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1. Make sure if reported that a student had something unlawful, that the source is credible.

2. Ask the student if he/she has anything they shouldn't.  Allow the student to admit it before searching.

3. Have another person in the office.  Resources Officer/Administrator.

4. Try to use gender on gender. If a female needs to be searched, try to use a female administrator if possible.

5. Inform the parents before doing anything.

6. Explain the law to the student and parent.

7. Don't assume the student will repeat the offense.

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Student are covered under the fourth amendment, however there are exceptions. There are different rules on school property. There has to reasonable grounds for search, without that they cannot search. Know what is permissible and what is not.
kidslegal.org

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Can a student be searched at school and have their property taken?

Students have an "expectation of privacy" that applies outside and on school property. However, there are different rules for the different locations. There are also different rules based on who is doing the search and what item is being searched.

Can a student's school locker or desk be searched?

Generally, any item that is considered property of the school can be searched without letting the student or the parent know. School staff can also give permission to the police to look in your locker or desk, even though you use it. Schools may have a policy on this and must be provided to students upon request.

Can the school search my pockets, backpack, or other personal items?

When it comes to your body and property, there are rules that must be followed. Which rules apply depends on who is doing the search.

School staff may search a student if there are "reasonable grounds" that the search will turn up evidence that the student broke a school rule. This means that staff have more than a hunch that the student did something wrong before the search can happen. They must have specific reason to believe you broke a school rule. The search must be:

There are a couple of factors to be looked at to establish a reasonable search.

For example, if a student is accused of having aspirin, which violates the school drug policy, it is reasonable for school staff to have the student empty pockets and look in a backpack. But, if nothing is found, it is not ok to ask you to pull out your underwear band to look for aspirin there.

Can a police officer search my pockets, backpack and other personal items?

If a police officer is doing the search, a different set of rules apply.

The police must follow a higher standard to search you. The police must have either

"Probable cause," (Probable cause means a reasonable person believes a crime was, is, or will be committed.) or

a search warrant from a Court.

If the police do not have probable cause or a warrant, you can refuse to be searched. If you are searched and evidence of a crime is found, that evidence may be kept out of Court. This is something you can talk to a juvenile defense attorney about if you are charged in Court. But, that evidence will not be kept out of a school discipline hearing, like an expulsion.

Can a School Resource Office search my pockets, backpack, and other personal items?

School resource officers are a little trickier. Some courts in the country have said that school resource officers are like school staff and can follow the "reasonable grounds" rule. Other courts in the country have said that school resource officers are the police and must follow the "probable cause" standard. Maine courts have not ruled on this issue yet, so we do not know which rule must be followed by a school resource officer.

Can a student be questioned by school staff?

School staff have the right to question students. Maine law does not say anything about whether the school has to first contact your parent. The school district may have a policy that talks about this. Check the school's website or call the administration office to see if there is a policy.

It is important to know that anything a student says to school staff can be used against the student in either a school discipline case or in a juvenile court case.

If the police are involved in questioning the student at school, things change. If the point of questioning is to find out if the student committed a crime, the police have to follow the rules for any criminal investigation. If they do not follow those rules, what the student says to the police may be kept out of court if they are charged with a juvenile offense. The student first need to know if you were in a "custodial setting" when the police questioned them at school.

What is a custodial setting?

Generally, students are in a custodial setting when they are with the police and are not free to leave. If the police question the student when they are not free to leave, it is a "custodial interrogation." There are two factors to look at:

The student may not be told they are under arrest but still be in a custodial setting. If the interrogation or questioning is custodial (meaning they student do not feel free to leave), the police must give the student Miranda warnings BEFORE asking questions. Miranda warnings are:

The right to remain silent

To be warned that anything you say can and will be used against you

The right to an attorney

If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to you

Do you understand your rights

Will you talk to me

If the student understands the student Miranda rights and still agrees to talk to the police, the student has waived those rights. That means what the student says to the police can be used against them.

Also, under Maine law, if the student is in a custodial setting, before the police can question them about crimes they think the student committed, their parent or legal guardian must be contacted. The parent must either be with you for the questioning or agree the police can question you without them being there.

Depending on what the student is accused of, they may be facing school disciplinary action, juvenile charges in Court, or both. The school disciplinary action will happen much faster than a juvenile court case. Anything you say in the school discipline case can be used against you in the court case.

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Students have an "expectation of privacy" that applies outside and on school property. However, there are different rules for the different locations. There are also different rules based on who is doing the search and what item is being searched.

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Standard 3.2. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly treat a student or minor in a manner that adversely affects or endangers the learning, physical health, mental health, or safety of the student or minor.

This relates to my topic since if a student could be affected with a continuous search and seizure.

The constant of being pulled out and searched can be harmful to students and embarrassing.

RULE §247.2

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Enforceable Standards.
(1) Professional Ethical Conduct, Practices and Performance. (A) Standard 1.1. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engage in deceptive practices regarding official policies of the school district, educational institution, educator preparation program, the Texas Education Agency, or the State Board for Educator Certification (SBEC) and its certification process. (B) Standard 1.2. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misappropriate, divert, or use monies, personnel, property, or equipment committed to his or her charge for personal gain or advantage. (C) Standard 1.3. The educator shall not submit fraudulent requests for reimbursement, expenses, or pay. (D) Standard 1.4. The educator shall not use institutional or professional privileges for personal or partisan advantage. (E) Standard 1.5. The educator shall neither accept nor offer gratuities, gifts, or favors that impair professional judgment or that are used to obtain special advantage. This standard shall not restrict the acceptance of gifts or tokens offered and accepted openly from students, parents of students, or other persons or organizations in recognition or appreciation of service. (F) Standard 1.6. The educator shall not falsify records, or direct or coerce others to do so. (G) Standard 1.7. The educator shall comply with state regulations, written local school board policies, and other state and federal laws. (H) Standard 1.8. The educator shall apply for, accept, offer, or assign a position or a responsibility on the basis of professional qualifications. (I) Standard 1.9. The educator shall not make threats of violence against school district employees, school board members, students, or parents of students. (J) Standard 1.10. The educator shall be of good moral character and be worthy to instruct or supervise the youth of this state. (K) Standard 1.11. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent his or her employment history, criminal history, and/or disciplinary record when applying for subsequent employment. (L) Standard 1.12. The educator shall refrain from the illegal use, abuse, or distribution of controlled substances, prescription drugs, and toxic inhalants. (M) Standard 1.13. The educator shall not be under the influence of alcohol or consume alcoholic beverages on school property or during school activities when students are present. (2) Ethical Conduct Toward Professional Colleagues. (A) Standard 2.1. The educator shall not reveal confidential health or personnel information concerning colleagues unless disclosure serves lawful professional purposes or is required by law. (B) Standard 2.2. The educator shall not harm others by knowingly making false statements about a colleague or the school system. (C) Standard 2.3. The educator shall adhere to written local school board policies and state and federal laws regarding the hiring, evaluation, and dismissal of personnel. (D) Standard 2.4. The educator shall not interfere with a colleague's exercise of political, professional, or citizenship rights and responsibilities. (E) Standard 2.5. The educator shall not discriminate against or coerce a colleague on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, age, gender, disability, family status, or sexual orientation. (F) Standard 2.6. The educator shall not use coercive means or promise of special treatment in order to influence professional decisions or colleagues. (G) Standard 2.7. The educator shall not retaliate against any individual who has filed a complaint with the SBEC or who provides information for a disciplinary investigation or proceeding under this chapter. (H) Standard 2.8. The educator shall not intentionally or knowingly subject a colleague to sexual harassment. (3) Ethical Conduct Toward Students. (A) Standard 3.1. The educator shall not reveal confidential information concerning students unless disclosure serves lawful professional purposes or is required by law. (B) Standard 3.2. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly treat a student or minor in a manner that adversely affects or endangers the learning, physical health, mental health, or safety of the student or minor. (C) Standard 3.3. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent facts regarding a student. (D) Standard 3.4. The educator shall not exclude a student from participation in a program, deny benefits to a student, or grant an advantage to a student on the basis of race, color, gender, disability, national origin, religion, family status, or sexual orientation. (E) Standard 3.5. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engage in physical mistreatment, neglect, or abuse of a student or minor. (F) Standard 3.6. The educator shall not solicit or engage in sexual conduct or a romantic relationship with a student or minor. (G) Standard 3.7. The educator shall not furnish alcohol or illegal/unauthorized drugs to any person under 21 years of age unless the educator is a parent or guardian of that child or knowingly allow any person under 21 years of age unless the educator is a parent or guardian of that child to consume alcohol or illegal/unauthorized drugs in the presence of the educator. (H) Standard 3.8. The educator shall maintain appropriate professional educator-student relationships and boundaries based on a reasonably prudent educator standard. (I) Standard 3.9. The educator shall refrain from inappropriate communication with a student or minor, including, but not limited to, electronic communication such as cell phone, text messaging, email, instant messaging, blogging, or other social network communication. Factors that may be considered in assessing whether the communication is inappropriate include, but are not limited to: (i) the nature, purpose, timing, and amount of the communication; (ii) the subject matter of the communication; (iii) whether the communication was made openly, or the educator attempted to conceal the communication; (iv) whether the communication could be reasonably interpreted as soliciting sexual contact or a romantic relationship; (v) whether the communication was sexually explicit; and (vi) whether the communication involved discussion(s) of the physical or sexual attractiveness or the sexual history, activities, preferences, or fantasies of either the educator or the student.

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Enforceable Standards. (1) Professional Ethical Conduct, Practices and Performance. (A) Standard 1.1. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engage in deceptive practices regarding official policies of the school district, educational institution, educator preparation program, the Texas Education Agency, or the State Board for Educator Certification (SBEC) and its certification process.

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Allowable Student Search –

“A student’s outer clothing, pockets, personal property, electronic equipment, vehicle, or school property used by the student (such as lockers or desks) may be searched when there is reasonable cause to believe the search will reveal articles or materials prohibited by the District. Students are responsible for ensuring that any personal property, vehicle, or school property used by the student does not contain prohibited items. Students may be disciplined for possession of prohibited items discovered during a search.” (Canyon ISD Student Handbook, pg. 8).  This was adopted by the board of Canyon ISD, outlined in the student handbook.  Link - https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxCbxQ5thfMLNWdrU0VrQ3hzZms/view

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Texas Education Code § 37.001
Allows Schools to set their guidelines for student searches and seizure by reasonable causes.

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(a) The board of trustees of an independent school district shall, with the advice of its district-level committee established under Subchapter F, Chapter 11, adopt a student code of conduct for the district.  The student code of conduct must be posted and prominently displayed at each school campus or made available for review at the office of the campus principal.  In addition to establishing standards for student conduct, the student code of conduct must:

(1) specify the circumstances, in accordance with this subchapter, under which a student may be removed from a classroom, campus, disciplinary alternative education program, or vehicle owned or operated by the district;

(2) specify conditions that authorize or require a principal or other appropriate administrator to transfer a student to a disciplinary alternative education program;

(4) specify that consideration will be given, as a factor in each decision concerning suspension, removal to a disciplinary alternative education program, expulsion, or placement in a juvenile justice alternative education program, regardless of whether the decision concerns a mandatory or discretionary action, to:

(B) intent or lack of intent at the time the student engaged in the conduct;

(C) a student's disciplinary history;  or

(D) a disability that substantially impairs the student's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the student's conduct;

(5) provide guidelines for setting the length of a term of:

(6) address the notification of a student's parent or guardian of a violation of the student code of conduct committed by the student that results in suspension, removal to a disciplinary alternative education program, or expulsion;

(7) prohibit bullying, harassment, and making hit lists and ensure that district employees enforce those prohibitions;

(8) provide, as appropriate for students at each grade level, methods, including options, for:

(A) managing students in the classroom, on school grounds, and on a vehicle owned or operated by the district;

(B) disciplining students;  and

(C) preventing and intervening in student discipline problems, including bullying, harassment, and making hit lists;  and

(9) include an explanation of the provisions regarding refusal of entry to or ejection from district property under Section 37.105 , including the appeal process established under Section 37.105(h) .

(b) In this section:

(2) "Harassment" means threatening to cause harm or bodily injury to another student, engaging in sexually intimidating conduct, causing physical damage to the property of another student, subjecting another student to physical confinement or restraint, or maliciously taking any action that substantially harms another student's physical or emotional health or safety.

(3) "Hit list" means a list of people targeted to be harmed, using:

(C) any other object to be used with intent to cause bodily harm.

(b-1) The methods adopted under Subsection (a)(8) must provide that a student who is enrolled in a special education program under Subchapter A, Chapter 29, may not be disciplined for conduct prohibited in accordance with Subsection (a)(7) until an admission, review, and dismissal committee meeting has been held to review the conduct.

(c) Once the student code of conduct is promulgated, any change or amendment must be approved by the board of trustees.

(d) Each school year, a school district shall provide parents notice of and information regarding the student code of conduct.

FindLaw Codes are provided courtesy of Thomson Reuters Westlaw, the industry-leading online legal research system. For more detailed codes research information, including annotations and citations, please visit Westlaw.

FindLaw Codes may not reflect the most recent version of the law in your jurisdiction. Please verify the status of the code you are researching with the state legislature or via Westlaw before relying on it for your legal needs.

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Search by Keyword or Citation (a) The board of trustees of an independent school district shall, with the advice of its district-level committee established under Subchapter F, Chapter 11, adopt a student code of conduct for the district.

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392 U.S. 1 - Ohio Supreme Court

Allows search for reasonable cause for a uniformed officer.

Officer stopped three mena and frisked one while discovering a pistol.

Ohio Supreme Court ruled he had reasonable cause to search the man

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392 U.S. 1

88 S.Ct. 1868

20 L.Ed.2d 889

John W. TERRY, Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF OHIO.

No. 67.

[Syllabus from pages 1-3 intentionally omitted]

Louis Stokes, Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner.

Reuben M. Payne, Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

His interest aroused, Officer McFadden took up a post of observation in the entrance to a store 300 to 400 feet away from the two men. 'I get more purpose to watch them when I seen their movements,' he testified. He saw one of the men leave the other one and walk southwest on Huron Road, past some stores. The man paused for a moment and looked in a store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and walked back toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same store window. He rejoined his companion at the corner, and the two conferred briefly. Then the second man went through the same series of motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walking on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store window again, and returning to confer with the first man at the corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece-in all, roughly a dozen trips. At one point, while the two were standing together on the corner, a third man approached them and engaged them briefly in conversation. This man then left the two others and walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton and Terry resumed their measured pacing, peering and conferring. After this had gone on for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men walked off together, heading west on Euclid Avenue, following the path taken earlier by the third man.

By this time Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious. He testified that after observing their elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window on Huron Road, he suspected the two men of 'casing a job, a stick-up,' and that he considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate further. He added that he feared 'they may have a gun.' Thus, Officer McFadden followed Chilton and Terry and saw them stop in front of Zucker's store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them earlier on the street corner. Deciding that the situation was ripe for direct action, Officer McFadden approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names. At this point his knowledge was confined to what he had observed. He was not acquainted with any of the three men by name or by sight, and he had received no information concerning them from any other source. When the men 'mumbled something' in response to his inquiries, Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other two, with Terry between McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing. In the left breast pocket of Terry's overcoat Officer McFadden felt a pistol. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. At this point, keeping Terry between himself and the others, the officer ordered all three men to enter Zucker's store. As they went in, he removed Terry's overcoat completely, removed a .38-caliber revolver from the pocket and ordered all three men to face the wall with their hands raised. Officer McFadden proceeded to pat down the outer clothing of Chilton and the third man, Katz. He discovered another revolver in the outer pocket of Chilton's overcoat, but no weapons were found on Katz. The officer testified that he only patted the men down to see whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until he felt their guns. So far as appears from the record, he never placed his hands beneath Katz' outer garments. Officer McFadden seized Chilton's gun, asked the proprietor of the store to call a police wagon, and took all three men to the station, where Chilton and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons.

On the motion to suppress the guns the prosecution took the position that they had been seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest. The trial court rejected this theory, stating that it 'would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension' to find that Officer McFadden had had probable cause to arrest the men before he patted them down for weapons. However, the court denied the defendants' motion on the ground that Officer McFadden, on the basis of his experience, 'had reasonable cause to believe * * * that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation should be made of their action.' Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer had the right to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who he had reasonable cause to believe might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory 'stop' and an arrest, and between a 'frisk' of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. The frisk, it held, was essential to the proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties, for without it 'the answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible.'

After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and Terry waived jury trial and pleaded not guilty. The court adjudged them guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District, Cuyahoga County, affirmed. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966). The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed their appeal on the ground that no 'substantial constitutional question' was involved. We granted certiorari, 387 U.S. 929, 87 S.Ct. 2050, 18 L.Ed.2d 989 (1967), to determine whether the admission of the revolvers in evidence violated petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). We affirm the conviction.

I.

We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity-issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court. Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to 'stop and frisk' -as it is sometimes euphemistically termed-suspicious persons.

On the other side the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. 6 It is contended with some force that there is not-and cannot be-a variety of police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest. The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the commands of the Constitution. Acquiescence by the courts in the compulsion inherent in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it is urged, would constitute an abdication of judicial control over, and indeed an encouragement of, substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police officers whose judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in 'the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). This, it is argued, can only serve to exacerbate police-community tensions in the crowded centers of our Nation's cities. 7

In this context we approach the issues in this case mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street. The State has characterized the issue here as 'the right of a police officer * * * to make an on-the-street stop, interrogate and pat down for weapons (known in street vernacular as 'stop and frisk').' 8 But this is only partly accurate. For the issue is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-393, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Thus its major thrust is a deterrent one, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-635, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1741, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words.' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The rule also serves another vital function-'the imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus in our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.

Having thus roughly sketched the perimeters of the constitutional debate over the limits on police investigative conduct in general and the background against which this case presents itself, we turn our attention to the quite narrow question posed by the facts before us: whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest. Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.

II.

Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. That is, we must decide whether and when Officer McFadden 'seized' Terry and whether and when he conducted a 'search.' There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as 'stop' and 'frisk' that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure' within the meaning of the Constitution. 12 We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search,' Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' 13 It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. 14

III.

Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and extent of the governmental interests involved. One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go Through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation. There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in. But the story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away. It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.

In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.

We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights which must be accepted if police officers are to be conceded the right to search for weapons in situations where probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking. Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience. Petitioner contends that such an intrusion is permissible only incident to a lawful arrest, either for a crime involving the possession of weapons or for a crime the commission of which led the officer to investigate in the first place. However, this argument must be closely examined.

Petitioner does not argue that a police officer should refrain from making any investigation of suspicious circumstances until such time as he has probable cause to make an arrest; nor does he deny that police officers in properly discharging their investigative function may find themselves confronting persons who might well be armed and dangerous. Moreover, he does not say that an officer is always unjustified in searching a suspect to discover weapons. Rather, he says it is unreasonable for the policeman to take that step until such time as the situation evolves to a point where there is probable cause to make an arrest. When that point has been reached, petitioner would concede the officer's right to conduct a search of the suspect for weapons, fruits or instrumentalities of the crime, or 'mere' evidence, incident to the arrest.

There are two weaknesses in this line of reasoning however. First, it fails to take account of traditional limitations upon the scope of searches, and thus recognizes no distinction in purpose, character, and extent between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons. The former, although justified in part by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), is also justified on other grounds, ibid., and can therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1652, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring). Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer of others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a 'full' search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.

Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 1035 (1878). 23 And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, supra.

IV.

We must now examine the conduct of Officer McFadden in this case to determine whether his search and seizure of petitioner were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. He had observed Terry, together with Chilton and another man, acting in a manner he took to be preface to a 'stick-up.' We think on the facts and circumstances Officer McFadden detailed before the trial judge a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery-which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons-and nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis. Although the trio had departed the original scene, there was nothing to indicate abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at some point. Thus, when Officer McFadden approached the three men gathered before the display window at Zucker's store he had observed enough to make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed; and nothing in their response to his hailing them, identifying himself as a police officer, and asking their names served to dispel that reasonable belief. We cannot say his decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment; the record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so.

We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1912, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 decided today. Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 1642, 1652, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1964). The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.

The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of these standards. Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions. He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He never did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his patdown which might have been a weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.

V.

Mr. Justice BLACK concurs in the judgment and the opinion except where the opinion quotes from and relies upon this Court's opinion in Katz v. United States and the concurring opinion in Warden v. Hayden.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.

While I unreservedly agree with the Court's ultimate holding in this case, I am constrained to fill in a few gaps, as I see them, in its opinion. I do this because what is said by this Court today will serve as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this important new field of law develops.

If the State of Ohio were to provide that police officers could, on articulable suspicion less than probable cause, forcibly frisk and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons, I would have little doubt that action taken pursuant to such authority could be constitutionally reasonable. Concealed weapons create an immediate and severe danger to the public, and though that danger might not warrant routine general weapons checks, it could well warrant action on less than a 'probability.' I mention this line of analysis because I think it vital to point out that it cannot be applied in this case. On the record before us Ohio has not clothed its policemen with routine authority to frisk and disarm on suspicion; in the absence of state authority, policemen have no more right to 'pat down' the outer clothing of passers-by, or of persons to whom they address casual questions, than does any other citizen. Consequently, the Ohio courts did not rest the constitutionality of this frisk upon any general authority in Officer McFadden to take reasonable steps to protect the citizenry, including himself, from dangerous weapons.

The state courts held, instead, that when an officer is lawfully confronting a possibly hostile person in the line of duty he has a right, springing only from the necessity of the situation and not from any broader right to disarm, to frisk for his own protection. This holding, with which I agree and with which I think the Court agrees, offers the only satisfactory basis I can think of for affirming this conviction. The holding has, however, two logical corollaries that I do not think the Court has fully expressed.

In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.

Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence. Just as a full search incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional justification, a limited frisk incident to a lawful stop must often be rapid and routine. There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.

The facts of this case are illustrative of a proper stop and an incident frisk. Officer McFadden had no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about to engage in burglary or robbery. His justifiable suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting Terry, restraining his liberty of movement briefly, and addressing questions to him, and Officer McFadden did so. When he did, he had no reason whatever to suppose that Terry might be armed, apart from the fact that he suspected him of planning a violent crime. McFadden asked Terry his name, to which Terry 'mumbled something.' Whereupon McFadden, without asking Terry to speak louder and without giving him any chance to explain his presence or his actions, forcibly frisked him.

I would affirm this conviction for what I believe to be the same reasons the Court relies on. I would, however, make explicit what I think is implicit in affirmance on the present facts. Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his privacy arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime. Once that forced encounter was justified, however, the officer's right to take suitable measures for his own safely followed automatically.

Upon the foregoing premises, I join the opinion of the Court.

Mr. Justice WHITE, concurring.

Also, although the Court puts the matter aside in the context of this case, I think an additional word is in order concerning the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop. There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation. In my view, it is temporary detention, warranted by the circumstances, which chiefly justifies the protective frisk for weapons. Perhaps the frisk itself, where proper, will have beneficial results whether questions are asked or not. If weapons are found, an arrest will follow. If none are found, the frisk may nevertheless serve preventive ends because of its unmistakable message that suspicion has been aroused. But if the investigative stop is sustainable at all, constitutional rights are not necessarily violated if pertinent questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly in the process.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

'The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of 'probable cause' before a magistrate was required.

'* * * It is important, we think, that this requirement (of probable cause) be strictly enforced, for the standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent. * * * And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable cause. * * * This immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without jeopardizing the privacy or security of the citizen.'

There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.

Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can 'seize' and 'search' him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.

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John W. TERRY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF OHIO.

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392 U.S. 1 88 S.Ct. 1868 20 L.Ed.2d 889 John W. TERRY, Petitioner,v.STATE OF OHIO. No. 67. [Syllabus from pages 1-3 intentionally omitted] Louis Stokes, Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner. Reuben M. Payne, Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent. Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

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Federal Administrative Law:
469 U.S. 325 –
Allows administration at public school to search students if there has been reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or in the process of being committed.  Also, if there is reasonable cause to search for school discipline or enforce school rules and policies (469 U.S. 325).
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/469/325/

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Constitutional Law: Fourth Amendment – protects individual from unreasonable search and seizure (US. Const. Amend. IV).  Law officers must provide a warrant to search and seize property.

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Texas Search and Seizure Laws: What the Police Can and Can't Do

Search and Seizure in Texas

In the course of investigations, law enforcement officers may sometimes confiscate a person's property as evidence. Texas state law and the U.S. Constitution both allow this activity to take place but only under certain circumstances.

In some cases, a police officer might overstep the law during a search. If this happens, a suspect's rights may be violated. Knowing exactly what the police can and can't do when it comes to search and seizure is essential for protecting your rights.

What Can The Police Search and Seize?

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that all U.S. citizens should be safe from all " unreasonable searches and seizures." The language used in this amendment is very broad, which has created a great deal of debate over the years. Of course, what a police officer believes is "unreasonable" might be very different from what a suspect in a criminal investigation thinks of the same issue.

In general, a police officer needs a warrant to search the property of a suspect. A warrant is a document that must be signed by a judge to allow law enforcement officers to invade the privacy of a person by conducting a search of their body and their property.

A warrant is a vital piece of an investigation. If a search is conducted without one, any evidence recovered may not be admissible in court.

For example, Officer Lopez believes that drug deals are occurring in a house that he has been observing for two weeks. He goes to a judge to show the evidence he has gathered and the judge issues a warrant. The SWAT team enters the house and arrests everyone inside. Any drugs or weapons that are found are covered by the warrant so they can be used as evidence in a prosecution.

However, if Officer Lopez does not get a warrant, anything he finds in the house may not be admissible, even if he finds ten pounds of cocaine in the basement.

In general, a warrant is written out against a person or a specific address. The warrant covers that person specifically and anything that is found in the property at that address. There are some exceptions to the necessity of warrants, however.

Exceptions to Warrant Searches

In general, a warrant is required to search a person or property. However, lawmakers realize that police officers do not always have time to stop and file a warrant in the middle of their duties. As a result, the law includes some provisions which allow police officers to conduct searches without first obtaining a warrant.

For example, a warrant may not be required for a search if:

A police officer is pursuing a suspect who then enters private property

A police officer actually witnesses a suspect commit a crime and then conceal evidence

A police officer is conducting an arrest and needs to check a suspect for weapons or contraband

For example, if Officer Martin witnesses a person fire a pistol at another civilian and then flee into a house, the officer does not have to stop and call a judge to get a warrant. If a person is in the act of committing a serious crime, the officer can pursue them into private property to protect the safety of others.

Body Searches vs. Vehicle and Home Searches

There is a very large distinction between searches of a person and a search of their vehicle or their home. In general, a search of a home has a greater legal standard of probable cause when compared to body searches or vehicle searches.

For example, if an officer places a person under arrest and has probable cause to believe that person has committed a crime or is concealing weapons or evidence, the officer can conduct a legal search without a warrant. The officer may pat the person down and ask them to empty their pockets. The officer may also conduct a vehicle search of a person that has been placed under arrest.

For example, if Officer Smith pulls over a car for erratic driving and then notices a strong smell of marijuana coming from the car, he may have probable cause to temporarily detain or arrest the driver. He may then conduct a legal search of their car and their clothing to check for drugs.

If an officer can see illegal contraband in plain sight through the window of a house, he may have the right to conduct a search without a warrant. In most cases, though, a warrant is required for searches of private residence.

Know Your Rights

The Fourth Amendment is one of the most powerful constitutional protections that citizens have. If you believe that your rights have been violated, you may consult with an attorney to discuss legal options.

Have your rights as a citizen been violated? Obtaining legal counsel is essential and attorney Matthew D. Sharp can help. Contact his office today at 713-868-6100.

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Texas Search and Seizure Laws: What the Police Can and Can't Do | Matt Sharp

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Texas Search and Seizure Laws: What the Police Can and Can't Do Search and Seizure in Texas In the course of investigations, law enforcement officers may sometimes confiscate a person's property as evidence. Texas state law and the U.S. Constitution both allow this activity to take place but only under certain circumstances.

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News Article
The High Cost of Random Searches

1. One student in the Los Angeles school systems believes that there are no random searches.

2. She said she isn't searched in her AP classes but in regular classes with high percentage of minorty students are.

3. While these searches are legal, it can be seen to contribute to alienating students because of their race (Flanner,y 2017).

Flannery, M., (December 14, 2017). The High Cost of Random Student Searches. neaToday.
Link-http://neatoday.org/2017/12/14/the-high-cost-of-random-student-searches/
Periodical
A student left a unattended bag on a bus and it was searched.
The case was taken to the Ohio Supreme Court and they sided that is was a legal search.
The bag turned up with bullets and the students was disclipined.
Walsh, M. (May 13, 2017). Ohio Supreme Court Upholds School Search of Unattended Student Backpack. Edweek

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Ohio's highest court has upheld a warrantless school search of a high school student's unattended book bag, ruling that such searches are justified by schools' obligation to keep students safe in the era of the Columbine and Sandy Hook campus attacks.

The Ohio Supreme Court held unanimously that the search by a school security officer of a backpack left on a school bus, which turned up bullets, was not an unreasonable search under the First Amendment.

The book bag belonging to Joshua Polk, a student at Whetstone High school in Columbus, Ohio, was first given a cursory search by security officer Robert Lindsey to determine who owned it and ensure that it was not dangerous. Lindsey said in court proceedings that he conducted dozens of such searches daily pursuant to school policy.

However, recalling a rumor that the student was involved with a gang, Lindsey took the bag to the principal's office, where he conducted a more thorough search that revealed the bullets. A police officer joined Lindsey in finding and searching Polk, and that search turned up a handgun in another bag that the student had with him.

The student was charged with crimes related to gun possession at a school. His lawyers challenged the searches of both his unattended bag and the bag he had with him under the Fourth Amendment. The initial search of the unattended bag was permissible, they said, but the more thorough search based on the rumor of Polk's gang affiliation was unjustified.

They also argued that regardless of the legality of the search of the bag in Polk's possession that had the handgun, the discovery of the gun was the fruit of the unconstitutional second search of the unattended bag.

Two lower courts agreed with Polk. But in its May 11 decision in , the state supreme court analyzed the second search of the unattended bag in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's three main student search decisions-(1985), Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995), and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls (2002).

The Ohio court noted that schools have faced deadly shootings such as at Columbine High School in Colorado and Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut, and that the entire nation has been more suspicious of unattended luggage and bags in the age of terrorism.

Whetstone High's search protocol for unattended backpacks and bags "supports the compelling governmental interest in public-school safety by helping to ensure that the contents of the bags are not dangerous and in turn that Whetstone's students remain safe from physical harm."

The state high court rejected the lower court's conclusions that the high school's policy was satisfied by the initial, cursory search of Polk's unattended book bag.

"A cursory inspection might easily fail to detect the presence of small but dangerous items," the high court said.

"Lindsey testified that he only peered into Polk's unattended bag when it first came into his possession and that he could see papers, notebooks, and a binder," the opinion says. "That cursory review provided him with the name of the bag's owner, but it did not enable him to determine that the contents were not dangerous. That determination could not be made-and execution of Whetstone's reasonable protocol for searching unattended book bags could not be completed-until the bag was emptied."

The court sent Polk's case back to a trial court for further proceedings.

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Ohio Supreme Court Upholds School Search of Unattended Student Backpack

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Ohio's highest court has upheld a warrantless school search of a high school student's unattended book bag, ruling that such searches are justified by schools' obligation to keep students safe in the era of the Columbine and Sandy Hook campus attacks.

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1. A student was searched immediately when entered his school because of a old photo showed up with him holding a gun and titled it school.

2. No gun was found on the student, and the search took only 5 minutes.

3. School punished the student and then his parents had to defend his innocence from the media post.

This still shows how school have a reasonable right to search a student if they feel it needs to be.
Morse, B. (September 3, 2019). Student Searched by School After Posting a Four-Year-Old Picture of Himself With a Gun Under Adult Supervision. The daily wire
Link https://www.redstate.com/brandon_morse/2019/09/03/student-searched-school-posting-four-year-old-picture-gun-adult-supervision/
Periodical
Supreme Court has ruled that the students do not give up their free speech rights when at school, but random searches do not violated their rights. However, does random searches constitute reasonable searches?  That is the questions, and the Supreme Court needs to jump in.
Gardner, W., (November 10, 2017). Random Searches Cross a Line. Education Week.

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Education Week - Walt Gardner's Reality Check

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The safety of students cannot be emphasized enough in the wake of violence in this country. That's why I support the use of metal detectors when students arrive on campus. But submitting students thereafter to random searches goes too far (" Should L.A. Students Have to Submit to Random Searches?" LAWeekly, Oct. 27).

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that students do not forfeit their free speech rights when they are on school grounds. But random searches do not constitute a violation of free speech, which is why they need to be justified. Otherwise, it's a slippery slope to even greater personal invasions. For example, do students have a reasonable expectation to privacy when they use the restrooms in school?

Because traditional public schools are required by law to enroll all who show up at their door, they have no control over the composition of the student body. The high school in the Los Angeles Unified School District where I taught for 28 years was once known for the safety of its campus, as well as for its academic excellence. But as the city changed, so did the student body. I had gang members in my classes. Yet I doubt that random searches would have done anything to improve the safety of the campus. I say that even though one of my students was expelled for packing a pistol. What led to his expulsion was trying to impress a girl on the school bus at the end of the day by flashing the weapon. But this occured before metal detectors were installed.

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The safety of students cannot be emphasized enough in the wake of violence in this country. That's why I support the use of metal detectors when students arrive on campus. But submitting students thereafter to random searches goes too far (" Should L.A. Students Have to Submit to Random Searches?"

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On the National Education Association website, the article "Vaping in Schools: 3 Million Students and Counting" it stated that vaping has risen over 75% over the past year (Flannery, 2018). The number of student that reported using vapes came in at a staggering 3 million (Flannery, 2018).  Vaping is becoming a epidemic in our youth and schools.  This important topic needs to be addressed with the highest importance.

Flannery, M. (November 14, 2018). Vaping in Schools: 3 Million Students and Counting. neaToday.

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That scent of cool mint or mango that sometimes wafts from the student bathroom or the back of the school bus? It's the olfactory evidence of growing, widespread use of e-cigarettes by middle and high school students.

"The bathrooms shouldn't smell like blueberry flavoring," notes Oklahoma teacher Christine Pankrantz in a recent NEA Today Facebook post. "Our students use them in their cars...in the bathrooms...we've had scientists and doctors come talk about the dangers of vaping, but it seems that we're fighting a losing battle. They're so easy to get."

Federal officials call it an " epidemic of youth use," and estimate that the number of high school students who use e-cigarettes, sometimes called vapes for their telltale plumes of scented vapor, has risen about 75 percent in the past year to about 3 million students, overtaking tobacco products in popularity. One of the most popular is JUUL (pronounced jewel). Equipped with kid-friendly flavors like "fruit medley," and packaged to look like a sleek computer flash drive that can be tucked into a fist or pocket and charged in a USB port, each JUUL cartridge contains roughly the same amount of nicotine as 20 cigarettes.

Nicotine is highly addictive, and the "developing adolescent brain is particularly vulnerable to addiction," notes the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which recently announced it would ban the sale of flavored e-cigarettes in convenience stores and gas stations.

Our students use them in their cars...in the bathrooms...we've had scientists and doctors come talk about the dangers of vaping, but it seems that we're fighting a losing battle. They're so easy to get." - Christine Pankrantz, teacher

But while federal officials consider their options, educators remain on the front lines of efforts to curb students' e-cigarette use. "It's happening in the hallways, it's happening in the bathrooms, we even had a kid a couple of years ago vaping in the classroom!" says Cam Traut, a school nurse at Libertyville High School in the Chicago suburbs and a National Association of School Nurses board member.

For the most part, students don't seem to realize it's a dangerous habit. "I get the sense that students think it's safe," says Traut. "The marketing or advertising was, 'oh, this is a much healthier version of traditional, tobacco cigarettes,' so the kids have focused on that 'healthier' component. And it's taken off like wildfire.

"As a school, we're trying to provide some education to the kids so that they understand the health risks they're taking, and we're also educating our staff on what to look for... It's an uphill battle," says Traut.

Vaping in Schools

Like regular tobacco-filled cigarettes, e-cigarettes work to deliver a jolt of nicotine to the brain. But unlike regular cigarettes, they're battery powered devices. Typically, the battery is activated by the user's puffing, which, in turn, heats and vaporizes liquid chemicals in the cartridge. The user inhales the resulting vapor, which often is flavored.

Those flavors are attractive to kids, warns the American Academy of Pediatrics. And, despite industry claims that the e-cigarettes are intended to help adult smokers move to a tar-free product, health advocates say the devices are creating a new generation of nicotine addicts. In fact, 15- to-17-year-olds are more than 16 times more likely to be JUUL users than 25- to 34-year-olds, according to the Truth Initiative, a non-profit public health organization that was established 20 years ago as part of a settlement between tobacco companies and states.

"The teens are after innovation and they're attracted by sleek design and ease of use," according to Dr. Sarper Taskiran, a child and adolescent psychiatrist at the Child Mind Institute, which recently produced a "need to know" guide for parents. "They look like an Apple product."

Taskiran notes that prevention is a lot easier than treatment. Parents and educators need to educate themselves first, and then their children and students. He notes "peer educators can play an important role."

It's easy to get addicted to nicotine, Michigan school bus driver Marti Alvarez warns students. She knows firsthand that it's much more difficult to stop. "It is so much easier to just not start a habit," she tells them.

And adolescents are particularly vulnerable to addiction, scientists have found. In a conversation with NEA Today in 2015, the author of The Teenage Brain, Dr. Frances Jensen, explained how young people have a higher degree of "synaptic plasticity" than adults, which means they are building bigger and faster connections in their brain. "They can imprint-on good things and bad things. For instance, addiction, which is a form of learning, is stronger, faster, and longer in younger people."

Jensen advises educators to talk to young people about their brains, how they work, and how the science reveals their particular risk of addiction.

"Evidence-based information" also is the preferred strategy in Libertyville, says Traut. While her district has policies that can lead to school suspension over e-cigs-as well as tobacco products-their school-based administrators don't aim to suspend students over vaping, she says. Students are more likely to be counseled and educated about the risks.

The best way to approach students is with "mutual respect," says Alvarez. Often, "the harder authority pushes and yells [about some forbidden thing], the more the kid is attracted to it and the more they rebel."

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Vaping in Schools: 3 Million Students and Counting - NEA Today

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That scent of cool mint or mango that sometimes wafts from the student bathroom or the back of the school bus? It's the olfactory evidence of growing, widespread use of e-cigarettes by middle and high school students. "The bathrooms shouldn't smell like blueberry flavoring," notes Oklahoma teacher Christine Pankrantz in a recent NEA Today Facebook post.

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The importance of this legal guide topic is vital since it can impact student safety. With the law in Texas now being 21 to buy tobacco, it is illegal now for 18 year old's in school.  Students are also trying to get out of class to vape, disrupting the classroom environment.
Best Practices
1.  Ask the student if he/she has a vape or did it at school
2.  Ask the student to show the vape and/or empty bag
3.  Have resource officer present if possible
4.  Inform student what will happen next and what the law says
One emerging topic is that vaping was considered safe. Now, students across the nation are being hospitalized from vaping.  With major health implications, students that are becoming sick are missing school more and more.  The future of vaping in school might still be prelevant, but it is still dangerous for our students.
Blake Hurst, Assistant Principal, Canyon High School.

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College and Career Counselor
High School Setting
Audience and Reason of Topic

1. Parents, Teachers, and Counselors

2. I chose this topic because the amount of searches of students are increasing every day. Vaping has become a problem in our schools and vapes are being seized in a weekly basis.