# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Civilians participating in an air-raid drill during 1942

# data[].attributes.body
Allied forces conducted many air raids on Japan during World War II, causing extensive destruction to the country's cities and killing between 241,000 and 900,000 people. During the first years of the Pacific War these attacks were limited to the Doolittle Raid in April 1942 and small-scale raids on military positions in the Kuril Islands from mid-1943. Strategic bombing raids began in June 1944 and continued until the end of the war in August 1945. Allied naval and land-based tactical air units also attacked Japan during 1945. One of the air raids on Japan was the Bombing of Tokyo, (March 9–10, 1945), codenamed “Operation Meetinghouse”. It was a firebombing raid by the United States on the capital of Japan during the final stages of World War II, often cited as one of the most destructive acts of war in history, more destructive than the bombing of Dresden, Hiroshima, or Nagasaki. Although the precise death toll is unknown, conservative estimates suggest that the firestorm caused by incendiary bombs killed at least 80,000 people, and likely more than 100,000, in a single night; some one million people were left homeless. The Japanese later called this the “Night of the Black Snow.” The cause of all of these air raids on Japan was to weaken the Japanese and destroy morale. The effect the air raids had was a loss of civilian life and mass destruction of cities targeted during the raids.

As well as regular bombings on Japan, the United States also detonated two atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945, respectively. The two bombings killed between 129,000 and 226,000 people, most of whom were civilians, and remain the only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. The cause of the atomic bombs was, it led to a quick end to World War II and saved the lives of American soldiers, it also matched the brutality that Japan used during the war. The long-term effects of the atomic bombs were it led to long term health effects for the people exposed to the radiation.

The bombings and the atomic bombings were both significant because they are what led to the defeat of the Japanese and the end of World War II.

Reasons In Favor of the Atomic Bombing of Japan - HISTORY CRUNCH - History Articles, Biographies, Infographics, Resources and More
Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Wikipedia
Short and Long Term Effects of Bombing Japan Essay Example | GraduateWay
Air raids on Japan - Wikipedia
Bombing of Tokyo | World War II | Britannica

# data[].attributes.body
The Empire of Japan, also known as the Japanese Empire or Imperial Japan, was a historical nation-state and great power that existed from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the enactment of the post-World War II 1947 constitution and subsequent formation of modern Japan. Imperial Japan was isolated from the world until the Americans forced them to open up for trade on July 8, 1853, when American Commodore Matthew Perry led his four ships into the harbor at Tokyo Bay, seeking to re-establish for the first time in over 200 years regular trade and discourse between Japan and the western world. The effect of the Americans forcing the Japanese to open up was the rise of Imperial Japan provided an impetus to the growth of nationalism in many Asian countries. The capital of Imperial of Japan: Kyoto (1868–1869) · Tokyo City (1869–1943). The rise of the Imperial Japan is significant because it is what contributed to brutal wars in the pacific during World War II and ultimately causing the Americans to get involved in the war.

Rise of Modern Japan and its Imperialist Power; between
Empire of Japan - Wikipedia 1890’s to FWW. (historydiscussion.net)
The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853

# data[].attributes.body
The Empire of Japan occupied the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) during World War II from March 1942 until after the end of the war in September 1945. It was one of the most crucial and important periods in modern Indonesian history. The cause of Japanese expansion into the Dutch East Indies was on May 1940, Germany occupied the Netherlands, and martial law was declared in the Dutch East Indies. Following the failure of negotiations between the Dutch authorities and the Japanese, Japanese assets in the archipelago were frozen. The Dutch declared war on Japan following the 7 December 1941 Attack on Pearl Harbor. The effects of the occupation were four million people died in the Dutch East Indies as a result of famine and forced labour during the Japanese occupation, including 30,000 European civilian internee deaths. The occupation of the Dutch East Indies was also significant because it led to the Kokoda Trail Campaign, the bombing of Darwin, and the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Dutch East Indies - Wikipedia
Japanese Occupation Of The Dutch East Indies - Encyclopedia Information (webot.org)

# data[].attributes.body
The Nanjing Massacre or the Rape of Nanjing was the mass murder of Chinese civilians in Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China, immediately after the Battle of Nanjing in the Second Sino-Japanese War, by the Imperial Japanese Army. The cause of the Nanjing Massacre was a result of Japanese expansion into China. Deaths: 200,000 (consensus), estimates range from 40,000 to over 300,000. The Nanjing Massacre was significant because it showed just how brutal the Japanese really were.

Nanjing Massacre - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Nanjing Massacre

Part of the Second Sino-Japanese War

Location

Nanjing, China

Date

From December 13, 1937, for six weeks[note 1]

Mass murder, wartime rape, looting, arson

Deaths

200,000 (consensus), estimates range from 40,000 to over 300,000

Victims

20,000 to 80,000 women raped, 30,000 to 40,000 POWs executed

Perpetrators

Imperial Japanese Army

The Nanjing Massacre or the Rape of Nanjing (formerly romanized as Nanking) was the mass murder of Chinese civilians in Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China, immediately after the Battle of Nanking in the Second Sino-Japanese War, by the Imperial Japanese Army. Beginning on December 13, 1937, the massacre lasted six weeks. The perpetrators also committed other war crimes such as mass rape, looting, and arson. The massacre is considered to be one of the worst wartime atrocities.

The Japanese army had pushed quickly through China after capturing Shanghai in November 1937. By early December, it was on the outskirts of Nanjing. As the Japanese approached, the Chinese army withdrew the bulk of its forces since Nanjing was not a defensible position. The civilian government of Nanjing fled, leaving the city under the de facto control of German citizen John Rabe, who had founded the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. On December 5, Prince Yasuhiko Asaka was installed as Japanese commander in the campaign. Whether Asaka ordered the Rape, or simply stood by as it happened, is disputed, but he took no action to stop the carnage.

The massacre began on December 13, the day the Japanese troops reached the city. They faced minimal resistance and ran entirely unchecked. Chinese soldiers were summarily executed in violation of the laws of war, and looting and rape was widespread. Due to multiple factors, death toll estimates vary from 40,000 to over 300,000, with rape cases ranging from 20,000 to over 80,000 cases. However, most credible scholars in Japan, which include a large number of authoritative academics, support the validity of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and its findings, which estimate at least 200,000 murders and at least 20,000 cases of rape. The massacre finally wound down in early 1938. John Rabe's Safety Zone was mostly a success, and is credited with saving at least 200,000 lives. After the war, multiple Japanese military officers and Kōki Hirota, former Prime Minister of Japan and foreign minister during the atrocities, were found guilty of war crimes and executed. Some other Japanese military leaders in charge at the time of the Nanjing Massacre were not tried only because by the time of the tribunals they had either already been killed or committed seppuku (ritual suicide). Prince Asaka, as part of the Imperial Family, was granted immunity and never tried.

The massacre has remained a wedge issue between modern China and Japan. Historical revisionists and nationalists in Japan have been accused of minimizing or denying the massacre.

Military situation

In August 1937, the Japanese army invaded Shanghai, where they met strong resistance and suffered heavy casualties. The battle was bloody as both sides faced attrition in urban hand-to-hand combat. By mid-November, the Japanese had captured Shanghai with the help of naval and aerial bombardment. The General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo initially decided not to expand the war due to the high casualties incurred and the low morale of the troops. Nevertheless, on December 1, headquarters ordered the Central China Area Army and the 10th Army to capture Nanjing, then-capital of the Republic of China.

Relocation of the capital

Strategy for the defense of Nanjing

In a press release to foreign reporters, Tang Shengzhi announced the city would not surrender and would fight to the death. Tang gathered about 100,000 soldiers, largely untrained, including Chinese troops who had participated in the Battle of Shanghai. The Chinese government left for relocation on December 1, and the president left on December 7, leaving the fate of Nanjing to an International Committee led by John Rabe, a German national.

In an attempt to secure permission for this cease-fire from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Rabe, who was living in Nanjing and had been acting as the Chairman of the Nanking International Safety Zone Committee, boarded the on December 9. From this gunboat, Rabe sent two telegrams. The first was to Chiang through an American ambassador in Hankow, asking that Chinese forces "undertake no military operations" within Nanjing. The second telegram was sent through Shanghai to Japanese military leaders, advocating for a three-day ceasefire so that the Chinese could withdraw from the city.

The following day, on December 10, Rabe got his answer from the Generalissimo. The American ambassador in Hankow replied that although he supported Rabe's proposal for a ceasefire, Chiang did not. Rabe says that the ambassador also "sent us a separate confidential telegram telling us that he has been officially informed by the Foreign Ministry in Hankow that our understanding that General Tang agreed to a three-day armistice and the withdrawal of his troops from Nanjing is mistaken, and moreover that Chiang Kai-shek has announced that he is not in a position to accept such an offer." This rejection of the committee's ceasefire plan, in Rabe's mind, sealed the fate of the city. Nanjing had been constantly bombed for days and the Chinese troops that remained there were disheartened and had taken to drinking before the city's inevitable fall.

On December 11, Rabe found that Chinese soldiers were still residing in areas of the Safety Zone, meaning that it became an intended target for Japanese attacks despite the majority being innocent civilians. Rabe commented on how efforts to remove these Chinese troops failed and Japanese soldiers began to lob grenades into the refugee zone.

Approach of the Imperial Japanese Army

Japanese war crimes on the march to Nanjing

An article on the "Contest to kill 100 people using a sword" published in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun. The headline reads, "'Incredible Record' (in the Contest to Cut Down 100 People) - Mukai 106-105 Noda - Both 2nd Lieutenants Go into Extra Innings".[14]

Although the massacre is generally described as having occurred over a six-week period after the fall of Nanjing, the crimes committed by the Japanese army were not limited to that period. Many atrocities were reported to have been committed as the Japanese army advanced from Shanghai to Nanjing, including but not limited to rape, arson and murder.

The 170 miles between Shanghai and Nanjing were described as "a nightmarish zone of death and destruction." Japanese planes frequently strafed unarmed farmers and refugees "for fun." Civilians were subjected to extreme violence and brutality in a foreshadowing of the upcoming Massacre. For example, the Nanqiantou hamlet was set on fire, with many of its inhabitants locked within the burning houses. Two women, one of them pregnant, were raped repeatedly. Afterwards, the soldiers "cut open the belly of the pregnant woman and gouged out the fetus." A crying two-year-old boy was wrestled from his mother's arms and thrown into the flames, while the mother and remaining villagers were bayoneted and thrown into a creek. Many Chinese civilians committed suicide, such as two girls who deliberately drowned themselves near Pinghu, an event witnessed by Japanese First Lieutenant Nishizawa Benkichi.

According to one Japanese journalist embedded with Imperial forces at the time:

The reason that the [10th Army] is advancing to Nanjing quite rapidly is due to the tacit consent among the officers and men that they could loot and rape as they wish.

In his novel Ikiteiru Heitai ('Living Soldiers'), Tatsuzō Ishikawa vividly describes how the 16th Division of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force committed atrocities on the march between Shanghai and Nanjing. The novel itself was based on interviews that Ishikawa conducted with troops in Nanjing in January 1938.

Perhaps the most notorious atrocity was a killing contest between two Japanese officers as reported in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun and the English-language Japan Advertiser. The contest-a race between the two officers to see who could kill 100 people first using only a sword-was covered much like a sporting event with regular updates on the score over a series of days. In Japan, the veracity of the newspaper article about the contest was the subject of ferocious debate for several decades starting in 1967.

In 2005, a Tokyo district judge dismissed a suit by the families of the lieutenants, stating that "the lieutenants admitted the fact that they raced to kill 100 people" and that the story cannot be proven to be clearly false. The judge also ruled against the civil claim of the plaintiffs because the original article was more than 60 years old. The historicity of the event remains disputed in Japan.

Retreating Chinese Troops' Scorched-Earth Policy

The Nanjing garrison force set fire to buildings and houses in the areas close to Xiakuan to the north as well as in the environs of the eastern and southern city gates. Targets within and outside of the city walls-such as military barracks, private homes, the Chinese Ministry of Communication, forests and even entire villages-were completely burnt down, at an estimated value of US$20-30 million (1937).

Establishment of the Nanking Safety Zone

German businessman John Rabe was elected as its leader, in part because of his status as a member of the Nazi Party and the existence of the German-Japanese bilateral Anti-Comintern Pact. The Japanese government had previously agreed not to attack parts of the city that did not contain Chinese military forces, and the members of the Committee managed to persuade the Chinese government to move their troops out of the area. The Nanking Safety Zone was demarcated through the use of Red Cross Flags.

On December 1, 1937, Nanjing Mayor Ma Chaochun ordered all Chinese citizens remaining in Nanjing to move into the "Safety Zone." Many fled the city on December 7, and the International Committee took over as the government of Nanjing.

Prince Asaka appointed as commander

Prince Asaka issued an order to "kill all captives," thus providing official sanction for the crimes which took place during and after the battle. Some authors record that Prince Asaka signed the order for Japanese soldiers in Nanjing to "kill all captives". Others assert that lieutenant colonel Isamu Chō, Asaka's aide-de-camp, sent this order under the Prince's sign-manual without the Prince's knowledge or assent. Nevertheless, even if Chō took the initiative, Asaka was nominally the officer in charge and gave no orders to stop the carnage. While the extent of Prince Asaka's responsibility for the massacre remains a matter of debate, the ultimate sanction for the massacre and the crimes committed during the invasion of China were issued in Emperor Hirohito's ratification of the Japanese army's proposition to remove the constraints of international law on the treatment of Chinese prisoners on August 5, 1937.

Battle of Nanking

Siege of the city

The Japanese military continued to move forward, breaching the last lines of Chinese resistance, and arriving outside the city gates of Nanjing on December 9.

Demand for surrender

In the meantime, members of the Committee contacted Tang and proposed a plan for three-day cease-fire, during which the Chinese troops could withdraw without fighting while the Japanese troops would stay in their present position.

John Rabe boarded the U.S. gunboat Panay on December 9 and sent two telegrams, one to Chiang Kai-shek by way of the American ambassador in Hankow ( Hankou), and one to the Japanese military authority in Shanghai.

Assault and capture of Nanjing

On December 12, under heavy artillery fire and aerial bombardment, General Tang Sheng-chi ordered his men to retreat. What followed was nothing short of chaos. Some Chinese soldiers stripped civilians of their clothing in a desperate attempt to blend in, and many others were shot by the Chinese supervisory unit as they tried to flee.

On 13 December, the 6th and the 116th Divisions of the Japanese Army were the first to enter the city, facing little military resistance. Simultaneously, the 9th Division entered nearby Guanghua Gate, and the 16th Division entered the Zhongshan and Taiping gates. That same afternoon, two small Japanese Navy fleets arrived on both sides of the Yangtze River.

Pursuit and mopping-up operations

Civilian evacuation

From December 13, 1937, the Japanese Army engaged in random murder, torture, wartime rape, looting, arson, and other war crimes. Such crime continued from three to six weeks depending on the types of crime. The first three weeks were more intense. A group of foreign expatriates headed by Rabe had formed a 15-man International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone on November 22 and mapped out the Nanking Safety Zone in order to safeguard civilians in the city.

In a diary entry from Minnie Vautrin on December 15, 1937, she wrote about her experiences in the Safety Zone:

Massacre contest

In 1937, the Osaka Mainichi Shimbun and its sister newspaper, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, covered a contest between two Japanese officers, Toshiaki Mukai and Tsuyoshi Noda of the Japanese 16th Division. The two men were described as vying to be the first to kill 100 people with a sword before the capture of Nanjing. From Jurong to Tangshan (two cities in Jiangshu Province, China), Mukai had killed 89 people while Noda had killed 78. The contest continued because neither had killed 100 people. By the time they had arrived at Zijin Mountain, Noda had killed 105 people while Mukai had killed 106 people. Both officers supposedly surpassed their goal during the heat of battle, making it impossible to determine which officer had actually won the contest. Therefore, according to journalists Asami Kazuo and Suzuki Jiro, writing in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun of December 13, they decided to begin another contest to kill 150 people.

Photo taken in Xuzhou, showing the body of a woman who was profaned in a way similar to the teenager described in case 5 of John Magee's film

Case 5 of John Magee's film: on December 13, 1937, about 30 Japanese soldiers murdered all but two of 11 Chinese in the house at No. 5 Xinlukou. A woman and her two teenaged daughters were raped, and Japanese soldiers rammed a bottle and a cane into her vagina. An eight-year-old girl was stabbed, but she and her younger sister survived. They were found alive two weeks after the killings by the elderly woman shown in the photo. Bodies of the victims can also be seen in the photo.[45][46]

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East estimated that in the first month of the occupation, Japanese soldiers committed approximately 20,000 cases of rape in the city. Some estimates claim 80,000 cases of rape. According to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, rapes of all ages, including children and elderly women, were commonplace, and there were several instances of sadistic and violent behavior related to these rapes. Following the rapes, many women were killed and their bodies were mutilated. A large number of rapes were done systematically by the Japanese soldiers as they went from door to door, searching for girls, with many women being captured and gang-raped. The women were often killed immediately after being raped, often through explicit mutilation, such as by penetrating vaginas with bayonets, long sticks of bamboo, or other objects.

I know not where to end. Never I have heard or read such brutality. Rape! Rape! Rape! We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night and many by day. In case of resistance or anything that seems like disapproval, there is a bayonet stab or a bullet.... People are hysterical... Women are being carried off every morning, afternoon and evening. The whole Japanese army seems to be free to go and come as it pleases, and to do whatever it pleases.

The slaughter of civilians is appalling. I could go on for pages telling of cases of rape and brutality almost beyond belief. Two bayoneted corpses are the only survivors of seven street cleaners who were sitting in their headquarters when Japanese soldiers came in without warning or reason and killed five of their number and wounded the two that found their way to the hospital. Let me recount some instances occurring in the last two days. Last night the house of one of the Chinese staff members of the university was broken into and two of the women, his relatives, were raped. Two girls, about 16, were raped to death in one of the refugee camps. In the University Middle School where there are 8,000 people the Japs came in ten times last night, over the wall, stole food, clothing, and raped until they were satisfied. They bayoneted one little boy of eight who [had] five bayonet wounds including one that penetrated his stomach, a portion of omentum was outside the abdomen. I think he will live.

Two Japanese soldiers have climbed over the garden wall and are about to break into our house. When I appear they give the excuse that they saw two Chinese soldiers climb over the wall. When I show them my party badge, they return the same way. In one of the houses in the narrow street behind my garden wall, a woman was raped, and then wounded in the neck with a bayonet. I managed to get an ambulance so we can take her to Kulou Hospital ... Last night up to 1,000 women and girls are said to have been raped, about 100 girls at Ginling College...alone. You hear nothing but rape. If husbands or brothers intervene, they're shot. What you hear and see on all sides is the brutality and bestiality of the Japanese soldiers.

In a documentary film about the Nanjing Massacre, In the Name of the Emperor, a former Japanese soldier named Shiro Azuma spoke candidly about the process of rape and murder in Nanjing.

At first we used some kinky words like Pikankan. Pi means "hip," kankan means "look." Pikankan means, "Let's see a woman open up her legs." Chinese women didn't wear under-pants. Instead, they wore trousers tied with a string. There was no belt. As we pulled the string, the buttocks were exposed. We "pikankan." We looked. After a while we would say something like, "It's my day to take a bath," and we took turns raping them. It would be all right if we only raped them. I shouldn't say all right. But we always stabbed and killed them. Because dead bodies don't talk.

Iris Chang, author of the book Rape of Nanjing, wrote one of the most comprehensive accounts of Japanese war atrocities in China. In her book, she estimated that the number of Chinese women raped by Japanese soldiers ranged from 20,000 to 80,000. Chang also states that not all rape victims were women. Some Chinese men were sodomized and forced to perform "repulsive sex acts". There are also accounts of Japanese troops coercing families into committing incestuous acts; sons were forced to rape their mothers, fathers their daughters, and brothers their sisters. Other family members would be forced to look on. Instead of punishing the Japanese troops who were responsible for wholesale rape, "'The Japanese expeditionary Force in Central China issued an order to set up comfort houses during this period of time,' Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a prominent history professor at Chuo University, observes, 'because Japan was afraid of criticism from China, the United States of America and Europe following the case of massive rapes between battles in Shanghai and Nanjing.'"

Massacre of civilians

A boy killed by a Japanese soldier with the butt of a rifle, reportedly because he did not take off his hat

For about three weeks since December 13, 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army entered the Nanking Safety Zone to search for former Chinese soldiers hidden among refugees. Many innocent men were misidentified and killed.

The death toll of civilians is difficult to precisely calculate due to the many bodies deliberately burnt, buried in mass graves, or dumped into the Yangtze River. Robert O. Wilson, a physician, testified that cases of gun wounds "continued to come in [to the hospital of University of Nanjing] for a matter of some six or seven weeks following the fall of the city on December 13, 1937. The capacity of the hospital was normally one hundred and eighty beds, and this was kept full to overflowing during this entire period. B. Campbell described the Nanjing Massacre as a genocide, given the fact that residents were still slaughtered en masse during the aftermath, despite the successful and certain outcome in battle. However, Jean-Louis Margolin does not believe that the Nanjing atrocities should be considered a genocide because only prisoners of war were executed in a systematic manner and the targeting of civilians was sporadic and done without orders by individual actors. On 13 December 1937, John Rabe wrote in his diary:

American vice consul James Espy arrived in Nanjing on January 6, 1938, to reopen the American embassy. He gave a summarized description of what happened in the city:

The picture that they painted of Nanking was one of a reign of terror that befell the city upon its occupation by the Japanese military forces. Their stories and those of the German residents tell of the city having fallen into the hands of the Japanese as captured prey, not merely taken in the course of organized warfare but seized by an invading army whose members seemed to have set upon the prize to commit unlimited depredations and violence. Fuller data and our own observations have not brought out facts to discredit their information. The civilian Chinese population remaining in the city crowded the streets of the so-called "safety zone" as refugees, many of whom are destitute. Physical evidences are almost everywhere to the killing of men, women and children, of the breaking into and looting of property and of the burning and destruction of houses and buildings.

It remains, however, the Japanese soldiers swarmed over the city in thousands and committed untold depredations and atrocities. It would seem according to stories told us by foreign witnesses that the soldiers were let loose like a barbarian horde to desecrate the city. Men, women and children were killed in uncounted numbers throughout the city. Stories are heard of civilians being shot or bayoneted for no apparent reason.

On 10 February 1938, Legation Secretary of the German Embassy, Rosen, wrote to his Foreign Ministry about a film made in December by Reverend John Magee to recommend its purchase.

During the Japanese reign of terror in Nanjing-which, by the way, continues to this day to a considerable degree-the Reverend John Magee, a member of the American Episcopal Church Mission who has been here for almost a quarter of a century, took motion pictures that eloquently bear witness to the atrocities committed by the Japanese.... One will have to wait and see whether the highest officers in the Japanese army succeed, as they have indicated, in stopping the activities of their troops, which continue even today. On December 13, about 30 soldiers came to a Chinese house at No. 5 Hsing Lu Koo in the southeastern part of Nanjing and demanded entrance. The door was open by the landlord, a Mohammedan named Ha. They killed him immediately with a revolver and also Mrs. Ha, who knelt before them after Ha's death, begging them not to kill anyone else. Mrs. Ha asked them why they killed her husband and they shot her. Mrs. Hsia was dragged out from under a table in the guest hall where she had tried to hide with her 1-year-old baby. After being stripped and raped by one or more men, she was bayoneted in the chest and then had a bottle thrust into her vagina. The baby was killed with a bayonet. Some soldiers then went to the next room, where Mrs. Hsia's parents, aged 76 and 74, and her two daughters aged 16 and 14 [were]. They were about to rape the girls when the grandmother tried to protect them. The soldiers killed her with a revolver. The grandfather grasped the body of his wife and was killed. The two girls were then stripped, the elder being raped by 2-3 men and the younger by 3. The older girl was stabbed afterwards and a cane was rammed in her vagina. The younger girl was bayoneted also but was spared the horrible treatment that had been meted out to her sister and mother. The soldiers then bayoneted another sister of between 7-8, who was also in the room. The last murders in the house were of Ha's two children, aged 4 and 2 respectively. The older was bayoneted and the younger split down through the head with a sword.

On 5 February 2009, the Japanese Supreme Court ordered Shūdō Higashinakano and the publisher Tendensha to pay four million yen in damages to Mrs. Shuqin Xia, who claims to be the 7- or 8-year-old girl who appears in Magee's film. Higashinakano had claimed in his book, Thorough Review of Nanjing Massacre, that she and the girl were different persons, and that she was not a witness of the Nanjing massacre, but he was unable to prove this at trial.

Bodies of Chinese massacred by Japanese troops along a river in Nanjing

Pregnant women were targeted for murder, as their stomachs were often bayoneted, sometimes after rape. Tang Junshan, survivor and witness to one of the Japanese army's systematic mass killings, testified:

The seventh and last person in the first row was a pregnant woman. The soldier thought he might as well rape her before killing her, so he pulled her out of the group to a spot about ten meters away. As he was trying to rape her, the woman resisted fiercely.... The soldier abruptly stabbed her in the belly with a bayonet. She gave a final scream as her intestines spilled out. Then the soldier stabbed the fetus, with its umbilical cord clearly visible, and tossed it aside.

The Hui people, a minority Chinese group, the majority of them Muslim, suffered as well during the massacre. One mosque was found destroyed and others found to be "filled with dead bodies." Hui volunteers and imams buried over a hundred of their dead following Muslim ritual.

Extrajudicial killing of Chinese prisoners of war

U.S. news correspondents F. Tillman Durdin and Archibald Steele reported seeing corpses of massacred Chinese soldiers forming mounds six feet high at the Nanjing Yijiang gate in the north. Durdin, who worked for The New York Times, toured Nanjing before his departure from the city. He heard waves of machine-gun fire and witnessed the Japanese soldiers gun down some two hundred Chinese within ten minutes. He would later state that he had seen tank guns used on bound soldiers.

Two days later, in his report to The New York Times, Durdin stated that the alleys and streets were filled with the dead, amongst them women and children. Durdin stated "[i]t should be said that certain Japanese units exercised restraint and that certain Japanese officers tempered power with generosity and commission," but continued "the conduct of the Japanese army as a whole in Nanjing was a blot on the reputation of their country"."

Just after Christmas, the Japanese set up public stages where they called upon former Chinese soldiers to confess, claiming they would not be harmed. When over 200 former soldiers did come forward, they were promptly executed. When former soldiers stopped identifying themselves, the Japanese began rounding up groups of young men who "aroused suspicion."

Based on the dutiful records of the Safety Zone committee, the post-war International Military Tribunal found that some 20,000 Chinese male civilians were killed on false accusations of being soldiers, while some 30,000 genuine former combatants were executed and their bodies thrown in the river.

Looting and arson

Stationed in Nanjing, an eyewitness, journalist F. Tillman of The New York Times, sent an article to his newspaper where he described the Imperial Japanese Army's entry into Nanjing in December 1937: "The plunder carried out by the Japanese reached almost the entire city. Almost all buildings were entered by Japanese soldiers, often in the sight of their officers, and the men took whatever they wanted. Japanese soldiers often forced Chinese to carry the loot."

One-third of the city was destroyed as a result of arson. According to reports, Japanese troops torched newly built government buildings as well as the homes of many civilians. There was considerable destruction to areas outside the city walls. Soldiers pillaged from the poor and the wealthy alike. The lack of resistance from Chinese troops and civilians in Nanjing meant that the Japanese soldiers were free to divide up the city's valuables as they saw fit. This resulted in widespread looting and burglary.

On 17 December, chairman John Rabe wrote a complaint to Kiyoshi Fukui, second secretary of the Japanese Embassy. The following is an excerpt:

Nanking Safety Zone and the role of foreigners

The Japanese troops did respect the Zone to an extent; until the Japanese occupation, no shells entered that part of the city except a few stray shots. During the chaos following the attack of the city, some were killed in the Safety Zone, but the crimes that occurred in the rest of the city were far greater by all accounts.

Rabe wrote that, from time to time, the Japanese would enter the Safety Zone at will, carry off a few hundred men and women, and either summarily execute them or rape and then kill them.

"Case 5 - On the night of December 14th, there were many cases of Japanese soldiers entering houses and raping women or taking them away. This created panic in the area and hundreds of women moved into the Ginling College campus yesterday."

"Case 10 - On the night of December 15th, a number of Japanese soldiers entered the University of Nanjing buildings at Tao Yuen and raped 30 women on the spot, some by six men."

"Case 13 - December 18, 4 p.m., at No. 18 I Ho Lu, Japanese soldiers wanted a man's cigarette case and when he hesitated, one of the soldier crashed in the side of his head with a bayonet. The man is now at the University Hospital and is not expected to live."

"Case 14 - On December 16, seven girls (ages ranged from 16 to 21) were taken away from the Military College. Five returned. Each girl was raped six or seven times daily - reported December 18th."

"Case 15 - There are about 540 refugees crowded in No. 83 and 85 on Canton Road.... More than 30 women and girls have been raped. The women and children are crying all nights. Conditions inside the compound are worse than we can describe. Please give us help."

"Case 16 - A Chinese girl named Loh, who, with her mother and brother, was living in one of the Refugee Centers in the Refugee Zone, was shot through the head and killed by a Japanese soldier. The girl was 14 years old. The incident occurred near the Kuling Ssu, a noted temple on the border of the Refugee zone ..."

"Case 19 - January 30th, about 5 p.m. Mr. Sone (of the Nanjing Theological Seminary) was greeted by several hundred women pleading with him that they would not have to go home on February 4th. They said it was no use going home they might just as well be killed for staying at the camp as to be raped, robbed or killed at home.... One old woman 62 years old went home near Hansimen and Japanese soldiers came at night and wanted to rape her. She said she was too old. So the soldiers rammed a stick up her. But she survived to come back."

[T]here is no obvious explanation for this grim event, nor can one be found. The Japanese soldiers, who had expected easy victory, instead had been fighting hard for months and had taken infinitely higher casualties than anticipated. They were bored, angry, frustrated, tired. The Chinese women were undefended, their menfolk powerless or absent. The war, still undeclared, had no clear-cut goal or purpose. Perhaps all Chinese, regardless of sex or age, seemed marked out as victims.

Photo in the album taken in Nanjing by Itou Kaneo of the Kisarazu Air Unit of the Imperial Japanese Navy

A picture of a dead child. Probably taken by Bernhard Sindberg

Skeletons of the massacre's victims

The dehumanization of Chinese people in the Japanese education system is also blamed for why many ordinary soldiers were eager to engage in atrocities. Shiro Azuma, a Japanese soldier, testified in a 1998 interview:

Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who presided over the Second Sino-Japanese War, justified the massacre as retaliation against persistent Kuomintang aggression, even advocating in January 1938 for the regime's destruction. Konoe had previously rejected Chiang Kai-Shek's offer of negotiation through a German ambassodor prior to the fall of Nanjing and believed the invasion of China to be "survival" for Japan.

Literature

Eyewitness accounts include testimonies of expatriates engaged in humanitarian work (mostly physicians, professors, missionary and businessmen), journalists (both Western and Japanese), as well as the field diaries of military personnel. American missionary John Magee stayed behind to provide a 16 mm film documentary and first-hand photographs of the Nanjing Massacre. Rabe and American missionary Lewis S. C. Smythe, secretary of the International Committee and a professor of sociology at the University of Nanjing, recorded the actions of the Japanese troops and filed complaints with the Japanese embassy.

Matsui's reaction to the massacre

On December 18, 1937, as General Iwane Matsui began to comprehend the full extent of the rape, murder, and looting in the city, he grew increasingly dismayed. He reportedly told one of his civilian aides:

I now realize that we have unknowingly wrought a most grievous effect on this city. When I think of the feelings and sentiments of many of my Chinese friends who have fled from Nanjing and of the future of the two countries, I cannot but feel depressed. I am very lonely and can never get in a mood to rejoice about this victory.... I personally feel sorry for the tragedies to the people, but the Army must continue unless China repents. Now, in the winter, the season gives time to reflect. I offer my sympathy, with deep emotion, to a million innocent people.

On New Year's Day, over a toast he confided to a Japanese diplomat: "My men have done something very wrong and extremely regrettable." Matsui blamed the atrocities on the moral decline of the Japanese Army, saying:

End of the massacre

In late January 1938, the Japanese army forced all refugees in the Safety Zone to return home, immediately claiming to have "restored order". After the establishment of the weixin zhengfu (the collaborating government) in 1938, order was gradually restored in Nanjing and atrocities by Japanese troops lessened considerably.

On 18 February 1938, the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone was forcibly renamed the Nanjing International Rescue Committee, and the Safety Zone effectively ceased to function. The last refugee camps were closed in May 1938.

Recall of Matsui and Asaka

Evidence collection

The Japanese either destroyed or concealed important documents, severely reducing the amount of evidence available for confiscation. Between the declaration of a ceasefire on August 15, 1945, and the arrival of American troops in Japan on August 28, "the Japanese military and civil authorities systematically destroyed military, naval, and government archives, much of which was from the period 1942-1945." Overseas troops in the Pacific and East Asia were ordered to destroy incriminating evidence of war crimes. Approximately 70 percent of the Japanese army's wartime records were destroyed. In regards to the Nanjing Massacre, Japanese authorities deliberately concealed wartime records, eluding confiscation from American authorities. Some of the concealed information was made public a few decades later. For example, a two-volume collection of military documents related to the Nanjing operations was published in 1989; and disturbing excerpts from Kesago Nakajima's diary, a commander at Nanjing, was published in the early 1980s.

Ono Kenji, a chemical worker in Japan, curated a collection of wartime diaries from Japanese veterans who fought in the Battle of Nanking in 1937. In 1994, nearly 20 diaries in his collection were published, which became an important source of evidence for the massacre. Official war journals and diaries were also published by Kaikosha, an organization of retired Japanese military veterans.

In early 1980s, after interviewing Chinese survivors and reviewing Japanese records, Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi concluded that the Nanjing Massacre was not an isolated case, and that Japanese atrocities against the Chinese were common throughout the Lower Yangtze River since the battle of Shanghai. The diaries of other Japanese combatants and medics who fought in China have corroborated his conclusions.

Death toll estimates

According to American historian Edward J. Drea:

According to Yang Daqing, professor of History and International Affairs at George Washington University:

In 2003, the director of Japan's Military History Archives of National Institute for Defense Studies said that as much 70 percent of Japan's wartime records were destroyed.

Other factors include the mass disposal of Chinese corpses by Japanese soldiers; the revisionist tendencies of both Chinese and Japanese individuals and groups, who are driven by nationalistic and political motivations; and the subjectivity involved in the collection and interpretation of evidence. However, the most credible scholars in Japan, which include a large number of authoritative academics, support the validity of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and its findings, which estimate more than 100,000 (if broadly defined) casualties.

Historian Tokushi Kasahara states "more than 100,000 and close to 200,000, or maybe more." With the emergence of more information and data, he said that there is a possibility that the death toll could be higher. Hiroshi Yoshida concludes "more than 200,000" in his book. Tomio Hora supports the information found in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which estimates a death toll of at least 200,000. An estimate death toll of 300,000 has also been cited.

According to the verdict of the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal on 10 March 1947, there are "more than 190,000 mass slaughtered civilians and Chinese soldiers killed by machine gun by the Japanese army, whose corpses have been burned to destroy proof. Besides, we count more than 150,000 victims of barbarian acts buried by the charity organizations. We thus have a total of more than 300,000 victims." However, this estimate includes an accusation that the Japanese Army murdered 57,418 Chinese POWs at Mufushan, though the latest research indicates that between 4,000 and 20,000 were massacred, and it also includes the 112,266 corpses allegedly buried by the Chongshantang, a charitable association, though today mainstream historians agree that the Chongshantang's records were at least greatly exaggerated if not entirely fabricated. According to Bob Wakabayashi, he estimates the death toll within Nanjing City Wall to be around 40,000, mostly massacred in the first five days; while the total victims after a 3-month period in Nanjing and its surrounding six rural counties "far exceed 100,000 but fall short of 200,000". Wakabayashi concludes that estimates of over 200,000 are not credible.

John Rabe, Chairman of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, estimated that between 50,000 and 60,000 (civilians) were killed. However, Erwin Wickert, the editor of The diaries of John Rabe, points out that "It is likely that Rabe's estimate is too low, since he could not have had an overview of the entire municipal area during the period of the worst atrocities. Moreover, many troops of captured Chinese soldiers were led out of the city and down to the Yangtze, where they were summarily executed. But, as noted, no one actually counted the dead."

Harold Timperley, a journalist in China during the Japanese invasion, reported that at least 300,000 Chinese civilians were killed in Nanjing and elsewhere, and tried to send a telegram but was censored by the Japanese military in Shanghai. Other sources, including Iris Chang's The Rape of Nanjing, also conclude that the death toll reached 300,000. In December 2007, newly declassified U.S. government archive documents revealed that a telegraph by the U.S. ambassador to Germany in Berlin sent one day after the Japanese army occupied Nanjing, stated that he heard the Japanese ambassador in Germany boasting that the Japanese army had killed 500,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians as the Japanese army advanced from Shanghai to Nanjing. According to the archives research "The telegrams sent by the U.S. diplomats [in Berlin] pointed to the massacre of an estimated half a million people in Shanghai, Suzhou, Jiaxing, Hangzhou, Shaoxing, Wuxi and Changzhou".

In the 2010 Japan-China Joint History Research Committee meeting, scholars from the Japanese side set the maximum possible number of civilian victims at 200,000, with estimates of around 40,000 or 20,000. The Chinese scholars of the committee maintained that at least 300,000 were killed.

Range and duration

The duration of the incident is naturally defined by its geography: the earlier the Japanese entered the area, the longer the duration. The Battle of Nanking ended on December 13, when the divisions of the Japanese Army entered the walled city of Nanjing. The Tokyo War Crime Tribunal defined the period of the massacre to the ensuing six weeks. More conservative estimates say that the massacre started on December 14, when the troops entered the Safety Zone, and that it lasted for six weeks. Historians who define the Nanjing Massacre as having started from the time that the Japanese Army entered Jiangsu province push the beginning of the massacre to around mid-November to early December (Suzhou fell on November 19), and extended the end of the massacre to late March 1938.

War crimes tribunals

Shortly after the surrender of Japan, the primary officers in charge of the Japanese troops at Nanjing were put on trial. General Matsui was indicted before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for "deliberately and recklessly" ignoring his legal duty "to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches" of the Hague Convention.

Other Japanese military leaders in charge at the time of the Nanjing Massacre were not tried. Prince Kan'in Kotohito, chief of staff of the Imperial Japanese Army during the massacre, had died before the end of the war in May 1945. Prince Asaka was granted immunity because of his status as a member of the imperial family. Isamu Chō, the aide to Prince Asaka, and whom some historians believe issued the "kill all captives" memo, had committed (ritual suicide) during the Battle of Okinawa.

Grant of immunity to Prince Asaka

Evidence and testimony

The prosecution began the Nanjing phase of its case in July 1946. Dr. Robert O. Wilson, a surgeon and a member of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, testified. Other members of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone who took the witness stand included Miner Searle Bates and John Magee. George A. Fitch, Lewis S. C. Smythe, and James McCallum filed affidavits with their diaries and letters.

The entry for the same day in Matsui's diary read, "I could only feel sadness and responsibility today, which has been overwhelmingly piercing my heart. This is caused by the Army's misbehaviors after the fall of Nanjing and failure to proceed with the autonomous government and other political plans."

Matsui's defense

Kōki Hirota, Prime Minister of Japan at an earlier stage of the war, and a diplomat during the atrocities at Nanjing, was convicted of participating in "the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy" (count 1), waging "a war of aggression and a war in violation of international laws, treaties, agreements and assurances against the Republic of China" (count 27) and count 55. Matsui was convicted by a majority of the judges at the Tokyo tribunal who ruled that he bore ultimate responsibility for the "orgy of crime" at Nanjing because, "He did nothing, or nothing effective, to abate these horrors."

Organized and wholesale murder of male civilians was conducted with the apparent sanction of the commanders on the pretext that Chinese soldiers had removed their uniforms and were mingling with the population. Groups of Chinese civilians were formed, bound with their hands behind their backs, and marched outside the walls of the city where they were killed in groups by machine gun fire and with bayonets. - From Judgment of the International Military Tribunal

Other trials

Hisao Tani, a lieutenant general for the 6th Division of the Imperial Japanese Army, was tried by the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal in China. He was found guilty of war crimes, sentenced to death, and executed by shooting on 26 April 1947. However, according to historian Tokushi Kasahara, the evidence used to convict Hisao Tani was not convincing. Kasahara said that if there was a full investigation of the massacre, many other high ranking authorities, which include higher level commanders, army leaders and emperor Hirohito, could have been implicated.

Moritake Tanabe, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese 10th Army at the time of the massacre, was tried for unrelated war crimes in the Dutch East Indies. He was sentenced to death and executed in 1949.

In 1985, the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was built by the Nanjing Municipal Government in remembrance of the victims and to raise awareness of the Nanjing Massacre. It is located near a site where thousands of bodies were buried, called the "pit of ten thousand corpses" (wàn rén kēng). As of December 2016, there is a total of 10,615 Nanjing Massacre victim names inscribed on a memorial wall.

In 1995, Daniel Kwan held a photo exhibit in Los Angeles titled, "The Forgotten Holocaust".

In 2005, John Rabe's former residence in Nanjing was renovated and now accommodates the "John Rabe and International Safety Zone Memorial Hall", which opened in 2006.

On December 13, 2009, both the Chinese and Japanese monks held a religious assembly to mourn Chinese civilians killed by invading Japanese troops.

On December 13, 2014, China held its first Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day.

Yanziji Nanjing Massacre Memorial in 2004

A statue titled "Family Ruined" in front of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall

John Rabe's former residence, now the "John Rabe and International Safety Zone Memorial Hall", in Nanjing, September 2010

Controversy

Before the 1970s, China did relatively little to draw attention to the Nanjing massacre. There was also virtually no public commemoration until after 1982. In her book Rape of Nanjing, Iris Chang asserted that the politics of the Cold War encouraged Chairman Mao to stay relatively silent about Nanjing in order to keep a trade relationship with Japan. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's biography of Mao claims Mao never made any comment either contemporaneously or later in his life about the massacre, but did frequently remark with enduring bitterness about a political struggle between himself and Wang Ming which also occurred in December 1937.

Mei Xiao-ao, the son of Mei Ju-ao, a Chinese justice who was present at the Tokyo war crime tribunal, published an essay claiming that in the early 1960s, Mei's father, inspired by the recent publication of a Japanese study on the destruction caused by the atomic bombs, tried calling for greater study of the massacre by Chinese historians of the time, but his ideas received a cold reception; he was reportedly accused of "stirring up national hatred and revenge" against the Japanese, and some others felt that writing about "the Chinese defeat and misery in Nanjing amounted to hidden praise for the strength of the Japanese troops." A study into the massacre was undertaken by a group of historians in the early 1960s, but supposedly due to political reasons it was restricted to the form of an "internal publication" in 1979.

Debate in Japan

The debate concerning the massacre took place mainly in the 1970s, according to Higashinakano Shudo. He said that during this time, the Chinese government's statements about the event were attacked by the Japanese because they were said to rely too heavily on personal testimonies and anecdotal evidence. He further added that aspersions were cast regarding the authenticity and accuracy of burial records and photographs presented in the Tokyo War Crime Court, which the Japanese government claimed were fabrications by the Chinese government, artificially manipulated or incorrectly attributed to the Nanjing Massacre.

During the 1970s, Katsuichi Honda wrote a series of articles for the Asahi Shimbun on war crimes committed by Japanese soldiers during World War II (such as the Nanjing Massacre). The publication of these articles triggered a vehement response from Japanese right-wingers regarding the Japanese treatment of the war crimes. In response, Shichihei Yamamoto and Akira Suzuki wrote two controversial yet influential articles which sparked the Japanese Negationist movement.

In 1984, in an attempt to refute the allegations of war crimes in Nanjing, the Japanese Army Veterans Association (Kaikosha) interviewed former Japanese soldiers who had served in the Nanjing area from 1937 to 1938. Instead of refuting the allegations, the interviewed veterans confirmed that a massacre had taken place and openly described and admitted to taking part in the atrocities. The results of the survey were published in the association's magazine, Kaiko, in 1985 along with an admission and apology that read, "Whatever the severity of war or special circumstances of war psychology, we just lose words faced with this mass illegal killing. As those who are related to the prewar military, we simply apologize deeply to the people of China. It was truly a regrettable act of barbarity."

Apology and condolences by the Prime Minister and Emperor of Japan

He offered his apology to all survivors and to the relatives and friends of the victims. That day, the prime minister and the Japanese Emperor Akihito pronounced statements of mourning at Tokyo's Nippon Budokan. Iris Chang, author of The Rape of Nanjing, criticized Murayama for not providing the written apology that had been expected. She said that the people of China "don't believe that an... unequivocal and sincere apology has ever been made by Japan to China" and that a written apology from Japan would send a better message to the international community.

Denials of the massacre in Japan

In May 1994, Justice Minister Shigeto Nagano called the Nanjing Massacre a "fabrication".

On February 20, 2012, Takashi Kawamura, mayor of Nagoya, told a visiting delegation from Nanjing that the massacre "probably never happened". Two days later he defended his remarks, saying, "Even since I was a national Diet representative, I have said [repeatedly] there was no [Nanjing] massacre that resulted in murders of several hundred thousands of people."

On February 24, 2012, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara denied the Nanjing massacre. He alleged it would have been impossible to kill so many people in such a short period of time. He alleged a death toll of 10,000.

On February 3, 2014, Naoki Hyakuta, a member of the board of governors of Japan's public broadcasting company, NHK, was quoted as saying the massacre never occurred. He said that there were isolated incidents of brutality but no widespread atrocity, and criticized the Tokyo Trials figure of 200,000.

A number of scholars have said that the Japanese Wikipedia version of the article () contains revisionist and denialist narratives. They note that the article notably lacks pictures and expresses doubt about the massacre in the first paragraph of the article. In 2021, Yumiko Sato translated a sentence from the first paragraph: "The Chinese side calls it the Nanjing Massacre, but the truth of the incident is still unknown".

Effect on international relations

Takashi Yoshida described how changing political concerns and perceptions of the "national interest" in Japan, China, and the U.S. have shaped the collective memory of the Nanjing massacre. Yoshida contended that over time the event has acquired different meanings to different people. People from mainland China saw themselves as the victims. For Japan, it was a question they needed to answer but were reluctant to do so because they too identified themselves as victims after the A-bombs. The U.S., which served as the melting pot of cultures and is home to descendants of members of both Chinese and Japanese cultures, took up the mantle of investigator for the victimized Chinese. Yoshida has argued that the Nanjing Massacre has figured in the attempts of all three nations as they work to preserve and redefine national and ethnic pride and identity, assuming different kinds of significance based on each country's changing internal and external enemies.

Many Japanese prime ministers have visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a shrine for Japanese war deaths up until the end of the Second World War, which includes war criminals that were involved in the Nanjing Massacre. In the museum adjacent to the shrine, a panel informs visitors that there was no massacre in Nanjing, but that Chinese soldiers in plain clothes were "dealt with severely". In 2006 former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi made a pilgrimage to the shrine despite warnings from China and South Korea. His decision to visit the shrine regardless sparked international outrage. Although Koizumi denied that he was trying to glorify war or historical Japanese militarism, the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused Koizumi of "wrecking the political foundations of China-Japan relations". An official from South Korea said they would summon the Tokyo ambassador to protest.

As a component of national identity

Yoshida asserts that "Nanjing has figured in the attempts of all three nations [China, Japan and the United States] to preserve and redefine national and ethnic pride and identity, assuming different kinds of significance based on each country's changing internal and external enemies."

Following the end of World War II, some circles of civil society in Japan reflected on the extent of the massacre and the participation of ordinary soldiers. Notably, the novelist Hotta Yoshie wrote a novel, Time ( Jikan) in 1953, portraying the massacre from the point of view of a Chinese intellectual watching it happen. This novel has been translated into Chinese and Russian. Other eyewitnesses to the massacre also expressed their opinions in Japanese magazines in the 1950s and 1960s, but political shifts slowly eroded this tide of confessions.

In 21st century Japan, the Nanjing Massacre touches upon national identity and notions of "pride, honor and shame". Yoshida argues that "Nanjing crystallizes a much larger conflict over what should constitute the ideal perception of the nation: Japan, as a nation, acknowledges its past and apologizes for its wartime wrongdoings; or ... stands firm against foreign pressures and teaches Japanese youth about the benevolent and courageous martyrs who fought a just war to save Asia from Western aggression." Recognizing the Nanjing Massacre as such can be viewed in some circles in Japan as "Japan-bashing" (in the case of foreigners) or "self-flagellation" (in the case of Japanese).

The government of Japan states that it cannot be denied that the killing of a large number of noncombatants, looting and other acts by the Japanese army occurred. However, it also states that the actual number of victims is hard to determine. In the 2010 Japan-China Joint History Research Committee meeting, scholars from the Japanese side set the maximum possible number of civilian victims at 200,000, with estimates of around 40,000 or 20,000. The Chinese scholars of the committee maintained that at least 300,000 were killed. The range of the death toll estimated by Japanese historians is from tens of thousands to 200,000.

The most widely used Japanese textbooks for junior high schools do contain references to the Nanjing Massacre and other issues like comfort women. Fiercely critical of such references, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform published the New History Textbook attempts to whitewash Japan's war record during the 1930s and early 1940s. It referred to the Nanjing Massacre as an "incident", and glossed over the issue of comfort women. There is also only one sentence that refers to the event: "they [the Japanese troops] occupied that city in December." This revisionist textbook though approved by the government was shunned by nearly all school districts and only used by 13 schools.

The Nanjing massacre has emerged as one fundamental keystone in the construction of the modern Chinese national identity. Modern Chinese (including most citizens of the PRC, partially in Taiwan and overseas) will refer to the Nanjing Massacre to explain certain stances they hold or ideas they have; this "national unifying event" holds true to middle-school educated peasants and to senior government officials alike.

The remembrance of the massacre has evolved drastically in China. Until 1982, mentioning of the massacre was suppressed in China because ideologically the communists would rather promote the "martyrs of class struggles" than wartime victims, especially when there were no communist heroes or any communists at all in Nanjing when the massacre happened. Only since the 1990s, through the revisionist Patriotic Education Campaign, the massacre has become a national memory as an episode of the " Century of Humiliation" prior to the communist founding of a "New China". This orthodox victimhood narrative has become entwined with the Chinese national identity and is very sensitive to the revisionist sentiments from the far-right in Japan, which makes the memory of the massacre a recurring point of tension in Sino-Japanese relations after 1982.

In December 2007, the PRC government published the names of 13,000 people who were killed by Japanese troops in the Nanjing Massacre. According to Xinhua News Agency, it is the most complete record to date. The report consists of eight volumes and was released to mark the 70th anniversary of the start of the massacre. It also lists the Japanese army units that were responsible for each of the deaths and states the way in which the victims were killed. Zhang Xianwen, editor-in-chief of the report, states that the information collected was based on "a combination of Chinese, Japanese and Western raw materials, which is objective and just and is able to stand the trial of history". This report formed part of a 55-volume series about the massacre, the Collection of Historical Materials of Nanjing Massacre ( 南京大屠杀史料集).

References

Further reading

Askew, David. "The International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone: An Introduction" Sino-Japanese Studies Vol. 14, April 2002 (Article outlining membership and their reports of the events that transpired during the massacre)

Askew, David, "The Nanjing Incident: An Examination of the Civilian Population" Sino-Japanese Studies Vol. 13, March 2001 (Article analyzes a wide variety of figures on the population of Nanking before, during, and after the massacre)

Bergamini, David, "Japan's Imperial Conspiracy," William Morrow, New York; 1971.[ISBN missing ]

Brook, Timothy, ed. Documents on the Rape of Nanjing, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999. ISBN 0472111345 (Does not include the Rabe diaries but does include reprints of "Hsū Shuhsi, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, Kelly & Walsh, 1939".)

Hua-ling Hu, American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin, Foreword by Paul Simon; 2000, ISBN 0809323036

Fujiwara, Akira "The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive Overview" Japan Focus October 23, 2007.

Higashinakano, Shudo, The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction: A Historian's Quest for the Truth, Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, 2005. ISBN 4916079124

Higashinakano, Kobayashi and Fukunaga, Analyzing The 'Photographic Evidence' of The Nanking Massacre, Tokyo: Soshisha, 2005. ISBN 4794213816

Hsū Shuhsi, ed. (1939), Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (reprinted in Documents on the Rape of Nanjing Brook ed. 1999)[ISBN missing ]

Kajimoto, Masato "Mistranslations in Honda Katsuichi's the Nanjing Massacre" Sino-Japanese Studies, 13. 2 (March 2001) pp. 32-44

Lu, Suping, They Were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by American and British Nationals, Hong Kong University Press, 2004.[ISBN missing ]

Murase, Moriyasu,Watashino Jyugun Cyugoku-sensen(My China Front), Nippon Kikanshi Syuppan Center, 1987 (revised 2005). (includes disturbing photos, 149 page photogravure) ISBN 4889008365 (村瀬守保, 私の従軍中国戦線 )

Rabe, John, The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe, Vintage (Paper), 2000. ISBN 0375701974

Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi "The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt Amid Fabricated Illusions, 1971-75",The Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 26 No. 2 Summer 2000.

Yang, Daqing. "Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing" American Historical Review 104, 3 (June 1999). 842-865.

Young, Shi; Yin, James. Rape of Nanking: Undeniable history in photographs Chicago: Innovative Publishing Group, 1997.[ISBN missing ]

External links

The Rape of Nanjing - Nanjing Massacre - documentary

Rape of Nanjing videos

Documents of Nanjing Massacre - UNESCO

BBC News: Nanjing remembers massacre victims

Online Documentary: The Nanjing Atrocities Archived 2019-02-21 at the Wayback Machine A master's degree thesis that delves into the atrocity

English translation of a classified Chinese document on the Nanjing Massacre

Japanese Imperialism and the Massacre in Nanjing by Gao Xingzu, Wu Shimin, Hu Yungong, & Cha Ruizhen

Kirk Denton, "Heroic Resistance and Victims of Atrocity: Negotiating the Memory of Japanese Imperialism in Chinese Museums"

Nanjing Massacre history site: History, Photos and Articles

'No massacre in Nanjing,' Japanese lawmakers say

"Denying Genocide: The Evolution of the Denial of the Holocaust and the Nanjing Massacre," college research paper by Joseph Chapel, 2004

Rape of Nanjing Original reports from The Times

War and reconciliation: a tale of two countries

Review of Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanjing: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II

The Ghosts of Nanjing: Mogollon Connection Special Series by Jesse Horn Archived 2019-04-15 at the Wayback Machine

The Nanjing Massacre Project: A Digital Archive of Documents & Photographs from American Missionaries Who Witnessed the Rape of Nanjing From the Special Collections of the Yale Divinity School Library

The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends by David Askew in the Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, April 2002

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Nanjing Massacre Part of the Second Sino-Japanese War Location Nanjing, China Date From December 13, 1937, for six weeks[note 1] Mass murder, wartime rape, looting, arson Deaths 200,000 (consensus), estimates range from 40,000 to over 300,000 Victims 20,000 to 80,000 women raped, 30,000 to 40,000 POWs executed Perpetrators Imperial Japanese Army The Nanjing Massacre or the Rape of Nanjing (formerly romanized as Nanking) was the mass murder of Chinese civilians in Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China, immediately after the Battle of Nanking in the Second Sino-Japanese War, by the Imperial Japanese Army.

# data[].attributes.body
The Bombing of Darwin, also known as the Battle of Darwin, on 19 February 1942 was the largest single attack ever mounted by a foreign power on Australia. On that day, 242 Japanese aircraft, in two separate raids, attacked the town, ships in Darwin's harbour and the town's two airfields in an attempt to prevent the Allies from using them as bases to contest the invasion of Timor and Java during World War II. Allies' casualties and losses: 236 killed, 300–400 wounded 30 aircraft destroyed, 11 vessels sunk, 3 vessels grounded, 25 ships damaged. Japanese casualties and losses: Four carrier aircraft lost, 2 killed, 1 POW, 34 carrier aircraft damaged. The bombing of Darwin also resulted in the destruction of 7 of the 11 above ground storage tanks that led to the construction of underground oil storage tunnels in Darwin in 1943. The bombing of Darwin was significant because it showed that the Japanese had the ability to attack Australia causing devasting results.

Bombing of Darwin - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Bombing of Darwin

Part of the Pacific War

The explosion of a ship, filled with TNT and ammunition, hit during the first Japanese air raid on Australia's mainland, at Darwin on 19 February 1942. In the foreground is HMAS Deloraine, which escaped damage.

Belligerents

Australia
United States

Japan

Commanders and leaders

David V. J. Blake Frederick Scherger

Chuichi Nagumo
Mitsuo Fuchida

Strength

31 aircraft
18 antiaircraft guns
1 destroyer
1 seaplane tender
2 sloops
4 minesweepers/corvettes
4 boom defence vessels
9 merchant ships/transports
1 hospital ship
23 auxiliary vessels
12 pearling luggers

242 aircraft (188 carrier-based aircraft; 54 land-based medium bomber aircraft)
4 aircraft carriers
2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
7 destroyers
3 submarines

Casualties and losses

236 killed[1][2]
300-400 wounded
30 aircraft destroyed[1]
11 vessels sunk
3 vessels grounded
25 ships damaged

Four carrier aircraft lost
2 killed[3]
1 POW
34 carrier aircraft damaged[1]

The Bombing of Darwin, also known as the Battle of Darwin, on 19 February 1942 was the largest single attack ever mounted by a foreign power on Australia. On that day, 242 Japanese aircraft, in two separate raids, attacked the town, ships in Darwin's harbour and the town's two airfields in an attempt to prevent the Allies from using them as bases to contest the invasion of Timor and Java during World War II.

Darwin was lightly defended relative to the size of the attack, and the Japanese inflicted heavy losses upon Allied forces at little cost to themselves. The urban areas of Darwin also suffered some damage from the raids and there were a number of civilian casualties. More than half of Darwin's civilian population left the area permanently, before or immediately after the attack.

The two Japanese air raids were the first, and largest, of more than 100 air raids against Australia during 1942-43. The event happened just four days after the Fall of Singapore, when a combined Commonwealth force surrendered to the Japanese, leading to the largest surrender in British history.

In 1942, Darwin - whilst it was the capital of the Northern Territory - was a small town with limited civil and military infrastructure. Due to its strategic position in northern Australia, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) had constructed bases near the town in the 1930s and the early years of World War II. Darwin's pre-war population was 5,800.

As early as August 1941, Darwin had been a key in the South Pacific air ferry route designed to avoid routes through the Japanese mandate in the central Pacific for bomber reinforcement of the Philippines. The first flight to use the route occurred when nine B-17D bombers of the 14th Bombardment Squadron (H) left Hawaii on 5 September and passed through Darwin 10-12 September. By October 1941 plans were underway to position fuel and supplies with two ships, including USAT Don Esteban, being chartered and actively engaged in that purpose when war came. By November 1941 Australia had agreed to allow the establishment of training bases, maintenance facilities, munitions storage, communications, and improvement of airfields, including at Darwin, to meet the needs of the B-17 bombers in Australia.

Following the outbreak of the Pacific War in early December 1941, Darwin's defences were strengthened. In line with plans developed before the war, several Australian Army and RAAF units stationed in the town were sent to the Netherlands East Indies (Dutch East Indies; NEI) to strengthen the defences of the islands of Ambon and Timor. An improvised plan for support of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies was completed in Washington on 20 December 1941 by the U.S. Army General Staff. It envisioned Darwin as the hub of transshipment efforts to supply those forces by landing supplies at Brisbane, shipping overland to Darwin, and onward by air and blockade-running ships. In reality, transport to Darwin by sea was necessary. Supplies and shipping intended both to build the Darwin base and to support the Java and Philippine forces were gathered in Darwin and the vicinity. In the two months before the air raids, all but 2,000 civilians were evacuated from the town. Japanese submarines laid mines off Darwin in January 1942.

By mid-February 1942 Darwin had become an important Allied base for the defence of the NEI. The Japanese had captured Ambon, Borneo, and Celebes between December 1941 and early-February 1942. Landings on Timor were scheduled for 20 February, and an invasion of Java was planned to take place shortly afterwards. In order to protect these landings from Allied interference, the Japanese military command decided to conduct a major air raid on Darwin. On 10 February a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft overflew the town, and identified an aircraft carrier (actually the seaplane tender USS Langley), five destroyers, and 21 merchant ships in Darwin Harbour, as well as 30 aircraft at the town's two airfields.

Among the ships in harbour were those returned the morning before the attack from the convoy escorted by USS Houston involved in the failed effort to reinforce Timor. Houston had departed for Java but left Mauna Loa and the Meigs which had attempted to transport Australian troops to Timor and the U.S. Army transports Portmar and Tulagi which had embarked a U.S. infantry regiment at Darwin.

Despite Darwin's strategic importance to the defence of Australia, the city was poorly defended. The Australian Army's anti-aircraft defences comprised sixteen QF 3.7-inch AA guns and two 3-inch AA guns to counter aircraft flying at high altitude and a small number of Lewis Guns for use against low-flying raiders. The crews of these guns had conducted little recent training due to ammunition shortages. The air forces stationed in and near the town comprised No. 12 Squadron, which was equipped with CAC Wirraway advanced trainers (which had been pressed into service as fighters), and No. 13 Squadron which operated Lockheed Hudson light bombers. Six Hudsons, 3 from No. 2 Squadron and 3 from No. 13 Squadron, also arrived at Darwin on 19 February after having been evacuated from Timor. None of the six Wirraways at Darwin on the day of the raid were serviceable. At the time of the event, there was no functional radar to provide early warning of air raids, and the town's civil defences were dysfunctional. The Lowe Commission, which was appointed to investigate the raids shortly after they occurred, was informed that the Australian military estimated that Darwin would have needed 36 heavy anti-aircraft guns and 250 fighter aircraft to defend it against a raid of the scale which occurred on 19 February. In addition to the Australian forces, ten United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) Curtiss P-40 Warhawks were passing through Darwin en route to Java on the day of the attack. The P-40 pilots were largely inexperienced in combat.

A total of 65 Allied warships and merchant vessels were in Darwin harbour at the time of the raids. The warships included the United States Navy (USN) destroyer Peary and seaplane tender William B. Preston. The RAN ships in port were the sloops Swan and Warrego, corvettes Deloraine and Katoomba, auxiliary minesweepers Gunbar and Tolga, patrol boat Coongoola, depot ship Platypus, examination vessel Southern Cross, lugger Mavie, and four boom-net ships. Several USN and Australian troopships were in the harbour along with a number of merchant vessels of varying sizes. Most of the ships in the harbour were anchored near each other, making them an easy target for air attack. Moreover, no plans had been prepared for how the ships should respond to an air raid.

In addition to the vessels in port, the American Army supply ships Don Isidro and Florence D., former Philippine vessels acquired as part of the South West Pacific Area command's permanent Army fleet earlier in February, were near Bathurst Island bound for the Philippines with arms and supplies on the morning of the raid.

Darwin was attacked by aircraft flying from aircraft carriers and land bases in the NEI. The main force involved in the raid was the 1st Carrier Air Fleet which was commanded by Vice-Admiral Chūichi Nagumo. This force comprised the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, and Sōryū and a powerful force of escorting surface ships. All four carriers had participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor at the start of the Pacific War. In addition to the carrier-based aircraft, 54 land-based bombers also struck Darwin in a high-level bombing raid nearly two hours after the first one struck at 0956. These comprised 27 G3M "Nell" bombers flying from Ambon and another 27 G4M "Betty" bombers operating from Kendari in Celebes.

The four Japanese aircraft carriers launched 188 aircraft on the morning of 19 February. The main objective of their crews was attacking ships and port facilities in Darwin Harbour. Their aircraft comprised 81 Nakajima B5N ("Kate") light bombers, 71 Aichi D3A ("Val") dive bombers, and an escort of 36 Mitsubishi A6M ("Zero") fighters. While the B5N was a purpose-built torpedo bomber, it could instead carry up to 800 kilograms (1,800 lb) of bombs and there is no evidence of torpedoes being used on this occasion; the D3A could carry up to 514 kilograms (1,133 lb) of bombs. All of these aircraft were launched by 8.45 am. This wave was led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who had also commanded the first wave of attackers during the raid on Pearl Harbor.

On their way to Darwin, Zeros shot down a US Navy PBY Catalina and strafed a USAAF C-47 Skytrain on the ground, near Melville Island. At 9.35 am Father McGrath of the Sacred Heart mission on Bathurst Island, who was also an Australian coastwatcher, sent a message using a pedal radio to the Amalgamated Wireless Postal Radio Station at Darwin that a large number of aircraft were flying overhead and proceeding southward. The message was then relayed to the Royal Australian Air Force Operations at 9.37 am. No general alarm was given until about 10 am as the RAAF officers there wrongly judged that the aircraft which had been sighted were the ten USAAF P-40s, which were returning to Darwin at the time after reports of bad weather forced them to abort a flight to Java via Kupang, West Timor. As a result, the air raid sirens at Darwin were not sounded before the raid.

Flying escort in a Zero fighter, Petty Officer Yoshikazu Nagahama was separated from his squadron while he was attacking the PBY flying boat and arrived over the city alone ahead of the strike force, which was making a turn to attack from the south. He engaged five US Army Air Force P-40 Warhawk fighters and single-handedly shot down four of them.

The Japanese raiders began to arrive over Darwin at 9:58 am. HMAS Gunbar was the first ship to be attacked, being strafed by several Zero fighters. At about this time, the town's air raid sirens were belatedly sounded. The Japanese bombers then conducted dive bombing and level bombing attacks on the ships in Darwin Harbour. These attacks lasted for 30 minutes, and resulted in the sinking of three warships and six merchant vessels, and damage to another ten ships. The ships sunk were the USS Peary, HMAS Mavie, USAT Meigs, MV Neptuna (which exploded while docked at Darwin's main wharf), Zealandia, SS Mauna Loa, MV British Motorist. The oil tanker Karalee and the coal storage hulk sank later. At least 21 labourers working on the wharf were killed when it was bombed.

All but one of the P-40s of Major Floyd Pell's 33rd Pursuit Squadron, was shot down or destroyed on the ground at RAAF Darwin by the Japanese. Japanese aircraft bombed and strafed the base and civil airfield, as well as the town's army barracks and oil store. All of these facilities were seriously damaged.

The bombers began to leave the Darwin area at about 10:10. On their way back to the carriers, their crews noted two Philippine-registered freighters lying just outside the port: Florence D. and Don Isidro. This information contributed to planning for the second raid that afternoon (which sank both vessels).

Japanese losses may have been as few as five aircraft and three crew. Another 34 Japanese aircraft landed safely with battle damage. Warrant Officer Katsuyoshi Tsuru and First Petty Officer (1st class) Takezo Uchikado were killed when their Aichi dive bomber (bu. no. 3304; tail no. AII-254) crashed near RAAF Darwin. Petty Officer Hajime Toyoshima (a.k.a. Tadao Minami) was taken prisoner after crash-landing his damaged Zero (bu. no. b. n. 5349; tail no. BII-124) on Melville Island. Those who ditched near the Japanese fleet and were rescued included Flyer 1st class Yoshio Egawa and the Aichi crew of Flyer 1st class Takeshi Yamada and Flyer 1st class Kinji Funazaki. In 2013, a reference was discovered in Japanese records to a Nakajima torpedo bomber suffering wheel damage from a "gunshot" and both crew (names unknown) being rescued after ditching (by the destroyer Tanikaze).

Allied ground fire was relatively intense and may have claimed all but two of the Japanese aircraft lost. Only one of the USAAF P-40 pilots remained airborne throughout the first attack, 1st Lieutenant Robert Oestreicher, who has also been credited by US and Japanese sources with one Aichi shot down and one damaged. Toyoshima's Zero is considered to have been brought down by small arms fire from Sappers Tom Lamb and Len O'Shea of the 19th Battalion. Most aviation historians believe Tsuru and Uchikado's Aichi was brought down by ground fire, possibly from a major Australian Army camp at Winnellie. Egawa reported that the damage to his Zero came from hitting a tree at Darwin.

The second wave, made up of 54 land-based medium bombers (27 Mitsubishi G3M and 27 Mitsubishi G4M) arrived over Darwin just before midday. The town's air raid sirens were sounded at 11:58 am when the bombers were sighted. The Japanese force separated into two groups flying at 18,000 feet (5,500 m). One of these formations attacked RAAF Base Darwin from the south-west while the other approached from the north-east. The two formations arrived over the base at the same time, and dropped their bombs simultaneously. The Japanese bombers then turned, and made a second attack on the base. Due to defective fuses, the Australian heavy anti-aircraft flak gunners were unable to shoot down or damage any of the high-flying Japanese aircraft. The bombers left the Darwin area at about 12:20 pm.

This raid inflicted extensive damage on the RAAF base, though casualties were light. Of the RAAF aircraft at the base, six Hudson light bombers were destroyed and another Hudson and a Wirraway were badly damaged. Two American P-40s and a B-24 Liberator bomber were also destroyed. Six RAAF personnel were killed. Lewis and Ingman list 30 aircraft destroyed.

The Japanese carrier force launched a small number of D3A dive bombers during the afternoon of 19 February to attack the and Don Isidro. Don Isidro was the first of these two ships to be attacked, and was rapidly sunk 40 kilometres (25 mi) north of Melville Island. Eleven of her 84-strong crew were killed. The dive bombers also attacked Florence D. and sank her off Bathurst Island with the loss of four crewmen. All of the survivors from Don Isidro were rescued by the corvette HMAS Warrnambool on 20 February. Some of Florence D.'s survivors landed on Bathurst and Melville Islands while the remainder were rescued by Warrnambool on 23 February. Among the survivors of Florence D. were the rescued crew of a U.S. Navy PBY piloted by then Lt Thomas H. Moorer (later to become Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff).

Admiral Halstead, strafed and with plates damaged by near misses, was brought to the pier where U.S. Army volunteers along with survivors of the U.S. and Philippine vessels helped unload her 14,000 drums of aviation gasoline.

Of major military consequence was the loss of most of the cargo shipping available to support efforts in Java and the Philippines with Java being effectively sealed off from further surface shipments from Australia.

The air raids caused chaos in Darwin, with most essential services including water and electricity being badly damaged or destroyed. Fears of an imminent invasion spread and there was a wave of refugees, as some of the town's civilian population fled inland. There were reports of looting, with provost marshals being among the accused. According to official figures, 278 personnel belonging to RAAF North-Western Area Command (NWA) were considered to have deserted as a result of the raids, although it has been argued that the "desertions" were mostly the result of ambiguous orders given to RAAF ground staff after the attacks. In the words of journalist Douglas Lockwood, after the second Japanese air raid, the commander of RAAF Darwin, Wing Commander Stuart Griffith

summoned his senior administrative officer, Squadron Leader Swan, and gave a verbal order that all airmen were to move half a mile down the main road and then half a mile inland. At this vague rendezvous point ... arrangements would be made to feed them. The order led to utter chaos. In being passed by word of mouth from one section to another, sometimes with officers present and sometimes not, it became garbled to the extent it was unrecognisable against the original. In its ultimate form it was interpreted, especially by those desiring such an interpretation, of an impending order for immediate and general evacuation of the area. Highly exaggerated rumours of an impending Japanese invasion had already reached the base from the town and spread quickly among those wanting to believe them. In the absence of restraint, men gathered their belongings and abandoned their stations.

While the NWA staff could see what was happening and issued countermanding orders "the damage was done and hundreds of men were already beyond recall".

The Australian Army also faced difficulty controlling some of its own troops from looting private property, including "furniture, refrigerators, stoves, pianos, clothes[,] [and] even children's toys" due to the breakdown of law and order after the bombing and the ensuing chaos. Many civilian refugees never returned, or did not return for many years, and in the post-war years some land they owned in Darwin had been expropriated by government bodies in their absence, made legal by the Darwin Lands Acquisition Act 1945.

The bombing of Darwin resulted in the destruction of 7 of the 11 above ground storage tanks, located on Stokes Hill, in raids on 19 February 16 March and 16 June 1942. This led to the construction of underground oil storage tunnels in Darwin in 1943.

Vessel/service/location

Alderman's estimates

Documented deaths

Notes

Neptuna
45

36

Five of the missing seamen were located in Alice Springs in March, and four others were evacuated on HMAHS Manunda. The Australian War memorial records the names of all 36 killed, and the Hong Kong Memorial records the names of the 25 Chinese seamen. Brendan de Burca, senior surviving Officer and George Boniface, senior surviving Engineer, both record 36 Neptuna crewmen died on 19 February.

Manunda

12

12

The Manunda log records the deaths of 12 crew members and 24 patients NAA:SP290/2 1941/MANUNDA/4. Those who died include: 9 crewmen, 3 AIF Hospital staff on board, 9 from the USS Peary, 2 from HMAS Kara Kara, Jack Dee from 2/14 Field Arty, 3 from HMAS Swan, 2 from British Motorist, 1 from HMAS Gunbar, 2 from Zealandia, Rowling from the Post Office and Bauer from the US 148 Field Arty, plus Hynes and Byers from the Wharf.

USS Peary

80

88

Eight of the crew died aboard the Manunda, and Roy Carlson died in Perth on 1 March. Northern Territory Library Roll of Honour. Errors on the memorial Plaques in Darwin are noted in Wikipedia

Mauna Loa
5

0

Enright and Stindt record that there were no deaths on Mauna Loa except for Manuel da Silva, who died before the attack. see Enright, Francis James. 1990. To leave this port. Orick, Calif: Enright Pub. Co. Stindt, Fred A. 1982. Matson's century of ships. Kelseyville, California (3382 Riviera West Dr., Kelseyville 95451): F.A. Stindt. Tex Tickner, from 2/4 Pioneer Battalion on board, was injured during aerial bombing at sea on 16 February 1942 he was on the Mauna Loa and "got a piece of a bomb fragment in the belly and passed away 25 February 1942 aged 22". Manuel da Silva, a crewman of Mauna Loa was also wounded in the attack. Da Silva died aboard the USS Houston, and was buried in Gardens Road cemetery.

Australian Army

2

2

Jack Dee, who died of illness aboard the Manunda and Roy Gardiner who was the unnamed soldier who was shot at the Berrimah Hospital

US Army (including US Army Air Force)

7

9

Civilians on the wharf

39

23

Northern Territory Library Roll of Honour. George Michaels is the often uncounted 23rd Warfie

Don Isidro; Florence D; PBY Catalina flying boat (US Navy)

15

16

Omitted from Alderman's estimates

USS William B. Preston

14

The "fifteenth" crew member was probably Joseph Shuler, Aviation Metalsmith 2nd Class (356-12-85), who died on Moorer's Catalina from Patwing 10/22. The Preston was a seaplane tender for the Patrol Wing 10, which had been reinforced with aircraft from Patwing 22 United States Naval historical Research Centre, Washington Navy Yard. USS William B. Preston. Ship's Log in Lewis, Tom (1986-1993), Tom Lewis Manuscript Collection, in possession of Northern Territory Library, Darwin

Total

243

236

(Most of the authors cited elsewhere in this article do not cite the primary source documents used to annotate this table.)

The number of people killed during 19 February raids is disputed. The Lowe Commission, which investigated them in March 1942, estimated 243 victims but, assuming a few were unidentified, concluded "I am satisfied that the number is approximately 250 and I doubt whether any further investigation will result in ascertaining a more precise figure."

Some researchers and government officials, including John Bradford (author of In the Highest Traditions - RAN Heroism Darwin 19 February 1942), Dr. Peter Stanley (the Australian War Memorial's Principal Historian and author of several books about Australian military history), Tom Womack (author of The Dutch Naval Air Force against Japan), Paul Rosenzweig (author of Darwin 1942: a reassessment of the first raid casualties), and Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce (governor of South Australia) have said there were 250-262 fatalities.

However, a plaque unveiled in Darwin in 2001 gave the total as 292. The plaque indicated 10 sailors had been killed aboard the USS William B. Preston but the US Navy said there were 13 fatalities and Peter Grose, author of An Awkward Truth, said fifteen - he wrote: "With the William B. Preston total corrected to 15, a figure of 297 known dead is the best count anyone is likely to achieve...the full death toll is likely to be a little over 300, perhaps as many as 310 or 320." Lewis and Ingman have revised that to 14 in their 2013 book Carrier Attack.

In 2000, Darwin historian Peter Forrest, who spoke to survivors and researched the attacks for an unpublished book, said (as paraphrased by a journalist), "the first Japanese air raids on Darwin probably killed more than double the official figure of 243", but by 2002 had lowered his estimate to "anything up to double that 243".

Other estimates put the toll far higher: one soldier who was there claimed to have seen barges filled with bodies towed out to sea, a member of one of the burial teams recounted seeing uncounted bodies "shoved in a large hole dug by a bulldozer" (paraphrased), according to some sources, former Darwin Mayor (1921-1922) Jack Burton estimated 900 people were killed; Harry Macredie, who helped rescue survivors and recover bodies in the harbour said, "we definitely estimate over 1,000", Rex Ruwoldt, one of the soldiers attacked that day, says that a few days after the raid he was told over the field telephone that Army Intelligence estimated 1,100 were killed. According to an AP article about the 50th anniversary of the attacks "some estimates say as many as 1,000 died". Bradford and Forrest said they spoke to survivors who estimated as many as 1,500 people died.

Stanley, Grose, Rosenzweig, and Tom Lewis rejected such numbers. The former said "it was certainly not the 1,024 claimed recently in unsubstantiated reports" and Grose wrote "numbers such as 1,100 are fancifully high".

By contrast, there is less dispute over the number of injured during the attacks. The Lowe Commission estimated "between 300 and 400" people were wounded. Lewis said the number was over 400, about 200 of which were seriously injured. Womack wrote that 311 were wounded. Australian military historian Chris Coulthard-Clark put the total between 250 and 320. Grose wrote: "if 900 or 1100 died, why were the numbers of injured so low? The count of the injured is more accurate, because they were treated in hospital or shipped out aboard the Manunda [a hospital ship]. The hospitals and Manunda noted names and numbers of those they treated."

The Japanese raid was unlike the attack on Pearl Harbor in that it was launched against a nation that had already declared war on Japan (on 8 December 1941). It was similar in that it was a successful aerial surprise attack on a naval target that came as a great shock to the attacked nation. While the number of bombs dropped on Darwin (681 bombs weighing 114,100 kilograms (251,500 lb) by 205 bombers) exceeded those dropped on Pearl Harbor (457 bombs [including 40 torpedoes]) weighing 133,560 kilograms (294,450 lb) by 273), loss of life was much greater at Pearl Harbor (more than 2,400 people) than Darwin (236 people) due to the presence of capital ships and the catastrophic loss of a single battleship, the USS Arizona, and its 1,177 men.

A frequently repeated myth is that the Australian government downplayed the damage from the bombing raids on Darwin, in a "cover-up". The newspapers of the day disprove this claim. On the day of the attack the prime minister is quoted on the front pages of most newspapers: "Damage to property was considerable", he said, "but reports so far to hand do not give precise particulars about the loss of life." "The Government regards the attacks as most grave, and makes it quite clear that a severe blow has been struck on Australian soil."

After the 19 February 1942 Japanese raid, the Northern Territory and parts of Western Australia's north were bombed approximately 100 times between 4 March 1942 and 12 November 1943. One of the heaviest attacks took place on 16 June 1942 when a Japanese force set fire to the oil fuel tanks around the harbour and inflicted severe damage to the vacant banks, stores and railway yards. The Allied navies largely abandoned the naval base at Darwin after the initial 19 February attack, dispersing most of their forces to Brisbane, Fremantle, and other, smaller, seaports. Conversely, Allied air commanders launched a build-up in the Darwin area, building more airfields and deploying many squadrons.

The four IJN aircraft carriers ( Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, and Sōryū) that participated in the Bombing of Darwin were later sunk during the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

A memorial ceremony has been held every year since at least 2009. On 19 February at the Cenotaph in Darwin, at 9:58 am, a World War II air-raid siren sounds to mark the precise time of the first attack.

A fictionalised version of the raid features prominently in the 2008 film Australia.

Clayton, Mark (April 1986). "The north Australian air war, 1942-1944". Journal of the Australian War Memorial. Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial (8): 33-45. ISSN 0729-6274.

Craven, Wesley Frank; Leagate, James (1983). Plans And Early Operations January 1939 To August 1942. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 1 (New Imprint by the Office of Air Force History Washington, D.C., 1983 ed.). Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History. ISBN 0-912799-03-X.

Fuchida, Mitsuo; Okumiya, Masatake (1957) [1951]. Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan: The Japanese Navy's story. London, England: Hutchinson. OCLC 729935982.

Gibson, Charles Dana; Gibson, E. Kay (July 2008). "Attempts to Supply The Philippines by Sea: 1942" (PDF). The Northern Mariner. XVIII (3/4).

Gill, G. Hermon (1968). Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942. Australia in the War of 1939-1945. Series 2 - Navy. Vol. I. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 848228.

Hiromi, Tanaka (1997). "The Japanese Navy's operations against Australia in the Second World War, with a commentary on Japanese sources". Journal of the Australian War Memorial. 30.

Leighton, Richard M.; Coakley, Robert W. (1995). Global Logistics And Strategy 1940-1943 (PDF). United States Army in World War II-The War Department. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 63151391.

Lewis, Tom (2003). A War at Home: A comprehensive guide to the first Japanese attacks on Darwin. Darwin: Tall Stories. ISBN 978-0-9577351-0-1.

Lewis, Tom; Ingman, Peter (2013). Carrier Attack. Darwin 1942 : the complete guide to Australia's own Pearl Harbor. Avonmore Books: Avonmore Books. ISBN 978-0-9871519-3-3.

Masterson, Dr. James R. (1949). U.S. Army Transportation In The Southwest Pacific Area 1941-1947. Washington: Transportation Unit, Historical Division, Special Staff, U. S. Army. Archived from the original on 30 September 2014.

Matloff, Maurice; Snell, Edwin M. (1999). The War Department: Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare 1941-1942. United States Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army. LCCN 53-61477.

Powell, Alan (1983). "The Darwin 'panic', 1942". Journal of the Australian War Memorial (3, October 1983): 3-9. ISSN 0729-6274.

Powell, Alan (2013). "Chapter 8". The air raids on Darwin, 19 February 1942: Image and reality. Dean, Peter. Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War. pp. 140-155. ISBN 9781107032279.

Hata, Ikuhiko; Izawa, Yasuho; Shores, Christopher (2011). Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and their aces, 1932-1945. London, UK: Grub Street. ISBN 9781906502843.

Tagaya, Osamu (2011). Aichi 99 Kanbaku 'Val' Units. Combat Aircraft #63. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1841769127.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Bombing of Darwin Part of the Pacific War The explosion of a ship, filled with TNT and ammunition, hit during the first Japanese air raid on Australia's mainland, at Darwin on 19 February 1942. In the foreground is HMAS Deloraine , which escaped damage. Belligerents Australia United States Japan Commanders and leaders David V.

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
US Marine from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines on Wana Ridge provides covering fire with his Thompson submachine gun, 18 May 1945.

# data[].attributes.body
The Battle of Okinawa, codenamed Operation Iceberg, was a major battle of the Pacific War fought on the island of Okinawa by United States Army and United States Marine Corps forces against the Imperial Japanese Army. The goal of taking Okinawa was to use it as a point to launch a bigger invasion onto mainland Japan. The initial invasion of Okinawa on 1 April 1945 was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Approximately 160,000 casualties combined: at least 50,000 Allied and 84,166–117,000 Japanese, including drafted Okinawans wearing Japanese uniforms. 149,425 Okinawans were killed, died by suicide or went missing, roughly half of the estimated pre-war 300,000 local population. The Battle of Okinawa lead to being one of the key reasons President Harry Truman dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The cause of The Battle of Okinawa was because the Americans planned on launching an invasion on mainland Japan. This battle was significant because the effect of The Battle of Okinawa was that it led to Americans to drop two atomic bombs on Japan to force them to surrender in fear of fighting a bloody battle and losing millions of Americans.

Battle of Okinawa - Wikipedia
What Caused The Battle Of Okinawana - 386 Words | Bartleby

# data[].attributes.body
Battle of Midway, (June 3–6, 1942), World War II naval battle, fought almost entirely with aircraft, in which the United States destroyed Japan’s first-line carrier strength and most of its best trained naval pilots. Together with the Battle of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Midway ended the threat of further Japanese invasion in the Pacific. During the battle, the Americans lost 1 fleet carrier, 1 destroyer, approximately 150 aircraft, 307 people including 3 killed as prisoners. The Japanese took heavier losses, losing 4 fleet carriers, 1 heavy cruiser with another heavy cruiser being damaged, 2 destroyers were damaged, 248 aircraft were destroyed with 3,057 people killed and 37 being captured. The cause of the battle was Japan's decision of trying to completely eliminate the US naval forces from the Pacific. The Effect of the battle and the reason it was significant was it made the US the superior naval power in the Pacific Ocean.

Battle of Midway | Significance & Outcome | Britannica
Battle of Midway - Wikipedia
The Battle of Midway: Long Term Effects - The Battle of Midway (weebly.com)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Examine how the U.S. Navy defeated Japan's fleet to check Japanese expansion in the Battle of Midway Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. See all videos for this article

Battle of Midway, (June 3-6, 1942), World War II naval battle, fought almost entirely with aircraft, in which the United States destroyed Japan's first-line carrier strength and most of its best trained naval pilots. Together with the Battle of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Midway ended the threat of further Japanese invasion in the Pacific.

Context

The Midway Islands were claimed for the United States on July 5, 1859, by Capt. N.C. Brooks. The coral atoll-consisting of Eastern Island and the larger Sand Island to the west-has a total land area of just 2.4 square miles (6.2 square km). Midway was formally annexed by the U.S. in 1867, and the same year a coal depot was established for transpacific steamers, but it was never used. For many years thereafter only slight attention was paid to Midway. In 1903 Pres. Theodore Roosevelt placed Midway under the administration of the U.S. Navy Department, and the atoll became a connecting point for the submarine cable being laid between Hawaii and the Philippines. It was not until the advent of air transportation that the real significance of Midway was appreciated. By 1935 the islands had become a regular stopover point for transpacific flights.

It was World War II which conclusively demonstrated the strategic importance of Midway. In 1940 the U.S. Navy began work on a major air and submarine base there. By the following year Eastern Island would boast three runways, while on Sand Island a seaplane hangar was built for a squadron of PBY Catalina flying boats. Sand Island was also home to Midway's defensive garrison as well as its power plant and radio facilities. Japan recognized that control of the atoll would be critical for its plans in the central Pacific. If the islands could be seized by Japan, then the American military presence in Hawaii, just 1,100 miles (1,770 km) to the southeast, could be seriously threatened. Furthermore, the supply lines between the United States and Australia could be severed, thereby crippling the Allied war effort and opening the southwest Pacific to conquest.

So prominent was Midway in Japanese war planning that it was included in the opening offensive of the Pacific War on December 7-8, 1941. Roughly 12 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese destroyers Sazanami and Ushio bombarded the power plant and seaplane hangar on Sand Island. Lieut. George Cannon, despite being seriously wounded by a Japanese shell, remained at his post to direct one of the island's defensive batteries. The Japanese ships were forced to retire, and Cannon, who died of his wounds, would be the first U.S. Marine to be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor during World War II.

Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content. Subscribe Now

Clash of carriers

Disposition of forces

Despite a strategic setback at the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 4-8, 1942), the Japanese had continued with plans to seize the Midway Islands and bases in the Aleutians. Seeking a naval showdown with the numerically inferior U.S. Pacific Fleet, Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku sent out the bulk of the Kidō Butai ("Mobile Force"), a massive carrier battle group under the command of Vice Adm. Nagumo Chuichi. The 4 heavy aircraft carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, and Soryu were supplemented by 2 light aircraft carriers, 2 seaplane carriers, 7 battleships, 15 cruisers, 42 destroyers, 10 submarines, and various support and escort vessels. Their orders were to engage and destroy the American fleet and invade Midway.

U.S. intelligence had divined Japanese intentions after breaking the Japanese JN25 naval code, and the Americans had time to prepare their defense. Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, could not muster a single battleship, however, and just two of his heavy carriers-the Hornet and the Enterprise-were combat ready. To further complicate matters, his most senior carrier commander, Vice Adm. William "Bull" Halsey, had been incapacitated by a serious bout of neurodermatitis and would miss the battle entirely. A third carrier, the Yorktown, had been so seriously damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea that the Japanese believed it sunk, and it spent nearly two weeks limping back to Pearl Harbor. An initial damage assessment estimated that it would take three months to return the ship to service. Nimitz told repair crews that they had three days. Miraculously, after less than 72 hours in dry dock, the Yorktown steamed out of Pearl Harbor on the morning of May 30. It would join the rest of Nimitz's fleet, which included the Hornet, the Enterprise, 8 cruisers, and 18 destroyers at a rendezvous point optimistically code-named "Point Luck," 350 miles (560 km) northeast of Midway. There they awaited the advance of Yamamoto's armada. Whereas the Japanese had no land-based air support, the Americans could commit about 115 land-based Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Forces planes from Midway and Hawaii. The American fleet also included some 19 submarines.

June 3

The battle began at 9:04 am on June 3, 1942, when an American reconnaissance plane sighted lead elements of the invasion fleet some 500 miles (800 km) west of Midway and was fired upon by Japanese deck gunners. A second surface contact was made at 9:25 am, approximately 700 miles (1,100 km) west of Midway, with an American pilot reporting that he had located the "main body" of the Japanese fleet. In reality, these vessels represented only a small portion of the landing and occupation force.

Discover the significant events of June 4, 1942, during the Battle of Midway Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc/Kenny Chmielewski

At 12:30 pm a flight of U.S. Army Air Forces Boeing B-17 bombers was dispatched from Midway. In the late afternoon they struck ineffectually at part of the Japanese invasion force, which was by now about 220 miles (350 km) southwest of the U.S. fleet. American strategic bombers would demonstrate limited usefulness against moving naval targets at Midway and elsewhere in the Pacific, but they proved to be excellent reconnaissance platforms. Their high operational ceiling and long range meant that they could loiter for extended periods at altitudes unreachable by Japanese antiaircraft fire, while their onboard armament presented a formidable defense against carrier-based fighters.

About 9:15 pm, before the B-17s had returned, a quartet of Consolidated PBY Catalina seaplanes was launched from Midway. This group intercepted a Japanese surface force about 1:15 am in the early hours of June 4 and carried out a torpedo attack and strafing run. One of the Catalinas scored a hit on the Japanese tanker Akebono Maru; this would prove to be the only successful torpedo attack launched by an American aircraft during the entire battle. As the Catalinas made their way back to Midway, they were notified by radio that the islands were under attack by Japanese aircraft.

June 4

The attack on Midway

About 5:45 am on June 4, a Catalina pilot excitedly radioed the uncoded message, "Many planes heading Midway, bearing 320, distance 150." Within minutes, two of the Japanese carriers were sighted, and by 6:00 am virtually all of Midway's planes were airborne and on combat patrol. Just after 6:15 am more than two dozen Marine fighters-a mixture of Brewster F2A Buffaloes and Grumman F4F Wildcats-sighted and engaged the first wave of Japanese planes about 30 miles (48 km) from Midway. Formations of Japanese Aichi D3A "Val" dive-bombers and Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo bombers were escorted by squadrons of Mitsubishi A6M " Zero " fighters. The American pilots were outnumbered roughly 4-to-1. Moreover, the Zero was demonstrably superior to both the Buffalo and the Wildcat. Despite the mismatch, the Marines lightly bloodied the attackers but paid an enormous cost, losing more than half their number in the process.

About 6:30 am, with the island's fighter screen largely neutralized, the aerial bombardment of Midway began. The Japanese attack lasted about half an hour and caused extensive damage to structures on both Eastern and Sand islands. Midway's runways were largely unharmed, however, possibly because the Japanese were planning to use them themselves once the invasion had been completed. Between the aerial engagement and Midway's antiaircraft defenses, the Japanese lost fewer than 10 planes in their attack on the island.

Midway attacks and Nagumo's decision

While Midway was absorbing the full force of the Japanese assault, land-based planes from Midway were converging on the Japanese fleet. Just after 7:00 am a quartet of U.S. Army Air Forces Martin B-26 Marauders began a torpedo attack run on the Akagi, Nagumo's flagship. They were closely followed by six U.S. Navy Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers. Most of the American planes were shot down in the attempt, and none scored hits, a fact that owed much to the dismal performance of U.S. Mark 13 torpedoes. The Imperial Japanese Navy, conversely, fielded aerial and surface torpedoes of outstanding quality, and the Japanese would retain the technological advantage in this area until the end of the war.

About this time Nagumo made a fateful decision. Midway's aircraft were obviously still active, and an after-action report from the Hiryu's air commander, Lieut. Joichi Tomonaga, indicated that a second attack on Midway would be necessary to suitably pacify the island ahead of the planned amphibious assault. In addition, Nagumo's scout planes had detected no trace of an American naval presence nearby. This was hardly the fault of the pilots, as the search area was an expanse of ocean larger than the entire United Kingdom and visibility was sharply reduced by cloud cover in some areas. At 7:15 am, believing that he retained the element of surprise and that the American fleet was no closer than Hawaii, Nagumo ordered that the fueled and ready planes on the Kaga and the Akagi were to have their torpedoes replaced with bombs. The situation changed abruptly at 7:28 am, when one of Nagumo's scouts reported sighting "10 enemy surface ships" but gave no indication of the makeup of this force. Now, faced with the possibility of American carriers in the area, Nagumo brought the rearming effort to halt. At 7:45 am he ordered those planes which had not yet had their torpedoes replaced to prepare for an attack on American naval units. The flight and hangar decks of the Japanese carriers were now covered with fueled and armed aircraft as well as unsecured ordnance.

Nearly an hour after the initial American strike at the Japanese carrier force, a second wave of Midway-based planes launched their attack. At 7:55 am a squadron of 16 U.S. Marine Corps Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers targeted the Soryu, scoring no hits and losing half their number to antiaircraft fire and Japanese fighters. Roughly 15 minutes later U.S. Army Air Forces B-17s carried out a high-level bombing of the carrier force to little effect but suffered no losses themselves. At approximately 8:20 am the last of Midway's planes, a squadron of 11 U.S. Marine Corps Vought SB2U Vindicator dive-bombers, targeted the Japanese battleship Haruna. Most of these planes were intercepted by the Japanese fighter screen, however, and the bombing runs that they did manage to carry out were not on target. Until this moment, the Battle of Midway was an unqualified Japanese victory.

Battle of Midway: Japanese aircraft carrier U.S. Air Force

As the Vindicators were being chased away, Nagumo finally received confirmation that the American naval force did, indeed, include a carrier. This news could not have come at a worse time. The planes from the attack on Midway were returning and low on fuel, and the fighters of Nagumo's combat air patrol were also in need of refueling and rearmament. If he chose to launch his ready aircraft for an attack on the imminent threat, he risked losing scores of skilled aviators as their planes splashed into the Pacific. Nagumo had also spent the previous 90 minutes demonstrating the futility of attempting uncoordinated attacks on a well-defended carrier battle group without fighter escort. Rather than risk the same outcome, Nagumo made a decision that would determine the course of the Pacific War. He would clear his flight decks and recover his planes before launching a concerted attack on the American fleet.

Attack by the American carriers

The American carriers were divided into two groups: Task Force 16, which included the Enterprise and the Hornet, under Halsey's replacement, Rear Adm. Raymond Spruance, and Task Force 17, which included the Yorktown, under Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher. Due to his seniority in rank, Fletcher would have overall tactical command, but he granted Spruance significant operational latitude. This was fortunate, as Spruance was arguably the finest American naval commander of the war.

The flight of the Devastators

As the attack on Midway was unfolding, Fletcher and Spruance were monitoring signals traffic in an effort to determine the strength and position of the Japanese fleet. Just after 6:00 am, Midway radioed that two carriers had been sighted, and the American admirals acted immediately. Spruance's Task Force 16 was about 10 miles (16 km) southwest of Fletcher and Task Force 17, placing it closer to the Japanese fleet. Fletcher ordered Spruance to sail southwest and engage the enemy. Fletcher, who had scouts in the air, would recover his planes and hold the Yorktown in reserve against the threat of additional Japanese carriers. Hoping to catch the Japanese carriers before they could prepare a second attack on Midway, Spruance gambled by launching his planes at 7:00 am from a distance that all but guaranteed that many of his aircraft would not have enough fuel to return.

While the American carrier planes were attempting to close on the Japanese fleet, they were given no additional guidance on its whereabouts. The lack of communication between Midway and the carriers and between the carriers and their own planes would mean that the American strike force would arrive piecemeal if it arrived at all. Dozens of planes were forced to return to the Hornet, land at Midway, or ditch at sea without ever having located the Japanese. At 8:38 am, having recovered his scouts and believing that his fleet had been discovered by the Japanese, Fletcher began launching planes from the Yorktown.

About 9:20 am, 15 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers from the Hornet became the first American carrier planes to strike at the Japanese. The attack of Torpedo Squadron 8 on the Soryu was an unmitigated disaster. Every one of the Devastators was shot down, and the squadron's sole survivor, pilot Ensign George Gay, would spend the next 30 hours floating in the Pacific as the battle raged around him. At 10:20 am torpedo squadrons from the Enterprise and Yorktown struck with similar results. Of the 41 Devastators launched at Midway, only six made it back to their carriers, and not a single one carried out a successful torpedo attack.

The Dauntlesses turn the tide

The Yorktown's Devastators were unique in that they were the only torpedo squadron to enter the battle with a fighter escort. A half-dozen Grumman F4F Wildcats from the Yorktown accompanied the slow-moving Devastators, and the Japanese combat air patrol responded immediately. They dropped down to near sea level to intercept the American fighters, unwittingly clearing the way for a new threat.

Battle of Midway U.S. Navy/National Archives/Naval Historical Center(Digital Photo Number: 80-G-17054)

Low on fuel and lacking any additional information about the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet, Lieut. Comdr. Wade McClusky was scanning the Pacific for any trace of the enemy. The Enterprise's air group commander had arrived at the estimated point of interception at 9:20 am, but Nagumo had changed course while they were en route. McClusky then made what Nimitz would later characterize as "one of the most important decisions of the battle." Rather than returning to the Enterprise with his squadron of Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers, McClusky continued his search to the northwest, eventually spotting the Japanese destroyer Arashi as it hastened to catch up with the rest of the fleet. The Dauntlesses spotted the Kaga and the Akagi about 10:00 am and moved into attack position.

Diving out of the sun, the Enterprise's Dauntlesses struck at 10:22 am just as the torpedo attack was concluding, and quickly scored multiple devastating bomb hits on both the Kaga and the Akagi. Almost simultaneously, 17 Dauntlesses that had accompanied the Yorktown torpedo attack group dove on the Soryu. Within minutes the three Japanese carriers were in flames, and the momentum in the Pacific had shifted. Although the dive-bombers did not emerge unscathed-the Enterprise lost more than a dozen Dauntlesses-they had inflicted enormous damage on the Kidō Butai. As fires raged out of control, Nagumo was forced to abandon the Akagi, and he transferred his flag to the light cruiser Nagara.

The Hiryu strikes back

About 10:50 am, as the other three Japanese carriers burned, Rear Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi, commander of the battle group which included the Soryu and the Hiryu, ordered a hastily assembled attack force into the air. For the next half hour, until Nagumo had reestablished his flagship, Yamaguchi would serve as the effective commander of what remained of the Japanese fleet. The Hiryu's planes followed the American strike force back to the Yorktown, and, just after noon, they carried out a dive-bombing attack that left the American carrier dead in the water. Although the American fighter screen and antiaircraft defenses had exacted a punishing toll on the Japanese, three bomb hits had seriously-but not fatally-damaged the Yorktown. While repair teams worked to patch the flight deck and restore operation to the ship's boilers, Fletcher transferred his flag to the cruiser Astoria.

Battle of Midway 2rd Class William G. Roy-U.S. Navy/NARA

An hour of frenzied work brought most of the Yorktown's boilers back online, and by 2:30 pm the ship was underway. Within minutes, however, a second wave of planes from the Hiryu pounced on the carrier. A pair of torpedo hits brought the Yorktown to a stop for a second time, and the ship began to list dangerously. At 2:55 pm the Yorktown 's captain, Capt. Elliott Buckmaster, gave the order to abandon ship.

Spruance in command

By this time, however, American scouts had located the Hiryu, and a mixed force of Dauntlesses from the Enterprise and the Yorktown took to the skies at 3:30 pm. They were soon joined by additional dive-bombers from the Hornet. The American bombers would travel without escort, as all available fighters were tasked with maintaining a combat air patrol over the fleet. Just before 4:00 pm Fletcher, recognizing that Task Force 17 had ceased to be a functional carrier battle group and not wishing to waste precious time by transferring his flag to the Enterprise, turned over operational control of the fleet to Spruance.

The first wave of American bombers descended on the Hiryu about 5:00 pm and quickly reduced the Japanese carrier to a flaming wreck. At least four American bombs struck the Hiryu, and the Hornet's Dauntlesses, arriving a half hour later, turned their attention to other ships in the Hiryu 's battle group. This attack caused no significant damage to the remaining Japanese ships nor did a subsequent high-altitude strike by B-17s from Midway and Hawaii.

After recovering his planes, Spruance opted to sail Task Force 16 east, away from the day's action, rather than west in pursuit of the remnants of the Kidō Butai. History would prove this to be an exceptionally prudent course, as the Japanese navy excelled at night engagements, and their surface fleet, even accounting for the loss of four carriers, remained a significant threat. Retiring to the east also kept the American ships within range of Midway's land-based aircraft. The destroyer Hughes from Task Force 17 was tasked with guarding the crippled Yorktown overnight. That evening the Kaga and the Soryu both sank.

June 5-6

On June 5 the Yorktown was taken under tow and a salvage operation was begun. The Akagi and the Hiryu, both of which had managed to remain afloat through the night, were scuttled. Yamaguchi opted to go down with his flagship, and he was accompanied by the Hiryu's captain, Rear Adm. Tomeo Kaku. While such a decision was entirely in keeping with the Japanese honour code ( Bushidō) it deprived the Japanese navy of a highly esteemed flag officer as well as one of its most senior naval aviators.

Battle of Midway National Archives, Washington, D.C.

On the afternoon of June 5 Spruance dispatched nearly 60 bombers in an attempt to catch the retiring Japanese surface force, but the Americans succeeded in locating just one ship, the destroyer Tanikaze. The Tanikaze had been tasked with ensuring that the Hiryu actually sunk, and despite being the target of multiple attacks, it managed to escape largely unscathed and rejoin the Japanese fleet. Spruance renewed the pursuit the following day, and Dauntlesses from the Hornet and the Enterprise found a group of stragglers from the main Japanese fleet. With no fighter escort to protect them, the Japanese ships were easy prey for the dive-bombers. The cruiser Mikuma was sunk, and the cruiser Mogami as well as the destroyers Asashio and Arashio were seriously damaged.

Meanwhile, repair crews were working feverishly to save the Yorktown. The destroyer Hammann had tied up to the carrier early on the morning of June 6, and other ships joined a growing protective ring. Scores of men worked throughout the day to fight fires and bring flooding under control, and good progress was being made when, at 1:35 pm, lookouts spotted the wakes of incoming torpedoes. The Japanese submarine I-168 had approached the salvage operation undetected, and explosions soon rocked both the Hammann and the Yorktown. Almost immediately the order was given to abandon the Hammann, which sank within minutes. Some of the remaining destroyers launched a depth charges attack against the I-168, but the submarine escaped. The Yorktown, for all the damage it had sustained, somehow remained afloat but listing, and the salvage crew had hoped to resume work the following day. However, in the early morning hours of June 7, the Yorktown 's list increased, and about 5:00 am the carrier slipped beneath the waves "with all her battle flags flying."

Casualties and significance

The material losses suffered by Japan at Midway were catastrophic. Four carriers, a heavy cruiser, and more than 320 planes were sent to the bottom of the Pacific. Approximately 3,000 Japanese sailors and airmen were killed, and, because the Japanese fleet left the action area in relative haste, there was little opportunity to recover survivors who might have gone into the water. The victory cost the United States one carrier and a destroyer, as well as nearly 150 aircraft-more than two-thirds of which were carrier-based. American personnel losses were relatively light; 317 sailors, airmen, and Marines from the Midway garrison were killed.

In the days following the engagement, U.S. Navy patrols in the area around Midway recovered several survivors, including nearly three dozen crewmen from the engineering department of the Hiryu. Interrogation of these prisoners of war would provide the Americans with vital intelligence about Japanese naval capabilities. On June 21, more than two weeks after the battle, an American Catalina flying boat spotted the two-man crew of one of the Enterprise 's Devastators some 360 miles (roughly 580 km) north of Midway. They would be the last survivors of Midway to be recovered from the Pacific.

The official U.S. Navy combat narrative of the battle characterized Midway as "a victory of intelligence," and this was certainly the case. From the breaking of the Japanese JN25 naval code to the execution of a clever scheme to confirm that Midway was to be the target of the Japanese attack, American cryptanalysts played an outsize role at Midway. Intelligence alone did not win the battle, however. Both Fletcher and Spruance employed sound carrier tactics, and Fletcher's decision to cede operational control to Spruance late on June 4 ensured that the American command structure would not be disrupted at a key point of the battle.

The Battle of Midway brought the Pacific naval forces of Japan and the United States to approximate parity and marked a turning point of the military struggle between the two countries. It was also the most decisive naval defeat suffered by Japan since 1592, when Korean admiral Yi Sun-shin destroyed Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion fleet. For the Allies it was a great strategic victory: the Japanese were prompted to cancel their plans to invade New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa and lost all but the last vestiges of their earlier strategic initiative.
Michael Ray

date

June 3, 1942 - June 6, 1942

location

participants

context

key people

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Battle of Midway | Significance & Outcome

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Battle of Midway (June 3-6, 1942), World War II naval battle, fought almost entirely with aircraft, in which the United States destroyed Japan's first-line carrier strength and most of its best trained naval pilots. The American victory effectively ended Japan's ability to prosecute an offensive war in the Pacific.

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Australian soldiers in a line preparing for combat.

# data[].attributes.body
The Kokoda Track campaign or Kokoda Trail campaign was part of the Pacific War of World War II. The campaign consisted of a series of battles fought between July and November 1942 in what was then the Australian Territory of Papua. During the campaign 625 Australian soldiers were killed with 1,055 being wounded and 4,000+ being sick. It is estimated the Japanese lost 2,050 with 4,050 being sick or wounded. The cause of the Kokoda Track campaign was because the Japanese wanted to take away the Allies power and control in the Pacific Ocean and to have the ability to bomb Australia easier. The effect of the Kokoda Track campaign was it resulted in Japanese defeat. The Kokoda Track campaign was significant because it stopped the invasion of Australia.

Kokoda Track campaign - Wikipedia
Effects - Kokoda Campaign WW2 (weebly.com)
Why was the Kokoda Track campaign so important? – Short-Facts

# data[].attributes.body
The Battle of the Coral Sea, from 4 to 8 May 1942, was a major naval battle between the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and naval and air forces of the United States and Australia. During the battle the Allies would lose: one fleet carrier, one carrier damaged, one oiler, one destroyer, 69 aircraft, and 656 killed. While the Japanese would lose 1 light carrier sunk, 1 destroyer sunk, 3 minesweepers sunk, 1 fleet carrier damaged, 1 destroyer damaged, 1 smaller warship damaged, 1 transport damaged, 69–97 aircraft destroyed with 966 killed. The battle was caused by the Japanese desire to control the Coral Sea during World War II. One of the most significant effects of the Coral Sea battle was the loss of Shōkaku and Zuikaku to Yamamoto for his planned battle in the air with the U.S. carriers at Midway.

Battle of the Coral Sea - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.body
The Attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack by Japan against the neutral United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on the morning of December 7, 1941. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor as a response to the United States embargo. The Japanese military leadership referred to the attack as the Hawaii Operation, Operation AI, and as Operation Z. This is significant because it caused the United States to join the war. The attack of Pearl harbor also caused 2,335 U.S. servicemen and civilians to be killed with 4 battleships sunk, 4 battleships damaged, 1 ex-battleship sunk, 1 harbor tug sunk, 3 cruisers damaged, 3 destroyers damaged, 3 other ships damaged, 188 aircraft destroyed, 159 aircraft damaged. Around Japanese were either killed or wounded with 1 being captured as well as, 4 midget submarines being sunk, 1 midget submarine grounded, 29 aircraft destroyed, 74 aircraft damaged. The effects of Pearl Harbor were it caused the US to join the war, eventually leading to the end of World War II.

Attack on Pearl Harbor - Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Losses and Casualties of the Pearl Harbor Attack Pearl Harbor Warbirds
Attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
British troops retreating from Singapore

# data[].attributes.body
The Fall of Singapore, also known as the Battle of Singapore, took place in the South–East Asian theatre of the Pacific War. The Empire of Japan captured the British stronghold of Singapore, with fighting lasting from 8 to 15 February 1942. During the fall the allies would lose 5,000 troops as well as 80,000 being wounded. The Japanese would see 1,714 killed with 3,378 being wounded. The fall of Singapore was significant because the effects of the fall of Singapore were a loss in manpower and the British loss power in the pacific causing the Japanese to have more power in the region ultimately leading to the Japanese occupying Dutch East Indies.

Fall of Singapore - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.body
D-Day

D-Day, code-named Operation Overlord was an Allied landing invasion along with airborne operations  on the beaches of Normandy in France on Tuesday, 6 June 1944. D-Day was significant because it threatened Germany's control over Europe and lead to the liberation of France which was a turning point in the war and lead to Allied Victory.

D-Day: Learn about the D-Day Invasion | Holocaust Encyclopedia (ushmm.org)

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Hitler being announced dead in a newspaper

# data[].attributes.body
The death of Hitler

Hitler died on 30, April, 1945 by suicide with his wife Eva in his bunker. Hitler had committed suicide because he was warned that the Russians were on their way. This was significant because it marked the end of WW2 in the European theatre.

Death of Adolf Hitler - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.body
Battle of Stalingrad

The Battle of Stalingrad was the bloodiest battle of World War II that lasted from August, 23, 1942 to February, 2, 1943 with an estimated 2 million total casualties. This battle was so significant during the war because whoever controlled Stalingrad would control the oil in the Caucasus and the major industrial and transport hub on the Volga River.

Battle of Stalingrad - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Soviet tanks in Moscow during the battle. 

# data[].attributes.body
Battle of Moscow

The Battle of Moscow was a military campaign that lasted from October, 2, 1941 to January, 7, 1942. The fighting during the Battle of Moscow took place on a 600 km sector of the eastern front during WWII. The battle ended in Russian victory and it was significant because Hitler had thought it would be a quick and easy battle that would lead them to win the war against Russia. It was also significant because Moscow was the capital of the USSR and its largest city.

Battle of Moscow - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Russian civilians that have died during the Siege.

# data[].attributes.body
Siege of Leningrad

The Siege of Leningrad started in September 8, 1941 in modern day city of Saint Petersburg. The Siege of Leningrad was a prolonged military blockade undertaken by the Axis powers against the Soviet city of Leningrad that ended in January, 27, 1944 lasting 872 days. The Siege of Leningrad was an Axis attempt to starve out the city until they surrendered. It was significant because it was an important Russian city that produced a lot of steel and tanks.

Siege of Leningrad - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Buildings in London destroyed after being bombed.

# data[].attributes.body
The Blitz on London

On September 7, 1940, German planes began flying over London at about 4:00 p.m. For two hours, 348 German bombers and 617 fighters targeted the city, dropping high-explosive bombs as well as incendiary devices. The Blitz ended on May, 11, 1941. This was significant because it targeted civilians and devastated London and it was the most determined attempt by the Germans so far to win the war.

The Blitz - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.body
The Battle of Britain

The Battle of Britain was an intense air battle between the Germans and the British over Great Britain's airspace from July, 10, to October, 31, 1940. It was the first battle of WWII that was fought mainly in the air. This was battle was significant because the Germans needed to win to be able to invade Britain and take over.

Battle of Britain | Australian War Memorial (awm.gov.au)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
RAF and Luftwaffe continue the Battle of Britain (1940)

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Soldiers from the British Expeditionary Force fire at low flying German aircraft during the Dunkirk evacuation

# data[].attributes.body
The Battle of Dunkirk

The Battle of Dunkirk was fought during the Second World War between the Allies and Nazi Germany around the French port of Dunkirk. The Battle of Dunkirk, fought from May 26 to June 4, 1940, occurred as the Allied forces were losing the Battle of France on the Western Front. This was significant because Dunkirk was a critical turning point in World War II. Germany's blitzkrieg strategy depended on maintaining a concentrated forward momentum in its invasion of France and Belgium, and if the Allies held out for longer, their plans could have been scuttled.

Battle of Dunkirk - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
German tanks and other vehicles in northern France

# data[].attributes.body
Blitzkrieg in France

The Blitzkrieg in France started in September, 7, 1940. The Blitzkrieg was an attack slicing across northern France with German panzers, supported by Luftwaffe tactical bombing. It reached the English Channel on May 20, 1941. The significance of this attack was that it cut off the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), as well as a large number of French and Belgian forces, from the rest of the Allied forces in France.

World War II Blitzkrieg: Phony War to Fall of France (thoughtco.com)

# data[].attributes.body
Hitler's Rise to Power

Adolf Hitler became the leader of the Nazi Party in July, 1921 and became the Chancellor of Germany in January 30 1933 following a series of electoral victories by the Nazi Party. As a result of the grim atmosphere of the early 1930s, Hitler came to power as the Germans were desperate for a strong leader. Germans believed the German government to be weak, and Heinrich Brüning, the chancellor, only added to the bitterness of Germans. In 28 February 1933 Adolf Hitler would seize emergency powers after the  Reichstag Fire. This was significant because this would give Hitler power to do whatever he wants and would lead to the start of WW2.

Adolf Hitler's rise to power - Wikipedia