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Uber is a well-known ride-hailing company with over 9 million customers and over 3.5 million drivers. Uber's surge pricing approach in India has been criticized and challenged. While surge pricing is intended to balance supply and demand during peak hours, it has received substantial criticism from riders who believe it results in exorbitant costs. Some argue that surge pricing can be exploitative, leaving riders with few affordable options during critical times.

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I. What happened

Uber is a well-known app providing ride-hailing services, with businesses operating around the world. It is a rather new business model - "the sharing economy" which matches up taxi passengers and drivers. In India before 2016 when price used to be unregulated, as opposed to the traditional taxi service providers mandated to charge fares below a certain threshold, Uber was free to set its price based on its dynamic pricing mechanism that could automatically adjust the price according to real-time demand and supply in a locality. At peak hours, Uber's fare could jump several times the regular rate. Such jumps concerned the Karnataka government of India.

II. Price ceiling

The Karnataka government imposed a price ceiling on app-based taxi services including Uber, which mandated that air-conditioned cabs and non-air-conditioned cabs will be not able to charge more than Rs 19.50 and Rs 14.5 per kilometre respectively. The policy was intended to ensure competitive fares between online and offline taxi players by restricting the pricing of all players in the market. The policy did not mean a ban on surge pricing of Uber entirely, but merely a ceiling. Compared to Uber's cheapest service starting at Rs 7/km at that time, the cap still allowed the company to raise fares almost 3 times higher.

III. Consequences

As the price went down, more passengers who once deemed Uber's services too costly wanted to ride out, but fewer drivers were incentivized to provide their services because of a lower return. The outcome was that passengers needed to wait longer to get a Uber. The winner would likely be those with patience and lower time cost, while those who did not want to wait might take alternatives like walking, taking a bus or metro. As a result, fewer people could get Uber's services, whereas those who had the service benefited from cheaper fares.

IV. Economics

Economic theories tell us that a price ceiling may not be beneficial to consumers. Let's assume the Uber pricing mechanism could always set at a market-clearing price where the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied. First of all, the price cut of Uber services means a drop of quantity supplied which will lead to a shortage in the market. That means some passengers willing to take a cap now fail to find any. Besides, some passengers, who are willing to pay a higher price and would have otherwise gotten the service under no price ceiling, can no longer get the service by bidding up the price. They are forced to compete in non-price forms like patience.

A price ceiling could not eliminate the scarcity of goods and services. The demand for Uber services still exists and buyers have to compete for it in other forms. In case of a shortage when price competition is forbidden, non-price rationing becomes an alternative method for resource allocation. Relationship, social class, violence and patience some alternative criteria for rationing. Take relationships as an example. Recognizing there are tons of consumers waiting for an Uber, drivers may want to prioritize the calls of relatives or close friends, leaving the ordinary consumers less chance of getting a cab.

While drivers are not allowed to adjust the price, they can always cut costs in other aspects. The price ceiling leads to a deterioration of quality. For example, although those who manage to get a cab could enjoy a lower price, free tissue provided before may be gone and the interior of the cab may not be as clean as before. The costs saved by cutting the free tissue and reducing the cleaning frequency are used to compensate for the reduction in fare.

The price ceiling will also decrease long run supply. Entrepreneur will devote themselves to a project that could generate the highest return. The price ceiling dampens the profitability. More entrepreneurs will shift to alternative investments. In the case of Uber in India, they may want to buy a truck to provide delivery services without a price cap rather than buying a private car to be an Uber driver. As a result, the supply of Uber will decrease in the long run.

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I. What happened Uber is a well-known app providing ride-hailing services, with businesses operating around the world. It is a rather new business model - "the sharing economy" which matches up taxi passengers and drivers.

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In the USA there has been a recent act that has been passed in 2022. It's called the IRA or the Inflation Reduction tax. Before the IRA there were many limitations of the subsidies granted for electric vehicles. The IRA was created to overcome these limitations and make these incentives/subsidies more accessible to the people who purchase electric vehicles.

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Inflation Reduction Act: Electric Vehicle Subsidies for Passenger Vehicles

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The Inflation Reduction Act works to expand the tax credit for electric passenger vehicle purchases. However, some of its key clauses are likely to make it harder to take advantage of the credit for at least a few years.

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Due to the economic event, the price floor, imposed by the Japanese government, pork prices were raised to ¥380 a kg from ¥365, and for beef, it raised to ¥790 a kg from ¥780. In Japan's past, they have had many disruptions in the global market chain due to imports of meat products. This government intervention, the price floor, was set to reduce Japan's reliance on imported meat products. The price floor also sought to strengthen rural economies. The government hoped to promote rural areas and keep a robust agricultural workforce by giving farmers with a consistent source of income.

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The agriculture ministry proposed Thursday that the government increase the price floors for domestically produced beef and pork for the first time in about three decades, as rising feed grain prices boost costs for livestock farmers.

The pork price floor would rise to ¥380 a kg in April from ¥365, and for beef it would rise to ¥790 a kg from ¥780, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry proposed at a panel meeting attended by farmers and consumer groups.

Japan is the world's largest corn importer.

Corn and soybean prices in Chicago have climbed to record highs, boosting costs for Japanese farmers dependent on overseas supplies for almost all their feed grains. Producers have difficulty passing on increases as meat prices are capped by imported products.

Japan's wholesale inflation rose at its fastest pace in 27 years in January as commodity costs gained.

The price floor increases would be the first for pork in 31 years and the first for beef in 27 years.

The government can buy meat from the market if prices fall below the government-imposed limit, providing protection for farmers. The ministry reviews price floors once a year and changes them if recommended by the panel.

Corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade rose to a record $5.2875 a bushel Feb. 6.

Corn is the biggest ingredient in Japanese compound feed used for livestock, and soybean meal is the second-largest.

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Ministry proposes raising prices of pork, beef

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The agriculture ministry proposed Thursday that the government increase the price floors for domestically produced beef and pork for the first time in about three decades, as rising feed grain prices boost costs for livestock farmers.

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Indirect Tax Increase on Tobacco in the UK 

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Indirect Tax Increase on Tobacco in the UK 

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Before the indirect tax imposed in 2012, more than 244 tonnes of cigarettes were produced and once the indirect tax increased, it dropped to around 162 tonnes. There were a few main reasons for the increase in indirect taxes. The first is to generate revenue for the government. Tobacco taxes provide billions of pounds in cash for the UK government each year. This money may be used to finance a wide range of government services, including healthcare, education, and infrastructure. As stated tobacco is a very addictive good which makes it price inelastic. Though the demand for the good will differ based on the price change, this change would be very minimal. Due to the government identifying that tobacco is an inelastic good, they were able to increase the indirect tax on it.

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The alcohol consumption in Arunachal Pradesh, a state in India, reached India's highest alcohol consumption per capita at 10.7 liters while the global average is around 6.3 liters. Alcohol consumption has major negative effects on people. In India alone, 360,000 deaths were attributed to alcohol consumption in 2015. To reduce alcohol consumption, the government intervention had to be unique.

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Abstract

INTRODUCTION

Alcohol consumption in India has been rising rapidly in the last decade. On average, 30% of Indians consume alcohol, out of which 4-13% are daily consumers and more than half of those who consume alcohol are hazardous drinkers (WHO, 2014). The per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages in India increased by 38%, from 1.6 l in 2003-2005 to 2.2 l in 2010-2012 (WHO, 2012). Against the global average of 16%, ~11% of Indians were binge drinkers (binge drinking or heavy episodic drinking is described as heavy consumption of alcohol over a short period of time). Excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages has been found to have a detrimental effect on health. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that alcohol consumption is associated with a variety of disease and disability ( Lim et al., 2012; Whiteford et al., 2013). Liver cirrhosis, cancers, tuberculosis, HIV and injuries are some of the adverse health effects worsened by alcohol consumption ( Baan et al., 2007; Shield, Parry & Rehm, 2013). The Global Burden of Disease Study estimates that excessive use of alcohol accounts for 3.9% of all deaths worldwide and 3% in India ( Wang et al., 2016). In India alone, 360,000 deaths were attributed to alcohol consumption in 2015 ( Wang et al., 2016). The percent of the global burden of disease and injury attributable to alcohol use is 2.9% in India. Recent Government of India data indicate that 15 people die every day or 1 every 96 minutes from the harmful effects of alcohol consumption in India ( Crime in India, 2013). In addition to adverse health impacts, alcohol use may also contribute to poverty and impoverishment either due to diversion of resources away from productive use or increasing healthcare cost associated with alcohol-related problems ( Benegal, 2005; Bonu et al., 2005; Gajalakshmi and Peto, 2009; Rathod et al., 2015).

Given the increasing evidence on the harmful effects of alcohol consumption, policymakers have resorted to either increasing alcohol prices through taxation or have put blanket bans on alcohol consumption. Alcohol consumption is completely prohibited in the Indian states of Gujarat, Bihar, Nagaland and is partially banned in Kerala and Tamilnadu. However, either the prohibition or the price increase can be an effective policy for reducing alcohol consumption if the demand for alcoholic beverages is price-sensitive and price-elastic (several studies have shown that alcohol price is a key determinant of consumption ( Anderson et al., 2009; Wagenaar et al., 2009)). If the consumers have inelastic demand for alcoholic products, then price control through taxation may not be an effective policy instrument to curb the adverse effects of alcohol consumption. Reduced availability due to prohibition may shift the demand to underground or black market or to illicit liquor, which is expensive and more harmful than recorded alcohol. Prohibition is less desirable because it severely restricts freedom of individual choice and may have undesirable and unintended effects, as was the case in the failed alcohol ban in the USA from 1920 to 1933 ( Thornton, 1991; Mahal, 2000) (the period was marked by rampant smuggling, corruption and black market).

Therefore, having reliable information on price elasticity of demand (PED), the percentage change in demand for alcohol resulting from a 1% increase in alcohol price by different characteristics of drinkers (such as gender and caste) are important for formulating appropriate tax policies to regulate alcohol consumption. There is lack of credible estimates of price elasticity for alcohol beverages in India, which is important for implementing effective interventions to reduce the harmful effects of alcohol consumption. There have not been many estimates of price elasticities for different alcoholic beverages in India to date except Mahal (2000) and using a representative cross-section of households from five states, this paper provides additional and more reliable estimates of PED for beer, spirits, and country liquor in India (these five states account for one-third of India's population).

In high-income countries, the literature on estimation of PED for alcohol products is quite extensive but diverges markedly in the magnitude of elasticity estimates. Some studies indicate that alcohol demand is elastic (price elasticity is >1), while other studies suggest the demand to be price inelastic (price elasticity is <1). These studies find that the own-price elasticity for alcohol demand is negative and varies substantially across type of drink and socio-economic and demographic groups. Three recent meta analyses comparing cross-beverage elasticity have found that beer, wine and spirits have different own-price elasticities, with beer appearing to be less elastic than wine and spirits ( Gallet, 2007; Wagenaar et al., 2009; Fogarty, 2010). Gallet (2007) and Wagenaar et al. (2009) reported an average PED for alcohol of −0.5, meaning that a 20% increase in alcohol price would reduce the demand for alcohol by 10%. In UK, Meng et al. (2014) found the price elasticity estimates to range from −0.08 to −1.27, and beer was the most elastic beverage.

The dearth of research on estimation of PED for alcoholic beverages in low and lower middle-income countries, including India, calls for additional research. To the best of my knowledge, I am only aware of the following three studies that deal with the estimation of PED for alcohol in India. Musgrave and Stern (1988), using NSS surveys for Karnataka in 1973-1974 and 1977-1978, estimate arrack price elasticities in the range of −0.47 and −0.62. In a simulated study, Mahal (2000) found that the own-price elasticity of participation in moderate to heavy alcohol consumption is 1.00 for individuals between 15 and 25 years old and 0.50 for individuals 25 years old and above. The estimates in Mahal (2000) are smaller than estimates for one state (Andhra Pradesh) by Reddy et al. (1999). Reddy et al. (1999) found an arc elasticity of demand for arrack (local liquor) in the range of −1.23 to −1.36, but this analysis was carried out on a very small sample of 86 moderate to heavy alcohol consumers of arrack in Andhra Pradesh. The PED estimates in these three studies lie in the mid-range of estimates reported in developed countries.

In India, the prevalence of alcohol consumption has been on the rise and policymakers are struggling to design an appropriate tax system to reduce alcohol consumption. In several instances, higher alcohol prices have led to consumption of spurious alcohol by poor households thereby resulting in premature loss of lives. Given the complex socio-economic conditions of households and lack of credible estimates of PED for alcohol in India, findings of this study will be important to design alcohol price strategy so that harmful effects of alcohol consumption can be minimized.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Data

The data used in this study are from the Survey of Unrecorded Alcohol in India (SURA) collected in 2014. Data collection for this cross-sectional survey was funded by the International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD) in order to assess the prevalence of unrecorded alcohol drinking in India. The survey sampled ~1200 respondents in each of the following five states-Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and West Bengal. The sample was selected under a semi-purposive, multi-stage probability design and oversampled respondents in rural areas. In the first stage, two districts were randomly selected based on the socio-economic profile of the districts in each state (districts were stratified based on proportion of schedule caste and tribe population, female literacy rate and percentage of households belonging to lowest wealth quintile). In the second stage, 10 urban wards/towns and 20 rural villages were selected from each district using the probability proportional to size sampling method. Urban wards/towns and rural villages formed the primary sampling units. Finally, in Stage 3, 20 respondents were selected from each primary sampling unit in each district. In addition, 50 respondents were purposively sampled from 2 randomly selected slums in each of the sampled urban wards/towns. The overall response rate was ~85%, and there was no significant difference in response rates between the urban and rural samples.

The survey covered individuals 15 years old and above. Among the eligible individuals in the households, the member with the most recent birth date was selected for the interview. Our initial sample included 6088 individuals. Of these respondents, 3988 (65%) respondents resided in rural areas while 2100 (35%) respondents resided in urban areas. The survey included questions about past and current drinking, and about the frequency and quantity of alcohol use in the past year. Of the total sample, 38.6% were current drinkers, 53.6% were lifetime abstainers and 7.8% were former drinkers. Among drinkers, alcohol per capita consumption (APC) in litres of pure alcohol per year is 11.6, which translates into consumption of 25.1 g of pure alcohol per day. There is significant geographic variation in the average consumption of pure alcohol. The average consumption of pure alcohol is 21.6 and 30.3 g per day in rural and urban areas, respectively. The average consumption among males is ~2 times more than that of females (26.2 g for males and 14.2 g for female) (APC is defined as the per capita amount of alcohol consumed in litres of pure alcohol in a given population). APC in litres of pure ethanol per year can be converted into grams per day as follows: g/day = APC x 1000 × 0.793/365 days). Six percent of drinkers are heavy drinkers, consuming >48 g of pure alcohol per day.

Detailed questions about the drinking habits, patterns and beverage type were asked to current drinkers only. The survey collected information on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents, such as age, gender, caste, marital status, income and family size. Price information was collected for the "most consumed drink (MCD)". Using the information in beverage-specific alcohol consumption module, the MCD is identified as the beverage with highest consumption by volume (quantity × frequency). Price and quantity data on the MCD were used to estimate PED for different types of alcoholic beverages. Analysis is restricted to the sample of respondents who reported beer, spirits and country liquor as their MCD. Price information about homemade alcohol drinks was missing for a large number of homemade alcohol respondents, therefore, homemade drinkers were excluded from the analysis. Price data were missing for 3.75% of the spirits drinkers and 0.18% of country liquor drinkers, but as long as price data is missing randomly, this will not bias our analyses.

Estimation

The standard approach to estimate PED is to quantify the empirical relationship between price and alcohol demand, after adjusting for socio-economic characteristics of the respondents including income. Socio-economic characteristics are able to capture differences in tastes and preferences across individuals. The linear relationship between price and demand is transformed into logarithmic (log) form, and the estimated model can be represented by the following equation for each beverage:

where is the dependent variable measuring quantity consumed of each beverage (beer, spirits, country liquor) by respondent i in district d and state s; the main independent variable is log of price of each beverage; is a vector of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents that can potentially affect alcohol demand (for example, age and gender of the respondent, education level of the respondent, monthly income of the respondent, whether respondent lives in the rural area); represents district fixed effects so that time invariant characteristics of district that may affect alcohol demand can be adjusted for; and finally is the idiosyncratic error terms in individual-level alcohol consumption, which are uncorrelated with other covariates included in the model. Standard errors are clustered by district to adjust for the possibility that residuals are not independent and identically distributed.

In Equation ( 1), is PED for beer, spirits and country liquor. In econometric models, where both the dependent and the independent variables are log-transformed, the regression parameter () is interpreted PED. The magnitude of shows the percentage change in alcohol demand for a specific beverage by respondent i, in response to a percentage change in price of that specific beverage:

Some prior studies have used average alcohol price or community-level price instead of beverage-specific actual price paid by individuals ( Ayyagari et al., 2013; Goryakin et al., 2015). Alcohol prices in these studies were aggregated due to unavailability of individual-level data on actual price paid by the respondents and to reduce measurement error in individual prices. Since the SURA survey had information on actual price paid by the drinkers for specific beverage, I use unit-level self-reported price data in the analysis. The negative relationship between price and demand means that the value of will be a negative number, meaning that individuals may reduce the demand or shift their consumption to a substitute drink as a result of increase in price.

RESULTS

Sample characteristics

Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis for current drinkers only. I define current drinking status in terms of whether an individual has consumed alcohol in the past 12 months. Using drinking frequency, number of drinks and size of the drink, annual consumption of each beverage in litres was calculated. The annual consumption is transformed in natural log. The average log price of alcoholic beverages ranged from 5.32 to 6.44. Distilled spirits are the most expensive drink type. The majority of current drinkers are male (91%) and the average age of current drinkers is 41 years. About two-fifths of current drinkers are illiterate, and ~60% of the respondents who are current drinkers live in rural areas. Close to two-fifths of the analytical sample earns <4000 rupees (equivalent to USD $65) per month. The average daily alcohol consumption is 25 g of pure ethanol in rural areas and 30 g of pure ethanol in urban areas.

Table 2 reports the percentage of current drinkers by sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents. Spirits is the MCD in rural areas, while consumption of country liquor is highest among illiterate drinkers (50%). On average, >90% of the drinkers are male. Seventy and seventy-six percent of spirits and beer drinkers are literate, respectively.

Price elasticity of demand

In Table 3, I report the results on PEDs for beer, country liquor and spirits from the ordinary least-square method for current drinkers. Each column reports results from separate regression models. In general, the results in Table 3 indicate that an increase in price has a small negative effect on alcohol demand. The estimated PED for beer and country liquor are −0.33 and −0.46, respectively. The elasticity estimates for beer and country liquor are statistically significant and are consistent with estimates reported in the USA and other developed countries and are well within the range of previous estimates ( Wagenaar et al., 2009). The magnitude of −0.33 means that a 1% increase in the price of beer is associated with a 0.33% reduction in beer consumption. The PED for spirits is 0.139. However, it is not significantly different from zero. The absolute value of all elasticities is <1, indicating that alcohol demand is not very sensitive to price change. Male and age are positively associated with alcohol demand, but the coefficients are statistically insignificant except for spirits drinkers. Education is positively associated with spirits demand: illiterate individuals consume more spirits than literate individuals. Household monthly income is positively associated with demand, while rural households have lower alcohol demand compared to urban households.

Elasticities by drinkers' characteristics

In Figs 1- 3, I analyse the heterogeneity in the impact of price on alcohol demand. In Fig. 1, own-price elasticity of alcohol demand by rural versus urban residents is reported. PED is higher for rural drinkers compared to urban drinkers except for spirits demand. The elasticities for beer and spirits are not statistically significant in urban areas, while country liquor demand responds significantly to price change in urban areas. Rural drinkers seem to be most responsive to price than urban drinkers, and the magnitude of response is highest for country liquor followed by beer. The higher elasticity of country liquor may be due to the availability of substitute drinks, which may result in switching behavior by drinkers.

A substantial amount of research in developed countries has established that there are consistent differences in drinking patterns between men and women. Men are more likely to consume alcohol than women ( Wilsnack et al., 2000; Parry et al., 2005); male drinkers consume larger quantities of alcohol than female drinkers do ( Hao et al., 2004) and male drinkers experience more behavioral problems related to their drinking than female drinkers do ( Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004). Since females differ in their behavior and preferences from males, it is important to understand whether responsiveness in alcohol demand due to price change varies by gender too. Ex ante, one would imagine that females would be more price sensitive than males, and therefore will have higher elasticity than males.

In Fig. 2, elasticity estimates by gender are reported, and there is no inter-gender differential in PED by gender. Most estimates of alcohol price elasticity are insignificant, except for males who are drinking country liquor. For beer demand, the elasticity among female drinkers is positive but is insignificant. The analysis of female beer drinkers lack power due to small sample size. There are only 21 female beer drinkers, which is not sufficient to have a separate analysis by gender. Small sample size and lack of power may be causing the unexpected positive sign.

The estimated own-price elasticities of alcohol demand vary by education; three out of six are statistically significant. The estimates range from −0.13 (spirits drinkers with less than a university education) to −0.58 (country liquor drinkers with at least a university education; Fig. 3). There is no consistent pattern; the demand for beer is more elastic for drinkers with less than university education, while spirits drinkers with at least university education are very responsive to spirits price. Insignificant differences were found for the elasticity estimates for country liquor drinkers by education levels.

DISCUSSION

The estimates of price elasticity of alcohol demand are of importance when the goal of policymakers is to control the price of alcohol through taxation to reduce alcohol consumption. This study is one of a handful of studies to estimate PED in India against the backdrop of rising alcohol consumption. Prices do seem to affect behavior. However, the effect size is modest and small. Among three alcoholic beverages, spirits consumption is least elastic (−0.14), while consumption of country liquor is most elastic (−0.46). The lower magnitude of PED does not mean that price control will be an ineffective policy, rather it implies that the reduction in consumption due to price increase will be modest but economically meaningful. The elasticity estimates have important policy implications in the context of a recent ban on alcohol consumption in a few states in India. If alcohol demand is not very price responsive, then prohibition may not be a good strategy to limit consumption as it may lead to the emergence of black market, smuggling and consumption of illicit beverages.

Taxing alcoholic beverages is considered regressive because low-income households have to pay a higher fraction of their income as tax. Given that the demand for spirits (whiskey, vodka and Indian-made foreign liquor) is less elastic in rural areas than urban areas, the tax burden would disproportionately affect rural households.

Our estimates compare well with findings in other countries. In a recent meta-analysis, ~26% of all studies had own-price elasticity of beer that was either insignificant or <0.2 ( Fogarty, 2010). The majority of the studies in this meta-analysis were from high-income countries, which may not compare well to a middle-income country like India. In a recent study in China, a middle-income country, the PED for beer was estimated to be −0.036 and was statistically insignificant ( Tian and Liu, 2011). Furthermore, I find some evidence of heterogeneous impacts of price change on alcohol consumption. The elasticity estimates varied by rural-urban, gender, and to some extent by education levels of the drinkers, though no consistent pattern emerged across different types of alcoholic beverages.

This study is not free from limitations, and the most important one is the cross-sectional and non-experimental nature of the data. The negative relationship between price and alcohol demand is merely an association between the two variables and should not be understood to have a causal interpretation. Although our models include several confounding variables and district fixed effects, the model still suffers from omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Second, due to lack of relevant data, this study is unable to estimate the cross-PED in order to understand the switching and substituting behavior of drinkers. The number of switchers is very small and, therefore, the sample lacks the power to estimate the cross-PED. Third, the frequency, quantity of drinks and price were self-reported by the respondents. This self-report may suffer from measurement error, as respondents tend to underreport alcohol consumption.

Our findings contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of demand- versus supply-side interventions to limit alcohol consumption. Price control is a supply-side policy instrument. Our results suggest a modest negative association between price and demand, implying that drinkers are not very responsive to price change. In this case, price controls alone may not be effective in reducing the adverse impacts of alcohol consumption, rather it should be complemented with demand-side intervention such as educating the population about the impact of harmful alcohol consumption. A policy mix of supply- and demand-side programs will go a long way in addressing the issue of increasing alcohol consumption in India. The harmful effect of alcohol consumption on health may become severe if demand for illicit liquor increases due to tax hike or prohibition. Future research should consider economic, social and health consequences of tax increase or prohibition in a country with significant consumption of unrecorded alcohol.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to thank Bhartendu Trivedi, Don Freeman, Jennifer Tujague and team members of the survey company (MORSEL). The author would also like to thank all the participants of the study for their patience and collaboration during primary data collection.

DISCLAIMER

This study was funded by the International Alliance for Responsible Drinking (IARD), a not-for-profit organization supported by major producers of alcoholic beverages ( www.iard.org). The work product, findings, viewpoints, and conclusions presented here are solely those of the named authors and do not necessarily represent those of IARD or its sponsoring companies.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

None declared.

REFERENCES

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Price Elasticity of Alcohol Demand in India

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AbstractAims. Using a household survey conducted in 2014, this study estimates price elasticity of demand (PED) for beer, country liquor and spirits in Ind

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In discussing Australia's economic performance in the third quarter of 2020, the article highlights a notable uptick in growth that is commonly referred to as a "kangaroo bounce." The COVID-19 epidemic caused the nation to experience its first recession in almost thirty years, yet despite this, there was a noticeable rebound in economic activity, especially in consumer consumption, exports, and company investment. Nevertheless, given the continued dangers and uncertainties, questions remain over how long this recovery may last.

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Australia’s economy bounced back in the third quarter | Business and Economy | Al Jazeera

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We use cookies and other tracking technologies to deliver and personalize content and ads, enable features, measure site performance, and enable social media sharing. You can choose to customize your preferences.Learn more about our Cookie Policy.

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The impact of the UK's sugary drink tax, which was enacted in April 2018 with the intention of reducing obesity rates, is discussed in the article. According to research, in its first year of implementation, the fee may have avoided almost 5,000 instances of obesity. Through providing producers with incentives to lower the sugar level of soft drinks, the legislation may have improved public health results. This demonstrates how well-targeted economic policies work to address public health issues like obesity.

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The soft drinks industry levy, the 'sugary drinks tax', in England was followed by a drop in the number of cases of obesity among older primary school children.

This is according to research led by the Medical Research Council's (MRC) Epidemiology Unit at the University of Cambridge.

Taking into account current trends in obesity, their estimates suggest that around 5,000 cases of obesity per year may have been prevented in year 6 girls alone.

The study, published in PLOS Medicine, looked at the impact of the levy on reception age children and those in year 6. However, it found no significant association between the levy and obesity levels in year 6 boys or younger children from reception class.

Risks of obesity

Obesity has become a global public health problem. In England, 1 in 10 reception age children (4 to 5 years old) is living with obesity and this figure doubles to 1 in 5 children in year 6 (10 to 11 years).

Children who are obese are more likely to suffer from serious health problems including high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes and depression in childhood and in later life.

In the UK, young people consume significantly more added sugars than is recommended, by late adolescence, they typically consume 70g of added sugar per day, more than double the recommended amount (30g). A large source of this is sugar-sweetened drinks.

Children from deprived households are more likely to be at risk of obesity and to be heavy consumers of sugar-sweetened drinks.

The 'sugar tax'

In April 2018, to protect children from excessive sugar consumption and tackle childhood obesity, the UK governments introduced a 2-tier sugar tax on soft drinks, the soft drinks industry levy.

The tax was targeted at manufacturers of the drinks to incentivise them to reduce the sugar content of soft drinks.

Researchers from MRC's Epidemiology Unit at the University of Cambridge tracked changes in the levels of obesity in children in England in reception year and year 6 between 2014 and 2020.

Taking account of previous trends in obesity levels they compared changes in levels of obesity 19 months after the sugar tax came into effect.

Preventing obesity

The team found that the introduction of the sugar tax was associated with an 8% relative reduction in obesity levels in year 6 girls, equivalent to preventing 5,234 cases of obesity per year in this group alone.

A relative reduction is the difference between the expected incidence of obesity had the sugar tax not been introduced and the actual incidence.

Reductions were greatest in girls whose schools were in deprived areas, where children are known to consume the largest amount of sugary drinks, those living in the most deprived areas saw a 9% reduction.

However, the team found no associations between the sugar tax coming into effect and changes in obesity levels in children from reception class. In year 6 boys, there was no overall change in obesity prevalence.

Reducing health inequalities

Dr Nina Rogers from the MRC Epidemiology Unit at Cambridge, the study's first author, said:

We urgently need to find ways to tackle the increasing numbers of children living with obesity, otherwise we risk our children growing up to face significant health problems.

That was one reason why the UK's soft drinks industry levy was introduced and the evidence so far is promising. We've shown for the first time that it is likely to have helped prevent thousands of children each year becoming obese.

It isn't a straightforward picture, though, as it was mainly older girls who benefited. But the fact that we saw the biggest difference among girls from areas of high deprivation is important and is a step towards reducing the health inequalities they face.

Reducing sugar consumption

Although the researchers found an association rather than a causal link, this study adds to previous findings that the levy was associated with a substantial reduction in the amount of sugar in soft drinks.

Senior author Professor Jean Adams from the MRC Epidemiology Unit said:

We know that consuming too many sugary drinks contributes to obesity and that the UK soft drinks levy led to a drop in the amount of sugar in soft drinks available in the UK, so it makes sense that we also see a drop in cases of obesity, although we only found this in girls.

Children from more deprived backgrounds tend to consume the largest amount of sugary drinks, and it was among girls in this group that we saw the biggest change.

Further considerations

There are several reasons why the sugar tax did not lead to changes in levels of obesity among the younger children, they say. Very young children consume fewer sugar-sweetened drinks than older children, so the soft drinks levy would have had a smaller effect.

Similarly, fruit juices are not included in the levy, but contribute similar amounts of sugar in young children's diets as sugar-sweetened beverages.

It's unclear why the sugar tax might affect obesity prevalence in girls and boys differently, however, especially since boys are higher consumers of sugar-sweetened beverages.

One explanation the researchers put forward is the possible impact of advertising. Numerous studies have found that boys are often exposed to more food advertising content than girls, both through higher levels of TV viewing and in how adverts are framed.

Physical activity is often used to promote junk food and boys, compared to girls, have been shown to be more likely to believe that energy dense junk foods depicted in adverts will boost physical performance. Boys are therefore more likely to choose energy-dense, nutrient-poor products following celebrity endorsements.

Collaborative research

The study was a collaboration involving researchers from:

University of Cambridge

London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine

University of Oxford

Great Ormond Street Institute of Child Health

University of Bath

It was funded by MRC and the National Institute for Health and Care Research.

Top image: Credit: Daisy-Daisy, iStock, Getty Images Plus via Getty Images

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Sugary drinks tax may have prevented over 5,000 cases of obesity

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The soft drinks industry levy, the 'sugary drinks tax', in England was followed by a drop in the number of cases of obesity among older primary school children.

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Google spends almost $10 billion a year to keep its dominant position in the search engine business, according to information released by the US government. This revelation coincides with heightened scrutiny of the tactics and commercial dominance of digital firms. The "default search engine" charge is purportedly paid to Google in order to maintain its default search engine status across a range of devices, including web browsers and cellphones. Opponents contend that these kinds of payments stifle innovation and competition in the online economy.

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Tuesday's opening remarks kick off the most consequential antitrust case in years, testing the limits of the tech giant's power.

Google accounts for a whopping 90 percent of the search engine market [Richard Drew/AP Photo]

Lawyers have presented opening arguments in a landmark antitrust case against the search engine Google, which could test the limits of corporate power in the United States.

On Tuesday, in a crowded federal courthouse in Washington, DC, the US Justice Department argued that Google uses its wealth and influence to stifle competition and maintain its dominance as the most popular search engine. Google countered that internet users rely on the search engine because of its quality.

Keep reading

"Google pays more than $10bn per year for these privileged positions,'' said Kenneth Dintzer, the Justice Department's lead litigator.

"Google's contracts ensure that rivals cannot match the search quality ad monetisation, especially on phones," he added. "Through this feedback loop, this wheel has been turning for more than 12 years. It always turns to Google's advantage."

The opening statements mark the beginning of one of the most consequential antitrust cases in decades.

Critics have long expressed concerns over monopolies in the tech industry, where a handful of giant companies - including Google's parent company Alphabet - control much of the market, their influence stretching from popular platforms to data acquisition and devices.

Google alone, for example, commands about 90 percent of the search engine market.

The administration of President Joe Biden, however, has taken a more adversarial stance on antitrust issues, announcing stringent rules for mergers between tech companies in July.

The current case, initiated under the administration of former President Donald Trump nearly three years ago, represents the most ambitious government effort yet to address the alleged modern-day tech monopolies.

Arguments will take place for 10 weeks, with top executives from companies such as Google and Apple expected to testify. Judge Amit Mehta is unlikely to issue a decision until next year, and a ruling against Google would mean another trial to assess options for reining in the company.

On Tuesday, Google's lawyer, John Schmidtlein said that customers who want to switch to a different search engine can do so with just "a few easy clicks". But, he argued, users continue to use Google because of its convenience and calibre.

"Users today have more search options and more ways to access information online than ever before," Schmidtlein told the court in his opening argument.

The Justice Department's legal team, meanwhile, alleged that the company has used that considerable stature to bend other companies to its will.

Google's parent company Alphabet has 182,000 employees and is worth about $1.7 trillion.

Dintzer, arguing for the Justice Department, said that Alphabet entered into revenue-sharing agreements with Apple on the condition that Google become the default search engine on every Apple device.

"This is not a negotiation," Dintzer said. "This is Google saying: Take it or leave it."

Source: Al Jazeera and news agencies

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US government says Google pays $10bn per year to maintain market dominance

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Tuesday's opening remarks kick off most consequential antitrust case in years, testing limits of the tech giant's power.

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Subsidy Policy on Fertiliser in Indonesia

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Subsidy Policy on Fertiliser in Indonesia

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The goal of Indonesia's fertiliser subsidy programme is to increase agricultural output and assist farmers. It has been offering subsidies for different fertilisers since the 1950s. Annually disbursed, these subsidies constitute an essential part of Indonesia's agricultural assistance framework. Concerns have been expressed, meanwhile, concerning the subsidy program's capacity to accomplish its stated objectives as well as its effects on the sustainability of the environment and the agriculture industry as a whole.

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FFTC Agricultural Policy Platform (FFTC-AP)

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Urgency
Fertilizer is a strategic commodity because it is related to increasing production and income of farmers and its contribution to building national food security. Together with other production factors, fertilizer has an important role in increasing crop production. Even though the contribution of fertilizer to farming costs is only around 10%, fertilizer is a strategic commodity and is included in the group of goods whose distribution is monitored (Susilowati, 2016). Rice as a commodity that receives the most subsidized fertilizers has a relatively high cost of production compared to other major world rice producers (Bordey et.al. 2016). Despite changing subsidized fertilizer policies, the GoI rice commodity is still maintained as a commodity receiving subsidized fertilizers. If the GoI revokes the subsidized fertilizer policy, it is feared that inflation will occur due to rising rice prices.

The subsidized fertilizers are procured by the producer (PT Pupuk Indonesia) and distributed to farmer's groups through distributors and retailers starting from the line I, line II, line III, up to line IV (Figure 1) based on RDKK at price not exceeding the HET.

Producer consists of PT Pupuk Sriwidjaja Palembang, PT Petrochemical Gresik, PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur, PT Pupuk Kujang, and PT Pupuk Iskandar Muda which produces inorganic and organic fertilizers. Distributor is an individual company or business entity, whether in the form of a legal or non-legal entities appointed by the producer based on a SPJB to purchase, store, distribute, and sell subsidized fertilizers in large parties in the area of responsibility.

The retailer is an individual company or business entity, whether in the form of legal or non-legal entities domiciled in sub-districts and/or villages, appointed by distributors based on SPJB with the main activity of selling. The retailer is required to carry out the distribution of subsidized fertilizers based on the six principles of precision of procurement and distribution of subsidized fertilizers which includes the right type, quantity, price, place, time, and quality in line IV to farmers and/or farmer groups based on the RDKK.

Line I is the location of the fertilizer warehouse in the producer factory area or the destination port area for imported fertilizers. Line II is the location of the manufacturer's warehouse in the provincial capital area and the Fertilizer Packaging Unit (UPP) or outside the port area. Line III is the location of the manufacturer's and/or distributor's warehouse in the district/city area designated or determined by the producer. Line IV is the location of a warehouse or retail kiosks on sub-district and/or village designated or established by the distributor. The formulation and subsidy disbursement of subsidized fertilizers are presented in Table 2.
UPDATE ON POLICY FOR FERTILIZER SUBSIDY Rationale
As an effort to recover from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and to restore growth in economic activity toward increasing national food security, the GoI continues to be committed to paying attention to the agricultural sector. Improving the pattern of agricultural empowerment is urgently needed to improve the quality and quantity of agricultural products to meet domestic staple food needs. The initial steps that need to be taken include providing production inputs for farmers such as seeds, seedlings, fertilizers, and cultivation techniques, including harvesting and post-harvest technology.

One of the strategic governments' policies related to fertilizers is providing subsidy so that farmers pay fertilizer at a lower price. It is carried out since fertilizer is a key factor in increasing productivity and subsidies with cheaper fertilizer prices will encourage an increase in the use of this input. Fertilizer subsidy aims to respond to the tendency of rising fertilizer prices in the international market and declining levels of farming profits. The fertilizer subsidy policy is also to fulfill six principles in its distribution, namely the right type, right price, right time, right place, right amount, and right quality. The result is that fertilizer subsidies are expected to increase agricultural productivity and farmer welfare (Susila, 2009).

In 2022, the Indonesian MoA has allocated a fertilizer subsidy budget of more than IDR25 trillion (US$1.67 billion) to meet the needs of around 16 million farmers, who are registered in the e-RDKK to support national food security (CMEF, 2022). It is supported by the Regulation of the Ministry of Agriculture Number 10/2022, followed by the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture Number 734/2022.
Regulation of the Ministry of Agriculture Number 10/2022
Regulation of the Ministry of Agriculture Number 10/2022 issues the Procedures for Determining the Allocation and Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizers in the Agricultural Sector on 1 October 2022. The summary of this regulation can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Summary of Regulation of the Ministry of Agriculture Number 10/2022

1. Subsidized fertilizers can come from domestic and/or foreign production, consisting of: Urea and Nitrogen, Phosphate and Potassium (NPK)1] produced and/or procured by PT Pupuk Indonesia; and

2. In the event that the fertilizer subsidy budget is still available after being allocated to subsidized fertilizer types, other types of fertilizers are needed to increase production, the provision of subsidized fertilizers can be allocated to other types of fertilizers.

1. Subsidized fertilizers are targeted to farmers who carry out farming sub-sectors of food crops, horticulture, and estate crops with a land area of no more than two hectares per planting season; and

2. Farmers receiving subsidized fertilizers must join a farmers' group and be registered in the Agricultural Extension Management System (Simluhtan), which is an agricultural extension information system that provides a database of extension institutions, extension personnel, and main actor institutions

It comprises nine commodities 2], namely: (1) Rice; (2) Maize; (3) Soybean (food crops); (4) Chili; (5) Shallot; (6) Garlic (horticulture); (7) Sugarcane; (8) Cocoa; and (9) Coffee (estate crops)

1. Determination of subsidized fertilizer allocations consists of subsidized fertilizer allocations at the central, provincial levels; and districts/cities; and

2. Determination of the allocation of subsidized fertilizers at the district/city level is carried out after the allocation of subsidized fertilizers at the provincial level has been determined. This is determined based on the spatial data of farmers' land or land area data in Simluhtan.

1. The allocation of subsidized fertilizers at the central level is determined based on the spatial data of farmers' land. Farmer's land spatial data is data about the geographical location, dimensions, size, and/or characteristics of agricultural land that is on or above the earth's surface;

2. The allocation of subsidized fertilizers at the provincial level is further broken down by district/city, type, amount, and monthly distribution. It is similarly implemented at the district/city level;

3. The allocation of subsidized fertilizers at the district/city level is further broken down by sub-districts, type, amount, and monthly distribution;

4. Proposals for fertilizer allocation from sub-districts are carried out through electronic group definitive needs plans (e-RDKK)3], and district/city-subsidized fertilizer allocations;

5. In addition to spatial data on farmers' land, the determination of the allocation of subsidized fertilizer at the central level takes into account the standard area of protected paddy fields and the determination of LP2B⁴], and/or the absorption of subsidized fertilizer in the previous year. If spatial data on farmer's land is not yet available, land area data in Simluhtan is used; and

6. If the allocation of subsidized fertilizers in an area in the current month is insufficient, the distribution of subsidized fertilizers can be carried out using the remaining allocation from the previous month and/or from the allocation for the following month, without exceeding the one-year allocation.

1. Subsidized fertilizer allocation can be reallocated if there is a shortage or surplus of fertilizers in one area by taking into account the available allocation and the proposed fertilizer needs; and

2. Reallocation is carried out as follows: (1) Reallocation between provinces and between types of fertilizers subsidized, determined by the Director General on behalf of the Minister; (2) Reallocations between regencies/cities within one province area are stipulated by a Governor's decision; and (3) Reallocation between sub-districts within one district/city area shall be stipulated by decision of the Regent/Mayor.

Subsidized fertilizer distribution from retail kiosks to farmers uses Farmer Cards through Electronic Data Capture machines and/or digital applications. If Farmer Cards 5] are not yet available, subsidized fertilizer distribution to farmers can use Identity Cards.

1. HET (the highest retail price) of fertilizer is determined by a Ministerial Decree; and

2. The HET is applied to purchases by farmers at authorized retailers by statutory provisions

Note:

1] Those are selected based-fertilization efficiency due to the current condition of agricultural land and the content of macro-nutrients essential for increasing optimal crop production.

²] It is selected to support the realization of better food security in the future.

³] e-RDKK is data on subsidized fertilizer receipts implemented to improve the accuracy of distribution targets to farmers registered in the farmers' group.

⁴] LP2B (Sustainable Food Agricultural Land) is a sector of agricultural land that is determined to be consistently protected and developed to produce staple food for national food self-sufficiency, resilience, and sovereignty.

⁵] Farmer Card is a means of accessing banking services in physical or electronic/digital form which functions as a transaction tool for subsidized fertilizer redemption at official retailers.

Source: MoA, 2022
Decree of the Minister of Agriculture Number 734/2022
Decree of the Minister of Agriculture Number 734/2022 concerns the Determination of the Allocation and the Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizers for 2023. It includes two basic components. , setting the HET for subsidized fertilizers for 2023 as follows: (1) Urea (Rp2,250 or US$0.14/kg); (2) NPK (Rp2,300 or US$0.15/kg); and (3) NPK special formula (Rp3,300 or US$0.21/kg). , allocating the subsidized fertilizers is about 9,013,736 tons (Table 4).

The high allocations are respectively in January to March and October to November as planting periods of the rainy season and the first dry season in Indonesia. During those seasons, fertilizers must be available to support agriculture, particularly for rice farming.
Perspective and challenges
The implementation of update on subsidized fertilizer policy program has been restricted in line with several concerns. , reducing the type of fertilizers namely from Urea, ZA, SP36, NPK, and organic to only Urea and NPK including NPK special formula due to increase in the price of raw materials for fertilizers especially natural gas (Table 5). , decreasing type of commodities i.e., from 70 commodities to nine strategic commodities that have an impact on inflation. , increasing the highest retail prices of Urea i.e., from Rp1,800 per kilogram to Rp2,250 per kilogram. , anticipating the rising global prices of fertilizers since the price of energy is increased. , responding to the shortage of raw materials for fertilizers and global food crisis problems, particularly related to the conflict of Russia and Ukraine.

There are some changes in the implementation of the update on fertilizer subsidy, primarily due to the limitation of the state budget and ineffective distribution mechanism of fertilizers. Even though restricting fertilizer amid the threat of a global food crisis could be considered counterproductive in the efforts of boosting domestic food production, the update on the fertilizer subsidy policy must be carried out to achieve the budget allocation that is right on target. Therefore, the GoI will further tighten the distribution and redemption of subsidized fertilizers to be more on target, among other things by preparing data of beneficiaries, using digital technology, and strengthening supervision.

It is challenging to implement this regulation, particularly in line with the disparity in prices between subsidized and non-subsidized fertilizers. According to CMEF (2022), the global fertilizer crisis has had a direct impact on increasing domestic fertilizer prices. Since the end of 2021, the prices of non-subsidized fertilizers in Indonesia have significantly increased compared to the previous prices. The price of non-subsidized Urea increased from Rp5,000-8,000 per kilogram in 2021 to Rp13,000 to Rp15,000 per kilogram at the beginning of 2022. Likewise, the price of NPK increased from Rp8,000 per kilogram to Rp15,000 per kilogram. In addition, update on non-subsidized fertilizers has emerged with trademarks very similar to those of subsidized fertilizers. With a relatively low level of knowledge and accuracy of farmers, they are often fooled by the trademarks of these non-subsidized fertilizers. The impact is not only on losses due to plants not growing optimally, but in some cases also increasing the intensity of pest and disease attacks.

The large disparity in the prices of subsidized and non-subsidized fertilizers also has the potential to cause moral hazard such as the hoarding of subsidized fertilizers and counterfeiting of subsidized fertilizers. Consequently, it is strongly required that the anticipatory steps be taken in the form of strict supervision involving law enforcement agencies to control the allocation and distribution of subsidized fertilizers following the implementation of this new regulation.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The government is committed to continue supporting and improving the governance of the subsidized fertilizer policy in economic development in the agricultural sector that is more innovative and adaptive to technological advances. The fertilizer subsidy can be viewed as pro-poor policy related to poverty alleviation among farmers by helping to reduce production costs in the context of agricultural cultivation.

The update on policy for fertilizer subsidy is critical, particularly in line with the current situation such as the increasing prices of fertilizers as an impact of the global crisis including the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, the GoI decided to only subsidize Urea and NPK fertilizers by implementing the Ministry of Agriculture Regulation Number 10/2022.

Supervision of subsidized fertilizers should start from upstream to downstream. Upstream supervision includes the process of budget and beneficiary planning. Furthermore, downstream supervision comprises distribution lines. The most potential mal administration will be in line III (distributor's warehouse at district/city level) and line IV (retailer's kiosk at village). The extent of potential mismanagement in line I (producer's warehouse at factory) and line II (producer's warehouse at province/UPP) is expected to be lower due to the implementation of monitoring based-computerization.
REFERENCES
Bordey, F. H., P. F. Moya, J. C. Beltran, and D. C. Dawe. 2016. Competitiveness of Philippine Rice in Asia. Science City of Munoz (PH): Philippine Rice Research Institute and International Rice Research Institute. Nueva Ecija.

CMEF. 2022. Benahi Tata Kelola Pupuk Bersubsidi, Pemerintah Siapkan Sektor Pertanian Lebih Inovatif dan Adaptif dengan Kemajuan Teknologi (Fixing the Subsidized Fertilizer Management, the Government Prepares the Agricultural Sector to be More Innovative and Adaptive with Advances in Technology). Press conference, 15 July 2022. Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs. Jakarta.

Darwis, V. and Supriyati. 2014. Subsidi Pupuk: Kebijakan, Pelaksanaan, dan Optimalisasi Pemanfaatannya (Fertilizer Subsidy: Policy, Implementation, and Optimization of Its Utilization). Jurnal Analisis Kebijakan Pertanian (Agricultural Policy Analysis Journal), Volume 11, Number 1, June 2014: 45-60. Indonesian Center for Agricultural Social Econimic and Policy Studies. Bogor.

DGAIF. 2022. Surat Edaran Direktur Jenderal Prasarana dan Sarana Pertanian Nomor 256 Tahun 2022 tentang Revisi Petunjuk Teknis Pengelolaan Pupuk Bersubsidi Tahun Anggaran 2022 (Circular Letter Number 256/2022 on Revision of the Technical Guidelines for the Management of Subsidized Fertilizers for the 2022 Fiscal Year). Directorate General of Agricultural Infrastructure and Facilities. Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture. Jakarta.

MoA, 2021. Peraturan Menteri Pertanian Indonesia Nomor 49 Tahun 2021 tentang Tata Cara Penetapan Alokasi dan Harga Eceran Tertinggi Pupuk Bersubsidi Sektor Pertanian (Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture of Indonesia Number 49/2021 on Procedures for Determining the Allocation and Highest Retail Price of Subsidized Fertilizer in the Agricultural Sector). Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture. Jakarta.

MoA. 2022. Peraturan Menteri Pertanian Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 2022 tentang Tata Cara Penetapan Alokasi dan Harga Eceran Tertinggi Pupuk Bersubsidi Sektor Pertanian (Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture of Indonesia Number 10/2022 on Procedures for Determining the Allocation and Highest Retail Price of Subsidized Fertilizer in the Agricultural Sector). Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture. Jakarta.

MoT. 2013. Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 15 Tahun 2013 tentang Pengadaan dan Penyaluran Pupuk Bersubsidi untuk Sektor Pertanian (Regulation of the Minister of Trade Number 15/2013 on Procurement and Distribution of Subsidized Fertilizers for the Agricultural Sector). Indonesian Ministry of Trade. Jakarta.

Osorio, C. G., D. E. Abriningrum, E. B. Armas, and M. Firdaus. 2011. Who Is Benefiting from Fertilizer Subsidies in Indonesia? Policy Research Working Paper 5758. Retrieved from: https://openknowledge. worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3519/5758.pdf (27 December 2022). Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, the World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region. Jakarta.

Rachman, B. and T. Sudaryanto. 2010. Impacts and Future Perspectives of Fertilizer Policy in Indonesia. Jurnal Analisis Kebijakan Pertanian (Agricultural Policy Analysis Journal), Volume 8, Number 3, September 2010. Indonesian Center for Agricultural Social Econimic and Policy Studies. Bogor.

Sinar Tani. 2021. Pupuk Bersubsidi Kurang? Anggaran Hanya Cukupi 37 Persen (Less Subsidized Fertilizer? Budget Only Sufficient 37 Percent). Retrieved from: https://tabloidsinartani.com/detail/indeks/agri-sarana/16748-Pupuk-Bersu... (28 December 2022). Tabloid of Sinar Tani. Jakarta.

Susila, W. R. 2010. Kebijakan Subsidi Pupuk: Ditinjau Kembali (Fertilizer Subsidy Policy: Review). Jurnal Litbang Pertanian (Journal of Agricultural R&D), Volume 29, Number 2, 2010: 43-49. Indonesian Agency for Agricultural Research and Development. Bogor.

Susilowati, S. H. 2016. Urgensi dan Opsi Perubahan Kebijakan Subsidi Pupuk (Urgency and Options for Changing Fertilizer Subsidy Policy). Jurnal Analisis Kebijakan Pertanian (Agricultural Policy Analysis Journal), Volume 14, Number 2, December 2016: 163-185. Indonesian Center for Agricultural Social Econimic and Policy Studies. Bogor.

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Update on Fertilizer Subsidy Policy in Indonesia: Perspective and Challenges

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ABSTRACT The fertilizer subsidy policy has been implemented in Indonesia for five decades, namely from 1970 up to the present.

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Market Equilibrium - Increase in Price of Salt in South Korea

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Market Equilibrium - Increase in Price of Salt in South Korea

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People in South Korea are buying salt in a panic because they think effluent from Fukushima may contaminate fish. Prices for salt have significantly increased as a result of this rise in demand. Japan's decision to discharge treated radioactive water into the ocean from the Fukushima nuclear facility is the source of the worries. South Koreans are still uneasy despite assurances from Japanese authorities and specialists on the safety of the treated water. The public's mistrust and worry over the possible health consequences of eating seafood that may have been exposed to Fukushima's wastewater are reflected in the panic buying.

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Customers in South Korea are purchasing fish and salt in large quantities to keep at home, while stores are hoarding them out of concern for a supply crisis.

South Koreans have started purchasing salt in a panic as a result of Japan's intention to dump a million metric tonnes of treated radioactive water originating from the Fukushima nuclear facility into the ocean. According to reports, the water served to cool reactors that had been damaged by the 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami.

China, one of Japan's neighbours, and other countries have criticised the decision as harming both the health of people worldwide and the marine life in the area. Customers in South Korea are purchasing fish and salt in large quantities to keep at home, while stores are hoarding them out of concern for a supply crisis.

The fisheries officials in South Korea have committed to increasing their efforts to keep a ban on seafood from the seas surrounding Fukushima and to increase their monitoring of organic salt farms for any increase in radioactive elements. However, despite their best efforts, some consumers continue to purchase far more than they actually require out of concern for possible health hazards associated with Japan's decision.
Impact on salt prices
When compared to two months prior, the cost of salt has increased by about 27% as a result of panic buying, which has been made worse by unfavourable weather and limited output. The South Korean government has agreed to distribute 50 metric tonnes of salt each day at a price reduction of 20 percent from the retail price until July 11 in order to combat the growing prices.
READ | What is Uniform Civil Code? How opposition reacted to PM Modi's remarks on UCC
Despite the Japanese government's assurances, fishermen and consumers in Japan and the surrounding countries are concerned that pouring treated water into the sea might pollute it with hazardous hydrogen isotopes, which could subsequently reach items manufactured from the sea, such as sea salt and shellfish.
Is the treated water safe to use?
Japan claims that the water has been processed to remove the majority of isotopes, however, it still includes tritium, a difficult-to-split hydrogen isotope from water. Experts predict that the ecosystem may not be significantly affected by the release of water.

CNBC cited University of Illinois professor Brent Heuser as claiming tritium is safe in modest doses. "Tritium is not harmful in tiny doses since it will be extremely diluted," Heuser added. It also has no negative effects on the environment, according to Heuser.
READ | Amarnath Yatra 2023: Here's why ITBP replaced CRPF on annual pilgrimage Neighbouring nations oppose Japan's move
Neighbouring nations, such as China and South Korea, have voiced their disagreement to Japan's intention to release the treated water. The environmental advocacy organisation Greenpeace has also criticised the idea, and local fishermen and locals have voiced their worries.

South Korea apparently considered taking legal proceedings against Japan's action before an international court and even contacted the Japanese diplomat to Seoul.
(With input from Reuters)

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why salt price increasing in south korea

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Why South Koreans are panic-buying salt? Fukushima wastewater fears explained

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Customers in South Korea are purchasing fish and salt in large quantities to keep at home, while stores are hoarding them out of concern for a supply crisis.