the enomotia (meaning "sworn" and made up by 2-4 stichœ, totaling up to 32 men), both led by a dimœrites who was assisted by a decadarchos and two decasterœ (sing. decasteros). Four to a maximum of 32 enomotiæ (depending on the era in question or the city) were forming a led by a , who in this way was in command of initially 100 hoplites to a maximum of c. 500 in the late Hellenistic armies. Here, it has to be noted that the military manuals of Asclepiodotus and Aelian use the term lochos to denote a file in the phalanx. A taxis ( for the Spartans) was the greatest standard hoplitic formation of 500 to 1500 men, led by a (general). The entire army, a total of several taxeis or moræ was led by a generals' council. The commander-in-chief was usually called a polemarchos or a strategos autocrator.

Hoplite phalanxes usually deployed in ranks of 8 men or more deep; The Macedonian phalanxes were usually 16 men deep, sometimes reported to have been arrayed 32 men deep. There are some notable extremes; at the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, the Theban general Epameinondas arranged the left wing of the phalanx into a "hammerhead" of 50 ranks of elite hoplites deep (see below) and when depth was less important, phalanxes just 4 deep are recorded, as at the battle of Marathon.

The phalanx depth could vary depending on the needs of the moment and plans of the general. While the phalanx was in march, an eis bathos formation (loose, meaning literally "in depth") was adopted in order to move more freely and maintain order. This was also the initial battle formation as, in addition, it permitted friendly units to pass through whether assaulting or retreating. In this status, the phalanx had twice the normal depth and each hoplite had to occupy about 1.8-2 metres (5 ft 11 in-6 ft 7 in) in width. When enemy infantry was approaching, a rapid switch to the pycne (spelled also pucne) formation (dense or tight formation) was necessary. In that case, each man's space was halved (0.9-1 metre or 2 feet 11 inches-3 feet 3 inches in width) and the formation depth returned to normal. An even denser formation, the synaspismos or sunaspismos (ultra tight or locked shields formation), was used when the phalanx was expected to experience extra pressure, intense missile volleys or frontal cavalry charges. In synaspismos, the rank depth was half that of a normal phalanx and the width each man occupied was as small as 0.45 metres (1.5 ft).

Several stages in hoplite combat can be defined:

Ephodos: The hoplites stop singing their pæanes (battle hymns) and move towards the enemy, gradually picking up pace and momentum. In the instants before impact, war cries ( alalagmœ, sing. alalagmos) would be made. Notable war cries were the Athenian ( eleleleleu! eleleleleu!) and the Macedonian ( alalalalai! alalalalai!) alalagmœ.

Krousis: The opposing phalanxes meet each other almost simultaneously along their front.

Doratismos: Repeated, rapid spear thrusts in order to disrupt the enemy formation. The use of long spears would keep enemies apart as well as allow men in a row to assist their comrades next to them. The prodding could also open up a man to allow a comrade to spear him. Too hard prodding could get a spear stuck in a shield, which would necessitate someone in the back to lend his to the now-disarmed man.

Othismos: Literally "pushing" after most spears have been broken, the hoplites begin to push with their spears and spear shafts against their opponents' shields. This could be the longest phase.

Pararrhexis: "Breaching" the opposing phalanx, the enemy formation shatters and the battle ends. Cavalry would be used at this point to mop up the scattered enemy.

The early history of the phalanx is largely one of combat between hoplite armies from competing Greek city-states. The usual result was rather identical, inflexible formations pushing against each other until one broke. The potential of the phalanx to achieve something more was demonstrated at Battle of Marathon (490 BC). Facing the much larger army of Darius I, the Athenians thinned out their phalanx and consequently lengthened their front, to avoid being outflanked. However, even a reduced-depth phalanx proved unstoppable to the lightly armed Persian infantry. After routing the Persian wings, the hoplites on the Athenian wings wheeled inwards, destroying the elite troop at the Persian centre, resulting in a crushing victory for Athens. Throughout the Greco-Persian Wars the hoplite phalanx was to prove superior to the Persian infantry (e.g. the battles of Thermopylae and Plataea).

Perhaps the most prominent example of the phalanx's evolution was the oblique advance, made famous in the Battle of Leuctra. There, the Theban general Epaminondas thinned out the right flank and centre of his phalanx, and deepened his left flank to an unheard-of 50 men deep. In doing so, Epaminondas reversed the convention by which the right flank of the phalanx was strongest. This allowed the Thebans to assault in strength the elite Spartan troops on the right flank of the opposing phalanx. Meanwhile, the centre and right flank of the Theban line were echeloned back, from the opposing phalanx, keeping the weakened parts of the formation from being engaged. Once the Spartan right had been routed by the Theban left, the remainder of the Spartan line also broke. Thus, by localising the attacking power of the hoplites, Epaminondas was able to defeat an enemy previously thought invincible.

Philip II of Macedon spent several years in Thebes as a hostage, and paid attention to Epaminondas' innovations. On return to his homeland, he raised a revolutionary new infantry force, which was to change the face of the Greek world. Philip's phalangites were the first force of professional soldiers seen in Ancient Greece apart from Sparta. They were armed with longer spears (the sarissa) and were drilled more thoroughly in more evolved, complicated tactics and manoeuvres. More importantly, though, Philip's phalanx was part of a multi-faceted, combined force that included a variety of skirmishers and cavalry, most notably the famous Companion cavalry. The Macedonian phalanx now was used to pin the centre of the enemy line, while cavalry and more mobile infantry struck at the foe's flanks. Its supremacy over the more static armies fielded by the Greek city-states was shown at the Battle of Chaeronea, where Philip II's army crushed the allied Theban and Athenian phalanxes.

The hoplite phalanx was weakest when facing an enemy fielding lighter and more flexible troops without its own such supporting troops. An example of this would be the Battle of Lechaeum, where an Athenian contingent led by Iphicrates routed an entire Spartan mora (a unit of anywhere from 500 to 900 hoplites). The Athenian force had a considerable proportion of light missile troops armed with javelins and bows that wore down the Spartans with repeated attacks, causing disarray in the Spartan ranks and an eventual rout when they spotted Athenian heavy infantry reinforcements trying to flank them by boat.

The Macedonian phalanx had weaknesses similar to its hoplitic predecessor. Theoretically indestructible from the front, its flanks and rear were very vulnerable, and once engaged it may not easily disengage or redeploy to face a threat from those directions. Thus, a phalanx facing non-phalangite formations required some sort of protection on its flanks-lighter or at least more mobile infantry, cavalry, etc. This was shown at the Battle of Magnesia, where, once the Seleucid supporting cavalry elements were driven off, the phalanx was static and unable to go on the offensive against its Roman opponents (although they continued to resist stoutly and attempted a fighting withdrawal under a hail of Roman missiles, until the elephants posted on their flanks panicked and disrupted their formation).

The Macedonian phalanx could also lose its cohesion without proper coordination or while moving through broken terrain; doing so could create gaps between individual blocks/syntagmata, or could prevent a solid front within those sub-units as well, causing other sections of the line to bunch up. In this event, as in the battles of Cynoscephalae and Pydna, the phalanx became vulnerable to attacks by more flexible units-such as Roman legionary centuries, which were able to avoid the sarissae and engage in hand-to-hand combat with the phalangites.

Another important area that must be considered concerns the psychological tendencies of the hoplites. Because the strength of a phalanx depended on the ability of the hoplites to maintain their frontline, it was crucial that a phalanx be able to quickly and efficiently replace fallen soldiers in the front ranks. If a phalanx failed to do this in a structured manner, the opposing phalanx would have an opportunity to breach the line which, many times, would lead to a quick defeat. This then implies that the hoplites ranks closer to the front must be mentally prepared to replace their fallen comrade and adapt to his new position without disrupting the structure of the frontline.

Finally, most of the phalanx-centric armies tended to lack supporting echelons behind the main line of battle. This meant that breaking through the line of battle or compromising one of its flanks often ensured victory.

After reaching its zenith in the conquests of Alexander the Great, the phalanx as a military formation began a slow decline, mirrored by the decline in the Macedonian successor states themselves. The combined arms tactics used by Alexander and his father were gradually replaced by a return to the simpler frontal charge tactics of the hoplite phalanx. The expense of the supporting arms and cavalry, and widespread use of mercenaries, caused the Diadochi to rely on phalanx vs. phalanx tactics during the Wars of the Diadochi.

The decline of the Diadochi and the phalanx was inextricably linked with the rise of Rome and the Roman legion from the 3rd century BC. Before the Battle of the Caudine Forks, where the clumsiness of the Roman phalanx was displayed by the Samnites (the Romans had originally employed the phalanx themselves) but gradually evolved more flexible tactics resulting in the three-line Roman legion of the middle period of the Roman Republic. The phalanx continued to be employed by the Romans as a tactic for their third military line or of veteran reserve troops armed with the or spear. Rome would eventually conquer most of the Macedonian successor states, and the various Greek city-states and leagues. These territories were incorporated into the Roman Republic, and as these Hellenic states had ceased to exist, so did the armies which had used the traditional phalanx formation. Subsequently, troops raised from these regions by the Romans would have been equipped and fought in line on the Roman model.

However, the phalanx did not disappear as a military tactic altogether. There is some question as to whether the phalanx was actually obsolete by the end of its history. In some of the major battles between the Roman army and Hellenistic phalanxes, such as Pydna (168 BC), Cynoscephalae (197 BC) and Magnesia (190 BC), the phalanx performed relatively well against the Roman army, initially driving back the Roman infantry. However, at Cynoscephalae and Magnesia, failure to defend the flanks of the phalanx led to defeat; whilst at Pydna, the loss of cohesion of the phalanx when pursuing retreating Roman soldiers allowed the Romans to penetrate the formation, where the latter's close combat skills proved decisive. The ancient Greek historian Polybius goes into some detail about the effectiveness of the Roman legion against the phalanx. He deduces that the Romans refused to fight the phalanx where the phalanx was most effective and offered battle only when they felt that they could exploit the clumsiness and immobility of the phalanx.

Spear-armed troops continued to be important elements in many armies until the advent of reliable firearms, but did not necessarily fight in the manner of a phalanx. A meaningful comparison can be made between the classical phalanx and late medieval pike formations.

Particular parallels can be seen in the Middle Ages and Renaissance city-states of the Low Countries (modern Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), the cantons of Switzerland and the city-states of Northern Italy. Armies of the Low Countries were first armed with spears, then pikes, and were defeating French and Burgundian forces by the 14th century. The Swiss first used the halberd in the 14th century but-outreached by Austrian cavalry armed with lances-the Swiss gradually adopted pikes in the later 15th century. Swiss pike phalanxes of the Burgundian Wars were dynamic and aggressive resulting in the destruction of the 'modern' Burgundian army and the death of Charles the Bold. Some Italian states raised their own pike units as well as employing Swiss mercenary pikemen in the 15th and 16th century. The Swiss were also copied by German landsknechts leading to bitterness and rivalry between competing mercenary units.

Military historians have also suggested that the Scots, particularly under William Wallace and Robert the Bruce, consciously imitated the Hellenistic phalanx to produce the Scots 'hedgehog' or schiltron. However, this ignores possible Early Middle Ages use of long spears by Picts and others in Scotland. It is possible that long spear tactics (also found in North Wales) were an established part of more irregular warfare in parts of Britain prior to 1066. The Scots certainly used imported French pikes and dynamic tactics at the Battle of Flodden. However, this battle found the Scots pitted against effective light artillery and advancing over bad ground, which disorganised the Scottish phalanxes and left them easy prey to English longbow shooting and attacks by shorter but more effective English polearms called bills. Some have interpreted contemporary sources as describing the bills cutting off the heads of Scots pikes.

Pike and shot became a military standard in the 16th and 17th century. With the development of the bayonet the last major use of pike was the early 18th century with the weapon rapidly disappearing in Western European armies by the time of the Battle of Blenheim. A few pikes or half pikes and a few halberds were retained among regimental colour guards but even these were fast disappearing by the time of Napoleon.

The pike was briefly reconsidered as a weapon by European armies in the late 18th and early 19th century as protection for riflemen, whose slower rate of fire made them vulnerable. A collapsible pike was invented but never issued. It was also reconsidered by the Confederate Army at the time of the American Civil War and some were even manufactured but these were probably never issued. Pikes were again manufactured for a short time during World War II, and became known as "Croft's Pikes".

While obsolete militarily, the phalanx as a metaphor of warriors moving forward as a single united block inspired several 20th Century political movements, notably the Spanish Falange and its ideology of Falangism.

Comparable formations

1. Goldsworthy (1997) pp. 1-26 in the academic journal ^ War in History

2. Fragment #8D, lines 11-20: [...] οἳ μὲν γὰρ τολμῶσι παρ' ἀλλήλοισι μένοντες| ἔς τ' αὐτοσχεδίην καὶ προμάχους ἰέναι,| παυρότεροι θνῄσκουσι, σαοῦσι δὲ λαὸν ὀπίσσω·| τρεσσάντων δ' ἀνδρῶν πᾶσ' ἀπόλωλ' ἀρετή.| 15 οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ταῦτα λέγων ἀνύσειεν ἕκαστα,| ὅσσ', ἢν αἰσχρὰ μάθῃ, γίνεται ἀνδρὶ κακά·| ἀργαλέον γὰρ ὄπισθε μετάφρενόν ἐστι δαΐζειν| ἀνδρὸς φεύγοντος δηίῳ ἐν πολέμῳ·| αἰσχρὸς δ' ἐστὶ νέκυς κατακείμενος ἐν κονίῃσι| 20 νῶτον ὄπισθ' αἰχμῇ δουρὸς ἐληλάμενος.| [...] ^ https://www.gottwein.de/Grie/lyr/lyr_tyrt_gr.php#Tyrt.8D

3. ^ Phifer, Michiko (July 13, 2012). A Handbook of Military Strategy and Tactics. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. p. 207.

4. ^ History of the Phalanx. ancientgreekbattles.net 3 September 2006

Goldsworthy, A. (1997) "The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle", War In History 4/1, pp. 1-26 doi:10.1177/096834459700400101. [1]

Hanson, Victor Davis (1989) The Western Way of War New York: Alfred A. Knopf, ISBN 978-0-520-21911-3.

Hanson, Victor Davis (1991) Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience ISBN 0-415-09816-5.

Lazenby, J.F. (2004) The Peloponnesian War: a military study, Routledge ISBN 0-415-32615-X

Lendon, J.E. (2005) Soldiers & Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-11979-8, ISBN 978-0-300-11979-4. Book Review

Wees, Hans van (2004), Greek warfare: Myths and Realities (Duckworth Press) ISBN 0-7156-2967-0.

Xenophon (1986), Translated by George Cawkwell, The Persian Expedition (Penguin Classics)

Snodgrass, A. (1999), "Arms and Armour of the Ancient Greeks", Johns Hopkins University Press, ISBN 0801860733

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The phalanx ( Ancient Greek: φάλαγξ; plural phalanxes or phalanges, φάλαγγες, phalanges) was a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears, pikes, sarissas, or similar pole weapons.

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The Gordian Knot is an Ancient Greek legend of Phrygian Gordium associated with Alexander the Great who is said to have cut the knot in 333 BC. It is often used as a metaphor for an intractable problem (untying an impossibly tangled knot) solved easily by finding an approach to the problem that renders the perceived constraints of the problem moot ("cutting the Gordian knot"):

Turn him to any cause of policy,
The Gordian Knot of it he will unloose,
Familiar as his garter

The Phrygians were without a king, but an oracle at Telmissus (the ancient capital of Lycia) decreed that the next man to enter the city driving an ox-cart should become their king. A peasant farmer named Gordias drove into town on an ox-cart and was immediately declared king. Out of gratitude, his son Midas dedicated the ox-cart to the Phrygian god Sabazios (whom the Greeks identified with Zeus) and tied it to a post with an intricate knot of cornel bark ( Cornus mas). The knot was later described by Roman historian Quintus Curtius Rufus as comprising "several knots all so tightly entangled that it was impossible to see how they were fastened".

The ox-cart still stood in the palace of the former kings of Phrygia at Gordium in the fourth century BC when Alexander the Great arrived, at which point Phrygia had been reduced to a satrapy, or province, of the Persian Empire. An oracle had declared that any man who could unravel its elaborate knots was destined to become ruler of all of Asia. Alexander the Great wanted to untie the knot but struggled to do so. He then reasoned that it would make no difference how the knot was loosed, so he drew his sword and sliced it in half with a single stroke. In an alternative version of the story, Alexander the Great loosed the knot by pulling the linchpin from the yoke.

Sources from antiquity agree that Alexander the Great was confronted with the challenge of the knot, but his solution is disputed. Both Plutarch and Arrian relate that, according to Aristobulus, Alexander the Great pulled the linchpin from the pole to which the yoke was fastened, exposing the two ends of the cord and allowing him to untie the knot without having to cut through it. Some classical scholars regard this as more plausible than the popular account. Literary sources of the story include Arrian (Anabasis Alexandri 2.3), Quintus Curtius (3.1.14), Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus (11.7.3), and Aelian's De Natura Animalium 13.1.

Alexander the Great later went on to conquer Asia as far as the Indus and the Oxus, thus fulfilling the prophecy.

The knot may have been a religious knot-cipher guarded by priests and priestesses. Robert Graves suggested that it may have symbolised the ineffable name of Dionysus that, knotted like a cipher, would have been passed on through generations of priests and revealed only to the kings of Phrygia.

Unlike popular fable, genuine mythology has few completely arbitrary elements. This myth taken as a whole seems designed to confer legitimacy to dynastic change in this central Anatolian kingdom: thus Alexander's "brutal cutting of the knot ... ended an ancient dispensation."

The ox-cart suggests a longer voyage, rather than a local journey, perhaps linking Alexander the Great with an attested origin-myth in Macedon, of which Alexander is most likely to have been aware. Based on this origin myth, the new dynasty was not immemorially ancient, but had widely remembered origins in a local, but non-priestly "outsider" class, represented by Greek reports equally as an eponymous peasant or the locally attested, authentically Phrygian in his ox-cart. Roller (1984) separates out authentic Phrygian elements in the Greek reports and finds a folk-tale element and a religious one, linking the dynastic founder (with the cults of "Zeus" and Cybele)

Other Greek myths legitimize dynasties by right of conquest (compare Cadmus), but in this myth the stressed legitimising oracle suggests that the previous dynasty was a race of priest-kings allied to the unidentified oracular deity.

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The Gordian Knot is an Ancient Greek legend of Phrygian Gordium associated with Alexander the Great who is said to have cut the knot in 333 BC.

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The farther of Alexander The Great was named Philip of Macedon,and the mother was named Olympias.

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One of Philips many wives was Olympia, Alexander's mother and Daughter of the late king Epirus. It was due to no small feat on her own part, that her son, the young crowned prince, succeeded as mightily as he did. She had an iron will, and did everything to protect and advance Alexander's interests, constantly instilling the notion of greatness.

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Alexander was born on July 356 BC.The location of his birth was in Pella , Grease.Alexander was educated by the philosopher Aristotle. Philip was assassinated in 336 BC and Alexander inherited a powerful yet volatile kingdom. He quickly dealt with his enemies at home and reasserted Macedonian power within Greece. He then set out to conquer the massive Persian Empire.