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BACK T O BASICS COMPILATION

When it is growing, especially if inflation is not a problem, workers and businesses are generally better off than when it is not

Many professions commonly use abbreviations. To doctors, accountants, and baseball players, the letters MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles), and ERA (earned run average), respectively, need no explanation. To someone unfamiliar with these fields, however, without an explanation these initialisms are a stumbling block to a better understanding of the subject at hand.

Economics is no different. Economists use many abbreviations. One of the most common is GDP, which stands for gross domestic product. It is often cited in newspapers, on the television news, and in reports by governments, central banks, and the business community. It has become widely used as a reference point for the health of national and global economies. When GDP is growing, especially if inflation is not a problem, workers and businesses are generally better off than when it is not.

Measuring GDP

GDP measures the monetary value of final goods and services-that is, those that are bought by the final user-produced in a country in a given period of time (say a quarter or a year). It counts all of the output generated within the borders of a country. GDP is composed of goods and services produced for sale in the market and also includes some nonmarket production, such as defense or education services provided by the government. An alternative concept, gross national product, or GNP, counts all the output of the residents of a country. So if a German-owned company has a factory in the United States, the output of this factory would be included in U.S. GDP, but in German GNP.

Not all productive activity is included in GDP. For example, unpaid work (such as that performed in the home or by volunteers) and black-market activities are not included because they are difficult to measure and value accurately. That means, for example, that a baker who produces a loaf of bread for a customer would contribute to GDP, but would not contribute to GDP if he baked the same loaf for his family (although the ingredients he purchased would be counted).

Moreover, "gross" domestic product takes no account of the "wear and tear" on the machinery, buildings, and so on (the so-called capital stock) that are used in producing the output. If this depletion of the capital stock, called depreciation, is subtracted from GDP we get net domestic product.

Theoretically, GDP can be viewed in three different ways:

● The production approach sums the "value-added" at each stage of production, where value-added is defined as total sales less the value of intermediate inputs into the production process. For example, flour would be an intermediate input and bread the final product; or an architect's services would be an intermediate input and the building the final product.

● The expenditure approach adds up the value of purchases made by final users-for example, the consumption of food, televisions, and medical services by households; the investments in machinery by companies; and the purchases of goods and services by the government and foreigners.

● The income approach sums the incomes generated by production-for example, the compensation employees receive and the operating surplus of companies (roughly sales less costs).

GDP in a country is usually calculated by the national statistical agency, which compiles the information from a large number of sources. In making the calculations, however, most countries follow established international standards. The international standard for measuring GDP is contained in the System of National Accounts, 1993, compiled by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations, and the World Bank.

Real GDP

One thing people want to know about an economy is whether its total output of goods and services is growing or shrinking. But because GDP is collected at current, or nominal, prices, one cannot compare two periods without making adjustments for inflation. To determine "real" GDP, its nominal value must be adjusted to take into account price changes to allow us to see whether the value of output has gone up because more is being produced or simply because prices have increased. A statistical tool called the price deflator is used to adjust GDP from nominal to constant prices.

GDP is important because it gives information about the size of the economy and how an economy is performing. The growth rate of real GDP is often used as an indicator of the general health of the economy. In broad terms, an increase in real GDP is interpreted as a sign that the economy is doing well. When real GDP is growing strongly, employment is likely to be increasing as companies hire more workers for their factories and people have more money in their pockets. When GDP is shrinking, as it did in many countries during the recent global economic crisis, employment often declines. In some cases, GDP may be growing, but not fast enough to create a sufficient number of jobs for those seeking them. But real GDP growth does move in cycles over time. Economies are sometimes in periods of boom, and sometimes in periods of slow growth or even recession (with the latter often defined as two consecutive quarters during which output declines). In the United States, for example, there were six recessions of varying length and severity between 1950 and 2011. The National Bureau of Economic Research makes the call on the dates of U.S. business cycles.

Comparing GDPs of two countries

GDP is measured in the currency of the country in question. That requires adjustment when trying to compare the value of output in two countries using different currencies. The usual method is to convert the value of GDP of each country into U.S. dollars and then compare them. Conversion to dollars can be done either using market exchange rates-those that prevail in the foreign exchange market-or purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. The PPP exchange rate is the rate at which the currency of one country would have to be converted into that of another to purchase the same amount of goods and services in each country. There is a large gap between market and PPP-based exchange rates in emerging market and developing countries. For most emerging market and developing countries, the ratio of the market and PPP U.S. dollar exchange rates is between 2 and 4. This is because nontraded goods and services tend to be cheaper in low-income than in high-income countries-for example, a haircut in New York is more expensive than in Bishkek-even when the cost of making tradable goods, such as machinery, across two countries is the same. For advanced economies, market and PPP exchange rates tend to be much closer. These differences mean that emerging market and developing countries have a higher estimated dollar GDP when the PPP exchange rate is used.

The IMF publishes an array of GDP data on its website ( www.imf.org). International institutions such as the IMF also calculate global and regional real GDP growth. These give an idea of how quickly or slowly the world economy or the economies in a particular region of the world are growing. The aggregates are constructed as weighted averages of the GDP in individual countries, with weights reflecting each country's share of GDP in the group (with PPP exchange rates used to determine the appropriate weights).

What GDP does not reveal

It is also important to understand what GDP cannot tell us. GDP is not a measure of the overall standard of living or well-being of a country. Although changes in the output of goods and services per person (GDP per capita) are often used as a measure of whether the average citizen in a country is better or worse off, it does not capture things that may be deemed important to general well-being. So, for example, increased output may come at the cost of environmental damage or other external costs such as noise. Or it might involve the reduction of leisure time or the depletion of nonrenewable natural resources. The quality of life may also depend on the distribution of GDP among the residents of a country, not just the overall level. To try to account for such factors, the United Nations computes a Human Development Index, which ranks countries not only based on GDP per capita, but on other factors, such as life expectancy, literacy, and school enrollment. Other attempts have been made to account for some of the shortcomings of GDP, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator and the Gross National Happiness Index, but these too have their critics.

Tim Callen is a former Assistant Director in the IMF's Communication Department.

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Gross Domestic Product: An Economy's All

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Download PDF BACK T O BASICS COMPILATION When it is growing, especially if inflation is not a problem, workers and businesses are generally better off than when it is not Many professions commonly use abbreviations. To doctors, accountants, and baseball players, the letters MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles), and ERA (earned run average), respectively, need no explanation.

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Economic Systems - Command Economy - Market Economy - Flocabulary

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Introduction

China's historical civilization dates to at least 13th century B.C., first under the Shang (to 1046 B.C.) and then the Zhou (1046-221 B.C) dynasties. The imperial era of China began in 221 B.C. under the Qin Dynasty and lasted until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. During this period, China alternated between periods of unity and disunity under a succession of imperial dynasties. In the 19 th century, the Qing Dynasty suffered heavily from overextension by territorial conquest, insolvency, civil war, imperialism, military defeats, and foreign expropriation of ports and infrastructure. It collapsed following the Revolution of 1911, and China became a republic under SUN Yat-sen of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist) Party. However, the republic was beset by division, warlordism, and continued foreign intervention. In the late 1920s, a civil war erupted between the ruling KMT-controlled government led by CHIANG Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Japan occupied much of northeastern China in the early 1930s, and then launched a full-scale invasion of the country in 1937. The resulting eight years of warfare devastated the country and cost up to 20 million Chinese lives by the time of Japan's defeat in 1945. The Nationalist-Communist civil war continued with renewed intensity following the end of World War II and culminated with a CCP victory in 1949, under the leadership of MAO Zedong.

MAO and the CCP established an autocratic socialist system that, while ensuring the PRC's sovereignty, imposed strict controls over everyday life and launched agricultural, economic, political, and social policies - such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) - that cost the lives of millions of people. MAO died in 1976. Beginning in 1978, subsequent leaders DENG Xiaoping, JIANG Zemin, and HU Jintao focused on market-oriented economic development and opening up the country to foreign trade, while maintaining the rule of the CCP. Since the change, China has been among the world's fastest growing economies, with real gross domestic product averaging over 9% growth annually through 2021, lifting an estimated 800 million people out of poverty, and dramatically improving overall living standards. By 2011, the PRC's economy was the second largest in the world. The growth, however, has created considerable social displacement, adversely affected the country's environment, and reduced the country's natural resources. Current leader XI Jinping has continued these policies, but also has maintained tight political controls. Over the past decade, China has also increased its global outreach, including military deployments, participation in international organizations, and initiating a global connectivity initiative in 2013 called the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). While many nations have signed on to BRI agreements to attract PRC investment, others have balked at the opaque lending behavior; weak environment, social, and governance (ESG) standards; and other practices that undermine local governance and foster corruption associated with some BRI-linked projects. XI Jinping assumed the positions of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2012 and President in 2013. In March 2018, the PRC's National People's Congress passed an amendment abolishing presidential term limits, opening the door for XI to seek a third five-year term in 2023.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

slightly smaller than the US

Yangtze - 6,300 km; Huang He - 5,464 km; Amur river source (shared with Mongolia and Russia [m]) - 4,444 km; Mekong river source (shared with Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam [m]) - 4,350 km; Brahmaputra river source (shared with India and Bangladesh [m]) - 3,969 km; Indus river source (shared with India and Pakistan [m]) - 3,610 km; Salween river source (shared with Thailand and Burma [m]) - 3,060 km; Irrawaddy river source (shared with Burma [m]) - 2,809 km; Pearl (shared with Vietnam [s]) - 2,200 km; Red river source (shared with Vietnam [m]) - 1,149 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Pacific Ocean drainage: Amur (1,929,955 sq km), Huang He (944,970 sq km), Mekong (805,604 sq km), Yangtze (1,722,193 sq km)
Indian Ocean drainage: Brahmaputra (651,335 sq km), Ganges (1,016,124 sq km), Indus (1,081,718 sq km), Irrawaddy (413,710 sq km), Salween (271,914 sq km)
Arctic Ocean drainage: Ob (2,972,493 sq km)
Internal (endorheic basin) drainage: Tarim Basin (1,152,448 sq km), Amu Darya (534,739 sq km), Syr Darya (782,617 sq km), Lake Balkash (510,015 sq km)

frequent typhoons (about five per year along southern and eastern coasts); damaging floods; tsunamis; earthquakes; droughts; land subsidence

volcanism: China contains some historically active volcanoes including Changbaishan (also known as Baitoushan, Baegdu, or P'aektu-san), Hainan Dao, and Kunlun although most have been relatively inactive in recent centuries

China map showing major cities as well as the many bordering East Asian countries and neighboring seas.

People and Society

Standard Chinese or Mandarin (official; Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages (see Ethnic groups entry); note - Zhuang is official in Guangxi Zhuang, Yue is official in Guangdong, Mongolian is official in Nei Mongol, Uighur is official in Xinjiang Uygur, Kyrgyz is official in Xinjiang Uygur, and Tibetan is official in Xizang (Tibet)

major-language sample(s):
世界概況 - 不可缺少的基本消息來源 (Standard Chinese)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

Mandarin audio sample:

improved: urban: 97.3% of population

rural: 91.5% of population

total: 95.1% of population

unimproved: urban: 2.7% of population

rural: 8.5% of population

total: 4.9% of population (2020 est.)

improved: urban: 97.6% of population

rural: 90.6% of population

total: 94.9% of population

unimproved: urban: 2.4% of population

rural: 9.4% of population

total: 5.1% of population (2020 est.)

Environment

municipal solid waste generated annually: 210 million tons (2015 est.)

Yangtze - 6,300 km; Huang He - 5,464 km; Amur river source (shared with Mongolia and Russia [m]) - 4,444 km; Mekong river source (shared with Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam [m]) - 4,350 km; Brahmaputra river source (shared with India and Bangladesh [m]) - 3,969 km; Indus river source (shared with India and Pakistan [m]) - 3,610 km; Salween river source (shared with Thailand and Burma [m]) - 3,060 km; Irrawaddy river source (shared with Burma [m]) - 2,809 km; Pearl (shared with Vietnam [s]) - 2,200 km; Red river source (shared with Vietnam [m]) - 1,149 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Pacific Ocean drainage: Amur (1,929,955 sq km), Huang He (944,970 sq km), Mekong (805,604 sq km), Yangtze (1,722,193 sq km)
Indian Ocean drainage: Brahmaputra (651,335 sq km), Ganges (1,016,124 sq km), Indus (1,081,718 sq km), Irrawaddy (413,710 sq km), Salween (271,914 sq km)
Arctic Ocean drainage: Ob (2,972,493 sq km)
Internal (endorheic basin) drainage: Tarim Basin (1,152,448 sq km), Amu Darya (534,739 sq km), Syr Darya (782,617 sq km), Lake Balkash (510,015 sq km)

Government

23 provinces (sheng, singular and plural), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu, singular and plural), 4 municipalities (shi, singular and plural), and two special administrative regions (tebie xingzhengqu, singular and plural)

provinces: Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang; (see note on Taiwan)

autonomous regions: Guangxi, Nei Mongol (Inner Mongolia), Ningxia, Xinjiang Uyghur, Xizang (Tibet)

note: China considers Taiwan its 23rd province; see separate entries for the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau

Economy

Since the late 1970s, China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role. China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion, resulting in efficiency gains that have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978. Reforms began with the phaseout of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, growth of the private sector, development of stock markets and a modern banking system, and opening to foreign trade and investment. China continues to pursue an industrial policy, state support of key sectors, and a restrictive investment regime. From 2013 to 2017, China had one of the fastest growing economies in the world, averaging slightly more than 7% real growth per year. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2017 stood as the largest economy in the world, surpassing the US in 2014 for the first time in modern history. China became the world's largest exporter in 2010, and the largest trading nation in 2013. Still, China's per capita income is below the world average.

In July 2005 moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies. From mid-2005 to late 2008, the renminbi (RMB) appreciated more than 20% against the US dollar, but the exchange rate remained virtually pegged to the dollar from the onset of the global financial crisis until June 2010, when Beijing announced it would resume a gradual appreciation. From 2013 until early 2015, the renminbi held steady against the dollar, but it depreciated 13% from mid-2015 until end-2016 amid strong capital outflows; in 2017 the RMB resumed appreciating against the dollar - roughly 7% from end-of-2016 to end-of-2017. In 2015, the People's Bank of China announced it would continue to carefully push for full convertibility of the renminbi, after the currency was accepted as part of the IMF's special drawing rights basket. However, since late 2015 Beijing has strengthened capital controls and oversight of overseas investments to better manage the exchange rate and maintain financial stability.

Beijing faces numerous economic challenges including: (a) reducing its high domestic savings rate and correspondingly low domestic household consumption; (b) managing its high corporate debt burden to maintain financial stability; (c) controlling off-balance sheet local government debt used to finance infrastructure stimulus; (d) facilitating higher-wage job opportunities for the aspiring middle class, including rural migrants and college graduates, while maintaining competitiveness; (e) dampening speculative investment in the real estate sector without sharply slowing the economy; (f) reducing industrial overcapacity; and (g) raising productivity growth rates through the more efficient allocation of capital and state-support for innovation. Economic development has progressed further in coastal provinces than in the interior, and by 2016 more than 169.3 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find work. One consequence of China's population control policy known as the "one-child policy" - which was relaxed in 2016 to permit all families to have two children - is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. Deterioration in the environment - notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the North - is another long-term problem. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and urbanization. Beijing is seeking to add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, focusing on natural gas, nuclear, and clean energy development. In 2016, China ratified the Paris Agreement, a multilateral agreement to combat climate change, and committed to peak its carbon dioxide emissions between 2025 and 2030.

The government's 13th Five-Year Plan, unveiled in March 2016, emphasizes the need to increase innovation and boost domestic consumption to make the economy less dependent on government investment, exports, and heavy industry. However, China has made more progress on subsidizing innovation than rebalancing the economy. Beijing has committed to giving the market a more decisive role in allocating resources, but its policies continue to favor state-owned enterprises and emphasize stability. Beijing in 2010 pledged to double China's GDP by 2020, and the 13th Five Year Plan includes annual economic growth targets of at least 6.5% through 2020 to achieve that goal. In recent years, China has renewed its support for state-owned enterprises in sectors considered important to "economic security," explicitly looking to foster globally competitive industries. Beijing also has undermined some market-oriented reforms by reaffirming the "dominant" role of the state in the economy, a stance that threatens to discourage private initiative and make the economy less efficient over time. The slight acceleration in economic growth in 2017-the first such uptick since 2010-gives Beijing more latitude to pursue its economic reforms, focusing on financial sector deleveraging and its Supply-Side Structural Reform agenda, first announced in late 2015.

$23,009,780,000,000 (2020 est.)

$22,492,450,000,000 (2019 est.)

$21,229,360,000,000 (2018 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars
country comparison to the world: 1

47% of GDP (2017 est.)

44.2% of GDP (2016 est.)

note: official data; data cover both central and local government debt, including debt officially recognized by China's National Audit Office report in 2011; data exclude policy bank bonds, Ministry of Railway debt, and China Asset Management Company debt
country comparison to the world: 111

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

10,773,248,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from coal and metallurgical coke: 8,652,419,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from petroleum and other liquids: 1,520,552,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from consumed natural gas: 600.276 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
country comparison to the world: 1

Communications

Transportation

Military and Security

People's Liberation Army (PLA): Ground Forces, Navy (PLAN, includes marines and naval aviation), Air Force (PLAAF, includes airborne forces), Rocket Force (strategic missile force), and Strategic Support Force (information, electronic, and cyber warfare, as well as space forces); People's Armed Police (PAP, includes Coast Guard, Border Defense Force, Internal Security Forces); PLA Reserve Force (2022)

note 1: the Strategic Support Force includes the Space Systems Department, which is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking, and control, and space warfare

note 2: the PAP is a paramilitary police component of China's armed forces that is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and charged with internal security, law enforcement, counterterrorism, and maritime rights protection

note 3: in 2018, the Coast Guard was moved from the State Oceanic Administration to the PAP; in 2013, China merged four of its five major maritime law enforcement agencies - the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Maritime Police, Fishery Law Enforcement (FLE), and Anti-Smuggling Police - into a unified coast guard

1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)

1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)

1.7% of GDP (2019) (approximately $290 billion)

1.7% of GDP (2018) (approximately $265 billion)

1.8% of GDP (2017) (approximately $260 billion)
country comparison to the world: 88

established in 1927, the PLA is the military arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission; the Central Military Commission is China's top military decision making body

the PRC's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People's Armed Police (PAP), and the militia; the PLA support the internal security forces as necessary:

the MPS controls the civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order; its primary mission is domestic law enforcement and maintaining order, including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism

the MSS is the PRC's main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service

the PAP is a paramilitary component (or adjunct) of the PLA; its primary missions include internal security, maintaining public order, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war; it is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC); the China Coast Guard (CCG) administratively falls under the PAP; the CCG has a variety of missions, such as maritime sovereignty enforcement, surveillance, resource protection, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement

the militia is an armed reserve of civilians which serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA upon mobilization; it is distinct from the PLA's reserve forces; militia units are organized around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission; they have dual civilian-military command structures; a key component of the militia are the local maritime forces, commonly referred to as the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM); the PAFMM consists of mariners (and their vessels) who receive training, equipment, and other forms of support from the Navy and CCG (although the PAFMM remains separate from both) to perform tasks such as maritime patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance, emergency/disaster response, transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary tasks in support of naval operations in wartime; the PAFMM's tasks are often conducted in conjunction or coordination with the Navy and the CCG; it has been used to assert Beijing's maritime claims in the East and South China seas

(2022)

Transnational Issues

China and India continue their security and foreign policy dialogue started in 2005 related to a number of boundary disputes across the 2,000 mile shared border; India does not recognize Pakistan's 1964 ceding to China of the Aksai Chin, a territory designated as part of the princely state of Kashmir by the British Survey of India in 1865; China claims most of the Indian state Arunachal Pradesh to the base of the Himalayas, but the US recognizes the state of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory; Bhutan and China continue negotiations to establish a common boundary alignment to resolve territorial disputes arising from substantial cartographic discrepancies, the most contentious of which lie in Bhutan's west along China's Chumbi salient; Chinese maps show an international boundary symbol (the so-called "nine-dash line") off the coasts of the littoral states of the South China Sea, where China has interrupted Vietnamese hydrocarbon exploration; China asserts sovereignty over Scarborough Reef along with the Philippines and Taiwan, and over the Spratly Islands together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei; the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea eased tensions in the Spratlys, and in 2017 China and ASEAN began confidential negotiations for an updated Code of Conduct for the South China Sea designed not to settle territorial disputes but establish rules and norms in the region; this still is not the legally binding code of conduct sought by some parties; Vietnam and China continue to expand construction of facilities in the Spratlys and in early 2018 China began deploying advanced military systems to disputed Spratly outposts; China occupies some of the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan; the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands are also claimed by China and Taiwan; certain islands in the Yalu and Tumen Rivers are in dispute with North Korea; North Korea and China seek to stem illegal migration to China by North Koreans, fleeing privation and oppression; China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with their 2004 Agreement; China and Tajikistan have begun demarcating the revised boundary agreed to in the delimitation of 2002; the decade-long demarcation of the China-Vietnam land boundary was completed in 2009; citing environmental, cultural, and social concerns, China has reconsidered construction of 13 dams on the Salween River, but energy-starved Burma, with backing from Thailand, continues to consider building five hydro-electric dams downstream despite regional and international protests

a major source of precursor chemicals, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and synthetic drugs, including fentanyl precursors and methamphetamine; PRC criminal organizations, transnational crime, and organizations from Mexico and Southeast Asia traffic licit precursor chemical components and illicit finished drugs within the PRC as well as to international markets; significant illicit drug consumption of methamphetamine and ketamine; a major destination and transit country for heroin produced in neighboring countries; the PRC remains a major source of NPS sold in North America and Europe

(2021)

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China's historical civilization dates to at least 13th century B.C., first under the Shang (to 1046 B.C.) and then the Zhou (1046-221 B.C) dynasties. The imperial era of China began in 221 B.C. under the Qin Dynasty and lasted until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912.

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China's workforce is growing older and shrinking faster, a new report has found, adding pressure to the recovery of the world's second-largest economy three years into the pandemic.

The average age of the country's labor force in 2020 was 39, nearly four years older than it was two decades ago, domestic media reported Wednesday, citing the report. The workforce was particularly aging faster in urban areas, more so in the past decade.

The report was released by the China Center for Human Capital and Labor Market Research at the Central University of Finance and Economics on Dec. 11 and is based on data published by the National Bureau of Statistics and surveys carried out by universities between 2001 and 2020.

The new figures come at a time when China is facing record-low birth and marriage rates in a rapidly aging society, despite policies encouraging young people to get married and have more children. By the end of 2021, people aged 60 and above accounted for about 19% of the country's total population, with the demographic estimated to grow to over 30% around 2035.

People aged between 46 and the retirement age - 60 for men, 55 for female cadres, and 50 for women in blue-collar jobs - accounted for about 34% of the workforce in 2020, up from 21.7% at the beginning of this century, according to the report. Data showed that China has faced a labor crunch since 2013, with the total number of workers declining at an average annual rate of 0.4% between 2013 and 2020.

While more older people are ready to reenter the workforce either out of necessity or not wanting to stay idle, they face a range of difficulties from ageist attitudes to a lack of legal support, with experts urging authorities to set up a flexible retirement system.

Meanwhile, young people have found it hard to join the workforce amid intense competition and the economic slowdown, as many small and medium-sized businesses struggle to stay afloat due to the pandemic.

In November, the country's urban youth unemployment rate for those aged between 16 and 24 hit 17.1%, a drop from the record high of nearly 20% in July but still 2.8 percentage points higher than the same period last year.
Editor: Bibek Bhandari. (Header image: VCG)

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China's Workforce Is Aging, New Report Finds

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China's workforce is growing older and shrinking faster, a new report has found, adding pressure to the recovery of the world's second-largest economy three years into the pandemic. The average age of the country's labor force in 2020 was 39, nearly four years older than it was two decades ago, domestic media reported Wednesday, citing the report.

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China's Population Is Shrinking: How It Happened and What It Means

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"What is concerning is not so much the decline in sheer size, but rather rapid aging and the socioeconomic challenges of adapting to the change in population structure," says one expert

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Prices in China

We calculate prices for China as a population-weighted mean of 544 cities. Since large cities tend to have a higher cost of living, it's better to visit specific city pages below for more relevant information.

China hotels map

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China vs

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Cost of Living in China: prices in 544 cities compared

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The average cost of living in China is $758, which is 1.23 times less expensive than the world's average. Compare cost of living by city. China ranked 108th out of 197 countries by cost of living and 90th best country to live in.

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China Unemployment Rate - September 2023 Data - 2002-2022 Historical

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China's surveyed urban unemployment rate declined to 5.0% in September 2023 from 5.2% in August. It was the lowest jobless rate since November 2021. The surveyed unemployment rate of the population with local household registration was 5.1% and that of the population with non-local household registration was 4.9% of which the rate of the population with non-local agricultural household registration stood at 4.7%.

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Newsela | The rise of China as a global power

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A series of reforms put in place after World War II transformed China into a global economic powerhouse

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China's Economic Freedom Index 2022 Scores

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China's Economic Freedom Index 2022 Scores

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Quick Facts

China's economic freedom score is 59.5, making its economy the 103rd freest in the 2020 Index. Its overall score has increased by 1.1 points due to increases in scores for business freedom and property rights. China is ranked 20th among 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and its overall score is below the regional and world averages.

China's economic freedom score has improved over the past five years, with most of the gains coming in areas related to the rule of law and, more recently, business regulation. The overall gains track with a continuing high rate of GDP growth.

Major reforms of the financial system have not occurred, but there is hope that a new investment law that is expected to take effect in 2020 may improve regulatory transparency. Overall, the economic freedom that does exist in China lacks depth and breadth, and the government needs to ensure that business-friendly policy changes are understood and implemented nationwide, not just in Beijing or the major commercial centers.

Background

Xi Jinping succeeded Hu Jintao as president of China in 2013. Xi has centralized his authority, ousted internal political enemies, and backed authoritarian policies to tighten control of civil society. China is the world's second-largest economy and biggest exporter, but its per capita income is below the global average. A slowdown in economic growth, which may be more severe than is officially acknowledged, poses serious challenges, both for the government and for Xi's new ideological economic framework. Since 2017, the U.S. and China have been engaged in serious trade negotiations that have been accompanied by the imposition of tariffs by both sides. The outcome of these negotiations will likely have a significant impact on the global economy.

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Download PDF Quick Facts China's economic freedom score is 59.5, making its economy the 103rd freest in the 2020 Index. Its overall score has increased by 1.1 points due to increases in scores for business freedom and property rights. China is ranked 20th among 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and its overall score is below the regional and world averages.

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Since China began to open up and reform its economy in 1978, GDP growth has averaged almost 10 percent a year, and more than 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty. There have also been significant improvements in access to health, education, and other services over the same period.

China is now an upper-middle-income country. It will be important going forward that poverty alleviation efforts increasingly shift to address the vulnerabilities faced by the large number of people still considered poor by the standards of middle-income countries, including those living in urban areas.

China's high growth based on resource-intensive manufacturing, exports, and low-paid labor has largely reached its limits and has led to economic, social, and environmental imbalances. Reducing these imbalances requires shifts in the structure of the economy from low-end manufacturing to higher-end manufacturing and services, and from investment to consumption.

Over the past few years, growth has moderated in the face of structural constraints, including declining labor force growth, diminishing returns to investment, and slowing productivity. The challenge going forward is to find new drivers of growth while addressing the social and environmental legacies of China's previous development path.

China's rapid economic growth exceeded the pace of institutional development, and there are important institutional and reform gaps that China needs to address to ensure a high-quality and sustainable growth path. The role of the state needs to evolve and focus on providing stable market expectations and a clear and fair business environment, as well as strengthening the regulatory system and the rule of law to further support the market system.

Given its size, China is central to important regional and global development issues. China is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, with per capita emissions now surpassing those of the European Union, although slightly below the OECD average and well below the United States, and its air and water pollution affects other countries. Global environmental problems cannot be solved without China's engagement. Moreover, maintaining economic growth at reasonable levels has important spillovers for the growth of the rest of the world economy.

Many of the complex development challenges that China faces are relevant to other countries, including transitioning to a new growth model, rapid aging, building a cost-effective health system, and promoting a lower carbon energy path. China is a growing influence on other developing economies through trade, investment, and ideas.

Following real GDP growth of 2.3 percent in 2020, China's economy is projected to grow by 8.5 percent in 2021, largely driven by base effects. The growth momentum is slowing reflecting the lagged impact of policy and macroprudential tightening, floods and the recent Delta outbreak. Although lingering tighter restrictions and cautious sentiment due to the recent Delta outbreaks will weigh on the consumption recovery, its impact is expected to be largely offset by robust foreign demand and moderate policy support in the latter half of the year. Near-term risks have shifted to the downside with the key risk being recurring outbreaks led by more transmissible COVID-19 variants which could lead to a significant economic disruption. Over the medium term, China's economy is facing structural headwinds given adverse demographics, tepid productivity growth, and the legacies of excessive borrowing and environmental pollution. These challenges require attention, with short-term macroeconomic policies and structural reforms aimed at reinvigorating the shift to more balanced high-quality growth.

The government recently highlighted achieving common prosperity as a key economic objective, reinforcing signals of a possible shift in policy priorities towards tackling income inequality. Over the medium term, policies to tackle high inequality through more progressive taxation and a strengthened social protection system will ensure lasting poverty reduction, a larger middle class and help boost private consumption as a driver of growth.

Last Updated: Oct 12, 2021

China and the World Bank Group have worked together for over 40 years. The WBG's new Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY2020 to 2025, issued in December 2019, reflects the evolution of the Bank Group's relationship with China toward a decline in lending and a more selective engagement in line with the capital increase commitments agreed to by its shareholders in 2018.

The CPF aims to help China address some of its remaining development challenges, notably the transition to more environmentally sustainable growth, strengthen key Chinese institutions engaged in economic and social development, and reduce inequality in lagging regions.

World Bank (IBRD) lending will decline over the CPF period and focus on supporting China in contributing to global public goods. As it does so, the Bank stands ready to provide more technical assistance and policy advice, as well as reimbursable advisory services (RAS), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) will engage in China's private sector, especially in investments in global public goods.

The CPF has three broad areas of engagement:

Advancing market and fiscal reforms by improving the environment for competition and private sector development; and achieving more efficient and sustainable subnational fiscal management and infrastructure financing.

Promoting greener growth by reducing air, soil, water, and marine plastic pollution; strengthening sustainable natural resource management; promoting low-carbon transport and cities; and facilitating the transition to a lower carbon energy path.

Sharing the benefits of growth by increasing access to health and social services; and improving the quality of early childhood development.

In addition, under the CPF, the World Bank Group will aim to help increase the transparency of China's lending and investment activities as well as emphasize the importance of promoting high standards of social and environmental risk management for these activities, and share applicable lessons and knowledge from China's poverty reduction.

The CPF is informed by the Bank Group's Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) published in early 2018 and other Bank studies including Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth published in 2019. At the CPF midpoint, the Bank Group will assess progress in CPF implementation.

Last Updated: Oct 12, 2021

China began its partnership with the Bank in 1980, just as it embarked on its reforms. Starting as a recipient of support from the International Development Association (IDA), the Bank Group's fund for the poorest, China graduated from IDA in 1999 and became a donor in 2007. It became the World Bank's third largest shareholder upon completion of the capital increase approved in 2010, the 30th anniversary of its partnership.

The nature of the Bank's activities in China has evolved over time as China's needs and level of development have changed. In the early years, the World Bank brought international experience to help design economic reform strategies, improve project management, and address key bottlenecks to growth. More recently, this two-way relationship has evolved -the World Bank offers international expertise to help address China's key development challenges and pilot reforms through projects and programs; and China's development experiences enhance the Bank's global knowledge and capacity to help other developing countries.
Research
Joint flagship studies have been important for deepening the dialogue on policies and Bank programs and provided a model for other middle-income countries. China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society, a joint report by the World Bank and the Development Research Center of China's State Council, lays out six strategic directions for China's future: completing the transition to a market economy; accelerating the pace of open innovation; going "green" to transform environmental stresses into green growth as a driver for development; expanding opportunities and services such as health, education and access to jobs for all people; modernizing and strengthening its domestic fiscal system; and seeking mutually beneficial relations with the world by connecting China's structural reforms to the changing international economy.

Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization, also a joint report by the World Bank and the Development Research Center of China's State Council, recommends that China curb rapid urban sprawl by reforming land requisition, give migrants urban residency and equal access to basic public services, and reform local finances by finding stable revenues and by allowing local governments to borrow directly within strict central rules.

Healthy China: Deepening Health Reform in China, Building High-Quality and Value-Based Service Delivery, a joint study on reforming China's health system in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, the National Health and Family Planning Commission, and the World Health Organization, recommends deeper healthcare reforms by creating a new model of people-centered quality integrated health care that strengthens primary care as the core of the health system; continuously improving health care quality; empowering patients with knowledge and understanding of health services; boosting the status of the health workforce, especially primary-care providers; allowing qualified private health providers to deliver cost-effective services; and prioritizing public investments.

Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth, a joint report by the Development Research Center of China's State Council, the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank Group proposes that China addresses its productivity challenges by promoting the "three Ds" - removing distortions in the economy, accelerating diffusion of existing advanced technologies and innovations, and fostering discovery of new technologies, products, and processes so as to expand China's productivity frontier. The report develops recommendations in seven areas to promote the "three Ds." These recommendations focus on strengthening competition across product and factor markets and creating a level playing field for all investors, investing in human capital and improving the targeting of support for innovation and entrepreneurship, and adapting the model of economic governance to adjust the balance between the state and the market.
Projects
World Bank-financed projects introduced innovations or piloted new approaches and serve as platforms for knowledge exchange. Many of them also placed a major emphasis on the environment and climate change. Here are some of our recent projects and results in China:

The Hunan Subnational Governance and Rural Public Service Delivery Program for Results, approved in February 2021, assists the province in delivering more equitable and efficient public services in rural areas. The financing supports measures to strengthen local debt management and provide results-oriented transfers aimed at reducing disparities in the quality of basic education in rural areas. It would also introduce greater accountability by making budget information more transparent and accessible to citizens.

The China Food Safety Improvement Project, approved in March 2021, helps China improve food safety management at both the national and targeted subnational levels, and reduce food safety risks. It will strengthen food safety regulations, enforcement, and compliance along selected value chains， consistent with global practices, and help farms and food enterprises to access finance for food safety technologies, and organize risk communication campaigns to promote food safety and advocate for healthier lifestyles.

The Emerging Infectious Diseases Prevention, Preparedness and Response Project, approved in June 2020, supports China in strengthening national and provincial systems to reduce the risk of zoonotic and other emerging health threats. The project introduces a multi-sectoral approach that brings together responses from public health, agriculture and food, as well as the environment and wildlife sectors.

The Sichuan Water Supply and Sanitation Public Private Partnership Project, approved in March 2020, is supporting improved water supply and sanitation services for more than 230,000 rural residents in Deyang in China's Sichuan Province. Jointly prepared with IFC, the project promotes a more transparent service and financing model through a public-private partnership, which is performance-based and focuses on improved service delivery to customers. The project will contribute to domestic and global public goods by protecting the environment through reduced discharge of untreated wastewater into the tributaries of the Yangtze River.

The Hubei Smart and Sustainable Agriculture Project, approved in May 2020, promotes environmentally sustainable and climate-smart agriculture and improves agricultural food quality and safety in one of China's leading agricultural producers. The project is expected to yield significant climate co-benefits and contribute to the achievement of China's agriculture-related climate change commitments, including under the Paris Agreement.

The Jiangxi Eco-industrial Parks Project, approved in June 2020, will strengthen the province's institutional and regulatory framework for eco-industrial parks, bringing them in line with international standards and helping to reduce the country's pollution and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The project will generate important lessons that could help make a tangible impact on China's and thus the world's environmental footprint.

The Renewable Energy and Battery Storage Promotion Project, approved in June 2019, aims to increase the integration and utilization of renewable energy by deploying battery storage systems at scale in China. The project will help China accelerate the ongoing clean energy transition and contribute to the country's emission reduction targets. The project is being implemented by Hua Xia Bank which has committed co-financing of at least $450 million. Parallel technical assistance, financed by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), will help improve the policy and regulatory framework for green energy technologies, thereby reducing risks and encouraging private investment.

The Guizhou Aged Care System Development Program-for-Results (PforR), approved in March 2019 and co-financed by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), is the first World Bank-financed aged care PforR worldwide. The program is helping China address the challenge of population aging by developing a comprehensive policy and institutional framework for elderly care in the southwestern Guizhou Province, one of the poorest provinces in the country. The support is focused on increasing equitable access to a basic package of care services for the elderly and strengthening the quality of services and the efficiency of the aged care system.

The Innovative Financing for Air Pollution Control in Jing-Jin-Ji Program (2016-2021), supports the Hua Xia Bank in providing enterprises with financing to reduce air pollutants and carbon emissions by increasing energy efficiency, investing in clean energy, and tightening air pollution control. The project focuses on the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (Jing-Jin-Ji) region and the surrounding provinces of Shandong, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Henan. The program is helping to combat climate change by reducing CO 2 emissions by 1.54 million tons per year, equivalent to avoiding nearly 10 GW of new coal power plants over lifetime of the investments.

The Hebei Air Pollution Prevention and Control Program (2016-2019) has supported the province's efforts to reduce air pollution by implementing a combination of targeted measures including a continuous emission monitoring system, replacement of heavily polluting diesel buses with electric vehicles, and a switch from coal-fueled cookstoves to clean gas stoves.

The Ningxia Desertification Control and Ecological Protection Project (2012-2020) has helped improve the environment and living conditions of local communities while curbing desertification and land degradation and restoring vegetation. The project has also created new jobs and sources of income for local farmers.

The Guangxi Poverty Reduction Program for Results has supported institutional innovations in the province including the enhancement of a poverty reduction big data platform and an infrastructure project management information system, and integration of poverty reduction funds from multiple sources to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of poverty reduction efforts.

Last Updated: Oct 12, 2021

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Since China began to open up and reform its economy in 1978, GDP growth has averaged almost 10 percent a year, and more than 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty. There have also been significant improvements in access to health, education, and other services over the same period.

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CultureGrams Online Database: Subscriber Area Only

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China has been accused of committing crimes against humanity and possibly genocide against the Uyghur population and other mostly-Muslim ethnic groups in the north-western region of Xinjiang.

Human rights groups believe China has detained more than one million Uyghurs against their will over the past few years in a large network of what the state calls "re-education camps", and sentenced hundreds of thousands to prison terms.

A series of police files obtained by the BBC in 2022 has revealed details of China's use of these camps and described the routine use of armed officers and the existence of a shoot-to-kill policy for those trying to escape.

The US is among several countries to have previously accused China of committing genocide in Xinjiang. The leading human rights groups Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have published reports accusing China of crimes against humanity.

China denies all allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The Chinese government - speaking after details of the Xinjiang Police Files were published - said the peace and prosperity brought to Xinjiang as a result of its anti-terrorism measures were the best response to "all sorts of lies".

Who are the Uyghurs?

There are about 12 million Uyghurs, mostly Muslim, living in Xinjiang, which is officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

The Uyghurs speak their own language, which is similar to Turkish, and see themselves as culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. They make up less than half of the Xinjiang population.

Recent decades have seen a mass migration of Han Chinese (China's ethnic majority) into Xinjiang, allegedly orchestrated by the state to dilute the minority population there.

Uyghur activists say they fear that the group's culture is under threat of erasure.

Where is Xinjiang?

Xinjiang lies in the north-west of China and is the country's largest region. Like Tibet, it is autonomous, meaning - in theory - it has some powers of self-governance. But in practice, both regions are subjected to major restrictions by the central government.

Xinjiang is a mostly desert region and produces about a fifth of the world's cotton. Human rights groups have voiced concerns that much of that cotton export is picked by forced labour, and in 2021 some Western brands removed Xinjiang cotton from their supply chains, leading to a backlash against the brands from Chinese celebrities and netizens.

In December 2020, research seen by the BBC showed that up to half a million people were being forced to pick cotton in Xinjiang. There is evidence that new factories have been built within the grounds of the re-education camps.

The region is also rich in oil and natural gas and because of its proximity to Central Asia and Europe is seen by Beijing as an important trade link.

In the early 20th Century, the Uyghurs briefly declared independence for the region but it was brought under the complete control of China's new Communist government in 1949.

The UK parliament declared in April 2021 that China was committing a genocide in Xinjiang.

A UN human rights committee in 2018 said it had credible reports that China was holding up to a million people in "counter-extremism centres" in Xinjiang.

The UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said the files contained "shocking details of China's human rights violations".

Earlier, leaked documents known as the China Cables made clear that the camps were intended to be run as high security prisons, with strict discipline and punishments.

People who have managed to escape the camps have reported physical, mental and sexual torture. Women have spoken of mass rape and sexual abuse.

Anti-Han and separatist sentiment rose in Xinjiang from the 1990s, sometimes flaring into violence. In 2009 about 200 people died in clashes in Xinjiang, which the Chinese blamed on Uyghurs who wanted their own state. But in recent years a massive security crackdown has crushed dissent.

Xinjiang is now covered by a pervasive network of surveillance, including police, checkpoints, and cameras that scan everything from number plates to individual faces. According to Human Rights Watch, police are also using a mobile app to monitor people's behaviour, such as how much electricity they are using and how often they use their front door.

Since 2017, when President Xi Jinping issued an order saying all religions in China should be Chinese in orientation, there have been further crackdowns. Campaigners say China is trying to eradicate Uyghur culture.

The Xinjiang Police Files, which all date from before 2019, shed further light on Uyghurs being punished for alleged crimes that took place years ago. Many appear to have been targeted for their mobile phone use, for listening to "illegal lectures" or not using their phones enough, which is regarded as a sign the user is trying to evade digital surveillance.

What does China say?

China denies all allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. In response to the Xinjiang Police Files, China's foreign ministry spokesman told the BBC that the documents were "the latest example of anti-China voices trying to smear China". He said Xinjiang enjoyed stability and prosperity and residents were living happy, fulfilled lives.

China says the crackdown in Xinjiang is necessary to prevent terrorism and root out Islamist extremism and the camps are an effective tool for re-educating inmates in its fight against terrorism.

It insists that Uyghur militants are waging a violent campaign for an independent state by plotting bombings, sabotage and civic unrest, but it is accused of exaggerating the threat in order to justify repression of the Uyghurs.

China has dismissed claims it is trying to reduce the Uyghur population through mass sterilisations as "baseless", and says allegations of forced labour are "completely fabricated".

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Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide?

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China has been accused by the US of genocide and crimes against humanity against the Muslim minority group.

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What is happening with the Uighurs in China? (Concentration Camp)

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What is happening with the Uighurs in China? (Concentration Camp)

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China's social credit score bans some from travel

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A Look Inside China’s Social Credit System | NBC News Now

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Select People and Society, Transnational Issues, and Communications Tabs

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Introduction

China's historical civilization dates to at least 13th century B.C., first under the Shang (to 1046 B.C.) and then the Zhou (1046-221 B.C) dynasties. The imperial era of China began in 221 B.C. under the Qin Dynasty and lasted until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. During this period, China alternated between periods of unity and disunity under a succession of imperial dynasties. In the 19 th century, the Qing Dynasty suffered heavily from overextension by territorial conquest, insolvency, civil war, imperialism, military defeats, and foreign expropriation of ports and infrastructure. It collapsed following the Revolution of 1911, and China became a republic under SUN Yat-sen of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist) Party. However, the republic was beset by division, warlordism, and continued foreign intervention. In the late 1920s, a civil war erupted between the ruling KMT-controlled government led by CHIANG Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Japan occupied much of northeastern China in the early 1930s, and then launched a full-scale invasion of the country in 1937. The resulting eight years of warfare devastated the country and cost up to 20 million Chinese lives by the time of Japan's defeat in 1945. The Nationalist-Communist civil war continued with renewed intensity following the end of World War II and culminated with a CCP victory in 1949, under the leadership of MAO Zedong.

MAO and the CCP established an autocratic socialist system that, while ensuring the PRC's sovereignty, imposed strict controls over everyday life and launched agricultural, economic, political, and social policies - such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) - that cost the lives of millions of people. MAO died in 1976. Beginning in 1978, subsequent leaders DENG Xiaoping, JIANG Zemin, and HU Jintao focused on market-oriented economic development and opening up the country to foreign trade, while maintaining the rule of the CCP. Since the change, China has been among the world's fastest growing economies, with real gross domestic product averaging over 9% growth annually through 2021, lifting an estimated 800 million people out of poverty, and dramatically improving overall living standards. By 2011, the PRC's economy was the second largest in the world. The growth, however, has created considerable social displacement, adversely affected the country's environment, and reduced the country's natural resources. Current leader XI Jinping has continued these policies, but also has maintained tight political controls. Over the past decade, China has also increased its global outreach, including military deployments, participation in international organizations, and initiating a global connectivity initiative in 2013 called the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). While many nations have signed on to BRI agreements to attract PRC investment, others have balked at the opaque lending behavior; weak environment, social, and governance (ESG) standards; and other practices that undermine local governance and foster corruption associated with some BRI-linked projects. XI Jinping assumed the positions of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2012 and President in 2013. In March 2018, the PRC's National People's Congress passed an amendment abolishing presidential term limits, opening the door for XI to seek a third five-year term in 2023.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

slightly smaller than the US

Yangtze - 6,300 km; Huang He - 5,464 km; Amur river source (shared with Mongolia and Russia [m]) - 4,444 km; Mekong river source (shared with Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam [m]) - 4,350 km; Brahmaputra river source (shared with India and Bangladesh [m]) - 3,969 km; Indus river source (shared with India and Pakistan [m]) - 3,610 km; Salween river source (shared with Thailand and Burma [m]) - 3,060 km; Irrawaddy river source (shared with Burma [m]) - 2,809 km; Pearl (shared with Vietnam [s]) - 2,200 km; Red river source (shared with Vietnam [m]) - 1,149 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Pacific Ocean drainage: Amur (1,929,955 sq km), Huang He (944,970 sq km), Mekong (805,604 sq km), Yangtze (1,722,193 sq km)
Indian Ocean drainage: Brahmaputra (651,335 sq km), Ganges (1,016,124 sq km), Indus (1,081,718 sq km), Irrawaddy (413,710 sq km), Salween (271,914 sq km)
Arctic Ocean drainage: Ob (2,972,493 sq km)
Internal (endorheic basin) drainage: Tarim Basin (1,152,448 sq km), Amu Darya (534,739 sq km), Syr Darya (782,617 sq km), Lake Balkash (510,015 sq km)

frequent typhoons (about five per year along southern and eastern coasts); damaging floods; tsunamis; earthquakes; droughts; land subsidence

volcanism: China contains some historically active volcanoes including Changbaishan (also known as Baitoushan, Baegdu, or P'aektu-san), Hainan Dao, and Kunlun although most have been relatively inactive in recent centuries

People and Society

Standard Chinese or Mandarin (official; Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages (see Ethnic groups entry); note - Zhuang is official in Guangxi Zhuang, Yue is official in Guangdong, Mongolian is official in Nei Mongol, Uighur is official in Xinjiang Uygur, Kyrgyz is official in Xinjiang Uygur, and Tibetan is official in Xizang (Tibet)

major-language sample(s):
世界概況 - 不可缺少的基本消息來源 (Standard Chinese)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

improved: urban: 97.3% of population

rural: 91.5% of population

total: 95.1% of population

unimproved: urban: 2.7% of population

rural: 8.5% of population

total: 4.9% of population (2020 est.)

improved: urban: 97.6% of population

rural: 90.6% of population

total: 94.9% of population

unimproved: urban: 2.4% of population

rural: 9.4% of population

total: 5.1% of population (2020 est.)

Environment

municipal solid waste generated annually: 210 million tons (2015 est.)

Yangtze - 6,300 km; Huang He - 5,464 km; Amur river source (shared with Mongolia and Russia [m]) - 4,444 km; Mekong river source (shared with Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam [m]) - 4,350 km; Brahmaputra river source (shared with India and Bangladesh [m]) - 3,969 km; Indus river source (shared with India and Pakistan [m]) - 3,610 km; Salween river source (shared with Thailand and Burma [m]) - 3,060 km; Irrawaddy river source (shared with Burma [m]) - 2,809 km; Pearl (shared with Vietnam [s]) - 2,200 km; Red river source (shared with Vietnam [m]) - 1,149 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Pacific Ocean drainage: Amur (1,929,955 sq km), Huang He (944,970 sq km), Mekong (805,604 sq km), Yangtze (1,722,193 sq km)
Indian Ocean drainage: Brahmaputra (651,335 sq km), Ganges (1,016,124 sq km), Indus (1,081,718 sq km), Irrawaddy (413,710 sq km), Salween (271,914 sq km)
Arctic Ocean drainage: Ob (2,972,493 sq km)
Internal (endorheic basin) drainage: Tarim Basin (1,152,448 sq km), Amu Darya (534,739 sq km), Syr Darya (782,617 sq km), Lake Balkash (510,015 sq km)

Government

23 provinces (sheng, singular and plural), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu, singular and plural), 4 municipalities (shi, singular and plural), and two special administrative regions (tebie xingzhengqu, singular and plural)

provinces: Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang; (see note on Taiwan)

autonomous regions: Guangxi, Nei Mongol (Inner Mongolia), Ningxia, Xinjiang Uyghur, Xizang (Tibet)

note: China considers Taiwan its 23rd province; see separate entries for the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau

Economy

47% of GDP (2017 est.)

44.2% of GDP (2016 est.)

note: official data; data cover both central and local government debt, including debt officially recognized by China's National Audit Office report in 2011; data exclude policy bank bonds, Ministry of Railway debt, and China Asset Management Company debt
country comparison to the world: 116

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

10,773,248,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from coal and metallurgical coke: 8,652,419,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from petroleum and other liquids: 1,520,552,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from consumed natural gas: 600.276 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
country comparison to the world: 1

Communications

Transportation

note 1: seven of the world's ten largest container ports are in China

note 2: China operates one PC 3 or 4 class medium ice breaker and three PC 5 or 6 class light icebreakers
note - PC indicates a Polar Class vessel: PC 3 - year-round operation in second-year ice which may include multi-year ice inclusions (ice thickness up to 2.5 m); PC 4 - year-round operation in thick first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions (ice thickness up to 120 cm); PC 5 - year-round operation in medium first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions (ice thickness up to 70-120 cm); PC 6 - summer/autumn operation in medium first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions (ice thickness up to 30-70 cm)

Military and Security

People's Liberation Army (PLA): Ground Forces, Navy (PLAN, includes marines and naval aviation), Air Force (PLAAF, includes airborne forces), Rocket Force (strategic missile force), and Strategic Support Force (information, electronic, and cyber warfare, as well as space forces); People's Armed Police (PAP, includes Coast Guard, Border Defense Force, Internal Security Forces); PLA Reserve Force (2022)

note 1: the Strategic Support Force includes the Space Systems Department, which is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking, and control, and space warfare

note 2: the PAP is a paramilitary police component of China's armed forces that is under the dual authority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Central Military Commission and charged with internal security, law enforcement, counterterrorism, and maritime rights protection

note 3: in 2018, the Coast Guard was moved from the State Oceanic Administration to the PAP; in 2013, China merged four of its five major maritime law enforcement agencies - the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Maritime Police, Fishery Law Enforcement (FLE), and Anti-Smuggling Police - into a unified coast guard

established in 1927, the PLA is the military arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission; the Central Military Commission is China's top military decision making body

the PRC's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People's Armed Police (PAP), and the militia; the PLA support the internal security forces as necessary:

the MPS controls the civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order; its primary mission is domestic law enforcement and maintaining order, including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism

the MSS is the PRC's main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service

the PAP is a paramilitary component (or adjunct) of the PLA; its primary missions include internal security, maintaining public order, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war; it is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC); the China Coast Guard (CCG) administratively falls under the PAP; the CCG has a variety of missions, such as maritime sovereignty enforcement, surveillance, resource protection, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement; as of 2023, it was the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world

the militia is an armed reserve of civilians which serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA upon mobilization, although it is distinct from the PLA's reserve forces; militia units are organized around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission; they have dual civilian-military command structures; a key component of the militia are the local maritime forces, commonly referred to as the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM); the PAFMM consists of mariners (and their vessels) who receive training, equipment, and other forms of support from the Navy and CCG (although the PAFMM remains separate from both) to perform tasks such as maritime patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance, emergency/disaster response, transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary tasks in support of naval operations in wartime; the PAFMM's tasks are often conducted in conjunction or coordination with the Navy and the CCG; it has been used to assert Beijing's maritime claims in the Sea of Japan and South China Sea (2023)

Transnational Issues

China and India continue their security and foreign policy dialogue started in 2005 related to a number of boundary disputes across the 2,000 mile shared border; India does not recognize Pakistan's 1964 ceding to China of the Aksai Chin, a territory designated as part of the princely state of Kashmir by the British Survey of India in 1865; China claims most of the Indian state Arunachal Pradesh to the base of the Himalayas, but the US recognizes the state of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory; Bhutan and China continue negotiations to establish a common boundary alignment to resolve territorial disputes arising from substantial cartographic discrepancies, the most contentious of which lie in Bhutan's west along China's Chumbi salient; Chinese maps show an international boundary symbol (the so-called "nine-dash line") off the coasts of the littoral states of the South China Sea, where China has interrupted Vietnamese hydrocarbon exploration; China asserts sovereignty over Scarborough Reef along with the Philippines and Taiwan, and over the Spratly Islands together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei; the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea eased tensions in the Spratlys, and in 2017 China and ASEAN began confidential negotiations for an updated Code of Conduct for the South China Sea designed not to settle territorial disputes but establish rules and norms in the region; this still is not the legally binding code of conduct sought by some parties; Vietnam and China continue to expand construction of facilities in the Spratlys and in early 2018 China began deploying advanced military systems to disputed Spratly outposts; China occupies some of the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan; the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands are also claimed by China and Taiwan; certain islands in the Yalu and Tumen Rivers are in dispute with North Korea; North Korea and China seek to stem illegal migration to China by North Koreans, fleeing privation and oppression; China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with their 2004 Agreement; China and Tajikistan have begun demarcating the revised boundary agreed to in the delimitation of 2002; the decade-long demarcation of the China-Vietnam land boundary was completed in 2009; citing environmental, cultural, and social concerns, China has reconsidered construction of 13 dams on the Salween River, but energy-starved Burma, with backing from Thailand, continues to consider building five hydro-electric dams downstream despite regional and international protests

a major source of precursor chemicals, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and synthetic drugs, including fentanyl precursors and methamphetamine; PRC criminal organizations, transnational crime, and organizations from Mexico and Southeast Asia traffic licit precursor chemical components and illicit finished drugs within the PRC as well as to international markets; significant illicit drug consumption of methamphetamine and ketamine; a major destination and transit country for heroin produced in neighboring countries; the PRC remains a major source of NPS sold in North America and Europe

(2021)

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China's historical civilization dates to at least 13th century B.C., first under the Shang (to 1046 B.C.) and then the Zhou (1046-221 B.C) dynasties. The imperial era of China began in 221 B.C. under the Qin Dynasty and lasted until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912.

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The Cultural Atlas aims to inform and educate the public in cross-cultural attitudes, practices, norms, behaviours, communications and business skills

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A brief introduction to the Chinese education system

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a brief introduction to the chinese education system

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A brief introduction to the Chinese education system

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This article outlines the structure of the Chinese education system and the study hours expected at a Chinese school.

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Chinese Religions and Philosophies - NatGeo

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Chinese Religions and Philosophies - NatGeo

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Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are considered the "three pillars" of ancient Chinese society. As philosophies and religions, they not only influenced spirituality, but also government, science, the arts, and social structure. Though their specific beliefs and teachings have occasionally been at odds with each other, there has been much room for overlap. Instead of one tradition taking over and pushing the others out, the three philosophies have influenced society alongside each other, changed each other, and at times blended together. Understanding the unique interplay between these three traditions gives great insight into ancient Chinese society, as well as modern times.
Confucianism
Though closer to a philosophy than a true religion, Confucianism was a way of life for ancient Chinese people, and it continues to influence Chinese culture today. The founder of Confucianism, named Confucius, lived from 551 to 479 B.C.E. He was a philosopher and political figure who lived during a time when traditional Chinese principles began to deteriorate under competing political states. He took older religious precepts and translated them into guidelines for social mores. His teachings gave guidance on all levels of ancient Chinese life, from interactions between family members and in the public sphere, to educational standards and how states should be governed. Confucius saw every aspect of life as being made up of obligations between people and entities, and rituals to convey the mutual dependency between them. His teachings focused on humanism, including treating others the way you would want to be treated. He taught that if everyone fulfilled their roles and obligations with respect and kindness towards others, it would build a stronger state. While religious rituals were mentioned alongside all of the other rituals a person was expected to perform, Confucius did not focus on spiritual concerns like the afterlife, gods and goddesses, or mysticism. This is why Confucianism is considered a philosophy rather than a religion, even though it is often lumped in with other major religions.

Confucianism became the dominant political philosophy during the Han Dynasty from 206 B.C.E. to 220 C.E. Because Confucian teachings were conservative and told people to maintain their role in social order, the philosophy was used by the state to keep the status quo from that time forward. The structure of Chinese society and its focus on rituals, familial respect and obligation, worship of ancestors, and self-discipline, remains greatly influenced by Confucius and his teachings.
Taoism
Taoism (also called Daoism) is a Chinese religion that developed a bit after Confucianism, around two thousand years ago. In contrast to Confucianism, Taoism is mainly concerned with the spiritual elements of life, including the nature of the universe. The guiding principle of Taoism is roughly translated as "the Way," which is a harmonious natural order that arises between humans and the world, and that Taoists should strive to achieve. In the Taoist structure of the universe, humans are meant to accept and yield to the Tao and only do things that are natural and in keeping with the Tao. This is the concept of wu-wei, which translates as "non-action," but really means to go with the true nature of the world and not strive too hard for desires. This puts Taoism in opposition to Confucianism in another way: it is not concerned about with humanistic morality, government, and society, all of which Taoists see as inventions of humans and not necessarily part of the Tao. At the same time, Taoists were interested in longevity, both of the human body and the soul. Achieving spiritual immortality through becoming one with nature is an important part of the Taoist religion.

Despite their differences, Taoist and Confucian ideas are not completely at odds with each other, so Chinese society was able to absorb concepts from both traditions. Taoism had influence on literature and the arts, but the biggest area of Taoist influence was in science. The Taoist focus on natural elements and observing how the natural world works helped to create Chinese medicine. Similar to the modern scientific method, Taoists observed how different medicines affected people and animals through experimentation. Their collective knowledge gained through trying to improve human longevity made a huge contribution to health sciences.
Buddhism
Buddhism was the third major belief system of ancient China. It was founded by Siddhartha Gautama, also called the Buddha, who lived in India around the sixth century B.C.E. Buddhism is a philosophy that focuses on personal development and attainment of deep knowledge. Buddhists seek to achieve enlightenment through meditation, spiritual learning, and practice. They believe in reincarnation and that life is impermanent and full of suffering and uncertainty; the way to find peace is through reaching nirvana, a joyful state beyond human suffering. There are many different sects that place different emphasis on various aspects of Buddhism. The two largest sects are Theravada Buddhism, which is found primarily in southern Asia, and Mahayana Buddhism, which is found in east Asia, including China.

After its founding in India, Buddhism spread to and became popular in China in the first century C.E. Part of the reason Buddhism became popular in China was because of Taoism. Some Buddhist practices were similar to Taoist ones, and Buddhist monks would use Taoist concepts to explain Buddhism to the Chinese, overcoming the cultural and language barrier between Indian and the Chinese people. Buddhism also influenced Taoism with its institutional structure, which Taoists copied and modified. A competition between Buddhism and Taoism arose to gain more followers and greater government influence, and this competition increased the vitality of both religions. As Buddhism became more prevalent, its concepts merged with Taoist and Confucian ideas to become the basis of ancient Chinese society and government. Its influence is seen in Chinese art, architecture, and literature.

Values and ideas from Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are still prevalent in Chinese culture today. Despite the differences and occasional contradictions between the three traditions, the ancient Chinese society held each of these philosophies in high importance and incorporated the different teachings into multiple areas of life.

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Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are considered the "three pillars" of ancient Chinese society. As philosophies and religions, they not only influenced spirituality, but also government, science, the arts, and social structure. Though their specific beliefs and teachings have occasionally been at odds with each other, there has been much room for overlap.

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Introduction

Religious observance in China is on the rise. Amid China's economic boom and rapid modernization, experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly adherents of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.

While China's constitution allows religious belief, adherents across all religious organizations, from state-sanctioned to underground and banned groups, face intensifying persecution, repression, and pressure to adhere to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology.

Freedom and Regulation

Article 36 of the Chinese constitution says that citizens "enjoy freedom of religious belief." It bans discrimination based on religion and forbids state organs, public organizations, or individuals from compelling citizens to believe in-or not believe in-any particular faith. The State Council, the government's administrative authority, passed regulations on religious affairs, which took effect in February 2018, to allow state-registered religious organizations to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, and collect donations. Yet alongside these rights come heightened government controls. The revised rules include restrictions on religious schooling and the times and locations of religious celebrations, as well as monitoring of online religious activity and reporting donations that exceed 100,000 yuan (around $15,900).

Human Rights Watch's China director, Sophie Richardson, says that while religious belief in China is protected by the constitution, the measures " do not guarantee [PDF] the right to practice or worship." Religious practices are limited to "normal religious activities," though "normal" is left undefined and can be broadly interpreted. The state recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The practice of any other faith is formally prohibited, although often tolerated, especially in the case of traditional Chinese beliefs. Religious organizations must register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, which are supervised by the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA).

The government's tally of registered religious believers is around two hundred million, or less than 10 percent of the population, according to several sources, including the UN Human Rights Council's 2018 Universal Periodic Review. Yet some independent reports suggest the number of religious adherents in China is far larger and is steadily increasing. The research and advocacy group Freedom House estimated in 2017 that there are more than 350 million religious believers in China, primarily made up of Chinese Buddhists, followed by Protestants, Muslims, Falun Gong practitioners, Catholics, and Tibetan Buddhists. Many believers do not follow organized religion and are said to practice traditional folk religion. These practitioners, along with members of underground house churches and banned religious groups, account for many of the country's unregistered believers.

Chinese public security officials monitor both registered and unregistered religious groups to prevent activities that " disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State," as stipulated by the Chinese constitution. In practice, however, monitoring and crackdowns often target peaceful activities that are protected under international law, say human rights watchdogs. Overall, "religious groups have been swept up in a broader tightening of CCP control over civil society [PDF] and an increasingly anti-Western ideological bent under [Chinese President] Xi Jinping," writes Freedom House.

"Religious groups have been swept up in a broader tightening of CCP control over civil society."

Freedom House

Under Xi, the CCP has pushed to Sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the doctrines of the officially atheist party and the customs of the majority Han Chinese population. New regulations that went into effect in early 2020 require religious groups to accept and spread CCP ideology and values. Faith organizations must now get approval from the government's religious affairs office before conducting any activities.

In addition, China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, likely numbering in the tens of thousands; while in custody, some are tortured or killed, rights groups say. Instances of arbitrary detentions and violence carried out with impunity have led the U.S. State Department to designate China as a country of particular concern over religious freedom annually since 1999.

Atheism and the CCP

The CCP is officially atheist. The party prohibits its more than ninety million party members from holding religious beliefs, and it has demanded the expulsion of party members who belong to religious organizations. Officials have said that party membership and religious beliefs are incompatible, and they discourage families of CCP members from publicly participating in religious ceremonies. Although these regulations are not always strictly enforced, the party periodically takes steps to draw a clearer line on religion. In 2017, the party's official newspaper warned CCP members from putting faith in religion, calling it "spiritual anesthesia."

Chinese Buddhism and Folk Religions

China has the world's largest Buddhist population, with an estimated 185-250 million practitioners, according to Freedom House. Though Buddhism originated in India, it has a long history and tradition in China and today is the country's largest institutionalized religion. Separately, a 2012 Pew Research Center report found that more than 294 million people, or 21 percent of China's population, practice folk religions. Chinese folk religions have no rigid organizational structure, blend practices from Buddhism and Daoism, and are manifest in the worship of ancestors, spirits, or other local deities. Though the number of traditional Chinese religious adherents is difficult to measure accurately, the building of new temples and the restoration of old temples signals the growth of Buddhism and folk beliefs in China.

"Buddhism, Daoism, and other folk religions are seen as the most authentically Chinese religions and there is much more tolerance of these traditional religions than of Islam or Christianity," says journalist Barbara Demick, former Beijing bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times. According to Ian Johnson, author of The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao, "hundreds, if not thousands, of folk religious temples are unregistered with the SARA but are tolerated."

"Buddhism, Daoism, and other folk religions are seen as the most authentically Chinese religions."

Barbara Demick,

Since China's opening and reform in the 1980s, the party has been tolerant of, and tacitly approved, the rise in Buddhist practice. However, Karrie Koesel, author of Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences, says that "political winds can shift quite quickly in China, so having a positive, collaborative relationship with the government is important to these religious communities." Under former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the government " passively supported " [PDF] the growth of Buddhism because it believed doing so helped bolster the image of China's peaceful rise, supported the CCP's goal of creating a "harmonious society," and could help to improve relations with Taiwan, according to the University of Ottawa's Andre Laliberte.

The growth of Buddhism led to heightened visibility of its institutions, particularly Buddhist philanthropic organizations [PDF] that deliver social services to the poor amid soaring inequality in China. Since Xi has come to power, experts have noted an apparent easing of tough rhetoric against, and even a promotion of, traditional beliefs in China. Xi has expressed hope that China's " traditional cultures " of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism could help curb the country's "moral decline."

Tibetan Buddhism

The Tibet Autonomous Region and its adjacent provinces are home to more than six million ethnic Tibetans, most of whom practice a distinct form of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of one of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Since 1987, he and his exiled government in India have played a prominent role in garnering international support for Tibetan autonomy. Buddhist monks within Tibet have also participated in largely peaceful anti-government demonstrations, though some have included riots and self-immolations. Experts say that discontent among Tibetan Buddhists stems in part from economic disparities between ethnic Tibetans and Han Chinese, as well as from religious and political repression. Tibetans are believed to account for nearly 90 percent of the autonomous region's population, though large numbers of Han Chinese have migrated to Tibet as part of a broader campaign by China to modernize its western regions.

China's religious policy in Tibet is inherently tied to the ethno-religious status of Tibetan Buddhists. To quell dissent, the CCP restricts religious activity in Tibet and Tibetan communities outside of the autonomous region. The state monitors daily operations of major monasteries, with facial-recognition cameras posted outside, and it reserves the right to disapprove an individual's application to take up religious orders; restrictions also extend to lay Tibetan Buddhists, including people who work for the government and teachers. For example, in 2018, party cadres and officials were given control over Sichuan Province's Larung Gar, one of the world's largest Buddhist study centers. Authorities demolished nearly half of the center in 2019, displacing up to six thousand monks and nuns.

Tibetan Buddhists face high levels of religious persecution. Authorities have reportedly detained and tortured monks and nuns for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama, and laypeople have been ordered to replace photos of the Dalai Lama with Chinese leaders. A Tibetan child believed to be a reincarnated, high-ranking religious leader, known as the Panchen Lama, was disappeared in 1995 and has not been seen since. (Beijing claims that he graduated from college, has a job, and does not want to be disturbed.) The government designated another child as the official Panchen Lama, though many Tibetans do not accept him as such.

Christian State-Sanctioned and House Churches

Since the 1980s, China has seen a significant growth in Christianity, and today Protestantism is the country's fastest-growing religious group. There are three state-regulated Christian organizations and many underground house churches of widely varying size. The Pew Research Center estimated [PDF] that in 2010 there were sixty-seven million Christians in China, roughly 5 percent of the total population, and, of these, fifty-eight million were Protestant, including both state-sanctioned and independent churches. Others estimate this number to now be closer to one hundred million, with unregistered churchgoers outnumbering members of official churches nearly two to one. Meanwhile, the Beijing-based Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' estimate is far smaller, tallying twenty-nine million Christian believers.

In recent years, China has witnessed a spike in state repression against both house churches and state-sanctioned Christian organizations, including campaigns to remove hundreds of rooftop crosses from churches, forced demolitions of churches, and harassment and imprisonment of Christian pastors and priests. A 2018 report [PDF] from ChinaAid, a Texas-based Christian nongovernmental organization, said that religious persecution, primarily against Christians, was on the rise. The report cited over one million cases of religious persecution in 2018. More than five thousand people were detained, including more than one thousand church leaders. One of China's most prominent Christian voices and the founder of a large underground church, Pastor Wang Yi, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2019 after a court charged him with subversion of state power and illegal business operations.

The Vatican has not had diplomatic ties with China, home to some ten to twelve million Catholics, since 1951. Its recognition of Taiwan and a dispute over the bishop appointment process have been major sticking points. However, in a sign of possible warming relations in 2018, the two sides reached a provisional agreement in which Pope Francis recognized several Chinese state-appointed bishops who had been excommunicated.

Islam and Uyghurs in Xinjiang

Muslims make up about 1.8 percent of China's population, accounting for around twenty-two million people. China has ten predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Hui, an ethnic group closely related to the majority Han population and largely based in western China's Ningxia Autonomous Region and the Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces.

The Uyghurs, a Turkic people who live primarily in the autonomous region of Xinjiang in northwest China, are also predominantly Muslim. There are about eleven million Uyghurs in this region, making up approximately half of its population. Officials in Xinjiang tightly control religious activity, while Muslims in the rest of the country have typically enjoyed greater religious freedom. In recent years, however, Hui Muslims in northwestern China have experienced an uptick in repression, including the imprisonment of religious leaders and forced closure of mosques.

For decades, Chinese authorities have cracked down on Uyghurs in Xinjiang, claiming the community holds extremist and separatist ideas. They point to occasional outbursts of violence against government workers and civilians in the region and have blamed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a separatist group founded by militant Uyghurs, for several terrorist attacks throughout China. Experts say most Uyghurs do not support the violence, but many are frustrated by frequent discrimination and the influx of Han Chinese to the region, as they disproportionately benefit from economic opportunities.

In recent years, the repression has intensified. Since 2017, up to two million Muslims, most of them Uyghurs, have been arbitrarily detained in so-called reeducation camps, according to experts and foreign government officials. Detainees have reported being tortured, sexually abused, barred from practicing their religion, and forced to pledge loyalty to the CCP. Many children of those who are detained are placed in boarding schools, where they study Mandarin and CCP ideology, according to a 2019 U.S. government report. Outside of the detention centers, Uyghurs are subjected to intense surveillance, widespread religious restrictions, and forced sterilizations.

Chinese officials deny human rights abuses in the region. They maintain that the reeducation camps have two purposes: to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, and vocational skills, and to prevent citizens from being influenced by extremist ideas. Beijing has resisted international pressure to allow outside investigators to freely travel in Xinjiang.

Banned Religious Groups

Several religious and spiritual groups, dubbed "heterodox cults" by Beijing, are subject to regular government crackdowns. The party-state has banned more than a dozen such faiths on the grounds that adherents use religion "as a camouflage, deifying their leading members, recruiting and controlling their members, and deceiving people by molding and spreading superstitious ideas, and endangering society." Those banned include quasi-Christian groups such as the Church of Almighty God, also known as Eastern Lightning, and Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that blends aspects of Buddhism, Daoism, and traditional qigong exercise. International human rights groups, scholars of religion, and Chinese human rights lawyers have questioned such designations, criticizing the Chinese government for harsh repression against believers.

"The religious landscape of China is too fragmented for any one religion to mount a credible political challenge."

Andre Laliberte,

Demick says that there is likely more activity among banned organizations in China than what is widely thought. A crackdown on Falun Gong was launched in 1999 after the group organized a large, peaceful demonstration outside CCP headquarters to advocate the release of detained adherents and greater freedom to practice. At its height, the group was believed to have as many as seventy million followers; Freedom House estimates that seven to twenty million people continue to practice despite nearly two decades of persecution. The Chinese government has initiated fresh campaigns against other smaller religious groups, one notably following a deadly attack on a woman in a McDonald's by suspected members of the Church of Almighty God.

A Continuing Revival

Religious revival among Chinese does not appear to be abating, experts say, though Beijing's rigorous regulation of religious affairs has intensified. Some argue that state repression of religion often has less to do with religious doctrine than with a group's organizational ability, due to fear that such a group could potentially challenge the CCP's legitimacy.

Tsering Shakya of the University of British Columbia's Institute of Asian Research says the fundamental problem [PDF] in the relationship between the Chinese state and religion is that "the party is willing to tolerate the emergence of religion as a purely private experience, but it is not willing to see religion expressed as a sort of collective authority."

Despite Beijing's concern that religious organizations may call the party's authority into question, some claim that the threat to the CCP is overblown. Laliberte writes that "the religious landscape of China is too fragmented for any one religion to mount a credible political challenge to the regime."

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Religious observance in China is on the rise. Amid China's economic boom and rapid modernization, experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly adherents of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.

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This article was most recently revised and updated by

xiao, Wade-Giles romanization hsiao (Chinese: "filial piety"), Japanese kō, in Confucianism, the attitude of obedience, devotion, and care toward one's parents and elder family members that is the basis of individual moral conduct and social harmony. Xiao consists in putting the needs of parents and family elders over self, spouse, and children, deferring to parents' judgment, and observing toward them the prescribed behavioral proprieties ( li).

Xiao was rooted in China's feudal social structure, in which land was held by large clans whose internal life was structured hierarchically and patriarchally. Confucius raised xiao to a moral precept by citing it as the basis of ("humanity"), the cultivated love of other people that was the Confucian moral ideal. Xiao is not simple obedience but rather deference, and on occasion it even entails remonstrance or gentle admonition. He also delineated the importance of xiao for both family harmony and sociopolitical stability and facilitated its practice by reemphasizing the rites and behaviours associated with it.

The concept, rendered kō, was adopted in Japan during the 17th century, when Confucianism became the official doctrine of the Tokugawa shogunate.

Matt Stefon.

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xiao, in Confucianism, the attitude of obedience, devotion, and care toward one's parents and elder family members that is the basis of individual moral conduct and social harmony. Xiao consists in putting the needs of parents and family elders over self, spouse, and children, deferring to parents'

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Everything you need to know about human rights in China - Amnesty International

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Everything you need to know about human rights in China - Amnesty International

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Severe Covid-19 restrictions in some cases undermined the right to health and adequate food. The government continued to stifle criticism of its policies and actions and discussion of topics considered sensitive through increasingly pervasive online censorship. Government critics, human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists and religious leaders and practitioners were among those subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. Systematic repression of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet continued. Authorities attempted to prevent the publication of an OHCHR report documenting potential crimes against humanity and other international crimes in Xinjiang. Women continued to endure sexual violence and harassment and other violations of their rights. The Hong Kong government continued its crackdown against the pro-democracy movement. Journalists, broadcasters and book publishers were among those prosecuted and imprisoned under the National Security Law and other repressive legislation, while civil society organizations both in Hong Kong and abroad faced criminal charges or harassment for legitimate activities. Despite some positive policy commitments, including to increased use of renewables, China's CO2 reduction targets were rated as "highly insufficient" and coal production increased.

Background

The government maintained its "zero-Covid policy" for most of the year involving widespread lockdowns and mandatory quarantine. Localized protests against the harsh restrictions intensified from mid-November. Demonstrations spread to at least 20 cities following an apartment block fire in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang), on 24 November in which at least 10 people died. The authorities denied that locked doors had prevented residents from escaping but announced the easing of Covid-19 restrictions following this incident.

In May, the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, conducted a six-day mission to China that included two days in Xinjiang. In June, 42 UN independent human rights experts called on the Chinese government to grant unhindered access to UN special procedures and mechanisms to assess allegations of serious human rights violations in the country, especially in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. In August, the government ratified ILO Conventions 29 on forced labour and 105 on the abolition of forced labour.

In October, President Xi Jinping's third term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was announced at the Party's 20th National Congress, raising fears that the human rights situation would continue to deteriorate following a decade of escalating repression under his leadership. China hosted the Winter Olympic Games in February.

Right to health

There were reports of food shortages and delayed or denied access to emergency healthcare in areas under lockdown. An unknown number of people died after being refused hospital admission. Conditions in quarantine facilities, where those who tested positive for Covid-19 were detained, were often poor and unhygienic. In some cases, children were separated from their parents in quarantine.

On 7 December, the central government announced significant easing of restrictions and on 26 December said that most elements of the "zero-Covid policy" would be substantially dismantled from 8 January 2023. Covid-19 infections and deaths subsequently rose and there were reports from multiple cities of hospitals under extreme pressure and of acute shortages of medications.

Freedom of expression and assembly

Online censorship grew more pervasive and sophisticated as a tool to stifle criticism of the government, intensifying around high-profile events and anniversaries.

The authorities failed to deliver on assurances made as hosts of the Winter Olympic Games to guarantee media freedom before and during the Games and ensure opportunities for peaceful protest. Prior to the Games, they warned athletes against "any behaviour or speeches" that violated "Chinese laws and regulations". High-profile dissidents were censored and had their movements restricted. Journalists accredited to the Games reported repeated government interference in coverage of preparations for the event and in interviews with athletes and local people both in and outside Olympic venues.

Authorities intensified their efforts to prevent criticism of lockdown measures on social media, including appeals for help by those under lockdown and allegations of human rights violations in quarantine facilities. Authorities manipulated the Covid-19 health status phone app that was required to enter public buildings and shops and use public transport or travel, to unduly restrict freedom of movement and peaceful assembly. In Henan province during demonstrations against the freezing of deposits by local banks in June, there were widespread reports of the app suddenly communicating a red-code alert requiring users to quarantine for 14 days. Five local officials subsequently received administrative sanctions for manipulating the app.

In September, in the lead-up to the CCP National Congress, the authority responsible for regulating cyberspace in China launched a three-month purge of internet "rumours and fake news", calling for tech companies to redouble monitoring, tracing, bans and suspensions against account holders. New attempts to block censorship circumvention tools such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN) were also reported.

On 13 October, police arrested Peng Lifa after he unfurled banners on a bridge in the capital, Beijing, during the CCP National Congress criticizing the government's "zero-Covid" policy and calling President Xi a dictator. Images of the protest went viral internationally but all footage and keywords were removed from Chinese social media platforms. There were reports that authorities had arrested some people for reposting images of the protest.

Large numbers of people were detained for participating in peaceful protests against Covid-19 restrictions following the fatal apartment fire in Urumqi in November. It was unclear how many remained in detention at the end of the year. Videos circulated online showed police beating protesters during arrests.

All discussion and commemoration of the victims of the suppression of the 1989 pro-democracy protests remained banned. On the eve of the 4 June anniversary of the military crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square, a well-known influencer's livestream was taken down, apparently because it featured an ice cream sculpture resembling a tank.

Human rights defenders

Authorities continued to imprison human rights defenders, including citizen journalists and human rights lawyers. Those detained were held in harsh conditions and subjected to torture and other ill-treatment.

On 1 March, human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng was released after completing a four-year prison sentence for "subverting state power" apparently for criticizing the president. Yu Wensheng said he was pepper-sprayed, forced to sit on a metal chair until he partially lost consciousness and denied adequate food during his pretrial detention.

In January, citizen journalist Zhang Zhan, who was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in 2020 for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" after reporting on the Covid-19 outbreak, ended her hunger strike to stop the authorities from further force-feeding. It was unclear if Zhang Zhan, whose health had deteriorated during her hunger strike, was permitted access to appropriate medical care.

In April, there were reports of serious deterioration in the health of Huang Qi, the imprisoned founder and director of the Sichuan-based human rights website "64 Tianwang". Huang Qi, who was serving a 12-year prison sentence for his human rights reporting, reportedly did not have access to adequate medical care and was denied access to a bank account where friends and family had deposited money for him to purchase medical and other supplies. He had been refused all contact with his family since 2020.

Many lawyers remained in prison or under strict surveillance. They included legal scholar Xu Zhiyong and human rights lawyer Ding Jiaxi, who were tried in secret in June after being indicted for "subversion of state power" in October 2021. The two men were prominent members of the New Citizens' Movement, a network of activists set up to promote government transparency and expose corruption. Neither had access to lawyers in the months prior to their trials.

In April, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention called on the Chinese authorities to immediately release labour activist Wang Jianbing. He was detained in Guangzhou in September 2021, along with #MeToo activist Sophia Huang Xueqin, and charged with "inciting subversion of state power" in connection with their participation in private gatherings in Wang Jianbing's house to discuss shrinking civil society space. Both were held in incommunicado detention and subjected to ill-treatment following their arrest.

Freedom of religion and belief

Harassment and imprisonment of individuals for practising their religion or beliefs continued. Religious leaders and practitioners, including those belonging to house churches, Uyghur imams, Tibetan Buddhist monks and Falun Gong members, were among those subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention during 2022.

Ethnic Autonomous Regions

Systematic repression of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet continued under the guise of "anti-separatism", "anti-extremism" and "counterterrorism". Access to both regions was highly restricted, making human rights documentation and reporting virtually impossible. Pervasive surveillance prevented those living there from sharing information about human rights violations.

The government continued to implement far-reaching policies that severely restricted the freedoms of Uyghurs, Kazakhs and those from other predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang, which threatened to erase their religious and cultural identities.

During their visit to the region in May, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and her team were not permitted to visit detainees or their families and were accompanied by state officials at all times. Having failed to acknowledge the serious human rights violations in the country during the mission, in August OHCHR released a long-awaited report reinforcing previous findings by Amnesty International and others that the extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghurs and others in Xinjiang may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity. It also documented allegations of torture or other ill-treatment, incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, forced labour and enforced disappearances, among other grave human rights violations.

The Chinese government sought to suppress the report, including by mobilizing other governments to lobby against its publication. Despite the findings, and calls by dozens of UN independent experts for the UN Human Rights Council to convene a special session on China, on 6 October the Council voted to reject a resolution to hold a debate on Xinjiang at its next session.

In November, the CERD Committee called on the Chinese government to immediately investigate all allegations of human rights violations and release all individuals arbitrarily deprived of their liberty in Xinjiang. Despite government claims that internment camps they called "training" or "education" centres had been closed, many thousands of men and women were still believed to be arbitrarily detained in internment camps, prisons or other facilities where political indoctrination, physical and psychological torture and other forms of ill-treatment were widely reported.

Chinese authorities continued to target Uyghurs and other Xinjiang residents who spent time overseas and continued to pressure other governments to return Uyghurs living abroad back to China.

In June, authorities informed the family of 25-year-old Uyghur student Zulyar Yasin that he would be sentenced to up to five years' imprisonment for "separatism". Zulyar Yasin, who had spent two years in Türkiye studying finance at Istanbul University, was detained in December 2021 and was scheduled to go on trial on 28 June, although this was postponed on two occasions due to Covid-19 lockdowns and eventually rescheduled for early 2023.

Four Uyghurs faced deportation from Saudi Arabia to China where they were at risk of serious human rights violations. Saudi authorities detained Buheliqiemu Abula and her 13-year-old daughter on 31 March. Buheliqiemu Abula's former husband Nuermaimaiti Ruze and religious scholar Aimidoula Waili had been detained without charge since November 2020. Aimidoula Waili was previously imprisoned in China from 2013 to 2016, and told Amnesty International he was repeatedly tortured while in detention.

Idris Hasan, a Uyghur computer designer who was arrested in Morocco in July 2021, remained in detention and at risk of forcible return to China. This was despite Interpol's cancellation of the "red notice", which formed the basis for his arrest, and appeals to the Moroccan authorities by the UN Committee against Torture and other special procedures not to extradite him.

Ethnic Tibetans continued to face discrimination and restrictions on their rights to freedom of religion and belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly. Protests against Chinese government repression nevertheless continued.

In September, the Kardze Intermediate People's Court in Sichuan sentenced six Tibetan writers and activists to prison terms of between four and 14 years for "inciting separatism" and "endangering state security". Gangkye Drupa Kyab, Seynam, Gangbu Yudrum, Tsering Dolma and Samdup were detained in March or April 2021. Pema Rinchen was detained in late 2020 and held incommunicado until his trial. All six had been arbitrarily detained in the past in connection with their writings or protests against the Chinese authorities and several suffered from health complications as a result of beatings, poor detention conditions and other ill-treatment experienced at the time.

Tibetan monk Rinchen Tsultrim continued to be denied any contact with his family and access to lawyers despite repeated requests by his family to visit him since his detention in August 2019. He was sentenced to four-and-a-half years' imprisonment in November 2020 following an unfair trial.

Death penalty

China remained the world's leading executioner, although the government continued to classify statistics for executions and death sentences as "state secrets". The death penalty remained applicable for 46 offences, including non-lethal offences that do not meet the threshold of the "most serious crimes" under international law and standards.

Women's rights

On 30 October, the country's top legislature adopted the amended Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests. Due to take effect on 1 January 2023, the revised law includes new provisions to strengthen protection for women in the workplace including requirements on employers to eliminate gender discrimination in hiring processes and to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.

Violence against women including sexual violence and sexual harassment remained widespread, and authorities censored public discussion around it.

Authorities quickly censored discussions about, and banned social media sites from sharing footage of an incident in June that was caught on CCTV of a group of men physically assaulting several women in a restaurant in Tangshan, Hebei province. Twenty-eight people were sentenced to prison terms for their role in the attack. Mao Huibin, a journalist who posted the footage and an article about the incident, was arrested in July and faced up to five years in prison for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble".

In August, Haidian District People's Court dismissed an appeal by Zhou Xiaoxuan against a court ruling rejecting her request for an apology and damages against a well-known state TV host, Zhu Jun, for groping and forcibly kissing her when she was an intern at the TV station in 2014. Zhou Xiaoxuan's public stance against sexual harassment resulted in her being the target of online bullying and state censorship.

In January, a video showing a woman in poor mental and physical health chained in an outhouse in Xuzhou in Jiangsu province went viral, sparking public outrage in China. At least four activists were arrested for investigating and publicizing the case and for supporting the woman who they suspected was a victim of human trafficking, but which local authorities initially denied. One, Wu Yi, was known to have been tried in secret for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" but details of her sentence and whereabouts were unknown. According to media reports in February, 17 local officials had been punished or were being investigated in relation to the case. In March, the Ministry of Public Security announced a one-year campaign to investigate trafficking of women and children.

LGBTI people's rights

Both off- and online LGBTI activism was severely restricted. Dozens of social media accounts of LGBTI groups remained closed due to pervasive censorship. The authorities also censored TV programmes and films, removing LGBTI-related content.

In July, Tsinghua University in Beijing issued official warning letters to two students for "distributing unauthorized promotional materials" after they were tracked by surveillance cameras leaving rainbow flags on the campus. In November, the Beijing Municipal Education Commission endorsed the university's action against the students. Authorities censored online discussions of the incident.

Failure to tackle climate crisis

Under its NDC submitted in 2021, China committed to reduce CO2 emission intensity by over 65% before 2030 from 2005 levels, to reach peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality "before 2060". In November, China's targets, policies and actions were given a rating of "highly insufficient" by the Climate Action Tracker, a consortium providing global scientific analysis, because they were not consistent with limiting warming to the 1.5°C temperature limit.

In March, the government published a new policy document on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an infrastructure project covering 72 countries. The document reaffirmed that no new coal power plants would be built under the BRI and that it would "proceed with caution" on coal power projects already underway.

New domestic renewable targets were issued in 2022 which aimed to increase electricity generation from renewable sources by approximately 35% by 2025 from 2020 levels. However, domestic production of coal increased despite commitments to control coal consumption until 2025 and start to gradually phase it down thereafter.

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

The Hong Kong authorities continued their crackdown against pro-democracy activists, journalists, human rights defenders and others. The 2020 National Security Law (NSL) and other repressive laws were widely used to target people exercising their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. The UN Human Rights Committee urged the Hong Kong government to repeal the NSL and sedition provisions of the Crime Ordinance, and in the meantime to refrain from applying them.

In July, John Lee, former Hong Kong security chief who oversaw the police crackdown on the 2019 protests and the implementation of the NSL, took over as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, having been selected by the central government in Beijing as the sole candidate in the May elections.

Freedom of expression and assembly

At least 11 people were sentenced to terms of imprisonment during the year under colonial-era sedition laws for exercising their right to peaceful expression.

In September, five speech therapists were sentenced to 19 months' imprisonment each after being found guilty of sedition for publishing children's books depicting the government's crackdown on 2019 pro-democracy protests and other issues.

In October, radio show host and public affairs commentator Edmund Wan (known as Giggs) was sentenced to 32 months in prison for "sedition" and "money laundering" for criticizing the government and raising funds for school fees for young Hong Kong activists who had fled to Taiwan after the 2019 protests. Giggs, who was detained for 19 months prior to his conviction, was released on 18 November but was required to hand over fundraising proceeds to the government.

Political activists, journalists, human rights defenders and others charged under the NSL were held for prolonged pretrial detention. As of 31 October, at least 230 people had been arrested under the NSL since its enactment in 2020.

The space for peaceful protest remained highly restricted and those who participated in demonstrations or encouraged others to do so risked prosecution. In January, Chow Hang-tung was convicted of "inciting others to take part in an unauthorized assembly" and sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment after publishing a social media post in 2021 encouraging people to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. In December, Chow Hang-tung won her appeal against that conviction, but remained in prison awaiting trial on similar charges under the NSL for which she faced up to 10 years' imprisonment.

Freedom of association

Authorities continued to criminalize or otherwise prevent legitimate civil society activities. Repressive legislation, including the NSL and Societies Ordinance, which gave excessive powers to the police to refuse, cancel the registration of or prohibit a society, were used with chilling effects on civil society organizations. More than 100 civil society organizations had been forced to disband or relocate since the enactment of the NSL in July 2020.

Restrictions were imposed on smaller, more informal groups. In June, police reportedly delivered letters to at least five representatives of small civil society groups, including informal Facebook groups and religious networks, warning them to register or risk violating the Societies Ordinance.

Five former trustees of the 612 Humanitarian Relief Support Fund, set up to assist participants in the 2019 protests with legal fees and other costs but which closed in 2021, were arrested in May, as well as the former secretary in November, for "colluding with foreign forces" under the NSL. They faced up to 10 years' imprisonment. In December, all six were found guilty of failing to register the fund under the Societies Ordinance and fined between HKD 2,500 and 4,000 each (approximately USD 321-513).

Attacks on groups operating outside Hong Kong also expanded. In March, the National Security Police sent a letter to the Chief Executive of a UK-based organization, Hong Kong Watch, accusing the group of "jeopardizing national security" by "lobbying foreign countries to impose sanctions" and engaging in "other hostile activities". The group was accused of violating Article 29 of the NSL which criminalizes "collusion with foreign forces" and asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction. Police also blocked Hong Kong Watch's website in Hong Kong.

Civil society organizations exercised self-censorship in order to be able to operate and raise funds. Local payment and crowdfunding platforms suspended the fundraising accounts of two groups. One of the platforms told a group that it had taken this action because of the "excessive risks involved" in hosting the account. In a separate case, three activists who had sued the Hong Kong police for ill-treatment during a land rights protest in 2014 reported that their account on an international crowdfunding platform had been removed because it was considered too high risk for the company.

LGBTI people's rights

The Hong Kong government made no progress towards drafting a gender-recognition law despite having established an inter-departmental working group on gender recognition in 2014 and carrying out a consultation in 2017.

1. "China: Lawyer Yu Wensheng must be granted true freedom after unjust imprisonment", 28 February

2. "China: Covid-19 journalist still needs medical attention: Zhang Zhan", 3 March

3. "China: No access to family and proper medical care: Huang Qi", 29 April

4. "China: Unfair trials of prominent activists an attack of freedom of association", 21 June

5. "China: Activists charged with subversion: Sophia Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing", 19 May

6. "China: Xinjiang vote failure betrays core mission of UN Human Rights Council", 6 October

7. "China: Uyghur student facing trial highlights government push to jail Muslims", 27 June

8. "Saudi Arabia: Uyghur teenage girl and mother detained: Buheliqiemu Abula, Nuermaimaiti Ruze, Aimidoula Waili", 6 April

9. "Morocco and Western Sahara: Ethnic Uyghur at risk of extradition to China: Idris Hasan", 2 March

10. "Hong Kong: Conviction of children's book publishers an absurd example of unrelenting repression", 7 September

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Severe Covid-19 restrictions in some cases undermined the right to health and adequate food. The government continued to stifle criticism of its policies and actions and discussion of topics considered sensitive through increasingly pervasive online censorship. Government critics, human rights defenders, pro-democracy activists and religious leaders and practitioners were among those subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

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Tiananmen Square Massacre - British Broadcasting Cooporation

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Tiananmen Square Massacre - British Broadcasting Cooporation

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Tiananmen Square: What happened in the protests of 1989?

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It’s more than 30 years since the Tiananmen Square protests were crushed in Beijing. What happened and why?

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It doesn't matter where I am, or what passport I hold. [Chinese authorities] will terrorize me anywhere, and I have no way to fight that.

-Uyghur Muslim with European citizenship, Washington, September 2019

China's government sees human rights as an existential threat. Its reaction could pose an existential threat to the rights of people worldwide.

At home, the Chinese Communist Party, worried that permitting political freedom would jeopardize its grasp on power, has constructed an Orwellian high-tech surveillance state and a sophisticated internet censorship system to monitor and suppress public criticism. Abroad, it uses its growing economic clout to silence critics and to carry out the most intense attack on the global system for enforcing human rights since that system began to emerge in the mid-20th century.

Beijing was long focused on building a "Great Firewall" to prevent the people of China from being exposed to any criticism of the government from abroad. Now the government is increasingly attacking the critics themselves, whether they represent a foreign government, are part of an overseas company or university, or join real or virtual avenues of public protest.

No other government is simultaneously detaining a million members of an ethnic minority for forced indoctrination and attacking anyone who dares to challenge its repression. And while other governments commit serious human rights violations, no other government flexes its political muscles with such vigor and determination to undermine the international human rights standards and institutions that could hold it to account.

If not challenged, Beijing's actions portend a dystopian future in which no one is beyond the reach of Chinese censors, and an international human rights system so weakened that it no longer serves as a check on government repression.

To be sure, the Chinese government and Communist Party are not today's only threats to human rights, as the Human Rights Watch World Report shows. In many armed conflicts, such as in Syria and Yemen, warring parties blatantly disregard the international rules designed to spare civilians the hazards of war, from the ban on chemical weapons to the prohibition against bombing hospitals.

Elsewhere, autocratic populists gain office by demonizing minorities, and then retain power by attacking the checks and balances on their rule, such as independent journalists, judges, and activists. Some leaders, such as US President Donald Trump, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, bridle at the same body of international human rights law that China undermines, galvanizing their publics by shadow boxing with the "globalists" who dare suggest that governments everywhere should be bound by the same standards.

Several governments that in their foreign policies once could be depended upon to defend human rights at least some of the time have largely abandoned the cause. Others, faced with their own domestic challenges, mount a haphazard defense.

Yet even against this disturbing backdrop, the Chinese government stands out for the reach and influence of its anti-rights efforts. The result for the human rights cause is a "perfect storm"-a powerful centralized state, a coterie of like-minded rulers, a void of leadership among countries that might have stood for human rights, and a disappointing collection of democracies willing to sell the rope that is strangling the system of rights that they purport to uphold.

Beijing's Rationale

The motivation for Beijing's attack on rights stems from the fragility of rule by repression rather than popular consent. Despite decades of impressive economic growth in China, driven by hundreds of millions of people finally emancipated to lift themselves out of poverty, the Chinese Communist Party is running scared of its own people.

Outwardly confident about its success in representing people across the country, the Chinese Communist Party is worried about the consequences of unfettered popular debate and political organization, and thus afraid to subject itself to popular scrutiny.

As a result, Beijing faces the uneasy task of managing a huge and complex economy without the public input and debate that political freedom allows. Knowing that in the absence of elections, the party's legitimacy depends largely on a growing economy, Chinese leaders worry that slowing economic growth will increase demands from the public for more say in how it is governed. The government's nationalist campaigns to promote the "China dream," and its trumpeting of debatable anti-corruption efforts, do not change this underlying reality.

The consequence under President Xi Jinping is China's most pervasive and brutal oppression in decades. What modest opening had existed briefly in recent years for people to express themselves on matters of public concern has been decisively closed. Civic groups have been shut down. Independent journalism is no more. Online conversation has been curtailed and replaced with orchestrated sycophancy. Ethnic and religious minorities face severe persecution. Small steps toward the rule of law have been replaced by the Communist Party's traditional rule by law. Hong Kong's limited freedoms, under "one country, two systems," are being severely challenged.

Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader of China since Mao Zedong, building a shameless cult of personality, removing presidential term limits, promoting "Xi Jinping thought," and advancing grandiose visions for a powerful, yet autocratic, nation. To ensure that it can continue to prioritize its own power over the needs and desires of the people of China, the Communist Party has mounted a determined assault on the political freedoms that might show the public to be anything but acquiescent to its rule.

The Unconstrained Surveillance State

More than any other government, Beijing has made technology central to its repression. A nightmarish system has already been built in Xinjiang, the northwestern region that is home both to some 13 million Muslims-Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic minorities-and to the most intrusive public monitoring system the world has ever known. The Chinese Communist Party has long sought to monitor people for any sign of dissent, but the combination of growing economic means and technical capacity has led to an unprecedented regime of mass surveillance.

The ostensible purpose is to avoid recurrence of a handful of violent incidents several years ago by alleged separatists, but the venture far surpasses any perceptible security threat. One million officials and party cadre have been mobilized as uninvited "guests" to regularly "visit" and stay in the homes of some of these Muslim families to monitor them. Their job is to scrutinize and report "problems" such as people who pray or show other signs of active adherence to the Islamic faith, who contact family members abroad, or who display anything less than absolute fealty to the Communist Party.

This in-person surveillance is just the tip of the iceberg, the analog prelude to the digital show. Without regard to the internationally recognized right to privacy, the Chinese government has deployed video cameras throughout the region, combined them with facial-recognition technology, deployed mobile-phone apps to input data from officials' observations as well as electronic checkpoints, and processed the resulting information through big-data analysis.

Data it collects are used to determine who is detained for "re-education." In the largest case of arbitrary detention in decades, one million or more Turkic Muslims have been deprived of their freedom, placed in an indefinite detention of forced indoctrination. The detentions have created countless "orphans"-children whose parents are in custody-who are now held in schools and state-run orphanages where they, too, are subjected to indoctrination. Children in regular Xinjiang schools may face similar ideological training.

The apparent aim is to strip Muslims of any adherence to their faith, ethnicity, or independent political views. Detainees' ability to recapture their freedom depends on persuading their jailers that they are Mandarin-speaking, Islam-free worshipers of Xi and the Communist Party. This brazen endeavor reflects a totalitarian impulse to reengineer people's thinking until they accept the supremacy of party rule.

The Chinese government is building similar systems of surveillance and behavior engineering throughout the country. Most notable is the "social credit system," which the government vows will punish bad behavior, such as jaywalking and failure to pay court fees, and reward good conduct. People's "trustworthiness"-as assessed by the government-determines their access to desirable social goods, such as the right to live in an attractive city, send one's children to a private school, or travel by plane or high-speed train. For the time being, political criteria are not included in this system, but it would take little to add them.

Ominously, the surveillance state is exportable. Few governments have the capacity to deploy the human resources that China has devoted to Xinjiang, but the technology is becoming off-the-shelf, attractive to governments with weak privacy protections such as Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe. Chinese companies are not the only ones selling these abusive systems-others include companies from Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom-but China's affordable packages make them attractive to governments that want to emulate its surveillance model.

China's Template for Prosperous Dictatorship

Many autocrats look with envy at China's seductive mix of successful economic development, rapid modernization, and a seemingly firm grip on political power. Far from being spurned as a global pariah, the Chinese government is courted the world over, its unelected president receiving red-carpet treatment wherever he goes, and the country hosting prestigious events, such as the 2022 Winter Olympics. The aim is to portray China as open, welcoming, and powerful, even as it descends into ever more ruthless autocratic rule.

The conventional wisdom once held that as China grew economically, it would build a middle class that would demand its rights. That led to the convenient fiction that there was no need to press Beijing about its repression; it was sufficient to trade with it.

Few today believe that self-serving rationale, but most governments have found new ways to justify the status quo. They continue to prioritize economic opportunities in China but without the pretense of a strategy for improving respect for the rights of the people there.

In fact, the Chinese Communist Party has shown that economic growth can reinforce a dictatorship by giving it the means to enforce its rule-to spend what it takes to maintain power, from the legions of security officials it employs to the censorship regime it maintains and the pervasive surveillance state it constructs. Those vast resources buttressing autocratic rule negate the ability of people across China to have any say in how they are governed.

These developments are music to the ears of the world's dictators. Their rule, they would have us believe with China in mind, can also lead to prosperity without the nettlesome intervention of free debate or contested elections. Never mind that the history of unaccountable governments is littered with economic devastation.

For every Lee Kwan Yew, the late Singaporean leader who is often mentioned by proponents of autocratic rule, there are many more-Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt, Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, or Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea-who led their country to ruin. Unaccountable governments tend to put their own interests above their people's. They prioritize their power, their families, and their cronies. The frequent result is neglect, stagnation, and persistent poverty, if not hyperinflation, public health crises, and economic debacle.

Even in China, an unaccountable system of government allows no voice to those left out of China's growing economy. Officials boast of the country's economic progress, but they censor information about its widening income inequality, discriminatory access to public benefits, selective corruption prosecutions, and the one in five children left behind in rural areas as their parents seek work in other parts of the country. They hide the forced demolitions and displacements, the injuries and deaths that accompany some of the country's massive infrastructure projects, and the permanent disabilities resulting from unsafe and unregulated food and drugs. They even deliberately underestimate the number of people with disabilities.

Moreover, one need not go back far in China's history to encounter the enormous human toll of unaccountable government. The same Chinese Communist Party that today proclaims a Chinese miracle only recently imposed the devastation of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, with deaths numbering in the tens of millions.

China's Campaign Against Global Norms

To avoid global backlash for crushing human rights at home, the Chinese government is trying to undermine the international institutions that are designed to protect them. Chinese authorities have long pushed back against foreign concern for human rights as an infringement on its sovereignty, but these efforts were comparatively modest. Now China intimidates other governments, insisting that they applaud it in international forums and join its attacks on the international human rights system.

Beijing seems to be methodically building a network of cheerleader states that depend on its aid or business. Those who cross it risk retaliation, such as the threats to Sweden after an independent Swedish group gave an award to a Hong Kong-based publisher (and Swedish citizen) whom the Chinese government had arrested and forcibly disappeared after he printed books critical of the Chinese government.

Beijing's approach puts it at odds with the very purpose of international human rights. Where others see people facing persecution whose rights need defending, China's rulers see a potential precedent of rights enforcement that could return to haunt them. Using its voice, its influence, and sometimes its Security Council veto, the Chinese government seeks to block United Nations measures to protect some of the world's most persecuted people, turning its back on the Syrian civilians facing indiscriminate airstrikes by Russian and Syrian planes; the Rohingya Muslims ethnically cleansed from their homes by the Myanmar army's murder, rape and arson; Yemeni civilians under bombardment and blockade by the Saudi-led coalition; and the Venezuelan people suffering economic devastation due to the corrupt mismanagement of Nicolas Maduro. In all of these cases, Beijing would rather leave the victims to their fate than generate a model of defending rights that might boomerang on its own repressive rule.

Beijing's methods often have a certain subtlety. The Chinese government adopts international human rights treaties but then tries to reinterpret them or to undermine their enforcement. It has become skilled at appearing to cooperate with UN reviews of its rights record while sparing no effort to thwart honest discussion. It prevents domestic critics from traveling abroad, denies key international experts access to the country, organizes its allies-many of them notoriously repressive themselves-to sing its praises, and often presents blatantly dishonest information.

Even when it comes to economic rights, Beijing wants no independent assessment of its progress because that would require examining not its preferred indicator-the growth in gross domestic product-but measures such as how the least favored in China are faring, including persecuted minorities and those left behind in rural areas. And it certainly wants no independent evaluation of civil and political rights, because respect for them would create a system of accountability-to civic activists, independent journalists, political parties, independent judges, and free and fair elections-that it is determined to avoid.

The Enablers

Although China is the driving force behind this global assault on human rights, it has willing accomplices. They include a collection of dictators, autocrats, and monarchs who themselves have an abiding interest in undermining the human rights system that might hold them to account. They also include governments, as well as companies and even academic institutions, that are ostensibly committed to human rights but prioritize access to China's wealth.

To make matters worse, several countries that once often could have been counted on to defend human rights have been missing in action. US President Trump has been more interested in embracing friendly autocrats than defending the human rights standards that they flout. The European Union, diverted by Brexit, obstructed by nationalist member states, and divided over migration, has found it difficult to adopt a strong common voice on human rights. Even as people have taken to the streets for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia, Russia, and Hong Kong in an impressive wave of global protests, democratic governments have often responded with lukewarm and selective support. This inconsistency makes it easier for China to claim that concerns expressed about its human rights record are a matter of politics rather than principle.

There have been rare exceptions to this acquiescence to China's oppression. In July, at the UN Human Rights Council, 25 governments joined together for the first time in such numbers to express concern about the extraordinary crackdown in Xinjiang. Remarkably, fearing the wrath of the Chinese government, none was willing to read the statement aloud to the council, as is customary. Instead, finding safety in numbers, the group simply submitted the joint statement in writing. That changed in October at the UN General Assembly when the United Kingdom read aloud a parallel statement from a similar coalition of governments, but the initial hesitation shows the great reluctance of even the most committed countries to challenge China frontally. This fear underpins the impunity that China has come to enjoy in international circles despite the sweeping nature of its abuses.

Other governments were all too happy to embrace Beijing. In response to these two instances of collective criticism, the Chinese government organized its own joint statements of support, which shamelessly applauded its "counter-terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang" that have led to a "stronger sense of happiness, fulfillment, and security." Up to 54 governments signed on, including such notorious human rights violators as Russia, Syria, North Korea, Myanmar, Belarus, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia. This gallery of repressive governments may have little credibility, yet their sheer numbers illustrate the uphill battle faced by the few countries willing to confront China on human rights.

One would have hoped that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)-the group of 57 mostly Muslim-majority nations-would come to the defense of the persecuted Muslims of Xinjiang, as they did for the Rohingya Muslims ethnically cleansed by the Myanmar military. Instead, the OIC issued a fawning panegyric, commending China for "providing care to its Muslim citizens." Pakistan-despite its role as OIC coordinator and its corresponding responsibility to speak out against abuses faced by Muslims-has championed such efforts.

Notably, however, OIC members Turkey and Albania have supported the call for an independent UN assessment in Xinjiang, while Qatar withdrew from China's counterstatement. In total, about half of the OIC member states declined to sign on to China's attempts to whitewash its record in Xinjiang-an important first step, but hardly sufficient in the face of such massive abuses.

OIC members and other states disinclined to challenge Beijing also participated in the propaganda tours of Xinjiang that the Chinese government organized to address criticism of its detention of Muslims. Mounting a Great Wall of Disinformation, Chinese authorities absurdly claimed that this mass deprivation of liberty was an exercise in "vocational training." They then arranged for delegations of diplomats and journalists to visit some of those in "training." What little opportunity there was to speak freely with the Muslim inmates quickly punctured the cover story. The staged exhibition was often so preposterous as to be self-refuting, as when a group of inmates was forced to sing, in English, the children's song "If you're happy and you know it, clap your hands!"

The point of these show tours was not to be convincing; it was to give governments an excuse not to criticize Beijing. They were a fig leaf to hide behind, an alibi for indifference.

World leaders who visited China, including those who see themselves as human rights champions, have not performed significantly better. For example, French President Emmanuel Macron visited China in November 2019 but made no public mention of human rights. Visiting leaders have typically excused such public silence by insisting that they raise human rights with Chinese officials in private discussions. But little if any evidence exists that this behind-the-scenes approach does any good.

Quiet diplomacy alone does nothing to shame a government that seeks acceptance as a legitimate and respected member of the international community. Instead, the photo-ops of smiling officials combined with the public silence on human rights signal to the world-and, most important, the people of China, who are the ultimate agents of change-that the VIP visitor is indifferent to Beijing's repression.

The Elements of China's Power

Chinese authorities orchestrate their attacks on human rights criticism in part through the centralized deployment of their economic clout. No Chinese business can afford to ignore the dictates of the Communist Party, so when word comes down to punish a country for its criticism of Beijing-for example, by not purchasing its goods-the company has no choice but to comply. The result is that any non-Chinese government or company seeking to do business with China, if it publicly opposes Beijing's repression, faces not a series of individual Chinese companies' decisions about how to respond but a single central command, with access to the entire Chinese market-16 percent of the world economy-at stake. For example, after the Houston Rockets general manager irked the Chinese government by tweeting his support for Hong Kong's pro-democracy protesters, all of the National Basketball Association's 11 official Chinese business partners-including a travel website, a milk producer, and a fast-food chain-suspended ties with the league.

The Trump administration is one government that has been willing to stand up to China, best evidenced by its October 2019 imposition of sanctions on the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau and eight Chinese technology companies for their complicity in human rights violations. But strong rhetoric from US officials condemning human rights violations in China is often undercut by Trump's praise of Xi Jinping and other friendly autocrats, such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Egypt's Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Saudi Arabia's Mohammad bin Salman, not to mention the Trump administration's own rights-violating domestic policies such as its cruel and illegal forced separation of children from their parents at the US-Mexican border.

This inconsistency makes it easier for Beijing to discount Washington's human rights criticisms. Moreover, the Trump administration's misguided withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council because of concerns for Israel has paved the way for the Chinese government to exert greater influence over this central institution for the defense of rights.

An important instrument of China's influence has been Xi's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI)-a trillion-dollar infrastructure and investment program that facilitates Chinese access to markets and natural resources across 70 countries. Aided by the frequent absence of alternative investors, the BRI has secured the Chinese government considerable good will among developing countries, even though Beijing has been able to foist many of the costs onto the countries that it purports to help.

China's methods of operation often have the effect of bolstering authoritarianism in "beneficiary" countries. BRI projects-known for their "no strings" loans-largely ignore human rights and environmental standards. They allow little if any input from people who might be harmed. Some are negotiated in backroom deals that are prone to corruption. At times they benefit and entrench ruling elites while burying the people of the country under mountains of debt.

Some BRI projects are notorious: Sri Lanka's Hambantota port, which China repossessed for 99 years when debt repayment became impossible, or the loan to build Kenya's Mombasa-Nairobi railroad, which the government is trying to repay by forcing cargo transporters to use it despite cheaper alternatives. Some governments-including those of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone-have begun backing away from BRI projects because they do not look economically sensible. In most cases, the struggling debtor is eager to stay in Beijing's good graces.

So rather than really being "no strings," BRI loans effectively impose a separate set of political conditions requiring support for China's anti-rights agenda. That ensures at best silence, at worst applause, in the face of China's domestic repression, as well as assistance to Beijing as it undermines international human rights institutions.

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, for example, whose government is a major BRI recipient, said nothing about his fellow Muslims in Xinjiang as he visited Beijing, while his diplomats offered over-the-top praise for "China's efforts in providing care to its Muslim citizens." Similarly, Cameroon delivered fawning statements of praise for China shortly after Beijing forgave millions in debt: referencing Xinjiang, it lauded Beijing for "fully protect[ing] the exercise of lawful rights of ethnic minority populations" including "normal religious activities and beliefs."

China's development banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Ex-Im Bank of China, have a growing global reach but lack critical human rights safeguards. The China-founded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is not much better. Its policies call for transparency and accountability in the projects it finances and include social and environmental standards, but do not require the bank to identify and address human rights risks. Among the bank's 74 members are many governments that claim to respect rights: much of the European Union including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, along with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Subversion of the United Nations

We thought this institution could protect our rights when the government violates them. But it is no different.

-A Chinese human rights defender about the UN, Geneva, June 2016

The Chinese government, allergic to foreign pressure about its domestic human rights problems, does not think twice about twisting arms to protect its image in international forums. Because a central purpose of the United Nations is to promote universal human rights, the UN has been a key target. The pressure has been felt all the way to the top. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has been unwilling to publicly demand an end to China's mass detention of Turkic Muslims, while heaping praise on Beijing's economic prowess and the BRI.

At the UN Human Rights Council, China routinely opposes virtually every human rights initiative that criticizes a particular country unless it is watered down enough to secure that government's consent. In recent years, China has opposed resolutions condemning human rights violations in Myanmar, Syria, Iran, the Philippines, Burundi, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Yemen, Eritrea, and Belarus. China also seeks to distort the international rights framework by suggesting that economic progress should precede the need to respect rights and by urging "win-win cooperation" (subsequently renamed "mutually beneficial cooperation"), which frames rights as a question of voluntary cooperation rather than legal obligation.

When China's human rights record came up for a routine review in 2018 and 2019 at the Human Rights Council, Chinese officials threatened critical delegations while encouraging allies to heap praise. Beijing also flooded the speakers list reserved for civil society organizations with government-sponsored groups tasked with lauding its record. Meanwhile, its diplomats gave blatantly false information to the reviewing body, threatened delegations with consequences if they attended a panel discussion of abuses in Xinjiang, and sought to prevent an independent group focused on Xinjiang from speaking at the council. To top it off, Chinese authorities mounted a large photo display outside UN meeting rooms depicting Uyghurs as happy and grateful to them.

At UN headquarters in New York, a major Chinese government priority has been to avoid discussion of its conduct in Xinjiang. Often working in tandem with Russia, China also has taken an increasingly regressive approach to any action on human rights in the Security Council, where it has veto power. For example, Beijing has been clear that it will not tolerate pressure on Myanmar, despite a UN fact-finding mission's conclusion that Myanmar's top military leaders should be investigated and prosecuted for genocide. Along with Russia, China opposed-though unsuccessfully-the Security Council even discussing Venezuela's humanitarian crisis. In September, as 3 million civilians faced indiscriminate bombing by Russian and Syrian jets, China joined Russia to veto a Security Council demand for a truce.

Global Censorship

We self-police ourselves.... Everybody [who participates in the student salon] is scared. Just this fear, I think creating the fear, it actually works.

-University student, Vancouver, June 2018

In addition to longstanding practices such as censoring access to foreign media, limiting funding from overseas sources to domestic civil society groups, and denying visas to scholars and others, Beijing has taken full advantage of the corporate quest for profit to extend its censorship to critics abroad. In recent years, a disturbing parade of companies have given in to Beijing for their perceived offenses or for criticism of China by their employees.

Hong Kong-based Cathay Pacific airlines threatened to fire employees in Hong Kong who supported or participated in the 2019 pro-democracy protests there. Volkswagen's chief executive, Herbert Diess, told the BBC he was "not aware" of reports about detention camps holding thousands of Muslims in Xinjiang, even though Volkswagen has had a plant there since 2012. Marriott fired a social media manager for "liking" a tweet praising the company for calling Tibet a country, and vowed "to ensure errors like this don't happen again." The accounting giant PwC disowned a statement published in a Hong Kong newspaper supporting the pro-democracy protests said to have been placed by employees of the Big Four accounting firms. Hollywood is increasingly censoring its films for Beijing's sensibilities, such as the digital removal of a Taiwan flag from Tom Cruise's bomber jacket in the recent sequel to the 1986 movie "Top Gun."

This list is telling. First, it demonstrates how small and insignificant the perceived slights are that incur the wrath of various voices in China. Even though the Great Firewall prevents most people in China from learning of criticism abroad, and even though the Chinese Communist Party devotes enormous resources to censoring social media at home and spreading its propaganda there, powerful actors in China still bristle at foreign criticism. With that sensitivity in mind, companies seeking to do business with China often silence themselves and their employees even without an edict from Beijing.

Second, it shows that Chinese censorship is becoming a global threat. It is bad enough for companies to abide by censorship restrictions when operating inside China. It is much worse to impose that censorship on their employees and customers around the world. One can no longer pretend that China's suppression of independent voices stops at its borders.

Free-speech problems are also cropping up at universities worldwide. The goal of maintaining the flow of students from China, who often pay full tuition, can easily become an excuse for universities to avoid uncomfortable subjects. In Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, some pro-Beijing students have sought to shut down campus discussions about human rights abuses in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, or Tibet. In other cases, students from China who want to join campus debates on ideas that would be taboo at home feel they cannot for fear of being reported to Chinese authorities. Universities have done little publicly in such cases to assert the rights of free speech.

That tendency is only compounded by Beijing's deliberate effort to enlist Chinese citizens abroad to propagate its views and to monitor each other and report any criticism of Xi Jinping's rule. For example, staff at the Chinese embassy in Washington met with and praised a group of students for censuring a Chinese student at the University of Maryland for criticizing the Chinese government in a commencement speech.

Chinese authorities also routinely threaten relatives in China of dissidents abroad to silence their criticisms. A technology consultant in Vancouver said: "If I criticize the [Chinese Communist Party] publicly, my parents' retirement benefits, their health insurance benefits could all be taken away." A Toronto-based journalist for a Chinese-language newspaper whose parents in China were harassed for her work said, "I don't feel there is free speech here. I can't report freely."

Censorship is also a threat as Chinese technology extends overseas. WeChat, a social-media platform combined with a messaging app widely used by Chinese people at home and abroad, censors political messages and suspends users' accounts on political grounds even if they are based outside China.

Rising to the Challenge

An extraordinary threat requires a commensurate response-and much still can be done to defend human rights worldwide from Beijing's frontal attack. Despite the Chinese government's power and hostility to human rights, its ascent as a global threat to rights is not unstoppable. Rising to this challenge demands a radical break from the dominant complacency and business-as-usual approach. It calls for an unprecedented response from those who still believe in a world order in which human rights matter.

Governments, companies, universities, international institutions, and others should stand with those in and from China who are struggling to secure their rights. As a first principle, no one should equate the Chinese government with the people of China. That blames an entire people for the abuses of a government that they had no say in choosing. Instead, governments should support critical voices in China and publicly insist that, in the absence of genuine elections, Beijing does not represent the people there.

Just as governments have stopped promoting the convenient fiction that trade alone promotes human rights in China, so they should abandon the reassuring-but-false view that quiet diplomacy suffices. The question to ask of dignitaries visiting Beijing who claim to discuss China's human rights record is whether the people of China-the main engine of change-can hear them. Do those people feel emboldened or disillusioned by the visit? Do they hear a voice of sympathy and concern or see only a photo-op at the signing of more commercial contracts? By regularly and publicly calling out Beijing for its repression, governments should raise the cost of that abuse while emboldening the victims.

The Chinese model of repressive economic growth can be refuted by highlighting the risks of unaccountable rule, from the millions left behind in China to the devastation caused by the likes of Mugabe of Zimbabwe or Maduro of Venezuela. Calling attention to how dictators around the world claim to serve their people while in fact serving themselves accomplishes much the same purpose.

Governments and international financial institutions should offer compelling, rights-respecting alternatives to China's "no strings" loans and development aid. They should leverage their membership in such organizations as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to push for the highest human rights standards in development rather than to enable a global race to the bottom.

Governments committed to human rights should be sensitive to the double standards of "China exceptionalism" that can creep into their conduct and enable Beijing to get away with abuses for which poorer and less powerful governments would be challenged. If they seek to hold Myanmar officials accountable for their abusive treatment of Muslims, why not Chinese officials? If they are attentive to Saudi or Russian efforts to buy legitimacy, why not similar Chinese efforts? If they encourage debates about human rights violations by Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela, why not by China? They rightly challenged the Trump administration's appalling separation of children from their parents on the US-Mexico border, so why not also challenge the Chinese government's separation of children from their parents in Xinjiang?

Governments should deliberately counter China's divide-and-conquer strategy for securing silence about its oppression. If every government alone faces a choice between seeking Chinese economic opportunities and speaking out against Chinese repression, many will opt for silence. But if governments band together to address China's flouting of human rights, the power balance shifts. For example, if the Organization of Islamic Cooperation were to protest against the Chinese government's repression of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, Beijing would need to retaliate against 57 countries. The Chinese economy cannot take on the whole world.

By the same token, companies and universities should draft and promote codes of conduct for dealing with China. Strong common standards would make it more difficult for Beijing to ostracize those who stand up for basic rights and freedoms. These standards would also make matters of principle a more important element of the institutions' public images. Consumers would be better placed to insist that these institutions not succumb to Chinese censorship as the price to obtain Chinese business, and that they should never benefit from or contribute to Chinese abuses. Governments should tightly regulate the technology that empowers China's mass surveillance and repression-and bolster privacy protections to check the spread of such surveillance systems.

Universities in particular should provide a space where students and scholars from China can learn about and criticize the Chinese government without fear of being monitored or reported. And they should never tolerate Beijing curtailing the academic freedom of any of their students or scholars.

Beyond issuing statements, governments that are committed to human rights should redouble cross-regional outreach efforts with a view to presenting a resolution at the UN Human Rights Council establishing a fact-finding mission, so the world can know what is happening in Xinjiang. These states should also force a discussion of Xinjiang at the UN Security Council so Chinese officials understand that they will have to answer for their actions.

More fundamentally, UN member states and senior officials should defend the United Nations as an independent voice on human rights. For example, until a UN fact-finding mission is created, reporting by the UN high commissioner for human rights as well as the Human Rights Council's experts is crucial. If China succeeds in leaving the UN toothless on human rights, all will suffer.

Governments committed to human rights should also stop treating China as a respectable partner. The red-carpet treatment for Chinese officials should be conditioned on real progress on human rights. A state visit should come with a public demand to give UN investigators independent access to Xinjiang. Chinese officials should be made to feel that they will never gain the respectability they crave so long as they persecute their people.

At a more targeted level, Chinese officials directly involved in the mass detention of Uyghurs should become persona non grata. Their foreign bank accounts should be frozen. They should fear prosecution for their crimes. And the Chinese companies that build and help run the detention camps in Xinjiang, and any company that exploits the labor of prisoners or provides the surveillance infrastructure and big data processing, should be exposed and pressured to stop.

Finally, the world should recognize that Xi Jinping's lofty rhetoric about establishing a "community of shared future for mankind" is really a threat-a vision of rights worldwide as defined and tolerated by Beijing. It is time to acknowledge that the Chinese government seeks to repudiate and reshape an international human rights system built on the belief that every person's dignity deserves respect-that regardless of the official interests at stake, limits exist on what states can do to people.

Unless we want to return to an era in which people are pawns to be manipulated or discarded according to the whims of their overlords, the Chinese government's attack on the international human rights system must be resisted. Now is the time to take a stand. Decades of progress on human rights are at stake.

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World Report 2020: Rights Trends in China's Global Threat to Human Rights

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It doesn't matter where I am, or what passport I hold. [Chinese authorities] will terrorize me anywhere, and I have no way to fight that. -Uyghur Muslim with European citizenship, Washington, September 2019 China's government sees human rights as an existential threat. Its reaction could pose an existential threat to the rights of people worldwide.

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The withdrawal of the Extradition Bill was only one of the "five demands" that have propelled the movement.

Protesters also want the government to retract its characterization of protests as "riots"; an independent investigation into use of force by police; and the unconditional release of everyone arrested in the context of protests.

They also want political reform to ensure genuine universal suffrage - the ability to choose Hong Kong's leaders themselves - as set under the city's mini-Constitution, the Basic Law.

Amnesty International welcomes the bill's withdrawal and is calling for an independent, impartial investigation into use of force by the Hong Kong police.

Demosistō's peaceful activism, as well as its stance on self-determination, has made it a target of attacks from both the Hong Kong and mainland governments. Many members of Demosistō have been arrested and prosecuted for their activism, including its Secretary General Joshua Wong. The party also had to deal with other legal challenges, such as the court case to disqualify its chairman Nathan Law from taking office after winning a seat in the Legislature in 2017.

In 2015 five booksellers associated with a bookshop in Hong Kong went missing in Thailand, mainland China and Hong Kong. The shops was known for its books on Chinese leaders and political detention and disappearances of the booksellers had a chilling effect on freedom of expression in Hong Kong. When one of the missing men, Lam Wing-kee, returned to Hong Kong in June 2016, he held a press conference in which he said he had been arbitrarily detained, ill-treated in detention and forced to "confess". Another bookseller, Gui Minhai, appeared on Chinese state television broadcaster CCTV making a "confession" in which he said he had voluntarily surrendered to the Chinese authorities over his supposed involvement in a hit-and-run accident.

Anthony Wong, a Cantopop star who actively participated in the Umbrella Movement protests, told Amnesty that altering musical work to cater to the censorship in China was the norm in the music industry. Wong says that after his involvement in the 2014 protests, work in Hong Kong and the mainland dried up.

In April 2019 four leaders of the Umbrella Movement protests - Benny Tai Yiu-ting, Chan Kin-man, Raphael Wong Ho-ming and Shiu Ka-chun - were sentenced to eight to 16 months' imprisonment, on conviction of "public nuisance" related charges. Their imprisonment set a chilling precedent from freedom of expression and peaceful assembly in Hong Kong.

Journalists working on China issues have experienced direct censorship and interventions from mainland authorities. Last year, Michael*, a veteran journalist, received calls from government officials in Beijing once a week on average. He said mainland authorities demanded front-line journalists "play down" news about Taiwan's independence. When he ignored the demand, the head of Michael's news department delivered the same message. His supervisor told him that people from the China Liaison Office slammed the owner's desk as they gave him instructions.

Since April 2019, up to 2 million protesters in Hong Kong took to the streets. The protests were largely peaceful but were faced with disproportionate police violence. Clashes between police and protesters have now become a frequent occurrence. (Credit: Jimmy Lam @everydayaphoto)

Starting from 12 June 2019, police deployed tear gas, guns firing rubber bullets, pepper spray and baton charges from police to disperse the demonstrations in various areas. These unlawful police actions posed a serious risk of severe injury, or even death, to protesters. (Credit: Jimmy Lam @ everydayphoto)

According to media reports, one protester suffered from a ruptured eye in Tsim Sha Tsui after being shot by what appeared to be a bean bag projectile from the police on August 11, 2019 (AFP/Getty Images)

The vast majority of Hong Kong protesters remain peaceful. However, there has been violence, which appears to be escalating alongside excessive use of force by the police. Police have also failed to act when protesters and journalists have been attacked by others.

While police have a duty to maintain public order, there are strict international human rights laws and standards governing the use of force.

If law enforcement decides to use force, it must be in strict compliance with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.

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The withdrawal of the Extradition Bill was only one of the "five demands" that have propelled the movement. Protesters also want the government to retract its characterization of protests as "riots"; an independent investigation into use of force by police; and the unconditional release of everyone arrested in the context of protests.

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Chinese authorities, recognizing in recent years that limited freedom of expression enables the government to better monitor potentially problematic social issues (referred to as "舆论监督") have begun to tolerate criticism, but only from certain categories of people, a kind of "free-speech elite," and only then in government-controlled forums.

Limited Freedom of Expression for China's "Free Speech Elite"

Despite barriers to access to the means of publication and the dangers inherent in publishing political news and information, members of China's "free-speech elite" are able to express concerns and criticism regarding the government with less fear of punishment than the average Chinese citizen. This group is composed of senior government and Communist Party leaders, those with the patronage of such leaders and, to a lesser extent, academics and journalism professionals.

The only people in China who can publish criticisms of, or opinions contrary to those of, the Communist Party, are senior members of the Communist Party. One example of this group is Li Rui, a retired senior Communist Party official and former aide to Mao Zedong, who earlier this year published a letter in the Beijing magazine "China Chronicle" calling for greater democracy in China's government:

The key is reforming an aged political system that is obsolete, and speeding up the development of democratic politics so the country can truly embark on a course of peace and stability characterized by democracy, science, and rule of law. . . . Only with democratization can there be modernization. This has been a global tide from the 20th century, especially the Second World War, onward, and those who join it will prosper while those who resist it will perish. The Constitution stipulates that the National People's Congress is the highest power in the country, and the relationship between the Party and the NPC should be suspended, the NPC should not be led and directed in the name of the Party.

This text is from a speech Mr. Li gave at the Sixteenth Party Congress last November. It was subsequently published in the China Chronicle in January. Communist Party authorities would generally not tolerate the use of such blunt language and veiled threats, but Mr. Li seems to have escaped punishment. Contrast this result with Mr. Li's fate when he criticized Communist Party policies: in 1959 he was "sent down" for reeducation through labor, and he spent eight years in prison during the Cultural Revolution.

Academics and editors of China's state-controlled publications are afforded somewhat less leeway than Party officials, but still more than the average person. This group is allowed to publicly question government policies (in newspaper interviews, on the Internet, etc.), and even to criticize them in private, government sponsored forums (in professional journals with limited distribution, academic and professional conferences, etc.). The operative principle with respect to this group could be expressed as follows: the degree to which the government is willing to tolerate criticism of its leaders and policies is contingent upon the size and nature of the audience and the ideological credentials of the speaker. For example, Chinese and Western academics convened a conference on the death penalty in January 2003, and some months later, a spirited debate ensued in the Chinese media. Centered on the review and approval process for death penalty cases, the debate in the press featured analytical articles by legal experts from Chinese universities (for a summary of this discussion see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Topic Paper: " The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality").

However, the Chinese government tolerates such debates only as long as they occur in private discussions, closed academic conferences, government-authorized publishing outlets, or other forums where the government does not feel there is any threat of public participation that it cannot control. For example, unlike the death penalty conference discussed above, the Internet Society of China's Annual Conference held in November 2002, in Shanghai and attended by Commission staff, was open to the press and the public. During the conference there was no discussion, much less debate, of freedom of expression as it relates to the Internet. One session was billed as having an "open forum," where audience members could question leaders of China's Internet industry. However, the open forum consisted of the moderator calling on a reporter from China's state owned media, who asked the panel: "When do you think the Spring of China's Internet will begin?" After several panel members responded, the moderator immediately declared the open forum over, even though 20 minutes remained before the session was scheduled to end.

Similarly, Chinese authorities silence debates if they begin to take on a life of their own, and refuse to recognize the right of the average Chinese citizens to publish their opinions on political issues in forums that are free from government censorship. So while the Chinese government encourages the state controlled media to engage in targeted reporting on corruption, it will not tolerate similar criticisms from private individuals.

Closely related to the intellectual elite are the "linguistic elite." This group includes those who publish in, and those who can read, a language other than Chinese, for example: the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and CNN and their readers. Because these sites for these media groups are only accessible to Internet users, and then only to those few Internet users with excellent English skills, they are allowed past China's national firewall, except at politically sensitive times. Chinese authorities are willing to tolerate a certain degree of criticism of their leaders and policies from these sources because the size the audience (and therefore the ability of the publication to influence public a opinion) is relatively insignificant.

Contrast these publications with the BBC's website. Testing performed by Commission staff indicates that readers in China can access all of the different language versions of the BBC's website, except the Chinese version, which is blocked.

While China's Constitution maintains that "the People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants," and Communist Party dogma claims that people in Western democracies do not enjoy freedom of the press because only capitalists who own the press can enjoy the freedom, the fact remains that China is one of the few countries in the world that has laws that actually require people to be wealthy before they can publish a newspaper or magazine. Article 11 of China's Publishing Regulations specifically requires that anyone wishing to publish a newspaper or magazine must have registered capital of at least RMB 300,000 (about US$ 35,000), a prohibitive amount of money in any country, but especially in China where the workers make less than US$100 a month.

No Freedom of Political Expression for Ordinary Citizens

So what of China's billion-plus citizens who are not members of the free-speech elite? Although an average citizen could privately express sentiments similar to those published by Li Rui, if an average person had written and privately published what Li Rui wrote, or presented such sentiments in a speech to a large political gathering as he did, there is little doubt that Chinese authorities would prosecute them for subversion.

For the average Chinese citizen freedom of publication is actually nothing more than the freedom to submit. In meetings with Commission staff Chinese officials have stated that anyone wanting to publish their opinions may submit their article or book to a government-licensed publisher, but if they are unable to find a licensed publisher, then the only way they can legally exercise their constitutional right to freedom of publication is to "enjoy their works themselves, or give copies to friends and family."

Certain groups and individuals who are unable to obtain government authorization to publish do manage to put out books and periodicals on a small scale, but this is possible only through subterfuge and violating Chinese law (for example, by stamping publications as "not for external distribution," or by purchasing book numbers that licensed publishers illegally offer for sale). These private publishers are therefore subject to the threat of closure and arrest each time they exercise their right to freedom of expression.

Nevertheless, Chinese authorities recognize that there must be outlets for the average person to express their dissatisfaction with the government. The reasons for this recognition are not a concern for human rights, but rather a pragmatic acknowledgment that the availability of officially approved and monitored outlets can help preserve the Communist Party's monopoly on power in several ways:

Lessen political tension by acting as a release valve for discontent;

Deflect criticism that people in the PRC do enjoy freedom of expression;

Enable government authorities to monitor the mood of the people and find out where weaknesses exist, both in the government apparatus and in popular support; and

Allow government authorities to track who is inclined to express discontent, and keep such expression from being forced underground where authorities could neither monitor nor control it.

Currently, if an average person in China wants to publish their opinions to an audience broader than their voice can carry and they do not have a free speech elite patron or a willing government publishing house, the safest mechanism is via Internet bulletin board systems run by the government. Chinese law requires all electronic bulletin board systems to be licensed, all posts to be constantly monitored, and any inappropriate posts to be taken down.

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Freedom of Expression in China: A Privilege, Not a Right

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Chinese authorities, recognizing in recent years that limited freedom of expression enables the government to better monitor potentially problematic social issues (referred to as "舆论监督") have begun to tolerate criticism, but only from certain categories of people, a kind of "free-speech elite," and only then in government-controlled forums. Despite barriers to access to the means of publication and the dangers inherent in publishing political news and information, members of China's "free-speech elite" are able to express concerns and criticism regarding the government with less fear of punishment than the average Chinese citizen.

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Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide?

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Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide?

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China has been accused of committing crimes against humanity and possibly genocide against the Uyghur population and other mostly-Muslim ethnic groups in the north-western region of Xinjiang.

Human rights groups believe China has detained more than one million Uyghurs against their will over the past few years in a large network of what the state calls "re-education camps", and sentenced hundreds of thousands to prison terms.

A series of police files obtained by the BBC in 2022 has revealed details of China's use of these camps and described the routine use of armed officers and the existence of a shoot-to-kill policy for those trying to escape.

The US is among several countries to have previously accused China of committing genocide in Xinjiang. The leading human rights groups Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have published reports accusing China of crimes against humanity.

China denies all allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The Chinese government - speaking after details of the Xinjiang Police Files were published - said the peace and prosperity brought to Xinjiang as a result of its anti-terrorism measures were the best response to "all sorts of lies".

Who are the Uyghurs?

There are about 12 million Uyghurs, mostly Muslim, living in Xinjiang, which is officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

The Uyghurs speak their own language, which is similar to Turkish, and see themselves as culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. They make up less than half of the Xinjiang population.

Recent decades have seen a mass migration of Han Chinese (China's ethnic majority) into Xinjiang, allegedly orchestrated by the state to dilute the minority population there.

Uyghur activists say they fear that the group's culture is under threat of erasure.

Where is Xinjiang?

Xinjiang lies in the north-west of China and is the country's largest region. Like Tibet, it is autonomous, meaning - in theory - it has some powers of self-governance. But in practice, both regions are subjected to major restrictions by the central government.

Xinjiang is a mostly desert region and produces about a fifth of the world's cotton. Human rights groups have voiced concerns that much of that cotton export is picked by forced labour, and in 2021 some Western brands removed Xinjiang cotton from their supply chains, leading to a backlash against the brands from Chinese celebrities and netizens.

In December 2020, research seen by the BBC showed that up to half a million people were being forced to pick cotton in Xinjiang. There is evidence that new factories have been built within the grounds of the re-education camps.

The region is also rich in oil and natural gas and because of its proximity to Central Asia and Europe is seen by Beijing as an important trade link.

In the early 20th Century, the Uyghurs briefly declared independence for the region but it was brought under the complete control of China's new Communist government in 1949.

The UK parliament declared in April 2021 that China was committing a genocide in Xinjiang.

A UN human rights committee in 2018 said it had credible reports that China was holding up to a million people in "counter-extremism centres" in Xinjiang.

The UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said the files contained "shocking details of China's human rights violations".

Earlier, leaked documents known as the China Cables made clear that the camps were intended to be run as high security prisons, with strict discipline and punishments.

People who have managed to escape the camps have reported physical, mental and sexual torture. Women have spoken of mass rape and sexual abuse.

Anti-Han and separatist sentiment rose in Xinjiang from the 1990s, sometimes flaring into violence. In 2009 about 200 people died in clashes in Xinjiang, which the Chinese blamed on Uyghurs who wanted their own state. But in recent years a massive security crackdown has crushed dissent.

Xinjiang is now covered by a pervasive network of surveillance, including police, checkpoints, and cameras that scan everything from number plates to individual faces. According to Human Rights Watch, police are also using a mobile app to monitor people's behaviour, such as how much electricity they are using and how often they use their front door.

Since 2017, when President Xi Jinping issued an order saying all religions in China should be Chinese in orientation, there have been further crackdowns. Campaigners say China is trying to eradicate Uyghur culture.

The Xinjiang Police Files, which all date from before 2019, shed further light on Uyghurs being punished for alleged crimes that took place years ago. Many appear to have been targeted for their mobile phone use, for listening to "illegal lectures" or not using their phones enough, which is regarded as a sign the user is trying to evade digital surveillance.

What does China say?

China denies all allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. In response to the Xinjiang Police Files, China's foreign ministry spokesman told the BBC that the documents were "the latest example of anti-China voices trying to smear China". He said Xinjiang enjoyed stability and prosperity and residents were living happy, fulfilled lives.

China says the crackdown in Xinjiang is necessary to prevent terrorism and root out Islamist extremism and the camps are an effective tool for re-educating inmates in its fight against terrorism.

It insists that Uyghur militants are waging a violent campaign for an independent state by plotting bombings, sabotage and civic unrest, but it is accused of exaggerating the threat in order to justify repression of the Uyghurs.

China has dismissed claims it is trying to reduce the Uyghur population through mass sterilisations as "baseless", and says allegations of forced labour are "completely fabricated".

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Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide?

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China has been accused by the US of genocide and crimes against humanity against the Muslim minority group.

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Chinese Family Values: How They Affect Life in China

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Discover how traditional Chinese family values (roles of elders, parents, children) interact with modern life in China. Understand Chinese society better. When you visit a country, among other experiences, getting to know the culture and society of the place can be very enlightening. In China, family is regarded as the most important part of an individual's life.

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Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy

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The EU sanctions against Russia have had a significant impact on the Russian economy. Discover how.

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Select Economy and Energy Tabs

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Introduction

Founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th-15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new ROMANOV Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific. Under PETER I (ruled 1682-1725), hegemony was extended to the Baltic Sea and the country was renamed the Russian Empire. During the 19th century, more territorial acquisitions were made in Europe and Asia. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 contributed to the Revolution of 1905, which resulted in the formation of a parliament and other reforms. Devastating defeats and food shortages in World War I led to widespread rioting in the major cities of the Russian Empire and to the overthrow in 1917 of the ROMANOV Dynasty. The communists under Vladimir LENIN seized power soon after and formed the USSR. The brutal rule of Iosif STALIN (1928-53) strengthened communist rule and Russian dominance of the Soviet Union at a cost of tens of millions of lives. After defeating Germany in World War II as part of an alliance with the US (1939-1945), the USSR expanded its territory and influence in Eastern Europe and emerged as a global power. The USSR was the principal adversary of the US during the Cold War (1947-1991). The Soviet economy and society stagnated in the decades following Stalin's rule, until General Secretary Mikhail GORBACHEV (1985-91) introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize communism, but his initiatives inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 led to the dissolution of the USSR into Russia and 14 other independent states.

Following economic and political turmoil during President Boris YELTSIN's term (1991-99), Russia shifted toward a centralized authoritarian state under President Vladimir PUTIN (2000-2008, 2012-present) in which the regime seeks to legitimize its rule through managed elections, populist appeals, a foreign policy focused on enhancing the country's geopolitical influence, and commodity-based economic growth. Russia faces a largely subdued rebel movement in Chechnya and some other surrounding regions, although violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

approximately 1.8 times the size of the US

permafrost over much of Siberia is a major impediment to development; volcanic activity in the Kuril Islands; volcanoes and earthquakes on the Kamchatka Peninsula; spring floods and summer/autumn forest fires throughout Siberia and parts of European Russia

volcanism: significant volcanic activity on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kuril Islands; the peninsula alone is home to some 29 historically active volcanoes, with dozens more in the Kuril Islands; Kliuchevskoi (4,835 m), which erupted in 2007 and 2010, is Kamchatka's most active volcano; Avachinsky and Koryaksky volcanoes, which pose a threat to the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, have been deemed Decade Volcanoes by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to their explosive history and close proximity to human populations; other notable historically active volcanoes include Bezymianny, Chikurachki, Ebeko, Gorely, Grozny, Karymsky, Ketoi, Kronotsky, Ksudach, Medvezhia, Mutnovsky, Sarychev Peak, Shiveluch, Tiatia, Tolbachik, and Zheltovsky; see note 2 under "Geography - note"

note 1: largest country in the world in terms of area but unfavorably located in relation to major sea lanes of the world; despite its size, much of the country lacks proper soils and climates (either too cold or too dry) for agriculture

note 2: Russia's far east, particularly the Kamchatka Peninsula, lies along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire

People and Society

Russian (official) 85.7%, Tatar 3.2%, Chechen 1%, other 10.1%; note - data represent native language spoken (2010 est.)

major-language sample(s):
Книга фактов о мире - незаменимый источник базовой информации. (Russian)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

improved: urban: 98.6% of population

rural: 94.2% of population

total: 97.1% of population

unimproved: urban: 1.4% of population

rural: 5.8% of population

total: 2.9% of population (2017 est.)

improved: urban: 94.8% of population

rural: 78.1% of population

total: 90.5% of population

unimproved: urban: 5.2% of population

rural: 21.9% of population

total: 9.5% of population (2017 est.)

Government

46 provinces (oblasti, singular - oblast), 21 republics (respubliki, singular - respublika), 4 autonomous okrugs (avtonomnyye okrugi, singular - avtonomnyy okrug), 9 krays (kraya, singular - kray), 2 federal cities (goroda, singular - gorod), and 1 autonomous oblast (avtonomnaya oblast')

oblasts: Amur (Blagoveshchensk), Arkhangel'sk, Astrakhan', Belgorod, Bryansk, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kemerovo, Kirov, Kostroma, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Magadan, Moscow, Murmansk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orenburg, Orel, Penza, Pskov, Rostov, Ryazan', Sakhalin (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), Samara, Saratov, Smolensk, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), Tambov, Tomsk, Tula, Tver', Tyumen', Ul'yanovsk, Vladimir, Volgograd, Vologda, Voronezh, Yaroslavl'

republics: Adygeya (Maykop), Altay (Gorno-Altaysk), Bashkortostan (Ufa), Buryatiya (Ulan-Ude), Chechnya (Groznyy), Chuvashiya (Cheboksary), Dagestan (Makhachkala), Ingushetiya (Magas), Kabardino-Balkariya (Nal'chik), Kalmykiya (Elista), Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (Cherkessk), Kareliya (Petrozavodsk), Khakasiya (Abakan), Komi (Syktyvkar), Mariy-El (Yoshkar-Ola), Mordoviya (Saransk), North Ossetia (Vladikavkaz), Sakha [Yakutiya] (Yakutsk), Tatarstan (Kazan'), Tyva (Kyzyl), Udmurtiya (Izhevsk)

autonomous okrugs: Chukotka (Anadyr'), Khanty-Mansi-Yugra (Khanty-Mansiysk), Nenets (Nar'yan-Mar), Yamalo-Nenets (Salekhard)

krays: Altay (Barnaul), Kamchatka (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy), Khabarovsk, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Perm', Primorskiy [Maritime] (Vladivostok), Stavropol', Zabaykal'sk [Transbaikal] (Chita)

federal cities: Moscow [Moskva], Saint Petersburg [Sankt-Peterburg]

autonomous oblast: Yevreyskaya [Jewish] (Birobidzhan)

note 1: administrative divisions have the same names as their administrative centers (exceptions have the administrative center name following in parentheses)

note 2: the United States does not recognize Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the municipality of Sevastopol, nor their redesignation as the "Republic of Crimea" and the "Federal City of Sevastopol"

description: bicameral Federal Assembly or Federalnoye Sobraniye consists of:
Federation Council or Sovet Federatsii (170 seats; 2 members in each of the 83 federal administrative units (see note below) - oblasts, krays, republics, autonomous okrugs and oblasts, and federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg - appointed by the top executive and legislative officials; members serve 4-year terms)
State Duma or Gosudarstvennaya Duma (450 seats (see note below); as of February 2014, the electoral system reverted to a mixed electoral system for the 2016 election, in which one-half of the members are directly elected by simple majority vote and one-half directly elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)

elections:
State Duma - last held 17 - 19 September 2021 (next to be held in fall 2026)

election results:
Federation Council (members appointed); composition - men 145, women 25, percent of women 14.7%

State Duma - United Russia 50.9%, CPRF 19.3%, LDPR 7.7%, A Just Russia 7.6%, New People 5.3% other minor parties and Independents 9.2%; seats by party - United Russia 324, CPRF 57, LDPR 21, A Just Russia 27, New People 13; Rodina 1, CP 1, Party of Growth 1, independent 5

note 1: the State Duma now includes 3 representatives from the "Republic of Crimea," while the Federation Council includes 2 each from the "Republic of Crimea" and the "Federal City of Sevastopol," both regions that Russia occupied and attempted to annex from Ukraine and that the US does not recognize as part of Russia

A Just Russia [Sergey MIRONOV]
Civic Platform or CP [Rifat SHAYKHUTDINOV]
Communist Party of the Russian Federation or CPRF [Gennadiy ZYUGANOV]
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia or LDPR [Vladimir ZHIRINOVSKIY]
New People [Alexey NECHAYEV]
Party of Growth [Irina MIRONOVA]
Rodina [Aleksei ZHURAVLYOV]
United Russia [Dmitriy MEDVEDEV]

note: 31 political parties are registered with Russia's Ministry of Justice (as of September 2021); 14 participated in the 2021 election, but only 8 parties maintain representation in Russia's national legislature

Economy

Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-based system. Both economic growth and reform have stalled in recent years, however, and Russia remains a predominantly statist economy with a high concentration of wealth in officials' hands. Economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy, transportation, banking, and defense-related sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak, and the state continues to interfere in the free operation of the private sector.

Russia is one of the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas, and is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. Russia is heavily dependent on the movement of world commodity prices as reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the volatile swings in global prices. The economy, which had averaged 7% growth during the 1998-2008 period as oil prices rose rapidly, has seen diminishing growth rates since then due to the exhaustion of Russia's commodity-based growth model.

A combination of falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with GDP falling by close to 2.8%. The downturn continued through 2016, with GDP contracting another 0.2%, but was reversed in 2017 as world demand picked up. Government support for import substitution has increased recently in an effort to diversify the economy away from extractive industries.

$3,968,180,000,000 (2019 est.)

$3,915,637,000,000 (2018 est.)

$3,818,780,000,000 (2017 est.)

note: data are in 2010 dollars
country comparison to the world: 6

15.5% of GDP (2017 est.)

16.1% of GDP (2016 est.)

note: data cover general government debt and include debt instruments issued (or owned) by government entities other than the treasury; the data include treasury debt held by foreign entities; the data include debt issued by subnational entities, as well as intragovernmental debt; intragovernmental debt consists of treasury borrowings from surpluses in the social funds, such as for retirement, medical care, and unemployment, debt instruments for the social funds are not sold at public auctions
country comparison to the world: 194

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

Communications

general assessment:
telecom market is largest in Europe, centered in large cities; competition active in Moscow and St Petersburg; most users access Internet through mobile platforms; fiber broadband sector is growing, supported by government in aim to extend reach to outlying regions; tests of 5G with Moscow adopting smart city technology; government justifies censorship and website blocks under a range of laws and regulations; government program aims to provide 97% of households with fixed broadband by 2024; publicly accessible Internet connections in institutions such as hospitals, libraries, schools, and mass transit available in cities; in rural areas, the availability of public Internet connections remains limited; major importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China (2021)

(2020)

domestic: cross-country digital trunk lines run from Saint Petersburg to Khabarovsk, and from Moscow to Novorossiysk; the telephone systems in 60 regional capitals have modern digital infrastructures; cellular services, both analog and digital, are available in many areas; in rural areas, telephone services are still outdated, inadequate, and low-density; 22 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular 164 per 100 persons (2019)

international: country code - 7; landing points for the Far East Submarine Cable System, HSCS, Sakhalin-Kuril Island Cable, RSCN, BCS North-Phase 2, Kerch Strait Cable and the Georgia-Russian submarine cable system connecting Russia, Japan, Finland, Georgia and Ukraine; satellite earth stations provide access to Intelsat, Intersputnik, Eutelsat, Inmarsat, and Orbita systems (2019)

note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments

Transportation

major seaport(s):
Arctic Ocean: Arkhangelsk, Murmansk Kaliningrad, Primorsk, Saint Petersburg
Black Sea: Novorossiysk
Pacific Ocean: Nakhodka, Vladivostok, Vostochnyy

oil terminal(s): Kavkaz oil terminal, Primorsk

container port(s) (TEUs): Saint Petersburg (2,221,724) (2019)

LNG terminal(s) (export): Sabetta, Sakhalin Island

river port(s): Astrakhan, Kazan (Volga River); Rostov-on-Don (Don River); Saint Petersburg (Neva River)

Military and Security

est. 3,000-5,000 Armenia; est. 1,500 Belarus; est. 7,000-10,000 Georgia; est. 100-200 Central African Republic; est. 500 Kyrgyzstan; est. 1,500-2,000 Moldova (Trannistria); est. 3,000-5,000 Syria; est. 5,000-7,000 Tajikistan; est. 25,000-30,000 Ukraine (including Crimea) (2020)

note(s): since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a truce agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020

as of late 2020, a Russian Government-backed private military company was assessed to have about 2,000 personnel in Libya supporting Libyan National Army forces;

Russia is a leader of CSTO contributes approximately 8,000 personnel to its Rapid Reaction Force

18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; males are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; one-year service obligation (Russia offers the option of serving on a two-year contract instead of completing a one-year conscription period); reserve obligation for non-officers to age 50; enrollment in military schools from the age of 16, cadets classified as members of the armed forces (2019)

note: in April of 2019, the Russian Government pledged its intent to end conscription as part of a decade-long effort to shift from a large, conscript-based military to a smaller, more professional force

Terrorism

Aum Shimrikyo (AUM/Aleph); Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Caucasus Province

note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T

Transnational Issues

Russia remains concerned about the smuggling of poppy derivatives from Afghanistan through Central Asian countries; China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with the 2004 Agreement, ending their centuries-long border disputes; the sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group, known in Japan as the "Northern Territories" and in Russia as the "Southern Kurils," occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia, and claimed by Japan, remains the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities; Russia's military support and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence in 2008 continue to sour relations with Georgia; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea; Norway and Russia signed a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement in 2010; various groups in Finland advocate restoration of Karelia (Kareliya) and other areas ceded to the Soviet Union following World War II but the Finnish Government asserts no territorial demands; Russia and Estonia signed a technical border agreement in May 2005, but Russia recalled its signature in June 2005 after the Estonian parliament added to its domestic ratification act a historical preamble referencing the Soviet occupation and Estonia's pre-war borders under the 1920 Treaty of Tartu; Russia contends that the preamble allows Estonia to make territorial claims on Russia in the future, while Estonian officials deny that the preamble has any legal impact on the treaty text; Russia demands better treatment of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia; Russia remains involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine while also occupying Ukraine's territory of Crimea; Lithuania and Russia committed to demarcating their boundary in 2006 in accordance with the land and maritime treaty ratified by Russia in May 2003 and by Lithuania in 1999; Lithuania operates a simplified transit regime for Russian nationals traveling from the Kaliningrad coastal exclave into Russia, while still conforming, as an EU member state with an EU external border, where strict Schengen border rules apply; preparations for the demarcation delimitation of land boundary with Ukraine have commenced; the dispute over the boundary between Russia and Ukraine through the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov is suspended due to the occupation of Crimea by Russia; Kazakhstan and Russia boundary delimitation was ratified on November 2005 and field demarcation should commence in 2007; Russian Duma has not yet ratified 1990 Bering Sea Maritime Boundary Agreement with the US; Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting additional data to augment its 2001 CLCS submission

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Founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th-15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new ROMANOV Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific.

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How Much Does It Cost to Live In Russia?

Russia is the largest country in the world, stretching through Eastern Europe and Northern Asia, and covering more than one-eighth of the Earth's inhabited land area.

Of course, the fact that the country is so big means that the cost of living will vary greatly depending on where you want to live, and how.

For instance, there are many small cities and villages in Russia, that have their own grown food and crops, and people there save significant amounts of money.

However, for a decent life in such big cities as Moscow or St. Petersburg, you will need 1,000$ or more per month.

Cost of Living Index:

Russia : Cost of Living by City

Cost of Living Averages Table for Russia

*Note: All prices are indicated in USD.

Average Restaurant Prices

Meal (Inexpensive Restaurant)

$7.62

Domestic Beer (0.5 Liter)

$1.52

Average Market Prices

Average Transport Prices

Average Utilities Prices

Basic (Water, Electricity, Garbage, Heating, Cooling)

$103.40

1 min. of Prepaid Mobile Tariff Local

$0.02

Internet (Unlimited Data, Cable/ADSL)

$7.31

Average Leisure Prices

Fitness Club, Monthly Fee for 1 Adult

$31.57

Tennis Court Rent (1 Hour)

$17.17

Cinema, 1 Seat, International Release

$4.57

Average Clothing Prices

1 Pair of Jeans (Levis 501 Or Comparable)

$66.90

1 Summer Dress in a Chain Store (Zara, etc...)

$39.97

1 Pair of Adidas Walking Shoes (Mid-Range)

$76.62

Average Rent Prices

Apartment (1 bedroom) in City Center

$398.08

Apartment (1 bedroom) Outside of Center

$251.03

Apartment (3 bedrooms) in City Center

$740.59

How Does the Average Person Spend Their Money in Russia?

Like in most countries, the people of Russia spend the biggest part of their incomes on food and groceries.

The second biggest expense for the people living in Russia is rent, which is expected since rent is a big financial burden for any home.

Restaurants are on the third place on the list of biggest expenses here, and this makes sense too since many people eat there every day, three times a day.

Transportation is also an important financial burden for everyone since it has to be paid, whether you use your private car or public transport.

Apparel is the least of all expenses, like in most countries.

Average Costs Breakdown

Russia: Average Salary, Minimum Wage & Mortgages

The average salary in Russia is relatively low, taking into consideration the rents and the prices of utilities, transportation and other expenses.

With an average monthly income of around 500$ you can cover all basic expenses, but you can't save up or indulge in experiences and adventures like traveling.

Minimum wage in Russia is around 180$ and, though this isn't staggeringly low, it definitely isn't enough to cover all basic needs so the situation in Russia, when it comes to salaries isn't really great.

The good thing is, though, is that in large cities of Russia you can find a good job much easier than in many other capitals and large cities around the world.

Mortgage Interest Rate 10.62%

What About Travel Safety in Russia?

Russia Safety Overview

READ THE FULL REPORT: Russia Safety Review

Safety Index:

Cost of Living by City in Russia

See these related locations:

Or, browse the country/city indexes:

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Cost of Living in Russia. (2023 Updated)

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Russia is the largest country in the world, stretching through Eastern Europe and Northern Asia, and covering more than one-eighth of the Earth's inhabited land area. Of course, the fact that the country is so big means that the cost of living will vary greatly depending on where you want to live, and how.

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Russian unemployment rate hits record low, economic data paints mixed picture

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Russia’s unemployment rate fell to a record low of 3.8% in August, but average nominal wages earned by Russians fell in month-on-month terms and weekly inflation returned, painting a mixed picture overall of the country’s economic health.

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CultureGrams Online Database: Subscriber Area Only

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Analysis | Putin says Russia's economy beat expectations. Did sanctions fail?

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Sign up to get the rest free , including news from around the globe and interesting ideas and opinions to know, sent to your inbox every weekday. As the global glitterati schmoozes in Davos, Switzerland, there is one country whose absence is notable, if not a surprise.

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Russia, the world's largest country by landmass, returned to become an independent nation with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although it hasn't been an easy nut to crack or understand-mainly because of its economic past-the potential for returns has been dynamic. Investors who want to park their money may have considered emerging market economies like Brazil, India, China, and Russia. And they may have seen Russia as a possibility at one point. Before you put your money into Russia-or any investment, for that matter-it helps understanding how the country's economy has transformed from the centrally planned economy it once was to the market economy it transitioned to become.

Key Takeaways

Russia Then and Now

The initial, transition period for Russia's economy were tough, as it inherited a devastated industrial and agricultural sector along with the fundamentals of a centrally planned economy. The regime introduced multiple reforms that made the economy more open, but a high concentration of wealth still continued.

Russia's economic growth​ rate remained negative during most of the 1990s, before the start of the subsequent golden decade. That's when the nation's economy grew at an average rate of 7%. This stellar growth brought Russia to a level where it was recognized as a fast-growing economy. Although the economy did exceedingly well between 1999 and 2008, its growth was mostly driven by the boom in commodity prices, especially oil. The Russian economy got a jolt as oil prices dipped-triggered by the 2008-09 global financial crisis-exposing Russia's dependence on oil. The economy gradually recovered as oil prices stabilized.

The Russian economy grew at a decent pace between 2010 and 2012, but structural issues started to emerge that caused a slowdown during 2013 when the economy grew by 1.3%. The year 2014 was hard for Russia, as it faced multiple issues including crashing oil prices, geopolitical pressures, and sanctions by the West. Its GDP dropped to 0.6%, the currency lost value, inflation spiked, and the stock market tumbled. Russia's economy suffered a recession between 2015 and 2017, ending 2016 with a 0.2% decrease in GDP. According to the World Bank, Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to grow by 1.8% in 2020, with more modest growth forecasted for 2021.

Russia's GDP Composition

Russia's GDP is largely made up of three broad sectors: A small agricultural sector that contributes about 5% to GDP, followed by its industrial sector, and service sectors, which contribute 32% and 62%, respectively, according to the most recent World Bank data.

Agricultural Sector

Harsh weather and tough geographic conditions make cultivation of land arduous and restricted to few small areas of the nation. This is one of the main reasons behind the minimal role of the agricultural sector in Russia's economy in terms of its contribution to GDP. The agricultural sector is small-just under 5% of Russia's GDP.But it provides employment to almost 6% of the population. The agrarian sector is characterized by the coexistence of both the formal sector, represented by large producers for commercial purposes, and the informal sector, where small land holders produce for self sustenance. The sector includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production.

Agricultural land is just about 13% of Russia's total land area-much less than that of other prominent nations. According to the World Bank, agricultural land refers to the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops or under permanent pastures. However, since Russia is such a huge country, this small percentage is big enough in terms of total area. Russia's main agricultural production includes wheat, potatoes, sunflower seeds, sugar beets, tomatoes, apples, vegetables, barely, rice, maize, and onions.

Despite being a large exporter of certain food items, Russia is a net importer in agriculture and food. According to the World Bank, food comprises food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, animal and vegetable oils and fats, and oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels. Other than the non-availability or shortage of certain food products domestically, a few factors explain Russia's rising food imports. One is the higher inflation in Russia vis-à-vis its trading partners, which makes foreign imports more price competitive. The second reason is its sound economic progress, especially during 2000 to 2008. This boom period led to income growth, further pushing up consumer demand for food, which was met by imports.

In 2014, in response to the West's food embargoes, the Russian government banned certain food categories including dairy, meat, and produce from several countries including the United States and the European Union, which significantly dropped Russia's share of food imports. Its domestic food production increased by over 4.7% in 2018, with drink production increasing by 3% from the previous year.

Industrial Sector

The contribution of Russia's industrial sector to its GDP has remained more or less stable, averaging about 35% over the years.The industrial sector comprises mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas and currently provides employment to around 27%the Russian population. Russia has an array of natural resources, with a prominence of oil and natural gas, timber, deposits of tungsten, iron, diamonds, gold, platinum, tin, copper, and titanium.

Major industries in the Russian Federation have capitalized on its natural resources. One of the prominent industries is machine building, which suffered heavily with the disintegration of the Soviet Union as there was a severe shortage of capital. It re-emerged with time and is the leading provider of machinery and equipment to the other industries in the economy.

Next is the chemical and petrochemical industry which contributes about 1.5% to Russia's GDP. According to an Ernst & Young Report, "A large number of products with higher added value (such as specialty composites and additives) are not produced in Russia. China and Europe, for example, produce about 25% and 20% of the world's primary plastics respectively, while Russia produces only 2%." Going by importance, the fuel and energy complex (FEC) is one of the most crucial for the Russian economy. It comprises the mining and production of energy resources, processing, delivery, and consumption of all types of energy. The FEC complex not only supports multiple sectors in the economy, its products are Russia's main exports.

The other competitive industries of Russia include mining and metallurgy, aircraft building, aerospace production, weapons and military machinery manufacture, electric engineering, pulp-and-paper production, the automotive industry, transport, road, and agriculture machinery production.

Service Sector

The service sector's contribution to Russia's GDP has increased over the years from 38% in 1991 to 57% in 2001. The service sector currently contributes almost 62% to the country's GDP, and employs the most people in the country-more than 67% of the population. The important segments of its service sector are financial services, communications, travel and tourism, advertising, marketing and sales, real estate, healthcare and social services, art and culture, IT services, wholesale, and retail trade and catering. It is often pointed out that as the crisis that accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union devastated agriculture and industry, it gave services a chance to pick up.

The Bottom Line

Russia needs to diversify its economy further to establish a more balanced economy that is less vulnerable. Focus on its manufacturing and service sector can help achieve more sustainable long-term growth. Although the GDP composition reflects the growing importance of services, it is oil exports that command most of its economy as they directly and indirectly affect everything else.

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Emerging Markets: The Parts of Russia's GDP

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Russia, the world's largest country by landmass, returned to become an independent nation with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although it hasn't been an easy nut to crack or understand-mainly because of its economic past-the potential for returns has been dynamic.

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Download PDF

Quick Facts

Russia's economic freedom score is 61.0, making its economy the 94th freest in the 2020 Index. Its overall score has increased by 2.1 points due primarily to a higher fiscal health score. Russia is ranked 43rd among 45 countries in the Europe region, and its overall score is well below the regional average and approximately equal to the world average.

The Russian economy is ranked moderately free for the first time this year after more than a decade in the ranks of the mostly unfree. GDP growth has been weak over the past five years, burdened by structural weaknesses, low levels of investment, and a poor demographic outlook, but improved in 2018.

As long as the government pursues statist, nationalist, and protectionist economic policies and maintains a cautious approach to inward foreign investment, expansion of economic freedom in Russia will be difficult. A subservient judiciary, rampant corruption, and links among bureaucrats and organized criminal groups compromise government integrity.

Background

Vladimir Putin was reelected president in 2018 amid allegations of electoral fraud. Russia illegally annexed Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula early in 2014 and continues to foment instability by supplying weapons and troops in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region. Ongoing Western economic sanctions have spurred a brain drain and capital flight. Russia's economy depends heavily on exports of oil and gas. Low oil prices, the financial burden of the Crimea annexation, and efforts to rearm the military have strained public finances in recent years, but the higher recent global demand for oil has caused the economy to improve slightly. Because of its actions in Ukraine, Russia's bid to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has been postponed.

The connection between political power and property is strong in Russia, with some senior officials reportedly using their government positions to amass vast property holdings. The judiciary lacks independence. Corruption is pervasive in the highly centralized authoritarian government. Private businesses are routinely targeted for extortion by both law enforcement and organized criminal groups.

The personal income tax rate is a flat 13 percent, and the top corporate tax rate is 20 percent. The overall tax burden equals 24.2 percent of total domestic income. Government spending has amounted to 34.7 percent of the country's output (GDP) over the past three years, and budget deficits have averaged 0.8 percent of GDP. Public debt is equivalent to 14.0 percent of GDP.

The government has streamlined the processes for obtaining a construction permit, getting hooked up to the electricity grid, paying taxes, and trading across borders, but only in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The labor code is outmoded and ineffective, and the labor market is inefficient. State-owned enterprises and the public sector employ 33 percent of workers. Most prices were liberalized in the early 1990s (with significant exceptions), but the government maintains a wide range of subsidy programs.

The total value of exports and imports of goods and services equals 51.5 percent of GDP. The average applied tariff rate is 3.6 percent, and layers of bureaucratic nontariff barriers further distort the flow of goods and services. Except in the energy sector, growth in foreign investment has been elusive because of the deficient investment framework. The financial sector is dominated by banks, and the five largest banks are state-controlled.

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Download PDF Quick Facts Russia's economic freedom score is 61.0, making its economy the 94th freest in the 2020 Index. Its overall score has increased by 2.1 points due primarily to a higher fiscal health score. Russia is ranked 43rd among 45 countries in the Europe region, and its overall score is well below the regional average and approximately equal to the world average.

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Putin's War Costs and Russia's Changing Economy

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Putin's War Costs and Russia's Changing Economy

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A warm winter and a looming recession in some Western countries have helped make sanctions against Russian exports work. Spending on the war has increased significantly, and the government has had to cut nonmilitary expenses and to finance the deficit through money emission. Sanctions cannot stop the war, but they are making it harder to fund. Putin is ready to spend, but his war chest is running thin.
Gas: Europe Will Not Freeze
For most of 2022, sanctions against Russian imports worked much better than sanctions against exports. At the end of the year, the situation changed. By cutting off gas supplies, Putin hoped to "freeze Europe" and dispose it to reduce support for Ukraine. However, he did not succeed. During the winter month and a half, only 12.5 percent was taken from Europe's gas storages (the 2016-2021 average was 17.5 percent). By the end of the year, the storage facilities were 83.2 percent full, one of the best rates in recent years. After remaining at around $1,500 per thousand cubic meters for a couple of weeks, the spot gas price dipped below $900 at the end of the year.

The recipe for the European "gas miracle" is weak demand for gas in the Asia-Pacific, a mild winter, and measures taken to reduce dependence on fuel from Russia. The share of Russian pipeline gas in European imports fell from 40-45 percent to 7-8 percent.

This decline is the result of both Allied sanctions and Russia's gas blackmail. The stoppage of gas deliveries to countries that refused to buy it with rubles, the shutdown of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, Europe's efforts to buy liquefied natural gas, and clandestine bombing of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines have cut off Russian exports. In 2022, Russian gas exports fell from 185.1 billion cubic meters to 100.9 billion (down 45 percent), the lowest since the collapse of the USSR. In 2023, gas exports may fall by another quarter.

By the end of the heating season Europe can expect to retain at least 50 percent of the gas currently in storage. This almost guarantees that Europe will have enough gas to cover needs for the next two winters, reducing the risk of fuel shortages until 2025, the Russian Institute of Energy and Finance states. As a result, gas price fluctuations in 2023 may not be as severe as in 2022.

Failing to freeze Europe, in 2022 Russia lost its gas market. For half a century, gas from Russia led to the interdependence of the European and Russian economies and largely determined the soft German Russian politics. This era is now over. In 2023, Russia's share of the EU natural gas market could be lower than that of the United States. Building a new pipeline to China will take about five years and huge investments.
Oil: No Super-Profits
Despite the sanctions, Russia's oil and gas revenues in 2022 were unusually large (in January-November they were $164.2 billion, almost 30 percent more than a year earlier). Before the war, oil and gas provided Russia with about 45 percent of total budget revenues and about 60 percent of export revenues. Russia's physical oil exports in 2022 could be 7.5 percent higher than in 2021. However, from its March peak of $140, the price of Brent crude had almost halved by the end of December. Russia's Urals blend fell from November's $66.5 to $50.5 per barrel in December (the 2022 average is $76.1). If the price of the Urals blend remains at $50 throughout 2023, the budget will lose about 7.7 percent of revenues.

The reason for the drop in oil prices was Europe's decision to stop importing Russian oil (except for small volumes imported by Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic). Beginning in February 2023, imports of oil products will also stop. The Allies have set a price ceiling for Russian oil-it cannot exceed $60 per barrel. In response, Putin has forbidden oil producers to trade with countries that have imposed price restrictions. Already in November, according to IEA estimates, Russia's total revenues from oil exports fell to $15.8 billion, down $0.7 billion from October.

The main buyers of Russian oil became India, China, and Turkey, which together imported about the same amount of oil that Europe used to import. These countries have not agreed to the "price ceiling." However, they get the Urals blend at a discount of $30+ per barrel to the Brent oil price. Also, the delivery of oil to Asian markets is more expensive for Russia than delivery to Europe, so the profits of the oil companies are decreasing. Because of sanctions, they have to increase discounts to buyers. In January 2023, Russian oil was trading at $38, or half the Brent price at that time. That's not a miracle: China is the main buyer of the Urals blend now, and demand there is weak because of COVID-19.
Budget In Negative Territory
The price of oil and gas will not recover any time soon: the developed economies are slowing down or are close to a recession. According to the consensus forecast from Morgan Stanley, in 2023 the GDP of the United States will grow by only 0.2 percent, while the eurozone's GDP will decline by 0.1 percent. Thus Russia will not see record super-profits from oil and gas sales for a very long time. However, one cannot exclude the growth of hydrocarbon prices in 2023 should the embargo, the price ceiling, and the revival of the Chinese economy lead to a shortage of fuel on the global market.

Ironically, just before the current decline, Russian government revenues from oil and gas were at their peak (in January-October 2022 they were 34 percent higher than a year earlier). Because of the very high gas prices, Gazprom made a record net profit of 2.5 trillion rubles in the first half of 2022 (more than the total of the previous two years combined). The state took half of Gazprom's profits, channeling them to finance the war. Nonetheless, its profits made Gazprom the country's largest taxpayer in 2022. The company would pay more than 5 trillion rubles in taxes (or more than the half the amount spent on the war and security).

Gazprom's profits for the second half of the year, however, could be close to zero. Oil revenues are also falling. In November the budget revenues from oil and gas, not including the payments from Gazprom, would have been 49 percent lower than the 2021 level. Tax revenues on imports were down 20 percent, and the "domestic" VAT and income tax revenues are also declining.
In Part 2 of the series, we will explore how the Kremlin is shifting the burden of war expenditures to the population. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

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Putin's War Costs: Changing Russia's Economy

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A warm winter and a looming recession in some Western countries have helped make sanctions against Russian exports work. Spending on the war has increased significantly, and the government has had to cut nonmilitary expenses and to finance the deficit through money emission. Sanctions cannot stop the war, but they are making it harder to fund.

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Select "People and Society"

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Introduction

Founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th-15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new ROMANOV Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific. Under PETER I (ruled 1682-1725), hegemony was extended to the Baltic Sea and the country was renamed the Russian Empire. During the 19th century, more territorial acquisitions were made in Europe and Asia. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 contributed to the Revolution of 1905, which resulted in the formation of a parliament and other reforms. Devastating defeats and food shortages in World War I led to widespread rioting in the major cities of the Russian Empire and to the overthrow in 1917 of the ROMANOV Dynasty. The communists under Vladimir LENIN seized power soon after and formed the USSR. The brutal rule of Iosif STALIN (1928-53) strengthened communist rule and Russian dominance of the Soviet Union at a cost of tens of millions of lives. After defeating Germany in World War II as part of an alliance with the US (1939-1945), the USSR expanded its territory and influence in Eastern Europe and emerged as a global power. The USSR was the principal adversary of the US during the Cold War (1947-1991). The Soviet economy and society stagnated in the decades following Stalin's rule, until General Secretary Mikhail GORBACHEV (1985-91) introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize communism, but his initiatives inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 led to the dissolution of the USSR into Russia and 14 other independent states.

Following economic and political turmoil during President Boris YELTSIN's term (1991-99), Russia shifted toward a centralized authoritarian state under President Vladimir PUTIN (2000-2008, 2012-present) in which the regime seeks to legitimize its rule through managed elections, populist appeals, a foreign policy focused on enhancing the country's geopolitical influence, and commodity-based economic growth. Russia faces a largely subdued rebel movement in Chechnya and some other surrounding regions, although violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

approximately 1.8 times the size of the US

permafrost over much of Siberia is a major impediment to development; volcanic activity in the Kuril Islands; volcanoes and earthquakes on the Kamchatka Peninsula; spring floods and summer/autumn forest fires throughout Siberia and parts of European Russia

volcanism: significant volcanic activity on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kuril Islands; the peninsula alone is home to some 29 historically active volcanoes, with dozens more in the Kuril Islands; Kliuchevskoi (4,835 m), which erupted in 2007 and 2010, is Kamchatka's most active volcano; Avachinsky and Koryaksky volcanoes, which pose a threat to the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, have been deemed Decade Volcanoes by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to their explosive history and close proximity to human populations; other notable historically active volcanoes include Bezymianny, Chikurachki, Ebeko, Gorely, Grozny, Karymsky, Ketoi, Kronotsky, Ksudach, Medvezhia, Mutnovsky, Sarychev Peak, Shiveluch, Tiatia, Tolbachik, and Zheltovsky; see note 2 under "Geography - note"

note 1: largest country in the world in terms of area but unfavorably located in relation to major sea lanes of the world; despite its size, much of the country lacks proper soils and climates (either too cold or too dry) for agriculture

note 2: Russia's far east, particularly the Kamchatka Peninsula, lies along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire

People and Society

Russian (official) 85.7%, Tatar 3.2%, Chechen 1%, other 10.1%; note - data represent native language spoken (2010 est.)

major-language sample(s):
Книга фактов о мире - незаменимый источник базовой информации. (Russian)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

improved: urban: 98.6% of population

rural: 94.2% of population

total: 97.1% of population

unimproved: urban: 1.4% of population

rural: 5.8% of population

total: 2.9% of population (2017 est.)

improved: urban: 94.8% of population

rural: 78.1% of population

total: 90.5% of population

unimproved: urban: 5.2% of population

rural: 21.9% of population

total: 9.5% of population (2017 est.)

Government

46 provinces (oblasti, singular - oblast), 21 republics (respubliki, singular - respublika), 4 autonomous okrugs (avtonomnyye okrugi, singular - avtonomnyy okrug), 9 krays (kraya, singular - kray), 2 federal cities (goroda, singular - gorod), and 1 autonomous oblast (avtonomnaya oblast')

oblasts: Amur (Blagoveshchensk), Arkhangel'sk, Astrakhan', Belgorod, Bryansk, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kemerovo, Kirov, Kostroma, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Magadan, Moscow, Murmansk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orenburg, Orel, Penza, Pskov, Rostov, Ryazan', Sakhalin (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), Samara, Saratov, Smolensk, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), Tambov, Tomsk, Tula, Tver', Tyumen', Ul'yanovsk, Vladimir, Volgograd, Vologda, Voronezh, Yaroslavl'

republics: Adygeya (Maykop), Altay (Gorno-Altaysk), Bashkortostan (Ufa), Buryatiya (Ulan-Ude), Chechnya (Groznyy), Chuvashiya (Cheboksary), Dagestan (Makhachkala), Ingushetiya (Magas), Kabardino-Balkariya (Nal'chik), Kalmykiya (Elista), Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (Cherkessk), Kareliya (Petrozavodsk), Khakasiya (Abakan), Komi (Syktyvkar), Mariy-El (Yoshkar-Ola), Mordoviya (Saransk), North Ossetia (Vladikavkaz), Sakha [Yakutiya] (Yakutsk), Tatarstan (Kazan'), Tyva (Kyzyl), Udmurtiya (Izhevsk)

autonomous okrugs: Chukotka (Anadyr'), Khanty-Mansi-Yugra (Khanty-Mansiysk), Nenets (Nar'yan-Mar), Yamalo-Nenets (Salekhard)

krays: Altay (Barnaul), Kamchatka (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy), Khabarovsk, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Perm', Primorskiy [Maritime] (Vladivostok), Stavropol', Zabaykal'sk [Transbaikal] (Chita)

federal cities: Moscow [Moskva], Saint Petersburg [Sankt-Peterburg]

autonomous oblast: Yevreyskaya [Jewish] (Birobidzhan)

note 1: administrative divisions have the same names as their administrative centers (exceptions have the administrative center name following in parentheses)

note 2: the United States does not recognize Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the municipality of Sevastopol, nor their redesignation as the "Republic of Crimea" and the "Federal City of Sevastopol"

description: bicameral Federal Assembly or Federalnoye Sobraniye consists of:
Federation Council or Sovet Federatsii (170 seats; 2 members in each of the 83 federal administrative units (see note below) - oblasts, krays, republics, autonomous okrugs and oblasts, and federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg - appointed by the top executive and legislative officials; members serve 4-year terms)
State Duma or Gosudarstvennaya Duma (450 seats (see note below); as of February 2014, the electoral system reverted to a mixed electoral system for the 2016 election, in which one-half of the members are directly elected by simple majority vote and one-half directly elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)

elections:
State Duma - last held 17 - 19 September 2021 (next to be held in fall 2026)

election results:
Federation Council (members appointed); composition - men 145, women 25, percent of women 14.7%

State Duma - United Russia 50.9%, CPRF 19.3%, LDPR 7.7%, A Just Russia 7.6%, New People 5.3% other minor parties and Independents 9.2%; seats by party - United Russia 324, CPRF 57, LDPR 21, A Just Russia 27, New People 13; Rodina 1, CP 1, Party of Growth 1, independent 5

note 1: the State Duma now includes 3 representatives from the "Republic of Crimea," while the Federation Council includes 2 each from the "Republic of Crimea" and the "Federal City of Sevastopol," both regions that Russia occupied and attempted to annex from Ukraine and that the US does not recognize as part of Russia

A Just Russia [Sergey MIRONOV]
Civic Platform or CP [Rifat SHAYKHUTDINOV]
Communist Party of the Russian Federation or CPRF [Gennadiy ZYUGANOV]
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia or LDPR [Vladimir ZHIRINOVSKIY]
New People [Alexey NECHAYEV]
Party of Growth [Irina MIRONOVA]
Rodina [Aleksei ZHURAVLYOV]
United Russia [Dmitriy MEDVEDEV]

note: 31 political parties are registered with Russia's Ministry of Justice (as of September 2021); 14 participated in the 2021 election, but only 8 parties maintain representation in Russia's national legislature

Economy

Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-based system. Both economic growth and reform have stalled in recent years, however, and Russia remains a predominantly statist economy with a high concentration of wealth in officials' hands. Economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy, transportation, banking, and defense-related sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak, and the state continues to interfere in the free operation of the private sector.

Russia is one of the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas, and is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. Russia is heavily dependent on the movement of world commodity prices as reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the volatile swings in global prices. The economy, which had averaged 7% growth during the 1998-2008 period as oil prices rose rapidly, has seen diminishing growth rates since then due to the exhaustion of Russia's commodity-based growth model.

A combination of falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with GDP falling by close to 2.8%. The downturn continued through 2016, with GDP contracting another 0.2%, but was reversed in 2017 as world demand picked up. Government support for import substitution has increased recently in an effort to diversify the economy away from extractive industries.

$3,968,180,000,000 (2019 est.)

$3,915,637,000,000 (2018 est.)

$3,818,780,000,000 (2017 est.)

note: data are in 2010 dollars
country comparison to the world: 6

15.5% of GDP (2017 est.)

16.1% of GDP (2016 est.)

note: data cover general government debt and include debt instruments issued (or owned) by government entities other than the treasury; the data include treasury debt held by foreign entities; the data include debt issued by subnational entities, as well as intragovernmental debt; intragovernmental debt consists of treasury borrowings from surpluses in the social funds, such as for retirement, medical care, and unemployment, debt instruments for the social funds are not sold at public auctions
country comparison to the world: 194

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

Communications

general assessment:
telecom market is largest in Europe, centered in large cities; competition active in Moscow and St Petersburg; most users access Internet through mobile platforms; fiber broadband sector is growing, supported by government in aim to extend reach to outlying regions; tests of 5G with Moscow adopting smart city technology; government justifies censorship and website blocks under a range of laws and regulations; government program aims to provide 97% of households with fixed broadband by 2024; publicly accessible Internet connections in institutions such as hospitals, libraries, schools, and mass transit available in cities; in rural areas, the availability of public Internet connections remains limited; major importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China (2021)

(2020)

domestic: cross-country digital trunk lines run from Saint Petersburg to Khabarovsk, and from Moscow to Novorossiysk; the telephone systems in 60 regional capitals have modern digital infrastructures; cellular services, both analog and digital, are available in many areas; in rural areas, telephone services are still outdated, inadequate, and low-density; 22 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular 164 per 100 persons (2019)

international: country code - 7; landing points for the Far East Submarine Cable System, HSCS, Sakhalin-Kuril Island Cable, RSCN, BCS North-Phase 2, Kerch Strait Cable and the Georgia-Russian submarine cable system connecting Russia, Japan, Finland, Georgia and Ukraine; satellite earth stations provide access to Intelsat, Intersputnik, Eutelsat, Inmarsat, and Orbita systems (2019)

note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments

Transportation

major seaport(s):
Arctic Ocean: Arkhangelsk, Murmansk Kaliningrad, Primorsk, Saint Petersburg
Black Sea: Novorossiysk
Pacific Ocean: Nakhodka, Vladivostok, Vostochnyy

oil terminal(s): Kavkaz oil terminal, Primorsk

container port(s) (TEUs): Saint Petersburg (2,221,724) (2019)

LNG terminal(s) (export): Sabetta, Sakhalin Island

river port(s): Astrakhan, Kazan (Volga River); Rostov-on-Don (Don River); Saint Petersburg (Neva River)

Military and Security

est. 3,000-5,000 Armenia; est. 1,500 Belarus; est. 7,000-10,000 Georgia; est. 100-200 Central African Republic; est. 500 Kyrgyzstan; est. 1,500-2,000 Moldova (Trannistria); est. 3,000-5,000 Syria; est. 5,000-7,000 Tajikistan; est. 25,000-30,000 Ukraine (including Crimea) (2020)

note(s): since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a truce agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020

as of late 2020, a Russian Government-backed private military company was assessed to have about 2,000 personnel in Libya supporting Libyan National Army forces;

Russia is a leader of CSTO contributes approximately 8,000 personnel to its Rapid Reaction Force

18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; males are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; one-year service obligation (Russia offers the option of serving on a two-year contract instead of completing a one-year conscription period); reserve obligation for non-officers to age 50; enrollment in military schools from the age of 16, cadets classified as members of the armed forces (2019)

note: in April of 2019, the Russian Government pledged its intent to end conscription as part of a decade-long effort to shift from a large, conscript-based military to a smaller, more professional force

Terrorism

Aum Shimrikyo (AUM/Aleph); Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Caucasus Province

note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T

Transnational Issues

Russia remains concerned about the smuggling of poppy derivatives from Afghanistan through Central Asian countries; China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with the 2004 Agreement, ending their centuries-long border disputes; the sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group, known in Japan as the "Northern Territories" and in Russia as the "Southern Kurils," occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia, and claimed by Japan, remains the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities; Russia's military support and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence in 2008 continue to sour relations with Georgia; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea; Norway and Russia signed a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement in 2010; various groups in Finland advocate restoration of Karelia (Kareliya) and other areas ceded to the Soviet Union following World War II but the Finnish Government asserts no territorial demands; Russia and Estonia signed a technical border agreement in May 2005, but Russia recalled its signature in June 2005 after the Estonian parliament added to its domestic ratification act a historical preamble referencing the Soviet occupation and Estonia's pre-war borders under the 1920 Treaty of Tartu; Russia contends that the preamble allows Estonia to make territorial claims on Russia in the future, while Estonian officials deny that the preamble has any legal impact on the treaty text; Russia demands better treatment of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia; Russia remains involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine while also occupying Ukraine's territory of Crimea; Lithuania and Russia committed to demarcating their boundary in 2006 in accordance with the land and maritime treaty ratified by Russia in May 2003 and by Lithuania in 1999; Lithuania operates a simplified transit regime for Russian nationals traveling from the Kaliningrad coastal exclave into Russia, while still conforming, as an EU member state with an EU external border, where strict Schengen border rules apply; preparations for the demarcation delimitation of land boundary with Ukraine have commenced; the dispute over the boundary between Russia and Ukraine through the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov is suspended due to the occupation of Crimea by Russia; Kazakhstan and Russia boundary delimitation was ratified on November 2005 and field demarcation should commence in 2007; Russian Duma has not yet ratified 1990 Bering Sea Maritime Boundary Agreement with the US; Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting additional data to augment its 2001 CLCS submission

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Founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th-15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new ROMANOV Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific.

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The Cultural Atlas team acknowledges the Traditional Owners of the lands throughout Australia on whose country we have the privilege to live and work. We pay our respects to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander custodians past, present and emerging.

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The Cultural Atlas aims to inform and educate the public in cross-cultural attitudes, practices, norms, behaviours, communications and business skills

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Russia's pervasive corruption leaves few stones unturned, and the country's highly regarded university sector is most certainly not immune. Just a few weeks ago, Mikhail Basharatyan, the deputy dean of the faculty of World Politics at the elite Moscow State University made headlines when he was caught accepting a 30,000 EUR bribe for a PhD admission. The scandal followed on just a year after another MSU professor was taped receiving 35,000 EUR from a student.
'If bribery in the West has the shape of an elite discipline, then in Russia it is a sport for all.'
Corruption in higher education is popularly considered to be endemic; and while no one can argue it is exclusively Russian phenomenon, the practice here does stand alone in terms of both scale and nature. If bribery in the West has the shape of an elite discipline, then in Russia it is a sport for all.

A tidy business

According to data presented in a 2012 report (link in Russian) by Open Government (OG), a council of experts established by Prime Minister Medvedev, higher education is perceived by the Russians to be the fourth most corrupt sector in the country, after the road police, security forces and community facility agencies (graph 2: red is dishonest, green honest; the other three service areas are hospitals, schools and employment). The black market, which runs from kindergarten to professional education, has an estimated value of 5.5 billion USD every year (source: OG report). It is a sophisticated system, with a multitude of agents encompassing professors, teachers, students, parents, ministerial officials, contractors, publishers, librarians, canteen administrators, mediators and fixers... All sorts of services and goods are exchanged, from exams, admissions and grades, to degrees and private tutoring, not to mention public tenders and auxiliary services such as free food at the canteen, unlimited access to books at the library and places in student hostels.

In 2011, the outspoken and extrovert liberal Moscow magazine Bolshoi Gorod set the cat among the pigeons with an investigative piece entitled 'All Moscow's grafts' ( link in Russian). The article contained a menu-like list of services procurable by bribes, from elbow surgery to a new driving licence (5,000 RUB plus a bottle of mid-market Cognac, and 50,000 RUB respectively). Many of the house specials came in the field of education.

A friend, himself in the middle buying a Master's degree at one of Kazan's universities, described the business to me in detail. 'Some universities look like supermarkets', he said. 'It isn't only demand driven. You just need to walk around a university to discover dozens of ads proposing tailor-made or recycled dissertations and theses'. Money and contacts, he adds, are key: 'It's not a trivial deal to bribe someone. You need to know the procedures, the appropriate way of approaching people, contacts that will introduce you, and of course the right sum to hand over'. My friend says he shows up just a couple of times a year, at the beginning and at the end of the sessions, with presents.

Not everyone concurs with the popular perception of ubiquitous corruption. Alexander Tevdoy-Burmuli is Professor of European Integration at Moscow's elite university, MGIMO. He explained to me that today's prestigious universities are reasonably upright and trustworthy: 'these days, it's almost impossible to buy degrees or even top grades in a renowned institute; everything is carefully monitored and top universities are very concerned about their reputation,' he says. At the same time, he acknowledged, there is occasionally evidence of malpractice in leading Moscow institutes.
'The assumption 'the further from Moscow, the more corrupt the university' is a dangerous over-simplification, because there are respectable institutes in the regions too.'
There seems to be significant variation across Russia's 83 regions. The assumption 'the further from Moscow, the more corrupt the university' is a dangerous over-simplification, because there are respectable institutes in the regions too. But clan loyalties and the absence of central control in the peripheries of Russia can create a particularly propitious environment for corruption. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the North Caucasus takes the gold medal in the sport. According to a one-time academic (now working as a human rights activist in this impoverished region), buying your way here is reasonably straightforward. 'You can buy whatever you want, it's just a matter of money. Obtaining a counterfeit certificate is generally quick and cheap. Getting it registered in the national database is more complicated and costly. It's not impossible, but there are many ways to do it. If you're not in a hurry, the simplest arrangement is to enrol directly in the final year and then buy your way out. In this way you're sure that nobody can contest your fake qualification.'

The government acts

University corruption is not a new problem in Russia. It was an often discussed reality of the Soviet era, particularly during the stagnation of the Brezhnev era. 'With the end of early Soviet social uplift, corruption and favouritism became widespread', recalls Tevdoy-Burmuli. But it was only in the 1990s and 2000s, with weakening of central authority, that the problem became particularly serious. 'When the USSR collapsed, new universities, regional branches, and departments of all sorts mushroomed nationwide. They went out of control and it was the start of a new business not always motivated by pedagogy.'

The scale of the problem eventually forced the government to act. A 2001 experimental reform replaced entry tests run independently by every university with a nationwide standardised test for all universities - the Unified State Examination ( USE), similar to the American SAT. Besides fostering competition from students who live in the provinces and are therefore unable to attend the tests of the prestigious establishments of the capital, the reform intended to ensure more transparency in the matriculating process, considered to be particularly corrupt. CCTV and electronic marking were also introduced.
'The scale of the problem eventually forced the government to act.'
But the reforms have, by general consensus, proved to be disastrous. It was not long before the new tests themselves succumbed to corruption, as the Director of the Federal Testing Centre, Vladimir Khlebnikov, himself readily acknowledged. Tevdoy-Burmuli believes the new tests actually took corruption to a new level: '..the universities immediately understood that USE results were not reliable, so they started to run their own supplementary entry tests, opening up more opportunities for corruption'.

In essence, the reform highlighted the very complex nature and multiple causes of corruption in education. And it proved that the hope of solving a structural problem through a mere technical solution was excessively naïve.

The miserable wage of professors, paid as little as 1000 USD per month, undoubtedly continues to be a key issue that must eventually be tackled. That said, it alone cannot explain the whole picture. Higher wages in public administration may be a deterrent only if the probability of detection and punishment rises as well. Salary policy is useless if it isn't coordinated with measures strengthening accountability and the rule of law in the country.

The way forward

Ruslan Yurevich Shulga, professor at the Civil Society Department of MGIMO, is convinced that no less than a root-and-branch reform of the whole Russian university system is required. For Shulga, this means reducing the number of establishments, increasing public spending on education, adopting a more impartial system of evaluation and putting in place special mechanisms like crisis hotlines and watchdog bodies in universities to strengthen civil society control.
'Even if the government can agree an effective plan, implementation is some way off. In the meantime, corruption will continue to blight the country.'
Even if the government can agree an effective plan, implementation is some way off. In the meantime, corruption will continue to blight the country. Bright minds, competition and financial resources will continue to be squandered. Education's quality control mission will continue to be undermined, with the potential for incompetent people rising to highly responsible positions in e.g. medicine or law, a situation that is at best inefficient and at worst a danger for the community.

But the most pervasive aspect to corruption in education is that it spreads the culture[1] of dishonesty among the younger generation. It teaches that cheating and bribery are perhaps the only way to succeed, compromising the entire political and economic future of the country.

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Russia's pervasive corruption leaves few stones unturned, and the country's highly regarded university sector is most certainly not immune. Just a few weeks ago, Mikhail Basharatyan, the deputy dean of the faculty of World Politics at the elite Moscow State University made headlines when he was caught accepting a 30,000 EUR bribe for a PhD admission.

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One's family holds the highest importance to individuals in Russia. Relatives usually have very close relationships and are interdependent, helping each other in times of need. Extended family members are also very involved with people's lives and the support of the household. If an uncle, aunt or any other relative is in need, it is considered to be the obligation of the to help. Grandparents play a big part in raising children, and may perhaps even live with the . The elderly hold a very respected position in society and generally hold the most authority in the household.

Russia has quite crowded housing conditions comparative to Australia (in square meters per person). Traditionally, three generations lived together in one household. However, in present-day Russia, the is becoming more common. Many young couples aspire to move out of their parents' home after marriage. A shortage in housing and difficult economic conditions can make independent living a challenge, which means many grown children have to live with their parents. If an elderly couple lives independently and one of them becomes widowed, they usually move into the household of one of their children to be cared for into their old age.

In the common Russian household dynamic, both parents usually work; it is more commonly the woman's job than the man's to care for the children and do the housework. However, many modern Russian families have alternative dynamics. For example, parents may be divorced, or work in different cities away from their children. Often, grandparents will help raising children whilst both parents work; they may keep the grandchildren for entire holiday periods to give the parents time for themselves.

Some families of lower-socioeconomic backgrounds may combine their assets in order for all members to have economic security. Typically, if grandparents live with the , their pensions contribute to the family budget.

Generally, most Russians adore children and aspire to have their own. It's a primary goal to see one's child be more successful than oneself and so Russians are often deeply proud of their kids. People can be expected to boast of their son or daughter's success. However, there is a growing tendency for people to deliberately choose to stay unmarried and childless in order to focus on their careers. Family sizes may also be limited by economic conditions.
Gender Roles
Women have equal rights to study and work in Russia. The communist regime sought to empower women and increase gender equality. However, since the collapse of communism, a significant amount of the progress towards gender equality has eroded. In the midst of high unemployment, women were the first to lose their jobs, and a traditionalist view of the division of labour and family life became popular again. Many women saw their participation in the workforce as a "double burden" when coupled with household labour as it continued to be considered the female's duty to complete domestic tasks.

Today, many women work to increase the household income and all generally have the opportunity to pursue higher education. However, they still do not occupy as many leadership positions. Men continue to dominate the public sphere and, since quotas for female representation were discarded, the numbers of women in politics have declined.

Russian culture generally possesses very strong conceptions about femininity and masculinity. Women are expected to be well groomed, reserved and have a feminine look. Meanwhile, though men are also expected to present themselves tidily, it's more acceptable for them to be unshaved, slightly unkempt and out of shape. If a Russian man is too well groomed, it may raise questions about his masculinity.
Dating and Marriage
Russian dating practices are similar to those in English-speaking Western cultures. However, Russians generally approach dating with the prospect of a long-term relationship in mind. Marriage is the ultimate goal; thus, dates are less casual than what Australians are accustomed to.

Couples generally meet one another through social circles. Dating websites are also gaining popularity. On dates, men are expected to behave like gentlemen while women usually act aloof. It is thought that the man needs to charm and convince the woman into liking him by making romantic gestures, such as buying her flowers, paying for her expenses and buying gifts.

Most Russians marry in their early 20s, commonly in the first years after they have left university. It is often considered somewhat humiliating to be single for a long time; older unmarried women have particularly low social statuses regardless of their wealth or occupation. Some Russians may choose to live together as an unmarried couple for a while, but generally legal marriage is preferred. Divorce is very common in Russia. In 2011, 51% of marriages ended in divorce.

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One's family holds the highest importance to individuals in Russia. Relatives usually have very close relationships and are interdependent, helping each other in times of need. Extended family members are also very involved with people's lives and the support of the household.

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The Temple of All Religions located in Kazan, Russia includes an Orthodox church, a mosque, and a synagogue, among places for other types of worship.

Russia's 144 million inhabitants subscribe to a diverse variety of religions, with the most popular religion in the state traditionally being the Russian Orthodox Church. However, irreligious beliefs have also become more and more popular in Russia over recent times. Attitudes towards religion in Russia have waned and fluctuated over time. During the lengthy era of the Soviet Union, atheism was the widespread practice. However, following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, religious beliefs began to re-emerge, setting the foundation for the present day religious association. However, atheism still remains a preferred way of life for many Russians. A detailed analysis of the religious beliefs of Russia is available below.

Most Common Religions in Russia

Orthodox Christianity - 71%

Orthodox Christianity in Russia can be traced back to at least the year 988 when it was introduced in Russia under the governance of Prince Vladimir of Kiev. Today, Orthodox Christianity is still the most popular Christian denomination in Russia, with 42.5% of Russians identifying as Orthodox Christians. Although religious activity was highly intertwined within Russian society throughout many centuries, the influence of the Russian Orthodox church lessened following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. After the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922, religious participation was at best discouraged and at worst persecuted. Other Orthodox churches, such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Georgian Orthodox Church, and the Belarusian Orthodox Church saw similar treatment during this era. Today, Christianity in Russia has experienced somewhat of an upsurge, a trend that began after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Non-Affiliated Beliefs - 15%

Atheism came into vogue in Russia during the Soviet era, as it was regarded to be communism-appropriate. Today, atheist beliefs prevail in Russia to an extent, with around 13% of the country identifying as such. However, it is difficult to determine exactly how many people are atheists in Russia, as many who identify as Orthodox Russian do not participate in any religious practices and are in fact atheists. Those who identified their religious beliefs as "non-affiliated" include Russians who consider themselves to be agnostic or just generally irreligious.

Many of those who are non-religiously affiliated are opposed to the major religions having influence in the affairs of the state. Non-believers remain generally unrepresented in Russia despite their relatively large numbers. Atheism and Agnosticism do not have any overt role in the matters of the nation.

Islam - 10%

Around 10% of the population of Russia identifies as Muslim. Islam was introduced to Russia through Dagestan around the mid-7th century. The central point of Islam's integration in Russia was the Volga region, from which it spread to other parts of the country. Today, Muslim communities in Russia are mainly concentrated in the Volga Region and the North Caucasus, with smaller numbers in St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are the two major Islamic republics in Russia. The Muslims in Tatarstan are majorly ethnic Muslims, who are direct descendants of the earliest Muslims in Russia, called the Volga Bulgars. There are over 5,000 registered Muslim communities in Russia. However, like Orthodoxy, Islam was suppressed during the Soviet Union, and many mosques were closed down during this time.

A large number of Muslims in Russia observe the Sunni branch of Islam while a smaller number are Shia Muslims. In other areas, notably Chechnya, some Muslims adhere to Sufism. A political party, the Nur All-Russia Public Movement was formed to lobby for political, social and economic rights of Muslims and other minority groups.

Other Christians - 2%

Other than Orthodox Christianity, the other Christian beliefs practiced in Russia include: Protestant Christians, Jehovah's Witness, the Old Believers, Catholics and Seventh Day Adventists. These groups represent around 2% of the population. A small amount of the population of Russia adheres to the Catholic Church. The aforementioned religious groups have minimal influence in Russia.

Other Faiths - 1%

The other faiths followed in Russia include Pagan beliefs, Slavic Folk Religion, and/or Central Asia Shamanism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, and Taoism. There is a small community of Scientologists in Russia. However, these beliefs have a combined following that represents only 1% of the population.

Religious Freedom in Russia

In recent years, the Russian government has come under fire from international whistleblowers for failing to respect religious freedom. Although the constitution of Russia calls for freedom of religion, many argue that this is stipulation that goes unfollowed. Acts of religious extremism are generally frowned upon in Russia, and the Russian Orthodox Church has been called the "un-official" church of the state.

The Future of Religion in Russia: Outlook For the Year 2050

2015 data released by the PEW Research Center showed interesting predictions for trends in religious beliefs in Russia. While non-affiliation in Russia is predicted to shrink in population, followers of Islam and Hinduism are predicted to grow in the future. Interestingly, the population of those who follow Russian Orthodoxy are predicted to shrink in population, from around 100 million today to 88 million in 2050. One possible reason for this could be the fact that Russia is one of the world's countries that actually has a shrinking population, which is determined by a low birth date and a relatively short life expectancy, among other factors.

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Russia's 144 million inhabitants subscribe to a diverse variety of religions, with the most popular religion in the state traditionally being the Russian Orthodox Church. However, irreligious beliefs have also become more and more popular in Russia over recent times. Attitudes towards religion in Russia have waned and fluctuated over time.

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NPR - At Least 1,700 Protestors in Russia Arrested

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NPR - At Least 1,700 Protestors in Russia Arrested

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More than 1,700 protesters were arrested in Russia on Wednesday as tens of thousands of Alexei Navalny supporters marched in demonstrations across the country.

OVD-info, the Russian human rights monitoring project, has been tracking the apprehensions, which started before the protests demanding that the Kremlin release the jailed opposition leader even began.

Navalny has been on a three-week hunger strike in prison, where his physician said earlier this week he could die "at any minute" without the proper medical care. Supporters organized the rallies - defying a national ban - to pressure President Vladimir Putin and his government to release the anti-corruption campaigner and to stop the Kremlin from shuttering Navalny's organization.

The marches swept across dozens of cities and were scheduled on the same day Putin delivered Russia's state of the union address. As crowds swelled in many places, demonstrators were met with heavy police presence in most major cities.

"For once, the police stood back and let them march - no dragging screaming protesters into their vans," the BBC reported from Moscow. "In St. Petersburg it was different: hundreds were arrested there, some stunned with electric shockers by police."

Russia's Interior Ministry estimated about 6,000 pro-Navalny supporters turned out in Moscow and another 4,500 reached the streets in St. Petersburg, The Moscow Times reported. But observers indicate the turnout in Moscow alone was in the tens of thousands, according to the outlet. Police in Yekaterinburg, Russia's fourth-largest city, also reported significantly lower numbers than the figures estimated by Navalny's office; officials there said about 5,000 people attended the rally, while Navalny's local office said 13,000 to 14,000 participated.

Navalny is the most prominent opposition figure in Russia and authorities have petitioned the Moscow City Court to label Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation and his regional headquarters network as "extremist." That would put them in the same category as ISIS, paving a path for the government to essentially outlaw the organization and levy prison sentences for staff and supporters. The court will review the request in a closed hearing on April 26, The Moscow Times reported.

"The detention of supporters of Alexei Navalny in advance of planned protests in Russia today are deplorable," Charles Michel, president of the European Council, said on Twitter.

"Authorities must respect the right to assembly," Michel added.

"I urge that the necessary and quality medical care be granted to Alexei Navalny and that he be released from prison."

The detention of supporters of Alexey #Navalny in advance of planned protests in #Russia today are deplorable.

Authorities must respect the right to assembly.

I urge that the necessary and quality medical care be granted to Alexey Navalny and that he be released from prison.
- Charles Michel (@eucopresident) April 21, 2021

The 44-year-old was arrested in mid-January after returning to Russia from Germany, where he had been treated for a nerve agent poisoning he says was orchestrated by Putin. He began the hunger strike after prison officials refused to adequately treat him for leg and back pain, he has said, adding that the two are likely linked to his poisoning.

On Monday, Russian prison authorities announced that Navalny had been moved to a medical ward at a different prison, where he would undergo "vitamin therapy." But Navalny has said prison officials have threatened to force-feed him.

Despite the crackdown and the looming threat to the Kremlin critic's organizations, Navalny's supporters say they will not capitulate.

"It is, of course, an element of escalation," Vladimir Ashurkov, a Navalny ally who is also the director of the Foundation for Fighting Corruption, told the AP.

"But I have to say we were able to regroup and organize our work despite the pressure before. I'm confident that now, too, we will find ways to work... We have neither the intention nor the possibility to abandon what we're doing."

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At Least 1,700 Protesters In Russia Arrested After Nationwide Anti-Putin Rallies

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More than 1,700 protesters were arrested in Russia on Wednesday as tens of thousands of Alexei Navalny supporters marched in demonstrations across the country. OVD-info, the Russian human rights monitoring project, has been tracking the apprehensions, which started before the protests demanding that the Kremlin release the jailed opposition leader even began.

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In Aleksei Navalny Protests, Russia Faces Biggest Dissent in Years (press three dots and hit "expand" to read article)

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In Aleksei Navalny Protests, Russia Faces Biggest Dissent in Years (press three dots and hit "expand" to read article)

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Demonstrations in support of the jailed opposition leader swept the nation, beginning in the Far East, where people braved subzero temperatures, and reaching the capital. Arrests climbed into the thousands.

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From the frozen streets of Russia's Far East and Siberia to the grand plazas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, tens of thousands of Russians rallied in support of the jailed opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny on Saturday in the biggest nationwide showdown in years between the Russian authorities and critics of the Kremlin.

The protests largely drew young Russians and did not immediately pose a dire threat to President Vladimir V. Putin's grip on power. But their broad scope signaled widespread fatigue with the stagnant, corruption-plagued political order that Mr. Putin has presided over for two decades.

On the island of Sakhalin, just north of Japan, hundreds gathered in front of the regional government building and chanted, "Putin is a thief!" More than 12 hours later, as tens of thousands of protesters dispersed in central Moscow, some of them pelted the police with snowballs and kicked at a car belonging to the domestic intelligence agency.

By early evening, more than 3,100 people had been arrested in 109 cities across the country, according to OVD-Info, an activist group that tracks detentions at protests. Among those taken into custody in Moscow - and later released - was Mr. Navalny's wife, Yulia, who posted a photo of herself in a police wagon on Instagram.

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Demonstrators across Russia clashed with the police on Saturday as they turned out in support of the jailed opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny. Credit Credit... Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

Vasily Zimin, a 47-year-old partner in a Moscow law firm who trudged through the slush Saturday, said he was protesting rampant corruption during Mr. Putin's time in power. Taking to the streets, he said, was the only way to effect change.

"The cup is full," he said, adding: "How can you say, 'I can't take any more of this' while sitting on your couch?"

In Moscow's Pushkin Square, people flanked in every direction by riot police officers chanted "Freedom!" as passing drivers honked their horns in support. Tensions rose in late day, with some protesters marching to the jail where Mr. Navalny was being held, only to be driven away by baton-wielding police.

By 9 p.m. in Moscow, the protests had largely died down. But Leonid Volkov, a top aide to Mr. Navalny, said that more demonstrations are planned for next weekend.

"Without a doubt this whole story is just beginning," Mr. Volkov said in a live YouTube video broadcast from an undisclosed location outside Russia.

It appeared to be the biggest day of protest across the country since at least 2017, though it was far from clear whether the show of dissent would push the Kremlin to change course. A report on state television called the protests a "wave of aggression" and warned that jail time loomed for some participants.

"Attacking a police officer is a criminal offense," the news report said. "Hundreds of videos were shot. All the faces are on them."

In the cities of Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean and Irkutsk and Novosibirsk in Siberia, footage showed crowds of well over 1,000 people chanting, "We are in charge here!" and "We won't leave!"

In Yakutsk, the world's coldest city, scores of protesters in the freezing fog braved temperatures of minus-60 Fahrenheit. In Khabarovsk, the city on the Chinese border that was the site of anti-Kremlin protests last summer, hundreds who returned to the streets were met with an overwhelming force of riot police officers.

"I was never a big supporter of Navalny, and yet I understand perfectly well that this is a very serious situation," Vitaliy Blazhevich, 57, a university teacher, said in a telephone interview about why he had come out to rally for Mr. Navalny in Khabarovsk.

"There's always hope that something will change," Mr. Blazhevich said.

Aleksei Navalny, a 44-year-old anticorruption activist who is the most prominent domestic critic of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, was poisoned with a military-grade nerve agent in Siberia in August in what Western officials have described as an assassination attempt by the Russian state.

He was airlifted to Germany and recovered. And last Sunday, after flying home to Moscow, he was arrested at passport control.

The Russian authorities say Mr. Navalny violated the parole terms from a suspended sentence he received six years ago, and are seeking to confine him on a yearslong prison term.

After he was jailed for an initial term of 30 days on Monday, his supporters called for protests - arguing that only pressure in the streets could avert what they describe as an attempt by Mr. Putin to sideline his most popular opponent.

Those protests were unfolding across Russia on Saturday, organized in part by Mr. Navalny's sprawling network of local offices. Local officials did not authorize the protests - citing the coronavirus pandemic, among other things - and they threatened to arrest anyone who took part.

Video showed police officers scuffling with demonstrators in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, but there were no immediate reports of large-scale violence. OVD-Info, an activist group that tracks arrests at protests, reported 3,134 detentions nationwide as of late evening.

In the usually quiet city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, a fishing and energy hub on an island north of Japan, hundreds of people joined in Saturday's protests.

Some schools rescheduled classes, while one put on a basketball tournament to try to keep teenagers away from the protests, said Lyubov Barabashova, a journalist based in the city.

The police did not prevent protesters from gathering in front of the regional government's headquarters, Ms. Barabashova said. When a police officer announced by megaphone that the rally was illegal, protesters chanted in response: "Putin is a thief! Freedom to Navalny!"

The Kremlin has weathered waves of protest in years past, and there was no immediate indication that this time would be different. There were mounting signals that the government intended to respond to the protests with a new wave of repression.

As night fell in Moscow, videos circulated on social media that showed extraordinary defiance by protesters and violent scuffles between them and the police.

Footage showed protesters pelting a group of riot police officers with snowballs. Chanting "Shame!" protesters also threw snowballs at a passing government car with an official blue light. After it came to a stop, people rushed at the car and started kicking it.

The remarkable acts of defiance showed how protesters on Saturday appeared to be more brazen than Russian demonstrators in years past. Across the country, videos showed protesters scuffling with police officers who rushed at them, swinging batons and kicking them.

The government car that was attacked belonged to the F.S.B., Russia's domestic intelligence agency, state news media reported later. The driver lost an eye, the RIA state news agency said.

Moscow's riot police unit was out in force on city streets, but over all the officers appeared more restrained than the security forces who used tear gas, stun grenades and rubber bullets to put down protests in neighboring Belarus last year. Still, there were numerous videos showing vicious beatings by the police in Moscow.

It is not clear whether footage of the violence will turn people away from future protests - or serve to energize the movement.

"If Putin thinks the most frightening things are behind him, he is very sorely and naïvely mistaken," Leonid Volkov, an aide to Mr. Navalny, said on YouTube as the protests wound down.

At regular intervals during his two decades in power, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has faced what leaders in most countries would shrug off as inconsequential protests by a few thousand people threatening no more than sporadic traffic disruptions.

But each time, and again on Saturday in cities across Russia, modest challenges from the street have turned into serious spectacles of dissent thanks to the heavy-handed response of the country's vast and often brutal security apparatus.

In Moscow on Saturday, riot police officers wearing black helmets and swinging batons began grabbing people in Pushkin Square, in the center of the Russian capital, even before the start of a planned protest. They did the same in the summer of 2019 during the last round of protests called by Aleksei A. Navalny.

The deployment of so many police and other security officers, who sometimes outnumber protesters, is a measure of how nervously the Kremlin views all deviations from the portrayal of Mr. Putin on state media outlets as Russia's divinely ordained and inviolable supreme leader.

The U.S. State Department, just days into the new American administration, condemned the use of harsh tactics against protesters, calling the crackdown and the arrest of the opposition leader Aleksei Navalny "troubling indications of further restrictions on civil society and fundamental freedoms."

"The United States will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies and partners in defense of human rights," the State Department said in a statement that urged Russia to release Mr. Navalny and all those detained "for exercising their universal rights."

The department also called on Russia to cooperate in an international investigation of Mr. Navalny's poisoning in August.

Russian media have already pushed back against an earlier U.S. statement.

When the U.S. Embassy in Moscow warned American citizens to stay away from Saturday's protests, a Russian news anchor used the warning to suggest that the United States had in fact organized them.

"This is very important: Information about the place and time of the unsanctioned events planned for tomorrow has appeared on the website of the American Embassy," the news anchor on Russia's state-controlled Channel One said. "As they say, draw your own conclusions."

The Russian authorities said they were starting criminal investigations of protest organizers. And on Friday, the evening news broadcast on Channel One devoted about one-third of the program to Mr. Navalny - a stark departure from the state media's typical practice of ignoring him.

Opinion polls - of uncertain value in a country saturated by state propaganda and often fearful of speaking out - indicate that President Vladimir Putin faces no grave challenge to his popularity from the opposition leader Aleksei Navalny.

A November survey of opinion by the Levada Center, an independent and highly respected polling organization, found that only 2 percent of respondents named Mr. Navalny as their first choice when asked whom they would choose if a presidential election were to be held the following Sunday. Fifty-five percent named Mr. Putin.

Such polls, however, say less about Mr. Navalny's popularity than the Kremlin's success in dulling many people's minds to even the possibility of an alternative to Mr. Putin, who has been in power for so many years that he has become a seemingly immovable fixture.

Mr. Putin would almost certainly win a head-to-head electoral race against Mr. Navalny but has refused to allow Mr. Navalny's name on a presidential ballot - or even to utter it in public.

"Who needs him?" Mr. Putin said at a news conference last month.

On the one occasion that Mr. Navalny was allowed on a ballot - for Moscow's mayoral election in 2013 - he captured 27 percent of the vote and finished second behind a Kremlin loyalist. That result so unnerved the Kremlin that Mr. Navalny was then placed under house arrest on fraud and embezzlement charges that the European Court of Human Rights has dismissed as politically motivated.

While Mr. Navalny appears to have only minority support among the general public, he has been cheered on by many young Russians, who made up the bulk of the crowds in Moscow and elsewhere on Saturday and largely get their news from social media rather than state television.

Surveys show that opposition to Mr. Putin is also strong among professionals and the middle class, particularly in Moscow, and indicate that about one-third of the capital's residents oppose the government.

Mikhail Dravsky, 60, an accountant who joined the protest in Moscow, said he was not inspired by the opposition leader Aleksei Navalny, but by this moment in his country's history.

"I don't support Navalny, but there are no others," Mr. Dravsky said. "He is the only opposition leader."

Mr. Dravsky said he didn't expect much to change as a result of Saturday's protests, but added that displays of dissent do, at least sometimes, work. He recalled joining protests in 1991 over a coup attempt by hard-line security and military officials against Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader.

"I didn't think it would work then either," Mr. Dravsky said, "but I would have been ashamed if I didn't come out."

Saturday's protests, which drew thousands of people from Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean to Moscow, nearly 4,000 miles to the west, fell far short of the mass demonstrations by hundreds of thousands seen last year in Minsk, the capital of neighboring Belarus.

But while posing no immediate challenge to Mr. Putin's grip on Russia, they raised a defiant cry in favor of an alternative, something that the president and his security apparatus have worked relentlessly to make seem impossible.

"We won't bear it anymore. We are not afraid," read a banner hoisted in Pushkin Square.

The street protests in Russia are providing an early test of how Twitter's decision to bar former President Donald J. Trump - and other online crackdowns in America - will echo globally.

The opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny opposed the ban on Mr. Trump, arguing that it set a precedent that played out in Russia as regulators asked social media sites to remove posts promoting Saturday's protests.

"Of course, during his time in office, Trump has been writing and saying very irresponsible things," Mr. Navalny posted on Twitter this month, noting that Mr. Trump had "paid for it by not getting re-elected for a second term."

Social media has been critical in helping government critics in Russia organize demonstrations.

Gathering or marching without a parade permit or calling for participation in such an action is illegal in Russia, and the often-ruthless enforcement of these laws has kept a lid on political opposition for years.

Mr. Navalny has promoted illegal protests for nearly a decade, saying they are justified to encourage political change. He has never called for violent action.

Russia's telecommunications regulator said it had ordered social networks to take down posts promoting Saturday's protests, and the country's top investigative body said it had started a criminal investigation into the alleged incitement of minors to join.

Enforcement has been mixed so far. The regulator said that YouTube, Instagram and the Russian social network VKontakte had begun following an order from the country's prosecutor-general that they remove "calls for children to participate in illegal mass events."

But on YouTube, a report that Mr. Navalny prepared accusing President Vladimir V. Putin of building a luxurious palace remained among the top trending videos in Russia, with more than 65 million views. On the social network TikTok, which is popular with young people, a hashtag dedicated to Saturday's protests remained accessible. Videos tagged with it had been viewed more than 125 million times.

In one popular posting, protesters were encouraged to tell the police that they were American in the hopes it will give the authorities pause.

Facebook said it was not taking down posts. "We've received requests from the local regulator to restrict access to certain content that calls for protest," the company said in a statement. "Since this content doesn't violate our community standards, it remains on our platform."

A ninth grader in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg asked his classmates this week why they did not like President Vladimir V. Putin.

According to their teacher, Irina V. Skachkova, they responded by citing the jailed opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny: "Putin has a palace that was built with stolen money, and Putin is himself a thief."

Mr. Navalny's dramatic return to Russia from Germany on Sunday and his immediate arrest, followed by his release of a video documenting Mr. Putin's purported secret palace on the Black Sea, has captivated many young Russians and prompted the authorities to scramble to keep them away from protests.

Some universities threatened students with expulsion if they were caught attending the protests calling for Mr. Navalny's release.

The Education Ministry urged families to spend the weekend doing nonpolitical activities like "taking a walk in a park or a forest."

Few people had heard of the nerve agent Novichok until 2018, when Western officials accused Russia of having used it in the attempted assassination of a former spy in Britain. It returned to the headlines in September when Germany said the poison had sickened the Russian dissident Aleksei A. Navalny.

But scientists, spies and chemical weapons specialists have known about and feared Novichok for decades. It is a potent neurotoxin, developed in the Soviet Union and Russia in the 1980s and '90s, that can be delivered as a liquid, powder or aerosol, and is said to be more lethal than nerve agents that are better known in the West, like VX and sarin.

The poison causes muscle spasms that can stop the heart, cause fluid buildup in the lungs that can also be deadly, and damage other organs and nerve cells. Russia has produced several versions of Novichok, and experts say it's anyone's guess how often they have been used, because the resulting deaths can appear like nothing more sinister than a heart attack.

That may have been the plan in the case of Sergei V. Skripal, a former Russian spy living in Salisbury, England. When Mr. Skripal was found barely conscious in a park in March 2018, there was no obvious reason to suspect poisoning - except that his daughter, who was visiting, experienced the same symptoms.

British intelligence agencies identified the substance as Novichok and blamed Russia. The attack became a major international scandal, further chilling relations between Moscow and the West. The British identified Russian agents who they said had flown into Britain, applied the poison to the front door handle of Mr. Skripal's house and left the country, leaving a trail of video and chemical evidence.

President Vladimir V. Putin's government has consistently denied any involvement, spinning a series of alternative theories. And just months before the Salisbury attack, Mr. Putin said that Russia had destroyed all of its chemical weapons.

In the days before Saturday's protests, Aleksei A. Navalny's team published a sprawling investigation describing a secret palace built for President Vladimir V. Putin on the Black Sea.

Released on Tuesday, less than 24 hours after Mr. Navalny was ordered jailed, the report was the latest swipe in the Russian opposition leader's dramatic battle with Mr. Putin.

The investigation - complete with floor plans, financial details and interior photographs of a compound that Mr. Navalny says cost more than $1 billion - appeared to offer the most comprehensive accounting yet of a huge residence that the president is said to have built for himself on southern Russia's verdant seashore.

The Kremlin denied the findings in the report, which went online as a 113-minute YouTube video and an illustrated text version that invited users to post pictures of Mr. Putin's purported luxury to Facebook and Instagram. The video has been viewed more than 65 million times on YouTube.

"They will keep on stealing more and more, until they bankrupt the entire country," Mr. Navalny says in the video, referring to Mr. Putin and his circle. "Russia sells huge amounts of oil, gas, metals, fertilizer and timber - but people's incomes keep falling and falling, because Putin has his palace."

Ivan Nechepurenko and Richard Pérez-Peña contributed reporting.

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In Aleksei Navalny Protests, Russia Faces Biggest Dissent in Years

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Demonstrations in support of the jailed opposition leader swept the nation, beginning in the Far East, where people braved subzero temperatures, and reaching the capital. Arrests climbed into the thousands. From the frozen streets of Russia's Far East and Siberia to the grand plazas of Moscow and St.

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2020 State Department Report on Human Rights in Russia

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2020 State Department Report on Human Rights in Russia

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Russia - United States Department of State

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Human rights groups continued to allege that authorities made improper use of international agreements that permit them to detain, and possibly repatriate, persons with outstanding arrest warrants from other former Soviet states. This system, enforced by informal ties among senior law enforcement officials of the countries concerned, permitted authorities to detain individuals for up to one month while the Prosecutor General's Office investigated the nature of the warrants.

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Russian Federation - Amnesty International

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Russian Federation - Amnesty International

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The COVID-19 pandemic exposed chronic under-resourcing in health care. The authorities used the pandemic as a pretext to continue the crackdown on all dissent, including through amendments to a vaguely worded law on "fake news" and tightening restrictions on public gatherings. Peaceful protesters, human rights defenders and civic and political activists faced arrest and prosecution. Persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses intensified. Torture remained endemic, as did near total impunity for perpetrators. The right to a fair trial was routinely violated while legal amendments resulted in a further reduction in judicial independence. Reports of domestic violence rose sharply during COVID-19 lockdown measures, although the draft law on domestic violence remained stalled in Parliament. LGBTI people continued to face discrimination and persecution. Thousands of labour migrants lost their jobs during the pandemic but were unable to leave because of border closures. Evidence emerged to corroborate allegations of war crimes by Russian forces in Syria.

Background

The economic downturn, underpinned by falling oil prices, dwindling investment and foreign sanctions, and exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, led to a further impoverishment of a growing proportion of the population. Discontent widened, with a slow but steady increase in protests. The government continually faced, and ignored, mounting allegations of corruption at all levels. Measures announced by President Vladimir Putin and his government, like extended fully paid leave for all workers in response to COVID-19, failed to address people's broader concerns.

The authorities introduced multiple amendments to the Constitution, with the apparent purpose of removing legal restrictions on President Putin's participation in future presidential elections.

Russia maintained a strong influence on its immediate neighbours, and its occupation of Crimea and other territories continued.

Right to health

The COVID-19 pandemic placed further strain on the health care system, exposing chronic under-resourcing. A shortage of hospital beds, key protective and medical equipment and medications, together with the delayed wages of health workers, were frequently reported across the country. Official and independent numbers on infection and mortality rates varied greatly, indicating government under-reporting.

Health workers

Whistle-blowers from among health workers and other groups faced reprisals, including disciplinary measures and prosecution for "fake news".

Doctor Tatyana Revva was arbitrarily reprimanded and threatened with dismissal after she repeatedly complained about the shortage and inadequacy of protective equipment. Police considered and dismissed "fake news" allegations against her following a complaint from the hospital's head doctor.

Prison conditions

Health care and sanitary provisions in penitentiary institutions remained inadequate and further exacerbated by the pandemic. Although the authorities implemented restrictive and additional sanitary measures, they did not take measures to reduce the prison population. Official COVID-19 figures in custody were considered unreliable by independent monitors.

Freedom of assembly

Freedom of peaceful assembly remained constrained with further restrictions introduced in December. The rules relating to public assemblies and single-person pickets were further restricted in response to the pandemic, and some regions banned them outright. Public protests were typically small but regular, despite reprisals. There was a sharp increase in the numbers of single picketers arrested and prosecuted.

On 15 July, over a hundred peaceful protesters against constitutional changes were arbitrarily arrested and at least three severely beaten by the police in Moscow. Dozens were heavily fined or detained for five to 14 days.

The 9 July arrest of Sergey Furgal, who in 2018 had defeated the pro-Kremlin candidate to be elected Governor in the Far East Khabarovsk Region, prompted weekly peaceful mass protests in Khabarovsk as well as solidarity protests across Russia. Unusually, tens of thousands were allowed to march repeatedly in Khabarovsk before police made the first arrests on 18 July. On 10 October, police dispersed the protest for the first time, arresting at least 25 people, with at least five later sentenced to several days in detention. The protests in Khabarovsk were continuing at year's end.

In December, peaceful protester Konstantin Kotov was released following his imprisonment in 2019 for "repeated violation" of regulations on public assemblies. In January, the Constitutional Court had ordered a review of his case, and in April, the Moscow City Court reduced his sentence from four years to 18 months. Others prosecuted for the same offence included political activist Yulia Galyamina, who was given a two-year conditional sentence in December, activist Vyacheslav Egorov standing trial in Kolomna, and protester Aleksandr Prikhodko from Khabarovsk. In December, Aleksandr Prikhodko's case was dropped.

While police routinely used excessive and unnecessary force against protesters, they also allowed anti-protester violence by other groups. In Kushtau, Bashkiria, peaceful environmental activists who opposed a local mining project were repeatedly assaulted, with impunity, by private security staff, occasionally operating alongside police. Late on 9 August, around 30 private security guards and around 100 masked men attacked a camp of 10 environmental activists. Police were called but did not intervene. This triggered further local protests which forced the closure of the mining project in late August.

Freedom of expression

Restrictions on freedom of expression continued. On 1 April, amendments to the so-called "fake news" law, first passed in 2019, criminalized dissemination of "knowingly false information about circumstances posing a threat to the lives and security of citizens and/or about the government's actions to protect the population." Individuals face up to five years' imprisonment if dissemination of information leads to bodily harm or death, with hefty fines for the media. Hundreds of people were fined under administrative proceedings, and at least 37 faced criminal proceedings under this law, many of them critical civil activists, journalists or bloggers. At least five media outlets were prosecuted. The newspaper Novaya Gazeta and its chief editor were fined twice, in August and September, for publications about COVID-19 and ordered to delete respective articles online.

Journalists

Harassment, prosecution and physical attacks against journalists continued. On 30 June, police in Saint Petersburg assaulted reporter David Frenkel at a polling station and broke his arm. On 15 October, a journalist from Khabarovsk, Sergei Plotnikov, was abducted by masked men, driven to the woods, beaten and subjected to a mock execution. He reported the incident to the police once released but by year's end, he had not been informed about any investigation.

A journalist from Nizhnii Novgorod, Irina Slavina, faced routine harassment by the authorities. On 1 October, her home was raided and searched, and police summoned her as a witness in a criminal case against a local activist under the "undesirable organizations" law. On 2 October, she died after self-immolating in protest in front of the regional police headquarters.

On 6 July, a military court in Pskov convicted journalist Svetlana Prokopieva of "public justification of terrorism" and fined her RUB500,000 (US$6,300) for her public comments on repressive policies that may have motivated a 17-year-old to blow himself up near the Federal Security Service building in Arkhangelsk.

Internet

Censorship of the internet continued. In June, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia and three other cases ruled that internet-blocking measures were "excessive and arbitrary" and violated the right to impart and receive information. A court in Moscow fined Google RUB1.5 million (US$18,899) in August and RUB3 million (US$ 40,580) in December for its search engine listing "dangerous content" banned by Russian authorities. In December, President Putin signed a law introducing sanctions on foreign internet platforms for blocking Russian media content. Another law passed in December introduced imprisonment for libel committed via the internet.

Repression of dissent

Opposition activists and other dissenting voices faced severe reprisals. As part of the politically motivated criminal case against opposition leader Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Fund, 126 bank accounts belonging to his associates were frozen in January, followed by criminal and civil libel cases against Alexei Navalny and others. On 20 August, Alexei Navalny was taken ill on a flight from Tomsk. He was urgently hospitalized, and later flown to Germany where he was diagnosed with poisoning by a military-grade nerve agent. The Russian authorities failed to investigate the poisoning.

Siberian shaman Aleksandr Gabyshev, who had vowed to "purge" President Putin from the Kremlin, was on 12 May confined to a psychiatric hospital after he refused to be tested for COVID-19. He was discharged on 22 July following criticism in Russia and abroad.

In June, political blogger Nikolay Platoshkin was placed under house arrest on criminal charges of "calls to mass disturbances" and dissemination of "knowingly false information" for planning a peaceful protest against constitutional amendments.

Human rights defenders

Harassment, prosecution, and physical attacks against human rights defenders remained commonplace.

Activists Alexandra Koroleva, in Kaliningrad, and Semyon Simonov, in Sochi, were charged and faced possible imprisonment for non-payment of arbitrary and heavy fines by their respective NGOs.

Journalist Elena Milashina and lawyer Marina Dubrovina were assaulted by a mob in a hotel in Grozny, Chechnya, on 6 February. A formal investigation started in March but was manifestly ineffective. Meanwhile, Chechen head Ramzan Kadyrov issued thinly veiled death threats against Elena Milashina, with impunity.

Lawyer Mikhail Benyash's appeal against his criminal conviction - which could lead to disbarment - started in October and was still ongoing at year's end.

Freedom of association

Laws on "foreign agents" and "undesirable organizations" were actively used to smear independent NGOs, deprive them of funding and severely penalize their members. In December, further draconian legislative changes were signed into law, including to extend the "foreign agents" provisions to NGOs' staff, unregistered groups and individuals.

In April, the education NGO Projectoria was forced to register as a "foreign agent" to avoid fines while its foreign donor, Project Harmony, was declared "undesirable".

In October, activist Yana Antonova from Krasnodar was sentenced to 240 hours of forced labour for association with an "undesirable organization", re-posting Open Russia-branded materials online and taking part in single person pickets. She was subsequently fined again under new administrative proceedings.

Freedom of religion and belief

The prosecution of Jehovah's Witnesses under "extremism" charges escalated, including in occupied Crimea, with a growing number of convictions, and longer sentences. At year's end, 362 people were under investigation or standing trial, 39 had been convicted and six were imprisoned. Artem Gerasimov, for example, was sentenced on appeal in June to six years' imprisonment and a fine of RUB400,000 (US$5,144) by the de facto Supreme Court of Crimea.

Torture and other ill-treatment

Torture and other ill-treatment remained pervasive, and the number of perpetrators convicted was negligible. Prosecutions were typically for "abuse of authority" and resulted in lenient sentences.

Twelve former prison officers from Yaroslavl colony were sentenced to up to four years and three months' imprisonment after a leaked video showed an inmate being beaten in 2017. Six of them were immediately released on account of time already spent in detention. The former head and deputy head of the colony were acquitted.

Unfair trials

Violations of the right to a fair trial remained common. Detainees were denied meetings with their lawyers and a number of trials continued to be closed to the public, with the COVID-19 pandemic being often abusively used as a justification.

In February and June respectively, seven young men from Penza, and two from Saint Petersburg, received sentences of up to 18 years' imprisonment under trumped-up terrorism charges over their purported involvement with a non-existent organization called "Network". Numerous allegations of torture and other ill-treatment, and of fabrication of evidence, were ignored.

Constitutional and legislative amendments further eroded the right to a fair trial, including by giving the President power to nominate the judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, and initiate the appointment of all federal judges and dismissal of senior federal judges.

Counter-terrorism

Counterterrorism legislation was widely abused, often to target dissent.

Journalist Abdulmumin Gadzhiev, from Dagestan, remained in custody under fabricated charges of financing terrorism and participation in terrorist and extremist organizations. His trial started in November.

In occupied Crimea, allegations of membership of the Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (labelled as a "terrorist" movement by Russia in 2003) were widely used to imprison ethnic Crimean Tatars. In June, Crimean human rights defender Emir-Usein Kuku lost the appeal against his 12-year prison sentence. In September, another Crimean human rights defender, Server Mustafayev, was sentenced to 14 years in prison.

In September, 19 men from Ufa, Bashkiria, convicted for alleged Hizb-ut-Tahrir membership and sentenced to between 10 and 24 years, lost their appeal, with one defendant's sentence reduced by a year.

Violence against women and girls

Proposals to introduce legislation on domestic violence remained stalled in Parliament, while NGOs reported a sharp increase in domestic violence following COVID-19 lockdown measures.

In June, the ECtHR held in Polshina v. Russia that deficiencies in the legal system related to domestic violence violated the prohibitions of torture and discrimination. The Court underlined Russia's consistent failure to investigate abuse, and years-long tolerance of "a climate which was conducive to domestic violence".

Rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people

LGBTI people continued to face discrimination and persecution. Constitutional amendments redefined marriage as a "union between a man and a woman", reinforcing existing limitations on same-sex marriage and ensuing restrictions, including adoption by same-sex couples.

LGBTI rights activist Yulia Tsvetkova was fined RUB75,000 (US$1,014) for posting online her drawings in support of same-sex couples and faced other penalties, including ongoing prosecution for pornography relating to her body positive drawings featuring female genitalia.

Migrants' rights

Over a third of foreign labour migrants reported having lost work owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, and thousands were stranded in Russia due to related border closures. In April, a presidential decree eased work permit and residency rules for migrants and refugees, and temporarily suspended forcible returns of foreign and stateless individuals. Some regional authorities ceased temporary detention of migrants, although new decisions on forcible returns were also reported.

Unlawful attacks

Evidence including witness statements, videos, photographs and satellite imagery of seven air strikes against medical facilities and schools by Russian forces, and four by Syrian or Russian forces, between May 2019 and February 2020 in Syria, corroborated allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law amounting to war crimes (see Syria entry).

1. Russian Federation: Russian doctor's persecution continues: Tatyana Revva (EUR 46/2970/2020, 2 September)

2. Russia: Prominent investigative journalist and lawyer attacked during visit to Chechnya (News story, 7 February)

3. Russia: Prosecution for membership of a non-existent "terrorist" organization must stop (News story 7 February)

4. Russian Federation: Activist faces jail for female body drawings: Yulia Tsvetkova (EUR 46/2977/2020)

5. Syria: 'Nowhere is Safe for Us': Unlawful attacks and mass displacement in north-west Syria (MDE 24/2089/2020)

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The COVID-19 pandemic exposed chronic under-resourcing in health care. The authorities used the pandemic as a pretext to continue the crackdown on all dissent, including through amendments to a vaguely worded law on "fake news" and tightening restrictions on public gatherings. Peaceful protesters, human rights defenders and civic and political activists faced arrest and prosecution.

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Primary Education

The national government provides school education although regional authorities may add a local flavor. Following one or more years in kindergarten where they learn to read and write, children enroll at primary school already literate, where they complete 4 grades.

Middle Education

After primary school, pupils upgrade to secondary school to study grades 5 to 9. There they complete a basic education in a wide range of subjects intended to provide a good start in life, regardless of their choice of eventual career.

Secondary Education

If they wish to study further by choice, students may move on to secondary general education for a further 3 years, in order to perhaps qualify for university admission or follow the vocational stream.

Vocational Education

Vocational training colleges offer career-specific education in a particular trade or semi-professional career. The knowledge students gain is procedural as opposed to academic, and prepares them for jobs as diverse as motor mechanics, computer technicians and nurses.

Tertiary Education

The basic bakalavr's degree requires 4 years of full-time study. Having achieved this, students have the choice of taking jobs, or studying longer for magister's degrees.

Russian higher education began with the establishment of the Universities of Moscow and St Petersburg (illustrated opposite) in the mid-18th Century. Today more than half of all Russians have a higher education qualification. Doctor of Science academic degree is a highest degree awarded after the public defense of a dissertation considering publications on research work in scientific magazines. It does not always have an equivalent in other countries.

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The national government provides school education although regional authorities may add a local flavor. Following one or more years in kindergarten where they learn to read and write, children enroll at primary school already literate, where they complete 4 grades. After primary school, pupils upgrade to secondary school to study grades 5 to 9.

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The world's largest country by far, Russia has played a correspondingly large role in international affairs. For most of the 20th century it was the dominant republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which, along with the United States, was one of the world's two superpowers. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought independence, and great political and economic changes, to Russia. Although the country struggled during the transition from Soviet-style communism to a free-market economy, it maintained a world stature that is rivaled by few other countries. (For information on the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, see " Russia-Ukraine War " below.) Area 6,592,850 square miles (17,075,400 square kilometers). Population (2023 est.) 144,995,000.

Russia is almost twice the size of either China or the United States. Covering the eastern third of Europe as well as the whole of northern Asia, Russia extends nearly halfway around the Northern Hemisphere. It stretches some 4,800 miles (7,700 kilometers) along the Arctic Circle and from 1,250 to 1,800 miles (2,000 to 2,900 kilometers) north to south.

Most of the people of Russia are ethnic Russians, but there are also more than 120 other ethnic groups. The European part of the country is much more densely populated than the Asian portion, which is also called Siberia. About three-quarters of the people live in urban areas. The chief cities are St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and the capital, Moscow.

Russia has the longest border of any country on Earth. In the west it borders Norway, Finland, the Gulf of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine. (A small exclave of Russia, Kaliningrad-formerly part of Germany-borders the Baltic Sea on the north and west, Poland on the south, and Lithuania on the north and east.) In the south Russia touches the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, and North Korea. In the east and north it borders various branches of the Pacific and Arctic oceans, respectively.

Topographic Regions
Russia contains two stable continental blocks-the East European and Siberian platforms. The suture that ties the two platforms together is the 250-million-year-old Ural Mountain chain, which forms the traditional boundary between Europe and Asia. Around these platforms are folded mountain systems of younger ages. The platforms' ancient rocks (more than 550 million years old) are exposed on the Fennoscandian Shield of the northwest, in the southern Urals, and on Siberia's Aldan and Anabar shields. The youngest materials are the sediments of the Azov-Caspian and West Siberian plains.

European Russia (the area west of the Urals) is dominated by the Russian Plain (also called the East European Plain). This vast lowland region extends 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) from the western border eastward to the Urals and from the Arctic Ocean more than 1,500 miles (2,400 kilometers) southward to the Caucasus Mountains and the Caspian Sea. Rising above the plain are the low Valdai Hills, which have a maximum elevation of 1,125 feet (343 meters); the Smolensk Upland and the Central Russian Upland, both approximately 1,000 feet (300 meters); and the Volga Hills. The Valdai Hills and the Smolensk Upland are made up of deposits left by glaciers. The highest elevations west of the Urals are in the Greater Caucasus mountains, at Russia's southern tip. In this range is Mount Elbrus, an extinct volcano that rises 18,510 feet (5,642 meters) and is the highest peak in Europe. On the Kola Peninsula of the northwest, the Khibiny Mountains reach heights of nearly 4,000 feet (1,200 meters) above sea level.

The Ural Mountains are low-lying remnants of much higher ranges. For some 250 million years these once-mighty mountains have been worn down by erosion. The northern Urals are highest, with peaks above 6,000 feet (1,800 meters). The central Urals are lowest and are the location of the main transportation routes, including the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The southern Urals are of medium elevation but broad.

Russia's most extensive geographic region is the West Siberian Plain. It stretches 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers) from the Urals eastward to the Yenisey River and 1,500 miles (2,400 kilometers) north to south. The plain rises above 650 feet (200 meters) in elevation only in the far south. The Ob River and its tributaries flow slowly across this massive lowland into the Arctic Ocean. When the southern tributaries swell with meltwater in the spring, the main trunk, the Ob, is still ice-dammed in the north. The flooding is extensive, creating the largest swamp in the Northern Hemisphere, the Vasyugan Swamp.

East of the Yenisey River lies the Central Siberian Plateau. This upland region, with elevations mostly between 1,000 and 2,300 feet (300 to 700 meters), covers most of the land between the Yenisey and the Lena River. To the north it descends to the North Siberian Lowland. To the south are the Sayan and Baikal mountains.

Russia's final geographic region is a series of high mountain ranges that dominates the south and east. The Altai Mountains, which reach a maximum elevation of 14,783 feet (4,506 meters), lie on Russia's borders with Kazakhstan and Mongolia. The Altai merge in the east with the Sayan Mountains, which extend to Lake Baikal and its surrounding ranges. Swinging arclike first eastward and then northward along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk are the Stanovoy, Dzhugdzhur, and Kolyma ranges. The Anadyr, Koryak, and Kamchatka ranges compose the Chukchi and Kamchatka peninsulas. The latter is one of Earth's most volcanically active regions. This is also true of the Kuril (derived from the Russian verb "to smoke") Islands. In the southeast the Amur River is flanked in the north by the Bureya Range and in the south by the Sikhote-Alin. Deep in the interior along the eastern bank of the Lena is the Verkhoyansk Range, which links with the Chersky Range.

In eastern Siberia lowlands are dispersed. The North Siberian Lowland divides the same-named plateau from the hilly Taymyr Peninsula. The Lena River creates the Central Yakut Lowland in its middle course near Yakutsk. Likewise the Kolyma Lowland is the product of the Kolyma River's winding course. Along the Amur is the fertile Zeya-Bureya Plain. Along the Ussuri River, a tributary of the Amur, is the Ussuri Lowland.

Rivers and Lakes
Among its 100,000 rivers, Russia contains some of the world's longest. Four of the country's five longest rivers-the Ob-Irtysh, Amur, Lena, and Yenisey-are in Siberia. All but the Amur flow northward into the Arctic Ocean. The longest European river is the Volga, which flows southward into the Caspian Sea. The Volga is famous for its major role in Russian history.

The most impressive of Russia's many lakes is Lake Baikal (or Baykal), in southeastern Siberia. It is the world's deepest lake, with a maximum depth of more than 1 mile (1,600 meters). Lake Baikal contains about one-fifth of the world's fresh water-more water than all five of the Great Lakes of North America combined. Truly unique on Earth, Baikal is home to more than 2,000 species of plants and animals, the majority of which can be found nowhere else in the world.

The greatest concentration of lakes is in the Karelia region of the northwest. Here ancient glaciers left thousands of bodies of water as they receded. The largest of these are Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega.

As with its topography, Russia's climates span vast distances. The climates of both European and Asian Russia are continental except for the northern tundra and the extreme southeast. Great seasonal ranges of temperature are typical. In winter temperatures get colder both from south to north and from west to east. Summers can be quite hot and humid, even in Siberia.

Russia has low annual precipitation that almost everywhere averages less than 24 inches (60 centimeters) and peaks in summer-usually in July or August. Rain and snow totals are typically higher in the mountains.

Russia's plant and animal life are closely tied to the climate. Nearly one-tenth of Russian territory is tundra, a treeless, marshy plain. The tundra occupies a narrow coastal belt in the extreme north of the Russian Plain and widens to a maximum of about 300 miles (500 kilometers) in Siberia. Its vegetation includes mosses, lichens, herbaceous plants, and shrubs. South of the tundra lies the vast taiga, which occupies the Russian and West Siberian plains north of latitude 56°-58° N, together with most of the territory east of the Yenisey River. The main feature of the taiga is its coniferous (cone-bearing) forests. As conditions become warmer with decreasing latitude, deciduous trees (which lose their leaves seasonally) appear in greater numbers and eventually become dominant. A triangular belt of mixed and deciduous forests is widest along Russia's western border and narrows toward the Urals. Extensive areas of wooded and open steppe, or grasslands, lie to the south and stretch eastward toward the Altai Mountains.

Contunico © ZDF Studios GmbH, Mainz; Thumbnail © Hannah Babiak/Dreamstime.com

Polar bears, walruses, and seals are found in Franz Josef Land and other areas of the far north. The main animal species on the tundra are Arctic foxes, musk oxen, beavers, lemmings, snowy owls, and ptarmigans (grouse). Reindeer are herded by the indigenous people. The taiga is rich in fur-bearing animals, such as sables, squirrels, marten, foxes, and ermines. It is also home to many elk, bears, muskrats, and wolves. Wildlife of the mixed and deciduous forest includes roe deer, wolves, foxes, and squirrels. Marmots, skunks, foxes, wolves, and antelope are common on the steppe.

Russia's population peaked in the early 1990s at about 149 million people and then began a steep decline. The reasons for the decline included a low birth rate and a significant drop in life expectancy due to such factors as drug and alcohol use, high smoking rates, poor nutrition, and inadequate health care. Recognizing the decline as a national crisis, the Russian government took steps to reverse the trend in the early 21st century. For example, it authorized incentive payments to women who had more than one child and introduced programs that promoted healthy lifestyles.

About four-fifths of the Russian population is concentrated in the European portion of the country, especially in the fertile region surrounding Moscow. Beginning in the 1890s and continuing throughout the next century, many people migrated from European Russia to Siberia. Still, however, Siberia contains only about one-fifth of the population though it makes up three-quarters of the country's territory. Most of Siberia's people live in the west or in pockets in the far south. Vast stretches of thinly settled and empty territories lie north of the main settled belt.

Ethnic Groups and Languages
Russia has great diversity among its people, with more than 120 distinct ethnic groups. Ethnic Russians make up about four-fifths of the population. The largest minority groups include the Tatars, Ukrainians, Bashkir, Chuvash, Chechen, Armenian, Mordvin, and Belarusian. Linguistically, the population of Russia can be divided into several groups. The Indo-European group comprises East Slavic and Indo-Iranian speakers. The Altaic group includes Turkic, Mongolian, and Manchu-Tungus. The Uralic group includes Finno-Ugric and Samoyedic. The Caucasian group comprises Abkhazo-Adyghian and Nakho-Dagestani speakers. In addition, there are several Paleo-Asiatic language groups in far eastern Siberia.

Russian is the official language. It is one of three languages in the eastern branch of the Slavic language family (the others are Ukrainian and Belarusian). It has origins in Old Church Slavonic, a language used by the Greek missionaries Saints Cyril and Methodius in the ad 800s to spread Christianity among the Slavs. Cyril and Methodius created a Slavic alphabet based on Greek characters. A modified form of this alphabet, named Cyrillic after Cyril, is still used to write modern Russian. Tsar Peter the Great made his mark on the language by altering the Cyrillic alphabet in the early 1700s. Peter's alphabet was further simplified in 1918 to form the current system of 33 letters. Peter's efforts to bring Western influences into Russian culture also began the incorporation of many words from western European languages into Russian. Since World War II it has borrowed many American terms.

The Eastern Orthodox branch of Christianity is the foremost religion in Russia. About half of all Russians who practice religion belong to the Russian Orthodox church. However, because religious activities were restricted by the government during the Soviet years, Russian Orthodox Christians number only about one-sixth of the population. The overwhelming majority of the population is nonreligious. Muslims make up Russia's second largest religious group.

Although there is some degree of correlation between language and religion, the two do not correspond entirely. Slavs are overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian. Turkic speakers are mainly Muslim, though several Turkic groups in Russia are not. For example, Christianity predominates among the Chuvash. Buddhism prevails among large numbers of Altai, Khakass, and Tyvans. Many Turkic speakers east of the Yenisey have retained their traditional shamanistic beliefs (though some have converted to Christianity). Buddhism is common also among the Mongolian-speaking Buryat and Kalmyk.

Jews make up a tiny percentage of the population. They long suffered discrimination in Russia, including purges in the 19th century, repression under the regime of Joseph Stalin, and Nazi atrocities on Russian soil during World War II. Beginning with Mikhail Gorbachev's reformist policies in the 1980s, Jewish emigration to Israel and elsewhere was permitted on an increasing scale. As a result, the number of Jews living in Russia (and all parts of the former Soviet Union) decreased.

Russia's culture represents a melding of native Slavic traditions and influences from a variety of foreign cultures. Beginning in the 800s, following contact with Christian missionaries from the Byzantine Empire, the borrowings were primarily from Eastern Orthodox Byzantine culture. From the 1300s to the 1600s Asian influences brought by the Mongol occupiers were added to the cultural mix. Finally, since the 1700s, the cultural heritage of western Europe has contributed to modern Russian culture.

Literature
The Russian literary tradition began with a body of proverbs, folktales, legends, and heroic ballads that passed orally among the earliest East Slavic tribes. The oldest dated Russian manuscript is The Ostromir Gospel (1056-57). From that time until the reign of Peter the Great in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, written literature was mainly religious in nature.

The 1800s are recognized as the Golden Age of Russian literature, a time when it began to show a conscience, especially regarding serfdom and the downtrodden. Aleksander Pushkin, often described as the "Russian Shakespeare," blended European and native Russian influences to reflect the thoughts, moods, and deeds of the society in which he lived. Mikhail Lermontov, considered Russia's greatest Romanticist, was another important poet of the Golden Age. He was the first Russian poet to describe not only the beauty of the Caucasus Mountains but also Caucasian culture and folk art.

Other great writers of the Golden Age include Nikolay Gogol, Ivan Goncharov, Ivan Turgenev, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, Maksim Gorky, and Aleksandr Blok. Chekhov, Gorky, and Blok wrote works that overlapped the 19th and 20th centuries. With them came another literary and artistic revival, designated sometimes as the Silver Age.

During the Soviet era Russian writers and artists were expected to take a positive view of socialist society. Writers were organized into the Union of Soviet Writers, which was guided by the Stalinist doctrine of socialist realism. Some writers, however, wanted to maintain their artistic independence. Several chose to leave Russia and live abroad. Among the notable writers who left Russia during the Soviet period were Ivan Bunin and Vladimir Nabokov. The period after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 was marked by several "thaws" during which writers were given a bit more freedom. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn became famous during one such thaw, though he was eventually expelled from the Soviet Union. In 1958 Boris Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature for his epic novel Doctor Zhivago, but he had to decline the award because of Soviet opposition to his work. Anna Akhmatova produced brilliant poems during the Soviet period, though for years she was forced into literary silence. Other outstanding Russian writers of the Soviet period were the novelist Mikhail Sholokhov and the poets Yevgeny Yevtushenko and Andrey Voznesensky. The collapse of the Soviet regime brought an end to government censorship and freed writers to engage in radical experimentalism. ( See also Russian literature.)

Visual arts
Like literature, Russian art was the servant of the Orthodox church until the reign of Peter the Great. Until then borrowings from the Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, and Turko-Mongols were the basis for the rich background of folk art that entered the liturgical tradition by way of embroidery, metalwork, leatherwork, wood carving, and some bas-relief sculpture.

Sculpture did not play a role in Russian art until relatively recent times because the church forbade the display of the human body in three-dimensional form. This also explains why the figures in icons are so two-dimensional in appearance. A serious art, icon painting was brought to its zenith as a Russian art form in the 14th and 15th centuries by Theophanes the Greek and Andrei Rublyov. Until the late 1600s the icon and the mosaic were the Russian artist's sole outlet.

Modern Westernized painting and sculpture date from Peter's reforms after 1700. Perhaps the most famous Russian artist in the last 200 years was Ilya Repin, who flourished in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The stress on socialist realism in art as well as literature hampered artistic creativity beginning in the 1920s. Experimental art typically was banned and forced underground. With the opening of Soviet society in the 1980s, however, public exhibits of modern art were again permitted.

Beginning in the 10th century Russian architecture was influenced by contacts with the Byzantine Empire. From the outset, however, Russian buildings had a higher, narrower silhouette than their Byzantine models. Russians experimented with the dome, which was derived from the yurt-a circular tent used by Central Asian nomads. This led to the onion-shaped domes characteristic of Russian Orthodox churches.

Early Russian architecture cannot be divided into periods like Gothic or baroque. Rather it sprang from different city centers: Kyiv (Kiev), Novgorod, Moscow, and later St. Petersburg. Soviet buildings were pragmatic products of standardized architecture, largely the result of the need to build quickly after the decimation of World War II. On a grander scale, several "wedding-cake" (tiered) skyscrapers built under Joseph Stalin still dominate Moscow's skyline. Since the 1960s more innovative architectural styles have appeared around the country, often combining European and Russian traditions.

Because musical instruments were forbidden in Russian Orthodox church services, Russian music and consequently opera were delayed in development as an art form until more recent times. Typically, Russian choruses chanted and sang without accompaniment except for an occasional drumbeat. Secular vocal music did not develop until the 1800s. Since then Russian operas, symphonies, instrumental compositions, and art songs have flourished. Most are based on the melodic and rhythmic patterns of Russian folk music and nationalistic themes. The latter were particularly stressed during the Soviet period.

The most ancient Russian folk instrument was a kind of zither, the gusli. Other traditional stringed instruments are the domra, gudok, and balalaika. The last, a triangular, three-stringed, short-necked instrument, was made popular in the 1800s in both city salons and in the countryside. Wind instruments include the flutelike dudka and suirel.

Russian music came of age in 1836 with the performance of Mikhail Glinka's opera A Life for the Czar, later called Ivan Susanin. Glinka also produced a musical fairy tale based on Pushkin's poem Ruslan and Lyudmila (1842), but Glinka's operas contain many examples of Italian style.

The Russian nationalist school was founded by Modest Mussorgsky with the production of the opera Boris Godunov (1869). Mussorgsky was one of a group of Russian composers whom critics at the time called "The Five." The group included Mily Balakirev, Nikolay Rimsky-Korsakov, Aleksandr Borodin, and César Cui. Balakirev is noted for his classical renderings of Russian folk music. Rimsky-Korsakov developed Orientalism to near perfection in his fairy-tale operas and in the brilliant symphonic suite Sheherazade. Borodin also followed this pattern in his opera Prince Igor. Cui composed miniature forms.

Not one of The Five, but the most famous of all Russian composers, is Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, composer of the well-known 1812 Overture and many other works, including symphonies, symphonic poems, operas, ballets, concertos, and piano pieces. Distinctively Russian, Tchaikovsky's melancholic lyricism was perpetuated by the music of Sergey Rachmaninoff, the last of the Russian Romantic composers.

Famous Russian composers of the 20th century were Igor Stravinsky, Sergey Prokofiev, Aleksandr Scriabin, and Dimitry Shostakovich. Stravinsky, however, was a resident of France and the United States for most of his creative life. Prokofiev left Russia in 1918 after conducting the first performance of his well-known Classical Symphony. He did not return permanently until 1932. Shostakovich composed 15 symphonies and two operas, some of which received severe criticism for not following the line of socialist realism.

Performing arts
Ballet was introduced to Russia as court entertainment in the early 1700s. By mid-century it had spread to the estates of the wealthy. Simultaneously, imperial ballet theaters and companies were created. In the 1800s the distinctive style of Russian ballet was strongly influenced by French, Italian, and Swedish choreographers and dancers, including Marius Petipa, considered the father of modern ballet. Only late in the century did the first Russian choreographers arise-Lev Ivanov and Michel Fokine.

As the great dancers Anna Pavlova and Vaslav Nijinsky rose to fame in the early 20th century, Russian ballet reached a high technical and stylistic level. In 1909 the impresario Serge Diaghilev founded the Ballets Russes and took Russian ballet to the capitals of Europe and the major cities of the United States.

Soviet ballet continued the 19th-century traditions. The Bolshoi Ballet in Moscow and the Mariinsky (formerly Kirov) Ballet in St. Petersburg remain famous throughout the world. Some of the more notable dancers to emerge during the Soviet era were Maya Plisetskaya, Rudolf Nureyev, and Mikhail Baryshnikov. The latter two dancers made headlines by defecting to the West at the height of their careers.

Russian theater originally was inspired by folk entertainment. Peasant companies performed for serfs and nobility alike, sometimes traveling from estate to estate. Later Russian theater was influenced by foreign models much like the ballet. The first Russian dramatists appeared in about 1750. Under Catherine the Great, herself an author of comedies, theater reached new highs, but most of the works were of foreign origin. Great Russian comedy came in the 1800s with the work of Aleksandr Griboyedov ( Woe from Wit, 1822-24) and Nikolay Gogol ( The Inspector General, 1836).

At the end of the 19th century Konstantin Stanislavsky founded the Moscow Art Theater, where Russian theater art came of age. Realistic plays produced there, among them the works of Chekhov and Gorky, stimulated the modern "method" school of acting. Nonrealistic theater, called conditional theater by producer-director-actor Vsevolod Meyerhold, flourished through the early Soviet period. As in literature under Joseph Stalin, experimental theater was replaced by socialist realism. Not until the 1980s, with the end of government censorship, was the performance of controversial works permitted. Writers shifted away from political topics and toward classical and psychological themes.

Cultural Institutions
Russia has hundreds of museums, some of which are world famous. In Moscow, the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts houses treasures of western European art, while the Tretyakov Gallery has a strong collection of Russian art. Also in Moscow, the Kremlin -home of the Russian president-contains several museums. South of the city is the museum-estate of Leo Tolstoy called Yasnaya Polyana, which features an excellent literary collection. Prominent museums in St. Petersburg include the Hermitage and the Russian Museum. In addition to the Moscow Art Theater, world-renowned Russian theaters include the Bolshoi, Maly, Vakhtangov, and Novaya (New) Opera theaters and the Obraztsov Puppet Theater in Moscow. Among the famed theaters in other Russian cities are the Mariinsky and Tovstonogov theaters in St. Petersburg and the Novosibirsk Theater of Opera and Ballet in Novosibirsk.

Education and Social Welfare
During the Soviet period, education was highly centralized, and indoctrination into Marxist-Leninist theory was a major element of schooling. The end of communist rule led to extensive curriculum revision.

Free, compulsory education begins at age six or seven and lasts for 11 years. This period, increased from nine years by a 2007 law, encompasses primary and secondary education. Minority children are taught in their own languages, but the study of Russian is required at the secondary level.

Entry to higher education is selective and highly competitive. The most prestigious schools include Moscow State University, St. Petersburg State University, and Novosibirsk State University. Higher education is almost entirely in Russian, though a few institutions-mostly in minority areas-use the local language as well.

Public welfare funds are used to improve the material and social conditions of workers in Russia. Social welfare programs formerly were funded by the central government. However, in the 1990s employer-based social insurance and pension funds, to which workers also contributed, were introduced. A major portion of Russia's public welfare budget funds free medical care, pensions, and scholarships.

Since the mid-19th century, industrialization and economic development have led to a substantial increase in urbanization. About three-quarters of Russia's population live in urban areas. Moscow, the largest city, has more than twice the population of its nearest rival, St. Petersburg, which in turn dwarfs the size of Russia's other major cities, such as Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Rostov-na-Donu, Samara, and Ufa.

Several major urban concentrations have developed in the main industrial regions. St. Petersburg stands alone as the northernmost metropolis. Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod are part of the large urbanized central industrial region, which has a cluster of large cities and numerous smaller towns. In the Ural Mountains region the towns are more widely spaced and include numerous small mining and industrial centers as well as a number of towns with more than 250,000 people. The only slightly less-populous Volga region has towns strung out along the riverbanks, with a particularly dense concentration in the area of Samara.

The main urban concentration east of the Urals is in the Kuznetsk Basin, which is a center for coal mining and industry. Major cities also occur along the length of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. These include, from west to east, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude, Chita, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. A few very isolated cities are located in the far north, notably the ports of Murmansk and Archangel and mining centers such as Vorkuta and Norilsk.

Because of its great size, its natural resources, and its political domination, Russia played a leading role in the economy of the Soviet Union. During that period the Russian economy was heavily industrialized, with strong development in such areas as mining, metals, chemicals, and energy production. By the 1980s, however, the economy of Russia and the country as a whole was in serious decline. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian government implemented radical reforms to convert the centrally controlled economy into a market economy based on private enterprise. The transition proved to be slow and difficult, causing extreme hardships for the Russian people. By the end of the 20th century the economy had begun to recover, fueled mainly by a boom in the oil and gas industry. A decade of rapid growth ended with the global economic crisis that began in late 2008. The crisis hit Russia especially hard, suggesting that further reforms were needed to ensure the country's continued economic growth and stability. The government has since established programs aimed at diversifying the economy and reducing dependency on oil and gas exports.

Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry
Because of the harshness of the Russian environment, less than one-sixth of the land is dedicated to agriculture. About three-fifths of the farmland is used for growing crops, with the remainder devoted to pasture. Many collective and state farms established during the Soviet era continue to operate, though many have been privatized and renamed as companies or cooperatives. Overall, agriculture contributes approximately 5 percent to Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) and employs less than one-tenth of the total labor force.

Russian farms produce mainly grains, particularly wheat, barley, rye, and oats. Fodder crops for livestock-grasses, clovers, root crops, and corn (maize)-are also grown. Other major crops include sunflowers, sugar beets, and potatoes and other vegetables. Cattle, sheep, and pigs are the most important livestock.

With access to three of the world's oceans-the Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific-Russian fishing fleets are a major contributor to the economy. The industry declined significantly in the post-Soviet years, however, as it struggled with the loss of government support and regulation. The chief fishing ports are Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea (which connects with the Atlantic), Murmansk and Archangel on the Barents Sea (Arctic), and Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan (Pacific). Smaller-scale fishing takes place in the Sea of Azov and the Black and Caspian seas. The Caspian sturgeon is the source of the world's finest caviar. By the early 21st century, however, overfishing, poaching (illegal fishing), and pollution had pushed sturgeon to the brink of extinction. There are important inland fisheries on lakes and rivers, including a good deal of fish farming.

Russia has the world's largest forest reserves, which supply lumber, pulp and paper, and other products. Needle-leaf trees predominate, making the country a world leader in softwood production.

Russian industry depends in large part on the country's vast energy and mineral resources. The country ranks among the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas. The great bulk of the oil and natural gas comes from huge fields in western Siberia. Extensive pipeline systems link producing districts to all parts of Russia and across the border to many Central Asian and European countries. Russia also has massive reserves of coal, especially in Siberia. Power plants fueled by natural gas, oil, and coal provide about three-quarters of the country's electricity. The remaining power output comes from hydroelectric and nuclear plants. Russia is also a world leader in the production of numerous other minerals, including iron ore, cobalt, copper, nickel, platinum, gold, and diamonds.

These resources provide raw materials for Russia's most important manufacturing industries-metals and machine-building. Iron ore is the basis of the massive steel industry. Machine-building factories satisfy most of Russia's requirements for electric generators, steam boilers and turbines, grain combines, electric locomotives, and automobiles. It also fills much of its demand for shipbuilding, machine tools, instruments, and automation components. Russia's factories also produce military equipment, including tanks, jet fighters, and rockets, for export. Another important heavy manufacturing industry is the production of chemicals. Chemical industries requiring large quantities of electric power are particularly important in Siberia, where both timber and electricity are plentiful.

Light industry contributes only a small part of Russia's industrial output. Production of textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear plummeted in the 1990s, as inefficient Russian factories suffered from competition with foreign companies. The most valuable light industry in the early 21st century was the manufacture of food products and beverages. A growing industry during that period was the production of electrical and electronic equipment, such as personal computers and cellular telephones.

Despite the ongoing importance of agriculture and industry, services accounted for about three-fifths of Russia's economic output and employment in the early 21st century. The wide-ranging service sector includes trade, government, education, health care, tourism, and financial services such as banking and insurance.

Foreign trade is very important to the Russian economy. The country has generally enjoyed a healthy trade surplus since the end of the Soviet Union. Primary exports include oil, natural gas, metals, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, and forestry products. Leading imports include machinery and transport equipment, foods, pharmaceutical products, and chemicals. Among Russia's leading trade partners are the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, China, Turkey, the United States, and Belarus.

Travel and tourism account for several million jobs in Russia. More than 20 million foreign visitors traveled to Russia in 2018. Among the country's most popular tourist destinations are Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Krasnodar territory. Free from the restrictions of Soviet times, Russians have increasingly traveled abroad.

Transportation and Communications
Russia's great expanse requires an extensive transportation system. For carrying freight and passengers over long distances, railroads were dominant in the Soviet era and remain so today. The rail system is much denser in European Russia than it is in Siberia. East of the Urals it consists of only a few major routes-for example, the Trans-Siberian Railroad and Baikal-Amur Mainline-with feeder branches to areas of economic significance.

Other than highways that link major cities in the European section, the road system is underdeveloped. Because motor vehicles were not much used for long-distance transport during the Soviet years, few paved roads were built outside of urban areas. The percentage of people who own vehicles is still quite small in comparison to other developed countries.

Maritime transport is crucial to foreign trade and also links the various regions of Russia, especially those along the Arctic seaboard. Because of ice, however, traffic on the Arctic Ocean route is seasonal. The busiest seaports are Novorossiysk, on the Black Sea, and St. Petersburg, on the Baltic. Inland waterways are also important in Russia. River traffic is heaviest on the Volga system.

Air transportation has played an increasingly important role in the early 21st century. It accounts for about one-fifth of all passenger travel. Aeroflot (renamed Aeroflot-Russian Airlines in 2000), formerly the state airline of the Soviet Union, is the country's largest air carrier. Only a tiny percentage of Russia's freight is hauled by air. Air freight is confined chiefly to high-value items carried to and from remote parts of Siberia, where aircraft are sometimes the only means of transport. Most major Russian cities have air service to international or domestic locations.

The Russian telecommunications sector is inferior to those of other industrialized countries. For example, in the early 1990s only about one-third of the country's households had a telephone. Largely through foreign investment, however, the country's telecommunications infrastructure has been greatly improved. Cellular phone use in particular has proliferated, and they now greatly outnumber landlines. Internet use grew very slowly in the 1990s, particularly outside the cities, but it has since grown fairly steadily. Much of Russian television is under state control, although there are several independent commercial television stations, some with wide viewership. There are also hundreds of public and privately owned radio stations.

While Russia was a Soviet republic, the government was dominated at all levels by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, under reforms introduced by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, the communist grip loosened and Russia and the other republics gained more autonomy. In 1991 the communist government collapsed, the Soviet Union was dissolved, and Russia became an independent country.

In 1993 Russian voters approved a new constitution. It gives significant powers to the president, who is elected by popular vote. In 2008 an amendment to the constitution, which took effect with the 2012 election, extended the presidential term from four to six years. Prior to 2020 the president could not serve more than two consecutive terms, but constitutional changes enacted that year abolished term limits for the office. As Russia's head of state, the president appoints the head of government (prime minister), key judges, and cabinet members. The president is also commander in chief of the armed forces. The constitution created the bicameral, or two-house, Federal Assembly as the country's legislature. The upper house is the Federation Council, in which each of Russia's administrative divisions has two representatives. The lower house is the State Duma, which has 450 members. All legislation must first pass the State Duma before being considered by the Federation Council.

The highest judicial body in Russia is the Supreme Court. It supervises the activities of all other judicial bodies and serves as the final court of appeal. There is also a Constitutional Court, which reviews Russian laws and treaties. Judges for both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court are nominated by the president and approved by the Federation Council.

The Russian constitution gives regional and local governments an array of powers. For example, they exercise authority over municipal property and policing, and they can impose regional taxes. Russia's administrative divisions include oblasts (regions), minority republics, okrugs (autonomous districts), krays (territories), federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), and one autonomous oblast. The power of these divisions was lessened in 2000 when the central government created seven federal districts-Central, Far East, Northwest, Siberia, Southern, Urals, and Volga. An eighth federal district, North Caucasus, was added in 2010. A ninth federal district was created in 2014 after Russia annexed the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea. This territorial claim was not recognized by Ukraine or most other countries, but Russia exercised de facto control of the region. Each federal district has its own presidential envoy with the power to implement federal law.

The land that is now Russia has been inhabited since the second millennium bc. In ancient times waves of nomadic invasions occurred on the southern steppes. The earliest invaders included the Cimmerians, Scythians, and Sarmatians. Later came the Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Avars, and Khazars.

Slavic peoples originally lived over a large area of eastern Europe that included parts of what are now Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus. In the 5th and 6th centuries ad the Slavs spread south and east, some of them into southern Russia.

Slavic ethnic distinction probably crystallized during a period of peace brought about by the domination of the Volga trade route by the Khazars. Established in the late 6th century ad, the Khazar Empire stretched as far west as the Dnieper River by the second half of the 8th century.

The Slavs accepted the domination of the Khazars, as they had endured the brief occupations of the invaders who came before. Loosely knit and socially bound mainly by extended families, the Slavs focused predominantly on farming and welcomed the protection they received from powerful warriors such as the Khazars.

In about 830 traders from Scandinavia moved southward into the north Volga region. These traders were known as the Rus-the source of the name Russia. Soon the Rus and other Scandinavian groups-together called the Varangians-extended their raiding down the main river routes toward the Middle East.

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According to tradition, the Slavs of Novgorod, tired of political turmoil, invited the Varangian prince Rurik to rule the city. He arrived in about 862 and established the dynasty that ruled various parts of East Slavic territory until 1598. After Rurik's death his relative Oleg became ruler of Novgorod and in 882 added Kyiv (Kiev) to his domains, making it his capital. This was the beginning of Kyivan (Kievan) Rus, the first East Slavic state. Between about 930 and 1000 the Varangians developed a trade route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, which became the basis of the Kyivan economy.

The chief architect of Kyivan Rus was Vladimir I, whose reign began in about 980. He expanded the realm and also developed a political structure for ruling the scattered territories. In 988 Vladimir became a Christian in the Byzantine, or Eastern Orthodox, tradition. Greek missionaries moved into Russia, bringing their religion and art and architecture. The missionaries also developed the Cyrillic alphabet. During the reigns of Vladimir and his son Yaroslav I, Kyivan Rus developed into a well-organized, democratic, urban, commercial society. At the height of its glory in the 11th century, Kyivan Rus was populated by seven to eight million people. It was the largest and most populous state in Europe.

Following Yaroslav's death in 1054, Kyivan Rus entered a long period of decay. Yaroslav's sons divided the empire into warring factions. At the same time the trade route from the Black Sea to the Baltic declined in importance. By the middle of the 12th century Kyivan Rus had lost supremacy to independent principalities, including Novgorod and Vladimir.

Between 1238 and 1240 Kyivan Rus was finally crushed by the onslaught of the Mongols, who were also known as Tatars. The Mongols were under the leadership of Batu, grandson of Genghis Khan. The once-flourishing populace either perished or fled into the neighboring forests.

Mongol Rule
The Mongols formed a kingdom with a capital at Sarai on a tributary of the Volga River. The influence of the so-called "Golden Horde" was felt to some extent almost everywhere in Russia. They did not attempt to settle the land but exacted tribute through Russian intermediaries. Asian customs became a part of Russian culture, but as long as they paid tribute the Russians were free to practice their religion and native customs. The one principality that escaped Mongol domination was Novgorod in the north. During this period Novgorod joined the European trading consortium, the Hanseatic League, and flourished.

In the second half of the 14th century the Mongols began to weaken because of war and internal discord. The principality of Muscovy (Moscow), nestled deep in the forest at the hub of all the major trade routes, developed at the expense of the Mongols as their power declined. Muscovite princes, who efficiently collected the tribute demanded by the Mongols, enhanced their coffers through reward and fraud. As descendants of the Rurik line, Muscovite princes came to be looked upon by the people as justified leaders of all Russians.

By 1480 Ivan the Great, grand prince of Muscovy, had stopped paying tribute to the Mongols. The Mongols sent an army against him, but the army withdrew without a battle. Ivan had added Novgorod to his domains in 1478 and eventually spread Muscovy's rule to the Arctic. Being free of serious Mongol threats was fortunate for Ivan, because after 1480 he was often faced with rebellion by family members and war with neighboring Lithuania.

First Tsars
Ivan IV, called "the Terrible" because of his savage cruelty, ruled Muscovy from 1533 to 1584. In 1547 he crowned himself tsar-the Russian word for Caesar. Russian sovereigns now ruled as absolute monarchs. Ivan defeated the Mongol states of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556, making the Volga a wholly Russian river. In the 1580s he spread Muscovy's rule into Siberia, but westward expansion was blocked. Ivan futilely engaged the Swedes, and Kyiv still lay deep within the powerful Polish-Lithuanian kingdom.

Ivan IV killed one of his sons. Another of his sons died at age nine. The remaining son, Fyodor, was mentally unfit to rule. During Fyodor's 14-year reign as tsar, government affairs were dominated by his wife's brother, Boris Godunov. Fyodor died childless in 1598, thus ending the Rurik Dynasty.

Godunov was elected tsar to succeed Fyodor. He proved to be an able ruler, but, soon after he came to power, drought, famine, and plague devastated the people of Muscovy. Peasants fled their villages, leaving their holdings in weeds. In response Godunov decreed that the peasants were forbidden to leave the estates on which they were born. The peasants were thus bound to the soil, and serfdom began in Russia.

Godunov died in 1605. His successor was murdered within a few months. Leaderless Russia was rife with dissension. For the next eight years it coped with civil wars, raids by Cossacks (peasants who had escaped serfdom) in the south, Polish invaders, and impostors pretending to be sons of Ivan IV and trying to claim the throne. The frustrated Russians in 1610 temporarily accepted the son of the Polish king as tsar, but Russian guerrilla forces later ousted the foreigners.

Romanov Dynasty
The Russian nobility sought a new bloodline for the aristocracy. They found it in Michael Romanov, who was a young nobleman, or boyar. His election as tsar in 1613 began the Romanov Dynasty, which ruled until 1917.

Peter and Catherine the Great
The Russian Empire-and with it the beginning of modern Russian history-dates from the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725). Peter defeated Sweden in the Second Northern War (Great Northern War) and gained an outlet to the Baltic Sea. He founded a navy, introduced factories, reformed the administrative machinery, and organized a modern army. He forced education upon his officers and members of his court, many of whom could not read. He created a new Russian capital-St. Petersburg-on the Gulf of Finland.

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Although Peter died in 1725, his work survived almost half a century of incompetent rulers. Then Catherine the Great came to the throne in 1762. She again took up the task of reform. She also greatly expanded the Russian Empire. Her armies defeated Turkey, giving Russia control of the northern Black Sea coast and the Crimean Peninsula. During her reign Russia also acquired vast amounts of territory from Poland, which was partitioned three times.

Alexander I and Nicholas I
The reign of Alexander I from 1801 to 1825 began in the spirit of Peter and Catherine, both of whom were Westernizers. Plans were drawn for a duma, or representative assembly, to propose new laws. Alexander had begun to carry out his program when Russia became involved in the Napoleonic wars. Reform was then abandoned as the government focused on defense.

Alexander's successor, Nicholas I, ruled from 1825 to 1855 and devoted his attention to protecting Russia against what he considered corrupting Western ideas. During his reign all democratic reform was suppressed.

In 1854 Russia became involved in the disastrous Crimean War, which lasted more than two years. The Russian people were tired of war, and the serfs rose against the landowners and burned and pillaged their estates.

Emancipation of the serfs
Nicholas I was succeeded in 1855 by Alexander II. Distressed at the outcome of the Crimean War, which had demonstrated Russia's backwardness, the new tsar introduced a series of reforms. The most important of these was the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, giving liberty to tens of millions of people. Another reform introduced self-governing local assemblies elected by the people.

The long years of tyranny and lack of progress, however, had produced discontent, especially among the young with university educations. Revolutionary activity, which had been brewing since an unsuccessful revolt against the tsar in December 1825, developed rapidly. In 1881 Alexander II was assassinated by a bomb hurled at his carriage. His murder set off waves of violence, much of which was directed at the Jewish population of the empire( see pogrom). Alexander II was succeeded by his son Alexander III, a Russian nationalist and no friend of reformers. Under Alexander III revolutionary organizations were completely suppressed.

The last tsar
Nicholas II, son of Alexander III, came to power in 1894. Weak-willed and indecisive, he was unsuited for the task of ruling a vast empire. In 1904 Russia and Japan went to war over Russia's expansionist activities in the Far East. The war was unpopular in Russia. The country suffered a terrible defeat, encouraging greater revolutionary activity.

Although small, a new factory laboring class was organized by the revolutionaries. Peasants sympathized and helped. Mutinies broke out in the army and navy. Manufacturers and landlords demanded reforms that would satisfy workers, peasants, and soldiers. The Revolution of 1905 reached its climax with a general strike and the formation of a soviet, or workers' council, in St. Petersburg. In response, Nicholas called for the election of a duma as proposed by his ancestor Alexander I a century before.

In August 1914 Russia went to war against Germany and Austria over conflicting claims in the Balkans. The peasants and workers at first accepted the war without protest, but great military failures resulted because of the Russian government's inability to equip its armies. Millions of Russian lives were sacrificed. The attitude of the public toward the war and the government changed.

Food shortages in early 1917 sparked mass rioting in the capital of Petrograd (the name given to St. Petersburg in August 1914). Soldiers deserted the government and joined the people. The Duma demanded that the tsar step down. Nicholas II abdicated his throne on March 15, ending more than 300 years of rule by the Romanov Dynasty. He and his family were exiled to Siberia and later executed.( See also World War I.)

The Soviet Union
In the second phase of the Russian Revolution, in October 1917, a group of radical socialists called the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, emerged as the preeminent power in Russia. In 1918 they changed their name to the Russian Communist Party. Between 1918 and 1920 the Red Army successfully defended the new government against anticommunist forces in a civil war.

The communist government officially established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on December 30, 1922. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic dominated the Soviet Union for its entire 74-year history. It was by far the largest of the republics, and Moscow, its capital, was also the capital of the Soviet Union. (For a detailed history of the Soviet period, see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)

The Yeltsin Presidency
Following years of economic decline and political turmoil, the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991. Boris Yeltsin, leader of the former Russian republic, became president of the independent Russian Federation. Russia joined with 11 other former Soviet republics to form a new organization called the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Russia entered the post-Soviet era on the verge of economic collapse. Production plummeted while inflation soared. Manufacturing, geared toward defense and heavy industrial products during the Soviet years, was inefficient and unprepared for the production of consumer goods. Essential everyday goods were in short supply.

Yeltsin's government began the difficult task of transforming the government-run Soviet economy into one based on private enterprise. Among other reforms, the government transferred control of most industries to the private sector. Privatization did little to improve the living conditions of the average Russian, however. It mainly benefited a select group of individuals who, because of their political connections, were able to buy companies for much less than they were worth. These individuals, called "oligarchs," came to control huge segments of the Russian economy.

Yeltsin's reform efforts were complicated by conflicts with the legislature. The constitution, held over from the Soviet era, did not specify which branch, legislative or executive, held supreme power. Yeltsin's supporters argued that ultimate power rested with the president. His opponents-led by hard-line communists-held that the legislature was sovereign. Political differences made the power struggle even more intense. After Yeltsin dissolved the parliament in September 1993, its supporters rose up in armed rebellion. Yeltsin used the army to seize the parliament building and arrest the legislators inside. A new constitution, introduced by Yeltsin and adopted in December 1993, gave the president vast powers.

Another pressing issue in post-Soviet Russia was ethnic relations. Ethnic minorities made up more than one-fifth of Russia's population. Many groups demanded more autonomy, or even complete independence. The republic of Chechnya, in the Caucasus region, declared independence in 1991, before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In late 1994 Yeltsin sent Russian troops into Chechnya, but they could not completely suppress the rebels. In 1996 a cease-fire was signed and Russian troops withdrew.

The war in Chechnya and the failure of his reforms to spur economic growth caused Yeltsin's popularity to plummet. Nevertheless, the president displayed his remarkable staying power by winning reelection over his communist party challenger in 1996.

Yeltsin's second term was tumultuous. Beset by declining health, the president faced continuing clashes with the parliament, including calls for his resignation. In 1998 the country faced a severe financial crisis and the collapse of the national currency, the ruble. Partly to maintain his grip on power, Yeltsin dismissed four prime ministers and in 1998 fired his entire cabinet. In 1999 the Duma tried unsuccessfully to impeach Yeltsin. Ever unpredictable, Yeltsin announced his resignation on December 31, 1999.

Putin Succeeds Yeltsin
Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin's final prime minister, followed him as president. He declared his priorities to be reestablishing a strong state, restoring law and order, and relaunching economic reform. As prime minister, Putin had blamed Chechen rebels for a series of terrorist bombings and launched a new military campaign in Chechnya. Although Russian troops won control of the region, Chechen rebels continued a guerrilla war against Russian forces and terrorist attacks against civilians.

Putin sought to reassert central control over Russia's wayward regions by reorganizing them into seven new federal districts, each headed by a representative appointed by the president. He also moved to reduce the power of Russia's unpopular business elite-the infamous oligarchs-by closing several media outlets and launching criminal proceedings against numerous leading figures. Economic reforms brought about a strong recovery from the recession of the 1990s. Despite criticism that Putin had concentrated too much power in the presidency and was lessening freedoms achieved when the Soviet Union broke apart, he remained popular and was reelected in 2004.

Medvedev as President
Although Putin's popularity continued to be high during his second term, the constitution prevented him from running for another term. Putin's chosen successor, Dmitry Medvedev, was easily elected president and took office in May 2008. Medvedev appointed Putin as prime minister, giving the former president a platform to extend his influence in Russian politics.

A few months after gaining office, Medvedev was faced with a growing military conflict within Russia's neighboring country of Georgia. South Ossetia, a region of Georgia that borders Russia, was fighting to win its independence. Russia sent thousands of troops to support the rebels not only in South Ossetia but also in Abkhazia, another separatist region of Georgia. Even after a cease-fire was declared, tensions remained high.

Meanwhile, sporadic fighting between Russian forces and local rebels continued elsewhere in the Caucasus region. In 2009 Medvedev announced the end of Russia's counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya, but outbreaks of violence continued there and in neighboring republics. In early 2010 suicide bombers who were believed to be linked to Caucasus militants killed more than three dozen people on the Moscow subway.

Putin's Presidential Return
In the presidential elections of 2012, Putin was elected to a third term as president of Russia. One of his first acts was to nominate Medvedev as prime minister, a move that was orchestrated between the two leaders a year earlier. Putin's first months in office were marked by attempts to quash or marginalize protest movements against the government that had materialized in the past few years.

Putin also took an active role in the events in neighboring Ukraine, where a protest movement toppled the country's pro-Russian government in early 2014. Putin's administration did not recognize the resultant acting government. Armed men (whose uniforms lacked visible insignia but were thought to be Russians) took control of key sites in the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea. Shortly thereafter, Crimea declared independence from Ukraine and was annexed by Russia. The United States and the European Union responded by enacting sanctions against high-ranking officials in Russia and in the self-declared government of Crimea. After pro-Russian separatists occupied government buildings throughout southeastern Ukraine, Ukrainian forces retaliated. Although Putin denied that Russia was connected with the rebels, Western intelligence agencies, NATO, and the Ukrainian government documented multiple instances of troops and matériel crossing into Ukraine from Russia. Putin later publicly declared his support for the separatists but reiterated the claim that Russia was not involved in the conflict, which claimed thousands of lives. Western countries enacted a series of sanctions against Russia that included limiting Russian access to international capital markets. Those measures, combined with plummeting oil prices, sent the Russian economy into a recession in early 2015. Putin and other world leaders eventually approved a peace plan aimed at ending the conflict in southeastern Ukraine, though fighting in the region continued.

Russian activities in Ukraine were part of a wider effort to assert military influence in the countries of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. In September 2015 Russia entered the Syrian Civil War in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia had long provided weapons and political support to Assad. Russia's ensuing military campaign in Syria allowed the Assad government, which had been on the verge of collapse, to regain momentum against rebel groups and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) forces.

Following the victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that the Russian government had engaged in a systematic effort to influence the election in Trump's favor. That effort reportedly involved the hacking of e-mails of members of the Democratic National Committee and the release of those documents through the media organization WikiLeaks. U.S. authorities opened an investigation into possible collusion between Russian officials and Trump campaign advisers. For his part, Putin denied the existence of any campaign to influence the election. In July 2017 the U.S. Congress voted to impose tougher sanctions on Russia as punishment for its meddling in the 2016 election and for its military actions in Ukraine and elsewhere.

In December 2017 Putin declared his intention to seek reelection as president. As the March 2018 election approached, it seemed all but certain that Putin would win by a wide margin. Aleksey Navalny, a prominent opposition leader, was barred from running. Other opposition candidates faced incessant criticism from state-run media. As expected, Putin claimed an overwhelming majority of the vote. The independent monitoring agency Golos characterized the election as being rife with irregularities, however. With the win, Putin secured a fourth presidential term.

In January 2020 Putin announced his intention to modify the Russian constitution and remove term limits for presidents, paving the way for him to remain in office indefinitely. Medvedev soon announced his resignation, stating that a new government would give Putin "the opportunity to make the decisions he needs to make." The Russian legislature quickly approved the constitutional changes. Putin then scheduled a national referendum on the matter. That vote was originally scheduled for April, but it was postponed until July because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The referendum results affirmed Putin's agenda. Opposition groups noted that there was no independent monitoring of the election process, however.

Russia was hit especially hard by the pandemic. By the end of 2021 more than 650,000 Russians had been killed by COVID-19.

Russia-Ukraine War
In early 2022 the prospect of a major war in Europe began to dominate global headlines, as Putin continued a massive buildup of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border. On February 21 Putin recognized the independence of two separatist-controlled regions of eastern Ukraine and ordered Russian "peacekeepers" into Ukrainian territory. On the morning of February 24 Putin delivered a televised address announcing the beginning of a "special military operation." Within minutes Russian air strikes were carried out against cities across Ukraine. Many world leaders condemned Putin's unprovoked attack and promised severe sanctions against Russia.

The sanctions that followed included the removal of key Russian banks from SWIFT, the main global financial messaging system, and a U.S. ban on imports of Russian oil and natural gas. Despite the raft of sanctions and the crushing effects they had on Russia's economy, Russian troops and armored vehicles continued to pour into Ukraine. Deadly air strikes on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities also persisted. In early March the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to condemn the invasion of Ukraine and to demand that Russia "immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw" its forces from the country. However, as Russia increasingly faced isolation on the world stage, its devastating attacks on Ukraine continued.

Over the following months Western countries provided billions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine, whose forces were able to repel Russia's main thrust toward Kyiv by April. The Russian military also met stiff resistance elsewhere. In September the Ukrainians launched a surprise counterattack in the Kharkiv region that drove Russian forces from the area. In the wake of that counterattack Putin called up 300,000 reservists to active military duty to support the war in Ukraine. He also threatened to deploy nuclear weapons, insisting that his threat was "not a bluff." In late September Russia annexed four regions of eastern Ukraine that remained under Russian military control. The international community widely condemned the annexation as illegal.

Blevins, Wiley. Russia (Scholastic, 2018). Duling, Kaitlyn. Russia (Cavendish Square, 2019). Immell, Myra. The Dissolution of the Soviet Union (Greenhaven Press, 2010). Lugovskaya, Nina. I Want to Live: The Diary of a Young Girl in Stalin's Russia (Houghton, 2006). Moon, Walt K. Let's Explore Russia (Lerner Publications, 2017). Senker, Cath. Russia (Wayland, 2018). Vincent, Zu. Catherine the Great (Franklin Watts, 2009).

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The world's largest country by far, Russia has played a correspondingly large role in international affairs. For most of the 20th century it was the dominant republic of the...

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Russia, the largest country in the world, occupies one-tenth of all the land on Earth.

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Topline

The Kremlin and senior Ukrainian officials have dismissed reports that Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich and two Ukrainian peace negotiators were poisoned during talks in Kyiv in early March, but as all men have since recovered and none were examined by forensics experts in time to detect suspected toxins, the truth may never be known, though there is a dark history of President Vladimir Putin and the Russian state using poison against their enemies.

The Kremlin has denied involvement in suspected poisonings of its and President Vladimir Putin's ... [+]
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Key Facts

Alexei Navalny, the leader of Russia's opposition party and a fierce Putin critic, survived a murder attempt in 2020 that used a military grade nerve agent Novichok, something then German Chancellor Angela Merkel said was an attempt to "silence" Navalny and raised questions that could only be answered by the Russian government.

In 2018, three people n Salisbury, England-including former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal-were injured and one person died after exposure to Novichok, a group of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union, i with two of the cases occurring months after the initial incident when the agent was discovered in a disguised perfume bottle.

Then Prime Minister Theresa May said the attack was an assassination attempt "almost certainly approved... at a senior level of the Russian state" and charges have been authorized against three Russian intelligence officers believed to be behind the attack (they cannot be formally charged without being arrested and Russia does not extradite its citizens).

Former Russian spy and Putin critic Alexander Litvinenko was killed in London in 2006 after his tea was spiked with polonium, a radioactive metal, which a U.K. public inquiry found was most likely approved by Putin himself.

When running against a pro-Russian candidate for Ukraine's presidency in 2004, pro-EU candidate (and later president) Viktor Yushchenko fell ill and was disfigured as a result of dioxin poisoning, something he and many others believe was ordered by Moscow, though this has not been proven.

The Kremlin has repeatedly denied any involvement in the poisonings or that there is a "trend" in its opponents being poisoned.

Key Background

In recent history, opponents of the Kremlin appear to have a higher chance of being poisoned than the general population. The very nature of poison-some toxins can be incredibly hard to detect, evidence can be lost over time or as bodies decay after death and, legally speaking, proving it was deliberately administered can be tricky-alongside the opacity and denials of the Russian state, mean it is very unlikely suspected poisonings can ever be proven conclusively. Evidence supporting Russian involvement ranges from a strong and likely connection-Novichok agents, for example, are extremely difficult to produce and likely only made in classified military laboratories-to something more vague and circumstantial. Russian interest in poison stretches over a hundred years when Vladimir Lenin gave orders to establish a secret chemical laboratory referred to by the Soviets as Lab X. The KGB used Lab X chemicals to silence state enemies at home and abroad. This included Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov, who was killed using ricin delivered with an umbrella in London in the late 1970s.

Further Reading

State Secrets: An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program (Vil Mirzayanov)

A familiar plot but truth may never be known about latest 'Russian poisoning' (Guardian)

Russia's century-old fascination with deadly toxins (The Times)

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Putin's Poisonous Playbook - Before Abramovich, Russia Has A Dark History Of Reportedly Poisoning Opponents

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The Kremlin and senior Ukrainian officials have dismissed reports that Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich and two Ukrainian peace negotiators were poisoned during talks in Kyiv in early March, but as all men have since recovered and none were examined by forensics experts in time to detect suspected toxins, the truth may never be known, though there is a dark history of President Vladimir Putin and the Russian state using poison against their enemies.

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Vladimir Putin's history with suspected poisonings (2017) | 60 Minutes Archive

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Introduction

Founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th-15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new ROMANOV Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific. Under PETER I (ruled 1682-1725), hegemony was extended to the Baltic Sea and the country was renamed the Russian Empire. During the 19th century, more territorial acquisitions were made in Europe and Asia. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 contributed to the Revolution of 1905, which resulted in the formation of a parliament and other reforms. Devastating defeats and food shortages in World War I led to widespread rioting in the major cities of the Russian Empire and to the overthrow in 1917 of the ROMANOV Dynasty. The communists under Vladimir LENIN seized power soon after and formed the USSR. The brutal rule of Iosif STALIN (1928-53) strengthened communist rule and Russian dominance of the Soviet Union at a cost of tens of millions of lives. After defeating Germany in World War II as part of an alliance with the US (1939-1945), the USSR expanded its territory and influence in Eastern Europe and emerged as a global power. The USSR was the principal adversary of the US during the Cold War (1947-1991). The Soviet economy and society stagnated in the decades following Stalin's rule, until General Secretary Mikhail GORBACHEV (1985-91) introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize communism, but his initiatives inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 led to the dissolution of the USSR into Russia and 14 other independent states.

Following economic and political turmoil during President Boris YELTSIN's term (1991-99), Russia shifted toward a centralized authoritarian state under President Vladimir PUTIN (2000-2008, 2012-present) in which the regime seeks to legitimize its rule through managed elections, populist appeals, a foreign policy focused on enhancing the country's geopolitical influence, and commodity-based economic growth. Russia faces a largely subdued rebel movement in Chechnya and some other surrounding regions, although violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

approximately 1.8 times the size of the US

permafrost over much of Siberia is a major impediment to development; volcanic activity in the Kuril Islands; volcanoes and earthquakes on the Kamchatka Peninsula; spring floods and summer/autumn forest fires throughout Siberia and parts of European Russia

volcanism: significant volcanic activity on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kuril Islands; the peninsula alone is home to some 29 historically active volcanoes, with dozens more in the Kuril Islands; Kliuchevskoi (4,835 m), which erupted in 2007 and 2010, is Kamchatka's most active volcano; Avachinsky and Koryaksky volcanoes, which pose a threat to the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, have been deemed Decade Volcanoes by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to their explosive history and close proximity to human populations; other notable historically active volcanoes include Bezymianny, Chikurachki, Ebeko, Gorely, Grozny, Karymsky, Ketoi, Kronotsky, Ksudach, Medvezhia, Mutnovsky, Sarychev Peak, Shiveluch, Tiatia, Tolbachik, and Zheltovsky; see note 2 under "Geography - note"

note 1: largest country in the world in terms of area but unfavorably located in relation to major sea lanes of the world; despite its size, much of the country lacks proper soils and climates (either too cold or too dry) for agriculture

note 2: Russia's far east, particularly the Kamchatka Peninsula, lies along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire

People and Society

Russian (official) 85.7%, Tatar 3.2%, Chechen 1%, other 10.1%; note - data represent native language spoken (2010 est.)

major-language sample(s):
Книга фактов о мире - незаменимый источник базовой информации. (Russian)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

improved: urban: 98.6% of population

rural: 94.2% of population

total: 97.1% of population

unimproved: urban: 1.4% of population

rural: 5.8% of population

total: 2.9% of population (2017 est.)

improved: urban: 94.8% of population

rural: 78.1% of population

total: 90.5% of population

unimproved: urban: 5.2% of population

rural: 21.9% of population

total: 9.5% of population (2017 est.)

Government

46 provinces (oblasti, singular - oblast), 21 republics (respubliki, singular - respublika), 4 autonomous okrugs (avtonomnyye okrugi, singular - avtonomnyy okrug), 9 krays (kraya, singular - kray), 2 federal cities (goroda, singular - gorod), and 1 autonomous oblast (avtonomnaya oblast')

oblasts: Amur (Blagoveshchensk), Arkhangel'sk, Astrakhan', Belgorod, Bryansk, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kemerovo, Kirov, Kostroma, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Magadan, Moscow, Murmansk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orenburg, Orel, Penza, Pskov, Rostov, Ryazan', Sakhalin (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), Samara, Saratov, Smolensk, Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), Tambov, Tomsk, Tula, Tver', Tyumen', Ul'yanovsk, Vladimir, Volgograd, Vologda, Voronezh, Yaroslavl'

republics: Adygeya (Maykop), Altay (Gorno-Altaysk), Bashkortostan (Ufa), Buryatiya (Ulan-Ude), Chechnya (Groznyy), Chuvashiya (Cheboksary), Dagestan (Makhachkala), Ingushetiya (Magas), Kabardino-Balkariya (Nal'chik), Kalmykiya (Elista), Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (Cherkessk), Kareliya (Petrozavodsk), Khakasiya (Abakan), Komi (Syktyvkar), Mariy-El (Yoshkar-Ola), Mordoviya (Saransk), North Ossetia (Vladikavkaz), Sakha [Yakutiya] (Yakutsk), Tatarstan (Kazan'), Tyva (Kyzyl), Udmurtiya (Izhevsk)

autonomous okrugs: Chukotka (Anadyr'), Khanty-Mansi-Yugra (Khanty-Mansiysk), Nenets (Nar'yan-Mar), Yamalo-Nenets (Salekhard)

krays: Altay (Barnaul), Kamchatka (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy), Khabarovsk, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Perm', Primorskiy [Maritime] (Vladivostok), Stavropol', Zabaykal'sk [Transbaikal] (Chita)

federal cities: Moscow [Moskva], Saint Petersburg [Sankt-Peterburg]

autonomous oblast: Yevreyskaya [Jewish] (Birobidzhan)

note 1: administrative divisions have the same names as their administrative centers (exceptions have the administrative center name following in parentheses)

note 2: the United States does not recognize Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the municipality of Sevastopol, nor their redesignation as the "Republic of Crimea" and the "Federal City of Sevastopol"

description: bicameral Federal Assembly or Federalnoye Sobraniye consists of:
Federation Council or Sovet Federatsii (170 seats; 2 members in each of the 83 federal administrative units (see note below) - oblasts, krays, republics, autonomous okrugs and oblasts, and federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg - appointed by the top executive and legislative officials; members serve 4-year terms)
State Duma or Gosudarstvennaya Duma (450 seats (see note below); as of February 2014, the electoral system reverted to a mixed electoral system for the 2016 election, in which one-half of the members are directly elected by simple majority vote and one-half directly elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)

elections:
State Duma - last held 17 - 19 September 2021 (next to be held in fall 2026)

election results:
Federation Council (members appointed); composition - men 145, women 25, percent of women 14.7%

State Duma - United Russia 50.9%, CPRF 19.3%, LDPR 7.7%, A Just Russia 7.6%, New People 5.3% other minor parties and Independents 9.2%; seats by party - United Russia 324, CPRF 57, LDPR 21, A Just Russia 27, New People 13; Rodina 1, CP 1, Party of Growth 1, independent 5

note 1: the State Duma now includes 3 representatives from the "Republic of Crimea," while the Federation Council includes 2 each from the "Republic of Crimea" and the "Federal City of Sevastopol," both regions that Russia occupied and attempted to annex from Ukraine and that the US does not recognize as part of Russia

A Just Russia [Sergey MIRONOV]
Civic Platform or CP [Rifat SHAYKHUTDINOV]
Communist Party of the Russian Federation or CPRF [Gennadiy ZYUGANOV]
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia or LDPR [Vladimir ZHIRINOVSKIY]
New People [Alexey NECHAYEV]
Party of Growth [Irina MIRONOVA]
Rodina [Aleksei ZHURAVLYOV]
United Russia [Dmitriy MEDVEDEV]

note: 31 political parties are registered with Russia's Ministry of Justice (as of September 2021); 14 participated in the 2021 election, but only 8 parties maintain representation in Russia's national legislature

Economy

Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-based system. Both economic growth and reform have stalled in recent years, however, and Russia remains a predominantly statist economy with a high concentration of wealth in officials' hands. Economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy, transportation, banking, and defense-related sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak, and the state continues to interfere in the free operation of the private sector.

Russia is one of the world's leading producers of oil and natural gas, and is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. Russia is heavily dependent on the movement of world commodity prices as reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the volatile swings in global prices. The economy, which had averaged 7% growth during the 1998-2008 period as oil prices rose rapidly, has seen diminishing growth rates since then due to the exhaustion of Russia's commodity-based growth model.

A combination of falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with GDP falling by close to 2.8%. The downturn continued through 2016, with GDP contracting another 0.2%, but was reversed in 2017 as world demand picked up. Government support for import substitution has increased recently in an effort to diversify the economy away from extractive industries.

$3,968,180,000,000 (2019 est.)

$3,915,637,000,000 (2018 est.)

$3,818,780,000,000 (2017 est.)

note: data are in 2010 dollars
country comparison to the world: 6

15.5% of GDP (2017 est.)

16.1% of GDP (2016 est.)

note: data cover general government debt and include debt instruments issued (or owned) by government entities other than the treasury; the data include treasury debt held by foreign entities; the data include debt issued by subnational entities, as well as intragovernmental debt; intragovernmental debt consists of treasury borrowings from surpluses in the social funds, such as for retirement, medical care, and unemployment, debt instruments for the social funds are not sold at public auctions
country comparison to the world: 194

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

Communications

general assessment:
telecom market is largest in Europe, centered in large cities; competition active in Moscow and St Petersburg; most users access Internet through mobile platforms; fiber broadband sector is growing, supported by government in aim to extend reach to outlying regions; tests of 5G with Moscow adopting smart city technology; government justifies censorship and website blocks under a range of laws and regulations; government program aims to provide 97% of households with fixed broadband by 2024; publicly accessible Internet connections in institutions such as hospitals, libraries, schools, and mass transit available in cities; in rural areas, the availability of public Internet connections remains limited; major importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China (2021)

(2020)

domestic: cross-country digital trunk lines run from Saint Petersburg to Khabarovsk, and from Moscow to Novorossiysk; the telephone systems in 60 regional capitals have modern digital infrastructures; cellular services, both analog and digital, are available in many areas; in rural areas, telephone services are still outdated, inadequate, and low-density; 22 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular 164 per 100 persons (2019)

international: country code - 7; landing points for the Far East Submarine Cable System, HSCS, Sakhalin-Kuril Island Cable, RSCN, BCS North-Phase 2, Kerch Strait Cable and the Georgia-Russian submarine cable system connecting Russia, Japan, Finland, Georgia and Ukraine; satellite earth stations provide access to Intelsat, Intersputnik, Eutelsat, Inmarsat, and Orbita systems (2019)

note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments

Transportation

major seaport(s):
Arctic Ocean: Arkhangelsk, Murmansk Kaliningrad, Primorsk, Saint Petersburg
Black Sea: Novorossiysk
Pacific Ocean: Nakhodka, Vladivostok, Vostochnyy

oil terminal(s): Kavkaz oil terminal, Primorsk

container port(s) (TEUs): Saint Petersburg (2,221,724) (2019)

LNG terminal(s) (export): Sabetta, Sakhalin Island

river port(s): Astrakhan, Kazan (Volga River); Rostov-on-Don (Don River); Saint Petersburg (Neva River)

Military and Security

est. 3,000-5,000 Armenia; est. 1,500 Belarus; est. 7,000-10,000 Georgia; est. 100-200 Central African Republic; est. 500 Kyrgyzstan; est. 1,500-2,000 Moldova (Trannistria); est. 3,000-5,000 Syria; est. 5,000-7,000 Tajikistan; est. 25,000-30,000 Ukraine (including Crimea) (2020)

note(s): since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a truce agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020

as of late 2020, a Russian Government-backed private military company was assessed to have about 2,000 personnel in Libya supporting Libyan National Army forces;

Russia is a leader of CSTO contributes approximately 8,000 personnel to its Rapid Reaction Force

18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; males are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; one-year service obligation (Russia offers the option of serving on a two-year contract instead of completing a one-year conscription period); reserve obligation for non-officers to age 50; enrollment in military schools from the age of 16, cadets classified as members of the armed forces (2019)

note: in April of 2019, the Russian Government pledged its intent to end conscription as part of a decade-long effort to shift from a large, conscript-based military to a smaller, more professional force

Terrorism

Aum Shimrikyo (AUM/Aleph); Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Caucasus Province

note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T

Transnational Issues

Russia remains concerned about the smuggling of poppy derivatives from Afghanistan through Central Asian countries; China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with the 2004 Agreement, ending their centuries-long border disputes; the sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group, known in Japan as the "Northern Territories" and in Russia as the "Southern Kurils," occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia, and claimed by Japan, remains the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities; Russia's military support and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence in 2008 continue to sour relations with Georgia; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea; Norway and Russia signed a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement in 2010; various groups in Finland advocate restoration of Karelia (Kareliya) and other areas ceded to the Soviet Union following World War II but the Finnish Government asserts no territorial demands; Russia and Estonia signed a technical border agreement in May 2005, but Russia recalled its signature in June 2005 after the Estonian parliament added to its domestic ratification act a historical preamble referencing the Soviet occupation and Estonia's pre-war borders under the 1920 Treaty of Tartu; Russia contends that the preamble allows Estonia to make territorial claims on Russia in the future, while Estonian officials deny that the preamble has any legal impact on the treaty text; Russia demands better treatment of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia; Russia remains involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine while also occupying Ukraine's territory of Crimea; Lithuania and Russia committed to demarcating their boundary in 2006 in accordance with the land and maritime treaty ratified by Russia in May 2003 and by Lithuania in 1999; Lithuania operates a simplified transit regime for Russian nationals traveling from the Kaliningrad coastal exclave into Russia, while still conforming, as an EU member state with an EU external border, where strict Schengen border rules apply; preparations for the demarcation delimitation of land boundary with Ukraine have commenced; the dispute over the boundary between Russia and Ukraine through the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov is suspended due to the occupation of Crimea by Russia; Kazakhstan and Russia boundary delimitation was ratified on November 2005 and field demarcation should commence in 2007; Russian Duma has not yet ratified 1990 Bering Sea Maritime Boundary Agreement with the US; Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting additional data to augment its 2001 CLCS submission

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Founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th-15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new ROMANOV Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific.

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Newsela | Countries Of The World: Russia

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This huge country stretches from Asia to Europe.

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We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation,
united by a common fate on our land,
establishing human rights and freedoms, civil peace and accord,
preserving the historically established State unity,
proceeding from universally acknowledged principles of equality and self-determination of peoples,
revering the memory of ancestors who have passed on to us their love for the Fatherland and faith in good and justice,
reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the firmness of its democratic basis,
striving to ensure the well-being and prosperity of Russia,
proceeding from the responsibility for our Fatherland before present and future generations,
recognizing ourselves to be a part of the world community,
do hereby adopt THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
SECTION ONE
CHAPTER 1. THE BASIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
Article 1

1. The Russian Federation - Russia is a democratic federative law-governed state with a republican form of government.

2. The names Russian Federation and Russia are equipollent.

Man, his rights and freedoms shall be the supreme value. The recognition, observance and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms shall be an obligation of the State.

1. The bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power in the Russian Federation shall be its multinational people.

2. The people shall exercise its power directly, as well as through State government bodies and local self-government bodies.

3. The supreme direct expression of the power of the people shall be referendum and free elections.

4. Nobody may usurp power in the Russian Federation. The seizure of power or usurpation of State authority shall be prosecuted under federal law.

1. The sovereignty of the Russian Federation shall extend to the entirety of its territory.

2. The Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws shall have supremacy on the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

3. The Russian Federation shall ensure the integrity and inviolability of its territory.

1. The Russian Federation shall consist of republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, an autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs, which shall have equal rights as constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

2. A republic (state) shall have its own constitution and legislation. A kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug shall have its own charter and legislation.

3. The federal structure of the Russian Federation shall be based on its State integrity, the unity of the system of State power, the division of matters of authority and powers between State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the equality and self-determination of peoples in the Russian Federation.

4. All constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be equal with one another in relations with federal State government bodies.

1. Citizenship of the Russian Federation shall be acquired and terminated in accordance with federal law, and shall be one and equal, irrespective of the grounds on which it is acquired.

2. Every citizen of the Russian Federation shall enjoy all rights and freedoms on its territory and shall bear equal responsibilities as envisaged in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. A citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deprived of his (her) citizenship or of the right to change it.

2. In the Russian Federation the labour and health of people shall be protected, a guaranteed minimum wage shall be established, State support shall be provided for the family, maternity, fatherhood and childhood, to the disabled and to elderly citizens, the system of social services shall be developed and State pensions, allowances and other social security guarantees shall be established.

1. In the Russian Federation the integrity of economic space, free flow of goods, services and financial resources, support of competition, and the freedom of economic activity shall be guaranteed.

2. In the Russian Federation private, State, municipal and other forms of property shall be recognized and shall be protected on an equal basis.

1. Land and other natural resources shall be utilized and protected in the Russian Federation as the basis of the life and activity of the peoples living on the territories concerned.

2. Land and other natural resources may be subject to private, State, municipal and other forms of ownership.

State power in the Russian Federation shall be exercised on the basis of its division into legislative, executive and judicial authority. Bodies of legislative, executive and judicial authority shall be independent.

1. State power in the Russian Federation shall be exercised by the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly (the Council of Federation and the State Duma), the Government of the Russian Federation, and the courts of the Russian Federation.

2. State power in constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be exercised by bodies of State government formed by those constituent entities.

3. The division of authorities and powers among State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be established by this Constitution, the Federation Treaty and other treaties on the division of authorities and powers.

Local self-government shall be recognized and guaranteed in the Russian Federation. Local self-government shall be independent within the limits of its competence. Bodies of local self-government shall not form part of the system of State government bodies.

1. Ideological diversity shall be recognized in the Russian Federation.

2. No ideology shall be proclaimed as State ideology or as obligatory.

3. Political diversity and the multi-party system shall be recognized in the Russian Federation.

4. Public associations shall be equal before the law.

5. The establishment and activities of public associations whose goals and activities are aimed at the forcible changing of the basis of the constitutional order and at violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, at undermining its security, at creating armed units, and at instigating social, racial, national and religious strife shall be prohibited.

1. The Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No religion may be established as the State religion or as obligatory.

2. Religious associations shall be separate from the State and shall be equal before the law.

1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have supreme legal force, direct effect and shall be applicable on the entire territory of the Russian Federation. Laws and other legal acts, which are adopted in the Russian Federation, must not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

2. State government bodies, local self-government bodies, officials, citizens and their associations shall be obliged to observe the Constitution of the Russian Federation and laws.

3. Laws must be officially published. Unpublished laws shall not have force. Any normative legal acts concerning human and civil rights, freedoms and obligations shall not have force unless they have been officially published for the information of the general public.

4. Universally recognized principles and norms of international law as well as international agreements of the Russian Federation should be an integral part of its legal system. If an international agreement of the Russian Federation establishes rules, which differ from those stipulated by law, then the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.

1. The provisions of this Chapter of the Constitution shall constitute the fundamental principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation and may not be changed except in accordance with the procedure established by this Constitution.

2. No other provisions of this Constitution may conflict with the fundamental principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation.
CHAPTER 2. HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
1. In the Russian Federation human and civil rights and freedoms shall be recognized and guaranteed according to the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and this Constitution.

2. Basic human rights and freedoms shall be inalienable and shall be enjoyed by everyone from birth.

3. The exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms must not violate the rights and freedoms of other people.

Human and civil rights and freedoms shall have direct force. They shall determine the meaning, content and implementation of laws, the functioning of legislative and executive authority and of local self-government, and shall be guaranteed by law.

1. All persons shall be equal before the law and the court.

2. The State guarantees the equality of human and civil rights and freedoms regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, material and official status, place of residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership of public associations, or of other circumstances. All forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial, national, language or religious grounds shall be prohibited.

3. Men and women shall enjoy equal rights and freedoms and equal opportunities to exercise them.

1. Everyone shall have the right to life.

2. Capital punishment until its complete abolition may be established by federal law as an exclusive form of punishment for particularly grave crimes against life, and the accused shall be granted the right to have his case examined by a court with the participation of a jury.

1. Human dignity shall be protected by the State. Nothing may serve as a basis for its derogation.

2. Nobody should be subjected to torture, violence, or other severe or humiliating treatment or punishment. Nobody may be subjected to medical, scientific or other experiments without voluntary consent.

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom and personal inviolability.

2. Arrest, detention and keeping in custody shall be permissible only under a court order. A person may not be detained for more than 48 hours without a court order.

1. Everyone shall have the right to the inviolability of his (her) private life, personal and family privacy, and protection of his (her) honour and good name.

2. Everyone shall have the right to privacy of correspondence, of telephone conversations and of postal, telegraph and other communications. This right may be limited only on the basis of a court order.

1. Collecting, keeping, using and disseminating information about the private life of a person shall not be permitted without his (her) consent.

2. State government bodies and local self-government bodies and their officials shall be obliged to provide everyone with access to documents and materials directly affecting his (her) rights and freedoms, unless otherwise envisaged by law.

The home shall be inviolable. Nobody shall have the right to enter a dwelling place against the will of those residing therein, except in those cases provided for by federal laws or on the basis of a court order.

1. Everyone shall have the right to determine and declare his (her) nationality. Nobody shall be forced to determine and declare his (her) nationality.

2. Everyone shall have the right to use his (her) native language and to a free choice of the language of communication, upbringing, education and creative work.

1. Everyone who is legally present on the territory of the Russian Federation shall have the right to travel freely and freely to choose the place of temporary or permanent residence.

2. Everyone may freely leave the Russian Federation. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right freely to return to the Russian Federation.

Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to profess individually or collectively any religion or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious and other convictions and act in accordance with them.

1. Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech.

2. Propaganda or agitation, which arouses social, racial, national or religious hatred and hostility shall be prohibited. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy shall also be prohibited.

3. Nobody shall be forced to express his thoughts and convictions or to deny them.

4. Everyone shall have the right freely to seek, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information by any legal means. The list of types of information, which constitute State secrets, shall be determined by federal law.

5. The freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited.

1. Everyone shall have the right of association, in cluding the right to establish trade unions for the protection of his(her) interests. The freedom of activity of public associations shall be guaranteed.

2. Nobody may be compelled to join any association or to stay there.

Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, mass meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets.

1. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to participate in managing State affairs both directly and through their representatives.

2. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to elect and be elected to State government bodies and local self-government bodies, as well as to participate in referendums.

3. Citizens who are recognized as incapable by a court, and citizens who are kept in places of imprisonment under a court sentence, shall not have the right to elect and be elected.

4. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall enjoy equal access to State service.

5. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to participate in administering justice.

Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to appeal in person and make individual and collective appeals to State bodies and local self-government bodies.

1. Everyone shall have the right to use freely his (her) abilities and property for entrepreneurial and other economic activity not prohibited by law.

2. Economic activity aimed at monopolization and unfair competition shall not be permitted.

1. The right of private property shall be protected by law.

2. Everyone shall have the right to have property and to possess, use and dispose of it both individually and jointly with other persons.

3. Nobody may be deprived of property except under a court order. Forced alienation of property for State requirements may take place only subject to prior and fair compensation.

4. The right of inheritance shall be guaranteed.

1. Citizens and their associations shall have the right to possess land as private property.

2. Possession, utilisation and disposal of land and other natural resources shall be exercised by the owners freely provided that this is not detrimental to the environment and does not violate the rights and lawful interests of other people.

3. The conditions and procedure for the use of land shall be determined by federal law.

1. Labour shall be free. Everyone shall have the right freely to use his (her) labour skills and to choose the type of activity and occupation.

2. Compulsory labour shall be forbidden.

3. Everyone shall have the right to work in conditions, which meet safety and hygiene requirements, and to receive remuneration for labour without any discrimination whatsoever and not below the minimum wage established by federal law, as well as the right of protection against unemployment.

4. The right of individual and collective labour disputes with the use of the methods for their resolution, which are provided for by federal law, including the right to strike, shall be recognized.

5. Everyone shall have the right to rest. For those working under labour contracts the duration of work time, days of rest and public holidays and annual paid leave established by federal law shall be guaranteed.

1. Maternity, childhood and family shall be protected by the State.

2. Care for children and their upbringing shall be the equal right and duty of parents.

3. Able-bodied children over 18 years of age must take care of disabled parents.

1. Everyone shall be guaranteed social security for old age, in case of illness, disability and loss of the breadwinner, for the bringing up of children and in other cases specified by law.

2. State pensions and social benefits shall be established by law.

3. Voluntary social insurance, the creation of additional forms of social security and charity shall be encouraged.

1. Everyone shall have the right to a home. Nobody may be arbitrarily deprived of his (her) home.

2. State government bodies and local self-government bodies shall promote housing construction and create conditions for exercising the right to a home.

3. Low-income citizens and other citizens mentioned in law who are in need of a home may receive it either free of charge or for an affordable payment from State, municipal and other housing funds according to the norms established by law.

1. Everyone shall have the right to health protection and medical care. Medical care in State and municipal health institutions shall be rendered to citizens free of charge at the expense of the appropriate budget, insurance premiums and other proceeds.

2. In the Russian Federation federal programmes for the protection and improvement of the health of the public shall be financed, measures shall be taken to develop State, municipal and private healthcare systems, and activities shall be encouraged which contribute to the improvement of human health, the development of physical education and sport, and ecological, sanitary and epidemiological well-being.

3. The concealment by officials of facts and circumstances, which pose a threat to the life and health of people, shall result in liability according to federal law.

Everyone shall have the right to a favourable environment, reliable information on the state of the environment and compensation for damage caused to his (her) health and property by violations of environmental laws.

1. Everyone shall have the right to education.

2. General access and free pre-school, secondary and secondary vocational education in State and municipal educational institutions and at enterprises shall be guaranteed.

3. Everyone shall have the right to receive on a competitive basis free higher education in State and municipal educational institutions and at enterprises.

4. Basic general education shall be compulsory. Parents or guardians shall ensure that children receive a basic general education.

5. The Russian Federation shall establish federal State educational standards and shall support various forms of education and self-education.

1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, technical and other types of creative activity and teaching. Intellectual property shall be protected by law.

2. Everyone shall have the right to participate in cultural life and use cultural establishments, and the right of access to cultural valuables.

3. Everyone shall be obliged to care for the preservation of the cultural and historical heritage, and to protect monuments of history and culture.

1. State protection of human and civil rights and freedoms in the Russian Federation shall be guaranteed.

2. Everyone shall have the right to protect his (her) rights and freedoms by all means not prohibited by law.

1. Everyone shall be guaranteed protection in court of his (her) rights and freedoms.

2. Decisions and actions (or inaction) of State government bodies, local self-government bodies, public organisations and officials may be appealed against in court.

3. Everyone shall have the right in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation to appeal to interstate bodies for the protection of human rights and freedoms if all available internal means of legal protection have been exhausted.

1. Nobody may be deprived of the right to have his (her) case heard in the court and by the judge within whose competence the case is placed by law.

2. Any person accused of committing a crime shall have the right to have his (her) case examined by a court with the participation of a jury in the cases envisaged by federal law.

1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the right to qualified legal assistance. In the cases envisaged by law, legal assistance shall be provided free of charge.

2. Any person detained, taken into custody or accused of committing a crime shall have the right to use the assistance of a lawyer (counsel for the defence) from the moment of being detained, placed in custody or accused.

1. Any person accused of committing a crime shall be considered innocent until his (her) guilt is proven in accordance with the procedure stipulated
by federal law and is confirmed by a court sentence which has entered into legal force.

2. The accused shall not be obliged to prove his (her) innocence.

3. Irremovable doubts about the guilt of a person shall be interpreted in favour of the accused.

1. Nobody may be convicted twice for one and the same crime.

2. In administering justice it shall not be permitted to use evidence received through violating federal law.

3. Any person convicted of a crime shall have the right to appeal against the verdict to a higher court in accordance with the procedure established by federal law, as well as to request pardon or mitigation of the punishment.

1. Nobody shall be obliged to testify against him self, his (her) spouse or close relatives, the range of whom shall be determined by federal law.

2. Federal law may establish other cases where the obligation to give evidence may be lifted.

The rights of victims of crimes and of abuses of office shall be protected by law. The State shall provide the victims with access to justice and compensation for damage sustained.

Everyone shall have the right to State compensation for damage caused by unlawful actions (inaction) of State government bodies and their officials.

1. A law, which introduces or increases liability, shall not have retroactive force.

2. Nobody may bear liability for an action, which was not regarded as a crime when it was committed. If, after an offense has been committed, the extent of liability for it is lifted or mitigated, the new law shall be applied.

1. The enumeration in the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the basic rights and freedoms should not be interpreted as a denial or diminution of other universally recognized human and civil rights and freedoms.

2. In the Russian Federation no laws must be adopted which abolish or diminish human and civil rights and freedoms.

3. Human and civil rights and freedoms may be limited by federal law only to the extent necessary for the protection of the basis of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other people, and for ensuring the defence of the country and the security of the State.

1. In the conditions of a state of emergency, in order to ensure the safety of citizens and the protection of the constitutional order and in accordance with federal constitutional law, certain restrictions may be imposed on human rights and freedoms with an indication of their limits and the period for which they have effect.

2. A state of emergency on the entire territory of the Russian Federation and in certain areas thereof may be introduced subject to the circumstances and in accordance with the procedure stipulated by federal constitutional law.

3. The rights and freedoms specified in Articles 20, 21, 23 (part 1), 24, 28, 34 (part 1), 40 (part 1), and 46-54 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation might not be restricted.

Everyone shall be obliged to pay legally established taxes and levies. Laws, which establish new taxes or deteriorate the position of taxpayers, shall not have retroactive force.

Everyone shall have a duty to preserve nature and the environment and to treat natural resources with care.

1. Defence of the Fatherland shall be the duty and obligation of a citizen of the Russian Federation.

2. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall perform military service in accordance with federal law.

3. In the event that their convictions or religious beliefs run counter to military service and in other cases established by federal law, citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to replace it with alternative civilian service.

A citizen of the Russian Federation may exercise all of his (her) rights and duties independently from the age of 18 years.

1. A citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deported from the Russian Federation or extradited to another state.

2. The Russian Federation shall guarantee its citizens protection and patronage abroad.

1. A citizen of the Russian Federation may have citizenship of a foreign state (dual citizenship) in accordance with federal law or an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

2. The possession of foreign citizenship by a citizen of the Russian Federation shall not diminish his (her) rights and freedoms and shall not release him from obligations stipulated for Russian citizenship, unless otherwise specified by federal law or an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

3. Foreign citizens and stateless persons shall enjoy rights and bear obligations in the Russian Federation on a par with citizens of the Russian Federation, except in those cases envisaged by federal law or by an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

1. The Russian Federation shall grant political asylum to foreign citizens and stateless persons in accordance with the universally recognized norms of international law.

2. In the Russian Federation persons who are persecuted for their political convictions or for actions (or inaction) not recognized as a crime in the Russian Federation may not be extradited to other states. The extradition of persons accused of a crime, as well as the surrender of convicts to serve sentence in other states, shall be carried out on the basis of federal law or an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

The provisions of this Chapter shall constitute the fundamental principles of the legal status of the individual in the Russian Federation and may not be changed otherwise than in accordance with the procedure which is established by this Constitution.

1. The Russian Federation shall be composed of the following constituent entities of the Russian Federation:
Republic of Adygeya (Adygeya), Republic of Altai, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Daghestan, Republic of Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, Republic of Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkessian Republic, Republic of Karelia, Komi Republic, Republic of Marij El, Republic of Mordovia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of North Osetia - Alania, Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan), Republic of Tuva, Udmurtian Republic, Republic of Khakasia, Chechen Republic, Chuvashi Republic - Chuvashia;
Altai kray, Krasnodar kray, Krasnoyarsk kray, Perm kray, Primorie kray, Stavropol kray, Khabarovsk kray;
Amur oblast, Arkhangelsk oblast, Astrakhan oblast, Belgorod oblast, Bryansk oblast, Vladimir oblast, Volgograd oblast, Vologda oblast, Voronezh oblast, Ivanovo oblast, Irkutsk oblast, Kaliningrad oblast, Kaluga oblast, Kamchatka oblast, Kemerovo oblast, Kirov oblast, Kostroma oblast, Kurgan oblast, Kursk oblast, Leningrad oblast, Lipetsk oblast, Magadan oblast, Moscow oblast, Murmansk oblast, Nizhni Novgorod oblast, Novgorod oblast, Novosibirsk oblast, Omsk oblast, Orenburg oblast, Oryol oblast, Penza oblast, Pskov oblast, Rostov oblast, Ryazan oblast, Samara oblast, Saratov oblast, Sakhalin oblast, Sverdlovsk oblast, Smolensk oblast, Tambov oblast, Tver oblast, Tomsk oblast, Tula oblast, Tyumen oblast, Ulyanovsk oblast, Chelyabinsk oblast, Chita oblast, Yaroslavl oblast;
Moscow, St.Petersburg - cities of federal significance;
the Jewish autonomous oblast;
Aginsk Buryat autonomous okrug, Koryak autonomous okrug, Nenets autonomous okrug, Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) autonomous okrug, Ust-Ordyn Buryat autonomous okrug, Khanty-Mansijsk autonomous okrug - Yugra, Chukotka autonomous okrug, Evenk autonomous okrug, Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug.

2. Admission into the Russian Federation and creation of a new constituent entity shall take place in accordance with the procedure established by federal constitutional law.

1. The status of a republic shall be determined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the constitution of the republic.

2. The status of a kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug shall be determined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the charter of the kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug which is adopted by the legislative (representative) body of the corresponding constituent entity of the Russian Federation.

3. On a submission from legislative and executive bodies of an autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug, a federal law concerning an autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug may be adopted.

4. Relations among autonomous okrugs within krays and oblasts may be regulated by federal law or by a treaty between State government bodies of the autonomous okrug and, accordingly, State government bodies of the kray or oblast.

5. The status of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation may be changed by mutual agreement between the Russian Federation and the constituent entity of the Russian Federation in accordance with federal constitutional law.

1. The territory of the Russian Federation shall comprise the territories of its constituent entities, inland waters and territorial sea and the air space over them.

2. The Russian Federation shall have sovereign rights and exercise jurisdiction on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure specified by federal law and norms of international law.

3. Borders between constituent entities of the Russian Federation may be changed upon their mutual consent.

1. The Russian language shall be the State language on the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

2. Republics shall have the right to establish their own State languages. In State government bodies, local self-government bodies and State institutions of republics they shall be used together with the State language of the Russian Federation.

3. The Russian Federation shall guarantee all of its peoples the right to preserve their native language and to create conditions for its study and development.

The Russian Federation shall guarantee the rights of indigenous small peoples in accordance with the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.

1. The state flag, emblem and anthem of the Russian Federation, their description and the procedure for the official use thereof shall be established by federal constitutional law.

2. The capital of the Russian Federation shall be the city of Moscow. The status of the capital shall be established by federal law.

The Russian Federation shall have jurisdiction over:
a) the adoption and amending of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, control over compliance therewith;

b) the federative structure and the territory of the Russian Federation;

c) regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; citizenship in the Russian Federation, regulation and protection of the rights of national minorities;

d) establishment of the system of federal legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the procedure for their organisation and activities, the formation of federal State government bodies;

e) federal State property and administration thereof;

f) establishment of the basic principles of federal policy and federal programmes in the sphere of State, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation;

g) establishment of the basic legal principles for the unified market; financial, currency, credit and customs regulation; money emission; the basic principles of pricing policy, federal economic services, including federal banks;

h) the federal budget, federal taxes and levies, federal funds of regional development;

i) federal power-engineering systems, nuclear power, fissile materials, federal transport, railways, information and communication, activities in space;

j) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international treaties of the Russian Federation, issues of war and peace;

k) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation;

l) defence and security; military production; determination of the procedure for selling and purchasing weapons, ammunition, military equipment and other military hardware; production of poisonous substances, narcotic substances and the procedure for their use;

m) determination of the status and protection of the State border, territorial sea, air space, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation;

n) the judicial system, public prosecution, criminal, criminal-procedural and criminal-executive legislation, amnesty and remission, civil, civil-procedural and arbitration-procedural legislation, legal regulation of intellectual property;

o) federal collision law;

p) meteorological service, standards, metric and time systems, geodesy and cartography, names of geographical units, official statistics and accounting;

q) State awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;

r) federal State service.

1. The following shall be within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian Federation:

a) measures to ensure the correspondence of constitutions and laws of republics, the charters, laws and other normative legal acts of krays, oblasts, cities
of federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws;

b) protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, protection of the rights of national minorities, ensuring lawfulness, law and order, public security; border zone regimes;

c) issues of the possession, utilisation and management of land and of subsurface, water and other natural resources;

d) demarcation of State property;

e) use of natural resources, protection of the environment and provisions for ecological safety; specially protected natural territories, protection of historical and cultural monuments;

f) general issues of upbringing, education, science, culture, physical education and sport;

j) coordination of health care issues; protection of the family, maternity, fatherhood and childhood, social protection, including social security;

h) carrying out measures against catastrophes, natural disasters, epidemics and rectification of their consequences;

i) establishment of common principles of taxation and levies in the Russian Federation;

j) administrative, administrative-procedural, labour, family, housing, land, water and forest legislation; legislation on subsurface resources and on environmental protection;

k) personnel of judicial and law enforcement bodies; lawyers, notaries;

l) protection of the traditional habitat and the traditional way of life of small ethnic communities;

m) establishment of general principles of the organisation of the system of State government and local self-government bodies;

n) coordination of international and foreign economic relations of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, observance of international agreements of the Russian Federation.

2. The provisions of this Article shall be equally valid for republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs.

Outside the limits of authority of the Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation on issues under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall enjoy full State power.

1. In the territory of the Russian Federation it shall not be permitted to establish custom borders, duties, levies or any other barriers to the free flow of goods, services and financial resources.

2. Restrictions on the movement of goods and services may be introduced in accordance with federal law only to ensure security, to protect the life and health of people and to preserve nature and cultural values.

1. The monetary unit in the Russian Federation shall be the rouble. Money emission shall be carried out exclusively by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The introduction and emission of other currencies in Russia shall not be permitted.

2. Protecting and ensuring the stability of the rouble shall be the principal function of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, which it shall fulfil independently of other State governmental bodies.

3. The system of taxes paid to the federal budget and the general principles of taxation and levies in the Russian Federation shall be determined by federal law.

4. State loans shall be issued in accordance with the procedure specified by federal law and shall be floated on a voluntary basis.

1. On issues under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws and federal laws shall be adopted. These shall have direct force on the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

2. On issues under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, in addition to federal laws, laws and other normative legal acts of constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be issued which are adopted in accordance with those federal laws.

3. Federal laws may not conflict with federal constitutional laws.

4. Outside the limits of authority of the Russian Federation and of the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian Federation republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs shall exercise their own legal regulation, including the adoption of laws and other normative legal acts.

5. Laws and other normative legal acts of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall not conflict with federal laws which are adopted in accordance with parts one and two of this Article. In the event of a conflict between a federal law and any other act issued in the Russian Federation, the federal law shall prevail.

6. In the event of a conflict between a federal law and a normative legal act of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation issued in accordance with part four of this Article, the normative legal act of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation shall prevail.

1. The system of State government bodies of republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs shall be established by the constituent entities of the Russian Federation independently in accordance with the basic principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation and the general principles of the organisation of representative and executive State government bodies which are established by federal law.

2. Within the limits of the jurisdiction and powers of the Russian Federation on issues under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation federal executive government bodies and executive government bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall form a unified system of executive authority in the Russian Federation.

1. Federal executive government bodies may, in order to exercise their powers, establish their own territorial bodies and appoint appropriate officials.

2. Federal executive government bodies, by agreement with executive government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, may delegate some of their powers to the latter provided that this does not conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

3. Executive government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, by agreement with federal executive government bodies, may delegate some of their powers to the latter.

4. The President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation shall provide for the implementation of the powers of federal State power on the entire territory of the Russian Federation in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation may participate in interstate associations and transfer some of its powers to those associations in accordance with international treaties provided that this does not entail restrictions on human and civil rights and freedoms and does not conflict with the basic principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation.

1. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Head of State.

2. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and of human and civil rights and freedoms. In accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, he (she) shall adopt measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and State integrity, and shall ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of State government bodies.

3. The President of the Russian Federation shall, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, determine the basic objectives of the internal and foreign policy of the State.

4. The President of the Russian Federation, as the Head of State, shall represent the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations.

1. The President of the Russian Federation shall be elected for six years by citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage by secret ballot.

2. Any citizen of the Russian Federation not younger than 35 years of age who has resided in the Russian Federation on a permanent basis for not less than 10 years may be elected President of the Russian Federation.

3. One and the same person cannot hold the office of the President of the Russian Federation for more than two terms running.

4. The procedure for elections of the President of the Russian Federation shall be determined by federal law.

1. On assuming office the President of the Russian Federation shall take the following oath of loyalty to the people:
"I swear that in exercising the powers of the President of the Russian Federation I shall respect and protect human and civil rights and freedoms, observe and protect the Constitution of the Russian Federation, protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the State, and faithfully serve the people".

2. The oath shall be taken in a solemn ceremony in the presence of members of the Council of Federation, deputies of the State Duma and judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

The President of the Russian Federation:

a) shall appoint, with the consent of the State Duma, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation;

b) shall have the right to chair meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation;

c) shall adopt decisions on the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation;

d) shall nominate to the State Duma a candidate for appointment to the post of Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation; shall raise before the State Duma the issue of relieving the Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation of his post;

e) in accordance with proposals of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, shall appoint and relieve of their post deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers;

f) shall present to the Council of Federation candidates for the posts of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, and a candidate for the post of Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation; shall submit to the Council of Federation proposals to relieve the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation of his post; and shall appoint judges of other federal courts;

g) shall form and head the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the status of which shall be determined by federal law;

h) shall approve the military doctrine of the Russian Federation;

i) shall form the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation;

j) shall appoint and dismiss plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the Russian Federation;

k) shall appoint and dismiss supreme commanders of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

l) shall appoint and recall after consultations with appropriate committees and commissions of the chambers of the Federal Assembly diplomatic representatives of the Russian Federation in foreign States and international organisations.

The President of the Russian Federation:

a) shall announce elections to the State Duma in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law;

b) shall dissolve the State Duma in the cases and in accordance with the procedure provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation;

c) shall announce referendums in accordance with the procedure established by federal constitutional law;

d) shall submit draft laws to the State Duma;

e) shall sign and promulgate federal laws;

f) shall address the Federal Assembly with annual messages on the situation in the country and on the basic objectives of the internal and foreign policy of the State.

1. The President of the Russian Federation may use conciliatory procedures to resolve disputes between State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and disputes between State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation. In the event that no agreed decision is reached, he (she) shall have the right to refer the dispute to the appropriate court.

2. The President of the Russian Federation shall have the right to suspend acts of executive government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the event that these acts conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws or with international commitments of the Russian Federation, or violate human and civil rights and freedoms until the issue is resolved by an appropriate court.

The President of the Russian Federation:

a) shall direct the foreign policy of the Russian Federation;

b) shall hold negotiations and sign international treaties of the Russian Federation;

c) shall sign instruments of ratification;

d) shall receive letters of credence and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to his (her) office.

1. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

2. In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or of a direct threat of aggression, the President of the Russian Federation shall introduce martial law on the territory of the Russian Federation or on certain parts thereof and shall immediately inform the Council of Federation and the State Duma of this.

3. The regime of martial law shall be defined by federal constitutional law.

The President of the Russian Federation, in the circumstances and in accordance with the procedure envisaged by federal constitutional law, shall introduce a state of emergency on the territory of the Russian Federation or on certain parts thereof and shall immediately inform the Council of Federation and the State Duma of this.

The President of the Russian Federation:

a) shall decide on issues of citizenship of the Russian Federation and of granting political asylum;

b) shall bestow State awards of the Russian Federation and confer honorary titles of the Russian Federation and supreme military and supreme specialtitles;

c) shall grant pardon.

1. The President of the Russian Federation shall issue edicts and regulations.

2. The edicts and regulations of the President of the Russian Federation shall be binding on the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

3. Edicts and regulations of the President of the Russian Federation must not conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

The President of the Russian Federation shall have immunity.

1. The President of the Russian Federation shall begin to exercise his (her) powers from the moment of taking the oath and shall cease to do so when his (her) term of office expires and after a newly-elected the President of the Russian Federation has been sworn in.

2. The President of the Russian Federation shall cease to exercise his (her) powers before the end of his (her) term in the event of his (her) resignation, persistent inability for health reasons to carry out the powers invested in him (her), or impeachment. Presidential elections shall be held before the expiration of three months from the date of the early termination of presidential office.

3. In all cases where the President of the Russian Federation is unable to fulfil his (her) duties, they shall be temporarily delegated to the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Acting President of the Russian Federation shall not have the right to dissolve the State Duma, call a referendum or to submit proposals for amendments to and the revision of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

1. The President of the Russian Federation may be impeached by the Council of Federation only on the basis of charges of high treason or of another grave crime brought by the State Duma and confirmed by a resolution of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the existence of indications of a crime in the actions of the President of the Russian Federation and by a resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation confirming that the established procedure for bringing charges has been observed.

2. The decision of the State Duma to bring charges and the decision of the Council of Federation to impeach the President must be adopted by two-thirds of votes of the total number of members of each chamber on the initiative of not less than one third of deputies of the State Duma and on the basis of a resolution of a special commission set up by the State Duma.

3. The decision of the Council of Federation to impeach the President of the Russian Federation must be adopted not later than three months after the State Duma brings charges against the President. If a decision of the Council of Federation is not adopted within this time the charges against the President shall be regarded as having been declined.

The Federal Assembly - parliament of the Russian Federation shall be the representative and legislative body of the Russian Federation.

1. The Federal Assembly shall consist of two chambers - the Council of Federation and the State Duma.

2. The Council of Federation shall include two representatives from each constituent entity of the Russian Federation: one from the legislative and one from the executive State government body.

3. The State Duma shall consist of 450 deputies.

1. The State Duma shall be elected for a term of five years.

2. The procedure for forming the Council of Federation and the procedure for electing deputies to the State Duma shall be established by federal laws.

1. Any citizen of the Russian Federation who has reached 21 years of age and who has the right to participate in elections may be elected deputy of the State Duma.

2. One and the same person may not be simultaneously a member of the Council of Federation and a deputy of the State Duma. A deputy of the State Duma may not be a deputy of other representative State government bodies and local self-government bodies.

3. Deputies of the State Duma shall work on a professional permanent basis. Deputies of the State Duma may not be employed in State service or engage in other paid activities, except for teaching and scientific and other creative work.

1. Members of the Council of Federation and deputies of the State Duma shall enjoy immunity during the whole term of their office. They may not be detained, arrested or searched, except in the event of detention at the scene of a crime. They may not be subjected to personal searches, except in instances where this is provided for by federal law in order to ensure the safety of other people.

2. The issue of the removal of immunity shall be resolved by an appropriate chamber of the Federal Assembly upon submission of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.

1. The Federal Assembly shall be a permanently functioning body.

2. The State Duma shall convene its first session on the thirtieth day after election. The President of the Russian Federation may convene a session of the State Duma earlier than this date.

3. The first session of the State Duma shall be opened by the oldest deputy.

4. From the moment that the State Duma of a new convocation begins to work the powers of the State Duma of the previous convocation shall expire.

1. The Council of Federation and the State Duma shall hold separate sessions.

2. Sessions of the Council of Federation and of the State Duma shall be open. In the cases envisaged by the procedural regulations of a chamber, the latter shall have the right to hold closed-door sessions.

3. The chambers may hold joint sessions to hear messages of the President of the Russian Federation, messages of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and speeches of leaders of foreign states.

1. The Council of Federation shall elect from among its members the Chairman of the Council of Federation and his (her) deputies. The State Duma shall elect from among its members the Chairman of the State Duma and his (her) deputies.

2. The Chairman of the Council of Federation and his (her) deputies and the Chairman of the State Duma and his (her) deputies shall chair sessions and shall be in charge of the internal routine of the chamber.

3. The Council of Federation and the State Duma shall set up committees and commissions and shall hold parliamentary hearings on issues under their authority.

4. Each of the chambers shall adopt its procedural regulations and resolve issues relating to the routine procedures for its activities.

5. To monitor implementation of the federal budget the Council of Federation and the State Duma shall set up the Accounts Chamber, whose composition and work procedures shall be determined by federal law.

The following shall be within the jurisdiction of the Council of Federation:

a) approval of border changes between constituent entities of the Russian Federation;

b) approval of edict of the President of the Russian Federation on the introduction of martial law;

c) approval of edict of the President of the Russian Federation on the introduction of a state of emergency;

d) deciding on the possibility of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation;

e) announcement of elections of the President of the Russian Federation;

f) impeachment of the President of the Russian Federation;

g) appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation;

h) appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation;

i) appointment and dismissal of the deputy Chairman and half of the auditors of the Accounts Chamber.

2. The Council of Federation shall adopt decreeson issues referred to its authority by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. Decrees of the Council of Federation shall be adopted by a majority of the total number of members of the Council of Federation unless another procedure for adopting decisions is envisaged by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The following shall be within the jurisdiction of the State Duma:

a) consent to the appointment of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation by the President of the Russian Federation;

b) deciding the issue of confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation;

c) hearing annual reports from the Government of the Russian Federation on the results of its work, including on issues raised by the State Duma;

d) appointment and dismissal of the Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation;

e) appointment and dismissal of the Chairman and half of the auditors of the Accounts Chamber;

f) appointment and dismissal of the Commissioner for Human Rights, who shall act according to federal constitutional law;

g) announcement of amnesty;

h) bringing charges against the President of the Russian Federation for his (her) impeachment;

2. The State Duma shall adopt decrees on issues referred to its authority by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. Decrees of the State Duma shall be adopted by a majority of the total number of deputies of the State Duma, unless another procedure for adopting decisions is envisaged by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

1. The right of legislative initiative shall belong to the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of Federation, members of the Council of Federation, deputies of the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, and legislative (representative) bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The right of legislative initiative shall also belong to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation on issues within their competence.

2. Bills shall be submitted to the State Duma.

3. Bills on the introduction or cancellation of taxes, on exemption from taxes, on the issue of State loans, on changes in the financial obligations of the State, and other bills envisaging expenses to be covered from the federal budget may be submitted only upon a resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation.

1. Federal laws shall be adopted by the State Duma.

2. Federal laws shall be adopted by a majority of votes of the total number of deputies of the State Duma, unless otherwise envisaged by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. Federal laws adopted by the State Duma shall be submitted within five days for examination by the Council of Federation.

4. A federal law shall be considered to have been approved by the Council of Federation if over a half of the total number of members of that chamber have voted for it or if the Council of Federation does not examine it within fourteen days. In the event that the Council of Federation rejects a federal law, the chambers may set up a conciliatory commission to settle differences, after which the federal law shall be reconsidered by the State Duma.

5. In the event that the State Duma disagrees with the decision of the Council of Federation a federal law shall be considered to have been adopted if in the second vote not less than two thirds of the total number of deputies of the State Duma has voted in favour of it.

Federal laws adopted by the State Duma on the following issues must compulsorily be examined by the Council of Federation:

a) the federal budget;

b) federal taxes and levies;

c) financial, currency, credit and customs regulation, money emission;

d) ratification and denunciation of international treaties of the Russian Federation;

e) the status and protection of the State border of the Russian Federation;

f) war and peace.

1. An adopted federal law shall be submitted within five days to the President of the Russian Federation for signing and promulgation.

2. The President of the Russian Federation shall sign the federal law and promulgate it within fourteen days.

3. If the President of the Russian Federation rejects a federal law within fourteen days of receiving it, the State Duma and the Council of Federation shall reconsider that law in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. If upon reconsideration the law is approved in the previously adopted wording by a majority of not less than two thirds of the total number of members of the Council of Federation and of deputies of the State Duma, it must be signed by the President within seven days and promulgated.

1. Federal constitutional laws shall be adopted on issues envisaged by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

2. A federal constitutional law shall be considered to have been adopted if it is approved by a majority of not less than three quarters of the total number of members of the Council of Federation and not less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the State Duma. An adopted federal constitutional law shall be signed by the President of the Russian Federation and promulgated within fourteen days.

1. The State Duma may be dissolved by the President of the Russian Federation in the cases envisaged by Articles 111 and 117 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

2. In the event that the State Duma is dissolved, the President of the Russian Federation shall announce the date of elections so that a newly-elected State Duma may be convened not later than four months after the dissolution.

3. The State Duma may not be dissolved on the grounds envisaged in Article 117 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation during the year following its election.

4. The State Duma may not be dissolved from the moment that it brings charges against the President of the Russian Federation until the Council of Federation adopts a decision on the issue.

5. The State Duma may not be dissolved while a state of emergency or martial law is in effect on the whole territory of the Russian Federation, or during the last six months of the term of office of the President of the Russian Federation.

1. Executive power in the Russian Federation shall be exercised by the Government of the Russian Federation.

2. The Government of the Russian Federation shall consist of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers.

1. The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation shall be appointed by the President of the Russian Federation with the consent of the State Duma.

2. Nominations for the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation shall be submitted not later than two weeks after a newly-elected President of the Russian Federation assumes office or after the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation or within one week after the State Duma has rejected a nomination.

3. The State Duma shall consider the candidate nominated by the President of the Russian Federation for the post of Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation within one week after the submission of the nomination.

4. In the event that the State Duma rejects the candidates for the post of Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation three times, the President of the Russian Federation shall appoint the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, dissolve the State Duma and announce new elections.

1. The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation shall, not later than one week after appointment, submit to the President of the Russian Federation proposals on the structure of federal executive government bodies.

2. The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation shall propose to the President of the Russian Federation candidates for the posts of deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers.

The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws and edicts of the President of the Russian Federation, shall determine the basic objectives of the activities of the Government of the Russian Federation and shall organize its work.

1. The Government of the Russian Federation:

a) shall develop and submit to the State Duma a federal budget and provide for its implementation; shall submit to the State Duma a report on the implementation of the federal budget; and shall submit to the State Duma annual reports on the results of its work, including on issues raised by the State Duma;

b) shall ensure the implementation in the Russian Federation of a uniform financial, credit and monetary policy;

c) shall ensure the implementation in the Russian Federation of a uniform State policy in the sphere of culture, science, education, health, social security and ecology;

d) shall carry out the administration of federal property;

e) shall carry out measures to secure the defense of the country, State security, and implementation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation;

f) shall implement measures to ensure lawfulness
and civil rights and freedoms, protect property and public order, and combat crime;

g) shall exercise other functions, which are entrusted to it by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws and edicts of the President of the Russian Federation.

2. The procedure for the activities of the Government of the Russian Federation shall be determined by federal constitutional law.

1. On the basis of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws and normative edicts of the President of the Russian Federation and for the purpose of their implementation, the Government of the Russian Federation shall issue decrees and regulations and ensure their implementation.

2. Decrees and regulations of the Government of the Russian Federation shall be binding in the Russian Federation.

3. In the event that decrees and regulations of the Government of the Russian Federation conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws and edicts of the President of the Russian Federation, they may be abolished by the President of the Russian Federation.

The Government of the Russian Federation shall resign its powers before a newly-elected President of the Russian Federation.

1. The Government of the Russian Federation may offer its resignation and the President of the Russian Federation shall either accept or reject it.

2. The President of the Russian Federation may decide on the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation.

3. The State Duma may express no confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation. A resolution of no confidence in the Government shall be adopted by a majority of votes of the total number of deputies of the State Duma. After the State Duma has expressed no confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian Federation shall have the right to announce the resignation of the Government or to reject the decision of the State Duma.
In the event that the State Duma expresses no confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation again within three months, the President of the Russian Federation shall announce the resignation of the Government or dissolve the State Duma.

4. The Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation may raise before the State Duma the issue of confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation. If the State Duma returns a vote of no confidence, the President shall within seven days adopt a decision on the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation or on the dissolution of the State Duma and the announcement of new elections.

5. In the event of the resignation or cessation of the powers of the Government of the Russian Federation, it shall continue to work on the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation until a new Government of the Russian Federation is formed.

1. Justice in the Russian Federation shall be administered only by court.

2. Judicial authority shall be exercised by means of constitutional, civil, administrative and criminal proceedings.

3. The judicial system in the Russian Federation shall be established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal constitutional law. The creation of extraordinary courts shall not be permitted.

Judges shall be citizens of the Russian Federation over 25 years of age with a higher education in law who have served in the legal profession for not less than five years. Federal law may establish additional requirements for judges of the courts of the Russian Federation.

1. Judges shall be independent and shall be subordinate only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law.

2. Should a court establish when considering a case that a legal act of a State or other body conflicts with law, it shall take a decision in accordance with the law.

1. Judges shall be irremovable.

2. The powers of a judge may be terminated or suspended only on the grounds and in accordance with the procedure established by federal law.

1. Judges shall be inviolable.

2. A judge cannot face criminal liability otherwise than in accordance with the procedure established by federal law.

1. The examination of cases in all courts shall be open. Cases may be heard in closed sessions in those instances where this is permitted by federal law.

2. The examination of criminal cases by default in courts shall not be permitted except in instances where this is permitted by federal law.

3. Judicial proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of controversy and the equality of the parties concerned.

4. In cases provided for by federal law, judicial proceedings shall be conducted with the participation of a jury.

Courts shall be financed only from the federal budget and should ensure the possibility of the complete and independent administration of justice according to the requirements of federal law.

1. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation shall consist of 19 judges.

2. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, at the request of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of Federation, the State Duma, one fifth of the members of the Council of Federation or of the deputies of the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, and legislative and executive government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, shall decide on cases on conformity to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of:

a) federal laws, normative acts of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of Federation, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation;

b) constitutions of republics, charters, and laws and other normative acts of constituent entities of the Russian Federation adopted on issues under the jurisdiction of State government bodies of the Russian Federation or under the joint jurisdiction of State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation;

c) treaties between State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, treaties between State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation;

d) international treaties of the Russian Federation, which are not in force.

3. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation shall resolve disputes on authority:

a) between federal State government bodies;

b) between State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation;

c) between higher State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

4. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, on receiving complaints about violations of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens and upon request of courts, shall check, in accordance with the procedure established by federal law, the constitutionality of a law which is used or is to be used in a particular case.

5. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, upon request of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of Federation, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, and legislative authorities of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, shall provide interpretation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

6. Acts or certain provisions thereof, which are recognized as unconstitutional, shall lose force; international treaties of the Russian Federation, which do not correspond to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, shall not be implemented or used.

7. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, upon request of the Council of Federation, shall issue a resolution on the observation of the established procedure for bringing charges of treason or of other grave crimes against the President of the Russian Federation.

The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation shall be the highest judicial body for civil, criminal, administrative and other cases under the jurisdiction of common courts; it shall exercise judicial supervision over their activities in the procedural forms envisaged by federal law and shall provide interpretation on issues of court proceedings.

The Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation shall be the highest judicial body for settling economic disputes and other cases examined by arbitration courts; it shall exercise judicial supervision over their activities in the procedural forms envisaged by federal law and shall provide interpretation on issues of court proceedings.

1. Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation and the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation shall be appointed by the Council of Federation upon nomination by the President of the Russian Federation.

2. Judges of other federal courts shall be appointed by the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure established by federal law.

3. The powers and the procedure for the formation and activities of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation and other federal courts shall be established by federal constitutional law.

1. The office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation shall be a single centralised structure in which public prosecutors are subordinated to higher public prosecutors and to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.

2. The Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation shall be appointed and dismissed by the Council of Federation upon a proposal of the President of the Russian Federation.

3. Public prosecutors of constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be appointed by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation by agreement with the constituent entities.

4. Other public prosecutors shall be appointed by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.

5. The powers, organisation and procedure for the activities of the office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation shall be determined by federal law.

1. Local self-government in the Russian Federation shall provide for the independent resolution by the population of issues of local importance, and the possession, use and management of municipal property.

2. Local self-government shall be exercised by citizens by means of referendum, elections and other forms of direct expression of their will, and through elected and other bodies of local self-government.

1. Local self-government shall be administered in urban and rural settlements and on other territories with due consideration to historical and other local traditions. The structure of bodies of local self-government shall be determined by the population independently.

2. Changes of borders of the territories in which local self-government is administered shall be permitted with due consideration to the opinion of the inhabitants of the relevant territories.

1. Bodies of local self-government shall independently manage municipal property, form, approve and implement the local budget, introduce local taxes and levies, ensure the preservation of public order, and resolve other issues of local importance.

2. Bodies of local self-government may be vested by law with certain State powers and accordingly receive material and financial resources which are necessary for their implementation. The implementation of the vested power shall be controlled by the State.

Local self-government in the Russian Federation shall be guaranteed by the right to legal protection and compensation of additional expenses arising as a result of decisions adopted by State government bodies, and by a ban on restrictions of the rights of local self-government which are established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

Proposals on amendments to and revision of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation may be submitted by the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of Federation, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, legislative (representative) bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and by groups consisting of not less than one fifth of the members of the Council of Federation or of the deputies of the State Duma.

1. The provisions of Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation may not be revised by the Federal Assembly.

2. If a proposal on revising the provisions of Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation is supported by three fifths of the total number of members of the Council of Federation and deputies of the State Duma, then in accordance with federal constitutional law, a Constitutional Assembly shall be convened.

3. The Constitutional Assembly shall either confirm the invariability of the Constitution of the Russian Federation or draft a new Constitution of the Russian Federation, which shall be adopted by the Constitutional Assembly by two thirds of the total number of its members or shall be referred to a referendum. In the event that a referendum is held, the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall be considered to have been adopted if over one half of voters who participated in the vote voted in favour of it and provided that over a half of the electorate participated in the referendum.

Amendments to the provisions of Chapters 3-8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure established for the adoption of federal constitutional law and shall come into force after they have been approved by legislative authorities of not less than two thirds of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

1. Amendments to Article 65 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation which determines the composition of the Russian Federation shall be introduced on the basis of a federal constitutional law on the admission to the Russian Federation and the creation within it of new constituent entities of the Russian Federation, or on changes in the constitutional and legal status of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation.

2. In the event of a change in the name of a republic, kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug the new name of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation shall be included in Article 65 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall come into force from the moment of its official publication according to the results of the national referendum.
The day of the national referendum, December 12, 1993, shall be considered the day of adopting the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
At the same time the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Federation - Russia adopted on April 12, 1978 with all amendments and additions shall cease to have effect.
In the event of the non-conformity to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the provisions of the Federation Treaty - Treaty on the division of authorities and powers between federal State government bodies of the Russian Federation and the State government bodies of constituent sovereign republics of the Russian Federation, the Treaty on the division of authorities and powers between federal State government bodies of the Russian Federation and the State government bodies of krays, oblasts, and the cities of Moscow and St.Petersburg of the Russian Federation, the Treaty on the division of authorities and powers between federal State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs within the Russian Federation, and other treaties between federal State government bodies of the Russian Federation and State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and treaties between State government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall apply.

2. Laws and other legal acts which were in force on the territory of the Russian Federation before this Constitution comes into force shall apply to the extent that they do not conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. The President of the Russian Federation, elected in accordance with the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Federation - Russia, shall from the day that this Constitution comes into force exercise the powers established by it until the term of office for which he (she) was elected expires.

4. The Council of Ministers - Government of the Russian Federation - from the moment that this Constitution comes into force, shall acquire the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the Russian Federation, which are established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and shall hereafter be called the Government of the Russian Federation.

5. The courts of the Russian Federation shall administer justice in accordance with their powers as established by this Constitution.
After the Constitution has come into force, judges of all courts of the Russian Federation shall retain their powers until the term for which they were elected expires. Vacant positions shall be filled in accordance with the procedure established by this Constitution.

6. Until the adoption and implementation of the federal law, which establishes the procedure for the examination of cases by a court of jury, the existing procedure for the court examination of corresponding cases shall apply.
Until criminal-procedural legislation of the Russian Federation has been brought into line with the provisions of this Constitution, the previous procedure for the arrest, detention and keeping in custody of persons suspected of committing a crime shall apply.

7. The Council of Federation of the first convocation and the State Duma of the first convocation shall be elected for a period of two years.

8. The Council of Federation shall meet for its first session on the thirtieth day after the elections. The first session of the Council of Federation shall be opened by the President of the Russian Federation.

9. A deputy of the State Duma of the first convocation may be simultaneously a member of the Government of the Russian Federation. Provisions of this Constitution on the immunity of deputies with respect to responsibility for actions (inaction) connected with the fulfilment of their official duties shall not extend to deputies of the State Duma who are members of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Deputies of the Council of Federation of the first convocation shall exercise their powers on a non-permanent basis.

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Official Website of the Government of the Russian Federation / The Russian Government

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We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by a common fate on our land, establishing human rights and freedoms, civil peace and accord, preserving the historically established State unity, proceeding from universally acknowledged principles of equality and self-determination of peoples, revering the memory of ancestors who have passed

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https://www.britannica.com/place/Russia/Government-and-society

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During the Soviet era the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (the R.S.F.S.R.) was subject to a series of Soviet constitutions (1918, 1924, 1936, 1977), under which it nominally was a sovereign socialist state within (after 1936) a federal structure. Until the late 1980s, however, the government was dominated at all levels by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was all-powerful and whose head was the country's de facto leader. Indeed, in the elections that were held, there was only a single slate of candidates, the great majority of whom were in effect chosen by the Communist Party.

From the late 1980s through 1991-the period of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika ("restructuring"), glasnost ("openness"), and demokratizatsiya ("democratization") reform policies-fundamental changes took place in the political system and government structures of the Soviet Union that altered both the nature of the Soviet federal state and the status and powers of the individual republics. In 1988 the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies was created, and a Congress of People's Deputies was established in each republic. For the first time, elections to these bodies presented voters with a choice of candidates, including noncommunists, though the Communist Party continued to dominate the system.

Thereafter, the pace of change accelerated. In June 1990 the Congress of the Russian republic proclaimed that Russian laws took precedence over Soviet laws, and the following year Boris Yeltsin became the republic's first democratically elected president. An abortive coup in August 1991 by hard-liners opposed to Gorbachev's reforms led to the collapse of most Soviet government organizations, the abolition of the Communist Party's leading role in government, and the dissolution of the party itself. Republic after republic declared its "sovereignty," and in December, when the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, Russia was established as an independent country.

Constitutional framework

The structure of the new Russian government differed significantly from that of the former Soviet republic. It was characterized by a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches, primarily over issues of constitutional authority and the pace and direction of democratic and economic reform. Conflicts came to a head in September 1993 when President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament (the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet); some deputies and their allies revolted and were suppressed only through military intervention.

On December 12, 1993, three-fifths of Russian voters ratified a new constitution proposed by Yeltsin, and representatives were elected to a new legislature. Under the new constitution the president, who is elected in a national vote, is vested with significant powers. As Russia's head of state, the president is empowered to appoint the chairman of the government (prime minister), key judges, and cabinet members. The president is also commander in chief of the armed forces and can declare martial law or a state of emergency. When the legislature fails to pass the president's legislative initiatives, he may issue decrees that have the force of law. In 2008 an amendment to the constitution, which took effect with the 2012 election, extended the presidential term from four to six years. Prior to 2020 the president could not serve more than two consecutive terms, but constitutional changes enacted that year abolished term limits for the office.

Under the new constitution the Federal Assembly became the country's legislature. It consists of the Federation Council (an upper house comprising appointed representatives from each of Russia's administrative divisions) and the State Duma (a 450-member popularly elected lower house). The president's nominee for chairman of the government is subject to approval by the State Duma; if it rejects a nominee three times or passes a vote of no confidence twice in three months, the president may dissolve the State Duma and call for new elections. All legislation must first pass the State Duma before being considered by the Federation Council. A presidential veto of a bill can be overridden by the legislature with a two-thirds majority, or a bill may be altered to incorporate presidential reservations and pass with a majority vote. With a two-thirds majority (and approval by the Russian Constitutional Court), the legislature may remove the president from office for treason or other serious criminal offenses. The Federation Council must approve all presidential appointments to the country's highest judicial bodies (Supreme Court and Constitutional Court).

The constitution provides for welfare protection, access to social security, pensions, free health care, and affordable housing; it also guarantees local self-governance. Nevertheless, national law takes precedence over regional and local laws, and the constitution enumerates many areas that either are administered jointly by the regions and the central government or are the exclusive preserve of the central government. In the years after the constitution's enactment, the central government implemented several measures to reduce the power and influence of regional governments and governors. In 2000 Pres. Vladimir Putin created seven federal districts above the regional level to increase the central government's power over the regions ( see discussion below). His successor, Dmitry Medvedev, continued this policy: as a part of Moscow's ongoing efforts to quell separatism and Islamic militancy in the Caucasus, he created an eighth federal district there in 2010.

Regional and local government

Under the Russian constitution the central government retains significant authority, but regional and local governments have been given an array of powers. For example, they exercise authority over municipal property and policing, and they can impose regional taxes. Owing to a lack of assertiveness by the central government, Russia's administrative divisions- oblasti (regions), minority republics, okruga (autonomous districts), kraya (territories), federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), and the one autonomous oblast-exerted considerable power in the initial years after the passage of the 1993 constitution. The constitution gives equal power to each of the country's administrative divisions in the Federal Assembly. However, the power of the divisions was diluted in 2000 when seven federal districts (Central, Far East, Northwest, Siberia, Southern, Urals, and Volga), each with its own presidential envoy, were established by the central government. In 2010 the southeastern portion of the Southern district was reorganized as an eighth federal district, North Caucasus. Russia's ninth federal district was created in 2014, after it annexed the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea; this territorial claim was not recognized by Ukraine or most other countries, but Russia exercised de facto control of the region. The districts' presidential envoys were given the power to implement federal law and to coordinate communication between the president and the regional governors. Legally, the envoys in federal districts had solely the power of communicating the executive guidance of the federal president. In practice, however, the guidance served more as a directive, as the president was able to use the envoys to enforce presidential authority over the regional governments.

In comparison to the federal government, regional governments generally have inadequate tax revenue to support mandatory items in their budgets, which have barely been able to cover wages for teachers and police. The budgets of regional governments also are overburdened by pensions.

Legislation has further affirmed the power of the federal government over the regions. For example, the regional governors and their deputies were prohibited from representing their region in the Federation Council on the grounds that their sitting in the Federation Council violated the principle of the separation of powers; however, under a compromise, both the legislative and executive branch of each region sent a member to the Federation Council. Legislation enacted in 2004 permitted the president to appoint the regional governors, who earlier were elected. In the first decade of the 21st century, the country began to undergo administrative change aimed at subordinating smaller okruga to neighbouring members of the federation.

Following these reforms in regional government, the new federal districts began to replace the 11 traditional economic regions, particularly for statistical purposes. The Central district unites the city of Moscow with all administrative divisions within the Central and Central Black Earth economic regions. The Northwest district combines the city of St. Petersburg with all areas in the North and Northwest regions, including Kaliningrad oblast. The Southern district includes portions of the Volga and North Caucasus economic regions; the North Caucasus district encompasses the remaining units of the latter economic region. The Volga district merges units of the Volga, Volga-Vyatka, and Ural economic regions. The Urals district consists of the remaining administrative divisions of the Ural economic region along with several from the West Siberia economic region. The Siberia district unites the remainder of the West Siberia economic region and all of East Siberia. Finally, the Far East district is congruent with the Far East economic region. The Crimean district, created in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory, included the federal city of Sevastopol.

Several of the administrative divisions established constitutions that devolved power to local jurisdictions, and, though the 1993 constitution guaranteed local self-governance, the powers of local governments vary considerably. Some local authorities, particularly in urban centres, exercise significant power and are responsible for taxation and the licensing of businesses. Moscow and St. Petersburg have particularly strong local governments, with both possessing a tax base and government structure that dwarf the country's other regions. Local councils in smaller communities are commonly rubber-stamp agencies, accountable to the city administrator, who is appointed by the regional governor. In the mid-1990s municipal government was restructured. City councils (dumas), city mayors, and city administrators replaced former city soviets.

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Russia - Federalism, Autonomy, Diversity

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Russia - Federalism, Autonomy, Diversity: During the Soviet era the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (the R.S.F.S.R.) was subject to a series of Soviet constitutions (1918, 1924, 1936, 1977), under which it nominally was a sovereign socialist state within (after 1936) a federal structure.

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What type of government does Russia have?

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What type of government does Russia have?

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Russian coat of arms.

In theory, Russia is a federal, democratic state.

In practice, it is believed that virtually all power in Russia is in the hands of its president, Vladimir Putin.

Putin has ruled Russia since the year 2000.

Since Putin took power in Russia, he has been accused of eroding human rights and democratic freedoms in the country.

On paper, Russia is a federal democratic state. In practice, however, many regard it as a dictatorship built around one man, President Vladimir Putin, who has been the leader of the Russian Federation since the year 2000. Russia has all the working parts of a democratic state, but since Putin took power, experts believe these working parts have been made to serve him and those close to him. Today, many believe that Putin now controls all levers of power in the country.

Post-Soviet Russia's Democratic Institutions

On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Russian Federation, formerly the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, was one of 15 former Soviet republics to become independent. From this point onward, Russia began a chaotic transition from a communist dictatorship to a capitalist, multiparty democracy.

In 1993, a new constitution was ratified, formally making the country into a federal, democratic republic. This constitution supposedly protects people's fundamental human rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of association. Article 10 of the constitution mentions the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that one would expect to find in any modern democracy, as well as the powers of those branches. It also proclaims the independence of the three branches.

The executive branch of Russia's government is headed by the President. The President of the Russian Federation is supposed to be the ultimate guarantor of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Russian people. He or she is responsible for maintaining the country's sovereignty, coordinating the function and interaction of state bodies, determining the basic objectives of both foreign and domestic policy, and representing Russia on the international stage. The Russian President is also the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces. He or she is directly elected by Russia's voters for a term of six years.

Federation Council building in Moscow, Russia. Image credit: VAUko/Shutterstock

It is the job of the Russian President to appoint a Prime Minister, which must be approved by the State Duma, the lower house of Russia's parliament, known as the Federal Assembly. The Prime Minister then appoints members of his or her cabinet, who head government ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 94 of the Russian constitution puts legislative power in the hands of the Federal Assembly, which is a bicameral legislature composed of two houses. The lower house is the previously-mentioned State Duma, and the upper house is called the Federation Council. The State Duma is composed of 450 members, who are elected for terms of five years. The Federation Council consists of two representatives from each constituent entity of the Russian Federation. One representative represents the legislative branches of the constituent entities, and the other represents the executives of those entities. Also, the Russian President has the right to appoint his own representatives to the Federation Council, so long as their numbers do not exceed 10% of all its members.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation also establishes a judicial branch that is supposed to act independently of the executive and legislative branches of government. The highest courts in Russia are the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Judges of both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court are appointed by the Federation Council based on a proposal by the Russian President. The Russian President also appoints the judges of the federal courts.

The Emergence Of Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Putin in 2017. Image credit: Frederic Legrand - COMEO/Shutterstock

Between 1991 and 2000, Russia's transition to democracy was chaotic and fraught with challenges. The economy was contracting, so many Russians found themselves poor and destitute. The country was also suppressing an armed, separatist rebellion in the Republic of Chechnya, one of Russia's federal entities, located in the south of the country. Nevertheless, Russia was emerging as a vibrant, multiparty democracy. That is, until shortly after the turn of the century.

On New Year's Eve in 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who led the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, resigned his position and turned power over to his prime minister, Vladimir Putin, who would subsequently win the presidential elections of that year. Putin gained popular support for his actions in Chechnya after he became prime minister in the summer of 1999. Shortly after becoming president, he worked successfully to stabilize Russia's economy, earning him even more popular support. This popular support paved the way for his ability to make gradual changes to the operations of the Russian government over the years that followed.

Putin Consolidates Power

Arguably the first step Putin took to consolidate his power came in 2001, when the Russian government took over ORT and NTV, two of the most popular independent media outlets in the country. This was the beginning of Putin's crackdown on the media in general. Over the next few years, he would work to overhaul Russia's political institutions to centralize power under him. He also established his own political party, the United Russia party, which would go on to dominate the legislative branch of Russia's government.

In 2008, Putin had to resign the Russian Presidency as he was only allowed to serve two consecutive terms in line with the country's constitution. Thus, he became prime minister once more until 2012, when he was allowed to run for the Presidency again. Between 2008 and 2012, it was generally assumed that even though another person was serving as the president, the real power remained with Putin. In 2012, Putin again won the presidential election. He then had the constitution amended to add an extra two years to his four-year term, so that he could remain president until 2018 when he was then elected to a second term. Thus, he can remain in power until 2024. Some, however, believe that he will seek to amend the constitution so that he can rule beyond the end of his second consecutive term.

Putin's Russia

Supporters of Alexei Navalny at a rally in Moscow, Russia. Image credit: NickolayV/Shutterstock

Opposition to Putin's rule has not ceased, but opposing the Russian President can lead to dire, if not fatal, consequences. Putin has been accused of assassinating some of his critics on both Russian and foreign soil. Protests in Russia are violently suppressed, and opponents of Putin are routinely arrested and jailed. Some are given lengthy prison sentences.

In the most recent case, Alexei Navalny, who is considered by many to be the most prominent opposition leader in Russia, was given a three and a half-year prison sentence for violating the terms of his probation. His probation is related to another sentence handed down to him for corruption charges viewed by many as political and baseless. Moreover, Navalny violated his probation when he sought medical treatment abroad after being poisoned by a nerve agent. Many suspect that Putin was behind the poisoning, which almost led to Navalny's death. On the night Navalny was jailed, more than 1,000 of his supporters were also arrested.

Putin now dominates all aspects of Russia's politics. Russia's media is all but entirely controlled by Putin and his supporters. Putin has even built a kind of personality cult around himself, in the same way as other dictators throughout history have done. The wheels of democracy, in theory, are still turning in Russia. Elections are still held, but they are widely regarded as shams, especially since Putin and his allies always change the country's election laws in their favor. In fact, even the poll workers themselves must be members of Putin's United Russia party. Votes are counted behind closed doors, and the results are routinely suspected of being rigged. Many would argue that Russia is fast becoming a totalitarian dictatorship.

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What Type Of Government Does Russia Have?

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In theory, Russia is a federal, democratic state. In practice, it is believed that virtually all power in Russia is in the hands of its president, Vladimir Putin. Putin has ruled Russia since the year 2000. Since Putin took power in Russia, he has been accused of eroding human rights and democratic freedoms in the country.

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Overview of Russia's Political Structure

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National Geographic Society

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Media Credits The audio, illustrations, photos, and videos are credited beneath the media asset, except for promotional images, which generally link to another page that contains the media credit. The Rights Holder for media is the person or group credited. Director Author National Geographic Society Production Managers Program Specialists other

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CultureGrams Online Database: Subscriber Area Only

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Select People and Society and Transnational Issues Tabs

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Introduction

Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil underwent more than a half century of populist and military government until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers. Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Having successfully weathered a period of global financial difficulty in the late 20th century, Brazil was seen as one of the world's strongest emerging markets and a contributor to global growth. The awarding of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the first ever to be held in South America, was seen as symbolic of the country's rise. However, from about 2013 to 2016, Brazil was plagued by a sagging economy, high unemployment, and high inflation, only emerging from recession in 2017. Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF (2011-2016) was removed from office in 2016 by Congress for having committed impeachable acts against Brazil's budgetary laws, and her vice president, Michel TEMER, served the remainder of her second term. In October 2018, Jair BOLSONARO won the presidency with 55 percent of the vote and assumed office on 1 January 2019.

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Geography

note: includes Arquipelago de Fernando de Noronha, Atol das Rocas, Ilha da Trindade, Ilhas Martin Vaz, and Penedos de Sao Pedro e Sao Paulo
country comparison to the world: 6

slightly smaller than the US

agricultural land: 32.9% (2018 est.)

arable land: 8.6% (2018 est.)

permanent crops: 0.8% (2018 est.)

permanent pasture: 23.5% (2018 est.)

forest: 61.9% (2018 est.)

other: 5.2% (2018 est.)

People and Society

Portuguese (official and most widely spoken language)

note: less common languages include Spanish (border areas and schools), German, Italian, Japanese, English, and a large number of minor Amerindian languages

Brazil's rapid fertility decline since the 1960s is the main factor behind the country's slowing population growth rate, aging population, and fast-paced demographic transition. Brasilia has not taken full advantage of its large working-age population to develop its human capital and strengthen its social and economic institutions but is funding a study abroad program to bring advanced skills back to the country. The current favorable age structure will begin to shift around 2025, with the labor force shrinking and the elderly starting to compose an increasing share of the total population. Well-funded public pensions have nearly wiped out poverty among the elderly, and Bolsa Familia and other social programs have lifted tens of millions out of poverty. More than half of Brazil's population is considered middle class, but poverty and income inequality levels remain high; the Northeast, North, and Center-West, women, and black, mixed race, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. Disparities in opportunities foster social exclusion and contribute to Brazil's high crime rate, particularly violent crime in cities and favelas (slums).

Brazil has traditionally been a net recipient of immigrants, with its southeast being the prime destination. After the importation of African slaves was outlawed in the mid-19th century, Brazil sought Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Germans) and later Asians (Japanese) to work in agriculture, especially coffee cultivation. Recent immigrants come mainly from Argentina, Chile, and Andean countries (many are unskilled illegal migrants) or are returning Brazilian nationals. Since Brazil's economic downturn in the 1980s, emigration to the United States, Europe, and Japan has been rising but is negligible relative to Brazil's total population. The majority of these emigrants are well-educated and middle-class. Fewer Brazilian peasants are emigrating to neighboring countries to take up agricultural work.

improved: urban: 100% of population

rural: 91.6% of population

total: 98.2% of population

unimproved: urban: 0% of population

rural: 8.4% of population

total: 1.6% of population (2017 est.)

improved: urban: 92.8% of population

rural: 60.1% of population

total: 88.3% of population

unimproved: urban: 7.2% of population

rural: 39.9% of population

total: 11.7% of population (2017 est.)

Government

note: Brazil has four time zones, including one for the Fernando de Noronha Islands

etymology: name bestowed on the new capital of Brazil upon its inauguration in 1960; previous Brazilian capitals had been Salvador from 1549 to 1763 and Rio de Janeiro from 1763 to 1960

description: bicameral National Congress or Congresso Nacional consists of:
Federal Senate or Senado Federal (81 seats; 3 members each from 26 states and 3 from the federal district directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 8-year terms, with one-third and two-thirds of the membership elected alternately every 4 years)
Chamber of Deputies or Camara dos Deputados (513 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms)

elections:
Federal Senate - last held on 7 October 2018 for two-thirds of the Senate (next to be held in October 2022 for one-third of the Senate)
Chamber of Deputies - last held on 7 October 2018 (next to be held in October 2022)

election results:
Federal Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PMDB 7, PP 5, REDE 5, DEM 4, PSDB 4, PSDC 4, PSL 4, PT 4, PDT 2, PHS 2, PPS 2, PSB 2, PTB 2, Podemos 1, PR 1, PRB 1, PROS 1, PRP 1, PSC 1, SD 1; composition - men 70, women 11, percent of women 13.6%
Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PT 56, PSL 52, PP 37, PMDB 34, PSDC 34, PR 33, PSB 32, PRB 30, DEM 29, PSDB 29, PDT 28, SD 13, Podemos 11, PSOL 10, PTB 10, PCdoB 9, NOVO 8, PPS 8, PROS 8, PSC 8, Avante 7, PHS 6, Patriota 5, PRP 4, PV 4, PMN 3, PTC 2, DC 1, PPL 1, REDE 1; composition - men 462, women 51, percent of women 9.9%; total National Congress percent of women 10.4%

Avante [Luis TIBE] (formerly Labor Party of Brazil or PTdoB)
Brazilian Communist Party or PCB [Ivan Martins PINHEIRO]
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party or PMDB [Michel TEMER]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB [Cristiane BRASIL]
Brazilian Renewal Labor Party or PRTB [Jose Levy FIDELIX da Cruz]
Brazilian Republican Party or PRB [Marcos Antonio PEREIRA]
Brazilian Social Democracy Party or PSDB [Tasso JEREISSATI]
Brazilian Socialist Party or PSB [Carlos Roberto SIQUEIRA de Barros]
Christian Democracy or DC [Jose Maria EYMAEL] (formerly Christian Social Democratic Party or PSDC)
Christian Labor Party or PTC [Daniel TOURINHO]
Communist Party of Brazil or PCdoB [Jose Renato RABELO]
Democratic Labor Party or PDT [Carlos Roberto LUPI]
The Democrats or DEM [Jose AGRIPINO] (formerly Liberal Front Party or PFL)
Free Homeland Party or PPL [Sergio RUBENS]
Green Party or PV [Jose Luiz PENNA]
Humanist Party of Solidarity or PHS [Eduardo MACHADO]
National Mobilization Party or PMN [Telma RIBEIRO dos Santos]
New Party or NOVO [Moises JARDIM]
Party of the Republic or PR [Alfredo NASCIMENTO]
Patriota [Adilson BARROSO Oliveira] (formerly National Ecologic Party or PEN)
Podemos [Renata ABREU] (formerly National Labor Party or PTN)
Popular Socialist Party or PPS [Roberto Joao Pereira FREIRE]
Progressive Party or PP [Ciro NOGUEIRA]
Progressive Republican Party or PRP [Ovasco Roma Altimari RESENDE]
Republican Social Order Party or PROS [Euripedes JUNIOR]
Social Christian Party or PSC [Vitor Jorge Abdala NOSSEIS]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Guilherme CAMPOS]
Social Liberal Party or PSL [Luciano Caldas BIVAR]
Socialism and Freedom Party or PSOL [Luiz ARAUJO]
Solidarity or SD [Paulo PEREIRA DA SILVA]
Sustainability Network or REDE [Marina SILVA]
United Socialist Workers' Party or PSTU [Jose Maria DE ALMEIDA]
Workers' Cause Party or PCO [Rui Costa PIMENTA]
Workers' Party or PT [Gleisi HOFFMAN]

green with a large yellow diamond in the center bearing a blue celestial globe with 27 white five-pointed stars; the globe has a white equatorial band with the motto ORDEM E PROGRESSO (Order and Progress); the current flag was inspired by the banner of the former Empire of Brazil (1822-1889); on the imperial flag, the green represented the House of Braganza of Pedro I, the first Emperor of Brazil, while the yellow stood for the Habsburg Family of his wife; on the modern flag the green represents the forests of the country and the yellow rhombus its mineral wealth (the diamond shape roughly mirrors that of the country); the blue circle and stars, which replaced the coat of arms of the original flag, depict the sky over Rio de Janeiro on the morning of 15 November 1889 - the day the Republic of Brazil was declared; the number of stars has changed with the creation of new states and has risen from an original 21 to the current 27 (one for each state and the Federal District)

note: one of several flags where a prominent component of the design reflects the shape of the country; other such flags are those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, and Vanuatu

note: music adopted 1890, lyrics adopted 1922; the anthem's music, composed in 1822, was used unofficially for many years before it was adopted

Economy

Brazil is the eighth-largest economy in the world, but is recovering from a recession in 2015 and 2016 that ranks as the worst in the country's history. In 2017, Brazil`s GDP grew 1%, inflation fell to historic lows of 2.9%, and the Central Bank lowered benchmark interest rates from 13.75% in 2016 to 7%.

The economy has been negatively affected by multiple corruption scandals involving private companies and government officials, including the impeachment and conviction of Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF in August 2016. Sanctions against the firms involved - some of the largest in Brazil - have limited their business opportunities, producing a ripple effect on associated businesses and contractors but creating opportunities for foreign companies to step into what had been a closed market.

The succeeding TEMER administration has implemented a series of fiscal and structural reforms to restore credibility to government finances. Congress approved legislation in December 2016 to cap public spending. Government spending growth had pushed public debt to 73.7% of GDP at the end of 2017, up from over 50% in 2012. The government also boosted infrastructure projects, such as oil and natural gas auctions, in part to raise revenues. Other economic reforms, proposed in 2016, aim to reduce barriers to foreign investment, and to improve labor conditions. Policies to strengthen Brazil's workforce and industrial sector, such as local content requirements, have boosted employment, but at the expense of investment.

Brazil is a member of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), a trade bloc that includes Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay - Venezuela's membership in the organization was suspended In August 2017. After the Asian and Russian financial crises, Mercosur adopted a protectionist stance to guard against exposure to volatile foreign markets and it currently is negotiating Free Trade Agreements with the European Union and Canada.

4.2% (2016 est.)

note: approximately 4% of the population are below the "extreme" poverty line

reals (BRL) per US dollar -

5.12745 (2020 est.)

4.14915 (2019 est.)

3.862 (2018 est.)

3.3315 (2014 est.)

2.3535 (2013 est.)

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

Communications

Military and Security

the military's primary role is enforcing border security, particularly in the Amazon states; it also assists with internal security operations with a focus on organized crime

Brazilian police forces are divided into Federal Police (around 15,000 personnel), Military Police (approximately 400,000 personnel), and Civil Police (approximately 125,000 personnel); the Federal Police serve under the Ministry of Justice, while the Military and Civil police are subordinate to the state governments; the National Public Security Force (Forca Nacional de Seguranca Publica or SENASP) is a national police force made up of Military Police from various states; article 144 of the Brazilian constitution states that all state Military Police are classified as reserve troops and ancillary forces of the Brazilian Army

Transnational Issues

uncontested boundary dispute between Brazil and Uruguay over Braziliera/Brasiliera Island in the Quarai/Cuareim River leaves the tripoint with Argentina in question; smuggling of firearms and narcotics continues to be an issue along the Uruguay-Brazil border; Colombian-organized illegal narcotics and paramilitary activities penetrate Brazil's border region with Venezuela

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Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930.

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The cultures of the indigenous Indians, Africans, and Portuguese have together formed the modern Brazilian way of life. The Portuguese culture is by far the dominant of these influences; from it Brazilians acquired their language, their main religion, and most of their customs. The Indian population is now statistically small, but Tupí-Guaraní, the language of many Brazilian Indians, continues to strongly influence the Brazilian Portuguese language; other Indian contributions to Brazilian culture are most apparent in the Amazon basin. African influences on the Brazilian way of life are strongest along the coast between the Northeast and Rio de Janeiro; they include traditional foods, religions, and popular music and dance, especially the samba. Commercial and cultural imports from Europe and North America have often competed with-and influenced-Brazilians' own cultural output, and critics have argued that the nation's cultural identity is suffering as a result. Despite numerous social and economic challenges, Brazilians continue to be exuberant and creative in their celebrations and art forms.

Cultural institutions

The Brazilian Academy of Letters, with its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, is generally regarded as the most prestigious of the country's numerous learned societies. The National Library, also in Rio, was founded in 1810 with 60,000 volumes from the Portuguese royal library; it now holds millions of books and documents. Most of Brazil's other libraries have limited holdings. Among the major history museums are the Museum of the Republic (1960; housed in the former governmental palace) and the National Historical Museum (1922), both in Rio, the São Paulo University Museum (1895), and the Imperial Museum (1940) in Petropólis. The São Paulo Art Museum (1947) and Rio de Janeiro Museum of Modern Art (1948) are internationally renowned. Both Rio and São Paulo have major museums of anthropology and numerous theatres. A notable institution for the performing arts is the São Paulo State Symphony Orchestra (1953; revitalized 1972), housed since 1999 in the Sala São Paulo, a renovated early 20th-century railroad station. Few of the country's major cultural institutions are based in Brasília.

The arts

Literature

Brazil has had many world-renowned literary figures whose cumulative writings are regarded by many to be richer than those of Portugal because of their variety of ethnic and regional themes. Joaquim Machado de Assis, the son of a freed slave, was a leading voice of the 19th century with his romantic novels. In the 20th century the Northeast produced a particularly wide range of superb writing, including that of Gilberto Freyre on the subject of life under slavery, Graciliano Ramos's tragedies about the drought quadrilateral, João Guimaraês Rosa's tales of survival and violence in the interior, and Jorge Amado's lighthearted stories set in the cacao-growing zone of Bahia. Érico Veríssimo 's tales of southern Brazil have also been translated into many languages.

Visual arts

The landscape architect Roberto Burle Marx has made urban Brazilians especially aware of the splendours of their natural environment by replacing the traditional, formal European-style gardens containing imported plants with a profusion of native species in approximation to their natural settings. Some of Marx's landscapes have been used to set off the imaginative structures of Brazil's world-renowned architect Oscar Niemeyer. Among his works, Niemeyer designed a striking array of public buildings in Brasília, in collaboration with Lúcio Costa, the creator of the capital's original layout. Brazil also cherishes numerous splendid structures from its colonial and imperial past, from the tiled houses and ornate churches of Salvador to the palaces and public buildings of Rio de Janeiro. Among the most revered of these are the 18th-century churches in Minas Gerais that were adorned by facades, biblical scenes, and statues carved in soapstone by Antônio Francisco Lisboa, better known as Aleijadinho ("Little Cripple").

Western styles of painting began developing in Brazil in the 18th century. In the 19th century, particularly during the reign of Emperor Pedro II, the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts in Rio de Janeiro drove the development of Brazilian painting, which was largely influenced by Neoclassical and Romantic styles. The academy organized art collections, held exhibitions and competitions, and trained a number of Brazilian artists who specialized in the painting of landscapes and historical subjects. Among the most prominent 19th-century Brazilian painters were Victor Meirelles, Pedro Américo, José Ferraz de Almeida Júnior, and Rodolfo Amoedo. In the late 19th century Belmiro de Almeida painted scenes of Brazilian daily life, influencing a trend toward realism. In the 20th century the painter Cândido Portinari was a major proponent of a uniquely Brazilian style, which blended abstract European techniques with realistic portrayals of the people and landscapes of his native land; the painter Emiliano Di Cavalcanti, a contemporary of Portinari, gained equal international renown. In 1922, seeking to break with the conservative past, Di Cavalcanti helped to organize Modern Art Week in São Paulo, which promoted a Modernist spirit in Brazilian art. Later in the 20th century, celebrated photographic collections, such as the works of Sebastião Salgado, interpreted Brazil's social and natural settings. The country's most prestigious art exhibition is the International Biennial of São Paulo (established 1951), which regularly attracts participants from more than 50 countries.

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Brazil - Culture, Diversity, Music: The cultures of the indigenous Indians, Africans, and Portuguese have together formed the modern Brazilian way of life.

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Cultural Traditions & Festivals in Brazil

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Cultural Traditions & Festivals in Brazil

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Much of Brazil's international reputation is centered around local traditions and celebrations such as capoeira, the national sport, and the festivities of Carnaval. From the cult of soccer to Catholic holidays to the rituals of the local religion, Candomble, Brazil's traditions are both secular and sacred. In some cases, such as in the earthy revelry of Carnaval, the division seems all but clear.

Brazil's Carnaval

Carnaval, the traditional festival of decadence before Lent begins, has some of its biggest celebrations in Brazil. The cities of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador are particularly famous for their parades; the performers spend months preparing and practicing. During the two weeks immediately preceding the festival, local community bands play throughout Rio's neighborhoods. The informal pre-festival celebrations are known as "blocos." They are very easy to attend and usually take place on the streets in front of bars. Fancy balls take place throughout the city's upscale venues. The Copacabana Palace Ball is the crown jewel of these parties. In the streets, visitors watch the Samba School Parade from Sunday night through Monday morning. Major streets close to traffic throughout the Carnaval festivities.

New Year's Celebrations

Rio is home to Reveillon, a high-spirited New Year's celebration. Early in the day, many local restaurants serve special buffet lunches. By evening, the throngs have gathered along the city's beaches to watch the midnight fireworks display. For followers of the Afro-Brazilian religion, Candomble, New Year's celebrations include wearing all-white garb, lighting candles and setting small boats loaded with trinkets into the ocean, in offering to the sea goddess Yemenja.

Bumba-meu-boi and Regional Festivals

Throughout the year, numerous regional festivals take place in all corners of Brazil. In Sao Luis, the Bumba-meu-boi festival has the townsfolk act out a folk story involving the killing and resurrection of a bull. The celebrations span several months. In Salvador, the end of January brings a ceremonial washing of the steps of the Bonfim Church, an event that draws an audience of 800,000 people. Women in traditional costumes use perfumed water to wash the steps. Leading up to Easter, the citizens of Nova Jerusalem enact a passion play, the largest in all of South America. The stages of the cross last 10 days, culminating on Easter Sunday.

National Traditions

Besides the country's animated festivals and celebrations, Brazil has numerous traditions, from sports to dance to religious rites. Capoeira, a home-grown martial art, is based on self-defense practices devised by African slaves. Because it was originally necessary to disguise the practice, the art now resembles dancing as much as fighting. Brazil's enthusiasm for soccer launches the sport to the level of a national obsession. Other national traditions draw from the predominant religions, Catholicism and Candomble. Candomble traditions include offerings to Lemanja during the new year, as well as Boa Morte, or beautiful death, a celebration that takes place in Salvador and incorporates music and dance. Samba music and dance comes from the Bantu who arrived in Brazil from Angola. This African musical import has evolved to produce Bossa Nova and other traditional forms of Brazilian music.

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Cultural Traditions & Festivals in Brazil

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Much of Brazil's international reputation is centered around local traditions and celebrations such as capoeira, the national sport, and the festivities of Carnaval. From the cult of soccer to Catholic holidays to the rituals of the local religion, Candomble, Brazil's traditions are both secular and sacred.

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The Cultural Atlas team acknowledges the Traditional Owners of the lands throughout Australia on whose country we have the privilege to live and work. We pay our respects to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander custodians past, present and emerging.

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The Cultural Atlas team acknowledges the Traditional Owners of the lands throughout Australia on whose country we have the privilege to live and work. We pay our respects to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander custodians past, present and emerging.

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Learn about the religious make-up of society and how religion influences daily life and culture

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Brazil (more general information, click "government")

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Brazil (more general information, click "government")

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Occupying half of South America and much of the Amazon River basin, Brazil is bordered by every country on the continent except for Ecuador and Chile. Framed by the Atlantic…

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Brazil (general information w/ multiple topics)

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Brazil (general information w/ multiple topics)

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OFFICIAL NAME: Federal Republic of Brazil

FORM OF GOVERNMENT: Democratic federal republic

CAPITAL: Brasilia

POPULATION: 208,846,892

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Portuguese

MONEY: Real

AREA: 3,286,470 square miles (8,511,965 square kilometers)

MAJOR MOUNTAIN RANGES: Serra do Mar, Serra do Espinhaço

MAJOR RIVERS: Amazon, São Francisco, Paraná, Tocantins

Brazil is the largest country in South America and the fifth largest nation in the world. It forms an enormous triangle on the eastern side of the continent with a 4,500-mile (7,400-kilometer) coastline along the Atlantic Ocean. It has borders with every South American country except Chile and Ecuador.

The Brazilian landscape is very varied. It is most well known for its dense forests, including the Amazon, the world's largest jungle, in the north. But there are also dry grasslands (called pampas), rugged hills, pine forests, sprawling wetlands, immense plateaus, and a long coastal plain.

Northern Brazil is dominated by the Amazon River and the jungles that surround it. The Amazon is not one river but a network of many hundreds of waterways. Its total length stretches 4,250 miles (6,840 kilometers). Thousands of species live in the river, including the infamous piranha and the boto, or pink river dolphin.
Map created by National Geographic Maps

PEOPLE & CULTURE

Most Brazilians are descended from three ethnic groups: Amerindians, European settlers (mainly from Portugal), and Africans. Starting in the 19th century, waves of immigrants from Europe, the Middle East, and even Japan added to this mix. This diversity of cultures has created a rich religious, musical, and culinary culture.

Brazilians are soccer crazy, and their country has produced some of the best players. The most famous of all is Edson Arantes do Nascimento, better known as Pelé. Brazil has won the World Cup soccer finals five times, more than any other nation.

Brazil has the greatest variety of animals of any country in the world. It is home to 600 mammal species, 1,500 fish species, 1,600 bird species, and an amazing 100,000 different types of insects. Brazil's jungles are home to most of its animal life, but many unique species also live in the pampas and semidesert regions.

In the central-western part of Brazil sits a flat, swampy area called the Pantanal. This patchwork of flooded lagoons and small islands is the world's largest wetland. Here live giant anacondas, huge guinea pig relatives called capybaras, and fierce South American alligators called caimans.

For thousands of years, people have been exploiting the jungles of Brazil. But since Europeans arrived about five centuries ago, forest destruction has been rampant. Most of Brazil's Atlantic rain forest is now gone, and huge tracts of the Amazon are disappearing every year. The government has established many national parks and refuges, but they only cover about 7 percent of the country.

GOVERNMENT & ECONOMY

Brazil is a federal republic with a president, a National Congress, and a judiciary. From 1888 until recently, the country struggled with democracy. But in 1985, the military government was peacefully removed, and by 1995, Brazil's politics and economy had become fairly stable.

Brazil has many different soils and climates, so it can produce a great variety of crops. Its agricultural exports include sugarcane, latex, coffee, cocoa beans, cotton, soybeans, rice, and tropical fruits.

Brazil is also South America's most industrial nation, producing chemicals, steel, aircraft, and cars.

Until recently, scientists thought Brazil was first settled by Asians about 10,000 years ago. But new evidence shows there were people living there at least 32,000 years ago. Some experts think they may have arrived from islands in the Pacific Ocean.

Brazil was added to the map of the world during the great European explorations in the late 15th century led by Portugal and Spain. When Europeans first reached the coast of Brazil, the country was home to about 30 million indigenous people, or Amerindians. Today, only about 300,000 remain, living primarily in Brazil's remotest places.

Portugal established its first colony in Brazil in 1530. Colonists created sugarcane plantations along the coast and sent diamonds and gold back to Europe. Soon, people from West Africa were brought to Brazil to work as slaves. The discovery of large inland gold reserves brought thousands of people from the coasts and as far away as Europe to the interior of the country.

In 1789, Brazilians tried to kick out their Portuguese rulers. The rebellion was soon put down, but it started a movement toward independence. By 1822, Brazil was a sovereign nation. Kings of Portuguese blood ruled until 1888, when military leaders and landowners expelled the king, and Brazil became a federal republic.

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Brazil Country Profile - National Geographic Kids

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Brazil is the largest country in South America and the fifth largest nation in the world.

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Brazil's Report on Freedom of the Press/Speech

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Brazil's Report on Freedom of the Press/Speech

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Reporters sans frontières assure la promotion et la défense de la liberté d'informer et d'être informé partout dans le monde. L'organisation, basée à Paris, compte des bureaux à l'international (Berlin, Bruxelles, Genève, Madrid, Stockholm, Tripoli, Tunis, Vienne et Washington DC) et plus de 150 correspondants répartis sur les cinq continents.

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Select Government, Military and Security, Transnational Issues Tabs

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Introduction

Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getúlio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. VARGAS governed over various versions of democratic and authoritarian regimes from 1930 to 1945. Democratic rule returned (including a democratically elected VARGAS administration from 1951 to 1955) and lasted until 1964, when the military overthrew President João GOULART. The military regime censored journalists and repressed and tortured dissidents in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The dictatorship lasted until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers, and the Brazilian Congress passed its current constitution in 1989.

By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Having successfully weathered a period of global financial difficulty in the late 20th century, under President Luiz Inácio LULA da Silva (2003-2010) Brazil was seen as one of the world's strongest emerging markets and a contributor to global growth. The awarding of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the first ever to be held in South America, was symbolic of the country's rise. However, from about 2013 to 2016, Brazil was plagued by a sagging economy, high unemployment, and high inflation, only emerging from recession in 2017. Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF (2011-2016) was removed from office in 2016 by Congress for having committed impeachable acts against Brazil's budgetary laws, and her vice president, Michel TEMER, served the remainder of her second term. A money-laundering investigation, Operation Lava Jato, uncovered a vast corruption scheme and prosecutors charged several high-profile Brazilian politicians with crimes. Former-President LULA was convicted of accepting bribes and served jail time (2018-19), although his conviction was overturned in early 2021. LULA's revival became complete in October 2022 when he narrowly defeated incumbent Jair BOLSONARO (2019-2022) in the presidential election.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

slightly smaller than the US

agricultural land: 32.9% (2018 est.)

arable land: 8.6% (2018 est.)

permanent crops: 0.8% (2018 est.)

permanent pasture: 23.5% (2018 est.)

forest: 61.9% (2018 est.)

other: 5.2% (2018 est.)

Amazon river mouth (shared with Peru [s]) - 6,400 km; Río de la Plata/Paraná river source (shared with Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay [m]) - 4,880 km; Tocantins - 3,650 km; São Francisco - 3,180 km; Paraguay river source (shared with Argentina and Paraguay [m]) - 2,549 km; Rio Negro river mouth (shared with Colombia [s] and Venezuela) - 2,250 km; Uruguay river source (shared with Argentina and Uruguay [m]) - 1,610 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

People and Society

Portuguese (official and most widely spoken language); note - less common languages include Spanish (border areas and schools), German, Italian, Japanese, English, and a large number of minor Amerindian languages

major-language sample(s):
O Livro de Fatos Mundiais, a fonte indispensável para informação básica. (Brazilian Portuguese)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

Brazil's rapid fertility decline since the 1960s is the main factor behind the country's slowing population growth rate, aging population, and fast-paced demographic transition. Brasilia has not taken full advantage of its large working-age population to develop its human capital and strengthen its social and economic institutions but is funding a study abroad program to bring advanced skills back to the country. The current favorable age structure will begin to shift around 2025, with the labor force shrinking and the elderly starting to compose an increasing share of the total population. Well-funded public pensions have nearly wiped out poverty among the elderly, and Bolsa Familia and other social programs have lifted tens of millions out of poverty. More than half of Brazil's population is considered middle class, but poverty and income inequality levels remain high; the Northeast, North, and Center-West, women, and black, mixed race, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. Disparities in opportunities foster social exclusion and contribute to Brazil's high crime rate, particularly violent crime in cities and favelas (slums).

Brazil has traditionally been a net recipient of immigrants, with its southeast being the prime destination. After the importation of African slaves was outlawed in the mid-19th century, Brazil sought Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Germans) and later Asians (Japanese) to work in agriculture, especially coffee cultivation. Recent immigrants come mainly from Argentina, Chile, and Andean countries (many are unskilled illegal migrants) or are returning Brazilian nationals. Since Brazil's economic downturn in the 1980s, emigration to the United States, Europe, and Japan has been rising but is negligible relative to Brazil's total population. The majority of these emigrants are well-educated and middle-class. Fewer Brazilian peasants are emigrating to neighboring countries to take up agricultural work.

improved: urban: 99.8% of population

rural: 96.9% of population

total: 99.4% of population

unimproved: urban: 0.2% of population

rural: 3.1% of population

total: 0.6% of population (2020 est.)

improved: urban: 94.1% of population

rural: 63.6% of population

total: 90.2% of population

unimproved: urban: 5.9% of population

rural: 36.4% of population

total: 9.8% of population (2020 est.)

Environment

agricultural land: 32.9% (2018 est.)

arable land: 8.6% (2018 est.)

permanent crops: 0.8% (2018 est.)

permanent pasture: 23.5% (2018 est.)

forest: 61.9% (2018 est.)

other: 5.2% (2018 est.)

Amazon river mouth (shared with Peru [s]) - 6,400 km; Río de la Plata/Paraná river source (shared with Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay [m]) - 4,880 km; Tocantins - 3,650 km; São Francisco - 3,180 km; Paraguay river source (shared with Argentina and Paraguay [m]) - 2,549 km; Rio Negro river mouth (shared with Colombia [s] and Venezuela) - 2,250 km; Uruguay river source (shared with Argentina and Uruguay [m]) - 1,610 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Government

description: bicameral National Congress or Congresso Nacional consists of:
Federal Senate or Senado Federal (81 seats; 3 members each from 26 states and 3 from the federal district directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 8-year terms, with one-third and two-thirds of the membership elected alternately every 4 years)

Chamber of Deputies or Camara dos Deputados (513 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by open party-list proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms)

elections:
Federal Senate - last held on 2 October 2022 for one-third of the Senate (next to be held on 4 October 2026 for two-thirds of the seats)

Chamber of Deputies - last held on 2 October 2022 (next to be held on 4 October 2026)

election results:
Federal Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PL 13, Brazil Union 12, MBD 10, PSD 10, PT 9, Progressistas 7, Podemos 6, PSDB 4, Republicans 3, PDT 2, Cidadania 1, PSB 1, PSC 1, PROS 1, REDE 1; composition - men 66, women 15, percent of women 18.5%

Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PL 99, PT 67, Brazil Union 59, PP 47, MDB 42, PSD 42, Republicans 41, PDT 17, PSB 14, PSDB 13, Podemos 12, PSOL 12, Avante 7, PCdoB 6, PSC 6, PV 6, Cidadania 5, Patriota 4, PROS 4, SD 4, NOVO 3, REDE 2, PTB 1; composition - men 423, women 90, percent of women 17.5%; note - total National Congress percent of women 17.7%

Act (Agir) [Daniel TOURINHO] (formerly Christian Labor Party or PTC)
Avante [Luis Henrique de Oliveira RESENDE] (formerly Labor Party of Brazil or PTdoB)
Brazil Union (União Brasil); note - founded from a merger between the Democrats (DEM) and the Social Liberal Party (PSL)
Brazilian Communist Party or PCB [Astrogildo PEREIRA]
Brazilian Democratic Movement or MDB [Luiz Felipe Baleia TENUTO Rossi]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB [Kassyo Santos RAMOS]
Brazilian Renewal Labor Party or PRTB [Júlio Cezar FIDELIX da Cruz]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB
Brazilian Social Democracy Party or PSDB [Bruno Cavalcanti de ARAÚJO]
Brazilian Socialist Party or PSB [Carlos Roberto SIQUEIRA de Barros]
Christian Democracy or DC [José Maria EYMAEL] (formerly Christian Social
Cidadania [Roberto João Pereira FREIRE] (formerly Popular Socialist Party or PPS)
Communist Party of Brazil or PCdoB [Luciana SANTOS]
Democratic Labor Party or PDT [Ciro FERREIRA Gomes]
Democratic Party or PSDC
Democrats or DEM [Jose AGRIPINO] (formerly Liberal Front Party or PFL); note - dissolved in February 2022
Green Party or PV [José Luiz PENNA]
Liberal Party or PL [Valdemar Costa Neto] (formerly Party of the Republic or PR)
National Mobilization Party or PMN [Antonio Carlos Bosco MASSAROLLO]
New Party or NOVO [Eduardo RIBEIRO]
Patriota [Ovasco RESENDE] (formerly National Ecologic Party or PEN)
Podemos [Renata ABREU] (formerly National Labor Party or PTN)
Progressive Party (Progressistas) or PP [Ciro NOGUEIRA Lima Filho]
Republican Social Order Party or PROS [Euripedes JUNIOR]
Republicans (Republicanos) [Marcos Antônio PEREIRA] (formerly Brazilian Republican Party or PRB)
Social Christian Party or PSC [Everaldo Dias PEREIRA]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Alfredo COATIT Neto]
Social Liberal Party or PSL [Luciano Caldas BIVAR]
Socialism and Freedom Party or PSOL [Juliano MEDEIROS]
Solidarity or SD [Paulinho DA FORÇA]
Sustainability Network or REDE [Marina SILVA]
United Socialist Workers' Party or PSTU [José Maria DE ALMEIDA]
Workers' Cause Party or PCO [Rui Costa PIMENTA]
Workers' Party or PT [Gleisi Helena HOFFMANN]

total World Heritage Sites: 23 (15 cultural, 7 natural, 1 mixed)

selected World Heritage Site locales: Brasilia (c); Historic Salvador de Bahia (c); Historic Ouro Preto (c); Historic Olinda (c); Iguaçu National Park (n); Jesuit Missions of the Guaranis (c); Rio de Janeiro: Carioca Landscapes (c); Central Amazon Conservation Complex (n); Atlantic Forest South-East Reserves (n); Paraty and Ilha Grande - Culture and Biodiversity (m)

Economy

$3.128 trillion (2021 est.)
$2.989 trillion (2020 est.)
$3.11 trillion (2019 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars

comparison ranking: 9

$14,600 (2021 est.)
$14,000 (2020 est.)
$14,700 (2019 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars

comparison ranking: 111

$317.175 billion (2021 est.)
$239.283 billion (2020 est.)
$260.075 billion (2019 est.)

note: Data are in current year dollars and do not include illicit exports or re-exports.

comparison ranking: 24

$681.336 billion (2019 est.)
$660.693 billion (2018 est.)

comparison ranking: 20

reals (BRL) per US dollar -

Exchange rates:
5.394 (2021 est.)
5.155 (2020 est.)
3.944 (2019 est.)
3.654 (2018 est.)
3.191 (2017 est.)

Energy

456.67 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from coal and metallurgical coke: 63.53 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from petroleum and other liquids: 328.824 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from consumed natural gas: 64.316 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

comparison ranking: total emissions 14

Communications

Transportation

698

civil airports: 35

military airports: 14

joint use (civil-military) airports: 17

other airports: 632

note: paved runways have a concrete or asphalt surface but not all have facilities for refueling, maintenance, or air traffic control; the length of a runway required for aircraft to safely operate depends on a number of factors including the type of aircraft, the takeoff weight (including passengers, cargo, and fuel), engine types, flap settings, landing speed, elevation of the airport, and average maximum daily air temperature; paved runways can reach a length of 5,000 m (16,000 ft.), but the "typical" length of a commercial airline runway is between 2,500-4,000 m (8,000-13,000 ft.)

Military and Security

1.2% of GDP (2022 est.)
1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)
1.4% of GDP (2020 est.)
1.4% of GDP (2019 est.)
1.5% of GDP (2018 est.)

comparison ranking: 108

the Brazilian Armed Forces (BAF) are the second largest military in the Western Hemisphere behind the US; while they are responsible for external security and protecting the country's sovereignty, Brazil does not have any territorial disputes with its neighbors or regional rivalries; the BAF's missions include patrolling and protecting the country's long borders and coastline and extensive territorial waters and river network, assisting with internal security, providing domestic disaster response and humanitarian assistance, and participating in multinational peacekeeping missions

the Army has a considerable internal security role; in the past decade, it has mobilized thousands of troops to conduct counternarcotics operations, support the police in combating crime, assist with disease outbreaks and humanitarian missions, and provide security for major events such as the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics; it has also cooperated with neighboring countries such as Argentina and Paraguay on border security to combat smuggling and trafficking; the Army is organized into regional commands, military regions, and geographically based divisions covering the entirety of the country; it has approximately 30 combat brigades which include light, mechanized, or motorized infantry, light armored/cavalry, special operations, artillery, and helicopter forces; many of the light infantry brigades are specialized for air mobile, airborne, jungle, mountain, or urban warfare operations; the Army has established a battalion-sized (1,000 troops) expeditionary force for foreign international missions that it plans to increase to a 3,000-strong brigade by 2030

the Navy conducts coastal, regional, and riverine operations and has a wide variety of missions ranging from sea patrolling and power projection to countering piracy, illegal fishing, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime; it is organized into 9 districts covering the entirety of the country; the Navy's principal warships include approximately 14 frigates, corvettes, and offshore patrol ships, 7 attack submarines, and a multi-purpose helicopter landing platform (LPH) amphibious assault ship that serves as the fleet's flagship; it also has a considerable coastal and riverine patrol vessel fleet, an aviation wing with about 50 combat aircraft and helicopters, and a marine amphibious force

the Air Force has over 100 fighter and ground attack aircraft, as well as dozens of support aircraft and helicopters for missions such as patrolling, reconnaissance, transport, logistics, special missions, and training

the three national police forces - the Federal Police, Federal Highway Police, and Federal Railway Police - have domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Ministry of Justice); there are two distinct units within the state police forces: the civil police, which performs an investigative role, and the military police, charged with maintaining law and order in the states and the Federal District; despite the name, military police forces report to the Ministry of Justice, not the Ministry of Defense; the National Public Security Force (Forca Nacional de Seguranca Publica or SENASP) is a national police force made up of Military Police from various states; the armed forces also have some domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Defense

Brazil has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the origins of Brazil's military stretch back to the 1640s; Brazil provided a 25,000-man expeditionary force with air and ground units to fight with the Allies in the Mediterranean Theater during World War II; the Navy participated in the Battle of the Atlantic (2023)

Space

has an active program with a long history, although it has been hampered by inconsistent funding; develops, builds, operates, and tracks satellites, including communications, remote sensing (RS), multi-mission, navigational, and scientific/testing/research; satellites are launched by foreign partners, but Brazil has a long-standing sounding (research) rocket and space launch vehicle (SLV) program and rocket launch facilities; cooperates with a variety of foreign space agencies and commercial entities, including those of Argentina, Canada, the European Space Agency and individual member states (particularly France and Germany), India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Ukraine, and the US; has a state-controlled communications company that operates Brazil's communications satellites and a growing commercial space sector with expertise in satellite technology (2023)

note: further details about the key activities, programs, and milestones of the country's space program, as well as government spending estimates on the space sector, appear in Appendix S

Terrorism

Terrorist group(s): Hizballah (2022)

note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T

Transnational Issues

Brazil-Bolivia: The Roboré Accord of March 29, 1958 placed the long-disputed Isla Suárez/Ilha de Guajará-Mirim, a fluvial island on the Río Mamoré, between the two towns of Guajará-Mirim (Brazil) and Guayaramerin (Bolivia), under Bolivian administration but did not resolve the sovereignty dispute

Brazil-Colombia: Contraband smuggling (narcotics and arms), illegal migration, trafficking in animals, plants, lumber, illegal exploitation of mineral resources, Colombian (FARC) insurgent incursions in the area remain problematic issues.

Brazil-Uruguay: The uncontested boundary dispute between Brazil and Uruguay over over Arroyo de la Invernada triangle and sovereignty over Isla Brasilera leaves the tripoint with Argentina in question. Smuggling of firearms and narcotics continues to be an issue along the Uruguay-Brazil border.

Brazil-Venezuela: Colombian-organized illegal narcotics and paramilitary activities penetrate Brazil's border region with Venezuela.

a significant drug transit and destination country for cocaine bound for Europe and other destinations including the United States; domestic drug use and addiction is a significant problem and it is second only to the United States in cocaine consumption; a major source of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics

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Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getúlio VARGAS rose to power in 1930.

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Everything You Need to Know About Human Rights in Brazil

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Everything You Need to Know About Human Rights in Brazil

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Brazil continued to experience an extended period of instability and crisis. The federal government lacked the commitment to coordinate effective responses in the management of the Covid-19 pandemic, impacting people's human rights. Those from groups who have historically experienced discrimination were disproportionately affected by the health emergency, which exacerbated the economic and social crisis, making their living conditions more precarious. President Jair Bolsonaro continued to promote initiatives contrary to the needs of most of the population and harmful to the environment and climate justice. His statements, which often vilified human rights defenders and activists, also undermined the Constitution and the independence of the judiciary.

Background

In April, the Senate established the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate the actions and omissions of the Brazilian government in the management of the Covid-19 pandemic. The investigation of the mismanagement of the health crisis by Jair Bolsonaro's administration included instances of corruption, the collapse of the public and private health systems, negligence regarding vaccines and the damage caused by the lack of effective public policies to address the social crisis, which deepened in 2021.

Economic and social rights

The Covid-19 pandemic continued to entrench structural and persistent inequalities and to exacerbate the economic, political, social and public health crises in the country. The government did not ensure the right to health or sufficient and adequate public policies for the social protection of the population, especially those belonging to groups that have historically faced discrimination, such as the Black population, Indigenous peoples, Quilombola communities, women, LGBTI people and those living in favelas and disadvantaged neighbourhoods on the outskirts of cities.

Right to health

As of December, more than 615,000 people had died of Covid-19. According to the Alerta group, a coalition of NGOs, 120,000 deaths could have been avoided by March 2021 if the government had not repeatedly ignored scientific evidence and failed to coordinate strategies to address the crisis.

Testing and monitoring of infection rates, medicines and hospital supplies, hospital beds and intensive care units were inadequate and insufficient, especially in public health facilities. As a result of the lack of oxygen in hospitals, people died in the state of Amazonas in January. The shortage of the medication necessary for the intubation of the most severely ill subjected patients, their families and healthcare professionals to stress and suffering.

According to the Alerta group, the government's neglect of socioeconomic and territorial inequalities, which in Brazil are related to racial inequalities, meant that Black people and those living in poverty experienced the highest death rates. They were particularly affected by the shortage of intensive care beds in public facilities and many died in pre-hospital units waiting for admission to specialist care units.

Investigations undertaken by the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry suggested that government actions during Covid-19 vaccine negotiations and implementation of the vaccine programme lacked coordination, efficiency, and commitment to follow scientific evidence. The spread of disinformation about vaccines and the authorities' defence of drugs that were proven to be ineffective violated the right to accurate public health information. The government's negligence in negotiations with pharmaceutical companies and with the COVAX initiative delayed the implementation of an effective vaccination plan.

In addition to vaccine shortages, the lack of coordination between national and state-level planning led to delays and interruptions in the vaccination roll-out throughout the year, as well as inconsistencies in schedules, deployments of vaccines and consensus on the coverage of priority groups. By December, 75% and 66% of Brazilians were partially and fully vaccinated, respectively.

Right to food

According to a study by the Brazilian Network of Research on Sovereignty and Nutritional Security, an independent national research network, food insecurity had increased by 54% in Brazil since 2018. More than half of the population did not have full and permanent access to food. Severe food insecurity, which refers to the situation of hunger, affected 19 million people in 2021, or 9% of the population. Among small family farmers and Quilombola, Indigenous and riverside communities, the proportion of households affected rose to 12%. Households headed by women and Black people suffered most from the lack of food.

Rights to housing, water and sanitation

A significant part of the population continued to live in precarious situations, lacking essential services. According to the Trata Brasil Institute, nearly 35 million people did not have access to clean water and 100 million had no sewage collection.

Those living in rural and traditional territories and disadvantaged neighbourhoods were most affected by the non-existent or insufficient sanitation infrastructure. A study by the NGO Criola found that the percentage of the Black population living in inadequate homes was significantly higher than that of the white population. In addition to the lack of basic sanitation, overcrowding was greater in Black homes. According to the Zero Eviction campaign, over 23,500 families were evicted from their homes between March 2020 and October 2021 during the pandemic. Following pressure from social mobilizations, in October Congress approved legislation that prohibited evictions throughout the country until 31 December 2021.

Rights to work and social assistance

The federal government used a false dichotomy between the defence of the economy and the defence of life to justify its failure to promote measures to prevent infection among workers who were unable to work remotely during the pandemic.

Emergency aid was discontinued during the first three months of 2021 and subsequently reintroduced at a lower rate and for a more restricted group of people. This led to accelerated impoverishment of the population impacted by the economic and social crises aggravated by the pandemic. A study by the University of São Paulo found that in 2021, with the reduction in emergency aid, more people began to live in poverty. Black women were the most affected: 38% and 12.3% were living in poverty or extreme poverty, respectively.

Data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics indicated that, in the first quarter of 2021, unemployment reached its highest rate since 2012 (14.7%). The proportion of Brazilians in the informal economy without income security or social protection reached 39.6% during the year.

Right to education

State education continued to be delivered remotely in much of Brazil until May 2021. Problems related to lack of access to the internet and the electronic equipment necessary to conduct remote activities were among the reasons for increased school dropout rates during 2021, especially among students in state education, which serves the most disadvantaged sections of the population.

All states started vaccinating school staff in June, as state schools were reopening. The infrastructure of many schools, however, did not ensure a safe return based on sanitary protocols. Water supply and access to basic sanitation and the internet were not a reality in all state schools in Brazil. In 2021, the National High School Exam, the main form of admission to higher education institutions, registered the lowest number of applicants in 13 years.

Freedom of expression

Throughout the pandemic, the state did not adequately guarantee the right to information for the population. Inaccurate or deliberately misleading public statements about Covid-19 prevention, treatments and vaccines sought to undermine scientific recommendations and dissenting voices, fuelling misinformation and reducing civic space.

Restrictions on civil society participation in public debate intensified because of the federal government's hostile approach to the press, social movements, NGOs and other critical voices.

In 2021, the organization Human Rights Watch identified 176 accounts of journalists, Congress members, influencers, media outlets and NGOs, including Amnesty International Brazil, blocked on President Jair Bolsonaro's social media.

Federal authorities promoted speeches and demonstrations that threatened the rule of law. On several occasions, such as the official celebration of Brazil's Independence Day, President Jair Bolsonaro sought to undermine the Supreme Court and called into question the electoral system.

Excessive use of force

The logic and implementation of the "war on drugs" that has structured public security policies in Brazil for many years continued to fuel the cycle of violence and killings in the country.

In 2020, police killed 6,416 people. More than half of the victims were young Black men.

Although the Supreme Court ordered the suspension of police operations in Rio de Janeiro's favelas in June 2020, a survey by the Study Group on New Illegalisms found that deaths caused by law enforcement personnel increased by 185% in January and February 2021, compared to the first four months after the Court order. Police operations using heavy weaponry resulted in hours of intense shooting in the favelas and other marginalized neighbourhoods.

The excessive use of force also took the form of raids on homes, the destruction of belongings, sexual violence, psychological torture, restrictions on freedom of movement and the suspension of essential services, such as schools and health facilities.

Unlawful killings

On 6 May, a police operation in the Jacarezinho favela, Rio de Janeiro, resulted in the death of 27 residents and one police officer. The operation was launched based on photographs of alleged suspects on social media. Images and preliminary investigations pointed to summary executions and evidence tampering at the crime scenes. Investigations into the deaths had not been concluded by the end of the year.

On 8 June, Kathlen Romeu, who was four months pregnant, died after being shot during a Military Police operation in the community of Lins de Vasconcelos in northern Rio de Janeiro. The investigation into the circumstances of her death was continuing at the end of the year.

On 22 November, nine people were found dead in circumstances suggesting they had been summarily executed in the Complexo do Salgueiro favela, Rio de Janeiro. On 20 November a policeman had been killed during a police operation, and preliminary investigations indicated that the nine killings were an act of revenge. Investigations were continuing at the end of the year.

In August, five police officers charged with the killings of 13 people almost three decades earlier in the 1994 massacre in the Nova Brasília favela, Rio de Janeiro, were acquitted for lack of evidence. In addition to the fact that it took 27 years for the case to be brought to trial, the result was considered inadequate by the victims and human rights organizations. The excessive and lethal use of force by the police was not promptly and effectively investigated in accordance with international standards. At the time of the killings, the police involved in the operation were absolved of responsibility before the proper investigations were carried out. The acquittal represented an example of the historical impunity that has perpetuated the cycle of violence and human rights violations by state agents, especially in favelas and disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights condemned the Brazilian state for police violence in the Nova Brasília case.

Human rights defenders

The killings of city councillor and human rights defender Marielle Franco and her driver Anderson Gomes in March 2018 had yet to be resolved. The families and civil society continued to press for justice. In July 2021, the Rio de Janeiro prosecutors who had been in charge of the investigations since 2018 asked to be removed from their positions, raising concerns about the progress and outcomes of the investigation and the case. The two men charged with the killings remained in prison and no date had been set for a trial by the end of the year. Those behind the killings remained unidentified.

The NGO Global Witness reported that Brazil was the country with the fourth highest number of killings of environmental leaders and land rights defenders in the world. In January, activist and rural worker Fernando dos Santos Araújo was killed in the state of Pará. He was a survivor and one of the main witnesses of the Pau D'Arco massacre in May 2017 in which 10 land rights activists were killed by military and civil police officers.

In May, Lindolfo Kosmaski, a gender and sexual diversity activist from the Landless Workers Movement, was found shot dead in a burnt-out car in the state of Paraná.

Right to a healthy environment

According to the NGO Imazon, in August the Brazilian Amazon had the highest deforestation rate for the month of August in 10 years. Between January and December, 10,362 km² of forest were cleared, 29% more than 2020.

Fires also increased in the Amazon region and other biodiversity-rich biomes as the Brazilian state continued to dismantle environmental protection agencies and mechanisms. The Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity and Natural Resources Programme lost part of its funding and investment fell in the prevention and control of deforestation and fires in Brazilian biomes.

Attacks on the right to a healthy environment were also seen in legislative initiatives. The Chamber of Deputies approved Bill 3.729/2004. If approved by the Senate, this Bill will facilitate the issuing of environmental licences for exploration activities. Bill 2.633/2020 also progressed through the Chamber of Deputies and, if approved, could allow land tenure regularization for illegal occupations of public lands.

Rights of Indigenous peoples, Quilombolas and other traditional communities

The rights of Indigenous peoples, Quilombolas and other traditional communities were systematically violated. Deforestation and fires, often resulting from the illegal appropriation of land by the agribusiness, livestock, logging and mining sectors, impacted the rights to land and territory, to a healthy environment and to the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples, Quilombolas and other traditional communities.

The latest data from the Pastoral Land Commission indicated that the number of conflicts in rural areas registered in 2020 was the highest since 1985. Land invasions, which took place despite legislation regulating territories and rights, increased by 102% between 2019 and 2020; 71% of the families affected were Indigenous. Between January and November 2021, 26 people were killed in the context of rural conflicts, a 30% increase over 2020; eight were Indigenous people.

In August, the National Articulation of Indigenous Peoples (APIB) movement filed a complaint before the ICC against President Jair Bolsonaro for the crime of genocide. Also in August, 6,000 Indigenous people from 176 ethnic groups demonstrated in the country's capital, Brasilia, to try to halt the anti-Indigenous agenda being pursued in the National Congress. They also reiterated their opposition to the "Time Framework" proposal, which was before the Supreme Court, and, if approved, could threaten the demarcation of Indigenous territories.

The government's inadequate management of the Covid-19 pandemic continued to impact the rights to life and health of Indigenous peoples and Quilombola communities, who in 2020 had appealed to the Supreme Court for specialized and priority support from the state. Despite a decision in their favour from the Court, they continued to report being denied the support that would help them to cope with the pandemic in 2021. Covid-19 continued to spread among Indigenous peoples and Quilombola communities because of the authorities' failure to establish sanitary barriers, to promote the removal of people who invaded their territories and to implement adequate health, monitoring and social assistance measures.

Indigenous peoples and Quilombola communities reported several shortcomings in the vaccination process, such as lack of information; institutional racism; discrimination against Indigenous people and Quilombolas who live in urban areas or outside officially designated territories; and lack of coordination between state and municipal planning and the National Immunization Plan.

LGBTI people's rights

A lack of adequate assistance, social protection and public policies left LGBTI people even more at risk during the health crisis. The National Association of Transvestites and Transsexuals reported that 80 transgender people were killed in Brazil in the first half of 2021 alone. In addition, physical attacks, threats, discrimination and social marginalization fuelled a cycle of violence that prevented LGBTI people from enjoying their rights in safety.

Women's rights

Brazil accounted for 75% of maternal deaths due to Covid-19 worldwide. According to the Covid-19 Obstetric Observatory, as of May, maternal deaths of Black women were 77% higher compared to those of white women.

According to the Brazilian Public Security Forum, the number of rapes in the first six months of 2021 was 8.3% higher than in the same period in 2020. Between January and June 2021, 666 women were the victims of femicide, the highest number since records began in 2017.

1. "Brazil: 1,000 days of Bolsonaro and Brazil's grave human rights crisis", 20 October

2. Brazil: Lack of Oxygen to Treat Patients in Manaus (Index: AMR 19/3539/2021), 15 January

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Brazil continued to experience an extended period of instability and crisis. The federal government lacked the commitment to coordinate effective responses in the management of the Covid-19 pandemic, impacting people's human rights. Those from groups who have historically experienced discrimination were disproportionately affected by the health emergency, which exacerbated the economic and social crisis, making their living conditions more precarious.

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Pro-Bolsonaro rioters storm Brazil's top government offices

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Pro-Bolsonaro rioters storm Brazil's top government offices

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RIO DE JANEIRO (AP) - Supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro who refuse to accept his election defeat stormed Congress, the Supreme Court and presidential palace Sunday, a week after the inauguration of his leftist rival, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Thousands of demonstrators bypassed security barricades, climbed on roofs, smashed windows and invaded all three buildings, which were believed to be largely vacant on the weekend. Some of the demonstrators called for a military intervention to either restore the far-right Bolsonaro to power or oust Lula from the presidency.

Hours went by before control of the buildings on Brasilia's vast Three Powers Square was reestablished, with hundreds of the participants arrested.

In a news conference from Sao Paulo state, Lula accused Bolsonaro of encouraging the uprising by those he termed "fascist fanatics," and he read a freshly signed decree for the federal government to take control of security in the federal district.

"There is no precedent for what they did and these people need to be punished," Lula said.

TV channel Globo News showed protesters wearing the green and yellow colors of the national flag that also have come to symbolize the nation's conservative movement and were adopted by Bolsonaro's supporters.

The former president has repeatedly sparred with Supreme Court justices, and the room where they convene was trashed by the rioters. They sprayed fire hoses inside the Congress building and ransacked offices at the presidential palace. Windows were broken in all of the buildings.

Bolsonaro, who flew to Florida ahead of Lula's inauguration, repudiated the president's accusation late Sunday. He wrote on Twitter that peaceful protest is part of democracy but vandalism and invasion of public buildings are "exceptions to the rule."

Police fired tear gas in their efforts to recover the buildings, and were shown on television in the late afternoon marching protesters down a ramp from the presidential palace with their hands secured behind their backs. By early evening, with authorities' control of the buildings restored, Justice Minister Flavio Dino said in a news conference that roughly 200 people had been arrested and officers were firing more tear gas to drive away lingering protesters.

But with the damage already done, many in Brazil were questioning how the police had ignored abundant warnings, were unprepared or were somehow complicit.

Lula said at his news conference there was "incompetence or bad faith″ on the part of police, and that they had been likewise complacent when Bolsonaro supporters rioted in the capital weeks ago. He promised those officers would be punished and expelled from the corps.

The incident recalled the Jan. 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol by supporters of then-President Donald Trump. Political analysts have warned for months that a similar storming was a possibility in Brazil, given that Bolsonaro has sown doubt about the reliability of the nation's electronic voting system - without any evidence. The results were recognized as legitimate by politicians from across the spectrum, including some Bolsonaro allies, as well as dozens of foreign governments.

Unlike the 2021 attack in the U.S., few officials were likely to have been working in the Brazilian Congress and Supreme Court on a Sunday.

U.S. President Joe Biden told reporters that the riots in Brazil were "outrageous." His national security adviser Jake Sullivan went a step further on Twitter and said the U.S. "condemns any effort to undermine democracy in Brazil."

Biden later tweeted that he looked forward to continuing to work with Lula, calling the riots an "assault on democracy and on the peaceful transfer of power in Brazil."

British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly tweeted: "The violent attempts to undermine democracy in Brazil are unjustifiable. President @LulaOficial and the government of Brazil have the full support of the UK."

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres also said on Twitter that he condemned the assault on Brazil's democratic institutions but he was confident "the will of the Brazilian people and the country's institutions" would be respected.

Earlier videos on social media showed a limited presence of the capital's military police; one showed officers standing by as people flooded into Congress, with one using his phone to record images. The capital's security secretariat didn't respond to a request from The Associated Press for comment about the relative absence of the police.

"Brazilian authorities had two years to learn the lessons from the Capitol invasion and to prepare themselves for something similar in Brazil," said Maurício Santoro, political science professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. "Local security forces in Brasilia failed in a systematic way to prevent and to respond to extremist actions in the city. And the new federal authorities, such as the ministers of justice and of defense, were not able to act in a decisive way."

Federal District Gov. Ibaneis Rocha confirmed on Twitter he had fired the capital city's head of public security, Anderson Torres. Local media reported that Torres is currently in the U.S.

The office of Lula's attorney general asked the Supreme Court to order Torres' imprisonment.

Bolsonaro supporters have been protesting Lula's electoral win since Oct. 30, blocking roads, setting vehicles on fire and gathering outside military buildings, urging the armed forces to intervene. The head of Brazil's electoral authority rejected the request from Bolsonaro and his political party to nullify ballots cast on most electronic voting machines.

"Two years since Jan. 6, Trump's legacy continues to poison our hemisphere," U.S. Sen. Bob Menendez, who chairs the Senate's foreign relations committee, tweeted, adding that he blamed Bolsonaro for inciting the acts. "Protecting democracy & holding malign actors to account is essential."

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Pro-Bolsonaro rioters storm Brazil's top government offices

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RIO DE JANEIRO (AP) - Supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro who refuse to accept his election defeat stormed Congress, the Supreme Court and presidential palace Sunday, a week after the inauguration of his leftist rival, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

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Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank

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Is Brazil a democracy?

Brazil is a democracy with a presidential and federal system of government. Its current constitution provides strong protections for civil liberties. It also guarantees many rights including to employment, childcare and healthcare.

There is an independent judiciary, media and central bank and the country has seen a peaceful transition of power since it became a democracy in 1985 following decades of military dictatorship.

However, Brazil's democracy has been challenged by increasingly polarized politics, a weak central state and the erosion of trust in the ruling class.

Successive governments have struggled to maintain law and order in all Brazil's vast territories particularly parts of the Amazon and in the Favelas (the vast slums surrounding some Brazilian cities). In some cases, police and security services lack a consistent presence in those areas, ceding control to illegal groups and undermining faith in the strength of the democratic state.

Corruption is also a persistent problem in Brazilian politics. Justice is slow due to a constitutional amendment that allows any case to be appealed to the Supreme Court and an overburdened judicial system.

Corruption is a persistent problem in Brazilian politics

'Operation Car Wash' (2014-19) was an investigation that exposed corruption at state-owned oil firm Petrobras and contracting companies.

The prosecution, led by judge Sérgio Moro, saw former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) jailed for accepting services from companies involved in the scandal.

The case drained faith in Lula's Workers Party, which had promised a cleaner form of politics in the early 2000s. But it also created division and suspicion of the justice system and, by extension, Brazil's democratic institutions. Moro, briefly hailed as a hero, was later revealed to have communicated with the prosecutors investigating the case. This, combined with his decision to briefly join the administration of President Jair Bolosono as justice minister, stained his reputation as an objective jurist.

In part, the election of President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 was a result of disillusionment with these continual political scandals and deeper shifts in Brazil's historically fluid system. Voters placed their faith in someone perceived as a political outsider and a strongman, much in the mould of Donald Trump.

However, under Bolsonaro, a former military officer, polarization in Brazil's politics worsened and public discourse coarsened.

What kind of democracy is Brazil?

Brazil has a US-style presidential system with power divided between the executive (the president), the legislature (the National Congress) and the judiciary (headed by the Supreme Court).

The National Congress has two houses: the Chamber of Deputies whose members are elected on four-year terms and the Senate with members elected on eight-year terms. As in the US, individual states have their own considerable autonomy.

There are 24 political parties represented in the Brazilian congress but even the largest traditional parties tend to be amorphous. This leads to a great deal of horse-trading in politics as small parties promise support to larger parties in exchange for incentives in deals that are made beyond the scrutiny of ordinary citizens. This drives corruption and erodes accountability for Brazilian voters.

The emphasis on coalitions does, however, help restrict the worst excesses of presidential power. Presidents are elected every four years using a two-round system. At the second round, the two remaining candidates are usually forced to align themselves with various parties in order to form governing coalitions, limiting their ability to force through legislation.

Participatory democracy in Brazil

In the 1990s, some Brazilian cities became renowned for their efforts to deliver more participatory democracy. The intent was to give citizens direct control of decision-making and allocation of funds in government.

Porto Alegre, the capital of Rio Grande do Sul state, led a widely-admired movement to deliver participatory budgeting from 1991 to 2004.

The mayor opened the city budget, allowing public meetings to decide how city funds should be spent, and other Brazilian cities followed its lead.

However, the experiment never trickled up to the federal level, which is still dominated by coalitions managed by political bosses. The movement has dwindled in the cities too.

Racial democracy in Brazil

Many Brazilians claim that the country does not suffer from significant racism. They state that there is no discrimination against non-whites and that the country enjoys a 'racial democracy' with a mix of cultures and races.

Brazil was one of the last countries in the world to abolish slavery

But the country has a lingering legacy of racism. It was one of the last countries in the world to abolish slavery and its class structure remains very clearly demarcated by race. This is reflected in standards of living and in sectors like education where schools serving populations of African descent are generally significantly poorer than those serving other communities.

National politicians of African and indigenous origin are also rare. There are some exceptions, like former senator and minister of the environment, Marina Osmarina da Silva Vaz de Lima. However, there are no parties of Afro-descent. Even workers' organizations, like the Communist Party, have failed to reflect the racial dimension to class division in the country.

The army is perhaps Brazil's most racially integrated institution with a greater proportion of people of African and indigenous descent represented in the non-officer corps than political parties or even other branches of the military like the navy.

Meanwhile Bolsonaro made openly racist comments at the expense of Brazil's African and indigenous populations before and during his presidency arguably using it to energize his supporters. However, Bolsonaro did appoint Brazil's first indigenous vice president, Hamilton Mourão, another former army officer.

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Brazil is a democracy with a presidential and federal system of government. Its current constitution provides strong protections for civil liberties. It also guarantees many rights including to employment, childcare and healthcare. There is an independent judiciary, media and central bank and the country has seen a peaceful transition of power since it became a democracy in 1985 following decades of military dictatorship.

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For months, supporters of Brazil's far-right former President Jair Bolsonaro have protested his election loss in October. They've blocked roads, set cars on fire and demanded military intervention.

Bolsonaro challenged his defeat in the courts, and opted to skip his successor's inauguration.

On Sunday, one week after President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in, the protests boiled over into riots, as Bolsonaro supporters stormed federal buildings in Brasília, the capital.

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Photos: Riot in the heart of Brazil's government

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For months, supporters of Brazil's far-right former President Jair Bolsonaro have protested his election loss in October. They've blocked roads, set cars on fire and demanded military intervention. Bolsonaro challenged his defeat in the courts, and opted to skip his successor's inauguration.

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CultureGrams Online Database: Subscriber Area Only

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The dry season returned to Brazil's Amazon region in late July-and with it, forest fires, largely human-made. After making substantial progress in reducing deforestation in the 2000s and early 2010s, Brazil has reversed course and deforestation is rising. In the Amazon, this season has been the worst in more than a decade in number of fires, and second worst in terms of total deforestation, according to satellite data from Brazil's National Institute of Space Research (INPE), which monitors the situation.

The problem has been even worse outside the Amazon region. This season, fires rose a staggering 220 percent in Brazil's Pantanal wetlands, compared with the same period in 2019. Fires destroyed almost all of the vegetation in the world's largest hyacinth macaw refuge in the Pantanal. Today, 85 percent of Brazil's coastal Atlantic Forest-home to 223 endemic bird species and more than 4,000 species of trees-has disappeared. The soy and cattle industries also endanger many of the 11,000 native plant species of the Cerrado biome.

Forest fires are usually neither natural nor accidental in Brazil. Since the Portuguese first arrived on the land they named for the brazilwood tree, chopping and burning trees has been central to Brazil's model of development. Ranchers, the soy industry, small farmers, and wildcat gold miners take advantage of the dry season to slash and burn, chopping down vegetation and then burning it when conditions become dry enough-much of the time illegally.

This time last year, international outcry over Brazil's 2019 fires succeeded in prodding the administration of right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro to clamp down on illegal land clearing. But the increased vigilance was temporary. In the first half of 2020, environmental fines dropped 60 percent, while satellite monitoring systems registered an alarming uptick in deforestation.

Scientists warn that the world's largest rainforest could soon reach a tipping point, transitioning into a savanna as trees die, and fires and droughts intensify in a death spiral. Converting the entire Amazon to pasture would add an estimated 0.25 degrees Celsius to global temperature rise.

Increasingly, economists and environmentalists agree on the need to take action. Last month, former Brazilian finance ministers and Central Bank presidents issued an open letter calling for a "green" economic recovery from COVID-19.

Our new report shows that cycles of inferno and conflagration could be averted. Over the course of a year, we listened to the perspectives of policymakers, environmental and social scientists, civil society, the business community, and ordinary Brazilians.

Together, their views present an emerging consensus for how to slow deforestation and rebuild Brazil's forest stocks. Our interviewees endorsed moving on three fronts.

First, we must keep pushing for more ambitious policies. The fact that Brazil established fixed emissions commitments at the Paris Accords was an environmentalist victory, but a recent UN report estimates they aren't enough to keep global warming below the 2 degree Celsius maximum target.

In the medium term, however, President Bolsonaro-who campaigned on the (unfulfilled) promise to abandon the Paris Accords and once suggested people defecate every other day to protect the environment-may block most legislative efforts.

That brings us to the second front: Laws and international commitments depend on fair and consistent environmental enforcement. At present, logging on public lands and laundering cattle -that is, selling cattle raised on illegally deforested land from one ranch or slaughterhouse to a more reputable one to obscure its origin-is a lucrative business.

Local NGOs, indigenous communities, and business leaders can all publicly support enforcement. International pressure also helps, as we saw following forest fires last August. Domestic and international pressure are again ramping up. However, monitoring a region roughly the size of the 48 contiguous United States requires sustained attention and resources.

But what if we rethink economies so that people don't even want to deforest? Many of our interviewees reimagined individual incentives for sustainability. This third front involves developing a new vision for economic development in Brazil's threatened regions. Here, international investors are critical.

Most famously, European donors are paying Amazon residents to preserve the forest via the REDD+ carbon pricing scheme. However, as Cambridge University geographer Christopher Schulz explained, funding stewardship in one corner of a forest may just encourage farmers, loggers, and miners to shift elsewhere.

The world needs would-be farmers, miners, and loggers involved instead in low-carbon economic development. Romantic images of an untouched, unpopulated Amazon are just that. Long before Europeans arrived, indigenous peoples were shaping the ecology of the forest to feed and house their families. The fact is, the Amazon is home to 30 million people who will find a way to earn a living.

Today, the Amazon Creative Labs are creating new and lucrative value chains from forest crops such as the brazil nut and the açai berry. The goal, says prominent climate scientist Carlos Nobre, is to build a "bio-economy" that "leaves the forest standing.

A standing forest economy will require skilled labor. We should be spending 100 times more to train the next generation of entrepreneurs, said Denis Minev, a business leader and founder of the Sustainable Amazon Foundation, to change the Amazon.

Even agriculture and energy, traditionally carbon-intensive industries, hold promise. R&D and capital investments in sustainable agriculture and ranching are increasing. And Brazil's wind and solar industries have begun to show a "green spiral," where environmental and industry dynamics become mutually reinforcing, according to Kathryn Hochstetler of the London School of Economics.

Brazilians are keenly aware that their local environments are changing, threatening the globe. However, seeing the pattern is easier than changing the economic systems generating it.

Increasingly, climate scientists and economists agree that the longstanding narrative that pits economic development against environmental protection must be jettisoned. Deforestation once built Brazil's economy, but standing forests may be the key to its future.
Amy Erica Smith Anya Prusa Sources Photo Credit: Photo courtesy of joannapg, Shutterstock.com. : BBC, Brazil Institute, Brazil in Fact, Brazil Ministry of the Environment, China Dialogue, Convergence for Brazil, Diversity and Distributions: A Journal of Conservation Biogeography, Folha International, Fundação FHC, Globo, Institute for International and Regional Studies at Princeton University, Journal of Field Ornithology, Mongabay, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. is a Senior Associate with the Wilson Center's Brazil Institute. is a former Wilson Center Fellow with the Brazil Institute and Global Risk & Resilience Program. She is currently a Professor of Political Science at Iowa State University.

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Protecting Brazil's Forests Could Boost Economic Development

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The dry season returned to Brazil's Amazon region in late July-and with it, forest fires, largely human-made. After making substantial progress in reducing deforestation in the 2000s and early 2010s, Brazil has reversed course and deforestation is rising.

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Select Economy and Energy Tabs

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Introduction

Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930. By far the largest and most populous country in South America, Brazil underwent more than a half century of populist and military government until 1985, when the military regime peacefully ceded power to civilian rulers. Brazil continues to pursue industrial and agricultural growth and development of its interior. Having successfully weathered a period of global financial difficulty in the late 20th century, Brazil was seen as one of the world's strongest emerging markets and a contributor to global growth. The awarding of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the first ever to be held in South America, was seen as symbolic of the country's rise. However, from about 2013 to 2016, Brazil was plagued by a sagging economy, high unemployment, and high inflation, only emerging from recession in 2017. Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF (2011-2016) was removed from office in 2016 by Congress for having committed impeachable acts against Brazil's budgetary laws, and her vice president, Michel TEMER, served the remainder of her second term. In October 2018, Jair BOLSONARO won the presidency with 55% of the vote and assumed office on 1 January 2019.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

slightly smaller than the US

Amazon river mouth (shared with Peru [s]) - 6,400 km; Rio de la Plata/Parana river source (shared with Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay [m]) - 4,880 km; Tocantins - 3,650 km; Sao Francisco - 3,180 km; Paraguay river source (shared with Argentina and Paraguay [m]) - 2,549 km; Rio Negro river mouth (shared with Colombia [s] and Venezuela) - 2,250 km; Uruguay river source (shared with Argentina and Uruguay [m]) - 1,610 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

People and Society

Portuguese (official and most widely spoken language); note - less common languages include Spanish (border areas and schools), German, Italian, Japanese, English, and a large number of minor Amerindian languages

major-language sample(s):
O Livro de Fatos Mundiais, a fonte indispensável para informação básica. (Brazilian Portuguese)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

Brazil's rapid fertility decline since the 1960s is the main factor behind the country's slowing population growth rate, aging population, and fast-paced demographic transition. Brasilia has not taken full advantage of its large working-age population to develop its human capital and strengthen its social and economic institutions but is funding a study abroad program to bring advanced skills back to the country. The current favorable age structure will begin to shift around 2025, with the labor force shrinking and the elderly starting to compose an increasing share of the total population. Well-funded public pensions have nearly wiped out poverty among the elderly, and Bolsa Familia and other social programs have lifted tens of millions out of poverty. More than half of Brazil's population is considered middle class, but poverty and income inequality levels remain high; the Northeast, North, and Center-West, women, and black, mixed race, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. Disparities in opportunities foster social exclusion and contribute to Brazil's high crime rate, particularly violent crime in cities and favelas (slums).

Brazil has traditionally been a net recipient of immigrants, with its southeast being the prime destination. After the importation of African slaves was outlawed in the mid-19th century, Brazil sought Europeans (Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Germans) and later Asians (Japanese) to work in agriculture, especially coffee cultivation. Recent immigrants come mainly from Argentina, Chile, and Andean countries (many are unskilled illegal migrants) or are returning Brazilian nationals. Since Brazil's economic downturn in the 1980s, emigration to the United States, Europe, and Japan has been rising but is negligible relative to Brazil's total population. The majority of these emigrants are well-educated and middle-class. Fewer Brazilian peasants are emigrating to neighboring countries to take up agricultural work.

improved: urban: 100% of population

rural: 91.6% of population

total: 98.2% of population

unimproved: urban: 0% of population

rural: 8.4% of population

total: 1.6% of population (2017 est.)

improved: urban: 92.8% of population

rural: 60.1% of population

total: 88.3% of population

unimproved: urban: 7.2% of population

rural: 39.9% of population

total: 11.7% of population (2017 est.)

Environment

Amazon river mouth (shared with Peru [s]) - 6,400 km; Rio de la Plata/Parana river source (shared with Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay [m]) - 4,880 km; Tocantins - 3,650 km; Sao Francisco - 3,180 km; Paraguay river source (shared with Argentina and Paraguay [m]) - 2,549 km; Rio Negro river mouth (shared with Colombia [s] and Venezuela) - 2,250 km; Uruguay river source (shared with Argentina and Uruguay [m]) - 1,610 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Government

description: bicameral National Congress or Congresso Nacional consists of:
Federal Senate or Senado Federal (81 seats; 3 members each from 26 states and 3 from the federal district directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 8-year terms, with one-third and two-thirds of the membership elected alternately every 4 years)
Chamber of Deputies or Camara dos Deputados (513 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms)

elections:
Federal Senate - last held on 7 October 2018 for two-thirds of the Senate (next to be held on 2 October 2022 for one-third of the Senate)
Chamber of Deputies - last held on 7 October 2018 (next to be held on 2 October 2022)

election results:
Federal Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PMDB 7, PP 5, REDE 5, DEM 4, PSDB 4, PSDC 4, PSL 4, PT 4, PDT 2, PHS 2, PPS 2, PSB 2, PTB 2, Podemos 1, PR 1, PRB 1, PROS 1, PRP 1, PSC 1, SD 1; composition - men 70, women 11, percent of women 13.6%
Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PT 56, PSL 52, PP 37, PMDB 34, PSDC 34, PR 33, PSB 32, PRB 30, DEM 29, PSDB 29, PDT 28, SD 13, Podemos 11, PSOL 10, PTB 10, PCdoB 9, NOVO 8, PPS 8, PROS 8, PSC 8, Avante 7, PHS 6, Patriota 5, PRP 4, PV 4, PMN 3, PTC 2, DC 1, PPL 1, REDE 1; composition - men 462, women 51, percent of women 9.9%; total National Congress percent of women 10.4%

Avante [Luis TIBE] (formerly Labor Party of Brazil or PTdoB)
Brazilian Communist Party or PCB [Edmilson COSTA]
Brazilian Democratic Movement or MDB [Luiz Felipe Baleia Tenuto ROSSI]
Brazilian Labor Party or PTB [Graciela NIENOV]
Brazilian Renewal Labor Party or PRTB [Jose Levy FIDELIX da Cruz]
Brazilian Republican Party or PRB [Marcos Antonio PEREIRA]
Brazilian Social Democracy Party or PSDB [Bruno ARAUJO]
Brazilian Socialist Party or PSB [Carlos Roberto SIQUEIRA de Barros]
Christian Democracy or DC [Jose Maria EYMAEL] (formerly Christian Social
Cidadania [Roberto Joao Pereira FREIRE] (formerly Popular Socialist Party or PPS)
Democratic Party or PSDC)
Christian Labor Party or PTC [Daniel TOURINHO]
Communist Party of Brazil or PCdoB [Luciana SANTOS]
Democratic Labor Party or PDT [Antonio Carlos Peixoto MAGALHAES Neto]
The Democrats or DEM [Jose AGRIPINO] (formerly Liberal Front Party or PFL)
Green Party or PV [Jose Luiz PENNA]
Liberal Party or PL [Valdemar COSTA Neto] (formerly Party of the Republic or PR)
National Mobilization Party or PMN [Antonio Carlos Bosco MASSAROLLO]
New Party or NOVO [Eduardo RIBEIRO]
Patriota [Ovasco RESENDE] (formerly National Ecologic Party or PEN)
Podemos [Renata ABREU] (formerly National Labor Party or PTN)
Progressive Party or PP [Ciro NOGUEIRA]
Republican Social Order Party or PROS [Euripedes JUNIOR]
Social Christian Party or PSC [Everaldo Dias PEREIRA]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Gilberto KASSAB]
Social Liberal Party or PSL [Luciano Caldas BIVAR]
Socialism and Freedom Party or PSOL [Juliano MEDEIROS]
Solidarity or SD [Paulo PEREIRA DA SILVA]
Sustainability Network or REDE [Marina SILVA]
United Socialist Workers' Party or PSTU [Jose Maria DE ALMEIDA]
Workers' Cause Party or PCO [Rui Costa PIMENTA]
Workers' Party or PT [Gleisi HOFFMANN]

green with a large yellow diamond in the center bearing a blue celestial globe with 27 white five-pointed stars; the globe has a white equatorial band with the motto ORDEM E PROGRESSO (Order and Progress); the current flag was inspired by the banner of the former Empire of Brazil (1822-1889); on the imperial flag, the green represented the House of Braganza of Pedro I, the first Emperor of Brazil, while the yellow stood for the Habsburg Family of his wife; on the modern flag the green represents the forests of the country and the yellow rhombus its mineral wealth (the diamond shape roughly mirrors that of the country); the blue circle and stars, which replaced the coat of arms of the original flag, depict the sky over Rio de Janeiro on the morning of 15 November 1889 - the day the Republic of Brazil was declared; the number of stars has changed with the creation of new states and has risen from an original 21 to the current 27 (one for each state and the Federal District)

note: one of several flags where a prominent component of the design reflects the shape of the country; other such flags are those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, and Vanuatu

Economy

Brazil is the eighth-largest economy in the world, but is recovering from a recession in 2015 and 2016 that ranks as the worst in the country's history. In 2017, Brazil`s GDP grew 1%, inflation fell to historic lows of 2.9%, and the Central Bank lowered benchmark interest rates from 13.75% in 2016 to 7%.

The economy has been negatively affected by multiple corruption scandals involving private companies and government officials, including the impeachment and conviction of Former President Dilma ROUSSEFF in August 2016. Sanctions against the firms involved - some of the largest in Brazil - have limited their business opportunities, producing a ripple effect on associated businesses and contractors but creating opportunities for foreign companies to step into what had been a closed market.

The succeeding TEMER administration has implemented a series of fiscal and structural reforms to restore credibility to government finances. Congress approved legislation in December 2016 to cap public spending. Government spending growth had pushed public debt to 73.7% of GDP at the end of 2017, up from over 50% in 2012. The government also boosted infrastructure projects, such as oil and natural gas auctions, in part to raise revenues. Other economic reforms, proposed in 2016, aim to reduce barriers to foreign investment, and to improve labor conditions. Policies to strengthen Brazil's workforce and industrial sector, such as local content requirements, have boosted employment, but at the expense of investment.

Brazil is a member of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), a trade bloc that includes Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay - Venezuela's membership in the organization was suspended In August 2017. After the Asian and Russian financial crises, Mercosur adopted a protectionist stance to guard against exposure to volatile foreign markets and it currently is negotiating Free Trade Agreements with the European Union and Canada.

$2,989,430,000,000 note: data are in 2017 dollars (2020 est.)

$3,115,910,000,000 note: data are in 2017 dollars (2019 est.)

$3,072,550,000,000 note: data are in 2017 dollars (2018 est.)

note: data are in 2010 dollars
country comparison to the world: 8

$14,100 note: data are in 2017 dollars (2020 est.)

$14,800 note: data are in 2017 dollars (2019 est.)

$14,700 note: data are in 2017 dollars (2018 est.)

note: data are in 2010 dollars
country comparison to the world: 110

4.2% (2016 est.)

note: approximately 4% of the population are below the "extreme" poverty line

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

Communications

general assessment: Brazil is one of the largest mobile and broadband markets in Latin America with healthy competition and pricing; 5G launched on limited basis; countrywide network spectrum auction held in November 2021; large fixed-line broadband market with focus on fiber; landing point for submarine cables and investment into terrestrial fiber cables to neighboring countries; Internet penetration has increased, access varies along geographic and socio-economic lines; government provides free WiFi in urban public spaces; pioneer in the region for M-commerce; major importer of integrated circuits from South Korea and China, and broadcasting equipment from China

(2021)

domestic: fixed-line connections stand at roughly 14 per 100 persons; less-expensive mobile-cellular technology has been a major impetus broadening telephone service to the lower-income segments of the population with mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 97 per 100 persons (2020)

international: country code - 55; landing points for a number of submarine cables, including Malbec, ARBR, Tamnat, SAC, SAm-1, Atlantis -2, Seabras-1, Monet, EllaLink, BRUSA, GlobeNet, AMX-1, Brazilian Festoon, Bicentenario, Unisur, Junior, Americas -II, SAE x1, SAIL, SACS and SABR that provide direct connectivity to South and Central America, the Caribbean, the US, Africa, and Europe; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean), 1 Inmarsat (Atlantic Ocean region east), connected by microwave relay system to Mercosur Brazilsat B3 satellite earth station; satellites is a major communication platform, as it is almost impossible to lay fiber optic cable in the thick vegetation (2019)

note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments

Military and Security

as of 2021, the military's primary role was enforcing border security, particularly in the Amazon states; it was also assisting with internal security operations with a focus on organized crime

Brazilian police forces are divided into Federal Police (around 15,000 personnel), Military Police (approximately 400,000 personnel), and Civil Police (approximately 125,000 personnel); the Federal Police serve under the Ministry of Justice, while the Military and Civil police are subordinate to the state governments; the National Public Security Force (Forca Nacional de Seguranca Publica or SENASP) is a national police force made up of Military Police from various states; all state Military Police are classified as reserve troops and ancillary forces of the Brazilian Army

Brazil has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments (2021)

Transnational Issues

uncontested boundary dispute between Brazil and Uruguay over Braziliera/Brasiliera Island in the Quarai/Cuareim River leaves the tripoint with Argentina in question; smuggling of firearms and narcotics continues to be an issue along the Uruguay-Brazil border; Colombian-organized illegal narcotics and paramilitary activities penetrate Brazil's border region with Venezuela

a significant transit and destination country for cocaine; most of the cocaine that entering Brazil is destined for domestic use or transits to Europe via West Africa; substantial and growing domestic drug consumption problem; second-largest consumer of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine-derivative products

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Following more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical system of government until the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in 1889. Brazilian coffee exporters politically dominated the country until populist leader Getulio VARGAS rose to power in 1930.

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How Much Does It Cost to Live In Brazil?

When we think about a paradise on Earth, one place that comes into our mind is definitely Brazil.

Festivals, beaches, nature, and entertainment, all are attractive to tourists who after visiting this amazing country decide to move there.

However, they need to know and not get surprised by the fact that the cost of living in Brazil is relatively high.

The reality of high prices might make you change your mind, but if you are earning in more developed countries, then the standard would be almost the same.

Cost of Living Index:

Brazil : Cost of Living by City

RESTAURANTS

Food is not too expensive in Brazil and the prices among restaurants vary as in any country.

If you eat in an inexpensive restaurant, you can find a meal for two at the price of $30.

There are those more luxurious ones that are fairly expensive, of course.

MARKETS

Unlike those who can afford to eat out daily, there are those who are satisfied with having enough foodstuff to prepare their meals at home.

Buying basic groceries at local markets at more affordable prices would enable you to manage food costs more easily and even put aside some money to spend on something else.

TRANSPORTATION

When transportation expenses are in question, Brazil boasts high prices both of public transport and gasoline.

If you manage to buy a car that costs a lot, you will need to pay all the other costs that go with it.

Much money can be saved by using public transportation which is well organized in Brazil.

UTILITIES (MONTHLY)

Due to the fact that the average salaries are below the cost of living and that it is difficult to cover all the costs, the utility prices are based on the standard of living and they are quite lower than in the majority of countries.

You will need approximately $100 for all the basic services.

SPORTS & LEISURE

If you are a tennis lover and have the habit of playing it frequently, once coming to Brazil some of your lifestyle habits might need to change, due to the very high prices of tennis court rents there.

It costs almost equally to pay one hour of tennis as the whole month's fee at the local gym.

CLOTHING & SHOES

Clothing is not more expensive than in some European capitals.

Quite the contrary, jeans and dresses can be found at lower prices.

If you decide to live the way most Brazilians do, meaning not spending much on apparel, the cost of living in Brazil may be lower for you.

RENT PER MONTH

If you are making an international salary and live in Brazil, you will be among the wealthy people there and will be able to afford to pay high rents.

For a person who earns the minimum wage of $217.4, paying three a bedroom apartment in the city center which costs $582 would be a dream.

Cost of Living Averages Table for Brazil

*Note: All prices are indicated in USD.

Average Restaurant Prices

Meal (Inexpensive Restaurant)

$5.28

Domestic Beer (0.5 Liter)

$1.57

Average Market Prices

Average Transport Prices

Average Utilities Prices

Basic (Water, Electricity, Garbage, Heating, Cooling)

$74.77

1 min. of Prepaid Mobile Tariff Local

$0.28

Internet (Unlimited Data, Cable/ADSL)

$20.07

Average Leisure Prices

Fitness Club, Monthly Fee for 1 Adult

$22.13

Tennis Court Rent (1 Hour)

$24.30

Cinema, 1 Seat, International Release

$6.70

Average Clothing Prices

1 Pair of Jeans (Levis 501 Or Comparable)

$45.30

1 Summer Dress in a Chain Store (Zara, etc...)

$40.86

1 Pair of Adidas Walking Shoes (Mid-Range)

$71.85

Average Rent Prices

Apartment (1 bedroom) in City Center

$307.77

Apartment (1 bedroom) Outside of Center

$197.35

Apartment (3 bedrooms) in City Center

$582.14

How Does the Average Person Spend Their Money in Brazil?

Monthly expenses and how they are covered vary widely and they depend on a person's lifestyle, area of living, and whether he/she possesses a place to live in.

In general, it can be said that the most money is given to food, accommodation, and transportation in Brazil.

Whether you will find food expensive or not depends on your eating habits.

You can either choose to eat out or cook at home and save some money by preparing your own meals.

Average Costs Breakdown

Brazil: Average Salary, Minimum Wage & Mortgages

The country's overall average monthly salary is around $392.

There is a huge difference between Brazil's official minimum wage and the average salary, due to the fact that the minimum does not exceed $217.4 per month.

If you are going to be paid in Brazil, it is great to know that incomes are not equal in all the parts and they are slightly higher in the southern areas of the country.

Those who settle there might want to buy their own place, even though the mortgage rate is high, reaching 10%.

Mortgage Interest Rate 9.60%

What About Travel Safety in Brazil?

Brazil Safety Overview

READ THE FULL REPORT: Brazil Safety Review

Safety Index:

Cost of Living by City in Brazil

See these related locations:

Or, browse the country/city indexes:

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Cost of Living in Brazil. (2023 Updated)

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When we think about a paradise on Earth, one place that comes into our mind is definitely Brazil. Festivals, beaches, nature, and entertainment, all are attractive to tourists who after visiting this amazing country decide to move there. However, they need to know and not get surprised by the fact that the cost of living in Brazil is relatively high.

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FocusEconomics | Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists

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Brazil Inflation Rate (CPI) - Brazil Economy Forecast & Outlook

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Updated data, charts and expert forecasts on Brazil Inflation. Get access to historical data and projections for Brazilian Average Consumer Price Inflation (CPI).

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Brazil Jobless Rate Falls to 8.1% in Three Months Through November

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Brazil Jobless Rate Falls to 8.1% in Three Months Through November

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Brazil Jobless Rate Falls to 8.1% in Three Months Through November

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By Jeffrey T. Lewis SÃO PAULO--Brazil’s unemployment rate fell in the three months through November for the ninth consecutive month as the number of people...

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Newsela | Countries Of The World: Brazil

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The largest country in South American, Brazil is home to the Amazon jungle.

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Brazil's 2022 inflation slows sharply, misses government target

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Brazil's 2022 inflation slows sharply, misses government target

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BRASILIA, Jan 10 (Reuters) - Brazil's inflation ended 2022 with a sharp slowdown from double-digit peaks seen throughout the year on the back of fiscal measures and an aggressive monetary policy tightening, but once again missed the government's official target.

The benchmark IPCA consumer price index rose 5.79% last year, statistics agency IBGE said on Tuesday, higher than the 5.60% median forecast in a Reuters poll of economists.

The result missed both the central bank's annual target of 3.5% and the top 5% of its tolerance band, marking the second straight year that it had done so.

Central bank chief Roberto Campos Neto, who is legally required to publish a letter justifying the inflation target miss, said the result was affected by inertia from 2021 inflation and higher commodity prices, also mentioning imbalances between demand and supply, shocks in food prices and pressures arising from the recovery in services and employment.

He said policymakers have taken the necessary steps to ensure inflation reaches its targets until 2025, reinforcing they will remain vigilant to see if keeping interest rates at the current 13.75% level for long enough will ensure such convergence.

The index was up 0.62% in December alone, IBGE said, above the 0.45% forecast in a Reuters poll.

Andres Abadia, chief Latin America economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics, noted that disinflation continues in Brazil, helped by tight financial conditions, stuttering economic growth, and broad tax waivers to bring prices down.

"Inflation should continue to decline over the next three to six months, though at a more modest pace than in the second half, assisted by the recent fall in oil prices," he wrote in a note to clients.

In 2022, the central bank continued its aggressive monetary tightening to battle inflation, lifting its key interest rate from a record low of 2% in March 2021. Since September, policymakers have left rates unchanged at their cycle-high.

William Jackson, chief emerging markets economist at Capital Economics, said the higher-than-expected 2022 inflation coincided with growing fiscal concerns after leftist President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva secured the approval of the Congress to boost welfare spending.

That will give the central bank "more cause to delay the start of its easing cycle," Jackson said.

According to IBGE, inflation last year was mainly impacted by the increased costs of food and beverages (+11.64%) and health and personal care items (+11.43%).

Overall 12-month inflation was in double digits until July last year, affected by surging commodity prices triggered by the war in Ukraine.

But the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro took measures to ease prices before an October presidential election, including a costly tax waiver on fuels that was recently extended by Lula.

Congress also approved last year a reduction in state taxes for a range of key items, including energy, telecommunications and fuels.

As a result, the transport group had a negative contribution of 1.29% to inflation in 2022, driven by the 25.78% drop in gasoline prices.

State-run oil giant Petrobras (PETR4.SA) contributed to the disinflationary trend, adopting a series of price cuts when international oil prices settled.

Reporting by Marcela Ayres; Editing by Steven Grattan, Paul Simao and Marguerita Choy

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Brazil's 2022 inflation slows sharply, misses government target

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BRASILIA, Jan 10 (Reuters) - Brazil's inflation ended 2022 with a sharp slowdown from double-digit peaks seen throughout the year on the back of fiscal measures and an aggressive monetary policy tightening, but once again missed the government's official target.

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Meet the Ranchers Who Claim the Brazilian Amazon is Theirs to Burn

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Meet the Ranchers Who Claim the Brazilian Amazon is Theirs to Burn

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Meet the Ranchers Who Claim the Brazilian Amazon is Theirs to Burn | The Dispatch

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Brazil is one of the world giants of mining, agriculture, and manufacturing, and it has a strong and rapidly growing service sector. It is a leading producer of a host of minerals, including iron ore, tin, bauxite (the ore of aluminum), manganese, gold, quartz, and diamonds and other gems, and it exports vast quantities of steel, automobiles, electronics, and consumer goods. Brazil is the world's primary source of coffee, oranges, and cassava (manioc) and a major producer of sugar, soy, and beef; however, the relative importance of Brazilian agriculture has been declining since the mid-20th century when the country began to rapidly urbanize and exploit its mineral, industrial, and hydroelectric potential. The city of São Paulo, in particular, has become one of the world's major industrial and commercial centres.

Brazil's economic history can be largely characterized as a cycle of booms and busts. From the 16th to the mid-20th century, the country was heavily dependent on one or two major agricultural products, whose prices fluctuated widely on international markets. The cyclical aspect of the economy began with the export of brazilwood in early colonial times and continued with a sugar boom, a mineral boom in the 18th century (paced especially by gold and diamond mining), a coffee boom from the mid-19th century, and a rubber boom in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Brazilian government in the 20th century attempted to diversify the country's production and reduce its dependency on agricultural exports by strongly encouraging manufacturing.

The government, hoping to ensure domestic control of key industries, spearheaded a host of nationalistic policies following the Great Depression of the 1930s. It took ownership of some of the country's largest companies, usually in partnership with one or more local or foreign corporations, and subsequently sold stock to private investors. The government's growing involvement in the industrial sector was criticized for promoting political and social objectives rather than economic ones and for its cumbersome and inefficient bureaucracy; however, some industries attributed their successes to government measures, which included direct investments, tax and other incentives, protective tariffs, and import restrictions. The government initiated several key industries, including a modern shipbuilding program, a petrochemical sector led by the huge Petrobrás company (created in 1953), a burgeoning microelectronics and personal computer industry, and aircraft manufacturing by the Embraer corporation, including commercial jetliners, aviation and surveillance equipment, and aircraft for the Brazilian air force. It established a motor vehicle industry in the 1950s to replace U.S. and German imports and assembly plants. For a period during the late 20th century, manufacturing accounted for the largest segment of the gross domestic product (GDP) before it was overtaken by the service sector.

Almost continuously high rates of inflation in the late 20th century affected every aspect of Brazil's economic life. Inflation came in part from the government's policies of deficit spending, heavily financing industrial expansion, and subsidizing business loans, as well as the practice among individual Brazilians of obtaining loans from foreign banks when domestic credit was restricted. In the latter part of the 20th century, Brazil indexed nearly all transactions for inflation, according to the constantly corrected value of the government's bonds. This practice virtually institutionalized inflation and led to public acceptance of its inevitability. As a result, Brazil's anti-inflation programs were only fleetingly successful until the mid-1990s, when the government initiated the Real Plan (Plano Real), a program that strictly limited government spending, introduced a new currency, and made other fiscal reforms.

The government privatized dozens of financial institutions, manufacturers, and mining companies in the 1990s, including several major steel producers and the Rio Doce Valley Company (Companhia Vale do Rio Dôce; CVRD). The CVRD, Brazil's giant mining and shipping conglomerate, was apportioned into separate (but still economically formidable) mining and shipping units. The government also sold a minority of its Petrobrás shares to private investors and partially opened the petroleum industry to competition. Additional public offerings of Petrobrás shares followed-in 2010, notably, the company raised about $70 billion in the world's largest share offering to date-but the government retained its majority ownership.

At the beginning of the 21st century, serious problems marked the Brazilian economy, aggravated by political uncertainties. Inflation, financial instability, and unemployment (or underemployment) remained constant threats, and political and financial scandals periodically erupted throughout the country. However, by mid-2004 the inflation rate had decreased, and for the first time Brazil issued bonds in its own currency, the real, instead of the dollar. Brazil still has one of the world's most lopsided distributions of wealth: 10 percent of the people received nearly half of the country's income, whereas the poorest 40 percent of the population brought in less than one-tenth of the total. In addition, patterns of landownership continued to be grossly uneven, as they were in colonial times, and social movements agitated for reforms.

Resources

Brazil has some of the world's most abundant renewable and nonrenewable resources. Most of the country's proved mineral reserves, agriculturally productive land, and other sources of wealth have been exploited in the Southeast and South, the country's economic heartland; however, other regions have been growing in prominence. Improved transportation has made more of these resources accessible either for export or for use by Brazil's burgeoning industries and growing population.

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Brazil - Economy, Agriculture, Trade: Brazil is one of the world giants of mining, agriculture, and manufacturing, and it has a strong and rapidly growing service sector. It is a leading producer of a host of minerals, including iron ore, tin, bauxite (the ore of aluminum), manganese, gold, quartz, and diamonds and other gems, and it exports vast quantities of steel, automobiles, electronics, and consumer goods.

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Select Transnational Issues and People and Society Tabs

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Introduction

Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile. Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI established a theocratic system of government with ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who, according to the constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts - a popularly elected 88-member body of clerics. US-Iranian relations became strained when a group of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostage until mid-January 1981. The US cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980. During the period 1980-88, Iran fought a bloody, indecisive war with Iraq that eventually expanded into the Persian Gulf and led to clashes between US Navy and Iranian military forces. Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism and was subject to US, UN, and EU economic sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement in terrorism and concerns over possible military dimensions of its nuclear program until Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Implementation Day in 2016. The US began gradually re-imposing sanctions on Iran after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018.

Following the election of reformer Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad KHATAMI as president in 1997 and a reformist Majles (legislature) in 2000, a campaign to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction was initiated. The movement floundered as conservative politicians, supported by the Supreme Leader, unelected institutions of authority like the Council of Guardians, and the security services reversed and blocked reform measures while increasing security repression. Starting with nationwide municipal elections in 2003 and continuing through Majles elections in 2004, conservatives reestablished control over Iran's elected government institutions, which culminated with the August 2005 inauguration of hardliner Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD as president. His controversial reelection in June 2009 sparked nationwide protests over allegations of electoral fraud, but the protests were quickly suppressed. Deteriorating economic conditions due primarily to government mismanagement and international sanctions prompted at least two major economically based protests in July and October 2012, but Iran's internal security situation remained stable. President AHMADI-NEJAD's independent streak angered regime establishment figures, including the Supreme Leader, leading to conservative opposition to his agenda for the last year of his presidency, and an alienation of his political supporters. In June 2013, Iranians elected a centrist cleric Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI to the presidency. A longtime senior member in the regime, he made promises of reforming society and Iran's foreign policy. In July 2015, Iran and the five permanent members, plus Germany (P5+1) signed the JCPOA under which Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief; however, the US reimposed sanctions in 2018 dealing a blow to RUHANI's legacy and the Iranian economy. Negotiations to restore the deal started in 2021 and are ongoing. Iran held elections in February 2020 for the Majles and the president in June 2021, resulting in a hardline and conservative monopoly across the regime's elected and unelected institutions. President Ebrahim RAISI is a hardline cleric with a decades-long career in Iran's judiciary and has had limited foreign policy and economic experience.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

almost 2.5 times the size of Texas; slightly smaller than Alaska

salt water lake(s): Caspian Sea (shared with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km; Lake Urmia - 5,200 sq km; Lake Namak - 750 sq km

Euphrates (shared with Turkey [s], Syria, and Iraq [m]) - 3,596 km; Tigris (shared with Turkey, Syria, and Iraq [m]) - 1,950 km; Helmand (shared with Afghanistan [s]) - 1,130 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Indian Ocean drainage: (Persian Gulf) Tigris and Euphrates (918,044 sq km)

People and Society

Persian Farsi (official), Azeri and other Turkic dialects, Kurdish, Gilaki and Mazandarani, Luri, Balochi, Arabic

major-language sample(s):
چکیده نامه جهان، منبعی ضروری برای کسب اطلاعات کلی جهان (Persian)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

Muslim (official) 99.6% (Shia 90-95%, Sunni 5-10%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian) 0.3%, unspecified 0.2% (2016 est.)

improved: urban: 99.8% of population

rural: 98.1% of population

total: 99.4% of population

unimproved: urban: 0.2% of population

rural: 1.9% of population

total: 0.6% of population (2020 est.)

improved: urban: 100% of population

rural: 100% of population

total: 100% of population

unimproved: urban: 0% of population (2015 est.)

rural: 0% of population

total: 0% of population (2020 est.)

Environment

salt water lake(s): Caspian Sea (shared with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) - 374,000 sq km; Lake Urmia - 5,200 sq km; Lake Namak - 750 sq km

Euphrates (shared with Turkey [s], Syria, and Iraq [m]) - 3,596 km; Tigris (shared with Turkey, Syria, and Iraq [m]) - 1,950 km; Helmand (shared with Afghanistan [s]) - 1,130 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Indian Ocean drainage: (Persian Gulf) Tigris and Euphrates (918,044 sq km)

Government

Combatant Clergy Association [Mostafa POURMOHAMMADI] (an active political group)
Executives of Construction Party [Hossein MARASHI]
Followers of the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent [Ali LARIJANI]
Front of Islamic Revolutionary Stability [Sadegh MAHSOULI, secretary general]
Islamic Coalition Party [Asadollah BADAMCHIAN]
Islamic Iran Participation Front [associated with former President Mohammed KHATAMI]
Islamic Law Party
Militant Clerics Society (Majma-e Ruhaniyoun-e Mobarez) or MRM [Mohammad Mousavi KHOEINIHA]
Moderation and Development Party [Hassan ROUHANI]
National Trust Party (Hezb-e E'temad-eMelli) or HEM [Elias HAZRATI]
National Unity Party
Pervasive Coalition of Reformists [Ali SUFI, chairman] (includes Council for Coordinating the Reforms Front, National Trust Party, Union of Islamic Iran People Party, Moderation and Development Party)
Principlists Grand Coalition (includes Combatant Clergy Association and Islamic Coalition Party, Society of Devotees and Pathseekers of the Islamic Revolution, Front of Islamic Revolution Stability)
Progress, Welfare, and Justice Front [Mohammad Saeed AHADIAN]
Progress and Justice Population of Islamic Iran or PJP [Hosein GHORBANZADEH, general secretary]
Resistance Front of Islamic Iran [Yadollah HABIBI, general secretary]
The Society of the Militant Clergy of Tehran (Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran) or JRM)
Union of Islamic Iran People's Party (Hezb-e Ettehad-e Iran-e Eslami) [Azar MANSOURI]
Wayfarers of the Islamic Revolution

chief of mission: none; Iran has an Interests Section in the Pakistani Embassy; address: Iranian Interests Section, Embassy of Pakistan, 1250 23rd Street NW, Washington, DC 20037; telephone: [1] (202) 965-4990; FAX [1] (202) 965-1073; info@daftar.org

embassy: none; the US Interests Section is located in the Embassy of Switzerland; US Foreign Interests Section, Embassy of Switzerland, Pasdaran, Shahid Mousavi Street (Golestan 5th), Corner of Paydarfard Street, No. 55, Tehran

Economy

Iran's economy is marked by statist policies, inefficiencies, and reliance on oil and gas exports, but Iran also possesses significant agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. The Iranian government directly owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly controls many companies affiliated with the country's security forces. Distortions - including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans - weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth.

Private sector activity includes small-scale workshops, farming, some manufacturing, and services, in addition to medium-scale construction, cement production, mining, and metalworking. Significant informal market activity flourishes and corruption is widespread.

The lifting of most nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in January 2016 sparked a restoration of Iran's oil production and revenue that drove rapid GDP growth, but economic growth declined in 2017 as oil production plateaued. The economy continues to suffer from low levels of investment and declines in productivity since before the JCPOA, and from high levels of unemployment, especially among women and college-educated Iranian youth.

In May 2017, the re-election of President Hasan RUHANI generated widespread public expectations that the economic benefits of the JCPOA would expand and reach all levels of society. RUHANI will need to implement structural reforms that strengthen the banking sector and improve Iran's business climate to attract foreign investment and encourage the growth of the private sector. Sanctions that are not related to Iran's nuclear program remain in effect, and these-plus fears over the possible re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions-will continue to deter foreign investors from engaging with Iran.

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

646.038 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from coal and metallurgical coke: 5.142 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from petroleum and other liquids: 204.21 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from consumed natural gas: 436.687 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
country comparison to the world: 8

Communications

Military and Security

the military forces of Iran are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah)

Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Sepah): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces; Law Enforcement Forces (2022)

note 1: the Artesh Navy operates Iran's larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz

note 2: the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group under the IRGC with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit; it is formally known as the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed; it is also known as the Popular Mobilization Army

note 3: Law Enforcement Forces include border and security troops

2.3% of GDP (2021 est.)

2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)

2.5% of GDP (2019 est.) (approximately $22.8 billion)

3.4% of GDP (2018 est.) (approximately $29.1 billion)

3.4% of GDP (2017 est.) (approximately $31.2 billion)
country comparison to the world: 48

18 years of age for men for compulsory military service; 16 years of age for volunteers; 17 years of age for Law Enforcement Forces; 15 years of age for Basij Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); conscript military service obligation is 18-24 months, depending on the location of service (soldiers serving in places of high security risk and deprived areas serve shorter terms); women exempt from military service (2021)

note: as of 2019, approximately 80% of Artesh ground forces personnel were conscripts, while Navy and Air/Air Defense Force personnel were primarily volunteers; conscripts reportedly comprised more than 50% of the IRGC

estimated to have up to 3,000 military personnel in Syria (2022)

note: Iran has recruited, trained, and funded thousands of Syrian and foreign fighters to support the ASAD regime during the Syrian civil war

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formed in May 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI's fall, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed for power; while the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions, such as the Army, followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI organized counterweights, including the IRGC, to protect the Islamic revolution; the IRGC's command structure bypassed the elected president and went directly to KHOMEINI; the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force with its own ground, air, naval, and special forces, plus control over Iran's strategic missile and rocket forces; as of 2022, the IRGC was a highly institutionalized and parallel military force to Iran's regular armed forces (Artesh); it was heavily involved in internal security and had significant influence in the political and economic spheres of Iranian society, as well as Iran's foreign policy; on the economic front, it owned factories and corporations and subsidiaries in banking, infrastructure, housing, airlines, tourism and other sectors; its special operations forces, known as the Qods/Quds Force, specialized in foreign missions and has provided advice, funding, guidance, material support, training, and weapons to militants in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as extremist groups, including HAMAS, Hizballah, Kata'ib Hizballah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (see Appendix T for additional details on the IRGC and Qods Force); the Qods Force also conducts intelligence and reconnaissance operations

the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) is the senior-most body for formulating Iran's foreign and security policy; it is formally chaired by the president, who also appoints the SCNS secretary; its members include the speaker of the Majles, the head of the judiciary, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (chief of defense or CHOD), the commanders of the Artesh (regular forces) and IRGC, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and intelligence; the SCNS reports to the supreme leader; the supreme leader is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (2022)

the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-003 Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea-Threats to US and International Shipping from Iran) effective 28 February 2022, which states in part that "heightened military activities and increased political tensions in this region continue to present risk to commercial shipping...there is a continued possibility that Iran and/or its regional proxies could take actions against US and partner interests in the region;" Coalition Task Force (CTF) Sentinel has been established to provide escorts for commercial shipping transiting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman

Terrorism

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); Jaysh al Adl (Jundallah); Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK); al-Qa'ida

note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T

Transnational Issues

Iran-Afghanistan: Iran protests Afghanistan's limiting flow of dammed Helmand River tributaries during drought; Afghan and Iranian commissioners have discussed boundary monument densification and resurvey

Iran-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Russia: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified a Caspian seabed delimitation treaty in 2018 based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea

Iran-Iraq: Iraq's lack of a maritime boundary with Iran prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf

Iran-UAE: Iran and UAE dispute Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island, which are occupied by Iran; the dispute was rehashed at the September 2021 UN General Assembly meeting; Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corp opened an airport on Greater Tunb in February 2022

significant transit and destination country for opiates and cannabis products mainly from Afghanistan; produces and consumes methamphetamine and traffics it to international markets; one of the primary transshipment routes for Southwest Asian heroin to Europe

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Known as Persia until 1935, Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 after the ruling monarchy was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI was forced into exile.

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Editor's Note: A version of this story appears in today's Meanwhile in the Middle East newsletter, CNN's three-times-a-week look inside the region's biggest stories. Sign up here.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has long ranked among the world's top executioners. But with the recent death sentences handed down to protesters, critics say the regime has taken capital punishment to a new level.

Last weekend, Iran executed two more protesters charged with killing security personnel, causing an international outcry. Critics said that the executions were a result of hasty sham trials.

The regime executed 314 people in 2021, 20% more than the previous year, rights group Amnesty International said in a report from May 2022. Many of those had to do with drug-related crimes.

This year, a number of protesters are entangled in Iran's court system, many of whom face a particularly unjust judicial process, according to activists.

Human rights activists have warned there's a real risk that many of them could become another number in the growing list of those executed by the Islamic Republic. At least 43 people are currently facing execution in Iran, according to a CNN count, but activist group 1500Tasvir says the number could be as high as 100.

"Defendants are systematically deprived of access to lawyers of their choice during the trial, are subjected to tortured and coerced confessions and then rushed to the gallows," Tara Sepehri Far, an Iran researcher at Human Rights Watch, told CNN.

United Nations human rights chief Volker Türk on Tuesday accused Iran of "weaponizing" criminal procedures, saying it amounts to "state sanctioned killing"

With this round of protests, critics say, the authorities are using charges that carry the death penalty more liberally than they have before, widening the application of such laws to cover protesters.

According to Iranian state media, dozens of government agents, from security officials to officers of the basij paramilitary force, have been killed in the protests. Activist groups HRANA and Iran Human Rights say that 481 protesters have been killed.

Security personnel have died in previous protests as well, Sepehri Far said, "but it is crucial to point out in this (time) round Iranian authorities are using the death penalty way beyond (the) intentional killing of security officers."

The regime appears to have capitalized on the executions, using them as a deterrent to people eager to speak out and flood the streets, as was seen after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini in the custody of the nation's morality police.

"The trials and executions are yet another piece of the repression machine serving to demonstrate power and control and spread fear and publicize (the) government's narrative about protesters," Sepehri Far explained.

Iran has used Islamic Sharia law to prosecute protesters with crimes carrying the death penalty, namely "waging war against God" or "moharebeh" and "corruption on earth," according to the UN Office of Human Right s.

The process has been criticized within the country too.

Mohsen Borhani, a professor at Tehran University and an expert in Islamic jurisprudence, has also challenged the use of such religiously based charges against protesters. In a television debate last month, he argued that the protesters executed were charged with waging war against God when their role in the protests did not in fact merit such a charge.

The brandishing of weapons by protesters, he said, was meant to intimidate, not injure security personnel. "This is fundamentally out of the realm of moharebeh because the person's opposition is towards the government, not civilians."

Sepehri Far said that Mohsen Shekari, one of the first protesters to be executed, was accused of injuring an officer. "Others have received the death penalty for extremely vague charges such as destruction and arson of public property or using a weapon to spread terror," she said.

Activists say Iranian authorities have developed sophisticated methods of spreading disinformation on how, why and when executions will be carried out. Civil rights activist Atena Daemi said in a tweet, for example, that several Iranian news outlets had reported that activists on death row had been released, news that was refuted by the prisoners' families.

Activists have said that condemning the protests is not enough. The European Union has taken note, and as the bloc continues to discuss imposing a fourth round of sanctions on Iran, some members have supported moves to classify its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.

The digest

Saudi Arabia to lift restrictions on pilgrim numbers for 2023 Hajj season

Saudi Arabia aims to host a pre-pandemic number of Muslim pilgrims for the Hajj in 2023, the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and Umrah said in a tweet on Monday. No age limits will be imposed on Hajj pilgrims this season, which starts on June 26.

Background: The kingdom had limited the number of pilgrims to 1,000 in 2020 and in 2021 increased the quota to almost 60,000, but only for residents of Saudi Arabia. In 2022, the kingdom authorized one million Muslims to perform the rites. The holy sites in the cities of Mecca and Medina normally host over 2 million people during the pilgrimage.

Why it matters: Performing the Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam which all able-bodied Muslims are required to perform at least once in their lives. Saudi Arabia has identified the pilgrimage as a key component of a plan to diversify its economy. According to Mastercard's latest Global Destination Cities Index, Mecca attracted $20 billion in tourist dollars in 2018.

Egypt commits to IMF to slow projects, increase fuel prices

Egypt committed to a flexible currency, a greater role for the private sector and a range of monetary and fiscal reforms when it agreed to a $3 billion financial support package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Reuters reported, citing an IMF staff report released on Tuesday. Among its pledges is one to slow investment in public projects, including national projects, so as to reduce inflation and conserve foreign currency, without specifying where cuts might fall. Egypt also said it would allow most fuel product prices to rise until they were in line with the country's fuel index mechanism to make up for a slowdown in such increases over the last fiscal year.

Background: In a letter of intent to the IMF, Egypt said it sought support after the war in Ukraine increased existing vulnerabilities amid tighter global financial conditions and higher commodity prices. Under the support, the IMF will provide Egypt with about $700 million in the fiscal year that ends in June.

Why it matters: Egypt is already suffering from economic hardship and rising inflation that has caused discontent at home. The 2011 revolution was partly triggered by economic matters and the cost of living.

Saudi Arabia plans to use domestic uranium for nuclear fuel

Saudi Arabia plans to use domestically-sourced uranium to build up its nuclear power industry, Reuters cited Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman as saying on Wednesday. He added that recent exploration had shown a diverse portfolio of uranium.

Background: Saudi Arabia has a nascent nuclear program that it wants to expand to eventually include uranium enrichment, a sensitive area given its role in nuclear weapons. Riyadh has said it wants to use nuclear power to diversify its energy mix.

Why it matters: Atomic reactors need uranium enriched to around 5% purity, but the same technology in this process can also be used to enrich the heavy metal to higher, weapons-grade levels. This issue has been at the heart of Western and regional concerns about Iran's nuclear program. It is unclear where Saudi Arabia's ambitions end, since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in 2018 that the kingdom would develop nuclear weapons if Iran did. The neighboring United Arab Emirates has committed not to enrich uranium itself and not to reprocess spent fuel.

12.7%

German exports to Iran rose by 12.7% last year, Reuters reported. Despite a significant deterioration in political ties between the two countries due to Iran's brutal crackdown on protesters, trade ties remained intact, with the value of trade climbing to $1.6 billion between January and November. Berlin is currently pushing for a fourth package of European Union sanctions on Iran.

Around the region

The Gulf nation of Oman become the latest in the small group of countries that are considering a move to a four-day workweek.

The government has said that it is studying the possibility of expanding weekends to three days instead of two, citing other nations' success in pilots to test the move.

Salem bin Muslim Al Busaidi, an undersecretary at the labor ministry, told local media that the nation's workforce has already increased flexibility, adopting remote work, part-time work and other initiatives to modernize the work environment.

Several countries have experimented with a four-day work week, including Iceland, Spain and Ireland, and the trials suggest that the move improves productivity.

Oman's neighbor, the UAE, has seen some of the most dramatic changes to the country's work environment. Besides shifting the country's weekend to Saturday and Sunday instead of Friday and Saturday, the country adopted a four-and-a-half-day workweek in 2022.

The UAE emirate of Sharjah took that a step further by adopting a four-day work week across all government sectors and allowing private companies to do the same.

The emirate reported a 40% drop in traffic accidents in the first 8 months, a boost in employee productivity, and a drop in gas emissions due to the decrease in commutes, according to local media.

The onset of Covid-19 drastically changed the working environment of the Gulf region as companies were forced to adapt to new ways of working under restrictions.

By Mohammed Abdelbary

Photo of the day

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international relations and national security

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Executions aren't new in Iran, but this time they're different | CNN

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Editor's Note: A version of this story appears in today's Meanwhile in the Middle East newsletter, CNN's three-times-a-week look inside the region's biggest stories. Sign up here . The Islamic Republic of Iran has long ranked among the world's top executioners.

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How Iran's Protests Engulfed the Country: A Timeline

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How Iran's Protests Engulfed the Country: A Timeline

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How Iran's Protests Engulfed the Country: A Timeline | WSJ

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The Cultural Atlas team acknowledges the Traditional Owners of the lands throughout Australia on whose country we have the privilege to live and work. We pay our respects to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander custodians past, present and emerging.

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The Cultural Atlas team acknowledges the Traditional Owners of the lands throughout Australia on whose country we have the privilege to live and work. We pay our respects to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander custodians past, present and emerging.

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Iran: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report | Freedom House

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See the Freedom in the World 2022 score and learn about democracy and freedom in Iran.

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World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Iran

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Iranian authorities continued to repress their own people. The country’s security and intelligence apparatus, in partnership with Iran’s judiciary, harshly cracked down on dissent, including through excessive and lethal force against protesters and reported abuse and torture in detention. President…

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Perceptions of China, a country in East Asia, must be adjusted to its enormous scale. Its culture and its civilization go back thousands of years. Its vast area is the third...

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Dragon dances have been performed in China for over 2,000 years and are believed to bring about good fortune.

OFFICIAL NAME: People's Republic of China

FORM OF GOVERNMENT: Communist state

CAPITAL: Beijing (Peking)

POPULATION: 1,397,897,720

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES: Standard Chinese, Mandarin

MONEY: Yuan (or renminbi)

AREA: 3,705,405 square miles (9,596,960 square kilometers)

MAJOR MOUNTAIN RANGES: Himalaya

MAJOR RIVERS: Yangtze, Yellow

Stretching 3,100 miles (5,000 kilometers) from east to west and 3,400 miles (5,500 kilometers) from north to south, China is a large country with widely varying landscapes. Its territory includes mountains, high plateaus, sandy deserts, and dense forests.

One-third of China's land area is made up of mountains. The tallest mountain on Earth, Mount Everest, sits on the border between China and Nepal.

China has thousands of rivers. The Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers are the most important. At 3,915 miles (6,300 kilometers) long, the Yangtze is the world's third largest river.
Map created by National Geographic Maps

PEOPLE & CULTURE

With a population of 1.4 billion, China has more people than any other country on Earth. About a third of the population lives in cities. The rest of the people live in the country.

Arts and crafts have a long history in China. Thousands of years ago the Chinese were some of the first people to use silk, jade, bronze, wood, and paper to make art. The artistic writing called calligraphy was invented in China.

Much of China's modern beliefs and philosophies are based on the teachings of a government official who lived nearly 3,000 years ago. Kongfuzi, also known as Confucius, taught people the value of such things as morality, kindness, and education.

China's diverse habitats are home to hundreds of species of animals and plants. More than 3,800 species of fish and hundreds of amphibians and reptile species live in the rivers, lakes, and coastal waters.

China's forest wildlife is threatened by logging and clear-cutting (clearing the land of all trees) for farmland. Expanding deserts in the north also shrink animal habitats. The Chinese government has created more than 1,200 reserves to protect plant and animal species.

The giant panda lives in the misty mountains of southwest China and nowhere else on Earth. They eat bamboo and usually live near stands of the woody evergreen plant. Pandas have been hunted and only about 1,600 remain in the wild.

GOVERNMENT & ECONOMY

China is an authoritarian state ruled by a very powerful central government. A huge workforce and lots of natural resources have driven economic change. This has forced the communist government to permit more economic and personal freedoms, but it has come at a huge cost to the environment.

Many experts predict that the 21st century will be the "Chinese century." Whether or not that proves to be true, there is no doubt that what happens in China will affect many other nations.

China is the home of one of the world's oldest civilizations, but it has only recently become a "modern" nation. In the last 20 years, China has changed faster than any other country in the world.

Chinese history is divided into dynasties, each of which marks the period when a line of emperors ruled. The first empire was the Qin dynasty and began in 221 B.C. The last emperor was overthrown in 1912, and China became a republic. The communist government began its rule in 1949 following a civil war with the Chinese Nationalists.

Ancient China was a land of invention. For centuries, China was way ahead of most other countries in science and technology, astronomy, and math. The Chinese invented paper, the magnetic compass, printing, porcelain, silk, and gunpowder, among other things.

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China Country Profile - National Geographic Kids

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Stretching 3,100 miles (5,000 kilometers) from east to west and 3,400 miles (5,500 kilometers) from north to south, China is a large country with widely varying landscapes.