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The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been actively involved in Syria since its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013.

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Humanitarian organizations have an unfortunate addiction to the word 'unprecedented'. Whenever a new crisis erupts and large numbers of people are forced to abandon their country, the major aid agencies will inevitably launch fund-raising appeals, saying "please help us to respond to this unprecedented emergency."

While the word 'unprecedented' has become overused and thereby devalued, we should have little hesitation in using it in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis, which is unprecedented - or at least unusual - in a number of ways.
Scale, speed and scope
First, the scale of Syrian displacement is exceptional. More than seven million people have been uprooted within the country, while some four million have fled to neighbouring and nearby states. Syrians now constitute the second largest refugee population in the world, after the Palestinians.

Second, the speed of the Syrian exodus has been astonishing. In the first year of the armed conflict in Syria, 2011-12, the movement of people out of the country was very modest in size. But that trickle became a mass exodus as the civil war intensified, and as civilian populations found themselves in the line of fire. In one 12-month period, the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon rocketed from just 130,000 to over one million.

Third, the Syrian refugee emergency is characterized by its wide geographic scope. During the past three years, Syrians have been fleeing in all directions, with the majority of them going to nearby countries such as Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. But that movement has now spread to North Africa and the Mediterranean, to the Balkans, southern Europe and Scandinavia.

Fourth, the emergency is unusual in terms of the settlement pattern of the exiled Syrians. There is still a tendency to associate the word 'refugee' with sprawling tented camps, where basic needs such as shelter, food, are provided by an array of aid agencies. But that is not the case for the vast majority of Syrians. In Egypt and Lebanon, no refugee camps have been established, although the latter country has witnessed the emergence of 'informal settlements', ramshackle concentrations of refugees which have all of the disadvantages of organized camps and none of the advantages. In Jordan, over 80 per cent of the refugees are living outside of camps in urban and rural locations.

A fifth important characteristic of the Syrian refugee emergency has been the scale of the response to it. The latest UN appeal for Syrian refugees amounts to over $4 billion, the largest in humanitarian history. Well over 100 different agencies are involved in the operation. Governments in the region, especially Turkey, have spent billions of additional dollars in their response to the emergency.

Sixth, the Syrian refugee crisis is unusual in terms of the number of other major emergencies that have erupted at the same time, including those in Iraq, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Ukraine, Yemen, the typhoon in Philippines, the Ebola crisis in West Africa and the earthquake in Nepal. At the same time, longstanding refugee situations such as those involving Afghans, Somalis and Sudanese have persisted. As many aid agencies have pointed out, the whole humanitarian system is now under very serious - perhaps even unprecedented - pressure.
Impact on host communities
A final characteristic of the Syrian refugee situation concerns the impact of the refugee influx on host countries and communities. This is not a new issue. For decades, countries such as Kenya, Pakistan and Bangladesh have drawn attention to the heavy costs they incur in hosting significant numbers of refugees, not only financially, but also in terms of the refugee impact on their economy, environment, infrastructure and security.

Such issues are of particular concern in relation to the Syrian refugee emergency, especially in Lebanon, where refugees now constitute 25 per cent of the population. According to the World Bank, the Syrian refugee influx and armed conflict are progressively reducing the country's Gross Domestic Product. Government revenue collection has slumped while state expenditure has increased, due to the massive new surge in demand for services. Schools and health facilities are overcrowded. The quality of water, sanitation and waste disposal services has deteriorated. Unemployment and consumer prices have both risen.

To makes the situation worse, the Syrian refugee emergency show no sign of coming to an end. During a visit to the region in 2012, many refugees said they could survive for a while by supplementing their assistance they by making use of their savings and borrowing money, pending the time when they could return to their homes.

On more recent visits, it has become clear that the majority of refugees have depleted whatever resources they had, have gone heavily into debt, that they have to resort to negative coping mechanisms and see no early prospect of going back to Syria. Hence the decision of growing numbers of Syrians to make their way to Europe.
Protection problems in perspective
Confronted with this scenario, many analysts have reached some very gloomy conclusions about the Syrian refugee situation. According to an independent review recently published by UNHCR, "after three years of humanitarian response to the refugee crisis, the situation has reached a critical phase. Refugee vulnerability is increasing. Humanitarian assistance is not sustainable at the current level. There are serious and growing protection concerns."

There is a wealth of evidence to support that last remark. States in the region are periodically imposing border closures and other forms of control that make it more difficult for Syrians to seek and find asylum in other states. The frequency with which Syrians are detained and deported appears to be on the rise. Women and girls are at growing risk of gender based violence.

Children more generally - and in Jordan and Lebanon they constitute just over half of the refugee population - are being taken out of school so that they can work and contribute to the family income. Even so, the refugees are struggling to survive. Assistance levels are declining because of a shortage of funds, with the result that two out of every three Syrians in Jordan are now living below the official poverty line.

These are all serious protection problems, but they have to be considered in a broader historical and geographical perspective. Let us recall what has happened in some other refugee emergencies during the past 25 years.

In 1991, Turkey deployed its armed forces along its mountainous border with Iraq, in order to prevent an influx of Kurdish refugees. Hundreds died as a result. In 1996, the Tanzanian military rounded up half a million Rwandan refugees and forced them to go back to their country of origin.

In 2008 and again this year, a spate of violent attacks took place in South Africa killing, injuring and displacing refugees who had made a home in that country. During the past 18 months, the Kenyan authorities have tried to force refugees out of the capital city of Nairobi, insisting that they be confined to camps in the remote north-east of the country. At the same time, the residents of those camps have come under growing pressure to return to Somalia, despite the continuing armed conflict and drought in that country.

Protection crises of this type have not occurred in the countries neighbouring Syria. Borders have never been completely closed. Large-scale refugee expulsions have not occurred. Syrians have generally been allowed to choose their place of residence. And despite many predictions to the contrary, large-scale violence between the refugees and their local hosts has not erupted.
Explaining and maintaining regional generosity
This scenario raises two questions. First, why has the region's response to the Syrian refugee emergency been so generous? And second, what can be done to ensure that such generosity is sustained in the months and years to come?

With respect to the first of those questions, it is difficult to ascribe the willingness of Syria's neighbours to host such large numbers of refugees in terms of their legal obligations, as they are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Indeed, as many commentators have suggested, the region's difficult experience with the Palestinians might have led them to exclude another large and potentially long-term refugee population.

Other variables would seem to be at play. The absorption of such a large refugee population is evidently linked to the fact that Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq are middle-income countries, with a greater capacity to host refugees than many states in Africa and Asia. It is connected with the strong cultural, linguistic and ethnic affinities that the refugees share with their hosts. And it is because the western powers, alarmed by the evolving geopolitics of the region, have been prepared to make enormous amounts of humanitarian assistance available to the refugees, and to a lesser extent the local population.

With respect to the question of sustaining the region's generosity towards the Syrian refugees, there are three principle ways forward.

First and most obviously, there is a need for the international community, to make a far more robust effort to bring the Syrian conflict to an end. This might seem to be a forlorn hope, given the failure of Special Envoys such as Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi to make any progress in the establishment of a peace process. But perhaps the situation is changing.

As Richard Gowan has pointed out, "the world is finally waking up to the fact that the international humanitarian system is falling apart" "UN officials," he continues, "privately admit that the gap between aid requirements and available funds may now be too big to bridge."

But money, he says, is not the real problem. "The chaos in the humanitarian system is just a symptom of a far bigger political crisis affecting the multilateral system: the decline of the post-Cold War emphasis on conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution as common international concerns."

With growing numbers of Syrians now making their way to Europe, adding to a Mediterranean refugee and migration crisis that has completely confounded the continent, could it be that the EU and its allies will finally recognize the need for more determined conflict resolution efforts?

Second, it has become increasingly clear that even a fully funded emergency operation would not meet the longer-term needs of the refugees and their hosts. While continued humanitarian assistance is essential, steps must also be taken to provide Syria's neighbours with economic support and developmental aid.

More specifically, the international community must help to create new job and livelihoods opportunities throughout the region, thereby allowing the refugees to support themselves and live in harmony with local communities. So far, the world's financial institutions, banks, development actors, donor states and private sector companies have not pursued these objectives with sufficient vigour.

Finally, if the region's generosity is to be maintained, then more prosperous parts of the world must set a far better example with respect to the way that they respond to the refugee issue.

At a time when countries in the Middle East have given refuge to four million Syrians, it is very disappointing to see that countries such as the UK and USA have failed to share a small proportion of that burden by establishing refugee resettlement programmes. Australia has set an even worse example by subjecting refugees to long-term detention, by transferring its unwanted refugees to developing countries and by paying human smugglers to turn back their boats.

Unless the Syrian refugee emergency is treated as a truly global responsibility, we cannot expect hard-pressed countries in the region to maintain the generosity they have demonstrated since the crisis erupted.

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Syria's refugees: a global responsibility

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Humanitarian organizations have an unfortunate addiction to the word 'unprecedented'. Whenever a new crisis erupts and large numbers of people are forced to abandon their country, the major aid agencies will inevitably launch fund-raising appeals, saying "please help us to respond to this unprecedented emergency."

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Essay Feedback and sample Introductions 

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Essay Feedback and sample Introductions 

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Essay Feedback with sample introductions

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Article assessing the effectiveness of the European Commission's Refugee Quota Scheme 

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Article assessing the effectiveness of the European Commission's Refugee Quota Scheme 

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In the slew of shocking numbers from the EU's refugee crisis this week - 30 times as many people entering Europe in the first two months of this year as last; 70,000 likely to need urgent accommodation in Greece; between 2,000 and 3,000 new arrivals every day - one stands out.

Last September, after months of fraught discussions, the European commission unveiled a "decisive" EU plan to redistribute around the bloc 160,000 Syrian, Iraqi and Eritrean asylum seekers from the frontline countries of Italy and Greece over the next two years.

As of Friday, the EU's only concrete, collective effort to find new homes for a small fraction of the 1.2 million refugees and migrants who, since January last year, have landed on its southern shores, has seen exactly 660 relocated.

According to the commission's figures, just 17 member states have so far made 6,642 places available, about 4% of the promised total. The numbers they have actually taken in, which range from two in Bulgaria to 140 in Finland, add up to just 0.4% of the target (and to less than 0.05% of those who have arrived).

Politicians, officials and aid workers say the scheme, which Britain decided not to join, faces significant logistical, bureaucratic and above all political obstacles - and warn that as the migration crisis continues to grow, it risks in any event being swamped by events.

"Even if the plan was fully signed up to and operational, it is plainly too small given the scale of what Europe is now experiencing," said Steve Symonds, Amnesty International's refugee and migrant rights programme director.

They also stress that if this temporary scheme is not properly implemented, it will prevent the permanent one the European commission has acknowledged will ultimately be needed from ever seeing the light of day.

"Some people," a Brussels official told Agence France-Presse, "are afraid this is going to fail. Some are losing hope. But some are also exploiting this loss of hope."

A number of the problems are purely practical. States have cited a lack of adequate housing and educational facilities, as well as short-term difficulties organising charter flights.

Many of the French towns, for example, asked to host some of the 24,000 asylum seekers France has pledged to accommodate - it has so far welcomed 130 - did not have the right kind of housing, Kléber Arhoul, the national refugee coordinator, told a parliamentary hearing in Paris.

"Localities mainly had made four or five-bedroom houses available, believing the demand would mostly be from families," he said. "Applications have come almost exclusively from single men. What we need is studios."

Other countries have said delays and failings at the seven so-called refugee hotspots - set up under the scheme in Greece and Italy to identify, register and fingerprint new arrivals - pose administrative problems.

Several states, including France, Belgium and Sweden, have also stepped up security checks on asylum seekers since it emerged that some of the attackers who carried out the suicide bombings and shootings in Paris last November may have entered Europe as part of last summer's refugee influx through Greece.

Others are reportedly selecting on religious or racial grounds: Hungary's prime minister, Viktor Orbán, who has vowed not to accept any refugees under the scheme, protested last year that Hungarians "do not want a large number of Muslim people in our country".

EU refugee emergency relocation scheme

Greece's minister for migration, Yiannis Mouzalas, said last month that some reception countries were "asking us [for refugees] not to be black, not to be big families, they ask us for more security".

One western diplomat, who asked not to be named, said some countries were also "looking at questions like whether or not asylum candidates had relatives already in the country, or qualifications, a profession that might be more useful".

But the relocation scheme is also failing because refugees themselves do not understand how it is supposed to work but see all too clearly that it is ineffective. Many also fear being sent to a country they do not particularly want to live in and not being able to move on.

"There's no way you're going to hang around, knowing if you put your shoes on and set off you stand a better chance of getting where you really want to be," Symonds said. "The longer this goes on, the less chance there is that individuals who could benefit will stay put and apply in Greece."

Arhoul says the competition between "the official relocation system, which is slow, demanding and restrictive ... and the option to try to move freely to Germany, Austria, Sweden or France" has ended up "completely undermining the effectiveness" of the EU scheme.

It is possible, as Demetrios Papademetriou, head of the Brussels-based Migration Policy Institute, has said, that some European countries are resisting the relocation quotas because they see "no end in sight" to the migrant crisis, and so to the demands they will face.

The biggest obstacles, however, are political. Last November, the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, and several high-ranking EU officials gathered at Athens airport to see off the first refugees to be relocated under the scheme, a group of 30 Syrians and Iraqis headed to Luxembourg.

EU refugee relocation scheme: how states responded

Tsipras conceded the 30 were "a drop in the ocean", but said he hoped they would become "a stream, then a river of ... shared responsibility". Italy's interior minister made similar noises in January when 19 Eritreans boarded a plane for Luleå in Sweden, calling the flight "a symbol of hope".

But anti-refugee sentiment and a mounting populist backlash spearheaded by the Visegrad group of countries, has seen a total of eight countries partly close their borders, particularly along the west Balkan refugee route to the migrants' favoured destinations of Germany and Sweden.

Last month, along with Slovenia, Croatia and non-EU members Serbia and Macedonia, Austria - which has rejected Brussels' criticism of its policy as "absurd" - imposed strict new restrictions, including a daily cap on the number of asylum seekers and migrants they would allow to enter their territory.

It was those restrictions that led to up to 10,000 refugees and migrants being stranded this week, in squalid conditions, at Greece's northern border with Macedonia, near the small town of Idomeni, with hundreds more arriving daily.

As the EU announced a €700m (£540m) aid package for Greece to help it deal with the crisis, officials in Athens admitted it now seemed likely that the country would become a reception rather than a transit country for refugees and migrants.

For NGOs and aid agencies, the bloc is fast failing the test. "Too many states are opting for a chaotic, individual approach rather than the coordinated, ordered one the EU is pressing on them," said Symonds.

The United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, condemned governments that were "not working together, despite agreements", while Human Rights Watch was scathing of the EU's "utter failure to respond collectively and compassionately".

Aid agencies are increasingly alarmed about the humanitarian consequences. "The EU needs to start putting the needs of the people seeking its protection first if it wants to manage this crisis," said Aurélie Ponthieu, Médécins sans Frontières's migration expert.

In Brussels, the EU diplomat was equally harsh. "Unless countries can escape their domestic political agendas," he said, "this scheme, which is already wholly inadequate, will continue to fail."

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EU refugee relocation scheme is inadequate and will continue to fail

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In the slew of shocking numbers from the EU's refugee crisis this week - 30 times as many people entering Europe in the first two months of this year as last; 70,000 likely to need urgent accommodation in Greece; between 2,000 and 3,000 new arrivals every day - one stands out.

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Feedback and model responses.

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People Movement Debate - Links and additional information 

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People Movement Debate - Links and additional information 

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What Can Countries Do to Help Refugees Fleeing to Europe?

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If the Syrian refugee crisis isn't just a European problem, what should other countries be doing?

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Tool to summarise all key knowledge from U4 AOS 1 in preparation for SAC and Exam 

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Tool to summarise all key knowledge from U4 AOS 1 in preparation for SAC and Exam 

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Unit 4 AOS 1 Ethical Issues and Debates Summary SAC Exam Preparation Document

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Ethical Issues and Debates Practice SAC 

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Ethical Issues and Debates Practice SAC 

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Please complete and submit on Thursday.

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Ethical Debates Arms Control Debates 2 and 3

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Arms Control Ethical Debate 1: International Security versus State Security 

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Arms Control Ethical Debate 1: International Security versus State Security 

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Arms Control Ethical Debate International Security vs State Security

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Additional resources

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twXxENO7nJ4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGgpoI_0oPs

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Sample Short Answer Responses with solutions and feedback

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Sample Short Answer Responses with solutions and feedback

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Short Answer Response Questions and Sample Answers VCE Gold and Silver

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Introduction

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3 Ethical issues and Debates Introduction

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Overview of Qatar Migrant Worker Situation 

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Overview of Qatar Migrant Worker Situation 

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Exploitation of migrant workers rights

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Migrant Workers 1990 Convention + Global Actor Responses

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Migrant Workers 1990 Convention + Global Actor Responses

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1990 Migrants Workers Convention and Responses

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Refugee Convention - Responses and Evaluation Tool

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Refugee Convention - Responses and Evaluation Tool

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Syrian Refugee Crisis and the world's response 

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Syrian Refugee Crisis and the world's response 

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1951 Refugee Convention + Global Actor Responses 

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1951 Refugee Convention + Global Actor Responses 

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There are no easy answers to Europe's migration crisis. Perhaps that fact alone - the reality that all options are insufficient - could be the basis to build a consensus out of the bitter divisions that now grip the continent. The answer to the crisis in the longer term will depend less on migration policy and much more on smarter ways to avoid such crises in the first place.

Those brave politicians who welcome the refugees, like German chancellor Angela Merkel, take a stand of basic human decency. People are fleeing for their lives from terror and war. To deny them asylum would violate the most basic standards of compassion. For you were strangers in a strange land, God reminds the Israelites in setting forth the principles of social justice.

Those favouring asylum are also in fact pragmatic. The international law of refugees (including the 1951 refugee convention) bars the forced return of refugees to their homeland. The European court of human rights has long upheld this principle. And with all the walls, and border patrols, Europe is no island. Nor for that matter is the US. Trying to forcibly stop the migrant influx into Europe would fail.

Yet those who oppose the refugees have their own valid points. It is true, and not simply cruel, to point out that the flow of refugees reflects the massive and repeated failures of western foreign policies. The US in particular has repeatedly used military force to try to impose its preferred regimes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and beyond. This regime-change policy lies in tatters and more than 10 million displaced people are the consequence.

It is also sensible, and not merely cruel, to demand from the politicians a longer term strategy. Accepting a one-time influx of refugees is compassionate. Asserting that Europe's door is open to migrants and refugees without limit is reckless, not compassionate. No high-income society can throw its doors open to all interested comers: the press of humanity to Europe (or the US) would be essentially unlimited. Gradual migration is important and replenishes our societies; wide-open doors are unfeasible and unmanageable.

In the 19th century migrants to the US came with nothing and expected little from the state when they arrived. There were no social transfers; no public healthcare; no guaranteed housing. And only a modest gap between the incomes they were leaving behind and those they would find upon arrival. They came poor but they did not create an underclass, just another addition to the poor they found on arrival.

Today, the migrants are leaving societies with incomes a fifth or a tenth of those of their target destinations in Europe and the US. An economist might say open the borders but withhold the social payments that currently attract the numbers, thereby reducing the flow. Yet the refugee sceptics know better. They don't want to create a new, large and persistent underclass within their own societies. Even without social benefit the numbers would be huge; and the populations on arrival would create new subgroups of penury and social dislocation. The sceptics judge rightly that this is a realistic risk. Nor are the new host countries able to commit large social transfers to an unending, and essentially unlimited, number of new arrivals. Withholding benefits would lead to a new underclass; paying benefits would lead to a fiscal crisis.

There is, in short, no good answer. Such an honest reflection could, by itself, help our societies think more clearly about the least bad options. The first implication, in my view, is to accept the humanitarian responsibility of taking in the refugees while simultaneously moving to end the Syrian bloodbath. This can be done if the US and its allies (Saudi Arabia and Turkey) stop trying to overthrow President Assad; and if the US, its allies, and Russia and Iran - with the support of the UN security council - back a joint action against Islamic State.

Once peace is restored, most of today's refugees should return home; and would do so if there were a viable future. In our madness - for what else is it? - the US and its allies spend trillions of dollars on useless wars but then typically balk at funds to rebuild homes, schools, clinics and the rest. The irony is that Europe's aid budgets are being swallowed in caring for refugees on European soil, when that money should be used to build stable economic futures in the source countries.

The second step for Europe and the US is to finance the investments needed for a viable life in the fragile regions of Africa, the Middle East and Asia that otherwise will be unremitting sources of mass migration. Europe and the US increasingly reject foreign assistance because, they claim, budgets are tight. Yet how foolish it is to believe that cuts in foreign assistance will be real savings in the long term. If conditions abroad are unviable, the wars, migrations and environmental catastrophes driving today's crisis will continue to be replicated and expanded.

A serious agreement on climate change is also an insurance policy against future mass migration. We know well that the Syrian disaster had some of its roots in the mega-droughts of the last decade. Many more environmental refugees are sure to follow a business-as-usual trajectory of global warming. The climate negotiations in Paris are therefore a key piece of the puzzle.

The right wing is cruel to reject the humanity of those whose lives depend on our succour. Yet the pro-refugee politicians will not win the day if they fail to address the deeper causes of the crisis. Accepting the refugees today has to be accompanied by a rapid end to the Syrian war; an end to the US-led wars of regime change; more cooperation in the UN security council; and long-term investments in sustainable development. The flood of refugees will abate to a manageable level only when people everywhere, including in poor and unstable regions, see a safe future for themselves and their children in their home countries.
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There's no perfect answer to the migrant crisis - and we must face that | Jeffrey Sachs

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There are no easy answers to Europe's migration crisis. Perhaps that fact alone - the reality that all options are insufficient - could be the basis to build a consensus out of the bitter divisions that now grip the continent.

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Continued use of chemical weapons in Syria 

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Continued use of chemical weapons in Syria 

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A failure of the OPCW, international community, Syria?

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(Beirut) - International efforts to deter chemical attacks in Syria in the year since the devastating sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017, have been ineffective, Human Rights Watch said today. Human Rights Watch has collated and analyzed evidence of chemical weapons attacks in Syria between August 21, 2013, the day of the deadliest chemical weapon attack in Syria to date, and February 25, 2018, when the Syrian government used chlorine in the besieged enclave of Eastern Ghouta.

The information, based on data from seven sources, shows that the Syrian government is responsible for the majority of 85 confirmed chemical weapon attacks. The data also show that the Syrian government has been largely undeterred by the efforts of the United Nations Security Council, the international Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and unilateral action by individual countries to enforce the prohibition on Syria's use of chemical weapons.

"In Syria, the government is using chemical weapons that are banned the world over without paying any price," said Lama Fakih, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. "One year after the horrific sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun, neither the UN Security Council nor the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has acted to uphold the prohibition against chemical weapon attacks."

On April 4, 2018, the UN Security Council will meet to discuss the situation of chemical weapons in Syria. Members of the Security Council should find an alternative to the Joint Investigative Mechanism, a group that the Security Council and OPCW had tasked with identifying the party responsible chemical weapons attacks, but whose mandate was not renewed because of a Russian veto. The Security Council should impose sanctions on officials involved in the Khan Sheikhoun attack.

The sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun was the largest chemical weapon attack in Syria since the government acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013. The government acceded to the convention following the chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta on August 21, 2013, when the Security Council demanded that the Syrian government destroy its chemical stockpiles, weapons, and production capacity.

In June 2014, the OPCW announced that it had shipped Syria's declared chemical weapons out of the country for destruction, though it continued attempting to verify the accuracy and completeness of the Syrian declaration. Nevertheless, several incidents of the use of the chemical weapons in Syria have been reported, including by the Syrian government. As part of a strategy to re-take areas held by anti-government groups, the Syrian government has conducted coordinated chemical weapon attacks, including in Aleppo in December 2016 and likely in Ghouta in January and February of 2018.

On April 4, 2017, an aircraft attacked Khan Sheikhoun, a town held by anti-government forces in Idlib governorate, with sarin, a toxic chemical. Human Rights Watch investigated the attack and found that all likely evidence pointed to Syrian government responsibility. On October 26, the Joint Investigative Mechanism confirmed that the Syrian government was responsible. On November 16, the Russian government vetoed a UN Security Council resolution to renew the group's mandate and on November 17, it ceased operations.

Russia has also used its veto at the Security Council to prevent holding the Syrian government accountable for its violations. That includes vetoing a resolution along with China that would have referred the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court on May 22, 2014.

Since the Joint Investigative Mechanism ceased to operate, the Syrian government has likely carried out at least five more chemical weapons attacks. There is no UN or OPCW entity to identify the party responsible for these attacks. And beyond unilateral sanctions by countries like the United States, France, and the European Union, those responsible have not been held accountable for the use of these weapons.

The sources Human Rights Watch used for this analysis are: Human Rights Watch research, the Joint Investigative Mechanism, the UN Commission of Inquiry, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in Syria, the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria, Amnesty International, and Bellingcat. In some cases, multiple sources investigated the same attack, while in others only one investigated it. The sources selected are independent and document violations based on witness and victim evidence, analysis of open source material, and - where available - physical samples. The 85 attacks reflect attacks that have been investigated by at least one of these sources and made public. The total number of actual chemical attacks is likely higher.

Human Rights Watch classified the data based on the organizations' findings. Human Rights Watch has not independently verified attacks that it did not investigate. Of the 85 chemical weapon attacks analyzed from these sources, more than 50 were identified by the various sources as having been committed by Syrian government forces. Of these, 42 were documented to have used chlorine, while two used sarin. In seven of the attacks, the type of chemicals was unspecified.

The groups found that the Islamic State group (also known as ISIS) carried out three chemical weapon attacks using sulfur mustard. One attack was by non-state armed groups using chlorine. Those responsible for the remaining attacks in the data set are unknown or unconfirmed.

The OPCW is also mandated with protecting and executing the international Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The Conference of the OPCW is empowered by Article XII to take " necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes it," including the use of collective measures such as sanctions.

But despite confirmed use of sarin by the Syrian government by both the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the OPCW's own fact-finding mission, the OPCW has not taken any collective measures. The OPCW should suspend and sanction the Syrian government for its failure to comply with the Convention, Human Rights Watch said. If the Security Council and OPCW continue to drag their feet, it is a signal that member countries need to individually hold the Syrian government accountable and re-instate a system to identify responsibility for attacks.

"Despite the incentives to act, the UN Security Council and OPCW are silently watching on as Syria transforms the nightmare of chemical warfare into reality," Fakih said. "It is high time to do right by the victims of the attack and the international standard set in the chemical weapons treaty."

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Syria: A Year On, Chemical Weapons Attacks Persist

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International efforts to deter chemical attacks in Syria in the year since the devastating sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017, have been ineffective, Human Rights Watch said today.

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Human Rights Watch suggest that global deterrence is ineffective in preventing the use  of chemical weapons

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Human Rights Watch suggest that global deterrence is ineffective in preventing the use  of chemical weapons

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Human Rights Watch Findings re: chemical attack in Ghouta, 21st Aug 2013 

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Human Rights Watch Findings re: chemical attack in Ghouta, 21st Aug 2013 

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1. What did Human Rights Watch find? Is this valid? How do we know?

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Syria: Chemical Attacks on Ghouta | August 21, 2013

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UN Investigation and findings into 2013 chemical attack in Syria 

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UN Investigation and findings into 2013 chemical attack in Syria 

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1. What is the responsibility of the international community?

2. Can the use of chemical weapons be stopped in warfare? What challenges does the IC face?

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The UN has confirmed that the worst chemical weapons attack in 25 years took place in eastern Damascus last month, involving specially designed rockets that spread sarin nerve agent over rebel-held suburbs of the Syrian capital.

The UN has confirmed that the worst chemical weapons attack in 25 years took place in eastern Damascus last month, involving specially designed rockets that spread sarin nerve agent over rebel-held suburbs of the Syrian capital.

The report did not assign blame for the attack but the US, Britain and France said the details on the sarin, the rockets used and their trajectories all proved that Bashar al-Assad's regime was responsible.

However, Russia argued that the western powers had "jumped to conclusions" and said claims of rebel use against their own supporters to provoke foreign intervention "should not be shrugged off".

There was also sharp disagreement about what kind of UN resolution was needed to implement the agreement struck by the US and Russia on Saturday in Geneva on dismantling the Assad regime's chemical weapons programme.

The differences - on whether an initial resolution should include the threat of punitive measures for Syrian non-compliance - were a reminder that the Geneva agreement could still unravel before it is put into force.

Presenting the report, the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, said: "This is the most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them in Halabja in 1988. The international community has pledged to prevent any such horror from recurring, yet it has happened again."

However, Ban did not say who was responsible for the attack, noting that was not in the mandate of the UN investigation.

"It is for others to pursue this matter further to determine responsibility. We will all have our own thoughts on this," the secretary general said.

Presenting their arguments afterwards, western diplomats said the head of the UN investigation team, Åke Sellström, a Swedish scientist, had observed that the quality of the sarin used in the attack on western and eastern Ghouta suburbs on 21 August was higher than that used in the 1995 terror attack on the Tokyo underground or Saddam Hussein's attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja.

Sellström also said the rockets used were professionally made. His report said they were fired from the north-west, and western officials said the details of the trajectories confirmed that they came from an area held by government troops.

"All of that confirms in our view there is no remaining doubt that it was the regime that used the chemical weapons. It confirms that the regime was responsible," Mark Lyall Grant, the British envoy to the UN, said.

His American counterpart, Samantha Power, singled out evidence in the UN report on the calibre of rocket used, saying that in "thousands of videos" from the Syrian conflict there was no indication that the rebels had such weapons. Nor was there any evidence that the rebels possessed sarin, she added.

"The technical details of the report make clear that only the regime could have carried out this chemical weapons attack," Power said. The French ambassador, Gerard Araud, echoed her conclusions.

However, the Russian ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, complained: "Some colleagues jumped to conclusions when they said the attack was by government forces. We have not even had a chance to look at the report. We have just had a quick glance. The allegations that it was the opposition cannot be simply shrugged off."

The Sellström report noted the kind of rockets used and pointed out that they had been fired from the north-west in the early hours when the air was moving downwards, maximising casualties.

"Chemical weapons use in such meteorological conditions maximises their potential impact as the heavy gas can stay close to the ground and penetrate into lower levels of buildings and constructions where many people were seeking shelter," it said.

The report said that one of the rockets analysed was an M14 rocket, which had been fired by a multiple rocket launcher. The second was a 330mm rocket.

Peter Bouckaert, a weapons specialist at Human Rights Watch, said: "The rocket systems identified by the UN as used in the attack - truck-launched 330mm rockets with around 50 to 60 litres of sarin, as well as 140mm Soviet-produced rockets carrying a smaller sarin-filled warhead - are both known to be in the arsenal of the Syrian armed forces. They have never been seen in rebel hands."

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is expected to meet in the coming days to endorse the Geneva agreement on the disarming of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile.
Topics

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Syrian chemical attack used sarin and was worst in 25 years, says UN

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The UN has confirmed that the worst chemical weapons attack in 25 years took place in eastern Damascus last month, involving specially designed rockets that spread sarin nerve agent over rebel-held suburbs of the Syrian capital.

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Marking Guide - Sample responses and examiners advice for practice questions + essay topics. 

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Marking Guide - Sample responses and examiners advice for practice questions + essay topics. 

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2014 - 2018

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Practice Qs Marking Guide and Examiners Advice U4 AOS1.docx

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Additional notes: Realism and Cosmopolitanism 

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Additional notes: Realism and Cosmopolitanism 

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Inside Story - Chemical Warfare in Syria?

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Inside Story - Chemical Warfare in Syria?

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Watch and respond to questions in class.

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In Syria, women and children were among the dozens found dead under suspicious circumstances this week. Rebel forces said more than 1,000 people were killed by the government in a chemical weapons attack, while the authorities dismissed the report as "baseless".

Syrian activists claimed that government forces had carried out a "poisonous gas" attack, in what would be the worst reported use of chemical weapons since the two-year civil war began.

Estimates of the death toll vary widely but doctors and opposition leaders said more than 1,300 people had been killed.

... There is not much that we know about exactly what happened, but it is clear that the victims have suffered from asphyxiation and most of their symptoms are consistent with some kind of chemical agent ... What's particularly important is that none of the victims displayed any exterior wounds.

Dina Esfandiary, a research associate on the non-proliferation and disarmament programme for the International Institute for Strategic Studies

The attack was said to have taken place on Wednesday in Eastern Ghouta, an area of countryside to the east of the capital Damascus. Activists said reports came in from Ein Tarma, Zermalka and Jobar.

The incident coincided with a visit to Syria by a 20-member UN chemical weapons team, which was staying just 16km away - in downtown Damascus.

Coincidentally, the UN team was in Syria to investigate three sites where chemical weapons attacks had allegedly occurred over the past year.

Al Jazeera's Nisreen El-Shamayleh, reporting from neighbouring Jordan, said there were videos allegedly showing both children and adults in field hospitals, some of them suffocating, coughing and sweating. Al Jazeera, however, cannot independently verify the footage.

There were no hesitations in the international reactions to Wednesday's attack.

France declared that the international community needs to respond with force if allegations are confirmed. But French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius also said the response should not include boots on the ground.

Turkey said red lines have been crossed in Syria, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that only the Syrian government possessed chemical weapons.

Iran disputed that assertion, and said that if the reports are confirmed, it would likely be so-called "terrorist groups" that used chemical weapons and were to blame. The US and Britain are meanwhile among the 35 countries who have called for the UN to investigate what took place in Ghouta.

So, where does this incident leave the international community, if the so-called red line has been crossed? And is a political solution still possible for Syria?

To discuss this, Inside Story, with presenter Jane Dutton, is joined by guests: Dina Esfandiary, a research associate on the non-proliferation and disarmament programme for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who specialises in chemical weapons and security; Firas Abi Ali, the head of the Middle East and North Africa country risk team for IHS Global; and Nikolaos Van Dam, the former Dutch ambassador to Egypt and Iraq.

"The three explanations that are being thrown around are: that Assad deliberately did this as a sort of ... intention to offend the international community while the inspectors were there, I don't think that is particular probable. The other explanation is that this was the rebels using chemical weapons in order to draw attention, and in order to encourage foreign intervention. I have seen no evidence that they [have] got this kind of capability .... The third explanation, which is the one that I am partial to, is that this was somebody within Assad's inner circle, worrying that Assad was willing to make compromises, was willing to negotiate and wanting to force him into a hard line, therefore choosing to conduct these attacks at this time."

Firas Abi Ali, head of the Middle East and North Africa country risk team for IHS Global

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In Syria, women and children were among the dozens found dead under suspicious circumstances this week. Rebel forces said more than 1,000 people were killed by the government in a chemical weapons attack, while the authorities dismissed the report as "baseless".

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International Law 2: Chemical Weapons Convention + US, Syrian and OPCW Responses 

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International Law 2: Chemical Weapons Convention + US, Syrian and OPCW Responses 

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**Includes holiday homework tasks.

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International Law 2 Chemical Weapons Convention.docx

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Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102; Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States hoped to maintain a monopoly on its new weapon, but the secrets and the technology for building the atomic bomb soon spread. The United States conducted its first nuclear test explosion in July 1945 and dropped two atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945. Just four years later, the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test explosion. The United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (1964) followed. Seeking to prevent the nuclear weapon ranks from expanding further, the United States and other like-minded countries negotiated the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.

India, Israel, and Pakistan never signed the NPT and possess nuclear arsenals. Iraq initiated a secret nuclear program under Saddam Hussein before the 1991 Persian Gulf War. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 and has successfully tested advanced nuclear devices since that time. Iran and Libya have pursued secret nuclear activities in violation of the treaty's terms, and Syria is suspected of having done the same. Still, nuclear nonproliferation successes outnumber failures, and dire decades-old forecasts that the world would soon be home to dozens of nuclear-armed states have not come to pass.

At the time the NPT was concluded, the nuclear stockpiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia numbered in the tens of thousands. Beginning in the 1970s, U.S. and Soviet/Russian leaders negotiated a series of bilateral arms control agreements and initiatives that limited, and later helped to reduce, the size of their nuclear arsenals.

Today, the United States deploys 1,419 and Russia deploys 1,549 strategic warheads on several hundred bombers and missiles, and are modernizing their nuclear delivery systems. Warheads are counted using the provisions of the New START agreement, which was extended for 5 years in January 2021. Russia suspended its participation in the treaty on Feb. 21, 2023; in response, the United States instituted countermeasures limiting information sharing and inspections. However, both the U.S. and Russia have committed to the treaty's central limits on strategic force deployments until 2026.

New START caps each country at 1,550 strategic deployed warheads and attributes one deployed warhead per deployed heavy bomber, no matter how many warheads each bomber carries. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs are counted by the number of re-entry vehicles on the missile. Each re-entry vehicle can carry one warhead.

The United States, Russia, and China also possess smaller numbers of non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear warheads, which are shorter-range, lower-yield weapons that are not subject to any treaty limits.

China, India, and Pakistan are all pursuing new ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems. North Korea continues its nuclear pursuits in violation of its earlier denuclearization pledges.

The world's nuclear-armed states possess a combined total of about 12,512 nuclear warheads.
Nuclear-Weapon States: The nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are the five states-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-officially recognized as possessing nuclear weapons by the NPT. The treaty recognizes these states' nuclear arsenals, but under Article VI of the NPT, they are not supposed to build and maintain such weapons in perpetuity. In 2000, the NWS committed themselves to an "unequivocal undertaking...to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." Because of the secretive nature with which most governments treat information about their nuclear arsenals, most of the figures below are best estimates of each nuclear-weapon state's nuclear holdings, including both strategic warheads and shorter-range and lower-yield nuclear bombs, generally referred to as tactical nuclear weapons.

According to the September 2022 New START declaration, Russia deploys 1,549 strategic warheads on 540 strategic delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers). Due to Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty in February 2022, it did not fulfill its treaty obligations to provide updated data. However, both Russia and the United States have committed to adhering by treaty limits until 2026.

The U.S. intelligence community assesses that, as of December 2022, Russia also maintains an arsenal of 1000-2000 non-strategic nuclear warheads not limited by the New START Treaty.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates that Russia's military stockpile consists of approximately 4,489 nuclear warheads, with 1,400 additional retired warheads awaiting dismantlement, as of May 2023.

According to the March 2023 New START declaration, the United States deploys 1,419 strategic nuclear warheads on 662 strategic delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers).

The United States also has an estimated 100 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs that are forward-deployed at six NATO bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands.

On October 5, 2021, the U.S. State Department issued a declassification announcement indicating that the total number of U.S. "active" and "inactive" warheads is 3,750 as of September 2020. The stockpile figures do not include retired warheads and those awaiting dismantlement. FAS estimates the current military stockpile stands at 3708 warheads, with 1,536 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement, for a total of 5,244 warheads as of early 2023.

Independent researchers estimate that China has approximately 410 nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers. Of that total, they estimate China has approximately 201 strategic launchers (intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.) Additional warheads are thought to be in production to eventually arm additional road-mobile and silo-based missiles and bombers.

Since the 1990s, China has continually modernized its nuclear forces, though the number and types of weapons fielded have expanded significantly in recent years. As of October 2023, the Defense Department assessed that China has a total of 500 nuclear weapons and, if it remains on its current trajectory, may have up to 1000 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2030.

France has a military stockpile of 290 operational warheads available for deployment on 98 strategic delivery systems, as of January 2022. This consists of 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 50 air-launched cruise missiles allocated for dual-capable land and carrier-based fighter aircraft.

The French government has committed to a long-term modernization program for its nuclear forces but does not plan to increase the size of its nuclear stockpile.

As of January 2022, the United Kingdom has a military stockpile of 225 warheads, of which an estimated 120 are operationally available for deployment on 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 105 are in storage.

The United Kingdom possesses a total of four Vanguard-class Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which together form its exclusively sea-based nuclear deterrent.

Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons Possessors: India, Pakistan, and Israel never joined the NPT and are known to possess nuclear weapons. India first tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974. That test spurred Pakistan to ramp up work on its secret nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan both publicly demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities with a round of tit-for-tat nuclear tests in May 1998. Israel has not publicly conducted a nuclear test but is universally believed to possess nuclear arms. The following arsenal estimates are based on the amount of fissile material-highly enriched uranium and plutonium-that each of the states is estimated to have produced. Fissile material is the key element for making nuclear weapons. India and Israel are believed to use plutonium in their weapons, while Pakistan is thought to use highly enriched uranium.

Israel is estimated to have 90 nuclear warheads, with fissile material stockpiles of over 200.

Israel does not admit nor deny having nuclear weapons, and states that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Israel is universally believed to possess nuclear arms stored in a partially disassembled state, although it is unclear exactly how many.

States that Declared Their Withdrawal from the NPT: North Korea joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state but announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 --a move that has not been legally recognized by the other NPT member states. North Korea has tested nuclear devices and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Uncertainty persists about how many nuclear devices North Korea has assembled. States of Immediate Proliferation Concern: Prior to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran pursued a uranium enrichment program and other projects that provided it with the capability to produce weapons-grade fissile material and develop nuclear weapons, if it chose to do so. Since 2019, Iran has taken steps to breach limits put in place by the JCPOA and expanded its uranium enrichment program beyond its pre-JCPOA capacity. Tehran maintains that it does not intend to pursue nuclear weapons and that its actions are a response to the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal and reimposition of sanctions. Iran continues to implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but suspended its additional protocol and certain JCPOA-specific measures in February 2021.

North Korea is estimated to have approximately 30 nuclear warheads and likely possesses additional fissile material that is not weaponized.

There is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding North Korea's fissile material stockpile and production.

North Korea operates its 5-megawatt heavy-water graphite-moderated reactor to extract plutonium for its nuclear warheads and has done so on an intermittent basis since August 2013. North Korea has uranium enrichment technology and a known uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon. It likely operates additional covert uranium enrichment facilities at other locations.

States That Had Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Weapons Programs at One Time: Sources: Arms Control Association, Federation of American Scientists, International Panel on Fissile Materials, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Iran has accumulated enough uranium enriched to 60 percent to build a nuclear weapon, but the warhead would be large, unwieldy, and inconsistent with the weapons-related work Iran did prior to 2003. Iran has not accumulated or enriched uranium to weapons-grade levels (90 percent).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the institution charged with verifying that states are not illicitly building nuclear weapons, concluded in a 2015 report that Iran had an organized nucler weapons program prior to 2003, including activities related to uranium enrichment that should have been declared to the agency, and continued some weapons-relevant experiments through 2009. There was no evidence of weapons-related work after 2009, according to the IAEA.

On July 2015, Iran and the "P5+1" (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) negotiated a long-term agreement to verify and significantly reduce Iran's capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons.

As part of this agreement, the IAEA and Iran concluded an investigation into Iran's past nuclear weapons-related activities. The agency concluded that Iran had an organized program to pursue nuclear weapons prior to 2003. Some of these activities continued through 2009, but there were no indications of weaponization activities taking place after that date.

On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA. Iran began to violate the accord a year later. The United States and Iran have not yet reached an interim agreement to replace the JCPOA. Continued coverage of the JCPOA can be found in Arms Control Today and the P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons following the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse but returned them to Russia and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.

The apartheid South African government secretly developed a small number of nuclear weapons. South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 and dismantled its entire nuclear weapons program prior to its transition to a multi-racial democracy in 1994.

Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War but was forced to verifiably dismantle it under the supervision of UN inspectors. The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 under the Bush administration's rationale of preventing Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. However, Iraq's nuclear program had remained dormant since its dismantlement in the 1990s and the country did not have ready stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons.

Libya voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear weapons efforts in December 2003.

Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Sweden, Australia, and Taiwan also once pursued nuclear weapons programs.

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Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance | Arms Control Association

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Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102; Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107. At the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States hoped to maintain a monopoly on its new weapon, but the secrets and the technology for building the atomic bomb soon spread.

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Key Terms, About NPT Notes + Class Notes  on NK and US Responses 

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Key Terms, About NPT Notes + Class Notes  on NK and US Responses 

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Google Docs Link: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pVu9OuZaVJPh-RREzR1Az3RJhArRRIV7McCN0a1zba4/edit

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Key Terms About NPT NK and US Responses Class Notes.docx

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Examiners Report and VH Sample Responses 2017 and 16 Exams

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2 Short Answer Response Examiners Report and Samples 2017 16 Exams.pptx

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https://www.wisconsinproject.org/north-korea-nuclear-milestones/

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-the-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT

http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/the-nuclear-age/

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/23/world/nuclear-weapon-countries.html?_r=0

https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html

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NPT Key Terms Int Law and Responses.docx

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The document from which VCAA will create your exam.

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Boats and boating--Equipment and supplies

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1 Introduction to Ethics and Key Terms.pptx

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Realism, cosmopolitanism, justice, ethics, international law

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Practice Short Answer Response and Essay Questions

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Practice Short Answer Response and Essay Questions

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Please use for VCAA approved definitions.

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​​​​​​​​

Glossary

Aid

Refers to the provision of assistance, predominantly monetary, to global actors with the intention of influencing their decisions and actions in order to achieve a specific aim.

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism reflects a desire among global actors to cooperate to reach common goals and outcomes to meet challenges that are presented to the global community.

Crisis diplomacy

Refers to negotiations between actors in the global political arena in response to an immediate crisis. This most commonly concerns conflicts and natural disasters, but also economic and health crises.

Cultural power

Refers to a desirable and transportable culture that states can use to achieve ends that might not be achieved through military and political means. It is often linked to soft power and may influence regional relationships and international standing.

Diplomacy

Refers to the ability to conduct effective negotiations between states without arousing hostility. As a foreign policy instrument of a state, it may be utilised through formal diplomatic channels, such as an ambassador, through its conduct in intergovernmental organisations and from meetings and speeches made by leaders of states.

Diplomatic power

Refers to the power accrued by states through their relationships with others in the form of alliances, alignments and international standing. Essentially, it is the ability of a state to influence other global actors by way of discussion and negotiation.

Economic power

A state's economic power is often determined by figures such as the gross domestic product (GDP), which indicate the wealth of a state and its economic activity. Economic power can also be assessed by the state's reliance on imports of goods and services. Crucially, economic power refers to a state's ability to influence the actions of another state through finance and trade.

Economic prosperity

The national interest of economic prosperity is important to a state as it indicates whether a state can weather international economic instability as well as protects and builds the wealth and welfare of its citizens. If a state is economically prosperous, it encourages other states to develop relationships with them and bolsters state sovereignty.

Ethics

This seeks to address questions of morality and extends to global politics, as global actors have underlying ideologies to their actions, such as realism or cosmopolitanism.

Global governance

Refers to institutions, rules, norms and legal arrangements that seek to facilitate cooperation, and manage relations, between states. Governance is carried out by both governmental organisations such as the United Nations and non-governmental organisations.​

Globalisation

Refers to acceleration and intensification of exchanges of goods, services, labour and capital, which promote global interdependence. These have been facilitated by rapid changes in communication and technology.

Hard power

Refers to power exercised through coercion, or threatened acts of coercion, to influence the actions of other global actors. This is most commonly exercised through military forms.

Idealism

Refers to a school of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by an ideological principle, as opposed to practical and pragmatic considerations.

Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO)

An intergovernmental organisation is an organisation composed primarily of states. They are established by a treaty, a founding charter for the organisation, and thus subject to international law. Examples include the United Nations and the European Union.

International cooperation

Refers to occasions when global actors work together to achieve common ideals and goals.

International law

Traditionally only relating to states, international law is a body of rules established by custom or written legal agreements that are accepted as binding upon the international community. Customary international law applies to all global actors. Written legal agreements, such as treaties, are only binding to those who consent to it through explicit ratification. Some international laws may apply only to states, such as the UN Convention against Torture, while others may apply directly to citizens, such as war crimes.

International standing

The international standing of a state is an important national interest as it influences the power a state has in global politics. Other national interests impact on international standing as well as a state's role and recognition in intergovernmental organisations and as a proponent of international law. If a state has a poor international standing it may threaten their sovereignty.

Justice

Refers to the concept of moral rightness based on ethics, law, fairness and equity that, importantly, also seeks punishment when these ethics are breached. Extends to global politics through international systems of justice, such as the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, which seek to uphold international law and deter future violations.

Military

Military as a foreign policy instrument refers to the military capacity of a state and how this is utilised to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The capacity will depend on the amount of money spent on the military, the type and calibre of weapons available, the number and expertise of servicemen and women in the armed forces, and the relationship between the military and the state. It may also refer to the placement of armed forces.

Military power

Refers to the use of a state's military to exert influence over the actions of other global actors. This may not need to be implemented through a use of force as placement and capacity of the military may be enough to influence other global actors.

Multilateralism

Refers to a system of coordinating relations between three or more states, usually in pursuit of objectives in particular areas.

Nation

Refers to groups of people claiming common bonds based on culture, language and history. Some nations have their own state, such as the Japanese, while others want their own state such as the Tibetans and Kurds.

National interests

The national interests of a state are pursued to ensure the survival and potential growth of that state. States implement policies and types of power to achieve their national interests and maintain state sovereignty.

National security

This is the national interest of a state to ensure it maintains sovereignty. Traditionally this term refers to the protection of a state's borders from intruders but has evolved to include other forms of security, such as resource and environmental security, that are necessary for a state to maintain sovereignty.

Nation-state

Political or social grouping in which people within territorial boundaries, with recognised sovereignty, have common bonds based on culture, language and history. For example, Japan.

Non-state actors

A non-state actor is a global actor that is not a state but still influences global politics. Often this refers to global actors that are not a direct part of global governance and international law, such as NGOs, global terrorist movements and/or organised religions.

Political power

Refers to the use of a state's internal political machinery to exert influence over the actions of others. For example, legislation, executive orders, white papers.

Power

Refers to the ability of one global actor to influence the actions of another global actor. Power can be exercised in a range of types.

Pragmatism

A school of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by practical considerations, as opposed to a particular ideology.

Realism

Realism involves states (and other global actors) prioritizing their specific interest and needs over those of the global community.

Regional relationships

Positive regional relationships are an important national interest to a state as they ensure its neighbours will not behave in a hostile manner and thus threaten state sovereignty. Alliances with other likeminded neighbours may help the success of other national interests. However, a state may consider other national interests more important than positive regional relationships if they better achieve the aims of a state.

Security

Traditionally this term refers to the protection of a state's borders from intruders and the maintenance of sovereignty, most commonly achieved through the use of military power. It has now evolved to include softer forms of security, such as access to resources and the protection of the environment.

Soft power

Refers to the ability of one global actor to shape the actions of other global actors through un-coercive yet persuasive means, so that they want the same outcome. This can be achieved in various ways, for example through diplomatic, cultural or historical ties. It is a term first coined by Joseph Nye.

Sovereignty

Legitimate or widely recognised ability to exercise effective control of a territory within recognised borders. This is the primary organising principle of global politics, providing states with the authority to represent their territorial entity within the international community. State sovereignty can be challenged internally (for example, secessionist groups) or externally (for example, one state invades another).

State

Traditionally this term refers to the central actor in global politics. States possess a permanent population, defined territory and recognised sovereignty. States are not necessarily culturally homogenous, for example Australia.

Trade

Refers to the manipulation of the exchange of goods, services, labour and capital to influence the actions of another state.

Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Refers to a company whose operations and investments extend beyond the boundaries of the state in which it is registered, and can also be referred to as a Multinational.

Unilateralism

Refers to the policy of a state acting alone, with little regard for the views or interests of other global actors, in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

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​​​​​​​​ Refers to the provision of assistance, predominantly monetary, to global actors with the intention of influencing their decisions and actions in order to achieve a specific aim. Cosmopolitanism reflects a desire among global actors to cooperate to reach common goals and outcomes to meet challenges that are presented to the global community.

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Unit 4 AOS 1 Ethical Issues and Debates Outline 

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Unit 4 AOS 1 Ethical Issues and Debates Outline 