# data[].attributes.body
Article examines Myanmar's social and political transition from ethnic nationalist armed leaders to a democratic state

# data[].attributes.body
Useful to read in order to understand the power struggles and tension over the hoarding of resources between military armed groups and ethnic minorities

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Mutual distrust, power struggles and tension over the hoarding of resources, including gold, gems and timber, have characterized the long history between the rulers of Myanmar - primarily of Burman background - and the many other smaller ethnic groups that comprise this Southeast Asian nation of more than 50 million.

According to the last official census in 1983, the Burman accounted for 69 percent of the country's population.

Each ethnic group regards the protection of their individual languages, customs, culture and natural resources important to their national identity. At the same time, the government has steadfastly believed that a "crisis of the minorities" - internal conflict among Myanmar's sizable minority communities, which make up one-third of the population - could undermine the country's stability.

Now, a shift in government discourse and a recent string of cautious ceasefires have prompted people to wonder whether peace will last this time and what it will bring to participants in the longstanding civil conflicts, how it will affect the regional refugee crisis, and what it will mean for the recent relaxation of restrictions and a more open Myanmar.

Until the 2010 presidential election, the military government had shown few concrete signs of addressing ethnic grievances, resorting instead to brutal crackdowns, which earned international rebuke and sanctions from potential donors. IRIN offers a brief overview of the complex ethnic mix that Myanmar hopes to meld into a flourishing modern state.

Main armed groups

Karen - The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) took up arms in 1949, almost immediately after the British left Myanmar, making it one of the oldest rebel armies in the world. The KNLA is the military wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).

Kachin - In 1961, after a coup led by General Ne Win - variously prime minister, head of state and chairman of the ruling party from 1958 until 1988 - the Kachin rebels formed the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the military wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO).

Karenni - The Karenni Army (KA) was created after the Burmese government incorporated Kayah State into the Union of Burma in 1951. Karenni leaders argued they had not agreed to incorporation. The KA is the military wing for the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).

Chin - The Chin National Front (CNF) was founded in March 1988 as a coalition of several Chin opposition groups to push for greater autonomy.

Mon - The New State Mon Party (NSMP) established an armed wing that has fought the government since 1949, when military forces entered Mon territory.

Rhakine - The Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) was first set up with the help of the KNU in the 1950s but it became defunct after most of its leaders were arrested. In the 1970s it reassembled, but is still one of the smallest ethnic armies.

Shan - The Shan State Army (SSA) was formed in 1964 as Burmese military began to move into Shan State. The SSA later split into two factions, creating the Shan State Army-North, which signed a ceasefire with the government in 1964, and the Shan State Army-South, which continued to fight the state until an initial ceasefire in December 2011.

Wa - The United Wa State Army (USWA), created after the fall of the Community Party Burma in 1989, is one of the country's most powerful ethnic armies and receives military resources, infrastructure and support from neighbouring China.

Splinter groups - As various leaders have left major armies and created new militias, some have signed ceasefires with the Burmese government and enjoyed freedom to trade with neighbouring countries, including the Karen (Democratic Buddhist Army, Karen Peace Council Kokang, Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army) and Kachin (New Democratic Army and Kachin Defence Army).

Why have they taken up arms?

Before British forces pulled out in 1947, they attempted to unite Myanmar's various "nations". With British officers as witnesses, many ethnic groups signed the Panglong Agreement, intended to be binding on the post-colonial administration, which would guarantee ethnic rights and self-determination, and the inclusion of minorities in the democratic process.

Aung San, a leader of the Burman ethnic group, who had led the country to independence (and was the father of current opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi), and leaders of the Shan, Kachin and Chin negotiated the agreement. However, Aung San was assassinated soon after and the Burmese military began its slow advance into the ethnic states to rule by force.

Many ethnic groups took up arms to protect their states from Burman rule, demanding autonomy, ethnic rights and an inclusive democracy.

Their demands have remained unchanged. According to Lama Gum Hpan, a KIO "Central Committee" member, the Kachin fighters have always stood by the Panglong Agreement. "To this day we wish for the Burmese government to honour the agreements made in 1947," he told IRIN.

In the run-up to the 2010 elections of the nominally civilian government in power, a proposal for a border guard force was drafted, which aimed to include ethnic groups in the state army - and called for their disarmament.

Nearly all the ethnic armies refused and several ceasefires faltered.

Why have ceasefires failed?

Burmese dissident media have compiled a list of ceasefires dating back more than two decades between the government and major rebel groups as well as splinter movements.

Recent peace deals - still in their early stages - have been inked: the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) signed in December 2011, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) in February 2012.

This has not stopped clashes. The Burmese government has blamed persisting army incursions on communication problems between the seat of government in Nay Pyi Daw and frontline troops at least 500km away. The central government ordered its troops to halt fighting on 12 December 2011 but a number are still firing.

"This is war. They [ Karen rebels] will continue to fight until they can see that the Burmese government is actually trying to achieve peace," said David Tackapaw, "foreign minister" for the KNU.

He maintains that historically there has been "a lack of genuine will by the Burmese government to listen to the KNU's demands for ethnic rights and self determination for the Karen people", and said they are dealing with a military that sees the ethnic problem as a military issue, not a political issue.

Lama Gum Hpan, of the Kachin Independence Organization, said although the government has recently made overtures, the rulers are not interested in finding a political solution to the problem. "We are not interested in ceasefires; we want to find long-lasting and durable solutions to the ethnic oppression in this country."

In June 2011, a 17-year ceasefire between the two sides collapsed following efforts by the government to incorporate numerous armed ethnic groups into a single border guard force.

Will current talks succeed?

Despite faltering peace on the frontlines, rebel leaders from the Myanmar's ethnic armies have noted change in the government's willingness to engage.

In a recent speech to parliament reported in local media, Myanmar President Thein Sein said long-time enemies have the same goal: "The expectation of ethnic groups is to get equal rights for all. Equal standards are also the wish of our government."

Discussing the ongoing conflict with the Kachin, Thein Sein said: "Fighting will not stop by pointing the finger of blame at each other. Ceasefires are first needed on both sides for political dialogue... We all have to work so our ethnic youths who held guns stand tall holding laptops."

Analysts note most ceasefires are in nascent stages and have a long way to go, but if the government can control its military, a thus-far elusive peace with ethnic rebels is within reach.

Tackapaw, of the Karen National Union, said ceasefires have been negotiated too quickly and with too few conditions to guarantee long-term change.

What about the region's refugees?

According to the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), due to conflict more than 400,000 people are believed to be living in internal displacement in the southeast, while some 150,000 refugees, asylum seekers and others fleeing violence in Myanmar are in camps in Thailand.

If the ceasefires hold, many may return to Myanmar, Sally Thompson, the TBBC's executive director, said. "If the current momentum of political reforms continues, then it is unlikely that the camps will still be open in five years."

Many refugees across nine camps along the 1800km-long border Thai-Burmese border told IRIN it is still too early to tell if recent respites in the conflict will last long enough for them to return home. Saw Plu, a Karen elder, said he believed the Myanmar government was "playing a trick", and fighting will inevitably erupt again. Yet despite their concerns, the vast majority of refugees voiced their desire to go home and are waiting for signs of a "genuine" peace.

"Ceasefires are only the beginning of a process of peace building and national reconciliation - there must be political dialogue," said Thompson. "It is a long road... to build trust after 60 years of conflict. The government will have to deliver significant improvements in the daily lives of people in former conflict areas to demonstrate their sincerity."

If the ceasefires do not last and fighting erupts again, more refugees will flood into Thailand, she warned. In Kachin State, where conflict has continued in some regions since June 2010, and peace efforts have failed, Burmese refugees are flooding to neighbouring China.

UN estimates put the number of people now in Kachin after being displaced by conflict at more than 50,000, with several thousand more in China.

Julia Marip, from the Thailand-based Kachin Women's Organization, said tens of thousands have been displaced by violence. "The situation is really bad here. The Burmese government has not allowed INGO[international NGO] access to the Kachin refugees in our areas. If a ceasefire agreement is not made soon, the refugee situation will become a major crisis."

What will happen if the country is more open?

Most foreign investors - with the notable exception of China - have long been reticent to do business in Myanmar because of internal conflicts and sanctions imposed by a number of Western countries.

If the government holds free and fair elections in April 2012, and can achieve lasting ceasefires with rebel armies, donors have held out the possibility of easing sanctions, which may open resource-rich areas inhabited by ethnic minorities for investment.

Ethnic leaders have voiced fears such development may rush ahead without taking their wishes into account.

"We know that one of the biggest incentives to find peace with ethnics is to get more foreign investment in," said Tackapaw. "We have to make sure that proper consultation is done with the civilians, and everything is done in a sustainable manner which benefits the ethnic civilians, not just the government and foreign investors."

wg/pt/he

For more, visit IRIN's in-depth: What next for Myanmar?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Mutual distrust, power struggles and tension over the hoarding of resources, including gold, gems and timber, have characterized the long history between the rulers of Myanmar - primarily of Burman background - and the many other smaller ethnic groups that comprise this Southeast Asian nation of more than 50 million.

# data[].attributes.headline
Military government vs ethnic groups on Myanmar's borders

# data[].attributes.subject
Military government vs ethnic groups on Myanmar's borders

# data[].attributes.body
A summary of a seminar involving various ethnic groups of Myanmar as well as political armed opposition members

# data[].attributes.body
The power struggle within Myanmar's ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has drawn concerns from local critics over the military's influence and its aim to play a dominant role even as the country prepares for its first democratic election.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
THE POWER struggle within Myanmar's ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has drawn concerns from local critics over the military's influence and its aim to play a dominant role even as the country prepares for its first democratic election.

Many of the critics expressed their views on Facebook last week, following the high-level reshuffle of the party that saw the dismissal of Thura Shwe Mann as chairman.

On his page, Yan Myo Thein, a political commentator/writer, said: "The current political situation in Myanmar is definitely not good. There are only two possibilities - to remain the same or to get worse. For me, in terms of percentage, the possibility is 50:50."

He believes that the reshuffle could have impacts on the upcoming election and envisages the possibility of the election being postponed, given that USDP was a military association that transformed into a political party. He pointed out that high-ranking military officials, who are accustomed to control, had created the USDP.

Larry Jagan, a specialist on Myanmar affairs and a freelance journalist, said the conflicts have been brewing for a while, and upon exploding, they could lead to the start of a "night of long knives" - referring to the turning point that established Adolf Hitler as "supreme judge of people".

"The coup shows Myanmar's political scene remains murky and rooted in the past. It does not bode well for its democratic transition," he said.

Until August 13, Shwe Mann was hailed as President Thein Sein's favourite candidate. When the latter assumed the presidency in 2011, he handed the chairmanship to Shwe Mann.

Though Shwe Mann remains union parliament speaker until the election, his dismissal indicates that he will not succeed Thein Sein. Over the past few years, Shwe Mann visited several countries and openly announced his readiness to work with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in moving the country forward. Yet, he managed to anger the military when he began backing the amendment of the 2008 Constitution. The military said he betrayed national and military interests.

Maybe the last straw for the military was the list of election candidates. At a meeting with the candidates on , Shwe Mann pointed out that some of them had taken bribes and abused their power. He also said that many of them had no knowledge or intention to abide by electoral laws, and some had not even bothered to speak to their constituents.

Among the candidates is Soe Thein, minister for the president's office, who will run as an independent candidate for the Upper House in Bawlakhe constituency, Kayah State. There are only around 5,000 eligible voters in the constituency, and he reportedly gave them gifts during a recent visit.

A soldier from the Bawlakhe Battalion said: "In the battalion, nobody said who we should vote for. I will vote for the person who will boost regional development. When Soe Thein visited Bawlakhe, he gave Sky Net satellite receivers to our families. I took one. A Soe Thein's football trophy is being planned, with the winners getting Ks3 million."

In the 2010 election, Soe Thein was elected in Kyunsu, Tanintharyi Region.

The party's candidate list includes 59 military officers for 26 seats for the upper and lower houses and 33 seats for regional and state parliaments. Fifty union ministers and deputy ministers will fight for 46 seats in Lower and Upper houses and four regional seats.

Among them is Hla Htay Win, the former supreme commander.

"I have performed duties in the defence and security sector. But I was also involved in national politics and will continue to serve the country. I want to perform duties to help social affairs, peace and stability," the retired general announced on August 12.

Though Thein Sein, 70, has not explicitly said he will run in the elections, he has indicated in interviews that he was open to the idea of a second term if asked.

At on August 12, before Shwe Mann lost his chairmanship, security forces surrounded the party's headquarters in Nay Pyi Taw.

Thura Zaw, a freelance political writer, wrote on Facebook that this move proved that Thein Sein had made this move to ensure he is made president again.

"Behind this reshuffle, there must have been some important points such as reconciliation between USDP and Tatmadaw [Myanmar armed forces] and the decision to give a second term to President Thein Sein. We can assume that the event led to the reestablishment of good communication between the party and the military. Given the very high possibility of winning 166 votes from military representatives, USDP led by Thein Sein will try to win another 167 places in the upcoming election. If this is true, then the new president after the elections will definitely be Thein Sein."

The government also plans to put military officers in government posts, though the move to place more officers in director general posts at the Health Ministry was called off last week after doctors launched a social-media campaign called "Black Ribbon".

"I disagree with the transfer of the officers. Everybody has a chance to freely criticise the ministry's plan," Dr Khin Maung Lwin, rector of the University of Medicine in Mandalay, said on Facebook. He was slamming the decision of giving jobs in civilian hospitals and universities to military personnel.

The Mandalay medical student union condemned these appointments, saying these jobs should be given to civilian doctors and intellectuals. The Myanmar Medical Association and teachers were also urged to condemn the move and join the Black Ribbon movement.

, a day after Shwe Mann's dismissal, the party was made to stop publishing Union Daily, which was considered his mouthpiece. The staff was not notified in advance.

"Factionalism is the main problem in an immature democratic transition. Proper solution cannot be found even though we know what the problem is. Even though we know the solution, we do not have enough capacity to sort it out. In this way, the discovery of a genuine democracy is like a palace in the dreams. There are a lot of lessons to be learned from other countries in democratic transition which cannot go ahead to the level of 'genuine' democracy," Min Zaw Oo, an exiled political commentator, wrote on Facebook.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Myanmar critics wary of overwhelming military power - The Nation

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
THE POWER struggle within Myanmar's ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has drawn concerns from local critics over the military's influence and its aim to play a dominant role even as the country prepares for its first democratic election.

# data[].attributes.headline
Myanmar power struggle: ruling party chief ousted, security forces surround ruling party headquarters

# data[].attributes.subject
Myanmar power struggle: ruling party chief ousted, security forces surround ruling party headquarters

# data[].attributes.body
Explains how various government parties follow rare discord within the establishment over the role of the military, which handed power to a semi-civilian government in 2011 but retains an effective veto over the political system.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Updated August 13, 2015 19:41:38

Myanmar's powerful ruling party chief Thura U Shwe Mann has been ousted from his post, according to party members, after losing a power struggle with president Thein Sein three months before a general election.

Security forces surrounded the headquarters of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the capital, Naypyitaw, late on Wednesday and prevented members there from leaving.

Family members said Mr Shwe Mann was at home in Naypyitaw when the soldiers took control of the USDP compound, where party members were hosting a meeting without him.

Mr Shwe Mann's ousting from the party follows rare discord within the establishment over the role of the military, which handed power to a semi-civilian government in 2011 but retains an effective veto over the political system.

"Shwe Mann isn't the chairman of the party anymore," said a USDP member of parliament.

"He's in good health and at home now."

Mr Shwe Mann still holds the position of speaker of parliament, the source said, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject, but has been replaced as party chairman by Htay Oo, who will also retain his position as vice chairman.

Mr Htay Oo is an ally of president Thein Sein.

Meanwhile, secretary general Maung Maung Thein, a supporter of Mr Shwe Mann, was also ousted from his post in a phone call he took from home.

He is to be replaced by one of the president's closest aides Tin Naing Thein, a senior party official said.

Tension rose between the president and Mr Shwe Mann, both former top military officers, over the selection of candidates for the November election, party sources said earlier.

The two are old rivals and both have suggested they would accept the job of president after the November 8 parliamentary election.

Security forces surround headquarters for private meeting

Late on Wednesday, several trucks of soldiers and police officers arrived at the ruling party's headquarters.

After the security forces took control of the compound, Soe Tha, one of the founders of the USDP, and Htay Oo led a late-night meeting of senior party officials that lasted into the early hours of Thursday, party members said.

Both men are close to the president.

Mr Shwe Mann and high-ranking party members considered to belong to his faction in the USDP were not present at the meeting, the sources said.

The security forces left after the meeting concluded at around 2:30am, sources said.

"What I heard ... was that there was a lot of reorganisation in the party last night," said government spokesman Ye Htut, who said he could not give further details as he is not a member of the party.

Mr Shwe Mann was a presidential hopeful when the military handed over power to a semi-civilian government after 49 years of rule in 2011.

Despite the establishment of the new government, the military has resisted recent efforts to introduce constitutional amendments to loosen its grip.

The USDP is comprised largely of former military officers and was created from a social movement set up by the former junta.

The constitution reserves 25 per cent of seats in parliament for unelected military officers.

Changes to the constitution require the support of at least 75 per cent of lawmakers, giving the military an effective veto over changes.

An amendment that would have seen the threshold of support lowered to 70 per cent failed, as expected, to gain enough support with lawmakers in a June vote.
Reuters
First posted August 13, 2015 13:05:18

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Myanmar ruling party chief ousted in power struggle with president

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Updated August 13, 2015 19:41:38 Myanmar's powerful ruling party chief Thura U Shwe Mann has been ousted from his post, according to party members, after losing a power struggle with president Thein Sein three months before a general election.

# data[].attributes.body
Informative data depicting Myanmar's military strength spread out through military equipment, manpower and attrition that drive the military power.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Each military power detailed on GlobalFirepower.com is judged on individual, as well as some collective, factors when it comes to waging a prolonged campaign against another party. The numbers available for a given nation are calculated through an in-house formula that produces the PwrIndx (PowerIndex) score. This is used to establish the final GFP ranking. Some values presented are estimates when official numbers are not available. This is particularly notable for closed-off nations such as North Korea. Otherwise official/semi-official reporting numbers are used and bonuses / penalties are added in to further refine the list from year-to-year. Also consider viewing the notes at the bottom of this entry.

©2006- www.GlobalFirepower.com. No reproduction of this content is permitted.

Myanmar (MYA) Myanmar is ranked 35 (out of 136) out of the countries currently considered for the annual GFP review. It holds a
PwrIndx rating of 0.6648. (0.0000 being perfect)

Manpower - Going beyond military equipment totals and perceived fighting strength is the actual manpower that makes up a given military force. Wars, particularly those with high attrition, traditionally favor those with more manpower.

Air Power - Includes both fixed-wing and rotary-wing (helicopter) aircraft from all branches of service (Air Force, Navy, Army). Air power is just one important component of a modern military force. Attack Aircraft represent both fixed-wing and dedicated forms as well as light strike types (some basic and advanced trainers are designed from the outset to fulfill this role). Some fighter warplanes can double as attack types (as in Multirole Fighters). Transport and Trainer aircraft include both fixed-wing and rotary-wing types. The more versatility an air service can promote, the better its in-the-field experience can be. EXTERNAL LINK: Aircraft throughout the military history of Myanmar

Army Strength - Tank value includes Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and light tanks (a few global operators still rely on such types) as well as those vehicles considered "tank destroyers" (whether wheeled or tracked). There is no distinction made between all-wheel and track-and-wheel designs. Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) value includes Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) as well as Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) as these defined battlefield roles become more-and-more blurred over time. EXTERNAL LINK: Armor and Artillery throughout the military history of Myanmar

Navy Strength - Aircraft Carrier value includes both traditional aircraft carriers as well as "helicopter carrier" warships (the latter growing in popularity). Cruisers are no longer tracked due to their declining value on the world stage. Submarine values includes both diesel-electric and nuclear-powered types and no distinction is made between conventional-attack and nuclear-attack models. Total Naval Assets is not simply a sum of the presented navy ship category values but instead it includes ALL types such as auxiliary vessels (not tracked individually by GFP). EXTERNAL LINK: Warships and Submarines throughout the military history of Myanmar

Natural Resources (Petroleum) - Oil remains the lifeblood of waging war and is as valuable as any one weapon system. As such, it is included as a primary factor in the GFP ranking covered by the values Oil Production, Oil Consumption, and Proven Oil Reserves. High oil consumption can offset oil production/proven reserves and is added as a penalty. Totals are shown as BBL/DY = Barrels Per Day.

Logistics - War is as much a battle of logistics - that is moving man and machine from Point A to Point B - as it is direct combat against one's foe. The GFP ranking in regards to logistics encompasses labor power, merchant strength, and general transportation capabilities of both goods and services. These can all be used to support wartime industry.

Finance - Waging a prolonged campaign goes beyond simple "strength-in-numbers" and relies heavily on many factors - chiefly financing. As such, the GFP ranking takes into account a nation's financial health on the world stage. All values presented in USD ($).

Geography - The presented geographical-related values below primarily figure into a defensive-minded war (i.e. invasion) and suits the defender. However, these values can also aid a power when responding to such an act by being able to move men, machines, and supplies from depots to the front line.

There are many sources used by GlobalFirepower.com to report the finalized GFP ranking. These include, but are not limited to, CIA.gov, the CIA World Factbook, wikipedia.com, public domain print and media sources as well as industry source contributions. Some values may be estimated when official sources are lacking.

NOTES:
The values showcased above are all considered for the final annual GFP ranking. This end-value is recognized as the "Power Index" (abbrv: "PwrIndx"). PwrIndx scores are judged against a perfect value of "0.0000" which is realistically unattainable due to the number of factors considered per country. Balance is ultimately the key to success - a large, strong fighting force across land, sea, and air backed by a resilient economy and defensible territory along with an efficient infrastructure - such qualities used to round out a particular nation's total fighting strength on paper; in this way it is simply not enough to field a fighting force of 10 million men, 20,000 tanks, or lead the world in oil production for there are many other factors at play in war management.

As stated elsewhere on this site, each nation's final ranking also carries with it bonuses and penalties assessed as needed. Landlocked nations (ex: Austria) are not penalized for lack of a standing navy - though they may suffer a penalty for not maintaining a sizeable Merchant Marine force.

It bears mention that nuclear weapons are NOT taken into account for this listing but those nations recognized (and suspected) as nuclear-capable are given a bonus. Powers are mainly based on conventional weaponry in inventory as well as other factors such as economic strength, border size, self-sustainability (in regards to wartime resources such as oil), water access etc... We have found that this collective approach produces a list that can be useful in ranking the various global military powers.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Each military power detailed on GlobalFirepower.com is judged on individual, as well as some collective, factors when it comes to waging a prolonged campaign against another party. The numbers available for a given nation are calculated through an in-house formula that produces the PwrIndx (PowerIndex) score.

# data[].attributes.body
The transformation of Myanmar’s political system was completely designed and implemented by the previous military regime.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Author: Adam P. MacDonald, Halifax

The transformation of Myanmar's political system was completely designed and implemented by the previous military regime. But the military has by and large withdrawn from governing the day-to-day affairs of the state since the transfer of power in 2011 to the Union of Solidarity and Development (USDP) government, a close ally principally comprised of former officers. The exact rationale underpinning this move is uncertain; they were not forced out by overwhelming international pressure, internal strife or defeat in war. The senior military leadership, specifically Than Shwe, simply decided to enact such changes, and then proceeded with their own resignations.

While initial motivations are difficult to discern, what is now important is determining the present military leadership's views on their roles, responsibilities and rights in the new political system. Specific constitutional conditions combined with the military's behaviour and official discourse are indicative of four main interests they wish to preserve, regardless of other changes to the state and society. First, the military wants to maintain institutional autonomy to govern its affairs, away from parliamentary or civilian oversight; second, it wants to retain exclusive control over its budget and, third, inhibit attempts to prosecute current and former military members. Finally, the military also wants to fence off certain policy domains, specifically security portfolios, from civilian input.

Constitutional stipulations and representation in Parliament and cabinet have fulfilled these objectives. This indicates that the original architects of Myanmar's political project wanted the military to remain a powerful, independent and autonomous entity. With these safeguards and protections in place, the military has stood by and allowed the reform process to evolve. Of course, the senior military leadership have emphasised the need for their continued political involvement, but only to interject selectively to protect the 'interests' of the state that conveniently coincide with their own idiosyncratic goals.

This is most apparent in the behaviour of military members of Parliament who have not drafted any legislation and only use their block voting power when their interests are at stake. For example, earlier this year the military obstructed parliamentary discussions about the sensitive issue of land seizures in ethnic areas. Senior military personnel have described their parliamentary role as one of a 'moderator', remaining politically neutral to ensure the process does not become dominated by one party and to guarantee that feuds between the executive do not become impossible to manage. This role, however, is increasingly seen as a major roadblock to further democratic reforms, specifically because of the persistent threat of civilian government subject to undue military influence. This paternalistic justification of their involvement also demonstrates continued mistrust of civilian authorities' ability to effectively run the state.

Regardless of who holds power, the military cannot keep these issues under its exclusive purview. The military's interests will affect the future of Myanmar's democratic project through their impact on other issues like electoral representation, ethnic inclusion, state building, and economic and social development. The maintenance of these military interests has the potential to impede several key aspects of President Thein Sein's reform agenda (not to mention that of the opposition National League for Democracy). Areas of particular concern include the large military budget allocation vis-à-vis other desperately underfunded priorities like health and education; the degree of freedom that military commanders enjoy in ethnic regions, sometimes in opposition to government direction ( evident in operations earlier this year in Kachin state), complicating the sustainability of cease-fires; ongoing military dealings with North Korea, which threaten newly developed and growing relations with the West; and the military's ability to restrict further constitutional reforms, specifically those aimed at allowing more citizens to enter the political realm.

In resolving these ongoing issues, it must be kept in mind that the military itself, like all of Myanmar's political actors, is an evolving entity. Supporting the continued retrenchment of the military from the political sphere, therefore, must be viewed over a long time projection in a series of gradual measures to secure its support of the political system - and not a particular government or regime. The issue most likely to threaten such initiatives is the potential prosecution of former and current military members, which could bind the USDP government and Tatmadaw closer together and delay further reforms. Reformers must constantly balance their pursuit of justice and the practical need of working with these powerful entities.

The military is not exiting the political landscape anytime soon, but unlike other authoritarian forms of government it has a legitimate place to retreat to in the new system - the military is an invaluable institution in most polities. The ascertaining of power by civilian authorities, therefore, is not dependent on the elimination of the Tatmadaw but on a process of gradual re-organisation. The reformers and the military presently may envisage contrasting end-states, particularly as to whether a military political role is required for a 'disciplined' democracy. But continued cooperation with civilian members in Parliament is an important development in creating avenues to build mutual trust and respect - demonstrating that change, even small, is underway.
Adam P. MacDonald is an independent researcher based in Halifax, Canada.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Author: Adam P. MacDonald, Halifax The transformation of Myanmar's political system was completely designed and implemented by the previous military regime. But the military has by and large withdrawn from governing the day-to-day affairs of the state since the transfer of power in 2011 to the Union of Solidarity and Development (USDP) government, a close ally principally comprised of former officers.

# data[].attributes.body
A report identifying Myanmar's contemporary internal security issues such as democratisation, modernising state institutions, market reforms,

in addition to a complex peace process, aimed at brokering a settlement between the Myanmar Government and the ethnic armed groups.

# data[].attributes.headline
Displaced from Kokang: The plight of Myanmar's IDPs

# data[].attributes.subject
Displaced from Kokang: The plight of Myanmar's IDPs

# data[].attributes.body
The desperate plight of the displaced in Kokang earlier this year. Useful to read as a means of understanding the human impact of borderland violence, which probably looks similar in other ethnic conflict zones in Myanmar.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Galay Ma and her husband, who were displaced by fighting in Myanmar's Kokang region, sit in a shelter at a Buddhist monastery in the Shan State town of Lashio. Photo by: Simon Lewis

Ongoing fighting in the northeast of Myanmar is making headlines as it threatens to spark a diplomatic incident with neighboring China. But the conflict may also be setting up a humanitarian crisis along a border to which international aid agencies have long struggled to gain access.

China has accused Myanmar's armed forces of dropping a bomb on its side of the border that killed four rural villagers and injured nine on March 13. Myanmar has denied the allegation, saying instead that the rebels it is fighting in the Kokang region of northern Shan State could have been responsible.

The incident marks the most serious spillover of the conflict that has raged since Feb. 9, with Myanmar deploying helicopter gunships and jets and claiming the rebel Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army also possesses heavy arms, including anti-aircraft weapons - but notably not aircraft.

With tens of thousands of people displaced or in areas affected by the fighting, international humanitarian actors face challenges accessing the area as their activities in both Myanmar and China are restricted.

The fighting sent tens of thousands of the ethnic Chinese Kokang population fleeing east across the border to China's Yunnan province. Meanwhile, more than 10,000 people, mostly migrant workers from other parts of Myanmar, have fled westward.

Some migrants, however, found themselves trapped by the fighting.

Galay Ma, a migrant worker from central Myanmar, said she and a group of almost 200 others were trapped in Kokang only weeks after arriving there to work on a sugar cane plantation. The plantation's Chinese owner fled immediately, but the workers were left to fend for themselves, she said.

According to Galay Ma, some MNDAA rebels came across the group, and escorted the workers to a main road, where they were left to be picked up by the Myanmar military. Eventually they were taken to the major northern Shan State town of Lashio, where she spoke at a Buddhist monastery housing internally displaced persons.

Kokang closed off - even to Red Cross

Aid workers say that small groups of displaced people are still finding their way out of the region each day. But international aid agencies were not operating in the region before the conflict, and have not been able to gain access since.

That has left the Myanmar government with a firm grip over information in the region, and meant that claims of human rights abuses against civilians cannot be verified.

Even the Myanmar Red Cross Society, which has close ties to the government and initially was helping to transport civilians away from the fighting, no longer has access after two convoys flagged with the Red Cross were attacked on the roads in the area. The government said rebels were responsible, and has declared a state of emergency, closing outside access to area completely and giving the military total legal authority over Kokang.

Even so, MRCS still tries to help as many IDPs as it could.

"We are continuing to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced people from the Kokang area, mostly in Lashio and Kunlong," MRCS spokeswoman Shwe Cin Myint told Devex.

Kunlong, a town just outside the Kokang region, is where the aid group is operating a camp to handle new refugees. That camp has received more than 7,000 IDPs since Feb. 11, and small numbers of people continue to arrive as of Feb. 17, she said. MRCS also has a presence in Laukkai, the main town in Kokang that saw pitched battles on its streets last month.

"We are in the community there [in Laukkai]," Shwe Cin Myint said. "Myanmar Red Cross local volunteers are based there and they are still providing some assistance."

The International Committee of the Red Cross has been supporting the unit as well, according to Michael O'Brien, a spokesman for the international organization's office in Yangon. ICRC was also to carry out an assessment trip, he said, with local staff able to travel as far as Kunlong.

"Our teams have included resident and expatriate health staff and we are endeavoring to see what we can do to assist," O'Brien told Devex.

Fears China might send back IDPs

The number of refugees who fled to China is unclear, and estimates have varied from 30,000 to more than 100,000.

Photographs published March 18 by the Chinese Communist Party-run People's Daily show rows of blue tents near the border provided by Chinese official aid agencies. Many refugees are also thought to be staying with local people in China.

"In the spirit of humanitarianism, China has provided the Myanmar refugees with some relief, including water and medical services, and put up tents for them in Lincang [in Yunnan province]," the People's Daily reported.

Observers believe that since most of the new refugees are part of the ethnic Han, Mandarin-speaking Kokang community, they are being treated well in China. There is considerable sympathy for their cause among Chinese, and on social media nationalist anger is being vented against China's government for not taking a stronger stance against Myanmar in the conflict.

But Kokang is not the only war-torn region of Myanmar to abut the Chinese border.

Myanmar's army has been fighting more than a dozen different ethnic armies at its peripheries since it gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. In the past four years, the most serious conflict - until last month - has been the war in the resource-rich northern Kachin State.

More than 7,000 ethnic Kachin refugees fled into China when a 17-year cease-fire between the Myanmar government and the Kachin Independence Army broke down in June 2011. But the following year, Chinese authorities reportedly forced the refugees back across the border, into an active war-zone.

Some fear that the new refugees from Kokang may meet a similar short-lived welcome in China if the region does not return to peace soon. If they are returned, they may face some of the same access difficulties experienced by the Kachin further north.

'Sustained, predictable and flexible access' needed

About 100,000 people are currently living in temporary camps, having been displaced from that conflict that has spread across Kachin State and into northern Shan State, pulling in other ethnic groups also fighting the government.

About half of the displaced are in border areas not under Myanmar government control, and therefore beyond the reach of many international aid agencies, some which have agreements with Myanmar but are not authorized to reach the camps and are not permitted to travel through China.

For the mostly Christian Kachin, religious organizations have stepped into the breach, with the Kachin Baptist Convention and the Catholic Church's Karuna Myanmar Social Services providing shelter, food and other supplies to IDP camps in both government- and rebel-controlled areas.

With access to the camps through China restricted, the United Nations until September 2014 sent regular missions to the border. But the so-called cross-line missions rely on the Myanmar government's approval, and for the past six months that approval was withheld. Tricky negotiations took place amid stalling nationwide cease-fire talks, with a major setback in November when a Myanmar army shell killed 23 cadets belonging to various ethnic armed groups at the Kachin rebel headquarters on the Chinese border at Laiza.

The convoys finally resumed March 12, according to the U.N.'s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, after the Myanmar government granted authorization for international U.N. and NGO staff to visit eight camps along the border before April 30.

"We very much welcome the opportunity to conduct these cross-line missions, as the authorization comes just in time for humanitarian organizations to assist with much-needed shelter repairs, water and sanitation work, and other preparations for the upcoming rainy season, which begins in May," Pierre Peron, OCHA's spokesman in Yangon, told Devex.

The government has not granted comprehensive access, however. The missions will not take in Laiza, where five camps house some 19,000 IDPs, according to data from the U.N.'s Myanmar Information Management Unit updated in February.

"While authorization for joint interagency convoys to Laiza has not been granted this time, some humanitarian organizations have had access to Laiza in recent months through bilateral authorizations with their respective line ministries," the OCHA official said.

Peron stressed that while physical aid is part of the missions' delivery, they also bring expertise and the opportunity to meet with IDP communities and assess their needs. Local NGOs - supported by international organizations - had been and would continue to provide the bulk of support to the border camps, he said, but the lack of international access "has resulted in gaps in the quality and quantity of the humanitarian response."

"More sustained, predictable and flexible access by humanitarian organizations to all affected communities in Kachin and northern Shan states is essential in order to adequately meet the needs of all people affected by the conflict," Peron concluded.
Is your organization working in conflict areas? What was your experience like delivering aid in areas with limited or restricted access? Let us know by leaving a comment below. Read more international development news online, and subscribe to The Development Newswire to receive the latest from the world's leading donors and decision-makers - emailed to you FREE every business day.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Displaced from Kokang: The plight of Myanmar's IDPs

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Fighting between government and rebel forces in the Kokang region of Myanmar's northern Shan State has led many migrants and locals in the area to seek refuge in neighboring states and across the border in China. With access severely restricted, how can aid groups help these IDPs?

# data[].attributes.headline
Why we need to worry about Burma’s extremist Ma Ba Tha monks

# data[].attributes.subject
Why we need to worry about Burma’s extremist Ma Ba Tha monks

# data[].attributes.body
Analysis of the nationalist Ma Ba Tha monks, who fiercely persecute other religions in Myanmar, especially Muslims. Interesting explanation of how this group was created from Myanmar's democracy, and how it poses a threat to it

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
One of the most concerning developments in any nascent democracy is the institutionalisation and mainstreaming of extremist ideologies. Countries undergoing political transitions are perhaps most susceptible to this, given that the conditions of early democratization - the jockeying of groups for power at a time when institutions are too weak to constrain those forces-are ripe for mass ideologies to take hold and proliferate. Groups can use more open media channels to manipulate nationalist sentiments, play on the public's fears of what democracy will bring, and spread new "truths" about the hostile intentions of elements within society. They assert values of tradition, and warn that change of any sort-whether it be new political parties gaining power, or the demographic make-up of society altering-is inherently threatening. In doing so they gain widespread popular support for policies or actions that in other contexts appear extremist, but are seen to be just responses to the prospect of change.

Burma (Myanmar) has not escaped this. The most visible playmaker in this arena is the Ma Ba Tha monk group, which grew out of the anti-Muslim 969 movement and now has offices across the country, staffed by both monks and civilians. This week it took it upon itself to expel a local NGO aiding flood victims in northern Burma on account of the fact that the NGO hadn't coordinated with Ma Ba Tha over relief operations. In the town of Kawlin where the NGO had been working, nearly 50,000 people have been affected by the flood and therefore urgently require this assistance.

But what is perhaps more concerning than Ma Ba Tha's actions - to deny aid to those who need it - is that it was able to do so with such ease; that it now has the confidence to wield authority in such a manner. That confidence doesn't emerge from thin air - it requires the tacit backing, or indeed cowering, of elements within the state and the support of a sizeable chunk of the population. Several years ago Ma Ba Tha may not have netted such a quick result in Kawlin, but over time it has been able to build, brick by brick, a formidable institution with the power to steer debates in parliament and cajole MPs into backing discriminatory and outwardly anti-democratic laws that its members themselves crafted. It preaches an exclusionary brand of nationalism that has found widespread support because it ties the fate of the country to the fate of Buddhism, so that anyone not supportive of Buddhism - namely, other religions - doesn't support the national project and, ergo, threatens Burma and those within it. It is fear-mongering of the most astute variety.

The government has lacked both the capacity and the will to rein in the group. The fact that parliament passed several highly discriminatory "Race and Religious Protection" laws shows that ideological support of the group exists at the highest levels of power. Of course not all in Burma back Ma Ba Tha - and vital and courageous voices rally against it - but it now carries enough influence to take it from the level of a small-scale activist collective to a kind of mass nationwide pressure group that can effectively write legislation. It has openly backed the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) - despite some conflict with it - and slandered the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) as Muslim-loving, unpatriotic troublemakers who will bring about exactly the kind of changes that Ma Ba Tha has been able to frame as so threatening. With the resources already available, popular fears that stem from the prospect of having such a "hostile" party in power can be quite easily activated, therefore drawing support away from the NLD. While this is unlikely to sway the result of elections in November, a focused campaign is well underway that could have longer-term repercussions.

U Wirathu, its symbolic leader, has talked of the group as a deity: "We came down from the sky ... We are brilliant people." This is particularly sinister because it carries the implicit message that those not ideologically aligned with it are the precise opposite-not pure, not brilliant, but nefarious and threatening. That dichotomy has driven much of its work-the "Race and Religious Protection" laws are geared towards protecting Buddhism from the evils of Islam, as if they are binary "good" and "bad" forces whose members all share those traits. Despite the facile nature of such a framing, the passing of the laws shows this campaign has proven highly effective.

"Uncivil society" groups like Ma Ba Tha can in many ways become more powerful than formal power holders, for they both heavily influence legislation yet are not constrained by the same laws that limit the clout of political parties and subject their actions to scrutiny. Their base isn't made up of registered party members but fluid networks of supporters and agitators that exist across all rungs of society, and who can campaign on issues regardless of the rules of election cycles, or can threaten mass protests when things aren't going their way. Their rhetoric is not tempered by political orthodoxy, but is free to create "facts" about rival groups, funnel them through increasingly open information channels, and prescribe quite sinister solutions to the problems supposedly created by those rivals.

So while we can be shocked at what has occurred in Kawlin, we shouldn't be surprised. Ma Ba Tha's power has been growing unchecked for too long, and now functions on two levels: the local, where its network of offices across Burma increasingly show signs of operating as de facto local authorities, and the national, where it can draw on an expanding civilian support base to pitch self-serving, but highly dangerous, policies to parliament with the veneer of popular backing. Groups like Ma Ba Tha are direct products of democratization - their goal is to exploit emerging freedoms of movement and information to capture state institutions when they are still weak. As we've seen in Burma, no one in power is putting up a fight - this void is exactly what Ma Ba Tha, now perhaps one of the biggest threats to Burma's transition, needs to better direct the course of the transition.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Why we need to worry about Burma's extremist Ma Ba Tha monks

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
One of the most concerning developments in any nascent democracy is the institutionalisation and mainstreaming of extremist ideologies. Countries undergoing political transitions are perhaps most susceptible to this, given that the conditions of early democratization - the jockeying of groups for power at a time when institutions are too weak to constrain those forces-are ripe for mass ideologies to take hold and proliferate.

# data[].attributes.body
Details on the fighting in the Kokang region on the Myanmar/China border earlier this year

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
MOST people think of Myanmar as one of the world's few encouraging stories. Aung San Suu Kyi, the country's longtime democracy activist and Nobel prize-winner, sits in parliament rather than under house arrest. America has begun lifting sanctions. The government has signed bilateral ceasefires with most of the myriad ethnic armies which have been fighting against it, bringing communal violence to its lowest level in decades.

But strife in Kokang, a little-noticed region of Myanmar bordering China, is testing how much of that progress is real. Fighting broke out on February 9th, when Phone Kyar Shin (also known as Peng Jiasheng), an octogenarian warlord, launched a series of attacks on the Burmese army around Laukkai, Kokang's capital. More than 130 people have died, and as many as 100,000 have been displaced. Ethnic Kokang are fleeing across the border into China; ethnic Burmans are heading south, deeper into Myanmar.
Get our daily newsletter
According to the government, the fighting is all but finished. Mr Phone's plan was "foiled", says Min Zaw Oo, director of ceasefire negotiations for the Myanmar Peace Centre, which oversees the reconciliation process between Myanmar's government and its ethnic armies. "[The] government side is now conducting mopping up operations in and round Laukkai."

Things look less rosy on the ground. Thein Sein, Myanmar's president, has put the area under martial law until the middle of May. Many roads into the region are closed, and villages lie deserted. During the first week of March-long after the government crowed that stability had been restored-Burman refugees from Kokang were still streaming into the Mansu monastery in central Lashio.

Daeng Tun, a 41-year-old from Laukkai, says the army told him it was not safe to return. U Kyaw Min Lwin, a retired officer who spent 20 years with the Burmese army in Kokang, thinks the fighting is getting worse, and could last months. His pessimism appears more credible than the central government's sunny reassurances-and that has troubling implications for Myanmar's future.

The conflict in Kokang has sucked in other armed groups. Myanmar's government has said China is arming and training Mr Phone's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), though both deny the accusation (see article). Even without Chinese involvement, the Kokang region seems to be crawling with fighters. The MNDAA claims its ranks have grown since the fighting started. Some ethnic armies that have either not signed ceasefires with Myanmar's government or seen them break down have taken up arms alongside the Kokang.

In a squat cinder-block hut on a narrow street on the outskirts of Lashio, a solidly built Palaung soldier with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) says he has just returned from Kokang. The Palaung live in northern Shan and Kachin states (see map); the soldier says the TNLA were drawn in because "the Burmese army was robbing [Palaung] villages and cutting down their sugar cane." Members of the Arakan Army-based in the south-west-are reportedly fighting alongside the MNDAA. A Kokang commander adds that they have been getting help from Kachin rebels, who live in Myanmar's northernmost state and have been fighting the government for decades (the Kachin deny involvement). Myanmar's ethnic groups are often fractious, but those in Ko-kang have shown unusual unity-perhaps banding together in a last-ditch effort for survival against an increasingly impatient government.

A great deal about the conflict remains unclear. It is possible that the outbreak was a response to the shelling, last November, by government forces of a Kachin training ground which killed 23 people, many of them from the same armies now fighting in Kokang. Mr Phone may have wanted to muscle in on the lucrative gambling trade in the area. Whatever the reasons, though, they matter less than the centrifugal consequences of the conflict and what they imply for Myanmar's peace process.

Myanmar-watchers have grown used to a familiar refrain from the government: the peace process is working; a national ceasefire deal is just around the corner; except for a few holdouts, all sides are not only talking, but have agreed on almost everything, with just a few details remaining to be worked out. The Kokang fighting shows that those "details"-which include military and police reform, control over natural resources and regional autonomy for ethnic minorities-are proving intractable. Moreover, it is happening at a time when problems for the government seem to be spreading: this week saw a brutal confrontation between students and police at Letpadan, 140km north of Yangon.

The long-term risk from the fighting is not that it destabilises the country-Myanmar's government has proved adroit at containing small insurgencies-but rather that it could affect this autumn's election, which was already under a cloud thanks to constitutional provisions barring Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president and reserving 25% of parliamentary seats for the army. In the 2010 election, the government banned voting in some ethnic-minority areas, ostensibly because of security concerns. A similar ban this autumn would deepen grievances, raise further doubts about the legitimacy of the election and complicate relations between Myanmar and donor governments, on which much of the troubled domestic-reform process depends.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
MOST people think of Myanmar as one of the world's few encouraging stories. Aung San Suu Kyi, the country's longtime democracy activist and Nobel prize-winner, sits in parliament rather than under house arrest. America has begun lifting sanctions.

# data[].attributes.body
Information concerning sectarian violence between Buddhist national groups and Muslims (particularly the Rohingya since 2012).

# data[].attributes.body
Although dated 2012, this article includes useful information identifying the different ethnic nationalities in the civil war

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Mutual distrust, power struggles and tension over the hoarding of resources, including gold, gems and timber, have characterized the long history between the rulers of Myanmar - primarily of Burman background - and the many other smaller ethnic groups that comprise this Southeast Asian nation of more than 50 million.

According to the last official census in 1983, the Burman accounted for 69 percent of the country's population.

Each ethnic group regards the protection of their individual languages, customs, culture and natural resources important to their national identity. At the same time, the government has steadfastly believed that a "crisis of the minorities" - internal conflict among Myanmar's sizable minority communities, which make up one-third of the population - could undermine the country's stability.

Now, a shift in government discourse and a recent string of cautious ceasefires have prompted people to wonder whether peace will last this time and what it will bring to participants in the longstanding civil conflicts, how it will affect the regional refugee crisis, and what it will mean for the recent relaxation of restrictions and a more open Myanmar.

Until the 2010 presidential election, the military government had shown few concrete signs of addressing ethnic grievances, resorting instead to brutal crackdowns, which earned international rebuke and sanctions from potential donors. IRIN offers a brief overview of the complex ethnic mix that Myanmar hopes to meld into a flourishing modern state.

Main armed groups

Karen - The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) took up arms in 1949, almost immediately after the British left Myanmar, making it one of the oldest rebel armies in the world. The KNLA is the military wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).

Kachin - In 1961, after a coup led by General Ne Win - variously prime minister, head of state and chairman of the ruling party from 1958 until 1988 - the Kachin rebels formed the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the military wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO).

Karenni - The Karenni Army (KA) was created after the Burmese government incorporated Kayah State into the Union of Burma in 1951. Karenni leaders argued they had not agreed to incorporation. The KA is the military wing for the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).

Chin - The Chin National Front (CNF) was founded in March 1988 as a coalition of several Chin opposition groups to push for greater autonomy.

Mon - The New State Mon Party (NSMP) established an armed wing that has fought the government since 1949, when military forces entered Mon territory.

Rhakine - The Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) was first set up with the help of the KNU in the 1950s but it became defunct after most of its leaders were arrested. In the 1970s it reassembled, but is still one of the smallest ethnic armies.

Shan - The Shan State Army (SSA) was formed in 1964 as Burmese military began to move into Shan State. The SSA later split into two factions, creating the Shan State Army-North, which signed a ceasefire with the government in 1964, and the Shan State Army-South, which continued to fight the state until an initial ceasefire in December 2011.

Wa - The United Wa State Army (USWA), created after the fall of the Community Party Burma in 1989, is one of the country's most powerful ethnic armies and receives military resources, infrastructure and support from neighbouring China.

Splinter groups - As various leaders have left major armies and created new militias, some have signed ceasefires with the Burmese government and enjoyed freedom to trade with neighbouring countries, including the Karen (Democratic Buddhist Army, Karen Peace Council Kokang, Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army) and Kachin (New Democratic Army and Kachin Defence Army).

Why have they taken up arms?

Before British forces pulled out in 1947, they attempted to unite Myanmar's various "nations". With British officers as witnesses, many ethnic groups signed the Panglong Agreement, intended to be binding on the post-colonial administration, which would guarantee ethnic rights and self-determination, and the inclusion of minorities in the democratic process.

Aung San, a leader of the Burman ethnic group, who had led the country to independence (and was the father of current opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi), and leaders of the Shan, Kachin and Chin negotiated the agreement. However, Aung San was assassinated soon after and the Burmese military began its slow advance into the ethnic states to rule by force.

Many ethnic groups took up arms to protect their states from Burman rule, demanding autonomy, ethnic rights and an inclusive democracy.

Their demands have remained unchanged. According to Lama Gum Hpan, a KIO "Central Committee" member, the Kachin fighters have always stood by the Panglong Agreement. "To this day we wish for the Burmese government to honour the agreements made in 1947," he told IRIN.

In the run-up to the 2010 elections of the nominally civilian government in power, a proposal for a border guard force was drafted, which aimed to include ethnic groups in the state army - and called for their disarmament.

Nearly all the ethnic armies refused and several ceasefires faltered.

Why have ceasefires failed?

Burmese dissident media have compiled a list of ceasefires dating back more than two decades between the government and major rebel groups as well as splinter movements.

Recent peace deals - still in their early stages - have been inked: the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) signed in December 2011, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) in February 2012.

This has not stopped clashes. The Burmese government has blamed persisting army incursions on communication problems between the seat of government in Nay Pyi Daw and frontline troops at least 500km away. The central government ordered its troops to halt fighting on 12 December 2011 but a number are still firing.

"This is war. They [ Karen rebels] will continue to fight until they can see that the Burmese government is actually trying to achieve peace," said David Tackapaw, "foreign minister" for the KNU.

He maintains that historically there has been "a lack of genuine will by the Burmese government to listen to the KNU's demands for ethnic rights and self determination for the Karen people", and said they are dealing with a military that sees the ethnic problem as a military issue, not a political issue.

Lama Gum Hpan, of the Kachin Independence Organization, said although the government has recently made overtures, the rulers are not interested in finding a political solution to the problem. "We are not interested in ceasefires; we want to find long-lasting and durable solutions to the ethnic oppression in this country."

In June 2011, a 17-year ceasefire between the two sides collapsed following efforts by the government to incorporate numerous armed ethnic groups into a single border guard force.

Will current talks succeed?

Despite faltering peace on the frontlines, rebel leaders from the Myanmar's ethnic armies have noted change in the government's willingness to engage.

In a recent speech to parliament reported in local media, Myanmar President Thein Sein said long-time enemies have the same goal: "The expectation of ethnic groups is to get equal rights for all. Equal standards are also the wish of our government."

Discussing the ongoing conflict with the Kachin, Thein Sein said: "Fighting will not stop by pointing the finger of blame at each other. Ceasefires are first needed on both sides for political dialogue... We all have to work so our ethnic youths who held guns stand tall holding laptops."

Analysts note most ceasefires are in nascent stages and have a long way to go, but if the government can control its military, a thus-far elusive peace with ethnic rebels is within reach.

Tackapaw, of the Karen National Union, said ceasefires have been negotiated too quickly and with too few conditions to guarantee long-term change.

What about the region's refugees?

According to the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), due to conflict more than 400,000 people are believed to be living in internal displacement in the southeast, while some 150,000 refugees, asylum seekers and others fleeing violence in Myanmar are in camps in Thailand.

If the ceasefires hold, many may return to Myanmar, Sally Thompson, the TBBC's executive director, said. "If the current momentum of political reforms continues, then it is unlikely that the camps will still be open in five years."

Many refugees across nine camps along the 1800km-long border Thai-Burmese border told IRIN it is still too early to tell if recent respites in the conflict will last long enough for them to return home. Saw Plu, a Karen elder, said he believed the Myanmar government was "playing a trick", and fighting will inevitably erupt again. Yet despite their concerns, the vast majority of refugees voiced their desire to go home and are waiting for signs of a "genuine" peace.

"Ceasefires are only the beginning of a process of peace building and national reconciliation - there must be political dialogue," said Thompson. "It is a long road... to build trust after 60 years of conflict. The government will have to deliver significant improvements in the daily lives of people in former conflict areas to demonstrate their sincerity."

If the ceasefires do not last and fighting erupts again, more refugees will flood into Thailand, she warned. In Kachin State, where conflict has continued in some regions since June 2010, and peace efforts have failed, Burmese refugees are flooding to neighbouring China.

UN estimates put the number of people now in Kachin after being displaced by conflict at more than 50,000, with several thousand more in China.

Julia Marip, from the Thailand-based Kachin Women's Organization, said tens of thousands have been displaced by violence. "The situation is really bad here. The Burmese government has not allowed INGO[international NGO] access to the Kachin refugees in our areas. If a ceasefire agreement is not made soon, the refugee situation will become a major crisis."

What will happen if the country is more open?

Most foreign investors - with the notable exception of China - have long been reticent to do business in Myanmar because of internal conflicts and sanctions imposed by a number of Western countries.

If the government holds free and fair elections in April 2012, and can achieve lasting ceasefires with rebel armies, donors have held out the possibility of easing sanctions, which may open resource-rich areas inhabited by ethnic minorities for investment.

Ethnic leaders have voiced fears such development may rush ahead without taking their wishes into account.

"We know that one of the biggest incentives to find peace with ethnics is to get more foreign investment in," said Tackapaw. "We have to make sure that proper consultation is done with the civilians, and everything is done in a sustainable manner which benefits the ethnic civilians, not just the government and foreign investors."

wg/pt/he

For more, visit IRIN's in-depth: What next for Myanmar?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Mutual distrust, power struggles and tension over the hoarding of resources, including gold, gems and timber, have characterized the long history between the rulers of Myanmar - primarily of Burman background - and the many other smaller ethnic groups that comprise this Southeast Asian nation of more than 50 million.

# data[].attributes.headline
Challenging the Reconciliation Process: Myanmar’s Ethnic Divide and Conflicts

# data[].attributes.subject
Challenging the Reconciliation Process: Myanmar’s Ethnic Divide and Conflicts

# data[].attributes.body
Explication of the complex causes of ethnic conflict, as well as analysis of the problems caused by the civil war and how they pose a threat to Myanmar's security

# data[].attributes.headline
7 Things to Know About Burma’s Upcoming Elections

# data[].attributes.subject
7 Things to Know About Burma’s Upcoming Elections

# data[].attributes.body
A who's who of the upcoming election- good contextual

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
7 Things to Know About Burma's Elections

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Here are seven factors that may prove decisive at Burma heads to the ballot box for landmark general elections

# data[].attributes.headline
'Catastrophic' floods in Myanmar hit most vulnerable, including children

# data[].attributes.subject
'Catastrophic' floods in Myanmar hit most vulnerable, including children

# data[].attributes.body
When Myanmar's frequent natural disasters hit, they are turned into a "double catastrophe" for Myanmar's poorest, given wide-scale poverty

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
"The floods are hitting children and families who are already very vulnerable, including those living in camps in Rakhine state," said Shalini Bahuguna, from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). There are 140,000 displaced children and families in Rakhine alone.

"Beyond the immediate impact, the floods will have a longer term impact on the livelihoods of these families," she warned.

According to the Myanmar Government, 39 people have died and over 200,000 people across the country are in need of lifesaving assistance. Twelve out of Myanmar's 14 states and regions have been affected by the rains. On 31 July, President U Thein Sein issued a statement declaring natural disaster zones in four regions, including Rakhine, where access is limited due to flooding, road blockages and landslides.

"Initial reports indicate that there is extensive damage to shelters and other infrastructure in camps around Sittwe [Rakhine's capital], where some 100,000 displaced people are staying," stressed the UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in an update from 30 July.

Limited information is availablethis this stage on the situation in Magway region and Chin state. In one township alone in Magway, around 70 villages are reported to be affected by floods and people in the area being relocated to schools, monasteries and other safe locations. In Chin state, at least 100 houses reported have been destroyed by landslides, pointed out OCHA.

Local authorities, the Government, the military, as well as the Myanmar Red Cross Society and local civil society organizations, with support from the UN and international organizations, are responding to the floods in different parts of the country, carrying out rescue operations and providing food, water, blankets, medical and other basic necessities to those affected.

Against that background, vulnerable children in Myanmar, UNICEF says, face a "double catastrophe" as floods add to the hardships of poverty, violence and conflict.

UNICEF is working closely with other UN agencies is working closely with the Myanmar authorities, dispatching assessment teams to affected areas to identify the priority needs of children and families in terms of water and sanitation, health care, and nutrition.

"UNICEF has already supported the distribution of water purification tablets and hygiene kits to the affected areas," Ms. Bahuguna said. "We are working...to get emergency messages out to local communities through radio, to tell people how to prevent water borne diseases."

Myanmar is prone to natural disasters such as floods, cyclones and earthquakes. There is a need for more resources to scale up disaster preparedness, and to improve community resilience. The heaviest affected areas are among the poorest states in Myanmar, a country where nearly 70 percent of people live close to the $2-per-day poverty threshold, and children make up 34 per cent of the population.

Earlier this year, UNICEF appealed for $24.9 million to help children affected by violence and conflict in Rakhine state. The agency has received $5.6 million so far, leaving a $19.3 million shortfall, even before the needs of flood-affected families are taken into account.

"The impact of these floods makes the need for funding, particularly for displaced and vulnerable families, even more urgent," Ms. Bahuguna said. "The poorest children and families are going to be the hardest hit, and we need to build their resilience so they can cope with these kinds of crises."

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
'Catastrophic' floods in Myanmar hit most vulnerable, including children - UN agencies

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
"The floods are hitting children and families who are already very vulnerable, including those living in camps in Rakhine state," said Shalini Bahuguna, from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). There are 140,000 displaced children and families in Rakhine alone. "Beyond the immediate impact, the floods will have a longer term impact on the livelihoods of these families," she warned.

# data[].attributes.headline
Myanmar’s Refugee Problem: It’s Not Just the Rohingya

# data[].attributes.subject
Myanmar’s Refugee Problem: It’s Not Just the Rohingya

# data[].attributes.body
While the international community is celebrating Myanmar's transition to a democracy and investing heavily in its economy, many ethnic minorities are trapped in exile in Thailand, Malaysia or India, or internally displaced.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
This article is part of "Southeast Asia: Refugees in Crisis," an ongoing series by The Diplomat for summer and fall 2015 featuring exclusive articles from scholars and practitioners tackling Southeast Asia's ongoing refugee crisis. All articles in the series can be found here.

This summer's boat abandonments made the world aware of the plight faced by the Rohingya. This was important and overdue recognition of a desperate situation. However, the Rohingya are not Myanmar's only refugees. Other ethnic groups from Myanmar are facing an increasingly difficult situation, trapped in exile by a continuing fear of persecution but finding their supporters and sources of protection slipping away. What will the future hold for them, and what must be done to make return a real possibility?

During decades of militarization in Myanmar, millions of people left the country illegally in search of security and a better life elsewhere. The vast majority became undocumented migrant workers in Thailand, Malaysia and beyond. A much smaller population is registered as refugees with the UNHCR: around 130,000 people in camps in Thailand, around 150,000 in Malaysia and more than 10,000 in India. To varying degrees, these people rely on international aid and assistance to support their lives in exile. Refugees in camps in Thailand are forbidden to leave the camp and are entirely dependent on external aid for food, shelter and other necessities of survival. In India and Malaysia, refugees are not confined to camps and can find (informal) employment to survive, but they continue to depend on the UNHCR and other organizations for protection and other assistance.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

Currently, refugees in these countries find themselves in a perplexing situation. After decades in which the international community was united in condemning Myanmar, the political climate has shifted. Myanmar is no longer an international pariah but is seen as a country in transition, a country whose former rulers have freely divested themselves of power in favor of a path to democracy and equality. This perception has had important consequences for refugees outside the country who have become an inconvenient truth rendered invisible by the good news story of transition and transformation. One indication of this is the disappearance of funding for refugee programming. In Thailand, The Border Consortium is operating with a large funding shortfall and struggling to attract donor support. My own interviews with refugees in India and Malaysia have found a similar theme: "We used to receive funding from Australia/Norway/Prague but now it has stopped," one said. "I used to be an interpreter with an NGO but now they have reduced their Burmese staff," another noted.

Myanmar's refugees also seem to be viewed with a more critical eye than previously. In Thailand, the government has made it plain that repatriation of refugees will be a priority if Myanmar's elections in November are deemed to be successful. In Malaysia (another country with deepening economic interests with Myanmar) pressure is similarly building, with refugees repeatedly told by both national officials and international agency staff that Myanmar has transformed and they should return home. Across countries there appears to be a growing sense - bordering on suspicion - that many of Myanmar's exiles are no longer "real" refugees but opportunists making demands on a system of international protection that they no longer require.

The fundamental question is: has Myanmar really changed? Most, if not all, refugees would say no. They have little trust in Myanmar's government, none at all in its military - and fail to see any meaningful separation between the two. Even the most optimistic Myanmar analysts recognize that pockets of the country remain deeply problematic: the worsening persecution of Rohingya and Myanmar Muslims, the ongoing conflict in Kachin and Shan states, the brutal assault on the Kokang. To recognize this and remain confident that refugees can return requires dividing Myanmar into its constituent parts to determine that a fear of persecution continues to exist in Rakhine State but not in Chin State; in Kachin State but not in Karenni State. Of course, it is certainly feasible that one region of a country is safe for refugee repatriation while another is not. Myanmar may seem like just such a country, given its division of territory by ethnic group. However, it is also a country where a single regime has dominated the nation - and, more importantly, where a single sensibility has dominated governance.

For the past fifty years, under successive military juntas, Myanmar has followed a strategic project of Burmanization, i.e. the promotion of a single religion (Buddhism), language (Burmese) and culture (Burman). At its mildest, this is a policy of cultural assimilation. At its worst, it has verged on - and arguably pursued - ethnic cleansing. Ceasefires with ethnic armed groups have reduced military activity and human rights violations in several ethnic states. But the treatment of Rohingya shows the continued potency of Burmese nationalism, and highlights that Myanmar is no rainbow democracy but a country with deep-seated racism and discrimination that is entrenched in existing law and pursued through new laws.

Viewed in that light, it is much clearer to see why many refugees of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities continue to feel a risk of persecution on return. Depending on the outcome of November's election, it is possible that more people will be willing to venture back home. The coming months therefore have the potential to be crucial in building confidence in Myanmar's political future and in the future for returnees. Here, there is an important link with the peace process between the Myanmar government and the ethnic armed groups.

To date, the peace talks have been almost totally silent on the issue of displacement, though refugees and IDPs are overwhelmingly from the non-Burman ethnic groups and their future choices will certainly be shaped by the outcome of that process. It is an immensely complex peace process, both with respect to the number of participants (sixteen ethnic armed groups attempting to negotiate in unison through the NCCT) and the portfolio of issues to be addressed: constitutional reform; federalism; political structures and institutions of governance; control over natural resources; military reform; electoral reform and many more.

Addressing displacement has not yet been a priority but the peace process is vital for successful refugee return, both to convince refugees that the political environment has truly changed and to remove existing barriers to return. It must also be recognized that a successful return process has important implications for the peace process. If Myanmar is truly moving towards democracy, returning refugees can help embed that process and contribute to developing the country. But a poorly managed return process could lead to disputes over jobs, land and housing and ultimately create new problems of crime and political instability.

After some months of apparent deadlock, the peace negotiations have seen dramatic developments, with a split in the NCCT negotiation bloc and the signing of a ceasefire by eight ethnic armed groups, including the KNU. These signings are controversial - even within their own parties - and the failure of the "nationwide ceasefire" process to reach a truly nationwide agreement hints at some of the changes and challenges that lie ahead. Hopefully, possibilities for progress will be clearer after next month's election.

At that stage, it will be essential to move beyond rhetoric. For peace-building to succeed, Myanmar's ethnic nationalities need evidence of convincing, enduring change: a commitment to political autonomy in ethnic states, demilitarization of ethnic areas; investment in development and infrastructure; legal reforms to ensure an end to discrimination on grounds of ethnicity and religion. For return to succeed, Myanmar's refugees need concrete guarantees: of security on return, of a restoration of identity documentation and citizenship status; of practical support to ensure future livelihoods. If these areas are addressed, it is likely that people will return gladly. Until these areas are addressed, many will remain trapped in a climate of dwindling protection.
Dr Kirsten McConnachie is Assistant Professor in law at the University of Warwick. Formerly a research fellow at the University of Oxford, she is the author of "Governing Refugees" (Routledge 2014) an analysis of camp governance and the administration of justice in refugee camps on the Thai-Myanmar border.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Myanmar's Refugee Problem: It's Not Just the Rohingya

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
This article is part of "Southeast Asia: Refugees in Crisis," an ongoing series by The Diplomat for summer and fall 2015 featuring exclusive articles from scholars and practitioners tackling Southeast Asia's ongoing refugee crisis. All articles in the series can be found here.

# data[].attributes.headline
Blood Teak: How Myanmar's Natural Resources Fuel Ethnic Conflicts

# data[].attributes.subject
Blood Teak: How Myanmar's Natural Resources Fuel Ethnic Conflicts

# data[].attributes.body
Analysis from April 2015 on why the October cease-fire is unlikely to lead to peace, because natural resource exploitation and illicit trade is the cause of much violent conflict in the borderlands

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
On March 30, the government of Myanmar and an umbrella group of 16 ethnic minority groups agreed to a draft agreement for a "nationwide ceasefire" to end decades of conflict in the country's northern reaches. But even as the latest ceasefire was being made, two armed groups, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), were in open conflict with the Burmese military. Fighting in Kokang and Kachin has led to casualties in the triple digits and displaced an estimated 100,000 civilians.

Given the potential for the military to use renewed conflict as a pretext to roll back or end Myanmar's nascent political reform process, it might seem puzzling for minority groups seeking greater autonomy and relief from human rights abuses to escalate violence at a time like this. But their logic is clearer when you understand what's been so commonly overlooked in Myanmar's ethnic conflicts: competition by both minority rebel groups and the Burmese military over the control of extractive resources and illicit industries.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

Rubies, Jade, Timber, and Poppy

Academics have pointed to competition and control over extractive natural resources such as minerals, metals, and timber as factors which lead to both higher rates and increased duration of internal conflict. Valuable extractive resources provide incentives for the formation of non-state armed groups and extend the duration of existing conflicts by providing a relatively easy source of income that groups can use to purchase military equipment and recruit fighters.

Areas currently under the control of or within the traditional home areas of ethnic minority groups in Myanmar are rich in timber, rubies, and jade. These resources are both extremely lucrative and easy for an armed group to control and export.

The KIA and other armed groups bordering China have long benefited from the exploitation of northeastern Myanmar's teak forests and other valuable hardwoods, which are harvested and smuggled into China. A recent report by the NGO Forest Trends found the overwhelming majority of Chinese timber imports from Myanmar are illegal. Likewise, rubies and other gems from ethnic minority areas have been smuggled across the border and into global markets.

What's more, the military strategies of many armed groups appear to be heavily influenced by a desire to maintain and expand control over natural resources. After the resumption of major hostilities between the KIA and Burmese military in 2011, a KIA force spread thin by the offensives of better equipped government forces surprisingly launched a significant offensive of their own. Their target? Hpakant, one of Myanmar's most lucrative jade mining centers.

Myanmar's booming drug production also serves as an easily exploitable source of revenue for non-state armed groups. Several of the most powerful armed groups run large-scale methamphetamine production operations and/or control the cultivation of poppy for the production of heroin. These are then smuggled into China and Thailand to supply growing demand in the region. The recent outbreak of conflict in Kokang may well be an attempt by the MNDAA to restore their control over the revenues of the drug trade.

An Alternate Path?

Given the seeming unending nature of these decades-long conflicts, options for resolution appear limited. A military resolution through the escalation of violence is both deplorable from a normative perspective and practically improbable. Is it possible, then, for nonviolent measures to alter the incentives of armed groups in ways that make control of extractive resources and illicit industries less important as a means of survival? There are several options.

First, the government of Myanmar and international actors could crack down on illicit exports. This approach may prove very difficult to implement, as smuggling across rugged borders is difficult to monitor and cooperation from local communities and governments on both sides of the border who gain financially from smuggling is unlikely to be forthcoming (high-ranking military and government officials are among those that profit most from smuggling outside ethnic minority controlled areas).

Alternatively, a long-term peace deal and political settlement which places the control of revenues from extractive resources in the hands of local governments run by ethnic minority officials may eliminate some of the most powerful motivations for the continuation of conflict. The prospects for such a long-term deal also appear dim. The military has demonstrated its willingness to undermine or ignore agreements when they conflict with their interests. Likewise, minority groups are unlikely to have enough trust in the state to agree to such a plan should it require them to lay down their arms.

Perhaps the most viable option in the medium to long term is development programs specifically targeted at diversification of local economies, reducing reliance on extractive resources and illicit industries for the survival of minority communities. As control of extractive resources diminishes in comparative economic importance, so would the incentives of communities to sustain armed conflict intended to maintain control of these industries.

This approach is not without its own challenges. It is difficult to know if the Burmese state and military would have the foresight to allow such development programs in rebel-held regions. In the government's current form, it seems unlikely, but if liberalization continues, perhaps it will become more possible. Additionally, those at the very top of the leadership structures of armed groups benefit the most from the status quo. This approach would therefore depend on eroding support for the continuation of resource-driven conflict from below, gradually undermining the comparative economic advantage to both civilians and rank and file members of armed groups to continue fighting.

The re-ignition of conflict should be a reminder that as long as the incentives to control exploitable natural resources and illicit industries are greater than the incentives to create stability, there is little hope for long-term peace in Myanmar. Sustainable progress is possible, but only if the underlying economic structures of minority groups are altered by the diversification of local economies and the government continues opening up. While this is by no means a panacea for the conflict, it may begin to alter the economic circumstances which have facilitated such persistent violence and bring about the conditions which lead to a more enduring peace.
Jay Benson is a research assistant at One Earth Future Foundation and a recent graduate of the International Studies Master's Program at the University of Denver.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Blood Teak: How Myanmar's Natural Resources Fuel Ethnic Conflicts

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
On March 30, the government of Myanmar and an umbrella group of 16 ethnic minority groups agreed to a draft agreement for a "nationwide ceasefire" to end decades of conflict in the country's northern reaches.

# data[].attributes.headline
Election 2015: Burma faces stern challenges in transition to democracy

# data[].attributes.subject
Election 2015: Burma faces stern challenges in transition to democracy

# data[].attributes.body
Good explanation of the challenges to democracy faced by Myanmar in its upcoming election, mostly in relation to the constitution and the borderlands

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
ON November 8, Burmese voters will head to the polls in what will be the country's most important election since military rule took grip of the country in 1962, and expectations are high that these elections will be a significant step forward along the path to democracy.

Burma (also known as Myanmar) has only had two general elections since the 1962 coup d'état and both of these were seriously flawed. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in the 1990 elections, gaining 392 of the 492 seats, but the results were ignored by the military junta and the party's leader, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest for the following 15 years. Suu Kyi's party was then excluded from the 2010 elections which the military's quasi-civilian party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), successfully won.

Since the 2010 elections gradual reforms have been introduced which have improved civil and political liberties. However there are still a number of serious challenges ahead which will test Asia's third least developed nation as it attempts to transition to a fully-fledged democracy. Among the challenges facing the country are a constitution that strongly favours the military; legislation that disqualifies Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president; armed conflicts along border regions; ultra-nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiment; and a climate of fear.
SEE ALSO: How the Burmese military perpetuates its own myth
Burma's constitution was drawn up by the military junta in 2008 and clearly signals its preference for military leadership. One of the constitution's most controversial points is the provision that guarantees the military 25 percent of all parliamentary seats. The constitution also ensures the military is guaranteed one vice-presidential position and influence over key positions within the cabinet. Furthermore any amendments to the constitution must be backed by over 75 percent of parliament, giving the military the power to veto any constitutional amendments. Any hope of changing the constitution will need the backing of some factions from within the military.

Another provision of the constitution that has been criticized by the international community is the stipulation that candidates who marry foreign nationals cannot become the country's president. It is widely believed that this provision was introduced by the military junta specifically to block Suu Kyi's ambitions of leading the country forward.

In a recent interview with Karan Thapar for India Today, Suu Kyi spoke out about the constitution and defiantly claimed that if her party were to win the election she would be the leader: "If the NLD wins the elections and we form a government, I am going to be the leader of that government whether or not I am the president." The democracy icon also indicated that she believed there were factions within the military willing to support changes to the constitution. "I do believe there are many members of the army who want what is best for the country and if we can agree with one another what would be best for the country then we can come to the arrangement," she said.

Other challenges facing a peaceful transition to democracy are the ongoing conflicts in border regions. Of Burma's population, 60 percent are Bamar and the remaining 40 percent are from a mix of ethnic groups, most of which live along the border regions. Many of these groups remain involved in ongoing conflicts with the Burmese military. Attempts are underway to implement a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) in time for the elections, with plans to sign an agreement on October 15. However negotiating the ceasefire has been fraught with difficulties.

Across Burma there are 21 armed ethnic groups, but the government only officially recognizes 15 of these groups and only eight have been involved in negotiations to sign the ceasefire agreement. Ethnic groups which have been excluded from negotiations have been critical of the NCA saying the pact is invalid because it does not involve all stakeholders.
SEE ALSO: Social media drives debate ahead of Burma's historic election
There are also fears that the military is using the conflict as an excuse to cancel elections in certain regions. Recent news reports indicate that 'security concerns' are being used to exclude 20,000 Mons in Karen State from participating in the elections. The Karen State is a region where pro-government parties were expected to do poorly in the ballot. If boarder regions are excluded from the democratic process, the ability of an elected government to effectively govern the entire country will be severely impaired.

Another ethnic group that will be excluded from the 2015 elections are the Rohingya Muslims whose legal status has been systematically eroded. The Rohingya community had previously been issued temporary identification papers which had enabled them to vote in earlier elections but these papers have since been discontinued and an estimated 500,000 Rohingya, mostly from Rakhine State, have been removed from voter registration lists.

The erosion of the Rohingya Muslim's rights has coincided with a tide of rising nationalism which has been bolstered by an organization of radical Buddhist monks known as Ma Ba Tha (Protection of Race and Religion). Prominent members of Ma Ba Tha have made international headlines for their outspoken anti-Muslim rhetoric. While monks are exempt from voting or running for office, these radical monks have become increasingly influential and the lack of Muslim representation in both the USDP and the NLD is believed to be the result of pressure from extremist monks. Ma Ba Tha has also been responsible for drafting and promoting recent legislation that restricts Muslims from having large families. There are genuine concerns that local political parties with ultra-nationalist ideologies could rise to power in the Rakhine State and introduce policies that will further persecute the Muslim community.
SEE ALSO: Why we need to worry about Burma's extremist Ma Ba Tha monks
After decades of military rule by a regime that has been notorious for repressing public debate, freedom of speech and protest, the past few years have seen some genuine improvements to political and civil liberties. However, there are concerns these 'reforms' are only surface deep and the populous continues to be intimated by the government.

On October 7, Amnesty International released a report, 'Going back to the old ways', which accused the government in Burma of launching a crackdown on opponents in the run-up to the elections. Laura Haigh, Amnesty International's Myanmar Researcher, explained: "Myanmar's authorities have clearly been playing a long game ahead of the elections, with repression picking up pace at least nine months before the campaigning period started in September. Their goal has been straightforward - take 'undesirable' voices off the streets way ahead of the elections and make sure they're not heard."

The Amnesty International report also describes a climate of fear created by government surveillance, harassment, and intimidation, and argues that Burma's improvements to civil liberties are little more than an illusion to please the international community.

"Myanmar's government is trying to spin an alternate reality where all is rosy for human rights, which the international community is far too eager to accept. The reality on the ground could not be more different. Authorities have intensified a chilling crackdown on freedom of expression over the past year."

When the Burmese electorate go to the polls on November 8 it will be participating in a genuinely historic election, the outcome of which will significantly influence the pace and direction of the country's reforms. If the NLD is able to win a majority, as many observers predict, it will have made an important step forward but will then be faced with new, complex challenges that include wrestling power away from a military junta reluctant to lose control, engaging with ethnic groups excluded from the democratic process, dealing with the influential ultra-nationalist Ma Ba Tha and tackling the rising violence in minority ethnic regions.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Election 2015: Burma faces stern challenges in transition to democracy

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
ON November 8, Burmese voters will head to the polls in what will be the country's most important election since military rule took grip of the country in 1962, and expectations are high that these elections will be a significant step forward along the path to democracy.

# data[].attributes.headline
'Going Back to the Old Ways': A New Generation of Prisoners of Conscience in Myanmar

# data[].attributes.subject
'Going Back to the Old Ways': A New Generation of Prisoners of Conscience in Myanmar

# data[].attributes.body
Amnesty International report shedding light on Myanmar's crack down on political activists in the months leading up to the November 8 election.

# data[].attributes.headline
How the Burmese military perpetuates its own myth

# data[].attributes.subject
How the Burmese military perpetuates its own myth

# data[].attributes.body
Analysis of the way in which the Myanmar military "securitises" issues and explanation of why instability contributes to the maintenance of discursive power for the government

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
A heated debate broke out in Burma's lower house Monday over efforts by the opposition to overhaul the constitution prior to the 2015 elections. As per previous debates, the military contingent - which takes up a quarter of seats and thereby wields effective veto over such matters - resisted the idea that charter reform, and allowing Aung San Suu Kyi to run for president, might benefit the country. "I would like you all to remember that the constitution is not written for just a person but for the future of everyone," Colonel Htay Naing, one of the uniformed MPs, told parliament.

But he deployed another buzz phrase that illustrates very succinctly how the military perpetuates the myth that it is the only viable protector of a country beset by internal discord. The constitution shouldn't be changed, Col. Htay Naing added, because ongoing fighting in the border regions threatened to destabilize Burma. Therefore "unity", in the shape of fealty to a constitution the junta rushed through in 2008 amid the chaos of Cyclone Nargis, is required.

This raises several questions. One concerns the reasons as to why Burmese should wish to stand by a constitution that was passed amid conditions that make a mockery of democratic processes (it allegedly received 98% of the vote from a 92% turnout, despite the fact that several million people had been left destitute by the cyclone, on top of the several million more in conflict zones that were unable to vote). Suu Kyi's party earlier this year collected signatures from 10% of the population wanting a referendum on the constitution, suggesting that not all are in agreement with Htay Naing's vision of "the future of everyone".

More pertinently, however, he exploited a situation in the border regions that the military plays a direct role in fueling. Despite some progress in ceasefire talks, bouts of heavy fighting are ongoing, with the army continuing to attack civilians. But Htay Naing's logic follows that the instability resulting from the fighting, which the military is arguably the key driver of, is apparently reason enough for it to retain power. It's a useful illustration of the circular strategy of the military - perpetuate instability, draw on it to justify dominance, and then refer back to it when that power is challenged.

Were this merely a case of one man pointing to one incident then it wouldn't be means for great concern. But it's a strategy the elite in Burma has used for decades to both rationalize its rule, and to cast those who challenge it as criminal saboteurs bent on destabilizing the union. It can be used to illuminate the more subtle ways in which the military, or those in government who share its resistance to democratic transition, has actively sought to foment unrest that it can then capitalize on - one example being the Buddhist-Muslim violence.

On top of the various suggestions that security forces played an active role in aiding Buddhist mobs (not to mention the decades of anti-Muslim government propaganda that has helped normalize the current-day attacks on Muslims), government ministers have been fingered for complicity - Aung Thaung, a powerful MP known to be close to former junta leader Than Shwe, was recently sanctioned by the US government reportedly for his role in provoking anti-Muslim sentiment (the US government isn't the only one to share this suspicion).

Indeed when violence first broke out in Rakhine state in June 2012, prominent Rakhines called for troops to come in and "protect" them against the Rohingya. This is despite the fact that the Rakhine have a long history of quite vitriolic resentment towards the Burmese military and have continually resisted its efforts to influence the affairs of the state.

In this sense it's plain to see how the military actively benefits from instability - Colonel Htay Naing spelled it out quite clearly. Why this is of particular concern with regards the constitution is that this document, were it revised, could be the one thing that dilutes the military's power, and then codifies a new order in which the military doesn't have veto over legislation in what should be a civilian parliament. Resisting this will have a serious impact on whether something approaching a genuine form of democracy ever emerges in Burma. At present, however, conflict clearly remains politically profitable, and because of that we may see the military continue to stoke it for some time.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
How the Burmese military perpetuates its own myth

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A heated debate broke out in Burma's lower house Monday over efforts by the opposition to overhaul the constitution prior to the 2015 elections. As per previous debates, the military contingent - which takes up a quarter of seats and thereby wields effective veto over such matters - resisted the idea that charter reform, and allowing Aung San Suu Kyi to run for president, might benefit the country.

# data[].attributes.body
Detailed data relating to all aspects of the indicators used in determining Myanmar's HDI positioning, including information relating to health, education, inequality and gender.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Infants lacking immunization, DTP (% of one-year-olds)

# data[].attributes.body
Explanation of UNDP data used to develop HDI. Classified as a "low HDI" country, Myanmar's education sector is particularly underdeveloped, with a mean years of schooling at only four years.

# data[].attributes.headline
Myanmar arrests two for their mocking Facebook posts 

# data[].attributes.subject
Myanmar arrests two for their mocking Facebook posts 

# data[].attributes.body
Oct 16 news: two are arrested for mocking the military on Facebook. Interestingly, much anti-NLD sentiment is online with no reaction from the government.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Myanmar Opposition female activist Chaw Sandi Tun, 24, who was arrested for a satirical Facebook post in October, 2015.
Photo: Facebook

"If you love her (Suu Kyi) so much, put a piece of her longyi (sarong) on your head," the comment read. In Myanmar's conservative society the idea of a man wearing a woman's clothes on his head is deemed by some people to be offensive.

Laura Haigh, Amnesty International's Myanmar researcher, described the arrests for harmless Facebook posts as outrageous. The pair could face years in jail.

"Myanmar's authorities have once again shown how dangerously thin-skinned and vindictive they are when it comes to criticism or ridicule," Ms Haigh said.

"They might claim that the country has turned a corner on human rights, but this is yet another chilling reminder that the same repressive practices continue."

Myanmar commander-in-chief General Min Aung Hlaing in an image from his Facebook page. Patrick Kum Jaa Lee, 43, was arrested at his home in Yangon for a Facebook post showing someone stepping on a photograph of the general.
Photo: Facebook

Rights groups have warned the government of returning to military-era repressive tactics in the run-up to the election that is seen as a test for the country's progress towards a democratic transition.

Amnesty claims that at least 93 prisoners of conscience have been put behind bars as authorities have intensified repression over the past two years.

A supporter sits in front of a portrait of Aung San Suu Kyi in Mandalay, Myanmar, earlier this month.
Photo: AP

Ms Suu Kyi's supporters say that manipulated photographs, false information and propaganda that are aimed to denigrate her are being disseminated widely on Facebook but no charges have yet been laid against those responsible. Myo Yan Thein, an NLD official, told journalists the government's selective imposition of communication laws was not fair. "Aung San Suu Kyi has been the victim shameless attacks so many times and in so many ways," he said.

The NLD is expected to poll strongly in large parts of the country and could win enough votes to control parliament, even though a quarter of seats are reserved for the military.

But the Nobel laureate who spend 15 years under house arrest has been warning of attempts to disrupt voting on polling day, urging voters to be "very, very brave".

During campaigning in the majority Buddhist country radical monks have been pushing a hardline nationalist agenda, stoking anti-Muslim sentiment, much of it directed against ethnic Rohingya in western Rahkine state.

The monks support laws enacted by parliament earlier this year that are aimed at stopping the spread of Islam by restricting conversions and inter-faith marriages .

The monks' campaign will benefit the ruling party of president Thein Sein, a former general who has been widely praised on the international stage for overseeing reforms and promising free and fair elections.

In 1990 the military refused to accept the results of an election which the NLD won in a landslide.

Ms Suu Kyi, 70, has been barred from becoming president after the November poll because her late husband and two sons are British. The military refused to allow the constitution to be amended that states a president cannot have family members who are foreigners.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Myanmar arrests two for their mocking Facebook posts

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
"If you love her (Suu Kyi) so much, put a piece of her longyi (sarong) on your head," the comment read. In Myanmar's conservative society the idea of a man wearing a woman's clothes on his head is deemed by some people to be offensive.

# data[].attributes.headline
2015 Palm Campaign: “Even Though I’m Free I Am Not”

# data[].attributes.subject
2015 Palm Campaign: “Even Though I’m Free I Am Not”

# data[].attributes.body
Information concerning recent crackdown on political activists and associated campaign to free them run by Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
2015 Palm Campaign: "Even Though I'm Free I Am Not"

UPDATE (13/03/15): In light of the recent violent government crackdowns and mass arrests of at least 127 people in connection with the student protests against the National Education Law this week, the 2015 Palm Campaign will be extended until further notice.

To demand the immediate and unconditional release of the detainees (information on detainees here), please continue reading and follow the instructions further down on this page.

(Photos sourced from Facebook and Eleven Media Group)

What's It About?

The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) and the Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS) are urging the international community to call on the Government of Burma to unconditionally release all current political prisoners; put an end to the use of oppressive laws to harass, arrest and imprison activists; and enact real lasting judicial and legislative reform.

To show the government that the world stands in solidarity with Burma's political prisoners and demands lasting reform, over the coming weeks we will collect photographs of our supporters' participation in our 2015 Palm Campaign. To demonstrate the international community's widespread call that the Government of Burma demonstrate the will to meet the demands of this campaign, the photographs of support will be showcased at an exhibition in Rangoon (date to be confirmed).

Why Does It Matter?

The steady rise in the number of political prisoners in the last year makes clear that the government is increasingly cracking down on fundamental freedoms in the run up to the 2015 election. As of March 2, 2015 there are 170 political prisoners in Burma's jails, with a further 238 activists awaiting trial.Despite this, the government remains unwilling to officially recognize their continued existence. There is a widespread belief that reforms in Burma have stalled, and the alarming political prisoner situation is demonstrative of the government's backsliding on the supposed transition to democracy. 2015 marks a critical period for Burma's burgeoning democracy; it is crucial that the international community puts renewed pressure on the government to fulfill its commitments to a democratic future.

What Can You Do?

Show the Government of Burma that you stand in solidarity with the political prisoners and demand lasting reform by participating in our 2015 Palm Campaign. Simply follow these steps:

All of the photographs collected thus far can be viewed on our campaign Instagram page. For more information on our campaign, or about AAPP, email us at campaigns@aappb.org

* Note: By sending your photograph to AAPP, you authorize AAPP to publicly use or publish your photograph in different outlets (exhibitions, social media, AAPP webpage etc.) for the purposes of the campaign. Please inform AAPP when sending your photo if you would not like it to be used in other outlets other than the exhibition.

Additional Links
Statement: Campaign Extension Campaign Information Pack Laws Used Against Activists

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
AAPP | Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) " 2015 Campaign: "Even Though I'm Free I Am Not"

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
UPDATE (13/03/15): In light of the recent violent government crackdowns and mass arrests of at least 127 people in connection with the student protests against the National Education Law this week, the 2015 Palm Campaign will be extended until further notice.

# data[].attributes.body
Myanmar's growing income inequality

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Economists warn that while the super rich in Myanmar are likely to get richer, the gap between the rich and poor may grow wider in the next 10 years.

Currently, only 40 people in Myanmar own more than US$30 million in personal wealth. By 2022 that number of super rich will surpass 300, according to Wealth-X, a global researcher on ultra-high net-worth individuals.

This is in a country still considered one of the poorest in East Asia, according to the World Bank, with an estimated GDP per capita of between $800 and $1,000 (Bt29,650 to Bt32,100).

"At the moment, the gap between the rich and the poor of Myanmar is the widest in the world," said economist Dr Aung Ko Ko.

"The existence of the gap between the rich and the poor depends on the country's policy of income distribution. If the country is dependant on selling its resources, such as oil and gas, the gap may continue to exist," he added.

As the government embarks on a series of political and economic reforms, foreign investors and capital are pouring in as companies vie for lucrative contracts in new hotel businesses, construction, natural gas and energy. Myanmar looks set to embrace the economic growth witnessed by the emerging Southeast Asian economies in the early '90s.

However, economists say that if Myanmar fails to rethink economic policy on balancing income distribution, the rich will grow richer while the poor sink deeper into poverty. Such income inequality can lead to political instability and lower growth in the future.

After decades of state-run socialism, Myanmar is now embracing a free-market system which allows for competition. However, equal access and opportunities in the market place are still lacking, as "crony" companies with connections to the old regime are often first to profit from lucrative contracts and deals.

Widening participation, guaranteeing fairness through laws, and preventing economic manipulation are crucial defences against the emergence of a crony economy, says Aung Ko Ko.

"There are competition laws in over 100 countries of the world, even China, but not in Myanmar.

"A market without competition will only result in unbalanced incomes," said the economist.

"Cronies from Myanmar have been doing businesses for at least 10 or 20 years. They have advantages over new businesses in manpower, financial power and technological know-how. Thus, the government will grant them projects because they are better equipped. We need to give equal opportunity to everyone," said a young entrepreneur.

Manipulation of taxation is also giving crony firms and others an unfair advantage.

After criticism of a lack of transparency, the Department of Revenue promised to draw up a tax list of Myanmar's wealthiest 500 business tycoons soon.

"Myanmar has tax dodgers, and the two committees of the Lower House need to cooperate ... to ensure everyone is taxed," Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann said last month.

Though the country has more than 30,000 local and overseas companies, only about 3,000 currently pay tax.

As a privileged few reap the rewards of the economic reforms, one figure illustrates the humble existence most people lead: 75 per cent of the population have no electricity. Meanwhile, more than a quarter (26 per cent) live in poverty.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Income gap 'world's widest' - The Nation

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Economists warn that while the super rich in Myanmar are likely to get richer, the gap between the rich and poor may grow wider in the next 10 years. Currently, only 40 people in Myanmar own more than US$30 million in personal wealth.

# data[].attributes.headline
What Burma's Elections Mean for the Rohingya

# data[].attributes.subject
What Burma's Elections Mean for the Rohingya

# data[].attributes.body
Analysis on the prospects of the Myanmar election for the Rohingya people

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Burma's Rohingya Muslims are the clear losers from the country's general election-and this before a single vote has even been cast. While the community has suffered systematic persecution for decades, the election has unleashed a frightening level of sectarian hatred against them.

Earlier this year-egged on by an extremist Buddhist group known as the Ma Ba Tha, and in an act of flagrant discrimination - the national parliament and the country's President Thein Sein stripped the Rohingya of voting rights in the November poll and disqualified their parliamentary candidates. Over the last 12 months he's also signed into law four odious 'Race and Religion' laws that discriminate against all Muslims in the country. What's more, by limiting access for international aid agencies, and through wider restraints on the Rohingya in terms of their movement and opportunities for employment, his government has compounded the suffering of some 140,000 displaced people. These Rohingya have now lived for over three years in overcrowded camps for the internally displaced in Rakhine State, following inter-communal violence and sectarian killings that forced them to flee for their lives.

I witnessed this first-hand last week, when visiting camps around Sittwe, the Rakhine State capital. Conditions there were dreadful and, in many places, there was a palpable sense of fear. The plight of children was particularly depressing. Most were clearly not in school and many looked hungry. While they were initially reluctant to talk, one little girl answered our questions. How long had they been here? "Three years." Why had they come? "Because they killed our neighbours". What did they need? "Food, medicine." What did they want for the future? "To go home, but it's not safe".

The international community is keen to talk up the country's flagging reform process and see the elections as a milestone in Burma's transition to democracy...But for the Rohingya the process is worse than flawed.

But this was not the worst of it. In another part of the sprawling camp we came across children who were completely naked and covered in dirt. The sanitary conditions were dire-with makeshift huts separated by open sewers. Many of the children looked ill, and one had a severely bloated belly and shockingly thin legs. We were told that some aid workers come to the area each day for a few hours, to help with the more pressing cases, but that lots of people did not get seen. We observed this later. Scores of mothers and children, waiting in line, sheltering from the blistering midday sun underneath a tarpaulin cover, hoping to see a doctor or nurse. Whatever medical aid is getting through is clearly woefully insufficient.

In the midst of these appalling conditions, we encountered-rather incongruously-a tent filled with high tech phone and video equipment. A young mother was sitting inside and calling a relative in Malaysia, asking him to send money so that she could care for her sick mother. He had apparently left by boat some years previously. We asked about these boats leaving Burma, and whether others in the camp were keen to go too. Some nodded. But others, seemingly in charge of the tent, were evasive and hostile, and we judged that we should not stay long. We later heard from UN officials that people smugglers are very active in the camps. Given the desperate conditions there, many more Rohingya are likely to seek out their services and flee, despite the perilous journey and the abuses they may suffer on arrival.\

This is the untold story of the Burmese elections. The international community is keen to talk up the country's flagging reform process and see the elections as a milestone in Burma's transition to democracy, even while acknowledging the many serious deficiencies in the election process. But for the Rohingya the process is worse than flawed. They have lost their voting rights, been denied citizenship, and struggle to survive - while those who rule the country show them only hatred and hostility.

Faced with abuse and misery on this scale, foreign governments, including the U.K., should be exerting much more pressure on Naypyidaw to allow full humanitarian access to the camps, the safe return of Rohingya to their homes or voluntary resettlement for the displaced, the restoration of voting rights, a non-discriminatory citizenship law, and an end to their unconscionable persecution.

The plight of the Rohingya is not the only issue facing Burma. But it is perhaps the single most defining test of that government's commitment to democratic change and the rule of law, as well as the efficacy of the international community's efforts to promote reform in Burma. It is a test they are both failing.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
What Burma's Elections Mean for the Rohingya

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Burma's Rohingya Muslims are the clear losers from the country's general election-and this before a single vote has even been cast. While the community has suffered systematic persecution for decades, the election has unleashed a frightening level of sectarian hatred against them.

# data[].attributes.headline
Al Jazeera Investigates - The Hidden Genocide (Myanmar)

# data[].attributes.subject
Al Jazeera Investigates - The Hidden Genocide (Myanmar)

# data[].attributes.body
Documents Buddhist/Rohingya violent clashes sparked by the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Myanmar: The Hidden Genocide | Al Jazeera Investigations

# data[].attributes.headline
FACTS ABOUT THE ROHINGYA MUSLIMS OF ARAKAN

# data[].attributes.subject
FACTS ABOUT THE ROHINGYA MUSLIMS OF ARAKAN

# data[].attributes.body
Detailed explanation of the Rohingya people, including information about their treatment in Myanmar since 1948.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
By Nurul Islam
President
Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO)

Arakan, formerly called Rohang, lies on the north-western part of Burma with 360 miles coastal belt from the Bay of Bengal. It borders 167 miles with Bangladesh both by land and sea.

Rohingyas have been living in Arakan from time immemorial. They are a people with distinct culture and civilization of their own. They trace their ancestry to Arabs, Moors, Pathans, Moghuls, Bengalis and some Indo-Mongoloid people. Early Muslim settlements in Arakan date back to 7th century AD.

Burma is a home to numours ethnic groups and about 60% of the area is inhabited by nearly 140 ethnic races and Rohingya is one of them. Burma has a population of about 50 million of which nearly 8 millions are Muslims. Of the Muslim population about 3.5 millions (both at home and at the places of refuge) are Rohingyas of Arakan. The Rohingyas are a majority community in Arakan.

Due to large scale persecution through ethnic cleansing and genocidal action against them, about 1.5 million Rohingyas are forced to leave their hearth and home since Burmese independence in 1948. This unfortunate uprooted people are mostly found in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; also in UAE, Thailand and Malaysia. Present distribution of the Rohingya population is given below:

Inside Burma: 2 million*
Bangladesh: 600,000 *
Pakistan: 350,000*
Saudi Arabia 400,000*
Others (U.A.E., Thailand, Malaysia.) : 100,000*

* Approximation

1. Occupation:
The Rohingyas are living on agriculture. Arakan state's agricultural output is mainly contributed by Rohingyas. Small percentage of them are engaged in fishing and trade & business. Besides there are Rohingya artisans, blacksmiths and carpenters. Due to discrimination against them, the Rohingyas have become landless and homeless. Their farm lands are being grabbed by the new Buddhist settlers being invited from within and outside the country. Over and above, high taxation on agricultural produce, continued forced labour and confiscation of farm lands and various restrictions on farming, conspire them to abandon their lands, live below poverty line or face starvation. At present, the number of Rohingya traders and businessmen sharply declined. They are not allowed to do trade and business freely. Sometimes, they require to share their business with the Buddhists giving them lion shares without investment. Ther military regime has prohibited the Rohingyas of their right to freedom of movement within the country, nay within the same locality seriously affecting the socio-cultural, economic, educational activities and daily life of the Rohingyas. The regime has stopped recruitment of Rohingyas even in civil services since 1970s. No Rohingyas are allowed to enter into defense services.

2. Religion, Culture and Civilization of Rohingyas:
Rohingyas are staunch followers of Islam. Most of the elderly Rohingya grow beards and the women wear hijab. All Rohingya houses are surrounded by high bamboo walls. There are mosques and Madrassahs (religious schools) in every quarter and village. The men pray in congregation, where as the female pray at home. There is still in existence of a social bond in every village called "Samaj". All social welfare activities like Adhahi meat distribution, helping the poor, widows, orphans and needy, marriage and funereal functions are done collectingly by the Samaj. The Ulema play a very prominent role particularly in matters relating to persoanal laws, like family affairs of the Rohingyas. Unfortunately, today the cultural problem becomes one of the most important problems of the Rohingyas in Burma. The Muslims have to encounter strong pressure of the Buddhist culture. Particularly the Rohingyas have to confront ideological assault from all directions. The Rohingyas are considered practicing the foreign way of life having no origin in Burma. According to the ruling military the Rohingyas are to adopt and entertain no ideas but those of Burman race and culture and Buddhism.

The Muslims or Rohingyas are told to discard Islamic names and adopt Burman names. Everywhere Muslims' or Islamic are razed to the ground. Hundreds of mosques have been demolished. Construction of new mosques or repairs to the old ones are prohibited. Pagodas, monasteries and Buddhist temples have been erected in every nook and cranny of the Rohingya homeland. Muslim students have been brainwashed in schools where anti-Islamic materials are being taught to them. Islam and Islamic culture are always projected or presented inhumiliating, derogatory, degrading and distorted forms.

3. Education of Rohingya:
Before 1962 military take over Rohingya Muslims did not lag behind their Buddhist sister community .Due to poverty, serious discrimination and continued persecution against them, the number of Rohingya students have declined much. To get admission in colleges and universities for higher studies is a problematic matter for the Rohingyas. Severe restrictions have been imposed on their pursuing professional courses for citizenship question. There are a number of voluntary religious schools educating a good percentage of Rohingya students. However, because of various restrictions, lack of funds and facilities these institutions are unable to modernize the teaching methods thus failing to produce efficient students or manpower for the society. Most of the Rohingyas living in exile have little means to educate their children.

4. Political status of Rohingya:
Prior to 1962 the Rohingya community has been recognized as an indigenous ethnic nationality of Burma. They have their representatives in Burmese parliament and some of them have bean appointed as ministers, parliamentary secretaries and in high government positions. After the military take over they have been systematically deprived of their political rights. With the promulgation of the most controversial and discriminatory citizenship law of 1982 they are declared as "non-national" or "foreign residents". Very much contradictory to their declaration, the military could not disallow the Rohingyas to participate in multi-party elections held in 1990, the result of which was not implemented by the military junta. Today the Rohingyas are living in sub-human condition with uncertain future. They are declared a people fit to be exterminated.

5. Junta's policy towards the Muslims of Burma:
the ruling military junta practices two pronged de-Islamisation policy in Burma: -- physical extermination through genocide and ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims of Arakan and cultural assimilation of Muslims living in other parts of Burma -- Their main objective is to turn strategic Muslim Arakan into a Burmanised Buddhist region by reducing the Muslims into insignificant or manageable minorities.

6 Crimes committed against Rohingyas and present situation:

Arbitrary arrests, torture, summary execution, custodial killings are rampant.
The Rohingyas are engaged in forced unpaid slave labor days in, days out.
Confiscation of farm lands, uprooting of Muslim settlements, eviction of inmates, establishment of new Buddhist settlements on evacuated Muslim land.
Demolishing of mosques, religious schools and erection of pagodas, Buddhist temples with a view to changing the landscape of Arakan.
Rape and dishonouring of women, forced marriage of Muslim women by Buddhists, banning hijab wearing and forced use of contraceptives and imposition of restriction on marriage of Rohingya couples.
Restriction on movement, even from one village to another within the same locality, on socio-cultural and religious activities, trade and business.
Revocation of citizenship depriving the Rohingya of citizenship rights including the right to seek higher and professional education.
Unbearable taxation on all agricultural produces and even on domestic livestocks like cattle, goats, fowls etc.
Uprooting of villages and eviction of inmates creating internal refugees or making them to wander from place to place while causing refugee exoduses off and on in to the neighbouring countries.

9. Refugee exodus:

As a result of physical extermination, ethnic cleansing operations, large scale persecution and uprooting of villages and eviction of inmates, there were unprecedented refugee influxes into Bangladesh once in 1978 and the other in 1991-1992 with constant trickle of refugee exodus all along.. About 1.5 million Rohingyas have so far been evicted from Arakan since the year of Burmese independence in 1948.

Add comment

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
FACTS ABOUT THE ROHINGYA MUSLIMS OF ARAKAN

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
By Nurul IslamPresident Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) Arakan, formerly called Rohang, lies on the north-western part of Burma with 360 miles coastal belt from the Bay of Bengal. It borders 167 miles with Bangladesh both by land and sea. Rohingyas have been living in Arakan from time immemorial.

# data[].attributes.headline
                                  Important Context!

# data[].attributes.subject
                                  Important Context!

# data[].attributes.headline
Rural poverty in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar

# data[].attributes.subject
Rural poverty in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar

# data[].attributes.body
Explains the correlation between agriculture and poverty in Myanmar

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
International Fund for Agricultural Development

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is an international financial institution and a specialized agency of the United Nations dedicated to eradicating poverty and hunger in rural areas of developing countries.

# data[].attributes.headline
Asian Development Bank: Interim Country Partnership Strategy: Myanmar, 2012–2014

# data[].attributes.subject
Asian Development Bank: Interim Country Partnership Strategy: Myanmar, 2012–2014

# data[].attributes.body
Poverty analysis in Myanmar, especially strong in explaining the causes of poverty in Myanmar and statistics relating to the change in poverty levels in twenty regions over five years.

# data[].attributes.headline
Myanmar Signs Cease-Fire With Several Rebel Groups Ahead of Elections

# data[].attributes.subject
Myanmar Signs Cease-Fire With Several Rebel Groups Ahead of Elections

# data[].attributes.body
Up to date information about Myanmar cease-fire, signed with eight out of the fifteen groups originally in talks. An "historic gift" as President Thein Sein says, or a disappointing result for the government?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Myanmar Signs Cease-Fire With Several Rebel Groups Ahead of Elections

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Myanmar signed a cease-fire with just some rebel groups, denying the government a needed political boost three weeks before national elections, as sporadic conflicts continued.

# data[].attributes.headline
Military government vs ethnic groups on Myanmar's borders

# data[].attributes.subject
Military government vs ethnic groups on Myanmar's borders

# data[].attributes.headline
COUNTRY AT A GLANCE (The World Bank and Peace Direct)

# data[].attributes.subject
COUNTRY AT A GLANCE (The World Bank and Peace Direct)

# data[].attributes.body
Population | 53.44 million | 2014
GDP | $64.33 billion | 2014
GDP growth | 8.5% | 2014
Inflation | 5.5% | 2014

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar

Main Language: Burmese Population

Life expectancy at birth: 65 years

Human Development Index 0.49

Global Peace Index 2.5

Corruption Perception Ranking 156/175

http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/myanmar/conflict-profile/

# data[].attributes.body
1057 - King Anawrahta founds the first unified Myanmar state at Pagan and adopts Theravada Buddhism.

1531 - Toungoo dynasty reunites country as Burma.

1885-86 - Burma comes under British rule.

1948 - Burma becomes independent.

1962 - The military junta takes over, initially in the shape of a single-party socialist system.

1990 - Opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) wins landslide victory in elections, but the military ignores the result.

2011 - The military hands over to a nominally civilian government following elections the previous year.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12990563

# data[].attributes.headline
The Landmine Victims of Myanmar’s Civil War

# data[].attributes.subject
The Landmine Victims of Myanmar’s Civil War

# data[].attributes.body
A photo essay documenting the victims of landmines planted by the Myanmar military. These take decades to degrade and are not detectable using metal detectors, making them especially dangerous. The victims are especially from Karen State, where health services are so poor that they are forced to cross the Thai-Myanmar border for treatment.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Landmines have been commonly used by both sides of what has been described as the world's longest running civil war between the Myanmar government and Karen ethnic rebels. While the Karen typically plant homemade mines that degrade after a couple of years, the Myanmar military often uses Chinese mines made out of a plastic polymer that takes decades to degrade and cannot be picked up by ordinary metal detectors.

Today, even in areas where the fighting has subsided since the Karen National Union (KNU) signed a ceasefire in 2012, landmines still linger beneath the ground, waiting for victims.

Because Karen State is known to have some of the worst health care in the world, many landmine victims must travel across the Thai-Myanmar border to seek treatment. Within the refugee camps along the border, some facilities - like the Care Villa for the Blind - provide shelter for landmine victims.

Meanwhile, on the Thai side of the border in Mae Sot, places like the Mae Tao Clinic's Prosthetics Workshop provide treatment completely free of charge. The founder of the clinic, Maw Keh, is a landmine victim himself. A former guerrilla with the KNU, Keh lost his leg during an offensive against Myanmar's military. Though he moved to Australia in 2014, Keh is proud to have started a workshop that serves patients from both sides of the conflict. "We don't care who is our enemy, who is our friend, who is civilian," he says.

The following photos, taken at the Mae Tao Clinic and Care Villa for the Blind, provide a visual look at the human cost of landmines in Myanmar.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The Landmine Victims of Myanmar's Civil War

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Landmines have been commonly used by both sides of what has been described as the world's longest running civil war between the Myanmar government and Karen ethnic rebels. While the Karen typically plant homemade mines that degrade after a couple of years, the Myanmar military often uses Chinese mines made out of a plastic polymer that takes decades to degrade and cannot be picked up by ordinary metal detectors.

# data[].attributes.headline
                                                                                                A Realist Approach to Myanmar

# data[].attributes.subject
                                                                                                A Realist Approach to Myanmar

# data[].attributes.headline
                                                                  A Critical Theory Approach to Myanmar

# data[].attributes.subject
                                                                  A Critical Theory Approach to Myanmar