# data[].attributes.body
Re D (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 315
D was born in 2004 and the parties were not married, but the father was named on D's birth certificate as his father.  In 2009, the father pleaded guilty to sexual offences committed against the mother's two daughters from a previous relationship. On his release, the mother successfully applied for an order that the father's parental responsibility should cease. Baker J found that D had suffered serious emotional harm as a consequence of the father's actions and that he was at risk of further emotional harm.

The father appealed on the following grounds:  i)              The trial judge failed to distinguish Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995] 1 FLR 1048 to have regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the changing social norms in the intervening 18 years since Re P; ii)             The trial judge failed to consider whether the mother had established the allegation that he was a sexual recidivist; and iii)            The judge had not made a proportionate order, or had not taken into account policy considerations that such applications should not become "a weapon in the hands of a dissatisfied mother".  The Court of Appeal held that:  i)              Whatever the change in social norms since Re P, the concept of the welfare paramountcy principle had remained intact and had been applied. Re P could not be distinguished on the basis that the father had not inflicted harm directly on D. The father had inflicted devastating emotional harm on the whole family, including D, and he could not be said to be capable of exercising his parental rights with responsibility.  ii)             It was well established that the provisions of the Children Act 1989 were compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. To the extent that differences existed in the statutory treatment of unmarried and married fathers, that difference should be construed as justified.   iii)            The judge had applied the correct test and considered the key issues. He utilised the welfare checklist and reminded himself of the interference with Article 8 rights which needed to be justified. His conclusion that, despite the need of every child to have a relationship with each parent wherever possible, D's welfare would be imperilled if the father had any involvement in his life was unassailable on the facts and as a value judgment within a careful welfare analysis.

The Court of Appeal also confirmed the ambit of the court's powers to make findings not sought by either party.

# data[].attributes.body
The father was serving a life sentence in prison for offences including battery against the mother, breach of a non-molestation order and driving a burning car into the family home while the mother and children were there. His fixation on harming the children's mother and his consequent total disregard for the children's welfare meant that they lived in a strictly confidential location. The mother said that the provision of school reports, even in an anonymised form, would pose too great a risk of their whereabouts being accidentally disclosed to him.

It was agreed that the father would not have any contact, direct or indirect, and would be prohibited from making any applications in respect of them without permission of the court.

The mother also sought to restrict the father's exercise of his parental responsibility by applying for an order to prohibit him from receiving the children's school reports, where all the father sought was anonymised 'data' comprising the grades of the children stripped of any information that might identify the current whereabouts of the mother and the children.

The court granted the mother's application, considering the welfare of the children and the risk of further harm, and considering the impact on the mother and her ability to meet the children's needs, which might have been impaired by any risk that the father would locate her, or by the worry and anxiety associated with a persistent and pernicious fear that her location and that of the children would be revealed to the father.

# data[].attributes.body
A child, D, was born in 2004.  In 2009, the father pleaded guilty to sexual offences committed on two of the mother's daughters. He was sentenced to a total of 48 months’ imprisonment and was released at the halfway point in June 2011.

Immediately upon the father’s release from prison, the mother applied for the termination of his parental responsibility.

Held:

The "magnetic factors" in this case were D's emotional needs, the harm he had suffered, and the risk of future harm. The court concluded that D's emotional security would be at risk if the father continued to have any further involvement in his life. The father's parental responsibility was terminated.

# data[].attributes.headline
Re: P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995]

# data[].attributes.subject
Re: P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995]

# data[].attributes.body
A father had seriously injured his child, with long-term effects on both the child’s physical and mental health. The court approached the matter by asking itself whether it would have granted parental responsibility to the father had he made an application for it.

Held:

The father would not exercise any aspect of parental responsibility in a way that would promote the welfare of the child, so it was appropriate to bring his parental responsibility to an end.

# data[].attributes.headline
Re H (Parental responsibility) [1998] 1 FLR 855, CA 

# data[].attributes.subject
Re H (Parental responsibility) [1998] 1 FLR 855, CA 

# data[].attributes.body
A man F applied for a parental responsibility order and a contact order in respect of his son S. On finding as a fact that F had sadistically injured S, the judge refused parental responsibility and granted only supervised contact. Butler-Sloss LJ said the standard "tripartite test" for a parental responsibility order is based on the father's degree of commitment to the child, the degree of attachment between them, and the father's reasons for applying, but this is no more than a starting point. The child's welfare is the paramount consideration; in the instant case the judge had been right to refuse an order, even though the three criteria were met, and F's appeal failed.

# data[].attributes.headline
Re: G (A Child) (Domestic Violence: Direct Contact) [2001]  

# data[].attributes.subject
Re: G (A Child) (Domestic Violence: Direct Contact) [2001]  

# data[].attributes.body
A child was born to a Polish Romany mother and a Polish father. When the child was 3 years old, the mother died after being beaten by the father; the father was later convicted of manslaughter and imprisoned. The couple had a history of excessive drinking, arguments and violence by the father to the mother, although the father denied this.

The child was placed with Polish foster-parents who had known her previously. She was very disturbed when she was first placed with the foster-parents but her disturbed behaviour subsided after a time and only resurfaced when she was told that she was to visit her father.

The local authority applied for a full care order, the care plan being that the foster-parents would continue to care for the child long term with a view to adoption, and for leave to terminate direct contact between the child and her father. The father who denied responsibility for the mother’s death, serious drinking, and serious violence, sought direct regular contact while in prison, and parental responsibility.

Held

1. The court granted a full care order to the local authority, stating that the father was unsuitable to have care of the child in the foreseeable future, if ever, because of his excess drinking, his violence, his refusal to acknowledge his violence or the adverse effect which that violence had had on the child, his refusal to accept that the child had been suffering from nightmares and behaving in a disturbed way, and his refusal to accept that the child was reluctant to see him.

2.

3. The court gave the local authority permission to terminate direct contact between the father and the child. In particular, the reluctance of a young child to see a parent in cases involving serious domestic violence required careful consideration. There was very strong evidence that direct contact would be seriously disadvantageous to the child. However, indirect contact at Christmas and on birthdays should be provided

1. The court refused to grant parental responsibility to the father, stating that weighing up all relevant factors, including the father’s commitment to the child, the degree of attachment between them, his reasons for the application, his violence and failure to accept it and its effect on the child, meant that no order was appropriate for the time being.