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CASE OF COLOZZA v. ITALY1.FactThe applicant Mr. Giacinto Colozza, an Italian, was alleged offences. As the authorities couldn’t find him anywhere, he was thought to waive exercise of his right to appear at the hearing and the judge concluded the decision that he was regarded as “latitante” and was , without his presence during the trial. As he had not entered an appeal, the judgement became a final and his later appeal was rejected for that reason.Since the applicant was deprived of his right of fair trial, he brought a claim against the authority under Article 6.2.ConclusionThe court considered the object and purpose of the Article taken as a whole show that a person "charged with a criminal offence" is entitled to take part in the hearing, and thought that the authority just relied on no more than an insufficient presumption, which could not be deemed that the applicant waived his right as the waiver of right must be in an unequivocal manner .Obviously, it didn’t in this case.As neither the Court of Appeal nor the Court of Cassation redressed the alleged violation,Mr. Colozza’s case was at the end of the day never heard, in his presence, by a”tribunal”, which was competent to determine all the aspects of the matter.There was therefore a breach of the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).3.OpinionI agree that it is unfair to trial a person without giving him a right to being heard or informed of what is going on. But sometimes it is hard to balance the right of the defendant and the interest of public.As was pointed out by the Government, the impossibility of holding a trial by default may paralyse the conduct of criminal proceedings, in that it may lead, for example, to dispersal of the evidence, expiry of the time-limit for prosecution or a miscarriage of justice. What if a criminal made use of such mechanism to escape from a trial, is it fair to the victim and the public? It has to be reconciled, through the striking of a "reasonable balance", with the public interest and notably the interests of justice. Maybe to perfect its remedy system and the time-limit to appeal.

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CASE OF COLOZZA v. ITALY1.FactThe applicant Mr. Giacinto Colozza, an Italian, was alleged offences. As the authorities couldn’t find him anywhere, he was thought to waive exercise of his right to appear at the hearing and the judge concluded the decision that he was regarded as “latitante” and was , without his presence during the trial. As he had not entered an appeal, the judgement became a final and his later appeal was rejected for that reason.Since the applicant was deprived of his right of fair trial, he brought a claim against the authority under Article 6.2.ConclusionThe court considered the object and purpose of the Article taken as a whole show that a person "charged with a criminal offence" is entitled to take part in the hearing, and thought that the authority just relied on no more than an insufficient presumption, which could not be deemed that the applicant waived his right as the waiver of right must be in an unequivocal manner .Obviously, it didn’t in this case.As neither the Court of Appeal nor the Court of Cassation redressed the alleged violation,Mr. Colozza’s case was at the end of the day never heard, in his presence, by a”tribunal”, which was competent to determine all the aspects of the matter.There was therefore a breach of the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).3.OpinionI agree that it is unfair to trial a person without giving him a right to being heard or informed of what is going on. But sometimes it is hard to balance the right of the defendant and the interest of public.As was pointed out by the Government, the impossibility of holding a trial by default may paralyse the conduct of criminal proceedings, in that it may lead, for example, to dispersal of the evidence, expiry of the time-limit for prosecution or a miscarriage of justice. What if a criminal made use of such mechanism to escape from a trial, is it fair to the victim and the public? It has to be reconciled, through the striking of a "reasonable balance", with the public interest and notably the interests of justice. Maybe to perfect its remedy system and the time-limit to appeal.

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RKH: This is a great summary of the case and I think your opinion is really interesting here. Regarding the possibility of a criminal using such a mechanism to escape from a trial, it is interesting to note that in the court's judgment, they specifically state that "The Court does not disclose that Mr. Colozza waived exercise of this right to appear and to defend himself or that he was seeking to evade justice." Based on this, they say that it is not necessary to decide whether a person accused of a crime who absconds forfeits the rights in question. Therefore, this case wouldn't be authoritative if someone deliberately tried to evade a trial, although it could be drawn on. It would be interesting to consider where you think the line should be drawn and how far the reasoning in this case could be stretched.

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1. FACTS

Perinçek, a Turkish politician, during his visits to Switzerland, repeatedly called the Armenian Genocide of 1915 a "great international lie". But he later clarified that there had been massacres, but reiterated his belief that these did not constitute genocide. He was then found guilty of racial discrimination by a Swiss district court. After appealing,  the Swiss Federal Court confirmed the original judgement. Perinçek then appealed to the ECtHR, alleging that his conviction violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.

2. CONCLUSIONS

The court considered:

Firstly, Nature of Perinçek’s statements. The Court concluded that while his remarks “were virulent and that his position was intransigent, but it should be recognized that they apparently included an element of exaggeration as they sought to attract attention.” [para. 239]
Secondly,  the Court held that it is difficult to assert that “any hostility that exists towards the Armenian minority in Turkey is the product of his statements in Switzerland or that his criminal conviction in Switzerland protected that minority’s rights in any real way or made it feel safer.” [para. 246] With regard to time factor, the Court held: “Whereas events of relatively recent vintage may be so traumatic as to warrant, for a period of time, an enhanced degree of regulation of statements relating to them, the need for such regulation is bound to recede with the passage of time.”
Then the court considered the extent to which the statements affected the rights of Armenians,  existence or lack of consensus among the States parties to the Convention and severity of the interference.
Finally, the Court concluded that the Swiss government’s interference with Perinçek’s right to freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society. As a result, it found the government in violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
3. MY OPINION
Leave Mr. P’s politician identity aside.

The key issue here is the fact of the massacres. If the court does not identify the massacres as genocide, then perhaps Mr. P’s remarks can be protected by freedom of expression. The court was tricky, it avoided to discuss and did not answer whether the massacre could be characterised as genocide. However, the reality is that even if the court did not answer this question, the 29 countries in the world have officially recognized this massacre as genocide. The UN Sub-commission On Prevention of Discrimination And Protection of Minorities also gave a positive answer to this question.

Therefore, the logic of the judgment may be understandable if we consider on the previous elements. But if you do not answer the question of the determination of genocide, it will be difficult to convince the majority, also it will easily lead people to think that the court is timid which just like the dissenting judges wrote.

RKH: This is a really good summary of the case and captures the main points. When discussing the case in an essay (and in formulating your opinion) I would recommend looking at the dissent in the case by three judges in the Grand Chamber. The dissenting judges felt that the real issue in the case was whether it is possible for a state to make it a criminal offence to insult the memory of people who have suffered genocide. They felt that it was possible i.e. the state could make it a criminal offence to insult the memory of people who have suffered genocide without overstepping their margin of appreciation. This obviously requires first accepting that this was a genocide, which the dissenting judgments do. When reviewing this case it is also helpful to compare it to holocaust denial cases

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A. The freedom of expension in England is very similar to the US. Everyone has the right to freedom of speech, freedom to have their own opinions, and the freedom of the press. But just like in England this right could inflicted if it has to do with terriost attacks. Also in times of war in the US this freedom could be suspended in order for the peace to be kept.
B. The court case which I want to cover is Eugene v. Debs v US.
1. Eugene v debs was an activist during war world 1. He was against the war and was a political speaker trying to convince the public to also go against the war. After the US joined WW1 they would go on to make laws called the sedition and espionage act that resticticted freedom of speech during WW1. Even so Eugene kept protesting against WW1 and he was later arrested and sent to court. His court case was sent all the way to the US supreme court. Debs argued that these laws were a violation of his first amendment right to freedom of speech.
2. When his case reached the supreme court the supreme court agreed that under war times the US can take away freedoms in order to maintain the peace. He was sentenced to 10 years in jail.
3. I found an article called when Americas most prominent socialist was jailed for speaking out against WW1 it is on Smithsonian.com by Erick trickery. This article gives the life story of Debs and explains that even though he did break the law that debs was still considered to be a hero among many and that the law was wrong to take away his freedom of speech
4. I do not agree with the judgement. I believe that Debs had the right to freedom of speech even through war times. If the government would choose to keep people quite during war times it's because they have something to hide.

RKH: Generally the approach to free speech in the USA is that it receives somewhat greater protection than it does in Europe. E.g. holocaust denial could probably not be made a criminal offence in the US. If you want to discuss the US case, I would recommend relating it directly to Europe. What can the comparison tell us about European law? It is also a relatively old case so you would need to check whether it has been updated or overruled by any more recent cases and whether it would be likely to be decided the same way today.

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A. In Spain the aproach to freedom of expresion is quite similar as in ECtHR. However, there are centain limits in the Spanish Constitution.  I would say the most important one it's the collision with another person's right, for example the right to no discrimitation and the right to privacy. When your right to freedom of expresion collides with someone else right to privacy you will have to weigh and see which one prevails over the other one.
B. In Spain there have been a few recent cases about people tweeting offensive things about tricky subjects like terrorism or make fun of the victims of ETA (spanish terrorist group). This has been hugely controversial. When does your freedom of expresion ends? There has been a few cases of this matter and they were accused of things like offense to religious feeling, glorification of terrorism and so on. Pretty much everyone was finally acquitted. Eventhough, this is a offense contempleted in Spanish law, it's highly unlikely that the judges will convict someone for this kind of offense. Jurisprudence shows that there is a predisposition to  make freedom of expression prevail over other rights.
One specific case is the Cassandra Vera one. She wrote some offensive tweets about the murdered of Franco's right hand during the Spanish dictatoreship and was accused of exaltation of terrorism but in the end she was acquitted.

RKH: This is a really interesting comparison and limits on freedom of expression for jokes that are found to be offensive is a really topical issue. There are some interesting articles particularly on the offence point regarding offensive cartoons that you may want to look at (e.g. The Freedom to Public Irreligious Cartoons by Neville Cox in the Human Rights Law Review, or Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression by David Keane in Human Rights Quarterly).

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1. FACTS

It is a complex case which involve many rights of ECHR. So I would like to introduce part of facts about this case, which are relevant to Art.6 right to a fair trial.

Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell were the prisoners who were believed by the authorities to form part of, or to be connected with, Irish Republican Army terrorist activities and were guilty by various offences. Although they consistently denied they had conncetion with IRA.

Then they engaged in a protest in the prison. After that, the Prison Board of Visitors of disciplinary held a disciplinary proceeding against Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell privately.

Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell, therefore, they alleged that this kind of non-public proceeding is a violation of Article 6. They believe that a fair trial should include both public hearing and public judgment.

However, the Board insisted that it is reasonable to hold the proceeding privately for public order, national security and judicial interest.

2. CONCLUSION

If proceedings were held outside, similar problems would arise as regards the prisoner’s transportation to and attendance at the hearing. To require that disciplinary proceedings concerning convicted prisoners should be held in public would impose a disproportionate burden on the authorities of the State. The Court therefore accepts that there were sufficient reasons of public order and security justifying the exclusion of the press and public from the proceedings against Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fell. There was accordingly no violation of Article 6 para. 1 in this respect.

3. MY OPINION

It might be reasonable and acceptable for the Board to hold privately and support by the judges. In my opinion, however, whether it is the board or the judge, their arguments and reasoning process are not convincing. Especially for this judgment, it only said that requiring a public proceedings would impose a disproportionate burden on the authorities of the State. But how? And is it relevant to principle of public hearing? Not seen.

In the end, I would like to quote the dissenting judges’ opinion:

“It was of course for the Government to show that the circumstances were such as to justify recourse to one of those exceptions. However, the Government (followed in this by the majority of the Chamber in paragraph 87 of the judgment) relied on the general nature of Board of Visitors’ proceedings and on the general practice and, although Mr. Campbell was stated to be a "category A" prisoner, the Government adduced no evidence to show that the absence of publicity of proceedings was in his specific case warranted by Article 6 (art. 6) as coming within the permitted exceptions. ”

RKH: This is a great summary of the case and I think your perspective on it is really important and interesting. This case is really interesting in the extent to which judges disagree with each other (note multiple dissents) over several issues - three judges felt Article 6 was not applicable at all (it is interesting to compare the case to Engel in this regard and think about whether you think these are criminal proceedings or whether you agree with the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Vilhjalmsson and Golcuklu and the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Vincent Evans). This means it is really interesting to look at the dissenting judgments as you have done. It may be interesting to think more about the dissent, which doesn't suggest that the proceedings couldn't have been held in private, but just that the government needed to provide further justifications for doing so. Think about how much the government should have to justify all decisions if this is the case - should the ECtHR be policing Parliament this closely?

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Freedom of Expression
CASE OF NEWS VERLAGS GmbH & Co.KG v. AUSTRIA

1.Facts：
News Verlags GmbH & Co.KG (“the applicant company”) is a company based in Tulln, Austria. In December 1993, the company published articles in its magazine News about a series of letter bombs incident. This article included the picture of the suspect B accompanied by comments and named him as the “perpetrator” of the offences. The Vienna Court of Appeal found that the applicant company had violated the presumption of innocence and ordered it to pay 50,000 Austrian schillings by way.

2.Summary of the Judgment:
At first, the Court was satisfied that the interference was "prescribed by law" namely by section 78 of the Austrian Copyright Act and pursued legitimate aims under Article 10, Section 2 of the Convention namely "the protection of the reputation or rights of others" as well as "maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary". Further, the Court concluded that the interference with the applicant company's right to freedom of expression was not "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 10, Section 2 of the Convention.   The court claimed that it found a breach of Article I0 of the Convention.

3.The Conflict Rights in this Case:
In this case, the ECHR recognized that the presumption of innocence entered into conflict with the right of the government to impart information about criminal investigations and with the right of the public to receive this information.

4.My Opinion: In this case, the company’s comments actually were contrary to the presumption of innocence that violated B's legitimate interests. So the rights to fair trial and the freedom of expression are conflict. It requires judges to do discretion and make balance of these two rights.  The presumption of innocence may not be so broad that no information can be given about investigations in progress, and the freedom of information may not be so broad that any kind of information may be imparted in any manner.

RKH: This is a great summary. In terms of additional things to think about, note the importance in this case of the lack of a connection between the injunction that was issued and the legitimate aim that was pursued. This was the key to finding the Article 10 breach. This is particularly true since other media were free to continue publishing his picture. So, the case turns on whether the injunction was a good way to pursue the aim, if it had been they likely wouldn't have found Article 10 to be violated.

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1.FACTS
The appellant (C) appealed against a decision which had the effect of dismissing her claim against the respondent newspaper (M) for damages for breach of confidence and compensation under the Data Protection Act 1998. M had published stories about C relating to her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous meetings. C had previously stated publicly that she did not take drugs. C claimed damages for breach of confidence and compensation under the 1998 Act, alleging the wrongful publication by M of private information.
2.CONCLUSION
The court concluded that the information in issue was all private and confidential. M ought to have known that there was a reasonable expectation that the information would be kept confidential.The publication of the fact that C had taken drugs and was seeking treatment was necessary to set the record straight given her previous statements, but the additional information, including the photographs, was an unjustified intrusion into C's private life. Balancing the competing interests, C's right to privacy under Art.8 outweighed M's freedom of expression under Art.10. The judge's award of damages would be restored.
3.MY OPINION
I  hold the belief that it is reasonable to allow C to appeal to the  court and  receive compensations. There is no  proper reason for M to publish C's personal information  since it has nothing to do with the  public interests, The exposed information is private, obviously, and M was infringing A's right to respect for her private and family life under  Article 8 ECHR.  Even though M has the  right to freedom of expression, there are some important restrictions which cannot be ignored. One of them is for the  protection of the reputation or rights of others. Hence, the court should balance the two rights under the ECHR

RKH: Your summary of the facts is mostly accurate but to get the most from the case and to fully engage with it, you should pay close attention to the details of the case, and look at critiques of the decision and academic opinion (particularly where we have already discussed basic facts in class). In this case, one key point that you should mention is the fact that the publication of the additional information would have caused substantial offence to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the Claimant's (NCs) position. Note that there is also a dissenting judgment of Lords Nicholls and Hoffman in this case that it is interesting to review (this was also the view of the Court of Appeal). According to the dissent the additional information was within the degree of latitude that should reasonable be afforded to journalists, and the article 10 rights of the defendants justified the publication of the additional information.

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FACTS & JUDGEMENT:
In July 1985, Danish journalist Jens Olaf Jersild interviewed a group of radical youths from a xenophobic group, the Greenjackets. The interview, which was broadcast via radio, featured several clips of Greenjacket members making derogatory statements about minority racial groups and immigrants. Jersild was later convicted of aiding and abetting the Greenjackets in publishing racist statements and was ordered to pay a fine. He appealed, but the High Court of Eastern Denmark, and the Supreme Court of Denmark both upheld the conviction. However, the European Court of Human Rights later held that the Danish Court’s ruling violated Jersild's freedom of expression, which is protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
COMMENTARY:
Some academics believe that because Jersild "aided and abetted the dissemination of racist remarks, he violated his right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the ECHR."
MY OPINION:
I personally believe it was wrong for Jersild to aid in the dissemination of racist remarks, however, for me, that is a moral issue, not a legal one. Although unethical in my view, I believe he was well within his rights acting as someone from the media to air the interview and that it was wrong for him to have been financially penalized.

RKH: This is a really interesting case to pick to highlight important issues relating to freedom of expression. Your view that this is a moral and not legal issue is a really interesting one, although it is always interesting to consider the extent to which human rights law does police morality to some extent (e.g. some people associate human rights with morality) so consider where we draw the line (remember the intersection of morals, law, and politics in human rights law). In this case there are also very interesting dissenting judgment that it would be good to read and consider. For example, one dissenting judgment suggests that the majority attributes more weight to freedom of expression than protection of those who have had to suffer racial hatred. Do you agree? And if so, is this ok?

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FACTS:
Husyan was an alleged terrorist.The applicant was captured in Pakistan and subsequently detained in Thailand. He was transferred to Poland and detained in the “black site” in Stare Kiejkuty where he allegedly was tortured by the CIA with Poland's knowledge and consent.

CONCLUSION:
Ultimately, the Court found that many rights had been violated in addition to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the transfer of the applicant from the respondent State’s territory despite the existence of a real risk that he could face a flagrant denial of justice.
MY OPINION:
I agree that this was a violation of the applicant's Article 6 right under the Convention because of the known risk that he could be treated unfairly.

RKH: This is a great case to pick to consider and can be compared to the Othman case in the UK. Your summary is good, but it would probably helpful to look at other academic opinions to develop your own critique. Just because there is a risk that someone could be treated unfairly, does this necessarily mean they can't be deported? This doesn't necessarily follow, as was evident from all of the debate surrounding these cases.

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B. and P. v. the United Kingdom       Facts：Following the parents' divorce or separation in 1993 and 1995, the two applicants separately made applications to the country court seeking a variation of the residence order in respect of their sons under section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989(“the residence application”). Further, the applicant applied to have the residence application heard in open court with a public pronouncement of the judgement. The first applicant appealed on the ground for the child’s interests. The second applicant appealed on the ground that the county court judge had fettered his discretion by indicating that he had no option but to hear the case in private. The court of first instance and the court of appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and made an order prohibiting the identification of the child. As the case was not heard in public and the judgments were not publicly pronounced, B. and P. complained in Strasbourg that these restricting measures on the publicity of their court case ought to have been considered to be in breach of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.    The Conclusion of Courts:In a judgment of 24 April 2001, the European Court of Human Rights noted that the proceedings in question concerned the residence of each man's son following the parents' divorce or separation, which were prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press and public might be justified to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid prejudicing the interests of justice. Concerning the publication of the judgments in question, the Court observed that anyone who could establish an interest was able to consult and obtain a copy of the full text of the judgments in child residence cases, while some of these judgments were routinely published, thus enabling the public to study the manner in which the courts generally approach such cases and the principles applied in deciding them. Under these circumstances, the Court reached the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1, either regarding the applicants' complaints about the public hearing or the public pronouncement of the judgments.                    I basically agree with the courts conclusion. I wonder the following question: the Article 6 demands that in civil proceedings the hearings must be held in public unless the court decides exceptionally. The exceptions must be determined by judges in concreto by reference to the particular facts of a case. So how to limit the range of judge's discretion to exclude the press and public from part of the trial?

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B. and P. v. the United Kingdom       Facts：Following the parents' divorce or separation in 1993 and 1995, the two applicants separately made applications to the country court seeking a variation of the residence order in respect of their sons under section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989(“the residence application”). Further, the applicant applied to have the residence application heard in open court with a public pronouncement of the judgement. The first applicant appealed on the ground for the child’s interests. The second applicant appealed on the ground that the county court judge had fettered his discretion by indicating that he had no option but to hear the case in private. The court of first instance and the court of appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and made an order prohibiting the identification of the child. As the case was not heard in public and the judgments were not publicly pronounced, B. and P. complained in Strasbourg that these restricting measures on the publicity of their court case ought to have been considered to be in breach of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.    The Conclusion of Courts:In a judgment of 24 April 2001, the European Court of Human Rights noted that the proceedings in question concerned the residence of each man's son following the parents' divorce or separation, which were prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press and public might be justified to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid prejudicing the interests of justice. Concerning the publication of the judgments in question, the Court observed that anyone who could establish an interest was able to consult and obtain a copy of the full text of the judgments in child residence cases, while some of these judgments were routinely published, thus enabling the public to study the manner in which the courts generally approach such cases and the principles applied in deciding them. Under these circumstances, the Court reached the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1, either regarding the applicants' complaints about the public hearing or the public pronouncement of the judgments.                    I basically agree with the courts conclusion. I wonder the following question: the Article 6 demands that in civil proceedings the hearings must be held in public unless the court decides exceptionally. The exceptions must be determined by judges in concreto by reference to the particular facts of a case. So how to limit the range of judge's discretion to exclude the press and public from part of the trial?

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RKH: This is a great summary of the case. I think your question about how to limit the judges discretion is a good one. If it is an issue you are interested in it may be worth looking at cases not involving children, since broadly it is often accepted that these cases can be held in private (to protect children). For a critical perspective on the case it would be good for you to read the dissenting opinion of Judges Loucaides and Tulkens.

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1. In this case a alleged terrorist from Jordan Abu Qatada is seeking asylum from the UK because he is scared to face torture in Jordan. The UK refuses to give him asylum because of his terriost alleged past. So Qatada goes to the ECHR in order for them to see his case.
2. In final decision the ECHR states that if the UK sends back Qatada to Jordan it would be a violation of article 6 because he wouldn't get a fair trial in Jordan because they would use the information they achieved through torture against him.
3. This is a very hard decision. But at the end I have to agree with the court. This is one of those situations where we must let an evil person be free in order for an innocent person in the future to be also set free. Also it shows how the UK is anti torture. Torture should never be used by the states. So by not sending this man to a place where they would use evidence achieved through torture it shows the UK stand on torture. I am aware that many people dont want him being free because he is accused of being a terrorist but like I said this is a situation where we have to let an evil man free for justice could be continued in the future.

RKH: Be really careful on details in terms of the facts of the case. This is broadly right, but a few small things are wrong (if you read the facts in the ECtHR judgment you'll get the full facts which you can then summarise). To get some more nuances on the case it would also be helpful to look at the judgment of the House of Lords before the case went to the ECtHR. This will give you some of the legal reasons in favor of the deportation. Also, how does this compare to the Beatles case (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/britain-beatles-death-penalty/565928/) here the UK is willing to allow people connected to Britain and who could face the death penalty to be deported from Syria despite no assurances the death penalty wont happen?

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1.FACTS
The applicant, Alexander Bartaia, is a Georgian national. The domestic court issued a default judgment rejecting his case. Mr.  Bartaia alleged that the default judgment had been issued against him without him being able to participate in the proceedings on an equal footing with the opposing party, who had been represented by a lawyer, and that he had not been given the possibility to then obtain a fresh examination of his case.Therefore, Mr. Bartaia alleged that  the proceedings in his case had been unfair.
2.CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that the applicant’s right to participate effectively in the proceedings and the right to equality of arms were restricted to an extent incompatible with the principles of a fair hearing established by Article 6 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1.
3.MY OPINION
I agree with that conclusion. under Article 6 § 1,"A fair and public hearing"is an important element while applying this  statute. In this case, very obviously, there is not a fair hearing. According to the court record, the first-instance judge disregarded the request for an adjournment as such.It is to say, the judge deprived Mr. Bartaia of his right to have a fair hearing, thus resulting in an unfair trial. Therefore, considering the facts, the protection of fairness as well as the aim of the ECfHR, the court's conclusion is reasonable.

RKH: This is an interesting case to read and summarise. One question that it is interesting to consider is the extent to which governments can be expected to intervene to put parties on an equal footing. For example, what should happen where one party has a lot of money and so can hire a better lawyer? It is very difficult practically for the government to do anything about this. Think about where the line should be drawn.