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1947 - Mendez v Westminster: Paving the Way to School Desegregation

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1947 - Mendez v Westminster: Paving the Way to School Desegregation

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https://teachdemocracy.org/online-lessons/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-23-2-c-mendez-v-westminster-paving-the-way-to-school-desegregation

Additional Information - April 2022:

https://newsroom.ocde.us/the-final-ruling-in-mendez-v-westminster-which-ended-sanctioned-school-segregation-came-75-years-ago-today/

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1954 - Brown vs Topeka, Kansas Board of Education 

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1954 - Brown vs Topeka, Kansas Board of Education 

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Landmark case calling for an end to segregation in U.S. Schools.

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Brown v. Board of Education | BRI's Homework Help Series

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Bilingual Education Act (BEA), U.S. legislation (January 2, 1968) that provided federal grants to school districts for the purpose of establishing educational programs for children with limited English-speaking ability. It was the first time that the U.S. government officially acknowledged that these students need specialized instruction. The Bilingual Education Act (BEA) was an amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

Beginning in the late 19th century, millions of immigrants entered the United States, and many could not speak English. Some state governments pushed for assimilation, requiring non-English-speaking adults to take English-language classes. Children went to public schools, where they were totally immersed in the English language and often punished for speaking their native language. California and Texas established segregated public schools to accommodate the increase in Spanish-speaking children from Mexico. These schools concentrated on teaching English, but they had less funding than the schools for white non-Latino children and thus had inferior resources and underqualified teachers. Under these conditions many immigrant children dropped out or received an education that limited job opportunities.

In the ensuing years there were sporadic efforts to end school segregation, and these intensified in 1946 after a federal court ruled in that the segregation of Mexican American students in California schools was unlawful. More lawsuits followed, culminating in the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court found that racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional. This decision helped guide future educational policies toward equal opportunity. The civil rights movement and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-intending to end discrimination based on race, colour, religion, or national origin-also furthered equality in education.

Despite these developments, language difficulties continued to hamper the education of many Spanish-speaking students. In 1967 U.S. Sen. Ralph Yarborough of Texas introduced a bill to help school districts educate students with limited English-speaking ability. This was a particularly important issue in Texas and other southwestern states, which were experiencing an increase in Mexican immigration. The bill recommended bilingual education-including Spanish and other native languages-and funding was designated for developing programs, training staff, and obtaining educational resources. In 1968 U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson signed the BEA into law.

Over the years, the BEA underwent various revisions to meet the needs of students, parents, and teachers. For example, when first conceived, the act favoured school districts with high percentages of students from low-income families. Funding was later broadened to include students from a wider range of economic groups. The grants were also expanded to include more options for their use, such as for technical assistance and for the establishment of special training programs.

In January 2002 U.S. Pres. George W. Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. It sought to improve public primary and secondary schools and, thus, student performance via increased accountability for schools, school districts, and states. For example, states were required to administer yearly tests in reading and mathematics to public school students and to demonstrate adequate progress toward raising the scores of all students. (In 2015 U.S. Pres. Barack Obama signed into law the Every Student Succeeds Act, which modified NCLB.) Under NCLB the BEA became the English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement Act.

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Bilingual Education Act | Definition, 1968, Summary, & Facts

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Bilingual Education Act, U.S. legislation (1968) that offered federal grants to school districts for the purpose of creating educational programs for students with limited English-speaking ability. It was the first time that the U.S. government officially acknowledged that such students need specialized instruction.

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In Lau v. Nichols, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Department of Education's May 25, 1970, Memorandum, that directed school districts to take steps to help ELL students overcome language barriers and to ensure that they can participate meaningfully in the districts' educational programs.

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Resource Materials for Planning and Self-Assessments

Legal Background

School districts in many parts of the country are experiencing a substantial increase in the enrollment of national-origin-minority students who cannot speak, read, or write English well enough to participate meaningfully in educational programs without appropriate support services. In the absence of specific steps to address the language-related limitations experienced by such students, these students are at risk of losing the educational opportunities provided to students generally.

The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. In Lau v. Nichols, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Department of Education's May 25, 1970, Memorandum, that directed school districts to take steps to help ELL students overcome language barriers and to ensure that they can participate meaningfully in the districts' educational programs.

Department of Education policies regarding ELL children are reflected in three OCR policy documents. The May 1970 memorandum to school districts entitled "Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin" clarifies OCR policy under Title VI on the responsibility of school districts to provide equal educational opportunity to language minority students. The December 3, 1985, guidance document entitled "The Office for Civil Rights' Title VI Language Minority Compliance Procedures" outlines the procedures OCR follows in applying the May 1970 memorandum and the Lau legal standard on a case-by-case basis. The September 27, 1991, memorandum entitled "Policy Update on Schools' Obligations Toward National Origin Minority Students with Limited-English Proficiency (LEP)" is a policy update to be read in conjunction with the May 1970 and December 1985 memoranda. It provides additional guidance for applying the May 1970 and December 1985 memoranda in the context of staffing, transition and/or exit criteria, and program evaluation, as well as to special education programs, gifted and talented, and other special programs.

OCR does not require or advocate a particular program of instruction for ELL students and nothing in federal law requires one form of instruction over another. Under federal law, programs to educate children with limited proficiency in English must be: (1) based on a sound educational theory; (2) adequately supported so that the program has a realistic chance of success; and (3) periodically evaluated and revised, if necessary. These three fundamental principles of federal law are discussed below.

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civil rights; english (second language);

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Developing ELL Programs: Legal Background

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Legal background regarding OCR's role in the development and implementation of a program of services for ELL students.

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Castañeda v. Pickard: Are ELLs receiving the services they need?

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Plaintiffs alleged that handicapped Hispanic children required bilingual-bicultural special education programs and were not being promptly evaluated and placed.

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Jose P. v. Ambach, 557 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) case opinion from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York

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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 1990

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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 1990

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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a law that makes available a free appropriate public education to eligible children with disabilities throughout the nation and ensures special education and related services to those children.

The IDEA governs how states and public agencies provide early intervention, special education, and related services to more than 8 million (as of school year 2022-23) eligible infants, toddlers, children, and youth with disabilities.

Infants and toddlers, birth through age 2, with disabilities and their families receive early intervention services under IDEA Part C. Children and youth ages 3 through 21 receive special education and related services under IDEA Part B.

Additionally, the IDEA authorizes:

Formula grants to states to support special education and related services and early intervention services.

Discretionary grants to state educational agencies, institutions of higher education, and other nonprofit organizations to support research, demonstrations, technical assistance and dissemination, technology development, personnel preparation and development, and parent-training and -information centers.

Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 2004 and most recently amended the IDEA through Public Law 114-95, the Every Student Succeeds Act, in December 2015.

In the law, Congress states:

Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to society. Improving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.

Other Laws for Children with Disabilities

The U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights ( OCR) provides additional resources of interest for individuals with disabilities and their families.

OCR does not enforce the IDEA; however, OCR does enforce the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Title II rights of IDEA-eligible students with disabilities.

To learn more, visit the OCR's Frequently Asked Questions About Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities.

Visit OCR's website for additional resources, including Disability Discrimination FAQs.

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About IDEA - Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

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The IDEA is a law that makes available a free appropriate public education to eligible children with disabilities throughout the nation and ensures special education and related services to those children.

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Issa v. School District of Lancaster (3d Cir., 2016)

The ACLU of Pennsylvania, the Education Law Center, and pro bono counsel Pepper Hamilton LLP filed a federal lawsuit on July 19, 2016, alleging that the School District of Lancaster (SDOL) has been illegally refusing to enroll older immigrant students with limited English proficiency or diverting them to an inferior, privately operated disciplinary school, rather than allowing them to attend the district's regular high school. The plaintiffs include six refugees aged 17-21 from Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burma who have fled war, violence, and persecution in their native countries.

The problem of school districts refusing to enroll LEP students or placing them in sub-standard programs appears to be increasing around the country. This is the third federal lawsuit filed on this issue in the past fifteen months, with earlier cases filed against school districts in Utica, New York, and Collier County, Florida.

Click here to download a copy of the complaint. The case has been assigned Case No. 16-cv-3881.

Click here to view the original press release from July, 2016.

Click here to view the press release in response to the court's decision from August, 2016.

Click here to view the court's ruling on August 26, 2016.

Click here to view the Third Circuit's decision from January 30, 2017.

Click here to view our January 30, 2017 press release.

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The ACLU of Pennsylvania, the Education Law Center, and pro bono counsel Pepper Hamilton LLP filed a federal lawsuit on July 19, 2016, alleging that the School District of Lancaster (SDOL) has been illegally refusing to enroll older immigrant students with limited English proficiency or diverting them to an inferior, privately operated disciplinary school, rather than allowing them to attend the district's regular high school.

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262 U.S. 390

43 S.Ct. 625

67 L.Ed. 1042

MEYER
v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA.

No. 325.

Messrs. A. F. Mullen, of Omaha, Neb., C. E. Sandall, of York, Neb., and I. L. Albert, of Columbus, Neb., for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 391-393 intentionally omitted]

Messrs. Mason Wheeler, of Lincoln, Neb., and O. S. Spillman, of Pierce, Neb., for the State of Nebraska.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 393-395 intentionally omitted]

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska, under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had no attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information is based upon 'An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska,' approved April 9, 1919 (Laws 1919, c. 249), which follows:

'Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language than the English language.

'Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides.

'Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.

'Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and approval.'

The Supreme Court of the state affirmed the judgment of conviction. 107 Neb. 657, 187 N. W. 100. It declared the offense charged and established was 'the direct and intentional teaching of the German language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth grade,' in the parochial school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congre ation, a collection of Biblical stories being used therefore. And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, but was a valid exercise of the police power. The following excerpts from the opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the conclusion:

'The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The Legislature had seen the baneful effects of permitting for eigners, who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their children in the language of their native land. The result of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety. To allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear them with that language as their mother tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country. The statute, therefore, was intended not only to require that the education of all children be conducted in the English language, but that, until they had grown into that language and until it had become a part of them, they should not in the schools be taught any other language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state. Pohl v. State, 102 Ohio St. 474, 132 N. E. 20; State v. Bartels, 191 Iowa, 1060, 181 N. W. 508.

'It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of the state and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry, and prevents them, without reason, from having their children taught foreign languages in school. That argument is not well taken, for it assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the statute. The hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are limited. It must have ample time for exercise or play. Its daily capacity for learning is comparatively small. A selection of subjects for its education, therefore, from among the many that might be taught, is obviously necessary. The Legislature no doubt had in mind the practical operation of the law. The law affects few citizens, except those of foreign lineage.

Other citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps in rare instances, have never deemed it of importance to teach their children foreign languages before such children have reached the eighth grade. In the legislative mind, the salutary effect of the statute no doubt outweighed the restriction upon the citizens generally, which, it appears, was a restriction of no real consequence.'

The problem for our determination is whether the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment:

'No state * * * shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'

While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220; Minnesota v. Bar er, 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 259, 55 L. Ed. 328; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v. Tanner, 224 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337, 62 L. Ed. 772, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254; Adkins v. Children's Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. --; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147. The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect. Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385.

The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares:

'Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.'

Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws.

Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the amendment.

The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any subject except in English; also the teaching of any other language until the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth grade, which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. The Supreme Court of the state has held that 'the so-called ancient or dead languages' are not 'within the spirit or the purpose of the act.' Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod, etc., v. McKelvie et al. (Neb.) 187 N. W. 927 (April 19, 1922). Latin, Greek, Hebrew are not proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian, and every other alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.

It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals, and 'that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state.' It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereb hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled.

That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to imporve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution-a desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should provide:

'That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent. * * * The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.'

In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual and state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.

The desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every character of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the state and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic tranquility has been shown.

The power of the state to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the state's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports. Those matters are not within the present controversy. Our concern is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 594, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973, pointed out that mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful is not enough to justify its abolition, although regulation may be entirely proper. No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state.

As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language, leaving complete freedom as to other matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the ordinary child.

The judgment of the court belo must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissent.

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262 U.S. 390 43 S.Ct. 625 67 L.Ed. 1042 MEYERv.STATE OF NEBRASKA. No. 325. Messrs. A. F. Mullen, of Omaha, Neb., C. E. Sandall, of York, Neb., and I. L. Albert, of Columbus, Neb., for plaintiff in error. [Argument of Counsel from pages 391-393 intentionally omitted] Messrs.

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USDOE & USDOJ – Dear Colleague Letter: English Learner Students

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USDOE & USDOJ – Dear Colleague Letter: English Learner Students

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How a Third-Grade Reading Retention Law Will Affect ELLs in Michigan, and a Call for Research on Child ELL Reading Development on JSTOR

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PAULA WINKE, XIAOWAN ZHANG, How a Third-Grade Reading Retention Law Will Affect ELLs in Michigan, and a Call for Research on Child ELL Reading Development, TESOL Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2 (JUNE 2019), pp. 529-542

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https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/404/1215/

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Sylvia Mendez, 85, recalls the time her late mother asked if she knew why her family went to court over the right to attend Westminster's 17th Street School.

Sylvia, about 10 at the time, thought it was so she and her brothers could go to the campus with the beautiful playground. Her mother set the record straight.

"She says, 'No, Sylvia. That's not why we were fighting. We were fighting because under God we're all equal. And you belong at that school, just like everybody else belongs at that school. And that's what we were fighting for.'"

Today marks the 75th anniversary of the final ruling in the landmark case of Mendez v. Westminster, which struck down the legal justification for forced school segregation in California and paved the way for the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Brown v. Board decision.

U.S. District Court Judge Paul J. McCormick, who presided over the trial initiated by five Orange County families, ordered local school districts to end discriminatory practices against students of Mexican descent in February 1946. But that ruling was appealed to the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

And it was upheld there the following year - on April 14, 1947, to be exact.

"The Mendez case marks a critically important turning point not just for Orange County but for our entire nation, and its reverberations extended into all areas of society where separate-but-equal policies challenged equity for all citizens," Orange County Superintendent of Schools Dr. Al Mijares said

"Keep in mind these were regular families who emptied their bank accounts and spent years of their lives working to ensure access for generations of students they would never meet," Mijares said. "In that light, this anniversary is not about acknowledging a past injustice. It should be commemorated as an affirmation of our shared values and a reminder that ordinary people can do extraordinary things when they band together behind a just case and put children first."

Raising awareness

As groundbreaking as Mendez v. Westminster was, it wasn't widely known in the decades that followed - even in Orange County. But that began to change when Sylvia Mendez, one of the children at the heart of the civil rights case, began raising awareness at her mother's request.

In recent years, the Mendez case has been the subject of news articles, books and documentaries, and it was commemorated with a U.S. postage stamp. In 2000, the Santa Ana Unified School District opened Gonzalo Felicitas Mendez Fundamental Intermediate School, named after Mendez's parents. The Los Angeles Unified School District also named a high school after Gonzalo and Felicitas Mendez, who became the subject of a Google Doodle.

The family's story traveled full circle in 2019, when the Mendez family was celebrated by the Westminster School District, which permanently changed its marquee to read "In Honor of La Familia Mendez."

"This is such an honor for my father, Gonzalo, and mother, Felicitas Mendez," Sylvia Mendez said at the ceremony. "My father grew up here in Westminster, and we fought the case and won it. And after it was won, nobody said, 'Gracias, Gonzalo.' But look at the wonderful 'gracias' we are getting today from this wonderful school district."

Nearby Westminster High School also dedicated its new learning pavilion in Sylvia Mendez's honor. And OCDE, which produced a podcast on the case in 2017, has teamed up with the City of Westminster for the creation of an interactive park and trail to recognize Mendez v. Westminster and its enduring legacy. Both public spaces are set to open this year.

17th Street School

Felicitas and Gonzalo Mendez moved to Westminster in the early 1940s to rent a 40-acre farm owned by the Munemitsu family, which had been forced to relocate to an internment camp for Japanese Americans during the second World War.

In 1943, the Mendezes sought to enroll Sylvia, then 8, and her brothers Geronimo (Jerome) and Gonzalo, Jr. at 17th Street School, one of two elementary schools in the city. Sylvia Mendez would later recall its lush lawns and "beautiful playground." But 17th Street School only accepted White students.

"We would stop at that school every day and see those kids go in, but this playground was right next to the street, and in that playground they had monkey bars, they had a teeter-totter, they had swings, and my thing was that I always wanted to go to that school because of the playground," Sylvia Mendez told OCDE in 2017.

It was their aunt, Soledad Vidaurri, who took the three Mendez siblings to the campus to register. Vidaurri's children, who had lighter complexions and European surnames, would be allowed to enroll at 17th Street School, they were told by a clerk. But the Mendez children were directed to Hoover Elementary, which was designated for students of Mexican heritage.

Felicitas and Gonzalo Mendez were both American citizens, as were their children. Believing the denial was in error, they appealed to district and county officials. But their response was the same, prompting the family to hire Los Angeles attorney David Marcus, who had challenged segregation in public facilities in Riverside.

Four other Orange County families joined the legal fight through the names of their patriarchs - Lorenzo Ramirez of Orange, Frank Palomino of Garden Grove, and William Guzman and Thomas Estrada from Santa Ana.

The ensuing lawsuit, Mendez, et al v. Westminster, et al, contended that 5,000 children throughout the county were harmed by unjust discrimination policies. Under the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment, they argued, equal protection meant citizens could not be treated differently based on their race.

Pursuing justice

Marcus pursued an unusual strategy in the courtroom, according to a U.S. Courts summary. He argued that segregated schools produced feelings of inferiority among Mexican-American students, jeopardizing their ability to be productive Americans. Meanwhile, testimony from the children undercut the district's argument that a language barrier prevented the Mexican-American students from being served in traditional schools.

"I remember going (to court) every day and sitting in the front row," Sylvia Mendez said, "and not knowing what they were fighting for. I thought they were just fighting for me to get into the White school."

On Feb. 18, 1946, the five families won a major legal victory, with Judge McCormick ordering local school districts to cease "discriminatory practices against the pupils of Mexican descent in the public schools."

Equal protection in the public school system, the U.S. District Court judge stated, "is not provided by furnishing in separate schools the same technical facilities, textbooks and courses of instruction to children of Mexican ancestry that are available to the other public school children regardless of their ancestry. A paramount requisite in the American system of public education is social equality. It must be open to all children by unified school association regardless of lineage."

The ruling was upheld by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on April 14, 1947, exactly one day before Jackie Robinson made his major league debut with the Brooklyn Dodgers, breaking baseball's color barrier. Two months later, California Governor Earl Warren signed a bill outlawing school segregation across the state.

A ruling reverberates

Some California schools found ways to resist the law, and sanctioned segregation continued in other states across the country. But Mendez v. Westminster established the foundation for the U.S. Supreme Court to declare in 1954 that any laws promoting segregated schools were unconstitutional. That was decided in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, which upended the notion that racially segregated public facilities were legal as long as they were equal.

It's worth highlighting a couple of familiar names that are linked to both cases. Civil rights lawyer Thurgood Marshall - he would go on to become the first Black U.S. Supreme Court Justice - wrote an amicus brief supporting the Mendez plaintiffs on behalf of the NAACP. He was also the lead counsel in Brown v. Board, employing similar language.

And then there's Governor Warren, who became chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court six years after signing the legislation banning school segregation in California. He would ultimately author the unanimous Brown v. Board decision.

Gonzalo Mendez died in 1964 at age 51. His wife, Felicitas Mendez, died in 1998, but not before imploring her daughter to tell the family's story.

Sylvia Mendez went on to earn nursing degrees and worked for more than 30 years at the Los Angeles University of Southern California Medical Center. Since retiring as the assistant nursing director of the Pediatric Pavilion, she's continued to speak passionately about the case and the importance of education.

For these efforts, she was invited to the White House by President George W. Bush in 2004, and in 2011 she was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Barack Obama.

"This is the history of the United States, the history of California," she told the Los Angeles Times in 2016. "Mendez isn't just about Mexicans. It's about everybody coming together. If you start fighting for justice, then people of all ethnicities will become involved."

Here's a brief video that OCDE produced in 2018 to announce the local trail and monument park coming to Westminster.

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Mendez v. Westminster, which ended forced school segregation, concluded 75 years ago today

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Today marks the 75th anniversary of the final ruling in the landmark case of Mendez v. Westminster, which ended the legal justification for forced school segregation in California and paved the way for the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Brown v. Board decision.

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UPDATE: California will now break down data by English learner subgroup

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The latest education news updates from EdSource.

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Recently, there has been an increase in discrimination complaints involving English Learner (EL) students. EL students are those who have a native language other than English and are not proficient in listening, speaking, writing and/or reading English. As of January 2015, EL students accounted for nine percent of all public school students nationwide and were enrolled in nearly three out of every four public schools, with those numbers steadily rising. Given the increase in complaints against school districts in Ohio involving EL students, mirroring similar complaints being investigated by the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) nationwide, this is an issue that should be on the radar for building administrators.

Federal law protects EL students from discrimination and mandates that they be provided with language services to enable them to meaningfully participate in school programs and activities, both curricular and extracurricular. If EL students or their parents believe that they have been discriminated against or denied a meaningful opportunity to participate, they may file complaints with the OCR. This article highlights some of the issues that can arise with EL students and provides tips for legal compliance.
1. Understand your obligation to identify EL students and educate teachers about their role in the process.
Public schools are legally obligated to identify students who may be in need of language assistance - students age 3 to 21 who were not born in the United States or whose native language is a language other than English. EL students may be born in the United States and be U.S. citizens.
2. Keep in mind that limited English proficiency is not a disability.
Your district probably uses a home language survey in the enrollment process as the primary mechanism for identification, but if you or one of your staff encounters a student or parent who appears to be limited English proficient, you should determine whether they have previously been identified through the home language survey as needing language services. If not, you should follow up with your district administrator in charge of language services to notify them that the student's English proficiency may need to be assessed and/or that the parent may need language assistance when interacting with the school.
3. Be alert to the potential for unlawful discrimination against EL students.
EL students do have special needs and some of the legal rules that apply to them look similar to those that apply to special education students. As mentioned above, schools have an obligation to identify and assess EL students and to provide the language services they need. However, schools should not identify or determine that EL students are students with disabilities solely because of their limited English language proficiency.

Even if your district's special education department also oversees the EL program, the two processes should be kept separate. EL students should not be placed on an Individualized Education Program unless separately determined to need special education services. Similarly, EL students with disabilities who are determined to need special education services should be separately assessed to determine their need for language assistance and should be offered both the disability-related services and the language services they need.
4. If you are involved in hiring recommendations, know what qualifications to look for in teachers providing language support programs for EL students. 5. Promote conversation and collaboration between ESL teachers and other classroom teachers regarding teaching of EL students and provide professional development to teachers on this topic.
Discrimination or harassment may occur in the form of negative behavior by students or staff against EL students based on race, color, national origin or religion, which may violate your district's board policies or student code of conduct.
6. Consider the need for qualified interpreters and/or translators when communicating with limited English proficient parents.
Discrimination may also occur if EL students are denied meaningful access to school programs and activities. This means that you must not only provide alternative language services to EL students but also make sure they are not unduly segregated from other students. Depending on the student's level of proficiency, an EL student may need to be in a segregated English as a Second Language (ESL) classroom for part of his/her day, but that does not mean that the student should be segregated for non-academic subjects such as recess, physical education, art and music.

Legal issues can also arise if EL students are kept in a language assistance program longer than necessary. The ultimate goal for every EL student is to attain English proficiency and exit from the ESL program. In addition, EL students must not be retained in a grade based solely on a lack of English proficiency. Ohio law specifies that you can promote to fourth grade a student who does not test proficient in English language arts if the student is a limited English proficient student, has been enrolled in U.S. schools for less than three full school years and has had less than three years of instruction in an ESL program.

To implement an ESL program effectively, the instructors should be teachers specially qualified to provide language assistance services. To the extent possible, you should look to hire ESL teachers with TESOL (Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages), bilingual certification or endorsement or at least someone who is working towards such licensure.

ESL (or bilingual language program) teachers have the primary responsibility for providing language assistance to EL students, but it is important to remember that the classroom teacher can help EL students be successful by knowing their assessed level of English proficiency, how to speak to EL students (such as avoiding the use of slang or idioms), being familiar with the student's culture and modifying teaching strategies when necessary. Providing opportunities for conversation and collaboration between ESL teachers and other classroom teachers can make classroom teachers more aware of how they can help.

In addition, when you are preparing teacher in-service training, don't forget to include professional development on this topic. For many, this is required if your district receives Title III funding. (You may find more information to assist you on the Ohio Department of Education's website under Teaching English Language Learners and the Lau Resource Center.)

Guidance from the OCR indicates that to enable limited English proficient (LEP) parents to meaningfully participate in their children's education, schools must try to communicate with them in a language they can understand. This typically means providing qualified interpreters and, sometimes, translated documents for such significant matters as student disciplinary proceedings, parent-teacher conferences, and special education eligibility and placement determinations. Therefore, it is important to familiarize yourself and your staff with your district's practices and procedures for obtaining interpreters for parent meetings and for translating documents provided to parents such as parent-teacher conference notices, codes of conduct, disciplinary notices and building newsletters.

For detailed information about the federal legal requirements applicable to EL students, see OCR's Dear Colleague letter issued January 7, 2015.

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English Learner students: Do you know your legal obligations?

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Recently, there has been an increase in discrimination complaints involving English Learner (EL) students.

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At a glance

IDEA is the nation's special education law.

Schools must find and evaluate students thought to have disabilities - at no cost to families.

To qualify for IDEA services, a child must have a disability and need special education to make progress in school.

To get special education services for a child, you have to follow a legal process. The most important law for this process is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

IDEA is the nation's special education law. It gives rights and protections to kids with disabilities. It covers them from birth through high school graduation or age 21 (whichever comes first). Parents and legal guardians also have rights under the law.

IDEA places two big responsibilities on states and their public schools.

Schools must find and evaluate students who may have disabilities, at no cost to families. This is known as Child Find. If a child has a qualifying disability, schools must offer special education and related services (like speech therapy and counseling) to meet the child's unique needs. These are provided through an Individualized Education Program (IEP). The goal is to help students make progress in school.

Second, schools have to give parents a voice in their child's education. At every point in the process, IDEA gives parents specific rights and protections. These are called procedural safeguards. For example, one safeguard is that a school must get consent from parents before providing services to kids.

The reach of IDEA goes beyond traditional public schools. It includes public magnet and charter schools. The law also provides early intervention services to infants and toddlers up to age 3. Finally, IDEA may impact some students in private schools.

Dive deeper

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What is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?

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What is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)? IDEA is a federal law that lays out children's rights in special education. Here's how it works.

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457 U.S. 202

102 S.Ct. 2382

72 L.Ed.2d 786

James PLYLER, Superintendent of the Tyler Independent School District and Its Board of Trustees et al., Appellants,
v.
J. and R. DOE et al. TEXAS, et al., Appellants, v. CERTAIN NAMED AND UNNAMED UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN CHILDREN et al.

Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934.

See 458 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 14.

Held : A Texas statute which withholds from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorizes local school districts to deny enrollment to such children, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 210-230.

(a) The illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases challenging the statute may claim the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause, which provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term. This Court's prior cases recognizing that illegal aliens are "persons" protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which Clauses do not include the phrase "within its jurisdiction," cannot be distinguished on the asserted ground that persons who have entered the country illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within its boundaries and subject to its laws. Nor do the logic and history of the Fourteenth Amendment support such a construction. Instead, use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" confirms the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory. Pp. 210-216.

(b) The discrimination contained in the Texas statute cannot be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State. Although undocumented resident aliens cannot be treated as a "suspect class," and although education is not a "fundamental right," so as to require the State to justify the statutory classification by showing that it serves a compelling governmental interest, nevertheless the Texas statute imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. These children can neither affect their parents' conduct nor their own undocumented status. The deprivation of public education is not like the deprivation of some other governmental benefit. Public education has a pivotal role in maintaining the fabric of our society and in sustaining our political and cultural heritage: the deprivation of education takes an inestimable toll on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and poses an obstacle to individual achievement. In determining the rationality of the Texas statute, its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children may properly be considered. Pp. 216-224.

(c) The undocumented status of these children vel non does not establish a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits that the State affords other residents. It is true that when faced with an equal protection challenge respecting a State's differential treatment of aliens, the courts must be attentive to congressional policy concerning aliens. But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the legislative record, no national policy is perceived that might justify the State in denying these children an elementary education. Pp. 224-226.

(d) Texas' statutory classification cannot be sustained as furthering its interest in the "preservation of the state's limited resources for the education of its lawful residents." While the State might have an interest in mitigating potentially harsh economic effects from an influx of legal immigrants, the Texas statute does not offer an effective method of dealing with the problem. Even assuming that the net impact of illegal aliens on the economy is negative, charging tuition to undocumented children constitutes an ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration, at least when compared with the alternative of prohibiting employment of illegal aliens. Nor is there any merit to the suggestion that undocumented children are appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on the State's ability to provide high-quality public education. The record does not show that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State. Neither is there any merit to the claim that undocumented children are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the State's boundaries and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State. Pp. 2400-2402.

No. 80-1538, 5th Cir., 628 F.2d 448, and No. 80-1934, affirmed.

Richard L. Arnett, Austin, Tex., for State of Tex. et al.

John C. Hardy, Tyler, Tex., for James L. Plyler et al.

Peter A. Schey, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees in No. 80-1934.

Peter D. Roos, San Francisco, Cal., for appellees in 80-1538.

[Amicus Curiae Information from pages 204-205 intentionally omitted]

Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

* Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime, 8 U.S.C. § 1325, and those who have entered unlawfully are subject to deportation, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252 (1976 ed. and Supp.IV). But despite the existence of these legal restrictions, a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering the United States, and now live within various States, including the State of Texas.

No. 80-1538

Plyler v. Doe

In considering this motion, the District Court made extensive findings of fact. The court found that neither § 21.031 nor the School District policy implementing it had "either the purpose or effect of keeping illegal aliens out of the State of Texas." 458 F.Supp. 569, 575 (1978). Respecting defendants' further claim that § 21.031 was simply a financial measure designed to avoid a drain on the State's fisc, the court recognized that the increases in population resulting from the immigration of Mexican nationals into the United States had created problems for the public schools of the State, and that these problems were exacerbated by the special educational needs of immigrant Mexican children. The court noted, however, that the increase in school enrollment was primarily attributable to the admission of children who were legal residents. Id., at 575-576. It also found that while the "exclusion of all undocumented children from the public schools in Texas would eventually result in economies at some level," id., at 576, funding from both the State and Federal Governments was based primarily on the number of children enrolled. In net effect then, barring undocumented children from the schools would save money, but it would "not necessarily" improve "the quality of education." Id., at 577. The court further observed that the impact of § 21.031 was borne primarily by a very small subclass of illegal aliens, "entire families who have migrated illegally and-for all practical purposes-permanently to the United States." Id., at 578. 3 Finally, the court noted that under current laws and practices "the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow," 4 and that without an education, these undocumented children, "[a]lready disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices, . . . will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic class." Id., at 577.

The District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that § 21.031 violated that Clause. Suggesting that "the state's exclusion of undocumented children from its public schools . . . may well be the type of invidiously motivated state action for which the suspect classification doctrine was designed," the court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the statute would survive a "strict scrutiny" analysis because, in any event, the discrimination embodied in the statute was not supported by a rational basis. Id., at 585. The District Court also concluded that the Texas statute violated the Supremacy Clause. 5 Id., at 590-592.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the District Court's injunction. 628 F.2d 448 (1980). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in finding the Texas statute pre-empted by federal law. 6 With respect to equal protection, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all essential respects the analysis of the District Court, id., at 454-458, concluding that § 21.031 was "constitutionally infirm regardless of whether it was tested using the mere rational basis standard or some more stringent test," id., at 458. We noted probable jurisdiction. 451 U.S. 968, 101 S.Ct. 2044, 68 L.Ed.2d 347 (1981).

No. 80-1934

In re Alien Children Education Litigation

During 1978 and 1979, suits challenging the constitutionality of § 21.031 and various local practices undertaken on the authority of that provision were filed in the United States District Courts for the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas. Each suit named the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency as defendants, along with local officials. In November 1979, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, on motion of the State, consolidated the claims against the state officials into a single action to be heard in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. A hearing was conducted in February and March 1980. In July 1980, the court entered an opinion and order holding that § 21.031 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F.Supp. 544. 7 The court held that "the absolute deprivation of education should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is the result of complete inability to pay for the desired benefit." Id., at 582. The court determined that the State's concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling state interest, id., at 582-583; that exclusion of these children had not been shown to be necessary to improve education within the State, id., at 583; and that the educational needs of the children statutorily excluded were not different from the needs of children not excluded, ibid. The court therefore concluded that § 21.031 was not carefully tailored to advance the asserted state interest in an acceptable manner. Id., at 583-584. While appeal of the District Court's decision was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in No. 80-1538. Apparently on the strength of that opinion, the Court of Appeals, on February 23, 1981, summarily affirmed the decision of the Southern District. We noted probable jurisdiction, 452 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 3078, 69 L.Ed.2d 950 (1981), and consolidated this case with No. 80-1538 for briefing and argument. 8

II

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis added.) Appellants argue at the outset that undocumented aliens, because of their immigration status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction" of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no right to the equal protection of Texas law. We reject this argument. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212, 73 S.Ct. 625, 629, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 S.Ct. 977, 981, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). Indeed, we have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal Government. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1890, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976). 9

Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection to persons within its jurisdiction while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants' view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within a State's boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that constricting construction of the phrase "within its jurisdiction." 10 We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due process. To the contrary, we have recognized that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state authority.

"The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo, supra, at 369, 6 S.Ct., at 1070 (emphasis added).

In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the United States," including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State. Wong Wing, supra, at 238, 16 S.Ct., at 981. 11 Our cases applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme: 12

There is simply no support for appellants' suggestion that "due process" is somehow of greater stature than "equal protection" and therefore available to a larger class of persons. To the contrary, each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an elementary limitation on state power. To permit a State to employ the phrase "within its jurisdiction" in order to identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as beyond its jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the obligation to assure that its laws are designed and applied equally to those persons, would undermine the principal purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection.

Although the congressional debate concerning § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was limited, that debate clearly confirms the understanding that the phrase "within its jurisdiction" was intended in a broad sense to offer the guarantee of equal protection to all within a State's boundaries, and to all upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its laws. Indeed, it appears from those debates that Congress, by using the phrase "person within its jurisdiction," sought expressly to ensure that the equal protection of the laws was provided to the alien population. Representative Bingham reported to the House the draft resolution of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (H.R. 63) that was to become the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1866). Two days later, Bingham posed the following question in support of the resolution:

"Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?" Id., at 1090.

Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Senate, was no less explicit about the broad objectives of the Amendment, and the intention to make its provisions applicable to all who "may happen to be" within the jurisdiction of a State: "The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another. . . . It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may happen to be within their jurisdiction." Id., at 2766 (emphasis added).

Use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory. That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction-either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States-he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish.

III

The Equal Protection Clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920). But so too, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124 (1940). The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the legislatures of the States. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.

But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification. The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises. Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect class," 14 or that impinge upon the exercise of a "fundamental right." 15 With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State. 16 We turn to a consideration of the standard appropriate for the evaluation of § 21.031.

Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial "shadow population" of illegal migrants-numbering in the millions-within our borders. 17 This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. 18 The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law. 19

The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. Their "parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms," and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 1465, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977). Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.

"[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the . . . child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent." Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1406, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972) (footnote omitted).

Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. Nor is undocumented status an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action. But § 21.031 is directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control. It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the United States. Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of § 21.031.

Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1298, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction. The "American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 43 S.Ct. 625, 627, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government," Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1575, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on which our society rests." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76, 99 S.Ct. 1589, 1594, 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979). "[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1536, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). And these historic "perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists." Ambach v. Norwick, supra, 411 U.S., at 77, 99 S.Ct., at 1594. In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.

In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority. But more directly, "education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S., at 221, 92 S.Ct., at 1536. Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. 20 What we said 28 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), still holds true:

B

IV

It is the State's principal argument, and apparently the view of the dissenting Justices, that the undocumented status of these children vel non establishes a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits that a State might choose to afford other residents. The State notes that while other aliens are admitted "on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws," Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1143, 92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948), the asserted right of these children to an education can claim no implicit congressional imprimatur. 21 Indeed, in the State's view, Congress' apparent disapproval of the presence of these children within the United States, and the evasion of the federal regulatory program that is the mark of undocumented status, provides authority for its decision to impose upon them special disabilities. Faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens, we agree that the courts must be attentive to congressional policy; the exercise of congressional power might well affect the State's prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens. But we are unable to find in the congressional immigration scheme any statement of policy that might weigh significantly in arriving at an equal protection balance concerning the State's authority to deprive these children of an education.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." Art. I., § 8, cl. 4. Drawing upon this power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our borders. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-589, 72 S.Ct. 512, 518-519, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952). The obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this field. Mathews, supra, at 81, 96 S.Ct., at 1892. But this traditional caution does not persuade us that unusual deference must be shown the classification embodied in § 21.031. The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). This power is "committed to the political branches of the Federal Government." Mathews, 426 U.S., at 81, 96 S.Ct., at 1892. Although it is "a routine and normally legitimate part" of the business of the Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status, id., at 85, 96 S.Ct., at 1894, and to "take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country," id., at 80, 96 S.Ct., at 1891, only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a State. See Id., at 84-85, 96 S.Ct., at 1893-1894; Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7, n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124, n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977).

As we recognized in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976), the States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal. In DeCanas, the State's program reflected Congress' intention to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work in this country. Id., at 361, 96 S.Ct., at 939. In contrast, there is no indication that the disability imposed by § 21.031 corresponds to any identifiable congressional policy. The State does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources was ever a congressional concern in restricting immigration. More importantly, the classification reflected in § 21.031 does not operate harmoniously within the federal program.

To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States unlawfully, these children are subject to deportation. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252 (1976 ed. and Supp.IV). But there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253(h), 1254 (1976 ed. and Supp.IV). In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed. It would of course be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.

We are reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold from these children, for so long as they are present in this country through no fault of their own, access to a basic education. In other contexts, undocumented status, coupled with some articulable federal policy, might enhance state authority with respect to the treatment of undocumented aliens. But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these children an elementary education. The State may borrow the federal classification. But to justify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to " the purposes for which the state desires to use it." Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 664-665, 68 S.Ct. 269, 284, 92 L.Ed. 249 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). We therefore turn to the state objectives that are said to support § 21.031.

V

Appellants argue that the classification at issue furthers an interest in the "preservation of the state's limited resources for the education of its lawful residents." 22 Brief for Appellants 26. Of course, a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-375, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1853, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). The State must do more than justify its classification with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate. Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 2282, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976). Apart from the asserted state prerogative to act against undocumented children solely on the basis of their undocumented status-an asserted prerogative that carries only minimal force in the circumstances of these cases-we discern three colorable state interests that might support § 21.031.

First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may seek to protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants. While a State might have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic effects of sudden shifts in population, 23 § 21.031 hardly offers an effective method of dealing with an urgent demographic or economic problem. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's economy. To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc. 458 F.Supp., at 578; 501 F.Supp., at 570-571. The dominant incentive for illegal entry into the State of Texas is the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to the State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free education. 24 Thus, even making the doubtful assumption that the net impact of illegal aliens on the economy of the State is negative, we think it clear that "[c]harging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration," at least when compared with the alternative of prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens. 458 F.Supp., at 585. See 628 F.2d, at 461; 501 F.Supp., at 579 and n. 88.

Second, while it is apparent that a State may "not . . . reduce expenditures for education by barring [some arbitrarily chosen class of] children from its schools," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on the State's ability to provide high-quality public education. But the record in no way supports the claim that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State. 25 As the District Court in No. 80-1934 noted, the State failed to offer any "credible supporting evidence that a proportionately small diminution of the funds spent on each child [which might result from devoting some state funds to the education of the excluded group] will have a grave impact on the quality of education." 501 F.Supp., at 583. And, after reviewing the State's school financing mechanism, the District Court in No. 80-1538 concluded that barring undocumented children from local schools would not necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those schools. 458 F.Supp., at 577. Of course, even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are "basically indistinguishable" from legally resident alien children. Id., at 589; 501 F.Supp., at 583, and n. 104.

Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State. Even assuming that such an interest is legitimate, it is an interest that is most difficult to quantify. The State has no assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the education provided by the State within the confines of the State's borders. In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.

VI

If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is

Justice MARSHALL, concurring.

While I join the Court's opinion, I do so without in any way retreating from my opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1315-1348, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (dissenting opinion). I continue to believe that an individual's interest in education is fundamental, and that this view is amply supported "by the unique status accorded public education by our society, and by the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional values." Id., at 111, 93 S.Ct., at 1336. Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn." Id., at 99, 93 S.Ct., at 1330. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-521, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1178-1180, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). It continues to be my view that a class-based denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice BLACKMUN, concurring.

I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

The "fundamental rights" aspect of the Court's equal protection analysis-the now-familiar concept that governmental classifications bearing on certain interests must be closely scrutinized-has been the subject of some controversy. Justice Harlan, for example, warned that "[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights. . . . [T]o extend the 'compelling interest' rule to all cases in which such rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.' " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1345, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Others have noted that strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is unnecessary when classifications infringing enumerated constitutional rights are involved, for "a state law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law's purpose or effect is to create any classifications." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1311, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 659, 89 S.Ct., at 1344 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Still others have suggested that fundamental rights are not properly a part of equal protection analysis at all, because they are unrelated to any defined principle of equality. 1

These considerations, combined with doubts about the judiciary's ability to make fine distinctions in assessing the effects of complex social policies, led the Court in Rodriguez to articulate a firm rule: fundamental rights are those that "explicitly or implicitly [are] guaranteed by the Constitution." 411 U.S., at 33- 34, 93 S.Ct., 1296-1297. It therefore squarely rejected the notion that "an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance" of a given interest is relevant to the level of scrutiny accorded classifications involving that interest, id., at 32, 93 S.Ct., at 1296, and made clear that "[i]t is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." Id., at 33, 93 S.Ct., at 1296.

I joined Justice POWELL's opinion for the Court in Rodriguez, and I continue to believe that it provides the appropriate model for resolving most equal protection disputes. Classifications infringing substantive constitutional rights necessarily will be invalid, if not by force of the Equal Protection Clause, then through operation of other provisions of the Constitution. Conversely, classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests even those involving "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)-generally are not subject to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, because they are not distinguishable in any relevant way from other regulations in "the area of economics and social welfare." Ibid.

With all this said, however, I believe the Court's experience has demonstrated that the Rodriguez formulation does not settle every issue of "fundamental rights" arising under the Equal Protection Clause. Only a pedant would insist that there are no meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States, and Rodriguez does not stand for quite so absolute a proposition. To the contrary, Rodriguez implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in equal protection analysis. Thus, the Court's decisions long have accorded strict scrutiny to classifications bearing on the right to vote in state elections, and Rodriguez confirmed the "constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process." 411 U.S., at 34, n. 74, 93 S.Ct., at 1297, n. 74. Yet "the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right," id., at 35, n. 78, 93 S.Ct., at 1319, n. 78. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1080, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 59, n. 2, 93 S.Ct., at 1310, n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Instead, regulation of the electoral process receives unusual scrutiny because "the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). In other words, the right to vote is accorded extraordinary treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen 2 cannot hope to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior right of participation in the political process. Those denied the vote are relegated, by state fiat, in a most basic way to second-class status.

It is arguable, of course, that the Court never should have applied fundamental rights doctrine in the fashion outlined above. Justice Harlan, for one, maintained that strict equal protection scrutiny was appropriate only when racial or analogous classifications were at issue. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 658- 663, 89 S.Ct., at 1344-1346 (dissenting opinion). See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S., at 590- 591, 84 S.Ct., at 1396 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But it is too late to debate that point, and I believe that accepting the principle of the voting cases-the idea that state classifications bearing on certain interests pose the risk of allocating rights in a fashion inherently contrary to any notion of "equality"-dictates the outcome here. As both Justice POWELL and THE CHIEF JUSTICE observe, the Texas scheme inevitably will create "a subclass of illiterate persons," post, at 241 (POWELL, J., concurring); see post, at 242, 254 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); where I differ with THE CHIEF JUSTICE is in my conclusion that this makes the statutory scheme unconstitutional as well as unwise.

In my view, when the State provides an education to some and denies it to others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with those purposes, mentioned above, of the Equal Protection Clause. Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve. And when those children are members of an identifiable group, that group-through the State's action-will have been converted into a discrete underclass. Other benefits provided by the State, such as housing and public assistance, are of course important; to an individual in immediate need, they may be more desirable than the right to be educated. But classifications involving the complete denial of education are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions. Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 115, n. 74, 93 S.Ct., at 1338, n. 74 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class social status; the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage.

This conclusion is fully consistent with Rodriguez. The Court there reserved judgment on the constitutionality of a state system that "occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children," noting that "no charge fairly could be made that the system [at issue in Rodriguez] fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire . . . basic minimal skills." Id., at 37, 93 S.Ct., at 1299. And it cautioned that in a case "involv[ing] the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, . . . [the] Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels." Id., at 42, 93 S.Ct., at 1301. Thus Rodriguez held, and the Court now reaffirms, that "a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its population." Ante, at 223. Similarly, it is undeniable that education is not a "fundamental right" in the sense that it is constitutionally guaranteed. Here, however, the State has undertaken to provide an education to most of the children residing within its borders. And, in contrast to the situation in Rodriguez, it does not take an advanced degree to predict the effects of a complete denial of education upon those children targeted by the State's classification. In such circumstances, the voting decisions suggest that the State must offer something more than a rational basis for its classification. 3

Concededly, it would seem ironic to discuss the social necessity of an education in a case that concerned only undocumented aliens "whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal." Post, at 250 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). But because of the nature of the federal immigration laws and the pre-eminent role of the Federal Government in regulating immigration, the class of children here is not a monolithic one. Thus, the District Court in the Alien Children Education case found as a factual matter that a significant number of illegal aliens will remain in this country permanently, 501 F.Supp. 544, 558-559 (SD Tex.1980); that some of the children involved in this litigation are "documentable," id., at 573; and that "[m]any of the undocumented children are not deportable. None of the named plaintiffs is under an order of deportation." Id., at 583, n. 103. As the Court's alienage cases demonstrate, these children may not be denied rights that are granted to citizens, excepting only those rights bearing on political interests. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977). And, as Justice POWELL notes, the structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported. Post, at 240-241, n. 6. Indeed, any attempt to do so would involve the State in the administration of the immigration laws. Whatever the State's power to classify deportable aliens, then-and whatever the Federal Government's ability to draw more precise and more acceptable alienage classifications-the statute at issue here sweeps within it a substantial number of children who will in fact, and who may well be entitled to, remain in the United States. Given the extraordinary nature of the interest involved, this makes the classification here fatally imprecise. And, as the Court demonstrates, the Texas legislation is not otherwise supported by any substantial interests.

Because I believe that the Court's carefully worded analysis recognizes the importance of the equal protection and preemption interests I consider crucial, I join its opinion as well as its judgment.

Justice POWELL, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to emphasize the unique character of the cases before us.

The classification in question severely disadvantages children who are the victims of a combination of circumstances. Access from Mexico into this country, across our 2,000-mile border, is readily available and virtually uncontrollable. Illegal aliens are attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps by other benefits as well. This is a problem of serious national proportions, as the Attorney General recently has recognized. See ante, at 218-219, n. 17. Perhaps because of the intractability of the problem, Congress-vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens-has not provided effective leadership in dealing with this problem. 1 It therefore is certain that illegal aliens will continue to enter the United States and, as the record makes clear, an unknown percentage of them will remain here. I agree with the Court that their children should not be left on the streets uneducated.

Our review in a case such as these is properly heightened. 2 See id., at 767, 97 S.Ct., at 1463. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). The classification at issue deprives a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded all other children simply because they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by their parents. These children thus have been singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State's interests be substantial and that the means bear a "fair and substantial relation" to these interests. 3 See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265, 99 S.Ct. 518, 523, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978) ("classifications based on illegitimacy . . . are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests"); id., at 271, 99 S.Ct., at 526 ("[a]s the State's interests are substantial, we now consider the means adopted").

Chief Justice BURGER, with whom Justice WHITE, Justice REHNQUIST, and Justice O'CONNOR join, dissenting.

Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children-including illegal aliens-of an elementary education. I fully agree that it would be folly-and wrong-to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our language. 1 However, the Constitution does not constitute us as "Platonic Guardians" nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, "wisdom," or "common sense." See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-195, 98 S.Ct. 2278, 2301-2302, 57 L.Ed.2d 312 (1978). We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.

The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders. 2 See ante, at 237-238 (POWELL, J., concurring). The failure of enforcement of the immigration laws over more than a decade and the inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma. It is a dilemma that has not yet even been fully assessed, let alone addressed. However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide "effective leadership" simply because the political branches of government fail to do so.

* In a sense, the Court's opinion rests on such a unique confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for little beyond the results in these particular cases. Yet the extent to which the Court departs from principled constitutional adjudication is nonetheless disturbing.

I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically "within the jurisdiction" of a state. However, as the Court concedes, this "only begins the inquiry." Ante, at 215. The Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of different categories of persons. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 1732, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147-148, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124 (1940).

The dispositive issue in these cases, simply put, is whether, for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a state has a legitimate reason to differentiate between persons who are lawfully within the state and those who are unlawfully there. The distinction the State of Texas has drawn-based not only upon its own legitimate interests but on classifications established by the Federal Government in its immigration laws and policies-is not unconstitutional.

A.

The Court acknowledges that, except in those cases when state classifications disadvantage a "suspect class" or impinge upon a "fundamental right," the Equal Protection Clause permits a state "substantial latitude" in distinguishing between different groups of persons. Ante, at 216-217. Moreover, the Court expressly-and correctly-rejects any suggestion that illegal aliens are a suspect class, ante, at 219, n. 19, or that education is a fundamental right, ante, at 221,223. Yet by patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.

In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are deprived of a public education, see ante, at 223-224. 3 If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is a prime example.

The Court first suggests that these illegal alien children, although not a suspect class, are entitled to special solicitude under the Equal Protection Clause because they lack "control" over or "responsibility" for their unlawful entry into this country. Ante, at 220, 223-224. Similarly, the Court appears to take the position that § 21.031 is presumptively "irrational" because it has the effect of imposing "penalties" on "innocent" children. Ibid. See also ante, at 2406 (POWELL, J., concurring). 4 However, the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude legislators from classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics over which individuals may be said to lack "control." Indeed, in some circumstances persons generally, and children in particular, may have little control over or responsibility for such things as their ill health, need for public assistance, or place of residence. Yet a state legislature is not barred from considering, for example, relevant differences between the mentally healthy and the mentally ill, or between the residents of different counties, 5 simply because these may be factors unrelated to individual choice or to any "wrongdoing." The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary and irrational classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming from prejudice and hostility; it is not an all-encompassing "equalizer" designed to eradicate every distinction for which persons are not "responsible." The Court does not presume to suggest that appellees' purported lack of culpability for their illegal status prevents them from being deported or otherwise "penalized" under federal law. Yet would deportation be any less a "penalty" than denial of privileges provided to legal residents? 6 Illegality of presence in the United States does not-and need not-depend on some amorphous concept of "guilt" or "innocence" concerning an alien's entry. Similarly, a state's use of federal immigration status as a basis for legislative classification is not necessarily rendered suspect for its failure to take such factors into account.

The Court's analogy to cases involving discrimination against illegitimate children-see ante, at 220; ante, at 238-239 (POWELL, J., concurring)-is grossly misleading. The State has not thrust any disabilities upon appellees due to their "status of birth." Cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1407, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). Rather, appellees' status is predicated upon the circumstances of their concededly illegal presence in this country, and is a direct result of Congress' obviously valid exercise of its "broad constitutional powers" in the field of immigration and naturalization. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1142, 92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948). This Court has recognized that in allocating governmental benefits to a given class of aliens, one "may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1891, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976). When that "relationship" is a federally prohibited one, there can, of course, be no presumption that a state has a constitutional duty to include illegal aliens among the recipients of its governmental benefits. 7

(2)

The second strand of the Court's analysis rests on the premise that, although public education is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, "neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." Ante, at 221. Whatever meaning or relevance this opaque observation might have in some other context, 8 it simply has no bearing on the issues at hand. Indeed, it is never made clear what the Court's opinion means on this score.

The importance of education is beyond dispute. Yet we have held repeatedly that the importance of a governmental service does not elevate it to the status of a "fundamental right" for purposes of equal protection analysis. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1295, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74, 92 S.Ct. 862, 874, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). In San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, Justice POWELL, speaking for the Court, expressly rejected the proposition that state laws dealing with public education are subject to special scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the Court points to no meaningful way to distinguish between education and other governmental benefits in this context. Is the Court suggesting that education is more "fundamental" than food, shelter, or medical care?

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of similarly situated persons, but it does not mandate a constitutional hierarchy of governmental services. Justice POWELL, speaking for the Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, 411 U.S., at 31, 93 S.Ct., at 1295, put it well in stating that to the extent this Court raises or lowers the degree of "judicial scrutiny" in equal protection cases according to a transient Court majority's view of the societal importance of the interest affected, we "assum[e] a legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence." Yet that is precisely what the Court does today. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655-661, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1342-1345, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

B

Once it is conceded-as the Court does-that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161-1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); see ante, at 216. 9

The State contends primarily that § 21.031 serves to prevent undue depletion of its limited revenues available for education, and to preserve the fiscal integrity of the State's school-financing system against an ever-increasing flood of illegal aliens-aliens over whose entry or continued presence it has no control. Of course such fiscal concerns alone could not justify discrimination against a suspect class or an arbitrary and irrational denial of benefits to a particular group of persons. Yet I assume no Member of this Court would argue that prudent conservation of finite state revenues is per se an illegitimate goal. Indeed, the numerous classifications this Court has sustained in social welfare legislation were invariably related to the limited amount of revenues available to spend on any given program or set of programs. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S., at 549- 551, 92 S.Ct., at 1733-1734; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 487, 90 S.Ct., at 1162. The significant question here is whether the requirement of tuition from illegal aliens who attend the public schools-as well as from residents of other states, for example-is a rational and reasonable means of furthering the State's legitimate fiscal ends. 10

Without laboring what will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply is not "irrational" for a state to conclude that it does not have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully present. By definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state may reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the state. 11 In DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357, 96 S.Ct. 933, 937, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976), we held that a State may protect its "fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the deleterious effects on its economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens." And only recently this Court made clear that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its schools and "the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2237, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973) (emphasis added). See also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 663-668, 98 S.Ct. 1338, 1348-1350, 55 L.Ed.2d 614 (1978). The Court has failed to offer even a plausible explanation why illegality of residence in this country is not a factor that may legitimately bear upon the bona fides of state residence and entitlement to the benefits of lawful residence. 12

It is significant that the Federal Government has seen fit to exclude illegal aliens from numerous social welfare programs, such as the food stamp program, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) (1976 ed. and Supp.IV) and 7 CFR § 273.4 (1981), the old-age assistance, aid to families with dependent children, aid to the blind, aid to the permanently and totally disabled, and supplemental security income programs, 45 CFR § 233.50 (1981), the Medicare hospital insurance benefits program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2 and 42 CFR § 405.205(b) (1981), and the Medicaid hospital insurance benefits for the aged and disabled program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 o and 42 CFR § 405.103(a)(4) (1981). Although these exclusions do not conclusively demonstrate the constitutionality of the State's use of the same classification for comparable purposes, at the very least they tend to support the rationality of excluding illegal alien residents of a state from such programs so as to preserve the state's finite revenues for the benefit of lawful residents. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S., at 80, 96 S.Ct., at 1891; see also n. 7, supra.

The Court maintains-as if this were the issue-that "barring undocumented children from local schools would not necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those schools." Ante, at 229. See 458 F.Supp. 569, 577 (ED Tex.1978). 13 However, the legitimacy of barring illegal aliens from programs such as Medicare or Medicaid does not depend on a showing that the barrier would "improve the quality" of medical care given to persons lawfully entitled to participate in such programs. Modern education, like medical care, is enormously expensive, and there can be no doubt that very large added costs will fall on the State or its local school districts as a result of the inclusion of illegal aliens in the tuition-free public schools. The State may, in its discretion, use any savings resulting from its tuition requirement to "improve the quality of education" in the public school system, or to enhance the funds available for other social programs, or to reduce the tax burden placed on its residents; each of these ends is "legitimate." The State need not show, as the Court implies, that the incremental cost of educating illegal aliens will send it into bankruptcy, or have a " 'grave impact on the quality of education,' " ante, at 229; that is not dispositive under a "rational basis" scrutiny. In the absence of a constitutional imperative to provide for the education of illegal aliens, the State may "rationally" choose to take advantage of whatever savings will accrue from limiting access to the tuition-free public schools to its own lawful residents, excluding even citizens of neighboring States. 14

II

The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S., at 74, 92 S.Ct., at 874. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-625, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1414, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, when this Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet another example of unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute to the weakening of our political processes. 15

Congress, "vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens," ante, at 237 (POWELL, J., concurring), bears primary responsibility for addressing the problems occasioned by the millions of illegal aliens flooding across our southern border. Similarly, it is for Congress, and not this Court, to assess the "social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests." Ante, at 221; see ante, at 223-224. While the "specter of a permanent caste" of illegal Mexican residents of the United States is indeed a disturbing one, see ante, at 218-219, it is but one segment of a larger problem, which is for the political branches to solve. I find it difficult to believe that Congress would long tolerate such a self-destructive result-that it would fail to deport these illegal alien families or to provide for the education of their children. Yet instead of allowing the political processes to run their course-albeit with some delay-the Court seeks to do Congress' job for it, compensating for congressional inaction. It is not unreasonable to think that this encourages the political branches to pass their problems to the Judiciary.

The solution to this seemingly intractable problem is to defer to the political processes, unpalatable as that may be to some.

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James PLYLER, Superintendent of the Tyler Independent School District and Its Board of Trustees et al., Appellants, v. J. and R. DOE et al. TEXAS, et al., Appellants, v. CERTAIN NAMED AND UNNAMED UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN CHILDREN et al.

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457 U.S. 202 102 S.Ct. 2382 72 L.Ed.2d 786 James PLYLER, Superintendent of the Tyler Independent School District and Its Board of Trustees et al., Appellants,v.J. and R. DOE et al. TEXAS, et al., Appellants, v. CERTAIN NAMED AND UNNAMED UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN CHILDREN et al. Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934. See 458 U.S.

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The ACLU of Pennsylvania, the Education Law Center, and pro bono counsel Pepper Hamilton LLP filed a federal lawsuit on July 19, 2016 alleging that the School District of Lancaster (SDOL) has been illegally refusing to enroll older immigrant students with limited English proficiency (LEP) or diverting them to an inferior, privately operated disciplinary school, rather than allowing them to attend the district's regular high school. The plaintiffs include six refugees aged 17-21 from Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burma who have fled war, violence, and persecution in their native countries.

According to the complaint, the school district has refused to enroll the plaintiffs at McCaskey, the regular public high school, even though it has a transitional program called the "International School, which is specifically designed to address the needs of LEP students who are new to the country. Instead, the district rejects their enrollment completely or, if they persist, assigns them to Phoenix Academy, an alternative high school for "underachieving" students run by a private company, Camelot Education.

A preliminary injunction hearing in the case began on August 16, 2016 and ended on August 22, 2016.

On August 26, 2016, the judge ordered that the district immediately allow refugee students to enroll in the district's normal high school. The judge also ordered that the district assess the students' language proficiency and provide them with appropriate language supports to enable them to participate in their education.

On September 2, 2016, the school district appealed the preliminary injunction order. On September 13, the district filed motions asking the court of appeals to expedite their appeal and to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal.

On September 16, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion asking the district court to extend its August 26 preliminary injunction to protect all English Language Learner immigrant students aged 17-21 against the district's continuing practices of delaying the enrollment of older immigrant students and denying them admission to the district's regular high school.

On September 21, 2016, the Court of Appeals denied the School District's motion to stay the preliminary injunction order, and granted the motion to expedite the appeal.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held oral argument on December 5, 2016, with Vic Walczak arguing for the plaintiffs. On January 30, 2017, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction, ruling that the District's assignment of refugee students to an accelerated school violated the Equal Educational Opportunities Act.
Blog series from the trial:
Press Release

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The ACLU of Pennsylvania, the Education Law Center, and pro bono counsel Pepper Hamilton LLP filed a federal lawsuit on July 19, 2016 alleging that the School District of Lancaster (SDOL) has been illegally refusing to enroll older immigrant students with limited English proficiency (LEP) or diverting them to an inferior, privately operated disciplinary school, rather than

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Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was a landmark class action lawsuit filed in 1971 that overturned a Pennsylvania law that denied public education to children with intellectual disabilities. The case was the first right-to-education lawsuit in the United States. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the denial of access to education for children with disabilities violated the 14th amendment.

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Gomez vs. Illinois State Board of Education

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Gomez vs. Illinois State Board of Education

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This court case upheld Lau's ruling that state boards have the responsibility to provide MLs with educational programs in which they can access both content and language. Specific program models were not mandated which can impact service delivery for some students.

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In this excerpt from Foundations for Teaching English Language Learners: Research, Theory, Policy, and Practice ( Caslon, 2010), Wayne Wright summarizes the landmark U.S. court cases that have had significant implications for ELLs. In particular, Wright focuses on cases relating to segregation, the right of communities to teach their native languages to children, and the linguistic and education needs of ELLs.

Wright also provides an overview of the No Child Left Behind legislation in No Child Left Behind and ELLs.

Note: For information about Plyler vs. Doe, which gives all children a right to a free, public education regardless of immigration status, see this related resource section.

Important Court Decisions and Legislation

Historical reluctance by many states throughout the country to provide equitable educational opportunities to ELL and other minority students and controversies over the use of languages other than English in public schools have sparked a large number of lawsuits that address these issues. The court decisions that grew out of these lawsuits have led to legislative changes that have helped to shape the policy climate of today. In this section we briefly review some of these cases and related legislation.

First, however, we must consider the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This amendment, ratified in 1868 after the Civil War, declares in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Many of the cases discussed in this section are based on the due process and the equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment.

Addressing Segregation

Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education

In 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court issued its now infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson that "separate but equal" public facilities, including school systems, are constitutional. Although the decision was related to the segregation of African American students, in many parts of the country Native American, Asian, and Hispanic students were also routinely segregated. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed Plessy v. Ferguson 58 years later in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education.

Independent School District v. Salvatierra, Alvarez v. Lemon Grove, and Méndez v. Westminster School District

A few lesser known lower-level cases concerning the segregation of Hispanic student predate Brown. In Independent School District v. Salvatierra (1930), Mexican American parents in the small border town of Rio, Texas, brought suit against the school district over segregation. The court sided with the school district that argued the segregation was necessary to teach the students English. This argument did not hold, however, for two similar cases in California: Alvarez v. Lemon Grove (1931) and Méndez v. Westminster School District (1947). The judge in Alvarez noted that segregation was not beneficial for the students' English language development (Trujillo, 2008), and the success of the Méndez case helped set the stage for Brown.

Like Plessy, Brown v. Board of Education focused on the segregation of African American students. But by ruling that states are responsible for providing "equal educational opportunities" for all students, Brown made bilingual education for ELLs more feasible.

Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson and Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District

In some instances, however, desegregation efforts made it more difficult. In San Francisco, for example, Chinese Americans fought a desegregation order that would force students out of neighborhood schools that provided bilingual English-Chinese programs for newcomer Chinese ELL students. The Chinese community took the case to court in 1971 in G uey Heung Lee v. Johnson, and it was appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District. In 1974, the court ruled against the Chinese community, declaring simply Brown applies to races.

Despite significant progress in the half century since Brown, the practice of segregation in public schools remains widespread (Kozol, 2005). School districts that provide bilingual education and ESL programs constantly struggle to balance the need for separate classes where the unique needs of ELL students can be addressed against the need to avoid prolonged segregation of ELLs from other students.

The Right of Communities to Teach Their Native Languages to Their Children

Meyers v. Nebraska

Three important cases have addressed the issue of private language-schooling for language-minority students. In the early 1900s, German communities typically ran their own private schools where students received instruction in both German and English. Then, in 1919, Nebraska passed the Siman Act, which made it illegal for any school, public or private, to provide any foreign language instruction to students below the 8th grade. Roman Catholic and Lutheran German parochial schools joined together to file suit against the act under the 14th Amendment.

The state court ruled that the act could not prevent schools from providing German language instruction outside of the hours of regular school study. In response, the parochial schools taught German during an extended recess period. Language restrictionist policymakers sought to close the loopholes in the law and fined Robert Meyers $25 fine for teaching Bible stories to 10-year-old children in German. The case, Meyers v. Nebraska (1923), went to Supreme Court, which consolidated this case with similar cases from Ohio and Idaho.

In a major victory for language-minority parents and communities, the Supreme Court struck down the states' restrictive legislation, ruling, in essence, that whereas state governments can legislate the language used for instruction in schools, states may not pass laws that attempt to prevent communities from offering private language classes outside of the regular school system.

Meyers is an important case because it makes clear that the 14th Amendment provides protection for language minorities. As the legal expert Sandra Del Valle (2003) points out, however, this decision did not give language minorities additional rights and privileges but simply ensured that "laws not be used as a rationale for denying them the same rights accorded others" (p. 39). Furthermore, because the focus of this case was on parochial schools, the decision was not an endorsement of bilingual education.

Farrington v. Tokushige

In a similar case handed down in Hawaii in 1927, Farrington v. Tokushige, the court offered further protections of after-school community language programs after attempts by education authorities to put restrictions on Japanese and Chinese heritage language programs.

In a similar case handed down in Hawaii in 1927, Farrington v. Tokushige, the court offered further protections of after-school community language programs after attempts by education authorities to put restrictions on Japanese and Chinese heritage language programs.

Despite these victories, as Del Valle observes, these cases were essentially about parents' rights rather than language rights. In addition, within the court's decision there were still signs of negative attitudes toward the "foreign population." Indeed, Hawaii tried yet again to limit private foreign language instruction. When the Chinese communities after World War II sought to restart their private language schools, the state passed the "Act Regulating the Teaching of Foreign Languages to Children." Part of the state's rationale was the need to "protect children from the harm of learning a foreign language" (Del Valle, 2003, p. 44).

Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Kok Po

In Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Kok Po (1947), the state court struck down the statute, rejecting the state's claim and arguing that, at least for "the brightest" students, study of a foreign language can be beneficial. The case was decided on the basis of Farrington and, once again, had more to do with parents' rights in directing the education of their children than with language rights.

Xenophobia toward German and Japanese Americans during World War I and World War II succeeded where attempts at language restrictive legislation failed. When Germany and later Japan became war enemies of the United States, the number of U.S. schools that provided instruction in these languages dropped dramatically, largely because of fears by members of these communities that such instruction would lead others to question their loyalty to the United States (Tamura, 1993; Wiley, 1998).

Nevertheless, the legacy of these cases, despite agreement in the courts about the need for states to Americanize minorities and their right to control the language used for instruction in public schools, is that minority communities have a clear right to offer private language classes in which their children can learn and maintain their home languages. Thus, the common practice of language-minority communities today in offering heritage language programs after school and on weekends is protected by the U.S. Constitution.

Addressing the Linguistic and Educational Needs of ELL Students

Case law concerning the linguistic and educational needs of ELL students has had a major impact on federal and state policy for ELL students, their families, and their communities. Since the early 1970s, conflict and controversy have surrounded the issue of what constitutes an appropriate education for ELLs. Some rulings provide support for bilingual education; others erode that support. Some cases involve suits filed against bilingual education; others involve suits filed against anti-bilingual education voter initiatives.

Equal Educational Opportunities for ELLs

Lau v. Nichols

The 1974 Supreme Court case Lau v. Nichols resulted in perhaps the most important court decision regarding the education of language-minority students. This case was brought forward by Chinese American students in the San Francisco Unified School District who were placed in mainstream classrooms despite their lack of proficiency in English, and left to "sink or swim." The district had argued that it had done nothing wrong, and that the Chinese American students received treatment equal to that of other students. Justice William Douglass, in writing the court's opinion, strongly disagreed, arguing:

Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education.... We know that those who do not understand English are certain to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no way meaningful.

The influence of Lau on federal policy was substantial. After the court's decision, the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights created the Lau Remedies. Whereas Title VII Bilingual Education Act regulations applied only to funded programs, the Lau Remedies applied to all school districts and functioned as de facto compliance standards.

The Office of Civil Rights used the Lau decision to go after districts that, like San Francisco, were essentially ignoring the needs of its LEP students. Even though the court decision does not mandate any particular instructional approach, the Lau Remedies essentially require districts to implement bilingual education programs for LEP students. James Lyons (1995), former president of the National Association for Bilingual Education, explains further:

The Lau Remedies specified proper approaches, methods and procedures for (1) identifying and evaluating national-origin-minority students' English-language skills; (2) determining appropriate instructional treatments; (3) deciding when LEP students were ready for mainstream classes; and (4) determining the professional standards to be met by teachers of language-minority children. Under the Lau Remedies, elementary schools were generally required to provide LEP students special English-as-a-second-language instruction as well as academic subject-matter instruction through the students' strongest language until the student achieved proficiency in English sufficient to learn effectively in a monolingual English classroom. (pp. 4-5)

The essence of Lau was codified into federal law though the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), soon after the case was decided. Section 1703(f) of this act declares: "No state shall deny educational opportunities to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin by ... (f) the failure of an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs."

At the time of its passage, this section of the EEOA was viewed as a declaration of the legal right for students to receive a bilingual education, under the assumption that this is what Lau essentially mandated (Del Valle, 2003). Although other legal actions have since made it clear that the Supreme Court never did mandate bilingual education, the EEOA remains in effect and several subsequent lawsuits have been based on this important legislation.

Rulings that Support Bilingual Education

United States v. Texas

United States v. Texas (1971, 1981) includes mandates that affect all Texas schools. The court ordered the district to create a plan and implement language programs that would help Mexican American students learn English and adjust to American culture and also help Anglo students learn Spanish. The court relied heavily on the testimony of José Cardenas and his theory of incompatibilities, which blames the educational failure of students on the inadequacies of school programs rather than on students themselves. (For a complete discussion of the theory, see Cardenas & Cardenas, 1977.)

Serna v. Portales

Serna v. Portales (1974) was the first case to raise the issue of bilingual education outside of the context of desegregation (Del Valle, 2003). The case dealt with a White-majority school in New Mexico that failed to meet the unique needs of "Spanish-surnamed students." It was argued under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national origin" in any program that receives federal funding. The court found the school's program for these students to be inadequate. The judge declared, "It is incumbent on the school district to reassess and enlarge its program directed to the specialized needs of the Spanish-surnamed students" and to create bilingual programs at other schools where they are needed. This case was first decided in 1972. Later it was appealed to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and decided in 1974 just six months after Lau. Like Lau, it makes clear that schools cannot ignore the unique language and educational needs of ELL students.

Aspira v. New York

Legal action taken by Puerto Rican parents and children in New York in Aspira v. New York (1975) resulted in the Aspira Consent Decree, which mandates transitional bilingual programs for Spanish-surnamed students found to be more proficient in Spanish than English. The Aspira Consent Decree is still in effect and has been a model for school districts across the country, though it is frequently under attack by opponents of bilingual education.

Bilingual education in New York received a further boost a few years later in Rios v. Reed (1978). The case was argued under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the EEOA. Puerto Rican parents brought suit claiming that many so-called bilingual education programs were not bilingual but based mainly on ESL. The federal court found the district's bilingual programs to be woefully inadequate, pointing to the lack of trained bilingual teachers and the absence of a clearly defined curriculum, clear entrance and exit criteria, and firm guidelines about how much instruction should be in the native language of the students. Although the court issued no specific remedies, the federal Office of Civil Rights came in to ensure that the district made improvements. This case is significant because it made a strong case for offering bilingual education and for doing it right.

Rulings That Erode Support for Bilingual Education

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

Another Texas case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), although not directly related to bilingual education, had some serious implications for it. It dealt with inequalities in school funding, with the plaintiff charging that predominantly minority schools received less funding than schools that served predominantly White students. The case was argued under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, but the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that there is no fundamental right to an education guaranteed by the Constitution. Indeed, if there is no constitutional right to an education under the 14th Amendment, as Del Valle (2003) points out, "there is clearly no constitutional right to a bilingual education" (p. 234, emphasis in original).

Flores v. Arizona and Williams v. California

Because of this case, all subsequent cases over inadequacies in school funding have had to be argued under state constitutions. Some of these cases, such as Flores v. Arizona (2000) and Williams v. California (settled in 2004), include or specifically address inadequacies related to the education of ELL students. But despite court orders in Flores to increase funding for ELL students, state legislators and educational leaders have used a wide variety of stall tactics and legal maneuvering to avoid fully complying with the court's order.

In 2009 the Arizona legislature and the state superintendent of public instruction appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. The high court essentially agreed with the state leaders that the situation in Arizona for ELLs had changed substantially since the original lower court ruling, and thus the lower courts must take these changes into consideration. Although the ruling was disappointing to the plaintiffs, it nonetheless keeps the legal battle alive, with the attorney and advocates in the state gathering new evidence of the harm caused by recent state policies and the underfunding of ELLs' education. This case demonstrates that even when courts issue decisions with specific mandates, changes do not happen immediately and are often resisted by political figures who disagree with the decision.

Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District

In the 1980s, in the wake of Lau, support for bilingual education was eroded by the courts. For example, a case in Colorado, Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District (1980), failed in the plaintiffs' attempt to obtain a court order for bilingual education. The plaintiffs wanted a plan for its Mexican American students like the one based on the testimony of Cardenas that was recommended by the court in United States v. Texas (1971) even though they made up a small number of students in the district, and less than 3% could even speak or understand Spanish. As in United States v. Texas, the court's decision made it clear that despite Lau, there is no constitutional right to bilingual or bicultural education (Del Valle, 2003).

Keyes v. School District No. 1

In another Colorado case, Keyes v. School District No. 1 (1983), the court also rejected a Cardenas-like plan on the basis that Lau did not mandate bilingual education and that according to the decision in Rodriguez there is no constitutional right to education. The bilingual education component was just one part of this complicated desegregation case. Del Valle suggests that the court seemed content that the district was simply offering a "number of programs" for ELLs, without examining the adequacy of these programs. This issue of program adequacy, however, was addressed in subsequent lawsuits.

Castañeda v. Pickard

The right to bilingual education suffered a further blow in 1981 in Castañeda v. Pickard. The case originated in Texas, where plaintiffs charged that the Raymondville Independent School District was failing to address the needs of ELL students as mandated by the EEOA. The federal court ignored the old assumption that Lau and the EEOA mandated bilingual education. Nevertheless, it did find that Raymondville fell far short of meeting the requirements of the EEOA. A major outcome of this case is a three-pronged test to determine whether schools are taking "appropriate action" to address the needs of ELLs as required by the EEOA.

The Castañeda standard mandates that programs for language-minority students must be (1) based on a sound educational theory, (2) implemented effectively with sufficient resources and personnel, and (3) evaluated to determine whether they are effective in helping students overcome language barriers (Del Valle, 2003). Since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lau, two other lawsuits have been decided in the high court that, while not related to bilingual education, nonetheless undermine the original legal argument of Lau. [These two cases are Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) and Alexander v. Sandoval (2001).] Thus, the Castañeda standard, which encapsulates the central feature of Lau - that schools do something to meet the needs of ELL students - has essentially become the law of the land in determining the adequacy of programs for ELLs.

Del Valle (2003), however, points out the shortcomings of the Castañeda test. Referring to prongs 1 and 2, she notes that nearly any program can be justified by an educational theory and that some approaches require very little in the way of staff or funding. Of even greater concern is that, under prong 3, a certain amount of time must pass before a determination can be made about the adequacy of the programs. Thus, many students may be harmed before inadequate programs are identified and rectified.

Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education

Despite these shortcomings, a case 6 years after Castañeda - Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education (1987) - demonstrated the value of the Castañeda test in legal efforts to rectify inadequate programs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit relied heavily on Castañeda in its decision and gave state boards of education the power to enforce compliance with the EEOA. The court declared, in a ruling much like Lau, that school districts have a responsibility to serve ELL students and cannot allow children to just sit in classrooms where they cannot understand instruction. However, as in Lau, the court did not mandate any specific program models.

Recent Lawsuits

Between 1995 and 2001, opponents of bilingual education in a few communities filed lawsuits against their school districts (e.g., Bushwick Parents Organization v. Mills [1995] in New York). Del Valle (2003) suggests that through these cases opponents of bilingual education attempted to turn the original purpose of bilingual education on its head by charging that a program that was developed to ensure that ELL students have the same educational opportunities as all other students was actually preventing equal educational opportunities for ELL students.

These cases also illustrate that attacks on bilingual education are rarely grass-roots efforts by Latino parents but rather are orchestrated by powerful outsiders who mislead parents into joining their cause and in the process often create divisions within Latino communities. Although these legal attacks on bilingual education failed, opponents of bilingual education have scored major victories in the court of public opinion through the English for the Children voter initiatives described earlier.

These voter initiatives, however, have not gone uncontested. Five cases in California were based on challenges to Proposition 227: Quiroz v. State Board of Education (1997); Valerie G. v. Wilson (1998); McLaughlin v. State Board of Education (1999); Doe v. Los Angeles Unified School District (1999); California Teachers Association v. Davis (1999). At least two cases in Arizona were based on challenges to Proposition 203: Sotomayor and Gabaldon v. Burns (2000) and Morales v. Tucson Unified School District (2001). Although some of these resulted in small victories, none has succeeded in overturning the voter initiatives.

Summary

Case law has had a major impact on federal and state policy for ELL students and their families and communities. While the courts have been reluctant to mandate a particular educational model or approach or to give language minorities fundamental rights directly related to the use of their native languages, the courts have nonetheless made it clear that schools may not ignore the unique needs of ELL students.

Any program for ELLs, regardless of the language of instruction or the models used, must do two very important things: teach English and teach academic content. Schools must provide instruction in English for ELLs because they are not yet proficient in English, and because they need fluency in English to succeed in mainstream classrooms and to be successful in life in general in the United States. At the same time, schools cannot focus just on teaching English. Students must also learn the same academic content their English proficient peers are learning, in such subjects as language arts, math, science, social studies, music, art, and physical education. In Chapter 4 we review the different program models for ELL students and how these programs address the legal requirements for teaching English and the content areas.

Acknowledgements

Our policy section is made possible by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The statements and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Wright, W. E. (2010). Foundations for Teaching English Language Learners: Research, Theory, Policy, and Practice. Excerpt from Chapter 3, "Language and Education Policy for ELLs." (pp. 70-76). © Caslon Publishing. Printed with permission, all rights reserved.

Cardenas, J. A., & Cardenas, B. (1977). The theory of incompatibilities: A conceptual framework for responding to the educational needs of Mexican American children. San Antonio, TX: Intercultural Development Research Association.

Del Valle, S. (2003). Language rights and the law in the United States: Finding our voices. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.

Kozol, J. (2005). The shame of the nation: The restoration of apartheid schooling in America. New York: Crown.

Lyons, J. (1995). The past and future directions of federal bilingual education policy. In O. García & C. Baker (Eds.), Policy and practice in bilingual education: Extending the foundations (pp. 1-15). Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.

Tamura, E. H. (1993). The English-only effort, the anti-Japanese campaign, and language acquisition in the education of Japanese Americans in Hawaii, 1914-1940. History of Education Quarterly, 33(1), 37-58.

TESOL (Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages). (2006a). PreK-12 English language proficiency standards. Alexandria, VA: Author.

Trujillo, A. (2008). Latino civil rights movement. In J. M. González (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Bilingual Education (pp. 505-510). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

U.S. Department of Education. (2003a). Non-regulatory guidance on the Title III State Formula Grant Program. Part II: Standards, assessments, and accountability. Washington, DC: Office of English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement for Limited English Proficient Students.

Wiley, T. G. (1998). The imposition of World War I era English-only policies and the fate of German in North America. In T. Ricento & B. Burnaby (Eds.), Language and politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and realities(pp. 211-241). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

For any reprint requests, please contact the author or publisher listed.

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Landmark Court Rulings Regarding English Language Learners

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In this excerpt from Foundations for Teaching English Language Learners: Research, Theory, Policy, and Practice ( Caslon, 2010), Wayne Wright summarizes the landmark U.S. court cases that have had significant implications for ELLs. In particular, Wright focuses on cases relating to segregation, the right of communities to teach their native languages to children, and the linguistic and education needs of ELLs.

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In 2001, ELC with co-counsel Gibbons Del Deo, filed a class action lawsuit against Newark Public Schools and the New Jersey Department of Education, alleging that Newark and the State failed to identify, locate, refer and evaluate students with disabilities for special education services, failed to provide these students with appropriate special education services, and failed to provide "compensatory education" for the deprived services. The complaint also charged the State with failure to monitor school districts and failure to provide appropriate relief in response to special education complaint investigation requests. [Docket No. 01-cv-3389 (US District Court for the District of NJ) Docket No. 02-1799 (US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit)]

Status: Plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction on behalf of two of the named plaintiffs, and withstood extensive motions to dismiss from both sets of defendants. In a decision from the Third Circuit, the Court affirmed both the preliminary injunction and the denial of the motions to dismiss. After a prolonged and unsuccessful attempt to settle the matter, the district court certified the class in 2009 in response to the motion brought by ELC, Gibbons and newly-added co-counsel, Seton Hall Law School Center for Social Justice. The parties then conducted additional discovery and again commenced settlement discussions. The parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, which was endorsed by the Court in 2012. The Settlement Agreement calls for the provision of special education services on a timely basis, "compensatory education" for students who did not receive timely services, implementation of a comprehensive special education database, mandatory staff training, extensive reporting of compliance activities, guidelines for corrective action if warranted and independent monitoring of special education services. Newark has issued two Compliance Reports ( July 2012 and February 2013), and the State has instituted one Corrective Action Plan. ELC is monitoring NPS and State compliance with the Settlement Agreement and, together with Seton Hall, prepared parent training materials in English, Spanish, Portuguese and Creole, and is training parents across the district.

A.R. v. Freehold Regional High School Board of Education

ELC, with the support of several pro bono attorneys, filed a motion on behalf of a group of disability advocacy organizations to appear as amici curiae in this case regarding who should bear the burden of proof in a due process hearing when a school district seeks to change a child's special education Individualized Education Program (IEP). The amicus brief argued that, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Schaffer v. Weast, the burden is on the district when it seeks to change the IEP, even where the parent files the hearing request to challenge the school district's action. The brief additionally explained why placing the burden of proof on parents in such cases would be unfair, violate public policy and undermine the goals of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. (United States District Court for the District of NJ Docket No. 06-cv-03849)

Status: Shortly after ELC filed the amicus brief, the school district settled the case with the student and the matter was dismissed. Subsequently, ELC successfully spearheaded an advocacy effort, with other New Jersey special education practitioners, that resulted in the passage of legislation imposing the burden of proof at special education hearings on school districts in all cases.

A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools

ELC filed a federal lawsuit to challenge the failure of a school district, the state education department, and individual employees to identify and remediate A.W.'s dyslexia. The case reached the Third Circuit twice, with the Court holding in the first decision (2003), that the state defendants had waived sovereign immunity by accepting federal financial assistance and could therefore be sued under IDEA and Section 504 and, in the second decision (2007), that individual state defendants could not be held liable under Section 1983. A.W.'s claims against his school district and NJDOE were successfully resolved through settlement. [341 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2003), 486 F. 3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007)]

Baer v. Klagholz

In 2001, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on eight challenges to the State's special education regulations brought by the Education Law Center and co-counsel. The Appellate Division ruling included the mandate that school districts provide parents with evaluation reports prior to eligibility determination meetings, that all students with disabilities receive assessments to determine appropriate post-secondary outcomes, that the pool of community rehabilitation programs for older students include those programs that serve students with the most severe disabilities, and that the scope of IDEA's disciplinary rights and protections be broadened to comply with federal law. [Docket No. A-7451-97T3 (Superior Court of NJ, Appellate Division)]

Status: Plaintiffs were subsequently successful in a contested motion for prevailing party attorney's fees.

Disability Rights New Jersey v. New Jersey Department of Education

In 2007, ELC, together with pro bono co-counsel, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey challenging the New Jersey Department of Education's failure to educate children with disabilities in the least restrictive environment as mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. [Docket No. 07-cv-02978 (US District Court for the District of NJ) Docket No. 08-8059 (United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit)]

Status: In February 2014, the parties entered into a historic Settlement Agreement designed to improve New Jersey's implementation of IDEA's mandate that students with disabilities receive an appropriate education in the least restrictive environment. The Agreement's requirements include: a needs assessment to be completed in the 75+ school districts with the worst track record in inclusion, heightened oversight of districts that segregate a disproportional number of students of color with disabilities, extensive training and technical assistance, specially designated state and local inclusion facilitators, parental input regarding district failures, and oversight by a stakeholder committee comprised of disability advocates.

P.N. v. Clementon Board of Education

ELC filed an amicus brief in this case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on its behalf and on behalf of numerous disability and education advocacy organizations. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, recognizing that "prevailing party" attorney's fees are available to students with disabilities who resolve their educational disputes with districts via a stipulated settlement agreement entered into by an administrative law judge. Citing to ELC's amicus brief, which detailed the important role the attorney's fee provision plays for poor parents, the Third Circuit noted that it was "particularly troubl[ed]" by the District Court's holding that reimbursement of a $425 psychologist fee was "de minimis" and did not support a prevailing party finding. ELC then represented the plaintiff in the United States Supreme Court, where it successfully urged the Court to deny the Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari [Docket No. 04-4705 (United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit) Docket No. 06-7 (US Supreme Court) Docket No. 02-1351 (District Court for the District of NJ)].

Status: Plaintiffs were subsequently successful in a contested motion for prevailing party attorney's fees before the District Court.

SPAN v. Hendricks

ELC represented SPAN in challenging the State's failure to complete an independent study of the census-based funding methodology for special education by June 2010, as required by the School Funding Reform Act. While the litigation was pending, the State released its independent study of the special education census funding method in the State school aid formula. (Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Docket No. A-000852-10)

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Significant Special Education Cases - Education Law Center

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M.A. v. Newark Public Schools In 2001, ELC with co-counsel Gibbons Del Deo, filed a class action lawsuit against Newark Public Schools and the New Jersey Department of Education, alleging that Newark and the State failed to identify, locate, refer and evaluate students with disabilities for special education services, failed to provide these students with...

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This landmark ruling made it possible to begin to "see" our multilingual learners as they are and provide the support that is needed.