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1.
Arrive
in Minsk

2.
Minsk-Church of Saints Simon and Helena, Victory Square, National Opera and Ballet Theatre of Belarus, National Library of Belarus, Island of Tears, Minsk-Arena Complex

3.
Depart
for Brest, go through Pinsk and Natsionalnyy Prirodnyy Park

4.
Brest-Memorial Complex Brest Hero Fortress, Brest Railway Museum, Lights Alley, Sovetskaya Street, Saved Artifacts Museum, Berestye Archeological Museum, The 5th Fort Museum, Resurrection Church, Brest Fortress

5.
Depart
for Grodno, go through Belavezsszkaja Puscsa Nemzeti Park

6.
Grodno- Kalozha Church Boris-Gleb Church, Zhiliber's Park, The Watchtower of the fire department and a Fire Museum, Pharmacy Museum, The Old Castle, Great Choral Synagogue, The Jesuit Catholic Church

7.
Depart
for Lake Narach, go through Lida

8.
Depart
for Bilieva(Marc Chagall Museum), then
on to Gomel

9.
Gomel-Gomel Palace & Park Ensemble, Rumyantsev-Paskevich Palace, Peter and Paul Cathedral, Observation Tower, The Chapel and the Burial Vault of the Paskevich, Clown Karandash

10.
Depart for Mazyr, go through Polesky
State Radioecological Reserve if you’re feeling up to it

11.
Depart for Minsk, go through Mir(Mir
Castle Complex) and Dudutki(Kraft
Museum)

12.
Leave back to your home, wherever
that might be

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Explination about the disaster that effected the southeastern part of Belarus

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The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was the result of a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel.

The resulting steam explosion and fires released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind - some 5200 PBq (I-131 eq).

Two Chernobyl plant workers died on the night of the accident, and a further 28 people died within a few weeks as a result of acute radiation poisoning.

UNSCEAR says that apart from increased thyroid cancers, "there is no evidence of a major public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 20 years after the accident."

Resettlement of areas from which people were relocated is ongoing. In 2011 Chernobyl was officially declared a tourist attraction.

The April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl a nuclear power plant in Ukraine was the product of a flawed Soviet reactor design coupled with serious mistakes made by the plant operators b . It was a direct consequence of Cold War isolation and the resulting lack of any safety culture.

The accident destroyed the Chernobyl 4 reactor, killing 30 operators and firemen within three months and several further deaths later. One person was killed immediately and a second died in hospital soon after as a result of injuries received. Another person is reported to have died at the time from a coronary thrombosis. Acute radiation syndrome (ARS) was originally diagnosed in 237 people onsite and involved with the clean-up and it was later confirmed in 134 cases. Of these, 28 people died as a result of ARS within a few weeks of the accident. Nineteen more workers subsequently died between 1987 and 2004, but their deaths cannot necessarily be attributed to radiation exposure. Nobody offsite suffered from acute radiation effects although a significant, but uncertain, fraction of the thyroid cancers diagnosed since the accident in patients who were children at the time are likely to be due to intake of radioactive iodine fallout. Furthermore, large areas of Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and beyond were contaminated in varying degrees. See also sections below and Chernobyl Accident Appendix 2: Health Impacts.

The Chernobyl disaster was a unique event and the only accident in the history of commercial nuclear power where radiation-related fatalities occurred. The design of the reactor is unique and in that respect the accident is thus of little relevance to the rest of the nuclear industry outside the then Eastern Bloc. However, it led to major changes in safety culture and in industry cooperation, particularly between East and West before the end of the Soviet Union. Former President Gorbachev said that the Chernobyl accident was a more important factor in the fall of the Soviet Union than Perestroika - his program of liberal reform.

The Chernobyl site and plant

The Chernobyl Power Complex, lying about 130 km north of Kiev, Ukraine, and about 20 km south of the border with Belarus, consisted of four nuclear reactors of the RBMK-1000 design (see information page on RBMK Reactors). Units 1 and 2 were constructed between 1970 and 1977, while units 3 and 4 of the same design were completed in 1983. Two more RBMK reactors were under construction at the site at the time of the accident. To the southeast of the plant, an artificial lake of some 22 square kilometres, situated beside the river Pripyat, a tributary of the Dniepr, was constructed to provide cooling water for the reactors.

This area of Ukraine is described as Belarussian-type woodland with a low population density. About 3 km away from the reactor, in the new city, Pripyat, there were 49,000 inhabitants. The old town of Chornobyl, which had a population of 12,500, is about 15 km to the southeast of the complex. Within a 30 km radius of the power plant, the total population was between 115,000 and 135,000 at the time of the accident.

Source: OECD NEA

The RBMK-1000 is a Soviet-designed and built graphite moderated pressure tube type reactor, using slightly enriched (2% U-235) uranium dioxide fuel. It is a boiling light water reactor, with two loops feeding steam directly to the turbines, without an intervening heat exchanger. Water pumped to the bottom of the fuel channels boils as it progresses up the pressure tubes, producing steam which feeds two 500 MWe turbines. The water acts as a coolant and also provides the steam used to drive the turbines. The vertical pressure tubes contain the zirconium alloy clad uranium dioxide fuel around which the cooling water flows. The extensions of the fuel channels penetrate the lower plate and the cover plate of the core and are welded to each. A specially designed refuelling machine allows fuel bundles to be changed without shutting down the reactor.

The moderator, the function of which is to slow down neutrons to make them more efficient in producing fission in the fuel, is graphite, surrounding the pressure tubes. A mixture of nitrogen and helium is circulated between the graphite blocks to prevent oxidation of the graphite and to improve the transmission of the heat produced by neutron interactions in the graphite to the fuel channel. The core itself is about 7 m high and about 12 m in diameter. In each of the two loops, there are four main coolant circulating pumps, one of which is always on standby. The reactivity or power of the reactor is controlled by raising or lowering 211 control rods, which, when lowered into the moderator, absorb neutrons and reduce the fission rate. The power output of this reactor is 3200 MW thermal, or 1000 MWe. Various safety systems, such as an emergency core cooling system, were incorporated into the reactor design.

One of the most important characteristics of the RBMK reactor is that it it can possess a 'positive void coefficient', where an increase in steam bubbles ('voids') is accompanied by an increase in core reactivity (see information page on RBMK Reactors). As steam production in the fuel channels increases, the neutrons that would have been absorbed by the denser water now produce increased fission in the fuel. There are other components that contribute to the overall power coefficient of reactivity, but the void coefficient is the dominant one in RBMK reactors. The void coefficient depends on the composition of the core - a new RBMK core will have a negative void coefficient. However, at the time of the accident at Chernobyl 4, the reactor's fuel burn-up, control rod configuration, and power level led to a positive void coefficient large enough to overwhelm all other influences on the power coefficient.

The 1986 Chernobyl accident

On 25 April, prior to a routine shutdown, the reactor crew at Chernobyl 4 began preparing for a test to determine how long turbines would spin and supply power to the main circulating pumps following a loss of main electrical power supply. This test had been carried out at Chernobyl the previous year, but the power from the turbine ran down too rapidly, so new voltage regulator designs were to be tested.

A series of operator actions, including the disabling of automatic shutdown mechanisms, preceded the attempted test early on 26 April. By the time that the operator moved to shut down the reactor, the reactor was in an extremely unstable condition. A peculiarity of the design of the control rods caused a dramatic power surge as they were inserted into the reactor (see Chernobyl Accident Appendix 1: Sequence of Events).

The interaction of very hot fuel with the cooling water led to fuel fragmentation along with rapid steam production and an increase in pressure. The design characteristics of the reactor were such that substantial damage to even three or four fuel assemblies would - and did - result in the destruction of the reactor. The overpressure caused the 1000 t cover plate of the reactor to become partially detached, rupturing the fuel channels and jamming all the control rods, which by that time were only halfway down. Intense steam generation then spread throughout the whole core (fed by water dumped into the core due to the rupture of the emergency cooling circuit) causing a steam explosion and releasing fission products to the atmosphere. About two to three seconds later, a second explosion threw out fragments from the fuel channels and hot graphite. There is some dispute among experts about the character of this second explosion, but it is likely to have been caused by the production of hydrogen from zirconium-steam reactions.

Two workers died as a result of these explosions. The graphite (about a quarter of the 1200 tonnes of it was estimated to have been ejected) and fuel became incandescent and started a number of fires, causing the main release of radioactivity into the environment. A total of about 14 EBq (14 x 10 ¹⁸ Bq) of radioactivity was released, over half of it being from biologically-inert noble gases.*
* The figure of 5.2 EBq is also quoted, this being "iodine-131 equivalent" - 1.8 EBq iodine and 85 PBq Cs-137 multiplied by 40 due its longevity, and ignoring the 6.5 EBq xenon-33 and some minor or short-lived nuclides.
About 200-300 tonnes of water per hour was injected into the intact half of the reactor using the auxiliary feedwater pumps but this was stopped after half a day owing to the danger of it flowing into and flooding units 1 and 2. From the second to tenth day after the accident, some 5000 tonnes of boron, dolomite, sand, clay, and lead were dropped on to the burning core by helicopter in an effort to extinguish the blaze and limit the release of radioactive particles.

The damaged Chernobyl unit 4 reactor building

The 1991 report by the State Committee on the Supervision of Safety in Industry and Nuclear Power on the root cause of the accident looked past the operator actions. It said that while it was certainly true the operators placed their reactor in a dangerously unstable condition (in fact in a condition which virtually guaranteed an accident) it was also true that in doing so they had not in fact violated a number of vital operating policies and principles, since no such policies and principles had been articulated. Additionally, the operating organisation had not been made aware either of the specific vital safety significance of maintaining a minimum operating reactivity margin, or the general reactivity characteristics of the RBMK which made low power operation extremely hazardous.

Immediate impact of the Chernobyl accident

The accident caused the largest uncontrolled radioactive release into the environment ever recorded for any civilian operation, and large quantities of radioactive substances were released into the air for about 10 days. This caused serious social and economic disruption for large populations in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Two radionuclides, the short-lived iodine-131 and the long-lived caesium-137, were particularly significant for the radiation dose they delivered to members of the public.

It is estimated that all of the xenon gas, about half of the iodine and caesium, and at least 5% of the remaining radioactive material in the Chernobyl 4 reactor core (which had 192 tonnes of fuel) was released in the accident. Most of the released material was deposited close by as dust and debris, but the lighter material was carried by wind over Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and to some extent over Scandinavia and Europe.

The casualties included firefighters who attended the initial fires on the roof of the turbine building. All these were put out in a few hours, but radiation doses on the first day were estimated to range up to 20,000 millisieverts (mSv), causing 28 deaths - six of which were firemen - by the end of July 1986.

The next task was cleaning up the radioactivity at the site so that the remaining three reactors could be restarted, and the damaged reactor shielded more permanently. About 200,000 people ('liquidators') from all over the Soviet Union were involved in the recovery and clean-up during 1986 and 1987. They received high doses of radiation, averaging around 100 millisieverts. Some 20,000 of them received about 250 mSv and a few received 500 mSv. Later, the number of liquidators swelled to over 600,000 but most of these received only low radiation doses. The highest doses were received by about 1000 emergency workers and on-site personnel during the first day of the accident.

The effects of radiation exposure fall into two main classes: deterministic effects, where the effect is certain to occur under given conditions (e.g. individuals exposed to several grays over a short period of time will definitely suffer Acute Radiation Syndrome); and stochastic effects, where the effect may or may not occur (e.g. an increase in radiation exposure may or may not induce a cancer in a particular individual but if a sufficiently large population receive a radiation exposure above a certain level, an increase in the incidence of cancer may become detectable in that population). UNSCEAR, 2011.

Initial radiation exposure in contaminated areas was due to short-lived iodine-131; later caesium-137 was the main hazard. (Both are fission products dispersed from the reactor core, with half lives of 8 days and 30 years, respectively. 1.8 EBq of I-131 and 0.085 EBq of Cs-137 were released.) About five million people lived in areas of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine contaminated (above 37 kBq/m ² Cs-137 in soil) and about 400,000 lived in more contaminated areas of strict control by authorities (above 555 kBq/m ² Cs-137). A total of 29,400 km ² was contaminated above 180 kBq/m ².

The plant operators' town of Pripyat was evacuated on 27 April (45,000 residents). By 14 May, some 116,000 people that had been living within a 30-kilometre radius had been evacuated and later relocated. About 1000 of these returned unofficially to live within the contaminated zone. Most of those evacuated received radiation doses of less than 50 mSv, although a few received 100 mSv or more.

In the years following the accident, a further 220,000 people were resettled into less contaminated areas, and the initial 30 km radius exclusion zone (2800 km ²) was modified and extended to cover 4300 square kilometres. This resettlement was due to application of a criterion of 350 mSv projected lifetime radiation dose, though in fact radiation in most of the affected area (apart from half a square kilometre) fell rapidly so that average doses were less than 50% above normal background of 2.5 mSv/yr. See also following section on Resettlement.

Environmental and health effects of the Chernobyl accident

Several organisations have reported on the impacts of the Chernobyl accident, but all have had problems assessing the significance of their observations because of the lack of reliable public health information before 1986.

In 1989, the World Health Organization (WHO) first raised concerns that local medical scientists had incorrectly attributed various biological and health effects to radiation exposure. Following this, the Government of the USSR requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to coordinate an international experts' assessment of accident's radiological, environmental and health consequences in selected towns of the most heavily contaminated areas in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Between March 1990 and June 1991, a total of 50 field missions were conducted by 200 experts from 25 countries (including the USSR), seven organisations, and 11 laboratories. In the absence of pre-1986 data, it compared a control population with those exposed to radiation. Significant health disorders were evident in both control and exposed groups, but, at that stage, none was radiation related.

Paths of radiation exposure h

In February 2003, the IAEA established the Chernobyl Forum, in cooperation with seven other UN organisations as well as the competent authorities of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. In April 2005, the reports prepared by two expert groups - "Environment", coordinated by the IAEA, and "Health", coordinated by WHO - were intensively discussed by the Forum and eventually approved by consensus. The conclusions of this 2005 Chernobyl Forum study (revised version published 2006) are in line with earlier expert studies, notably the UNSCEAR 2000 report which said that "apart from this [thyroid cancer] increase, there is no evidence of a major public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 14 years after the accident. There is no scientific evidence of increases in overall cancer incidence or mortality or in non-malignant disorders that could be related to radiation exposure." As yet there is little evidence of any increase in leukaemia, even among clean-up workers where it might be most expected. However, these workers - where high doses may have been received - remain at increased risk of cancer in the long term. Apart from these, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) says that "the great majority of the population is not likely to experience serious health consequences as a result of radiation from the Chernobyl accident. Many other health problems have been noted in the populations that are not related to radiation exposure."

The Chernobyl Forum report says that people in the area have suffered a paralysing fatalism due to myths and misperceptions about the threat of radiation, which has contributed to a culture of chronic dependency. Some "took on the role of invalids." Mental health coupled with smoking and alcohol abuse is a very much greater problem than radiation, but worst of all at the time was the underlying level of health and nutrition. Apart from the initial 116,000, relocations of people were very traumatic and did little to reduce radiation exposure, which was low anyway. Psycho-social effects among those affected by the accident are similar to those arising from other major disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and fires.

According to the most up-to-date estimate of UNSCEAR, the average radiation dose due to the accident received by inhabitants of 'strict radiation control' areas (population 216,000) in the years 1986 to 2005 was 31 mSv (over the 20-year period), and in the 'contaminated' areas (population 6.4 million) it averaged 9 mSv, a minor increase over the dose due to background radiation over the same period (about 50 mSv).

The numbers of deaths resulting from the accident are covered most fully in the account of health effects provided by an annex to the UNSCEAR 2008 report, released in 2011.

Some exaggerated figures have been published regarding the death toll attributable to the Chernobyl disaster. A publication by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) lent support to these. However, the Chairman of UNSCEAR made it clear that "this report is full of unsubstantiated statements that have no support in scientific assessments", and the Chernobyl Forum report also repudiates them.

A particularly sad effect of the accident was that some physicians in Europe advised pregnant women to undergo abortions on account of radiation exposure, even though the levels concerned were vastly below those likely to have teratogenic effects. The foetal death toll from this is likely very much greater than directly from the accident.

UNSCEAR in 2011 concludes: In summary, the effects of the Chernobyl accident are many and varied. Early deterministic effects can be attributed to radiation with a high degree of certainty, while for other medical conditions, radiation almost certainly was not the cause. In between, there was a wide spectrum of conditions. It is necessary to evaluate carefully each specific condition and the surrounding circumstances before attributing a cause.

According to an UNSCEAR report in 2018, about 20,000 cases of thyroid cancer were diagnosed 1991-2015 in patients who were 18 and under at the time of the accident. The report states that a quarter of the cases 2001-2008 were "probably" due to high doses of radiation, and that this fraction was likely to have been higher in earlier years, and lower in later years. However, it also states that the uncertainty around the attributed fraction is very significant - at least 0.07 to 0.5 - and that the influence of annual screenings and active follow-up make comparisons with the general population problematic. Thyroid cancer is usually not fatal if diagnosed and treated early; the report states that of the diagnoses made between 1991 and 2005 (6,848 cases), 15 proved to be fatal.

Conifers in about 10 square kilometres of forest close to the plant were killed by the high radiation levels, but regeneration got underway from the following year. The net environmental effect of the accident has been much greater biodiversity and abundance of species. The exclusion zone has become a unique sanctuary for wildlife.

Progressive closure of the Chernobyl plant

In the early 1990s, some US$400 million was spent on improvements to the remaining reactors at Chernobyl, considerably enhancing their safety. Energy shortages necessitated the continued operation of one of them (unit 3) until December 2000. (Unit 2 was shut down after a turbine hall fire in 1991, and unit 1 at the end of 1997.) Almost 6000 people worked at the plant every day, and their radiation dose has been within internationally accepted limits. A small team of scientists works within the wrecked reactor building itself, inside the shelter.

Workers and their families now live in a new town, Slavutich, 30 km from the plant. This was built following the evacuation of Pripyat, which was just 3 km away.

Ukraine depends upon, and is deeply in debt to, Russia for energy supplies, particularly oil and gas, but also nuclear fuel. Although this dependence is gradually being reduced, continued operation of nuclear power stations, which supply half of total electricity, is now even more important than in 1986.

When it was announced in 1995 that the two operating reactors at Chernobyl would be closed by 2000, a memorandum of understanding was signed by Ukraine and G7 nations to progress this, but its implementation was conspicuously delayed. Alternative generating capacity was needed, either gas-fired, which has ongoing fuel cost and supply implications, or nuclear, by completing Khmelnitski unit 2 and Rovno unit 4 ('K2R4') in Ukraine. Construction of these was halted in 1989 but then resumed, and both reactors came on line late in 2004, financed by Ukraine rather than international grants as expected on the basis of Chernobyl's closure.

Chernobyl today

See Chernobyl website for details.

Unit 4 containment

Chernobyl unit 4 was enclosed in a large concrete shelter which was erected quickly (by October 1986) to allow continuing operation of the other reactors at the plant. However, the structure is neither strong nor durable. The international Shelter Implementation Plan in the 1990s involved raising money for remedial work including removal of the fuel-containing materials. Some major work on the shelter was carried out in 1998 and 1999. About 200 tonnes of highly radioactive material remains deep within it, and this poses an environmental hazard until it is better contained.

The New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure was completed in 2017, having been built adjacent and then moved into place on rails. It is an arch 110 metres high, 165 metres long and spanning 260 metres, covering both unit 4 and the hastily-built 1986 structure. The arch frame is a lattice construction of tubular steel members, equipped with internal cranes. The design and construction contract for this was signed in 2007 with the Novarka consortium and preparatory work onsite was completed in 2010. Construction started in April 2012. The first half, weighing 12,800 tonnes, was moved 112 metres to a holding area in front of unit 4 in April 2014. The second half was completed by the end of 2014 and was joined to the first in July 2015. Cladding, cranes, and remote handling equipment were fitted in 2015. The entire 36,000 tonne structure was pushed 327 metres into position over the reactor building in November 2016, over two weeks, and the end walls completed. The NSC is the largest moveable land-based structure ever built.

The hermetically sealed building will allow engineers to remotely dismantle the 1986 structure that has shielded the remains of the reactor from the weather since the weeks after the accident. It will enable the eventual removal of the fuel-containing materials (FCM) in the bottom of the reactor building and accommodate their characterisation, compaction, and packing for disposal. This task represents the most important step in eliminating nuclear hazard at the site - and the real start of dismantling. The NSC will facilitate remote handling of these dangerous materials, using as few personnel as possible. During peak construction of the NSC some 1200 workers were onsite.

The Chernobyl Shelter Fund, set up in 1997, had received €864 million from international donors by early 2011 towards this project and previous work. It and the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), set up in 1993, are managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The total cost of the new shelter was in 2011 estimated to be €1.5 billion. In November 2014 the EBRD said the overall €2.15 billion Shelter Implementation Plan including the NSC had received contributions from 43 governments but still had a funding shortfall of €615 million. The following month the EBRD made an additional contribution of €350 million in anticipation of a €165 million contribution by the G7/European Commission, which was confirmed in April 2015. This left a balance of €100 million to come from non-G7 donors, and €15 million of this was confirmed in April 2015.
Chernobyl New Safe Confinement under construction and before being moved into place (Image: EBRD)
Funding other Chernobyl work

The Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), had received €321 million by early 2011 for Chernobyl decommissioning and also for projects in other ex-Soviet countries. At Chernobyl it funds the construction of used fuel and waste storage (notably ISF-2, see below) and decommissioning units 1-3. In April 2016 the European Commission pledged €20 million to the NSA, the largest part of €45 million expected from the G7 and the European Commission. A further €40 million was expected from the EBRD in May 2016.

In total, the European Commission has committed around €730 million so far to Chernobyl projects in four ways. First, €550 million for assistance projects, out of which €470 million were channelled through international funds, and €80 million implemented directly by the European Commission. Secondly, power generation support of €65 million. Thirdly, €15 million for social projects. And finally, €100 million for research projects.

Chernobyl used fuel: ISF-1 & ISF-2

Used fuel from units 1-3 was stored in each unit's cooling pond, and in an interim spent fuel storage facility pond (ISF-1). A few damaged assemblies remained in units 1&2 in 2013, with the last of these removed in June 2016. ISF-1 now holds most of the spent fuel from units 1-3, allowing those reactors to be decommissioned under less restrictive licence conditions. Most of the fuel assemblies were straightforward to handle, but about 50 are damaged and required special handling.

In 1999, a contract was signed with Framatome (now Areva) for construction of the ISF-2 radioactive waste management facility to store 25,000 used fuel assemblies from units 1-3 and other operational wastes long-term, as well as material from decommissioning units 1-3 (which are the first RBMK units decommissioned anywhere). However, after a significant part of the dry storage facility had been built, technical deficiencies in the concept emerged in 2003, and the contract was terminated amicably in 2007.

Holtec International became the contractor in September 2007 for the new interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility (ISF-2 or SNF SF-2) for the state-owned Chernobyl NPP. Design approval and funding from the NSA was confirmed in October 2010, and the final €87.5 million of €400 million cost was pledged in April 2016.

ISF-2 will be the world's largest dry used fuel storage facility and will accommodate 21,217 RBMK fuel assemblies in dry storage for at least a 100-year service life. It was licensed in March 2013, allowing stage 2 to proceed to 2015, with completion expected in 2017. The works are being carried out by Ukrainian companies UTEM-Engineering (principal contractor) and Ukrtransbud.

The project includes a processing facility, able to cut the RBMK fuel assemblies* and to put the material in double-walled canisters, which will be filled with inert gas and welded shut. They will then be transported to concrete dry storage vaults in which the fuel containers will be enclosed for up to 100 years. This facility, treating 2500 fuel assemblies per year, is the first of its kind for RBMK fuel.
* According to Holtec: "Unique features of the Chernobyl dry storage facility include the world's largest 'hot cell' for dismembering the conjugated RBMK fuel assembly and a (Holtec patented) forced gas dehydrator designed to run on nitrogen."
Other Chernobyl radwastes

Industrial Complex for Radwaste Management (ICSRM): In April 2009, Nukem handed over this turnkey waste treatment centre for solid radioactive waste. In May 2010, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee licensed the commissioning of this facility, where solid low- and intermediate-level wastes accumulated from the power plant operations and the decommissioning of reactor blocks 1 to 3 is conditioned. The wastes are processed in three steps. First, the solid radioactive wastes temporarily stored in bunkers is removed for treatment. In the next step, these wastes, as well as those from decommissioning reactor blocks 1-3, are processed into a form suitable for permanent safe disposal. Low- and intermediate-level wastes are separated into combustible, compactable, and non-compactable categories. These are then subject to incineration, high-force compaction, and cementation respectively. In addition, highly radioactive and long-lived solid waste is sorted out for temporary separate storage. In the third step, the conditioned solid waste materials are transferred to containers suitable for permanent safe storage.

As part of this project, at the end of 2007, Nukem handed over an Engineered Near Surface Disposal Facility for storage of short-lived radioactive waste after prior conditioning. It is 17 km away from the power plant, at the Vektor complex within the 30-km zone. The storage area is designed to hold 55,000 m ³ of treated waste which will be subject to radiological monitoring for 300 years, by when the radioactivity will have decayed to such an extent that monitoring is no longer required.

Another contract has been let for a Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Plant (LRTP), to handle some 35,000 cubic metres of low- and intermediate-level liquid wastes at the site. This will be solidified and eventually buried along with solid wastes on site. Construction of the plant has been completed and the start of operations was due late in 2015. LRTP is also funded through EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account (NSA).

Non-Chernobyl used fuel

The Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) Project for Ukraine's VVER reactors is being built by Holtec International within the Chernobyl exclusion area, between the resettled villages Staraya Krasnitsa, Buryakovka, Chistogalovka, and Stechanka, southeast of Chernobyl and not far from ISF-2. This will not take any Chernobyl fuel, though it will become a part of the common spent nuclear fuel management complex of the state-owned company Chernobyl NPP.

Decommissioning units 1-3

After the last Chernobyl reactor shut down in December 2000, in mid-2001 a new enterprise, SSE ChNPP was set up to take over management of the site and decommissioning from Energoatom. (Its remit includes eventual decommissioning of all Ukraine nuclear plants.)

In January 2008, the Ukraine government announced a four-stage decommissioning plan which incorporated the above waste activities and progresses towards a cleared site.

In February 2014 a new stage of this was approved for units 1-3, involving dismantling some equipment and putting them into safstor condition by 2028. Then, to 2046, further equipment will be removed, and by 2064 they will be demolished.

Resettlement of contaminated areas

In the last two decades there has been some resettlement of the areas evacuated in 1986 and subsequently. Recently the main resettlement project has been in Belarus.

In July 2010, the Belarus government announced that it had decided to settle back thousands of people in the 'contaminated areas' covered by the Chernobyl fallout, from which 24 years ago they and their forbears were hastily relocated. Compared with the list of contaminated areas in 2005, some 211 villages and hamlets had been reclassified with fewer restrictions on resettlement. The decision by the Belarus Council of Ministers resulted in a new national program over 2011-15 and up to 2020 to alleviate the Chernobyl impact and return the areas to normal use with minimal restrictions. The focus of the project is on the development of economic and industrial potential of the Gomel and Mogilev regions from which 137,000 people were relocated.

The main priority is agriculture and forestry, together with attracting qualified people and housing them. Initial infrastructure requirements will mean the refurbishment of gas, potable water and power supplies, while the use of local wood will be banned. Schools and housing will be provided for specialist workers and their families ahead of wider socio-economic development. Overall, some 21,484 dwellings are slated for connection to gas networks in the period 2011-2015, while about 5600 contaminated or broken down buildings are demolished. Over 1300 kilometres of road will be laid, and ten new sewerage works and 15 pumping stations are planned. The cost of the work was put at BYR 6.6 trillion ($2.2 billion), split fairly evenly across the years 2011 to 2015 inclusive.

The feasibility of agriculture will be examined in areas where the presence of caesium-137 and strontium-90 is low, "to acquire new knowledge in the fields of radiobiology and radioecology in order to clarify the principles of safe life in the contaminated territories." Land found to have too high a concentration of radionuclides will be reforested and managed. A suite of protective measures was set up to allow a new forestry industry whose products would meet national and international safety standards. In April 2009, specialists in Belarus stressed that it is safe to eat all foods cultivated in the contaminated territories, though intake of some wild food was restricted.

Protective measures will be put in place for 498 settlements in the contaminated areas where average radiation dose may exceed 1 mSv per year. There were also 1904 villages with annual average effective doses from the pollution between 0.1 mSv and 1 mSv. The goal for these areas is to allow their re-use with minimal restrictions, although already radiation doses there from the caesium are lower than background levels anywhere in the world.

The Belarus government decision was an important political landmark in an ongoing process. Studies reviewed by UNSCEAR show that the Chernobyl disaster caused little risk for the general population. A UN Development Program report in 2002 said that much of the aid and effort applied to mitigate the effects of the Chernobyl accident did more harm than good, and it seems that this, along with the Chernobyl Forum report, finally persuaded the Belarus authorities. In 2004 President Lukashenko announced a priority to repopulate much of the Chernobyl-affected regions of Belarus, and then in 2009 he said that he "wants to repopulate Chernobyl's zone quickly".

In 2011 Chernobyl was officially declared a tourist attraction, with many visitors.

In 2015 the published results of a major scientific study showed that the mammal population of the exclusion zone (including the 2162 sq km Polessian State Radiation-Ecological Reserve - PSRER in Belarus) was thriving, despite land contamination. The "long-term empirical data showed no evidence of a negative influence of radiation on mammal abundance." The data "represent unique evidence of wildlife's resilience in the face of chronic radiation stress." ( Current Biology, Elsevier)

What has been learned from the Chernobyl disaster?

Leaving aside the verdict of history on its role in melting the Soviet 'Iron Curtain', some very tangible practical benefits have resulted from the Chernobyl accident. The main ones concern reactor safety, notably in eastern Europe. (The US Three Mile Island accident in 1979 had a significant effect on Western reactor design and operating procedures. While that reactor was destroyed, all radioactivity was contained - as designed - and there were no deaths or injuries.)

While no-one in the West was under any illusion about the safety of early Soviet reactor designs, some lessons learned have also been applicable to Western plants. Certainly the safety of all Soviet-designed reactors has improved vastly. This is due largely to the development of a culture of safety encouraged by increased collaboration between East and West, and substantial investment in improving the reactors.

Modifications have been made to overcome deficiencies in all the RBMK reactors still operating. In these, originally the nuclear chain reaction and power output could increase if cooling water were lost or turned to steam, in contrast to most Western designs. It was this effect which led to the uncontrolled power surge that led to the destruction of Chernobyl 4 (see Positive void coefficient section in the information page on RBMK Reactors). All of the RBMK reactors have now been modified by changes in the control rods, adding neutron absorbers and consequently increasing the fuel enrichment from 1.8 to 2.4% U-235, making them very much more stable at low power (see Post accident changes to the RBMK section in the information page on RBMK Reactors). Automatic shut-down mechanisms now operate faster, and other safety mechanisms have been improved. Automated inspection equipment has also been installed. A repetition of the 1986 Chernobyl accident is now virtually impossible, according to a German nuclear safety agency report.

Since 1989, over 1000 nuclear engineers from the former Soviet Union have visited Western nuclear power plants and there have been many reciprocal visits. Over 50 twinning arrangements between East and West nuclear plants have been put in place. Most of this has been under the auspices of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), a body formed in 1989 which links 130 operators of nuclear power plants in more than 30 countries (see also information page on Cooperation in the Nuclear Power Industry).

Many other international programmes were initiated following Chernobyl. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety review projects for each particular type of Soviet reactor are noteworthy, bringing together operators and Western engineers to focus on safety improvements. These initiatives are backed by funding arrangements. The Nuclear Safety Assistance Coordination Centre database lists Western aid totalling almost US$1 billion for more than 700 safety-related projects in former Eastern Bloc countries. The Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted in Vienna in June 1994 is another outcome.

The Chernobyl Forum report said that some seven million people are now receiving or eligible for benefits as 'Chernobyl victims', which means that resources are not targeting those most in need. Remedying this presents daunting political problems however.

Notes & references

Notes

a. Chernobyl is the well-known Russian name for the site; Chornobyl is preferred by Ukraine. [ Back]

b. Much has been made of the role of the operators in the Chernobyl accident. The 1986 Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident (INSAG-1) of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group accepted the view of the Soviet experts that "the accident was caused by a remarkable range of human errors and violations of operating rules in combination with specific reactor features which compounded and amplified the effects of the errors and led to the reactivity excursion." In particular, according to the INSAG-1 report: "The operators deliberately and in violation of rules withdrew most control and safety rods from the core and switched off some important safety systems."

However, the IAEA's 1992 INSAG-7 report, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, was less critical of the operators, with the emphasis shifted towards "the contributions of particular design features, including the design of the control rods and safety systems, and arrangements for presenting important safety information to the operators. The accident is now seen to have been the result of the concurrence of the following major factors: specific physical characteristics of the reactor; specific design features of the reactor control elements; and the fact that the reactor was brought to a state not specified by procedures or investigated by an independent safety body. Most importantly, the physical characteristics of the reactor made possible its unstable behaviour." But the report goes on to say that the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group "remains of the opinion that critical actions of the operators were most ill judged. As pointed out in INSAG-1, the human factor has still to be considered as a major element in causing the accident."

It is certainly true that the operators placed the reactor in a dangerous condition, in particular by removing too many of the control rods, resulting in the lowering of the reactor's operating reactivity margin (ORM, see information page on RBMK Reactors). However, the operating procedures did not emphasise the vital safety significance of the ORM but rather treated the ORM as a way of controlling reactor power. It could therefore be argued that the actions of the operators were more a symptom of the prevailing safety culture of the Soviet era rather than the result of recklessness or a lack of competence on the part of the operators.

In what is referred to as his Testament - which was published soon after his suicide two years after the accident - Valery Legasov, who had led the Soviet delegation to the IAEA Post-Accident Review Meeting, wrote: "After I had visited Chernobyl NPP I came to the conclusion that the accident was the inevitable apotheosis of the economic system which had been developed in the USSR over many decades. Neglect by the scientific management and the designers was everywhere with no attention being paid to the condition of instruments or of equipment... When one considers the chain of events leading up to the Chernobyl accident, why one person behaved in such a way and why another person behaved in another etc, it is impossible to find a single culprit, a single initiator of events, because it was like a closed circle." [ Back]

c. The initial death toll was officially given as two initial deaths plus 28 from acute radiation syndrome. One further victim, due to coronary thrombosis, is widely reported, but does not appear on official lists of the initial deaths. The 2006 report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Health", Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes, states: "The Chernobyl accident caused the deaths of 30 power plant employees and firemen within a few days or weeks (including 28 deaths that were due to radiation exposure)." [ Back]

d. Apart from the initial 31 deaths (two from the explosions, one reportedly from coronary thrombosis - see Note c above - and 28 firemen and plant personnel from acute radiation syndrome), the number of deaths resulting from the accident is unclear and a subject of considerable controversy. According to the 2006 report of the UN Chernobyl Forum's 'Health' Expert Group: "The actual number of deaths caused by this accident is unlikely ever to be precisely known."

On the number of deaths due to acute radiation syndrome (ARS), the Expert Group report states: "Among the 134 emergency workers involved in the immediate mitigation of the Chernobyl accident, severely exposed workers and fireman during the first days, 28 persons died in 1986 due to ARS, and 19 more persons died in 1987-2004 from different causes. Among the general population affected by the Chernobyl radioactive fallout, the much lower exposures meant that ARS cases did not occur."

According to the report: "With the exception of thyroid cancer, direct radiation-epidemiological studies performed in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine since 1986 have not revealed any statistically significant increase in either cancer morbidity or mortality induced by radiation." The report does however attribute a large proportion of child thyroid cancer fatalities to radiation, with nine deaths being recorded during 1986-2002 as a result of progression of thyroid cancer. [ Back]

e. There have been fatalities in military and research reactor contexts, e.g. Tokai-mura. [ Back]

f. Although most reports on the Chernobyl accident refer to a number of graphite fires, it is highly unlikely that the graphite itself burned. Information on the General Atomics website (but now deleted ) stated: "It is often incorrectly assumed that the combustion behavior of graphite is similar to that of charcoal and coal. Numerous tests and calculations have shown that it is virtually impossible to burn high-purity, nuclear-grade graphites." On Chernobyl, the same source stated: "Graphite played little or no role in the progression or consequences of the accident. The red glow observed during the Chernobyl accident was the expected color of luminescence for graphite at 700°C and not a large-scale graphite fire, as some have incorrectly assumed."

A 2006 Electric Power Research Institute Technical Report states that the International Atomic Energy Agency's INSAG-1 report is
...potentially misleading through the use of imprecise words in relation to graphite behaviour. The report discusses the fire-fighting activities and repeatedly refers to "burning graphite blocks" and "the graphite fire". Most of the actual fires involving graphite which were approached by fire-fighters involved ejected material on bitumen-covered roofs, and the fires also involved the bitumen. It is stated: "The fire teams experienced no unusual problems in using their fire-fighting techniques, except that it took a considerable time to extinguish the graphite fire." These descriptions are not consistent with the later considered opinions of senior Russian specialists... There is however no question that extremely hot graphite was ejected from the core and at a temperature sufficient to ignite adjacent combustible materials.

There are also several referrals to a graphite fire occurring during the October 1957 accident at Windscale Pile No. 1 in the UK. However, images obtained from inside the Pile several decades after the accident showed that the graphite was relatively undamaged. [

g. The International Chernobyl Project, 1990-91 - Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Summary Brochure, published by the International Atomic Energy Agency, reports that, in June 1989, the World Health Organization (WHO) sent a team of experts to help address the health impacts of radioactive contamination resulting from the accident. One of the conclusions from this mission was that "scientists who are not well versed in radiation effects have attributed various biological and health effects to radiation exposure. These changes cannot be attributed to radiation exposure, especially when the normal incidence is unknown, and are much more likely to be due to psychological factors and stress.Attributing these effects to radiation not only increases the psychological pressure in the population and provokes additional stress-related health problems, it also undermines confidence in the competence of the radiation specialists." [

h. Image taken from page 31 of The International Chernobyl Project Technical Report , Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Report by an International Advisory Committee , IAEA, 1991 (ISBN: 9201291914) [

i. A 55-page summary version the revised report, Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Second revised version , as well as the Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Environment" Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Health" are available from the IAEA's webpage for the Chernobyl Forum ( http://www-ns.iaea.org/meetings/rw-summaries/chernobyl_forum.htm

j. The United Nations Scientific Commission on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) is the UN body with a mandate from the General Assembly to assess and report levels and health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident , Annex J to Volume II of the 2000 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation Report to the General Assembly, is available at the UNSCEAR 2000 Report Vol. II webpage (www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/2000_2.html). It is also available (along with other reports) on the webpage for UNSCEAR's assessments of the radiation effects of The Chernobyl accident (www.unscear.org/unscear/en/chernobyl.html). The conclusions from Annex J of the UNSCEAR 2000 report are in Chernobyl Accident Appendix: Health Impacts

k. The quoted comment comes from a 6 June 2000 letter from Lars-Erik Holm, Chairman of UNSCEAR and Director-General of the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations. [

l. A reinforced concrete casing was built around the ruined reactor building over the seven months following the accident. This shelter - often referred to as the - was intended to contain the remaining fuel and act as a radiation shield. As it was designed for a lifetime of around 20 to 30 years, as well as being hastily constructed, a second shelter - known as the New Safe Confinement - with a 100-year design lifetime is planned to be placed over the existing structure. See also ASE keeps the lid on Chernobyl , World Nuclear News (19 August 2008). [

m. The UNSCEAR committee in 2018 estimated that the fraction of the incidence of thyroid cancer attributable to radiation exposure among non-evacuated residents of Belarus, Ukraine and the four most contaminated oblasts of the Russian Federation, who were under 18 at the time of the accident, is in the order of 0.25 . The committee states that the uncertainty range of the fraction is large, at least from 0.07 to 0.5. [ Back]

, Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, GRS-121 (February 1996) [9. Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes , Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum, Expert Group "Health", World Health Organization, 2006 (ISBN: 9789241594172)
2. Appendix D, Graphite Decommissioning: Options for Graphite Treatment, Recycling, or Disposal, including a discussion of Safety-Related Issues , EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, 1013091 (March 2006)
The International Chernobyl Project, 1990-91 - Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Summary Brochure , International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA/PI/A32E, 1991; The International Chernobyl Project, An Overview , Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Report by an International Advisory Committee , IAEA, 1991 (ISBN: 9201290918); The International Chernobyl Project Technical Report , Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, Report by an International Advisory Committee , IAEA, 1991 (ISBN: 9201291914) [
4. Mikhail Balonov, Malcolm Crick and Didier Louvat, Update of Impacts of the Chernobyl Accident: Assessments of the Chernobyl Forum (2003-2005) and UNSCEAR (2005-2008) , Proceedings of the Third European IRPA (International Radiation Protection Association) Congress held in Helsinki, Finland (14-18 June 2010) [
5. UNSCEAR, 2011, Health Effects due to Radiation from the Chernobyl Accident . UNSCEAR 2008 Report, vol II, annex D (lead author: M. Balanov) [
6. Chernobyl - A Continuing Catastrophe, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2000 [
The Accident and the Safety of RBMK-Reactors
8. Deryabina, T.G. Long-term census data reveal abundant wildlife populations at Chernobyl , Current Biology, Volume 25, Issue 19, pR824-R826, Elsevier (5 October 2015) [
Back] Evaluation of data on thyroid cancer in regions affected by the Chernobyl accident, UNSCEAR (2018) [ Back]

INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-7, 1992, (ISBN: 9201046928)

Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Second revised version, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA/PI/A.87 Rev.2/06-09181 (April 2006)

Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience, Report of the Chernobyl Forum Expert Group 'Environment', International Atomic Energy Agency, 2006 (ISBN 9201147058)

Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Health", World Health Organization, 2006 (ISBN: 9789241594172)

The Chernobyl accident, UNSCEAR's assessments of the radiation effects on the UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) radiation website

Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident, Annex J of Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation , UNSCEAR 2000 Report to the General Assembly Vol. II

Ten Years after Chernobyl: what do we really know? (based on the proceedings of the IAEA/WHO/EC International Conference, Vienna, April 1996), International Atomic Energy Agency

Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts - 2002 Update of Chernobyl: Ten Years On, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (2002).

Zbigniew Jaworowski, Lessons of Chernobyl with particular reference to thyroid cancer , Australasian Radiation Protection Society Newsletter No. 30 (April 2004). The same article appeared in Executive Intelligence Review (EIR), Volume 31, Number 18 (7 May 2004). An extended version of this paper was published as Radiation folly, Chapter 4 of Environment & Health: Myths & Realities, Edited by Kendra Okonski and Julian Morris, International Policy Press (a division of International Policy Network), June 2004 (ISBN 1905041004). See also Chernobyl Accident Appendix 2: Health Impacts

website www.chernobyl.info - out of date but some useful information

Chernobyl Forum information on IAEA website

Mikhail Balonov, The Chernobyl Forum: Major Findings and Recommendations, presented at the Public Information Materials Exchange meeting held in Vienna, Austria on 12-16 February 2006

GreenFacts webpage on Scientific Facts on the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident (www.greenfacts.org/en/chernobyl)

European Centre of Technological Safety's Chernobyl website (www.tesec-int.org/Chernobyl) and its webpage on Sarcophagus and Decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP

Chernobyl Legacy website (www.chernobyllegacy.com)

David Mosey, Looking Beyond the Operator, Nuclear Engineering International, 26 Nov 2014

Chernobyl 25th anniversary, Frequently Asked Questions, World Health Organization (23 April 2011)

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Chernobyl | Chernobyl Accident | Chernobyl Disaster - World Nuclear Association

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The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was the result of a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel. The resulting steam explosion and fires released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind - some 5200 PBq (I-131 eq).

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Economic Indicators for Belarus including actual values, historical data charts, an economic calendar, time-series statistics, business news, long term forecasts and short-term predictions for Belarus economy.

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http://www.factrover.com/history/Belarus_history.html

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bo.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarus

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/belarus/indicators

And all of the sources in the attachments above

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This page shows you all of the prices you might need to know moving here

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Average prices of more than 40 products and services in Belarus. Prices of restaurants, food, transportation, utilities and housing are included.

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In the People and Society section statistics can be found

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Europe :: BELARUS

Introduction :: BELARUS

After seven decades as a constituent republic of the USSR, Belarus attained its independence in 1991. It has retained closer political and economic ties to Russia than have any of the other former Soviet republics. Belarus and Russia signed a treaty on a two-state union on 8 December 1999 envisioning greater political and economic integration. Although Belarus agreed to a framework to carry out the accord, serious implementation has yet to take place. Since his election in July 1994 as the country's first and only directly elected president, Aleksandr LUKASHENKO has steadily consolidated his power through authoritarian means and a centralized economic system. Government restrictions on political and civil freedoms, freedom of speech and the press, peaceful assembly, and religion have remained in place.

Geography :: BELARUS

Eastern Europe, east of Poland

slightly less than twice the size of Kentucky; slightly smaller than Kansas

Area comparison map:

border countries (5): Latvia 161 km, Lithuania 640 km, Poland 418 km, Russia 1,312 km, Ukraine 1,111 km

cold winters, cool and moist summers; transitional between continental and maritime

generally flat with much marshland

elevation extremes: lowest point: Nyoman River 90 m

highest point: Dzyarzhynskaya Hara 346 m

timber, peat deposits, small quantities of oil and natural gas, granite, dolomitic limestone, marl, chalk, sand, gravel, clay

arable land 27.2%; permanent crops 0.6%; permanent pasture 15.9%

a fairly even distribution throughout most of the country, with urban areas attracting larger and denser populations

large tracts of marshy land

soil pollution from pesticide use; southern part of the country contaminated with fallout from 1986 nuclear reactor accident at Chornobyl' in northern Ukraine

party to: Air Pollution, Air Pollution-Nitrogen Oxides, Air Pollution-Sulfur 85, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands

signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements

landlocked; glacial scouring accounts for the flatness of Belarusian terrain and for its 11,000 lakes

People and Society :: BELARUS

9,549,747 (July 2017 est.)

Belarusian 83.7%, Russian 8.3%, Polish 3.1%, Ukrainian 1.7%, other 2.4%, unspecified 0.9% (2009 est.)

Russian (official) 70.2%, Belarusian (official) 23.4%, other 3.1% (includes small Polish- and Ukrainian-speaking minorities), unspecified 3.3% (2009 est.)

Orthodox 48.3%, Catholic 7.1%, other 3.5%, non-believers 41.1% (2011 est.)

0-14 years: 15.78% (male 774,995/female 732,191)

15-24 years: 10.29% (male 505,420/female 477,123)

25-54 years: 44.76% (male 2,104,170/female 2,170,515)

55-64 years: 14.21% (male 599,630/female 757,744)

65 years and over: 14.95% (male 457,766/female 970,193) (2017 est.)

population pyramid:

total dependency ratio: 43.8

youth dependency ratio: 23.2

elderly dependency ratio: 20.6

potential support ratio: 4.9 (2015 est.)

female: 43.1 years (2017 est.)

10.3 births/1,000 population (2017 est.)

13.2 deaths/1,000 population (2017 est.)

0.7 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2017 est.)

a fairly even distribution throughout most of the country, with urban areas attracting larger and denser populations

urban population: 77.4% of total population (2017)

rate of urbanization: -0.04% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.)

MINSK (capital) 1.915 million (2015)

at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female

0-14 years: 1.06 male(s)/female

15-24 years: 1.06 male(s)/female

25-54 years: 0.97 male(s)/female

55-64 years: 0.79 male(s)/female

65 years and over: 0.46 male(s)/female

total population: 0.87 male(s)/female (2017 est.)

4 deaths/100,000 live births (2015 est.)

total: 3.6 deaths/1,000 live births

male: 4 deaths/1,000 live births

female: 3.1 deaths/1,000 live births (2017 est.)

total population: 73 years

female: 78.8 years (2017 est.)

1.48 children born/woman (2017 est.)

4.07 physicians/1,000 population (2014)

11 beds/1,000 population (2013)

urban: 99.9% of population

rural: 99.1% of population

total: 99.7% of population

urban: 0.1% of population

rural: 0.9% of population

total: 0.3% of population (2015 est.)

urban: 94.1% of population

rural: 95.2% of population

total: 94.3% of population

urban: 5.9% of population

rural: 4.8% of population

total: 5.7% of population (2015 est.)

definition: age 15 and over can read and write

female: 99.7% (2015 est.)

female: 12.6% (2009 est.)

Government :: BELARUS

conventional long form: Republic of Belarus

conventional short form: Belarus

local long form: Respublika Byelarus'/Respublika Belarus'

local short form: Byelarus'/Belarus'

former: Belorussian (Byelorussian) Soviet Socialist Republic

etymology: the name is a compound of the Belarusian words "bel" (white) and "Rus" (the Old East Slavic ethnic designation) to form the meaning White Rusian or White Ruthenian

presidential republic in name, although in fact a dictatorship

geographic coordinates: 53 54 N, 27 34 E

time difference: UTC+2 (7 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)

6 provinces (voblastsi, singular - voblasts') and 1 municipality* (horad); Brest, Homyel' (Gomel'), Horad Minsk* (Minsk City), Hrodna (Grodno), Mahilyow (Mogilev), Minsk, Vitsyebsk (Vitebsk)

note: administrative divisions have the same names as their administrative centers; Russian spelling provided for reference when different from Belarusian

25 August 1991 (from the Soviet Union)

Independence Day, 3 July (1944); note - 3 July 1944 was the date Minsk was liberated from German troops, 25 August 1991 was the date of independence from the Soviet Union

history: several previous; latest drafted between late 1991 and early 1994, signed 15 March 1994

amendments: proposed by the president of the republic through petition to the National Assembly or by petition of least 150,000 eligible voters; approval required by at least two-thirds majority vote in both chambers or by simple majority of votes cast in a referendum (2016)

civil law system; note - nearly all major codes (civil, civil procedure, criminal, criminal procedure, family, and labor) were revised and came into force in 1999 and 2000

has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt

citizenship by descent only: at least one parent must be a citizen of Belarus

dual citizenship recognized: no

residency requirement for naturalization: 7 years

18 years of age; universal

chief of state: president Aleksandr LUKASHENKO (since 20 July 1994)

head of government: prime minister Andrey KOBYAKOV (since 27 December 2014); first deputy prime minister Vasiliy MATYUSHEVSKIY (since 27 December 2014)

cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president

elections/appointments: president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (no term limits); first election took place on 23 June and 10 July 1994; according to the 1994 constitution, the next election should have been held in 1999; however, Aleksandr LUKASHENKO extended his term to 2001 via a November 1996 referendum; subsequent election held on 9 September 2001; an October 2004 referendum ended presidential term limits and allowed the president to run and win in a third (19 March 2006), fourth (19 December 2010), and fifth election (11 October 2015); next election in 2020; prime minister and deputy prime ministers appointed by the president and approved by the National Assembly

election results: Aleksandr LUKASHENKO reelected president; percent of vote - Aleksandr LUKASHENKO (independent) 83.5%, Tatstyana KARATKEVICH (Tell the Truth) 4.4%, Sergey GAYDUKEVICH (LDP) 3.3%, other 8.8%; note - election marred by electoral fraud

description: bicameral National Assembly or Natsionalnoye Sobraniye consists of the Council of the Republic or Sovet Respubliki (64 seats; 56 members indirectly elected by regional and Minsk city councils and 8 members appointed by the president; members serve 4-year terms) and the House of Representatives or Palata Predstaviteley (110 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 4-year terms); note - the US does not recognize the legitimacy of the National Assembly

elections: House of Representatives - last held on 11 September 2016 (next to be held in 2020); OSCE observers determined that the election was neither free nor impartial and that vote counting was problematic in a number of polling stations; pro-LUKASHENKO candidates won virtually every seat, with only the UCP member and one independent forming alternative representation in the House; international observers determined that the previous elections, on 28 September 2008 and 23 September 2012, also fell short of democratic standards, with pro-LUKASHENKO candidates winning every seat

election results: Council of the Republic - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - KPB 8, Belarusian Patriotic Party 3, Republican Party of Labor and Justice 3, LDP 1, UCP 1, independent 94

highest court(s): Supreme Court (consists of the chairman and deputy chairman and organized into several specialized panels, including economic and military; number of judges set by the president of the republic and the court chairman); Constitutional Court (consists of 12 judges including a chairman and deputy chairman)

judge selection and term of office: Supreme Court judges appointed by the president with the consent of the Council of the Republic; judges initially appointed for 5 years and evaluated for life appointment; Constitutional Court judges - 6 appointed by the president and 6 elected by the Council of the Republic; the presiding judge directly elected by the president and approved by the Council of the Republic; judges can serve for 11 years with an age limit of 70

subordinate courts: provincial (including Minsk city) courts; first instance (district) courts; economic courts; military courts

Belarusian Agrarian Party or AP [Mikhail SHIMANSKIY]

Belarusian Patriotic Party [Nikolai ULAKHOVICH]

Belarusian Social Sport Party [Vladimir ALEKSANDROVICH]

Communist Party of Belarus or KPB [Aleksei SOKOL]

Liberal Democratic Party or LDP [Sergey GAYDUKEVICH]

Republican Party [Vladimir BELOZOR]

Republican Party of Labor and Justice [Vasiliy ZADNEPRYANIY]

Belarusian Christian Democracy Party [Paval SEVIARYNETS] (unregistered)

Belarusian Party of the Green [Anastasiya DOROFEYEVA]

Belarusian Party of the Left "Just World" [Sergey KALYAKIN]

Belarusian Popular Front or BPF [Ryhor KASTUSEU]

Belarusian Social-Democratic Assembly [Stanislav SHUSHKEVICH]

Belarusian Social Democratic Party ("Assembly") or BSDPH [Ihar BARYSAU]

Belarusian Social Democratic Party (People's Assembly) [Mikalay STATKEVICH] (unregistered)

Christian Conservative Party or BPF [Zyanon PAZNYAK]

United Civic Party or UCP [Anatoliy LEBEDKO]

Assembly of Pro-Democratic NGOs [Sergey MATSKEVICH] (unregistered)

Belarusian Association of Journalists [Andrei BASTUNETS]

Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions or BRDP [Aleksandr YAROSHUK]

Belarusian Helsinki Committee or BHC [Aleh HULAK]

Belarusian Language Society [Aleh TRUSAU, Alena ANISIM]

Center-Right Coalition [Vital RYMASHEUSKI, ANATOLY LEBEDKO, YURAS HUBAREVICH]

Congress of Democratic Forces [Mikalay STATKEVICH]

For Freedom Movement [Yuras HUBAREVICH]

Malady Front (Young Front) [Zmitser DASHKEVICH] (unregistered)

Perspektiva [Anatoliy SHUMCHENKO] (small business association)

"Tell the Truth" Movement [Tatsyana KARATKEVICH, Andrei DMITRIYEV]

Vyasna (Spring) human rights center [Ales BELYATSKIY] (unregistered)

Women's Independent Democratic Movement [Ludmila PETINA]

BSEC (observer), CBSS (observer), CEI, CIS, CSTO, EAEC, EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, NSG, OPCW, OSCE, PCA, PFP, SCO (dialogue member), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer), ZC

chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant; recalled by Belarus in 2008); Charge d'Affaires Pavel SHIDLOVSKIY (since 23 April 2014)

chancery: 1619 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20009

telephone: [1] (202) 986-1606

consulate(s) general: New York

chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant; left in 2008 upon insistence of Belarusian Government); Charge d'Affaires Robert RILEY (since 22 August 2016)

embassy: 46 Starovilenskaya Street, Minsk 220002

mailing address: Unit 7010 Box 100, DPO AE 09769

telephone: [375] (17) 210-1283

red horizontal band (top) and green horizontal band one-half the width of the red band; a white vertical stripe on the hoist side bears Belarusian national ornamentation in red; the red band color recalls past struggles from oppression, the green band represents hope and the many forests of the country

no clearly defined current national symbol, the mounted knight known as Pahonia (the Chaser) is the traditional Belarusian symbol; national colors: green, red, white

name: "My, Bielarusy" (We Belarusians)

lyrics/music: Mikhas KLIMKOVICH and Uladzimir KARYZNA/Nester SAKALOUSKI

note: music adopted 1955, lyrics adopted 2002; after the fall of the Soviet Union, Belarus kept the music of its Soviet-era anthem but adopted new lyrics; also known as "Dziarzauny himn Respubliki Bielarus" (State Anthem of the Republic of Belarus)

Economy :: BELARUS

As part of the former Soviet Union, Belarus had a relatively well-developed, though aging industrial base; it retained this industrial base - which is now outdated, energy inefficient, and dependent on subsidized Russian energy and preferential access to Russian markets - following the breakup of the USSR. The country also has a broad agricultural base which is largely inefficient and dependent on government subsidies. After an initial burst of capitalist reform between 1991 and 1994, including privatization of smaller state enterprises and some service sector businesses, creation of institutions of private property, and development of entrepreneurship, Belarus' economic development greatly slowed. About 80% of all industry remains in state hands, and non-Russian foreign investment has been hindered by a reluctance to welcome private investment absent joint ownership or affiliation with the state. A few businesses, which had been privatized after independence, were renationalized. State banks account for 75% of the banking sector.

Economic output declined for several years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but revived in the mid-2000s due to the boom in oil prices. Belarus has only small reserves of crude oil, though it imports most of its crude oil and natural gas from Russia at prices substantially below world market prices. Belarus then derives export revenue by refining Russian crude and selling it at market prices. In late 2006, Russia began a process of rolling back its subsidies on oil and gas exports to Belarus. Several times since, Russia and Belarus have had serious disagreements over the level and price of Russian energy supplies. At one point in 2010, Russia stopped the export of all subsidized oil to Belarus save for domestic needs before the two countries reached a deal to restart the export of discounted oil to Belarus. Beginning in early 2016, Russia claimed Belarus began accumulating debt - reaching $740 million by April 2017 - for paying below an agreed price for Russian natural gas. Russia decided to reduce its export of crude oil as a result of the debt. In April 2017, Belarus agreed to pay its gas debt and Russia restored the flow of crude. The agreement paved the way for resumption of cheap energy imports and financial assistance from the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development.

New non-Russian foreign investment has been limited in recent years. In 2011, a financial crisis began, triggered by government-directed salary hikes, compounded by an increased cost in Russian energy inputs and an overvalued Belarusian ruble that lead to a nearly three-fold devaluation of the Belarusian ruble. In November 2011, Belarus agreed to sell to Russia its remaining shares of Beltransgaz, the Belarusian natural gas pipeline operator, in exchange for reduced prices for Russian natural gas. The situation stabilized in 2012, after Belarus received part of a $3 billion loan from the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Community Bailout Fund, a $1 billion loan from the Russian state-owned bank Sberbank, and $2.5 billion from the sale of Beltransgaz to Russian state-owned Gazprom; nevertheless, the Belarusian currency lost more than 60% of its value, as inflation reached new highs in 2011 and 2012, before calming in 2013. In December 2013, Russia announced a new loan for Belarus of up to $2 billion for 2014. Notwithstanding foreign assistance, the Belarusian economy continued to struggle under the weight of high external debt servicing payments and trade deficit. In mid-December 2014, structural economic shortcomings were aggravated by the devaluation of the Russian ruble, which triggered a near 40% devaluation of the Belarusian ruble.

Belarus's economy stagnated between 2012 and 2016, which led to widening productivity and income gaps between Belarus and neighboring countries. Since 2015, the Belarusian government has tightened its macro-economic policies, allowed more flexibility to its exchange rate, taken steps towards price liberalization, and reduced subsidized government lending to state-owned industrial and agricultural enterprises, amid a drop in state budget revenues that resulted from falling global prices on key Belarusian export commodities - petroleum products and potash fertilizer. Belarus returned to weak growth in 2017, largely driven by improvement of external conditions that allowed for growth in its manufacturing sector. Belarus also issued sovereign debt for the first time since 2011 for $1.4 billion in June 2017, which provided the country with badly-needed liquidity.

$175.9 billion (2017 est.)

$174.6 billion (2016 est.)

$179.4 billion (2015 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars

$52.78 billion (2017 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars

household consumption: 54.8%

government consumption: 16.8%

investment in fixed capital: 24.1%

investment in inventories: -1.1%

exports of goods and services: 65%

imports of goods and services: -59.6% (2017 est.)

services: 51.1% (2017 est.)

grain, potatoes, vegetables, sugar beets, flax; beef, milk

metal-cutting machine tools, tractors, trucks, earthmovers, motorcycles, synthetic fibers, fertilizer, textiles, refrigerators, washing machines and other household appliances

4.381 million (2016 est.)

services: 66.8% (2015 est.)

note: official registered unemployed; large number of underemployed workers

highest 10%: 21.9% (2008 est.)

expenditures: $22.54 billion (2017 est.)

14% (31 December 2017 est.)

14.4% (31 December 2016 est.)

$2.881 billion (31 December 2017 est.)

$2.718 billion (31 December 2016 est.)

$6.03 billion (31 December 2017 est.)

$5.431 billion (31 December 2016 est.)

$21.45 billion (31 December 2017 est.)

$20.64 billion (31 December 2016 est.)

$-2.801 billion (2017 est.)

$-1.703 billion (2016 est.)

$24.2 billion (2017 est.)

$22.98 billion (2016 est.)

machinery and equipment, mineral products, chemicals, metals, textiles, foodstuffs

Russia 46.3%, Ukraine 12.2%, UK 4.6%, Germany 4% (2016)

$26.2 billion (2017 est.)

$25.57 billion (2016 est.)

mineral products, machinery and equipment, chemicals, foodstuffs, metals

Russia 55.5%, China 7.8%, Germany 4.9%, Poland 4.4% (2016)

$5.059 billion (31 December 2017 est.)

$4.927 billion (31 December 2016 est.)

$38.75 billion (31 December 2017 est.)

$37.74 billion (31 December 2016 est.)

$6.929 billion (31 December 2016 est.)

$7.241 billion (31 December 2015 est.)

$3.547 billion (31 December 2016 est.)

$4.649 billion (31 December 2015 est.)

Belarusian rubles (BYB/BYR) per US dollar -

Energy :: BELARUS

electrification - total population: 100% (2016)

32.04 billion kWh (2015 est.)

31.75 billion kWh (2015 est.)

3.482 billion kWh (2015 est.)

6.104 billion kWh (2015 est.)

10.08 million kW (2015 est.)

99.2% of total installed capacity (2015 est.)

0% of total installed capacity (2015 est.)

0.4% of total installed capacity (2015 est.)

0.9% of total installed capacity (2015 est.)

32,670 bbl/day (2016 est.)

31,770 bbl/day (2014 est.)

450,200 bbl/day (2014 est.)

198 million bbl (1 January 2017 est.)

471,600 bbl/day (2014 est.)

172,000 bbl/day (2015 est.)

290,300 bbl/day (2014 est.)

2,387 bbl/day (2014 est.)

30 million cu m (2015 est.)

26.5 billion cu m (2015 est.)

17.3 billion cu m (2015 est.)

2.832 billion cu m (1 January 2017 est.)

70 million Mt (2013 est.)

Communications :: BELARUS

total subscriptions: 4,515,382

subscriptions per 100 inhabitants: 47 (July 2016 est.)

subscriptions per 100 inhabitants: 120 (July 2016 est.)

general assessment: Belarus lags behind its neighbors in upgrading telecommunications infrastructure; modernization of the network progressing with over two-thirds of switching equipment now digital

domestic: state-owned Beltelcom is the sole provider of fixed-line local and long distance service; fixed-line teledensity is improving although rural areas continue to be underserved; the country has three major GSM mobile-cellular networks; mobile-cellular teledensity now approaches 120 telephones per 100 persons

international: country code - 375; Belarus is a member of the Trans-European Line (TEL), Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) fiber-optic line, and has access to the Trans-Siberia Line (TSL); 3 fiber-optic segments provide connectivity to Latvia, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine; worldwide service is available to Belarus through this infrastructure; additional analog lines to Russia; Intelsat, Eutelsat, and Intersputnik earth stations (2017)

7 state-controlled national TV channels; Polish and Russian TV broadcasts are available in some areas; state-run Belarusian Radio operates 5 national networks and an external service; Russian and Polish radio broadcasts are available (2017)

percent of population: 71.1% (July 2016 est.)

Transportation :: BELARUS

number of registered air carriers: 2

inventory of registered aircraft operated by air carriers: 30

annual passenger traffic on registered air carriers: 1,489,035

annual freight traffic on registered air carriers: 1.807 million mt-km (2015)

gas 5,386 km; oil 1,589 km; refined products 1,730 km (2013)

broad gauge: 5,503 km 1.520-m gauge (874 km electrified)

standard gauge: 25 km 1.435-m gauge (2014)

unpaved: 11,741 km (2010)

2,500 km (major rivers are the west-flowing Western Dvina and Neman Rivers and the south-flowing Dnepr River and its tributaries, the Berezina, Sozh, and Pripyat Rivers) (2011)

river port(s): Mazyr (Prypyats')

Military and Security :: BELARUS

Belarus Armed Forces: Land Force, Air and Air Defense Force, Special Operations Force (2013)

18-27 years of age for compulsory military or alternative service; conscript service obligation is 12-18 months, depending on academic qualifications, and 24-36 months for alternative service, depending on academic qualifications; 17 year olds are eligible to become cadets at military higher education institutes, where they are classified as military personnel (2016)

Transnational Issues :: BELARUS

boundary demarcated with Latvia and Lithuania; as a member state that forms part of the EU's external border, Poland has implemented strict Schengen border rules to restrict illegal immigration and trade along its border with Belarus

refugees (country of origin): 244,621 applicants for forms of legal stay other than asylum (Ukraine) (2017)

stateless persons: 6,182 (2016)

current situation: Belarus is a source, transit, and destination country for women, men, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; more victims are exploited within Belarus than abroad; Belarusians exploited abroad are primarily trafficked to Germany, Poland, Russian, and Turkey but also other European countries, the Middle East, Japan, Kazakhstan, and Mexico; Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, and Vietnamese are exploited in Belarus; state-sponsored forced labor is a continuing problem; students are forced to do farm labor without pay and military conscripts are forced to perform unpaid non-military work; the government has retained a decree forbidding workers in state-owned wood processing factories from leaving their jobs without their employers' permission

tier rating: Tier 3 - Belarus does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and was placed on Tier 3 after being on the Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years without making progress; government efforts to repeal state-sponsored forced labor policies and domestic trafficking were inadequate; no trafficking offenders were convicted in 2014, and the number of investigations progressively declined from 2005-14; efforts to protect trafficking victims remain insufficient, with no identification and referral mechanism in place; care facilities were not trafficking-specific and were poorly equipped, leading most victims to seek assistance from private shelters (2015)

limited cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis, mostly for the domestic market; transshipment point for illicit drugs to and via Russia, and to the Baltics and Western Europe; a small and lightly regulated financial center; anti-money-laundering legislation does not meet international standards and was weakened further when know-your-customer requirements were curtailed in 2008; few investigations or prosecutions of money-laundering activities

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The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate.

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Good phrases to start learning to help you when you get to Belarus

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This page contains a course in Belarusian phrases and daily expressions as well as a list of other lessons in grammar topics and common words in Belarusian.

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Minsk, Brest, and Gomel are popular choices where you'll probably see a lot of other tourists, but they are still worth going to because of their rich history.

Lake Narach is good to go to in the summer with its beaches and river cruises.

On the other hand, Silichy is nice in the winter having many ski resorts and slopes.

Grodno has many historic building like churches castles and cathedrals.

Mir castle, Dudutki, and Marc Chagell House Museum are personal picks that just seem cool,

I also highly recommend the Białowieża Forest in the southwest on the border of Belarus and Poland. It is a national park that is quite beautiful.

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The recorded history of Belarus begins in the early centuries A.D. when the Baltic and Slavic people settled there. Belarus was originally part of one country called Litva in the 9th century. This country consisted of the modern day Lithuania and you guessed it, Belarus. Belarus’ religion was catholic until the Russian empire suppressed it. One member of the Catholic Church was Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a driving force in the American Revolution. The Belarusian people were occupied by Russia from the 18thcentury until 1918, but there freedom in 1918 was not long lived. From 1918till 1944 Belarus was in very bad positions and eventually was forcibly taken control of by the Soviet Union. From 1944-1990 Belarus was controlled by the Soviet Union. They declared independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union as well independence as a country. It has been run by authoritarian Alexander Lukashenko since 1994

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The economy in Belarus is in general not so good. In the entirety of its independence the economy has not fared well.The stress in the economy is mostly because of oil reserves.Belarus only has small reserves of crude oil and used to refine oil from the Russians for a cheap discount on actually getting their own oil in return. In 2006 Russia held back on giving Belarus much oil. In 2010 the whole system started up again. In 2011 Belarus made the same kind of deal and gave their shares in a natural gas pipeline operator in return for bigger discounts on the oil and natural gas. One big loan was given to Belarus in 2012 but their entire currency crashed because of it and over 60% of it was completely used up and lost. But because of their standing relationship, in 2013-2014, Russia gave Belarus a loan of 2 billion dollars. Belarus entered 2015 with a steady economic growth and was by far the most economical growth that Belarus has ever had.

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The country of Belarus is normal when it comes to geography. It is only slightly smaller than the United Kingdom with a square area of 207,600 square kilometers. Over 40% of this landlocked country is forested. It borders with Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. Its capital city is Minsk and the other districts in Belarus include Homiel, Brest, Hrodna, Vitsbesk, and Mahiliou. Belarus is home to about 42 rivers and streams, and about 11,000 lakes. Belarus’s major rivers are the Neman, Pripyat, and the Dnieper. The highest point is Dzyarshynskaya Hara at 345 meters and the lowest point is on the Neman River at 90 meters. The climate in Belarus is between the continental and maritime climates, with an average temperature of 18 Celsius in the summer and -6 Celsius in the winter. It receives a range of 550 to 700 millimeters of precipitation and is sometimes in excess.

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Legal Theft

When you are staying in a hotel in Belarus watch out for "Legal Theft". Some maids in Belarus have found a way to steal peoples belongings legally. They will hide your valuable items in a very obscure spot in your room. After you leave, not having found your item, the maid will put it in the lost and found and after a few days have the right to claim it as their own. This is completely legal, and a terrible loophole in the system. Do not let this happen to you by either keeping valuable items in the hotel safe or on your person at all times.

Money

Whenever you want to change in your money for Belarussian rubles be sure to give them the right kind of money. If the bills you give them are in any way bent wrong, marked, or ripped then they will not accept them. Be careful with this and make sure that you keep your bills flat all of the time in your wallet.