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Marxism and populism may have something in common only in one respect - they are both about better future. But Marxism propose the way - even if it is wrong - how to achieve that. Populism just promises anything you like

In a socialist society where everybody  hast the same relation to the means of production there is no basis for any explotaion and so there will be a more equal and just society.

https://www.slideshare.net/slipalong/introducing-marxist-media-theory

Modern work is specialized, modern work leads to alienation.

Modern work is insecure capitalism
makes human being utterly expendable, just one factors among
others., bármikor helyetesithető olcsobb munkaerővel vagy géppel , ezert a munkas megijed

Workers get paid little , while capitalist getting richer

Capitalism is unstable- like 2008-as világválság

Capitalist hierarchy teach us to be anxious, competitive , conformist, and politically complacent

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We show that the differential impact of the crisis explains the rise of antiestablishment, often populist, parties, and also the respective drop in trust toward political parties and the European Union. Globalization in gen- eral and the EU in particular have been successful in promoting growth but have not done as well in sharing the gains. Large parts of society have felt left behind and have risen against the establishment, national, and European institutions. The recent vintage of populism unites far-right and radical-left politicians in their criticism of the continent’s elites and of the cross-border integration that these elites represent. In some cases, the rise in unemployment fuels support for far-left parties, such as Podemos in Spain; in other cases, it encourages far-right nationalistic and xenophobic parties, as in Hungary and the Netherlands. Sometimes, rising unemploy- ment fuels support for both radical-left and ultraright nationalistic parties that increasingly coordinate, for example, the coalition between Syriza and the Independent Greeks. 311 o The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism YANN ALGAN

Sciences Po

SERGEI GURIEV

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ELIAS PAPAIOANNOU

London Business School

EVGENIA PASSARI

Université Paris-Dauphine
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/algantextfa17bpea.pdf

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There are two potential explanations for the decline of trust toward the EU, the rise of Eurosceptic populists, and the electoral successes of radical-left and far-right parties. The first one is a cultural backlash against progressive values, such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, and a shift toward national identity. The second explanation emphasizes economic insecurity, stemming from either globalization and technological progress (typified by outsourcing, increased competition from low-wage countries, and automation) or the sharp increase in unemployment in Europe in the aftermath of the recent global financial and economic crisis. Although these two explanations are not mutually exclusive and certainly interact, much of the public debate has been about the cultural backlash. This paper explores the economic roots of populism, focusing on the impact of the Great Recession.

The recent crisis has had a major impact on the European economy. The EU-wide unemployment rate increased from 7 percent in 2007 to 11 percent in 2013. Unemployment dynamics have been uneven. After a short-lived spike in 2008–09, unemployment in Germany fell to pre- crisis levels; in Greece and Spain, it climbed above 20 percent. There has been substantial heterogeneity in unemployment dynamics within the EU periphery and core 310 old. The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism

The people are being fed up by the economic and social policies of the established parties and goverments

In an in eivoremnt where you want a simple, digest message across, these populist are perfect. The media is also helping. For example : Make America Great again.- there is n o substance hear , but we don't have time for substance thank you .

The peoples want reward ant they ,fell they don't get this to being a good citizen.

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As difficult as it is, the best way to cope with populist actors and supporters lies in engaging in an honest dialogue with them. This dialogue should strive not only to better understand the issues that are being politicized by populists, but also to consider how to address these issues within the liberal democratic framework.

Ha kirekesztjük oket a diskurzusbol , jogosan mondhatjak azt , hogy ezek nem hajlandok az emberek  akaratat teljesíteni

Populism and the Question of How to Respond to ItCristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

The Oxford Handbook of populismOxford : Oxford University Press 2017

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The paradox of democratic self-destruction is particularly challenging when it comes to responding to populist forces, which—as noted above—are not against democracy per se, but rather against liberal democracy. Remember that populists neither argue that elections should be proscribed nor are inclined to disrespect the results of elections.² What they claim is that unelected bodies that are intrinsic to the liberal democratic regime have a tendency to run amok and thus protect the interests of (powerful) minorities instead of defending the popular will. Seen in this light, one could maintain that populist actors and constituencies favor vertical accountability at the cost of horizontal accountability. By contrast, those who are at odds with populism normally prefer to invest in horizontal rather than in vertical accountability. To paraphrase the terminology advanced by Dan Slater (2013), the political conflict that emerges here has less to do with consolidating democracy vis-à-vis collapsing into authoritarianism and much more to do with the tension between populist vis-à-vis oligarchic modes of politics.

The Oxford Handbook of populismOxford : Oxford University Press 2017

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In both Brexit and Trump the real factors were the age and education not income.

Therese a division between the younger and the older people.

The older people have a nostalgia for a kind of capitalism that was less multicultural and less global

Theres a division between city and the small town.

Voters started to lineup parties with values than economic preferences - because of this the bond between the workers and social democratic  left has eroded .
The left failed to address value and cultural based issues: Immigration national identity

he Forum 2016; 14(3): 249–264

Populism in American politics

Mark D. Brewer*

DOI 10.1515/for-2016-0021

If there is one thing that appears to connect all of the elements of American populism outlined above it is that populism requires an enemy. This is not to say that America’s populist movements have not been for anything. Indeed, populist efforts in the US have been marked by a diverse array of hopes and goals. But it is absolutely essential for American populism to have something and/or someone to be against, often viscerally against. Hatred may be too strong of a word to use here, but this question is certainly open to debate. 255 oldal

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There are three main reasons for the sharp rise of populism in Europe,” said Cas Mudde, a professor in international affairs at the University of Georgia. “The great recession, which created a few strong left populist parties in the south, the so-called refugee crisis, which was a catalyst for right populists, and finally the transformation of non-populist parties into populist parties – notably Fidesz and Law and Justice [in Poland].”
Paul Lewis, Seán Clarke, Caelainn Barr, Josh Holder and Niko Kommenda
Tue 20 Nov 2018

„Why might Europe have become particularly vulnerable to populist actors since the mid-1970s or so, and in recent years in particular? Some answers might seem obvious: a retrenchment of the welfare state, immigration, and, above all in recent years, the Eurocrisis. But a crisis—whether economic, social, or ultimately also political—does not automatically produce populism in the sense defended in this book (except, possibly, when old party systems are disintegrating). On the contrary, democracies can be said perpetually to create crises and, at the same time, to have the resources and mechanisms for self-correction.27 Rather, at least as far as the current wave of populism in Europe is concerned, I would say that it is the particular approach to addressing the Eurocrisis—for shorthand, technocracy—that is crucial for understanding the present-day rise of populism.
45 oldal”

Kivonat a következőből: Jan-Werner Muller. „What Is Populism?” 2016 University of Pensylvania press

Whether one likes it or not, populists around the world are posing legitimate questions about the current state of liberal democracy. Many citizens are angry at the establishment and feel betrayed by mainstream political forces. To a great extent, this can be explained by the growing influence of unelected bodies and the concurrently declining power of politicians. Although elected leaders can make important decisions, their maneuvering rooming is increasingly limited by unelected institutions, which in theory are autonomous and contribute to the provision of public goods. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances unelected bodies can run amok and favor the interests of powerful minorities (Dahl, 1989). Consider the inability of the European Union to tame capital to generate social peace. As Wolfgang Streeck (2014) has pointed out, even though the deregulation and liberalization of financial markets promoted by the European Union is one of the main causes of the Great Recession, the European Union has imposed austerity measures rather than forcing the financial industry to assume a significant part of the costs of the Great Recession.

Populism and the Question of How to Respond to ItCristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

The Oxford Handbook of populismOxford : Oxford University Press 2017

. It is now evident that populism draws strength from public opposition to mass immigration, cultural liberalization, and the perceived surrender of national sovereignty to distant and unresponsive international bodies. If economic arguments had determined the outcome of the Brexit vote, Britain would have remained in the EU.

The rise of the populist right has coincided with a catastrophe for the center-left.

Under pressure, center-right parties have felt compelled to adjust by shifting toward populist policies and rhetoric.
The rise of European populism and the collapse of the center-left

William A. Galston

Thursday, March 8, 2018

It is, of course, no coincidence that the wave of populist nationalism now breaking over the West began in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, when millions of working- and middle-class voters lost savings, jobs, and future prospects. But the wave engulfed liberal politics even where economic pillars remained intact. Poland was Eastern Europe’s economic engine—its Germany—when the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party defeated the classically liberal Civic Platform in 2015. Civic Platform Prime Minister Donald Tusk had described his platform as the maintenance of “warm water in the tap.” When I was in Warsaw the following year, Konstanty Gebert, a columnist and former Solidarity leader, said to me, “He thought that was enough, but he was wrong. People wanted history, they wanted glory, they wanted meaning. And PiS offered a meaning. Their meaning was, ‘We’ll make Poland great again.’”

Bannon has claimed that the American electorate is dividing between “nationalists” and “cosmopolitans.” Trump plainly agrees, and he knows his base. A 2017 survey found that “fears about immigrants and cultural displacement were more powerful factors than economic concerns in predicting support for Trump among white working-class voters.” Almost half of such voters agreed with the statement, “things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own country”—an echo of the title of Arlie Russell Hochschild’s study of working-class

The Economic Crisis Is Over. Populism Is Forever

JAMES TRAUB | OCTOBER 31, 2018, .

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A populizmus a vilag minden táján fellelhető.A különbőző földrészek populizmusai nemcsak térben, de történelmi gyökereikben, szerkezeti felépitésükben  is eltérnek egymástól. Ezért megkülönböztethetjük az
Észak -Amerikai
Dél-Amerikai
Eurázsiai ( európai, szovjet utódállamok)
populizmusokat.

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Populizmus két fajtája az új ember

Cas mudde Thin centerd ideology : Corrupt elite vs the ordinary man
"thinideology"-nak, azaz „keskeny ideológiának” nevez1, amelynek egy "korlátozott magja van, amely a politikai fogalmak szűk köréhez kapcsolódik"2. Konkrétumokra lefordítva ez azt jelenti, hogy nincs például populista egészség-, oktatás- vagy adópolitika. Egy adott populistának természetesen lehetnek fix viszonyulásai ezen témákhoz, de nem ezek az ideológiai viszonyulások kötik őt össze a többi populistával...... Stanley Ben and Michael Freeden

„Like the term fascism, the term populism has been abused equally as a condensation of extremes from right to left. It has been inflated or conflated with anything that stands against liberal democracy. For example, politicians like Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto or the former British prime minister Tony Blair (notably, after the British “Brexit” of 2016) charged that populism was standing against the neoliberal status quo that they so passionately represented. In fact, this tendency to paint populism as an unproblematized negative take on democracy reveals a simplistic, and often self-serving, identification of democracy with neoliberalism.”

Kivonat a következőből: Finchelstein, Federico;. „From Fascism to Populism in History”. 292?

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A „hétköznapi ember" - ha megvan a józan esze - ösztönösen érti a világ működési mechanizmusát és van túlélési ösztöne, jobban kiérdemli a bizalmat, mint a „képzett elit". E logika mentén, valamint azon meggyőződés alapján, hogy az emberi értelem és erény az egyes emberek e tulajdonságainak összessége, az a nézet alakult ki, hogy minél tanulatlanabbak az emberek, annál inkább képesek eldönteni egyes kérdéseket, sőt jobban is, mint a tanultak.

A populizmus másik válfaja az emberek széles körű tudatlanságának kihasználásán alapul. Ebben az esetben a politikusok a hétköznapi emberek érzelmeire hatnak, és a tanulatlan emberek támogatását akarják megszerezni még olyan esetekben is, amikor ezek egyáltalán nem rendelkeznek azzal a tudással, amelynek birtokában ésszerű döntést lennének képesek hozni. Támogatásuk elnyerése érdekében a politikusok gyakran fordulnak a demagógia, a félelem és az előítélet eszközeihez. A populizmus e fajtája arról árulkodik, hogy a politikai elit ezen része lenézi a „hétköznapi embereket". Véleményük szerint a politika túl összetett és bonyolult, semhogy a hétköznapi emberek megérthetnék. Bár a hétköznapi emberek politikai részvétele a demokratikus berendezkedésű társadalmakban döntő fontosságú, a politikai elit nem tart igényt arra, hogy az emberek megértsék a dolgokat, inkább a választók indulatait szítja. „A kedvesség és a racionális párbeszéd eszközeivel értelmes emberek esetében szoktunk élni, a társadalommal való párbeszédben azonban ezeknek semmi hasznát nem vesszük" - írta egykor egy liberális politikus. „Úgy vélem, az a probléma, hogy liberálisként általánosságban intelligensebbek, megfontoltabbak és képzettebbek vagyunk, ezért többet engedünk meg magunknak annak érdekében, hogy meggyőzzük a társadalmat arról, hogy a mi tiszta és jól megfogalmazott érvelésünk logikus és igaz."

Nem azért idézem ezeket a szavakat, hogy elítéljem a liberális politikusokat, inkább hogy rávilágítsak arra, hogy a jelenlegi politikai színtéren a populizmus jelensége jóval túlmutat a konkrét ideológiák és politikai rendszerek kontextusán; általánosságban a politikai kultúra egy vetületének tekinthető. Mind a revolúciós, mind a reakciós populizmusra hozhatnánk példákat, amely hol bal-, hol jobboldalról, hol pedig középről indult. Néha nehéz belátnunk, hogy a démosz („köznép") a populista szólamoknak enged: nemcsak akkor, amikor nem a mi szájízünk szerint szavaz, de akkor is, amikor teljes mértékben azonosul a mi elképzeléseinkkel. Ezért van az, hogy egyesek az ellentmondás felismerése nélkül képesek lelkesedni Barack Obamának a republikánusok populizmusa feletti diadaláért, ugyanakkor sopánkodni a populizmus kaliforniai győzelmén, ahol ugyanazok az emberek, akik megválasztottak egy fekete bőrű elnököt, egy népszavazás során az azonos neműek házassága ellen voksoltak.

A populizmus népszerűsége közvetlenül kapcsolódik a médiafelhajtáshoz. Az emberek logikus gondolkodásra való képességét leépítő televízió és más vizuális médiumok hatására a nyugati társadalom posztracionális korszak felé tart. A politikusoknak nehéz ellenállniuk a populizmus kísértésének, amikor média befolyásolta választókkal kell párbeszédet folytatniuk, közben pedig rendelkezésükre állnak ezek a hatásos és erős eszközök - különösen akkor, ha politikai ellenfeleik sem állnak ellent e kísértésnek.

Eszerint elkerülhetetlen számunkra a populizmus? XVI. Benedek pápa tanításaiban két „biztosítékot&quot; találunk, amelyek megvédhetik a demokráciát, hogy tébolyult államformává váljék. Az egyik a transzcendens felé nyitott elme, a másik a természetjog, amelyet az igaz elme képes felismerni.

(A szerző az Európai Unió Püspöki Konferenciáinak Tanácsa /COMECE/ új főtitkára, cikke a szervezet havilapja, a Europe Infos 111. számában jelent meg.)

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A „hétköznapi ember" - ha megvan a józan esze - ösztönösen érti a világ működési mechanizmusát és van túlélési ösztöne, jobban kiérdemli a bizalmat, mint a „képzett elit". E logika mentén, valamint azon meggyőződés alapján, hogy az emberi értelem és erény az egyes emberek e tulajdonságainak összessége, az a nézet alakult ki, hogy minél tanulatlanabbak az emberek, annál inkább képesek eldönteni egyes kérdéseket, sőt jobban is, mint a tanultak.

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1. nem önálló politikai ideológia ugyan, de egyfajta politikai jelenség, aminek lényege a fellelhető empirikus elemzések szerint sem szociálpszichológiai, sem osztályalapon nem ragadható meg.
2.A populizmusnak ugyanis nincs a társadalmi státusz, vagy a szociális helyzet szempontjából markánsan elkülönülő, jellemző bázisa.
3.van belső, konzisztens logikája, ami a politikáról alkotott morális képből ered;

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Technocrats – again, this is a crude characterization but also not a complete caricature – will hold that there is only one rational solution to a particular policy challenge (think of the German government’s stance during the Eurocrisis). Citizens, and parliaments, can only really consent to such solutions; there is simply no room for reasonable debate. Whoever opposes such policies reveals themselves to be irrational. This stance makes it easy for populists to exclaim: “Where are the people in all this? How can there be a democracy without choices?” To be sure, as has hopefully become clear enough in this chapter, populists are not really advocates of more participation by “ordinary people.” And if citizens actually flock to populists under such circumstances, technocrats will feel further justified in taking as many decisions as possible away from the people. A vicious circle ensues.

Both Tecrocacy and populism they are both form of anti pluralism. . Technocrats hold that there’s only one correct policy solution; populists claim that there is only one authentic will of the people (and only they represent it); whoever disagrees with them, reveals themselves as traitor to the people. For both sides, there is no point in exchanging arguments, no space for debate, and, in the end, no real need for an institution like parliament. In short: both pose dangers to democracy, and the fact that they can perversely reinforce each other compounds the peril.

The Rise and Rise of Populism?

Jan-Werner Müller
Open mind https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BBVA-OpenMind-Jan-Werner-Muller-The-Rise-and-Rise-of-Populism-1.pdf

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1.A török-amerikai sztárközgazdász Dani Rodrik  már a kilencvenes években is kritizálta a globalizációt, amikor a nyugati közgazdászok zöme még a minél gyorsabb világszintű gazdasági integrációt szorgalmazta. A professzor munkásságának mérföldköve, hogy a 2000-es években megalkotta a globalizációs trilemma koncepcióját, ami lényegében azt állítja, hogy a jól működő demokratikus intézmények, a nemzetállami felépítés és a hiperglobalizáció egyszerűen nem összeegyeztethető egymással.

rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the left-behinds has fueled popular resentment of the political classes. This situation is believed to have made the less secure strata of society – low-waged unskilled workers, the long-term unemployed, households dependent on shrinking social benefits, residents of public housing, single-parent families, and poorer white populations living in inner-city areas with concentrations of immigrants-- susceptible to the anti-establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering exploited of populist movements, parties, and leaders, blaming ‘Them’ for stripping prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from ‘Us’.  2oldal
Robert F ingkehart and Pippa Norris

The Deep Causes of Secular Stagnation and the Rise of Populismby James Montier, Philip Pilkington of GMO, 3/2
Looking at this chart, it is not hard to see why people tend to blame their economic problems on migrants. We have already seen that unemployment has reached structurally higher levels after the Golden Age of capitalism. This has been accompanied by increases in net migration into the US. It is not difficult to understand why unemployed people would tend to take this correlation to imply causation and blame their joblessness or job insecurity on migration.

But the key impact that globalisation has had on working people is not to encourage the free movement of labour, but rather to encourage the free movement of goods and services. This has both pros and cons. On the pro front, the US consumer has benefited from lower prices. The cons include reduced domestic demand and job losses.

This is reflected in the rhetoric of many populist campaigners who tell their constituents that globalisation has served to take their jobs and create unemployment.

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A nemzetközi gazdasági és politikai intézményrendszerek, és általánosságban a Nyugat jövőjéről három szcenáriót vázolt fel a közgazdász:

A rossz forgatókönyv szerint az 1920-as évekhez hasonlóan összeomlik a globális kooperáció, keményvonalas jobb- és baloldali kormányok emelkednek fel.

A csúnya forgatókönyv alapján populista és protekcionista erők törnek előre, amik teljesen szétforgácsolják mind a liberális demokráciákat, mind a nyílt világgazdaságot.

A jó forgatókönyv alapján az államok visszalépnek a hiperglobalizációtól, és bizonyos mértékig visszaveszik a nemzeti önrendelkezésüket.Dani Rodrik

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A súlyos társadalmi és gazdasági problémák is erősítik a populista politikusok felemelkedését. Az első populista mozgalmat, ami az Egyesült Államokban a 19. század végén volt aktív. A populistákat főként egzisztenciális nehézségekkel küzdő nyugati és déli farmerek támogatták. Az 1896-os választáson a demokrata jelölt, William J. Bryan a populisták színeiben is indult, és az egyik fő kampányígérete egy olyan „bimetallikus pénzrendszer” kialakítása volt, ami  gerjesztett inflációval pörgette volna fel a gazdaságot.

Daniel Rodrik

1.    bár a modern populizmus a fasizmusból ered, de a a populizmus hívei is alkalmazkodó- és tanulóképességükről tettek tanúbizonyságot, aminek eredményeképpen a populizmus mára már esszenciálisan különbözik a fasizmustól.

2.a fasizmus diktatórikus keretek közötti újbóli megvalósítása a megváltozott ideológiai térben immáron ellehetetlenült. A legitimitás és a hatalom megszerzésére csak demokratikus keretek között nyílik lehetőség, így a főleg Dél-Amerikában megjelenő populista rendszerek tulajdonképpen a fasizmus demokratikus újratervezésén alapulnak. ( dél-amerikai populizmusok és történetük külön fejezet)

3.A bipoláris világrendben pedig a populizmus egyfajta ideológiai harmadik útnak feleltethető meg, a liberális és a kommunista tömbök között, ami egyben a társadalmak válaszreakciója volt 1945 után, ugyanúgy mint napjainkban.
Válaszreakció a liberális demokráciák gyenge pontjaira, amely hangsúlyozottan demokratikus keretek között a képviseleti rendszer „korrekciójára” irányul.

Federico Finchelstein Returning Populism to History

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Politikai pártok válsága, politkai elitek

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Politikai pártok válsága, politkai elitek

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These voters are correct when they say that the West’s political systems have become less representative of their views because, on balance, they have. The proportions of degree-holders and affluent politicians who sit in legislatures are at record highs, while the proportions of politicians with working-class backgrounds are at record lows. Ensuring that our institutions are representative of all groups is another helpful response, as is involving citizens in decisions about these issues, for example through greater democratic innovation.

Matthew Goodwin is professor of politics at the University of Kent

NewStatesman 3’d of October 2018

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Social media : „Over the last years, a slew of writers have compared the invention of digital technology—and especially of social media—to the invention of the printing press. In Clay Shirky’s words, “you used to have to own a radio tower or television tower or printing press. Now all you have to have is access to an Internet café or a public library, and you can put your thoughts out in public.”3 Heather Brooke makes much the same point even more concisely: “Our printing press,” she wrote, “is the Internet. Our coffee houses are social networks.”

„The Revenge of Techno Pessimists”
„Throughout Trump’s unlikely campaign, it was obvious what an important role social media was playing in his ability to bypass the traditional gatekeepers of American politics. In an earlier age, television networks would likely have refused to air his blatant lies or his tirades against immigrants, religious minorities, and political opponents. But thanks to Twitter, Donald Trump did not need the infrastructure of traditional media outlets. Instead, he could tweet messages directly to his millions of followers. Once he had done so, established broadcasters faced a stark choice: ignore the main subject of conversation and make yourself irrelevant—or discuss each Tweet at length, thereby amplifying Trump’s message even as they ostensibly scrutinized it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they chose the latter course of action.18”

Kivonat a következőből: Yascha Mounk. „The People vs. Democracy”. Apple Books.

However, to be effective, the leadership of a populist movement has to consider employing media management techniques that respond to the increasing professionalization of political action. Not all populist leaders use the sophisticated means that presidents, prime ministers and other major politicians employ in modern political warfare or make recourse to the ‘scientific engineering and targeting of messages’ (Bennett and Manheim, 2001: 282). Rather, in general, the communication strategies of populist leaders and movements include:

1. playing the role of the underdog; 2. use of professional expertise;

Populism and the Media 55

56 Twenty-First Century Populism3. rallies;
4. free media publicity;
5. staging events; and
6. tactical attacks on the media.(Stewart, Mazzoleni and Horsfield, 2003)Playing on an underdog status is an uncertain strategy as it is not always successful. Le Pen and Bossi have paradoxically gained more support when targeted by unfriendly news coverage. In various elections, Silvio Berlusconi has cleverly exploited the aggressive hostility of the liberal Italian press and his supposed ‘demonization’ by the opposition. Like Berlusconi, Haider and Le Pen have also used professional media relations advisers and, in so doing, have succeeded in getting less hostile coverage. Similarly, in Belgium, theVlaams Blok benefited from a professional leadership, strong and verbally skilled politicians and a pronounced communication strategy – perfectly suited to striking the anti-political chords of the population (Jagers and Walgrave, 2003).
55-56

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Populist leaders present themselves as the voice of the people

They craft an image as man of action rather than worlds , who is not afraid to take difficult and quick decisions.

Women populist can use their genes , as an outsider.

Another groups of populist are the enterpentaurs- billionares.

Trump, Berlusconi, Ross Petrot.

They present themselves , as businessman who made the fortune not because of the corrupt elite, but because they are self made mens. 71
Case Mudde and Cristobal Kaltweisser : A very short in troduction

This principled anti-pluralism then also explains

why populists so frequently oppose the, so to speak,

morally correct outcome of a vote to the actual empir-

ical outcome of an election, when the latter was not in

their favor (which, of course, is a variation on contrast-

ing the general will and the will of all). Think of Victor

Orban claiming after losing the 2002 Hungarian elec-

tions that “the nation cannot be in opposition”; or think

of Andes Manuel Lopez Obrador, arguing, after his

failed bid for the Mexican presidency in 2006, that “the

victory of the right is morally impossible” (and declar-

ing himself “the legitimate president of Mexico”)

32

;or

think of Recep Tayyip Erdogan insisting in the face of

rather strong empirical evidence that Turkish citizens

were

protesting against his policies in Gezi Park that

the protesters did not belong to the Turkish people. In

short, the logic of populism is not: we are the 99%.

It is: we are the 100%.
487 oldal
The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People”:

Reflections on Populism

One in four Europeans vote populist

Continent-wide, however, the picture is unambiguous: 12.5 million Europeans lived in a country with at least one populist cabinet member in 1998; in 2018, that has risen more than tenfold, to 170.2 million.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist

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A populizmus legfőbb toposzai azaz "elvei"

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A populizmus legfőbb toposzai azaz "elvei"

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1. A populista vezető politikájának erkölcsi alapját elsősorban a népakaratnak a korrupt,  társadalmon belül kisebbségben lévő elitekkkel szembeni érvényesítése adja.
2.„a hard working people” akaratának pedig csak akkor lehet érvényt szerezni, ha minden északpolitikai kérdést végső soron a józan észre vezetünk vissza, ez viszont logikusan magával vonja a különböző policy-k leegyszerűsítését.
3.a populista vezető támogatója a képviseleti
rendszernek, s egyáltalán nem törekszik a politikai részvétel deliberatív formáinak elterjesztésére. A képviseleti rendszer, a
populista szerint is, a leghatékonyabb módja a népakarat megjelenítésének, a probléma csak az, hogy az elitek visz-
szaélnek/éltek a rendszeren belüli pozícióikkal. Ebből kifolyólag az optimális választói magatartás, ha a polgárok a kép-
viselőválasztáson nagy felhatalmazást adnak a populista pártoknak, utána viszont passzivitásba fordulnak. A populista logikája szerint így garantált leginkább az általa megtestesített és visszaigazolt népakarat és közjó érvényre juttatása.
4. hogy nincs értelme a közjóval szembeni rivális politikai alternatívák megjelenítésének, ezért a populista szükségszerűen antipluralista attitűdökkel
rendelkezik. Mindennek értelmében az alternatív politikát folytató ellenzéki szereplők a populista szempontjából morális
alap nélkül tevékenykednek, így legitimitásukat folyamato-
san megkérdőjelezi, a demokratikus játékszabályok tisztelete és betartása mellett (legalitás).
5.A populista erőknek tehát
„nem marad más választásuk” mint a korrupt és partikuláris  érdekeket képviselő elitek eltávolítása az államapparátusból, amivel párhuzamosan megindulhat a saját klientúra kiépítése. A populista az állam megszállását, saját olvasatában, morálisan indokolt okokból hatja végre, a korrupt elitek
helyébe a populista céljait, vagyis a közjót szem előtt tartó„autentikus”, „hiteles” személyeket helyezve.

Jan-Werner
Müller „The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People: Reflections on Populism”

6. Az ellenség kijelölése mindegyik populis-
ta mozgalom számára létkérdés, hogy legyen mivel szemben meghatároznia magát, és legyen mivel szemben mozgósítania a társadalmat. Láthattuk, hogy az oligarchia léte kielégíti ezt a populista igényt.

Ritchie Savage: A demokrácia előszobája?

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In 2017 Ipsos Mori surveyed nearly 18,000 voters in 25 countries. It found that 43 per cent of the British, 54 per cent of Hungarians and 63 per cent of Italians believed that “immigration is causing my country to change in ways that I do not like”. The percentage of people who agreed that “traditional parties and politicians don’t care about people like me” ranged from a low of 44 per cent in Sweden to 61 per cent in Poland and 67 per cent in France.

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1. A nemzetközi közgazdaságtan doktrínái szerint:
-  a vámhatárok lebontása növeli az össztársadalmi jólétet, ezért az IMF, a Világbank és általában a nyugati működő tőke irányítói is sokáig ezt követelték meg a feltörekvő országoktól a beáramló dollármilliárdokért cserébe; de voltak más követelmények is, főként - -makrogazdasági célszámok, melyeket a Washingtoni konszenzus pontjaiban foglaltak össze. Rodrik munkáiban úgy ítéli meg, hogy ez a fejlesztési modell egyértelműen megbukott.

2. Valóban növekedést hoz a globalizáció, de egyben  jelentős társadami újraelosztással jár együtt, azaz vannak a folyamatnak abszolút vesztesei is. A neoliberális közgazdászok szerint a kompenzációkkal ezeket a problémákat át lehet hidalni, a professzor szerint nem ilyen egyszerű a helyzet. Miközben a tőke rugalmas és gyorsan alkalmazkodik a világpiaci változásokhoz, addig a munkaerő általában helyhez kötött.

A világgazdaság nemzetállamok közötti viszonyt hoz létre

Szabad tőke kivitel , szabad munka áramlás , nemzetközi tőzsdék

What is driving the people of resurgence of populism  both to the right and left is the failure of the neoliberal economic model

Neoliberalism in developed world democracies has delivered almost no improvements., in terms of income in many ordinary people

After 2008 many people felt left behind by governments and parties

the peoples looking into the elitist politicians and they fell , that these politicians have no duty to communicate or to live similar life

„Like the term fascism, the term populism has been abused equally as a condensation of extremes from right to left. It has been inflated or conflated with anything that stands against liberal democracy. For example, politicians like Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto or the former British prime minister Tony Blair (notably, after the British “Brexit” of 2016) charged that populism was standing against the neoliberal status quo that they so passionately represented. In fact, this tendency to paint populism as an unproblematized negative take on democracy reveals a simplistic, and often self-serving, identification of democracy with neoliberalism.”

Kivonat a következőből: Finchelstein, Federico;. „From Fascism to Populism in History”. 3oldal

Branko Milanovic közgaszdász : Elefánt ábra
Az ázsiai középosztálynak tenyleg jobb lett, a leggazdagabbak még gazdagabbak lettek. Azonban a nyugati munkásoknak nem lett jobb .Inkább szavaztak egy valósághősre mint valaki olyanra akik felmondtak a regi lecke

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Image

The chart published in 2013 by the economists Branco Milanovic and Christoph Lakner showing global income gains from 1988 to 2008. It has become known as the elephant graph. Credit Credit Christoph Lakner and Branko Milanovic; Peterson Institute for International Economics

LONDON - It's one of the most celebrated graphs ever produced by economists.

The chart, first published in 2013 by Branko Milanovic and Christoph Lakner using data from the World Bank, shows global income gains from 1988 to 2008. The graph climbs sharply on the left, indicating how outcomes improved in the developing world from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession. Further to the right, it shows how equivalent outcomes declined dramatically for the working and middle classes in the developed world, but soared for the planet's wealthiest 1 percent. This arrestingly unequal pattern of global income distribution has become known, famously (at least to economists), as the elephant graph.

What does this have to do with the art market? Well, pretty much everything. A decade after the fall of Lehman Brothers and Damien Hirst's era-defining " Beautiful Inside My Head Forever" auction at Sotheby's, the art market remains one of the most glaringly visible symptoms of global income inequality.

"High-value celebrity art is completely disconnected from the everyday world," said Stephen Bayley, a cultural commentator based in London. "It only exists for the very, very, very rich. Art is a new financial asset class, and this has altered the perspective of the more modest buyer."

The elephant trunk of "ultrahigh net worth individuals" continues to push the prices of art trophies to unprecedented highs, while the West's beleaguered middle class, for a variety of financial and cultural reasons, is spending less on art and collectibles. The closure last year of the Christie's auction rooms in the South Kensington district of London, which catered to those more modest buyers, was a sign of these changing times. Decorative arts such as antique furniture and ceramics - the traditional bread and butter of an auction house - raised $118.2 million at Christie's sales in 2017, according to a company spokeswoman. This represented less than 2 percent of the company's annual sales.

Image

The Fileman Antiques booth at the LAPADA Art & Antiques Fair in London. Credit Fileman Antiques

"People of a certain generation have done their collecting. We're waiting for the next generation to come through. But the disposable income just isn't there," said Adam Fileman, a director of Fileman Antiques, one of 114 exhibitors this month at the 10th edition of the LAPADA art and antiques fair in Berkeley Square, half a mile from where, a decade earlier, Mr. Hirst's two-day "Beautiful" sale raised $200 million.

Fileman is a 120-year-old family dealership specializing in antique glass and chandeliers, based in Sussex, in southern England. Nowadays, with domestic demand reduced, virtually all purchases of more than 10,000 pounds, or about $13,200, are made by foreign buyers, usually for chandeliers and usually via the internet, Mr. Fileman said.

Prices on his booth ranged from £320 for an engraved 18th-century drinking glass, to £120,000 for a George III chandelier. "It's a weird atmosphere," Mr. Fileman said on the Sunday of the fair. "People are walking round, but they're not really buying."

It's no secret that the antiques, a once-ubiquitous element of comfortable middle-class homes, have fallen out of favor, and this latest iteration of the London fair wasn't helped by the lingering uncertainty that Brexit negotiations are casting over the British economy.

Yet the lower end of the market also remains a cause for concern in more fashionable areas.

In June, an international team of economists published the World Inequality Report, which revised the Milanovic and Lakner graph, extending the period to 2016. These calculations, using different data, found the global 1 percent even more dominant, capturing more than double the income growth of the bottom 50 percent from 1980 to2016. The elephant had turned into the Loch Ness monster.

A drawing from the "Tech World Tarot Series" by Mieke Marple, an artist represented by the San Francisco gallery, Ever Gold [Projects]. Credit Mieke Marple/Ever Gold [Projects]

Much of that high net worth has been generated by "liquidity events" - such as a company buyout or cashed-in shares - rather than salaries. These windfalls allow today's wealthy to buy bigger-ticket art by established names from the outset, bypassing lower value entry-level sales. This is one reason smaller contemporary galleries have been struggling.

Jarvis Dooney, for example, is a five-year-old gallery in Berlin that specializes in contemporary photography and video by artists from Australia and New Zealand. The gallery co-founder Michael Dooney said his typical client was a "standard middle-class earner" buying editioned works priced between 1,000 and 5,000 euros, about $1,200 to $6,000. After an encouraging 2013, Mr. Dooney said that sales at his gallery and others in Berlin have become progressively "fewer and farther between." He acknowledged that his inventory falls below the price range of "investment" pieces.

"But if you're middle class, €5,000 is a lot," Mr. Dooney said. "You want to know if it's going to hold its value."

This lower-value segment of the market is under pressure. Would-be collectors in the "squeezed middle" have become as concerned about investment as everyone else, and art and antiques in the $500 to $5,000 range offer uncertain returns.

Then why not simply enjoy owning art that you like? Well, even the concept of ownership has become problematic.

Photographs by the Australian artist Kate Robertson will be presented by the Berlin gallery Jarvis Dooney in September. Credit Kate Robertson/Jarvis Dooney

"People, particularly younger people, have much less desire to own stuff," said Mr. Bayley, the cultural critic. "There's consumer fatigue. And if you're never going to be able to afford to buy a house, what's the point of buying the stuff that goes in a house?"

And yet dealers and auction houses keep plugging away, coming up with new initiatives and strategies to keep the grass roots of the market alive, if not verdantly green.

"I show a lot of emerging artists, and under $20,000 is definitely the harder market," said Andrew McClintock, director of Ever Gold [Projects] in San Francisco. "It's always been a struggle."

But unlike Berlin, the San Francisco Bay Area is awash with tech wealth, some of which is trickling to California's contemporary art dealers.

Enigmatic drawings of tech-inspired tarot cards by Mieke Marple (who also formerly co-owned Los Angeles's trendy Night Gallery) are currently among Mr. McClintock's best sellers in the $3,000 to $10,000 range, he said, adding that younger collectors were encouraged by flexible payment plans and invoices payable in cryptocurrency. "Gallerists need to start thinking of themselves as entrepreneurs, not sit around waiting for a client to walk in the door," Mr. McClintock said.

Bonhams has relied on lower- and middle-range art and antiques, plus classic cars. Credit Grant Smith/Bonhams

And then there is Bonhams, a London-based international auction house whose business model has (so far) relied on traditional lower and middle range art and antiques, plus classic cars, rather than the celebrity end of the contemporary market. Last year, Bonhams took £450 million, or about $600 million, in sales, according to a spokeswoman. Christie's raised $6.6 billion.

This month, Bonhams was bought for an undisclosed sum by the British private equity company Epiris. The Financial Times questioned how the auction house could achieve significant growth, given its reliance on a stagnant middle market and lack of an online sales strategy.

Owen Wilson, a partner at Epiris, was more upbeat. "Bonhams is a global business operating in a market with long-term structural growth and high barriers to entry," Mr. Wilson said in a statement. "It is a platform with extensive scope for transformation through investment."

A spokeswoman for Epiris declined to comment further.

But for would-be middle class collectors, the "barriers to entry" at Bonhams and other businesses trying to sell art and collectibles valued at less than $20,000 - or even less than $5,000 - remain relatively low. Yet there is an obstacle.

An elephant is standing in the way.

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LONDON - It's one of the most celebrated graphs ever produced by economists. The chart, first published in 2013 by Branko Milanovic and Christoph Lakner using data from the World Bank, shows global income gains from 1988 to 2008.

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1 Stanley, Ben. The thin ideology of populism. Journal of Political Ideologies, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2008, 108. oldal.
2 Michael Freeden. Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? Political Studies, 46: 4, 1998, 750. oldal.

3. Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kaltwasser

4.Federico Finchelstein Returning Populism to History

5. Populism

A very short introduction

Oxford university press 2017

3 oldal
Robert F.Inglehart and Pippa Norris

Harvard Kennedy School August 2016  RWP16-026
2 oldal
7.Jan-Werner Müller „The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People: Reflections on Populism”

Matthew Goodwin is professor of politics at the University of Kent

NewStatesman 3’d of October 2018

The Deep Causes of Secular Stagnation and the Rise of Populismby James Montier, Philip Pilkington of GMO, 3/2
8.Ritchie Savage
A DEMOKRÁCIA ELŐSZOBÁJA?

One in four Europeans vote populist  Paul Lewis, Seán Clarke, Caelainn Barr, Josh Holder and Niko Kommenda

Tue 20 Nov 2018 The guardian