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People, Fish and Coral Reefs in Indonesia

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People, Fish and Coral Reefs in Indonesia

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This paper discusses the natural, social and economic issues related to the management of coastal ecosystems and resources.

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Vulnerability assessment of ecological conditions in Seribu Islands, Indonesia

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Vulnerability assessment of ecological conditions in Seribu Islands, Indonesia

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Assessing the ecological vulnerability with a focus on coral reefs in Seribu Islands using Geographic Information Systems and Remote Sensing technologies.

The urban pressures and pollutants from four main rivers in Jakarta Bay and Banten Province played a significant role in the environmental degradation. Most of the islands associated with Seribu Islands are at risk, if the urban development continues. The vulnerability analysis of Seribu Islandscan assist the decision makers to prepare pivotal actions in order to adapt the changes and developessential recovery programs for the region

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Global change and coastal threats: The Indonesian case.
An attempt in multi-level social-ecological research

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Global change and coastal threats: The Indonesian case.
An attempt in multi-level social-ecological research

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This paper links global issues, including climate change, with national (Indonesian) coastal, ocean and environmental policies, and relates both to local situations and outcomes.

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This chronological chart of events explains and puts into perspective the formation of the nation of Indonesia

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A chronology of key events in the history of Indonesia

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Anatomy of an Occupation:The Indonesian Military in West Papua

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Anatomy of an Occupation:The Indonesian Military in West Papua

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Regional militant group Jemaah Islamiah poses a lingering threat to security in Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiah is blamed for a series of attacks, including the Bali bombings of October 2002 and the Jakarta bombings of July 2009.

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Indonesia’s Rising Regional and
Global Profile: Does Size Really
Matter?

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Indonesia’s Rising Regional and
Global Profile: Does Size Really
Matter?

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Spatial Segmentation in Bank Loan Markets:
Evidence from Indonesia 

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Spatial Segmentation in Bank Loan Markets:
Evidence from Indonesia 

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Indonesia's poor net international investment position, along with a current account deficit, make it vulnerable to periods of acute risk aversion in the global economy. In an environment of rising global interest rates, this is an increasing risk.

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AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA: CURRENT PROBLEMS, FUTURE PROSPECTS

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AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA: CURRENT PROBLEMS, FUTURE PROSPECTS

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Australia's relations with Indonesia have fluctuated over time. Indonesian government sees Australia as a big threats to its territory, such as Papua and PNG.

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Indonesia's democratisation has brought the two neighbours' political systems more in line with each other. Yet, this has not led to quieter times. Rather, suspicions in Indonesia over Australia's interests towards the provinces of Papua have deepened along with Australian worries about religious developments in Indonesia.

In his Lowy Institute Paper, Professor Jamie Mackie, a very experienced Indonesia analyst who has researched the bilateral relationship for over five decades, evaluates the sources of this volatility and ways the two governments can counteract them and the potential problems if things stay as they are.

The Paper can be downloaded here.

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Australia and Indonesia: current problems, future prospects

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Indonesia's democratisation has brought the two neighbours' political systems more in line with each other. Yet, this has not led to quieter times. Rather, suspicions in Indonesia over Australia's interests towards the provinces of Papua have deepened along with Australian worries about religious developments in Indonesia.

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Controversial mine threatens Indonesian waters

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Controversial mine threatens Indonesian waters

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Bangka is a tiny 48 sq km island situated just off the northern tip of Sulawesi Island, Indonesia in the heart of the Coral Triangle. It's just 30km from Manado, the capital of North Sulawesi province. Bangka borders a marine park that protects two world famous dive sites, Bunaken and Lembeh, although many divers consider Bangka's reefs to be just as impressive, not least the dive operators that run resorts there. The seascape here is a global hotspot of marine biodiversity, supporting rare species like pygmy sea horses, leaf fish and dugongs as well as turtles, white tip reef sharks and even whales. But an allegedly illegal mining operation is said to be changing the face of the island and threatening the fertile waters that surround it.

Under Indonesian law, mining on islands smaller than 2,000sq km that adversely affects the local environment is prohibited. PT Mikgro Metal Perdana (MMP), an Indonesian subsidiary of Hong Kong based Aempire Resource Group, has been seeking licenses to extract iron ore from Bangka since 2008. According to dive operators and local residents, the company has already caused extensive environmental damage, including coastal excavation and land reclamation near sensitive coral reefs. Yet the company has enjoyed the support of officials at both the local and national level.

Sompie Singal, head of the North Minahasa Regency where Bangka is located, has issued a series of permits for MMP to explore for iron ore in a 2000ha concession - almost half of Bangka's total area. An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was approved by 26 out of 27 government officials and specialists, despite the global significance of Bangka's coastal ecosystems and its close proximity to the Bunaken National Park, home to some of the highest levels of marine biodiversity on earth. Veronica Kumurur, Head of Urban and Regional Planning at Sam Ratunlangi University in Manado gave the only No vote. "They didn't submit a detailed engineering plan, so how could we assess the environmental impact?" she says. "They also wanted to build a dam and a smelter on the island. I don't think that is possible without damaging Bangka's unique ecosystems."

In July 2014, former Minister for Energy & Minerals Jero Wacik, who is currently under investigation for alleged graft in two unrelated cases, issued MMP a license to operate. This appears to directly contravene a ruling by Indonesia's Supreme Court in September 2013 that effectively blocked further mining exploration on Bangka.

But MMP claims the license issued by Wacik shortly before his resignation invalidates the prior ruling. Images taken by tourists and dive operators as recently as this month appear to show the ongoing development of coastal roads, concrete jetties constructed over reefs for the landing of heavy machinery and nearby corals swamped in sediment. In February last year, angry locals tried to prevent an MMP boat carrying mining vehicles from landing on Bangka and a few months later, a group of divers claimed that MMP security threw rocks at them and deleted photos they had taken of damaged coral. On 18 March the Jakarta Post reported that 70 Chinese nationals were alleged to be working on the island illegally.

Save Bangka Island, a coalition of local people, environmentalists, divers and activists that has received support from Greenpeace and Change.org, is leading the campaign to stop the mining. Indonesian rock stars Slank, who have visited Bangka on a number of occasions, are also supporting protest action. The Bangka Conservation Fund is running a crowd funding campaign to challenge MMP and its supporters in the courts on behalf of nine plaintiffs seeking to revoke the operating license issued by Jero Wacik, which they say is illegal.

The legal morass surrounding developments in Bangka is all too common in Indonesia, with local officials issuing controversial permits to extract natural resources, sometimes in violation of national laws. Corruption within the judicial system can make it all the more difficult to challenge controversial resource extraction contracts. As of March 2015, local administrators in North Sulawesi had issued a total of 145 mining licenses (IUP) according to Marly Gumalag, head of the General Mining Sector of the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources in North Sulawesi. At a recent meeting with tourism industry representatives in Manado, North Sulawesi governor Sinyo Harry Sarundajang played down the reported impacts of the mining development, calling into question evidence of negative environmental impacts.

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An image taken earlier this month by one of the dive operators on Bangka appears to show increased sedimentation levels on coral reefs, allegedly caused by MMP. Photograph: Bangka Conservation Fund

On 12 March, a delegation of Supreme Court representatives, the nine local plaintiffs suing MMP and the three lawyers representing them, carried out an official inspection of mining sites on Bangka. According to Didi Koleangan from NGO the People's Alliance Against Mining (AMMALTA), local people including seven of the nine plaintiffs were prevented from taking part by police. He also stated that MMP removed heavy equipment ahead of the inspection, a claim supported by dive operators on the island. An MMP spokesperson did not respond to requests for comment.

The current court case challenges the legality of the license to operate issued by the Ministry for Energy & Minerals. A verdict is expected in the next two months. Many environmentalists view Bangka as a crucial test case that could play a major role in determining the fate of other small, ecologically sensitive islands in Indonesia that harbour natural resources. The bigger question is whether the world's largest archipelagic nation can manage its marine resources sustainably - a key element in President Joko Widodo's grand plan to turn Indonesia into a major maritime power.

This article was amended on 4 April to correct two factual errors. It was stated that Bangka is a 480 sq km island. In fact its total area is 48 sq km. The article also stated that 18 Chinese workers were alleged to be working on Bangka illegally. The number of workers was in fact 70.

Topics

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Controversial mine threatens Indonesian dive mecca

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Bangka is a tiny 48 sq km island situated just off the northern tip of Sulawesi Island, Indonesia in the heart of the Coral Triangle. It's just 30km from Manado, the capital of North Sulawesi province.

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					Counter­Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia,
Algeria and Saudi Arabia 
				
			
		

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					Counter­Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia,
Algeria and Saudi Arabia 
				
			
		

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Counter-Insurgency (COIN) , Shades of Islamist radicalism in Indonesia and the 'enemy-Centric' Approach, The War against Terrorism after Suharto, International and Regional Cooperation, Finance, Organisational Problems From 'Hard' to 'Soft' Approaches, The Role of Civil Society Bringing the State's Role back in

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					Analysis of food insecurity risk in Indonesia 
				
			
		

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					Analysis of food insecurity risk in Indonesia 
				
			
		

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(Relevance to Indonesia starts pg .40)

Indonesia is a net exporter of agro-food products but a net importer of most of its staple foods, including rice, wheat and maize. This leaves Indonesian policy-makers and consumers uneasy about the country’s vulnerability to international markets for these commodities and also uneasy about unforeseen events that may impact negatively on the country’s domestic food production capability. Transitory food insecurity is a concern for Indonesia not just because it is a net food importer, but also because possible international fuel price increases, macroeconomic shocks, plant and animal disease outbreaks and natural disasters all threaten the reliability of its food supplies

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Analysis of food insecurity risk in Indonesia - Managing Food Insecurity Risk - OECD iLibrary

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The analytical framework comprises three steps: preparatory analysis, risk assessment and policy analysis. The preparatory analysis is technical in nature and

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					The political economy of non-traditional security:
Explaining the governance of Avian Influenza in
Indonesia 
				
			
		

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					The political economy of non-traditional security:
Explaining the governance of Avian Influenza in
Indonesia 
				
			
		

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Avian influenza has been subject to considerable securitisa-

tion and rescaling efforts in recent years but, we demonstrate, the outcomes have been fundamentally shaped by the nature of the coalitions assembled to support and resist rescaling and the struggles between them, which are in turn conditioned by the political economy of the poultry industry

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The political economy of non-traditional security: Explaining the governance of Avian Influenza in Indonesia

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Given the common association of non-traditional security (NTS) problems with globalisation, surprisingly little attention has been paid to how the political economy context of given NTS issues shapes how they are securitised and managed in practice.

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2014 Indonesia Nutrition Country Profile 

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2014 Indonesia Nutrition Country Profile 

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Despite recent economic growth and significant demographic advantages, Indonesia faces sizable challenges in educating its huge population.

There is significant inequality in the distribution of institutions throughout the country, with poorer regions having the fewest institutions of higher education, and a number of provinces within these regions having no public institutions at all. As an archipelago of more than 18,000 islands, distributing educational opportunities evenly is a tough task, especially with an estimated 700 different languages spoken across the country.

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By Nick Clark, Editor, World Education News & Reviews
Introduction
Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous country and third-largest democracy. The archipelago of over 18,000 islands is home to more than a quarter million people, of whom 86 percent identify as Muslims making it the world's biggest Muslim-majority nation. Demographically, the nation is young, has a growing middle class, and does not face the issues related to ballooning elderly populations confronted by countries such as Japan and South Korea. The economy is the biggest in Southeast Asia and it has been enjoying strong GDP growth of between 5.0 and 6.5 percent for over a decade. Observers predict that the number of families with household incomes exceeding US$10,000 will double by 2020, while average disposable incomes are expected to increase at 3-5 percent annually.

All these factors combine to make Indonesia of particular strategic importance to regional neighbours, in addition to global partners in the West. The current U.S. administration has made cooperation with Indonesia one of its foreign-policy priorities, and educational collaboration is a significant part of that engagement plan. During her visit to Indonesia in 2009, then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made reference to educational collaboration and exchange with Indonesia as being among one of the essential steps toward boosting academic mobility between the two countries and an important means of furthering the United States' commitment to "smart power."
Educational Challenges
In anticipation of increased and rejuvenated academic mobility and cooperation between the United States and Indonesia, World Education Services, through the Knowledge Resource Exchange, will be offering a free webinar on April 11 designed to help international education professional evaluate Indonesian academic credentials.

In this article we offer a hardcopy companion to that webinar, while also looking at some of the challenges currently facing the Indonesian education system. We also take a look at current and future trends in international academic mobility to and from the country.

Despite recent economic growth and significant demographic advantages, Indonesia faces sizable challenges in educating its huge population. The Boston Consulting Group released a report in May 2013 suggesting that Indonesian companies will struggle to fill half of their entry-level positions with fully qualified candidates by the end of the decade due to low upper secondary and tertiary enrollment rates and substandard quality standards. The engineering field is expected to experience the worst shortages, with the shortfall of engineering graduates projected to increase to more than 70 percent in 2025 from a 40 percent shortage in 2013. And while the report suggests that shortages will not be as severe at senior levels, it says that many at that level will lack the global exposure and leadership skills needed to succeed.

In 2011, the gross enrollment ratio (GER) at the tertiary level (total tertiary enrollment as a percentage of the college-age population) was 25 percent (UNESCO, 2013). This is a lower percentage than all BRIC nations with the exception of India (20 percent), lower than the global average (31 percent) and lower also than most members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Nonetheless, the number of graduates in the country doubled between 2005 and 2012, according to data from the British Council, while the GER has risen significantly from just 12 percent a decade earlier (2001) . And the government is focused on increasing access further, setting a goal of enrolling one quarter of the Indonesian college-age population in an institution of higher education by 2020. This represents an approximately quarter million annual increase in students over the next decade.

While enrollment figures through the first nine years of basic education have also improved significantly in recent years, at the upper secondary level just 51 percent of the population aged 15-18 attended school in 2012, well below the Southeast Asian average of 65 percent. This is despite the fact that the government is constitutionally obligated to direct 20 percent of the national budget towards education, something observers say does not happen in reality. Official figures for 2010 put education expenditures at 17.1 percent of the national budget, which represents 3 percent of GDP, low comparative to most neighboring countries. Waste through corruption is considered a major issue within the Indonesian education system.

As a consequence, quality standards at the secondary and tertiary level are well below global standards as measured by a number of different indicators. According to the results of the 2012 Program for International Student Assessment, 15-year-olds in Indonesia were rated 64 th out of 65 countries in mathematics, science, and reading.

Indonesian universities have also performed poorly in international university rankings. The Times Higher Education rated no Indonesian institutions among its top 400 global universities or top 100 Asian universities in 2013. Likewise, the Shanghai Jiao Tong Ranking reported no Indonesian universities among its global top 500. The QS World Ranking, on the other hand, lists the University of Indonesia 64 th in Asia (309 th globally), the Bandung Institute of Technology 129 th (461-470 globally), Universitas Gadjah Mada 133 rd (501-550), and Airlangga University 145 th (701+).
A Focus on Vocational Training
Indonesia finished bottom out of 50 countries in the 2013 edition of the Universitas 21 ranking, which grades national higher education systems on investment, research output, gender balance, international connectivity and other measures. It scored particularly poorly on the first two metrics.

Data from Indonesia's Directorate General of Higher Education shows that there is significant inequality in the distribution of institutions throughout the country, with poorer regions having the fewest institutions of higher education, and a number of provinces within these regions having no public institutions at all. As an archipelago of more than 18,000 islands, distributing educational opportunities evenly is a tough task, especially with an estimated 700 different languages spoken across the country.

In light of the many challenges facing the tertiary sector, alongside the rapidly increasing demand for tertiary places and the unmet needs of the labor market, the Indonesian government is currently focused more on expanding vocational programs than it is traditional academic training.

To help achieve this, the government is committed to developing a network of institutions based on the U.S. community college model. Unlike the low-cost training provided by currently existing Indonesian polytechnics, credits from community colleges will be transferable to a university, thus offering graduates opportunities to further their vocational training at a higher level.
International Mobility
The government is working to establish 500 community colleges within the next four years. More than 30 have already been established with a similar number ready to open soon. These colleges are largely focused on training for jobs in manufacturing, nursing, automotive technology and other trades. The government is also supporting universities looking to establish a generation of technical colleges.

At the secondary level, the government has set a target of 50 percent upper secondary enrollment in vocational schools by 2015 and a ratio of 70:30 by 2025. In 2010, 41 percent of upper secondary students were enrolled in technical and vocational schools, up from 33 percent in 2007.

Competition for places at Indonesia's best public universities is fierce. In 2010, 447,000 students sat for the National University Entrance Examination, with just 80,000 seats available. In conjunction with rising prosperity and a growing middle class, increased - and unmet demand - for university places is likely to lead to increasing numbers of students looking overseas for tertiary study options.

And some say the number is likely to grow quickly, even if from a low base of 34,067 worldwide in 2010 (UNESCO, 2012). Currently the number of outbound Indonesian students account for less than one percent (0.7%) of all Indonesian tertiary students, very low compared to global averages; and inbound rates are even lower.

In 2012, the British Council estimated that growth in the number of internationally mobile Indonesian students would average 20 percent in the coming years, stating that Indonesia will be one of the world's "major international education markets in the next few years." The Council's 2012, Going Global report: The Shape of Things to Come, predicts that the number of Indonesians in higher education will grow by a total of 2.3 million to 7.8 million students by 2020, making it the fifth largest system in the world after China, India, the United States and Brazil.

Simply put, the British Council believes that Indonesian institutions of higher education will not be able to meet burgeoning demand in the coming years, so an increasingly affluent middle class will be forced to look at options offered internationally.

Currently, Australia is the number one choice for Indonesians abroad, largely due to geographic proximity, perceived institutional quality, and English-medium instruction. Australia Education International reports that there were 17,131 Indonesians studying in Australia in 2013, mainly at the tertiary level, and representing the eighth largest source market for Australian institutions of higher education.

The third-most popular destination, the United States, has seen a resurgence in the number of Indonesian students entering its universities in the last couple of years after a fairly precipitous decline in the 10 years prior. After a period of steady growth in the 1980s and 1990s, peaking in 1997/98 at 13,282 students, Indonesian enrollment numbers have tailed off steadily, with especially large declines seen in the three years following the 2001 World Trade Center attacks. Enrollment numbers in 2010/11 were the same as they were in 2009/10 at just under 7,000 and have since grown to 7,670 in 2013, ranking Indonesia as the 18 th leading place of origin for students coming to the United States.

Cost, distance and lingering fears about visa denials in the post-9/11 era have all contributed to making the United States less attractive as a study destination, especially in the face of increased competition and marketing efforts from regional competitor destinations. The PIE News reported recently that "China, Malaysia and Singapore have latterly been joined by New Zealand in announcing their intention to attract more Indonesian students. China, in particular, increased scholarships in the country after witnessing a 42 percent enrollment surge at its universities in 2007-2009."
The Future of US-Indonesia Academic Mobility
Malaysia became the second-most popular destination for Indonesian students in 2010, according to UNESCO data, which is reflective of an Indonesian focus on affordability and cultural similarities.

The British Council has also pinpointed Indonesia as a country that has great potential with regards to transnational education (TNE) provision, despite currently having a legislative framework that has "not proved conducive to facilitating TNE initiatives from overseas providers." The British Council predicts that, "Indonesia will become [an] increasingly important player in the global tertiary education sector," with "significant TNE opportunity" in the near-term future. Specifically, the British Council suggests that the best, perhaps only, way into the domestic Indonesian education market is in partnership with local institutions.

Despite the recent declining enrollment trend among Indonesian students in the U.S., there are reasons to believe that a reversal is imminent, if not already underway. Primary among these reasons is an initiative launched by President Barak Obama and Indonesian officials in November 2010 to double the current number of Indonesians studying at U.S. institutions by 2015 to 15,000, and to significantly increase educational opportunities in Indonesia for U.S. students.

Both President Obama and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for increased collaboration in education between the two countries on separate trips to Indonesia in 2010 and 2009. During President Obama's visit, he and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, a long-term commitment to broadening, deepening, and elevating bilateral relations between the United States and Indonesia, with a priority placed on higher-education cooperation.

In the interests of meeting the goal of increasing academic mobility between the two nations, a " Joint U.S.-Indonesia Council for Higher Education Partnership " was formed to allow institutions of education to work in coordination with the two governments. The Council, which was endorsed by both presidents at their 2010 meeting, has been established to advise the U.S. academic community about U.S. or Indonesian government funds that are, or which may become, available. In addition, it is working with U.S. institutions of higher education and other Council participants to develop solutions that will lower the cost of a U.S. education for Indonesians, and make studying abroad in Indonesia more attractive to Americans.

Under the governmental Partnership agreement, a plan of action was agreed to by the two governments, with priorities including: Study abroad for students from both countries, joint degree programs, university partnerships and mutual recognition of academic degrees and certificates, and a strengthening of cooperation in science, technology and innovation.

The Council believes that government and current private efforts will achieve 3,000-4,000 of the aimed increase in Indonesian student numbers. Therefore, it points to the need for engineering a way of enabling the remaining 3,000-4,000 by the end of 2015. This, it says, "will include innovative ways to lower the cost of a U.S. education, guarantee student loans by governments, achieve a higher percentage of Indonesians in international student enrollments on U.S. campuses, better prepare Indonesians for U.S. study, and better market U.S. educational institutions in Indonesia."
Overview
The Institute for International Education has been leading another effort, funded by the U.S Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), that in 2010 saw leaders from six U.S. colleges and universities and six Indonesian universities meet in Indonesia to take part in a workshop and study tour focused on strengthening higher education ties between the two countries. The tour was part of the U.S.-Indonesia Partnership Program (USIPP), a two-year initiative sponsored by the ECA to increase the number of U.S. students who study abroad in Indonesia. The initiative led to the launch of the USIPP Consortium in 2013, which will continue the work of the original two-year partnership program.

Education System

The Indonesian education system is based on a 12-year school structure (6+3+3) followed by four years at the undergraduate level and two years at the master's level for students pursuing non-vocational studies.

Education is compulsory for the first nine years (primary and junior secondary), and Islamic education is offered at all levels. The language of instruction is Bahasa Indonesia, but local regional languages may be used in the first three years of primary school. The school year runs from mid-July to mid-June on a semester system.

Alongside the general education system, there are also Islamic schools or madrasahs. Islamic primary, lower and upper secondary schools are known as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MT), and Madrasah Aliyah (MA), respectively. Technical and vocational education within the Islamic school system, known as Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan (MAK), is also provided. Madrasah schools follow the same 6-3-3 system structure as in general education.

The Ministry of National Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs have oversight of secondary, vocational and higher education, including state and private religious schools, which must adopt core curriculum developed by the Ministry of National Education. The Ministry of Religious Affairs primarily oversees the religious components of Islamic curricula.

Primary Education ( sekolah dasa - SD)

Primary schooling begins at the age of six for most children and is compulsory for all. The six-year curriculum includes: Civics and religious education, moral education, Indonesian history, Bahasa Indonesia (national language), mathematics, science, social studies, physical education, and art.

Students graduate with the Certificate of Graduation (Surat Tanda Kelulusan - STK) after taking a school-administered final examination.

In 2010, 83.2 percent of all children in primary education were in public schools.

Junior Secondary Education( Sekolah Menengah Pertama - SMP)

Junior secondary schooling is three years in length (grades 6-9) and the curriculum includes: Pancasila (civics), religious education, Bahasa Indonesia, English language, mathematics, biology, chemistry, physics, economics, geography, history, art, and physical education.

Students graduate with the Certificate of Completion of Junior Secondary Education (Surat Tanda Tamat Belajar: Sekolah Menengah Pertama - STTB: SMP or Ijazah: SMP), which is issued by the school attended.

In addition, the Certificate of Graduation (Surat Keterangan Hasil Ujian Nasional - SKHUN) is issued to students who pass the National Examination (Ujian [Akhir] Nasional - UN/UAN) set by the Department of National Education at the end of grade 9. Students are tested in mathematics, English, Bahasa Indonesia, and sciences. Results are indicated on the certificate.

In 2010, 63.7 percent of lower secondary students were in public schools.

Upper Secondary Education ( Sekolah Menengah Atas - SMA)

Upper secondary education is three years in length (grades 9-12), with the first-year curriculum being more generalist than the last two. Students join either the general academic ( Sekolah Menengah Atas - SMA) or vocational stream ( Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan - MAK) upon entry into upper secondary.

From the second year of the general academic upper secondary stream, students specialize in one of four discipline groups, while also continuing to study core subjects:

Natural Sciences

Social Sciences

Languages

Religion (at madrasah schools)

Curriculum Technical and Vocational Upper Secondary (Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan - MAK)
The stream or discipline chosen by students will generally determine the field of study that they apply for at the higher-education level, should they chose to further their studies, although the emphasis on specialization has been lessened over the last decade.

In 2010, 50.2 percent of upper secondary students were enrolled in public schools. The majority of madrasah and religious schools are private. Private schools are required to comply with national education regulations in the areas of curriculum, educational calendar, teaching load and teacher quality standards. Students that pass the National Examination receive graduation certificates equivalent to that of general secondary school students.

The Indonesian government is currently trying to increase enrollment in the secondary technical and vocational stream, in response to the need for middle-level skilled workers in the growing economy. The government has set a target of 50 percent upper secondary enrollment in vocational schools by 2015 and a ratio of 70:30 by 2025. In 2010, 41 percent of upper secondary students were enrolled in technical and vocational schools, up from 33 percent in 2007.
Graduation Requirements Secondary School Exams
Technical and vocational education is offered only at the upper secondary level in both general and religious schools. Schools must follow the national curriculum, but are encouraged to develop a curriculum to meet the needs of the local economy. Technical education is offered in six broad streams: Technology and engineering; information and communication technology; community welfare, arts, crafts, and tourism; agribusiness and agro-technology; and business and management. These fields can be further divided into 40 programs and 121 competencies.

Although students in technical and vocational institutions can transfer to general secondary programs, it does not happen commonly.
National Examinations (Ujian Nasional)
Secondary school examinations are administered by individual schools and held before the National Examinations. Grades from the final year of study are shown separately on the student's school report.

To pass the examinations an overall average of 6 is required (4.26 minimum for individual subjects). The exception is for key schools, where the minimum pass mark is 6 in each subject.

The National Examinations are administered by the Ministry of National Education. To pass the exams, an overall average of 6 is required (4.26 minimum for individual subjects). Students are tested in the following streams:

* Natural Science (mathematics, Bahasa Indonesia and English)
Qualifications
* Social Science ( Bahasa Indonesia, English and economics)

* Language ( Bahasa Indonesia, English and another foreign language)
Admission to Higher Education General Requirements
The Secondary School Certificate of Completion (Ljazah, or Surat Tanda Tamat Belajar Sekolah Menengah Atas - STTB: SMA) details scores from the final school exams and guarantees that the student has completed secondary school. This document is issued by the school attended.

The Certificate of Graduation (Surat Keterangan Hasil Ujian Nasional - SKHUN) is issued to students who pass the National Examinations. This document is required for admission to higher education, and is issued by the Ministry of National Education.

Secondary School Certificate of Graduation (and, by default, the Certificate of Completion)

National University Entrance Exam (Seleksi Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru) for entry to public universities

Private universities have their own entrance examinations

Polytechnics (politeknik) and academies (akademi) set their own entrance exams, which are open to students with a Secondary School Certificate of Graduation.

Higher Education
Competition to study at public universities is very high, and subsequently the admissions examinations are highly competitive. These tests tend to favor students with the means to take preparatory classes.
Types of Institutions
In 2010, 447,000 students sat for the National University Entrance Examination, with just 80,000 seats available. By law (2010), 60 percent of freshman seats are reserved for top-scoring candidates on the admissions examination, which is centrally administered by the Ministry of National Education and takes place on the same day at all public universities across the country. The remaining 40 percent of the seats are distributed according to individual admissions criteria/exams set by each university. Many public universities give priority to students from their province or district.
Diplomas and Degrees
According to the Directorate of General Higher Education, in 2009 there were 3,016 institutions of higher education in Indonesia, an increase of 28 percent from 2005 when there were 2,428 institutions. In 2010, 58 percent of students were enrolled in private institutions of higher education.
Teacher education

Universities (private and public). Oversight and recognition through the Ministry of National Education. In 2009, there were 460 universities, over 400 of which were private.

IKIPS (Institutes and Teacher Training Institutes), which rank as universities with full degree-granting status, but across a specialized field of studies. In 2009, there were 54 institutes.

Islamic Institutes. These have the same rank as universities but under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Colleges, or Advanced Schools, (Sekolah Tinggi) offer academic and professional university-level education in one particular discipline. In 2009, there were 1,306 colleges

Single-Faculty Academies offering diploma/certificate technician-level programs only. In 2009, there were 1,034 academies.

Polytechnics are attached to universities and provide sub-degree junior technician training. In 2009, there were 162 polytechnics.

Community Colleges offering two-year programs with credits that are transferable to university programs, similar to the U.S. model. Community colleges are a recent addition to the Indonesian higher education system and are being introduced in a bid to meet rapidly increasing demand for skilled workers among Indonesian employers. The government hopes to open as many as 500 community colleges across Indonesia in the next four years.

The Diploma (Diploma I - Diploma IV) requires one to four years of full time study, or 40-160 credits depending on program length. The title of the Diploma (I-IV) generally indicates, in years, the length of the program. The D-II award is offered mainly in education, while the D-III award is the most common and is offered across a broad spectrum of disciplines. D-11 and D-III programs are typically offered at polytechnics. The D-I and D-IV are offered in a limited number of fields, and the D-IV (or Sarjana Sains Terapan - SST) is considered a degree-level program akin to a bachelor of applied science.

The Bachelor's Degree (Sarjana 1) requires four to five years of full time study, or 144-160 credits, with courses in the student's major beginning in the first year. Longer programs are typically in professional fields such as medicine, dentistry and pharmacy, and allow awardees the right to practice, although extra requirements may be needed in health fields.

The Master's Degree (Magister or S2) requires two years of full time study, or 36-50 credits, and the completion of a thesis.

The Doctor of Philosophy (Doktor or S3) requires a minimum of three years or 48-53 credits, and the defense of a dissertation.

Primary school teachers are trained at IKIPs where they follow two-year programs leading to the award of a Diploma (D2) following upper secondary education.

Junior secondary school teachers are trained at the tertiary level in two- or three-year programs at IKIPs leading to the award of a Diploma (D2 or D3).
Recognition
Upper secondary teachers are required to hold Diploma III Kependidikan (Education) or a Bachelor's Degree for the Sarjana ( S1).

According to the Teacher Law of 2005, all new teachers will be required to hold a four-year higher education degree (diploma or bachelor) by 2015
WES Document Requirements Secondary Education
The National Accreditation Agency for Higher Education ( Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tingi, BAN-PT) is responsible for performing program quality assurance audits in both the public and private sectors. Programs are rated on a scale of A to D, with programs rated A or B accredited for five years and those rated a C for three years. Those rated D have five years to improve or face risk of closure.
Higher Education
A searchable directory of accredited programs and their ratings is available through the BAN-PT website. In the search fields ' Tinggi' refers to the name of the institution and ' Studi ' the name of the program.

WES requires that a copy of the graduation certificate indicating all exams taken and grades obtained be sent to WES directly from the secondary school attended.
Sample Documents
WES requires a photocopy of the degree or diploma in addition to the academic transcripts indicating all subjects taken and grades obtained. The transcript must be sent directly to WES by the institution attended.

If official documents are issued in Bahasa Indonesia, WES requires a precise word for word English translation.

This file of Sample Documents (pdf) shows a set of annotated credentials from the Vietnamese and Indonesian education systems. Indonesian sample documents begin on page 22:

High School Graduation Certificate (original and English translation)

High School Examination Results (with translation)

Bachelor Degree Transcript

Bachelor Degree Certificate

Master Degree Transcript

Master Degree Certificate

For a more in-depth discussion of the documents seen here, WES is offering a free interactive webinar on April 11.

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By Nick Clark, Editor, World Education News & Reviews ACCESS WEBINAR ARCHIVE ON INDONESIA AND VIETNAM Introduction Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous country and third-largest democracy. The archipelago of over 18,000 islands is home to more than a...Read more

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For every 100 students who enter school, only 25 will come out meeting minimum international standards in literacy and numeracy. The education system has also been racked by teacher shortages, and by repeated cheating scandals—including the selling of exam answers. All of these shortcomings matter not just in terms of stunted lives but also for the economy. A recent study from the Boston Consulting Group found that Indonesia faces a dire shortage of managerial talent—an alarming problem for a country with a growing services sector.

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WITH roughly 55m students, 3m teachers and more than 236,000 schools in 500 districts, Indonesia has the world's fourth-largest education system. But the system does not work nearly as well as it should. The country's new president, Joko Widodo, generally known as Jokowi, hopes to change that with help from his new education secretary, Anies Baswedan, a former university president and creator of a programme that sends graduates to teach in remote areas.

Like so much else in the sprawling archipelago, nothing is simple. Three separate ministries are involved. The education ministry oversees state primary, junior and secondary schools; the religious-affairs ministry has control of madrassas, or Islamic schools; and the president has now made the ministry for research and technology responsible for universities and polytechnics.
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Since the 1970s Indonesia has boosted primary and junior-secondary enrolment rates dramatically. In the past decade it has narrowed the gap in school-completion rates between rich and poor students, and between those from rural and urban areas. Since 2009 it has allocated a fifth of its annual budget to education. Yet gains in education have a lot more scope. Whereas primary-enrolment rates in richer districts are close to 100%, in some poorer districts they remain below 60%. Nor are teachers evenly distributed. Mr Baswedan says that if a school is next to a main road, "I can guarantee it has more teachers than it needs. But if it's two or three kilometres from that road, it won't have enough." Across the system enrolment declines markedly with age. Mr Baswedan says Indonesia has 170,000 primary schools, 40,000 junior-secondary schools and just 26,000 high schools.

Boosting educational quality, particularly relative to Indonesia's neighbours, has been hard. Though average reading and maths scores on standardised PISA tests have improved since 2000, scores in science have declined-and scores in maths and reading have recently been slipping again. In the tests Indonesia markedly lags behind not just rich Singapore, but also Vietnam, whose GDP per capita is three-fifths its own.

The system lets Indonesians down. For every 100 students who enter school, only 25 will come out meeting minimum international standards in literacy and numeracy. In reading, maths and science, the average Indonesian 15-year-old is roughly four years behind the average Singaporean. The education system has also been racked by teacher shortages, and by repeated cheating scandals-including the selling of exam answers. All of these shortcomings matter not just in terms of stunted lives but also for the economy. A recent study from the Boston Consulting Group found that Indonesia faces a dire shortage of managerial talent-an alarming problem for a country with a growing services sector.

In the hope of improving things, a law was introduced in 2005 which required teacher certification. Yet a report this year from the World Bank finds that the certification made no big difference to how much students learned. What matters is how well teachers perform in the classroom, and encouraging students to think critically.

Mr Baswedan wants to start by improving the teachers. He believes they should be evaluated not only on how many hours a week they teach, but on how well their students perform. Almost certainly, teachers need better training. Of more than 400 teacher-training institutes in Indonesia, Mr Baswedan reckons that no more than a tenth are much good. The minister also wants to improve Indonesia's vocational-training institutes, particularly those in agriculture and fisheries, as a way both to boost the country's skilled-manufacturing workforce and to help those in rural areas dependent on farming and the sea.

In the presidential race earlier this year, Jokowi campaigned heavily on education. He wasted no time on one of his campaign promises, launching the "Indonesia Smart Card" in November. It provides school fees and stipends to 24m poor students across Indonesia, guaranteeing them 12 years of free education. But the scheme's value will depend on how well Mr Baswedan can make his longer-term reforms work. Just stuffing more students into bad schools will be of little help to anyone.

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WITH roughly 55m students, 3m teachers and more than 236,000 schools in 500 districts, Indonesia has the world's fourth-largest education system. But the system does not work nearly as well as it should.

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Education is central to the Indonesian Government’s development agenda. Although Indonesia has recovered well from the economic crisis of the late 90’s, the country continues to under-perform neighbouring countries in terms of access to quality education services. The focus of efforts is now on the quality of institutions and public expenditures. Key challenges include: junior secondary enrolment, student learning achievement, allocation of spending.

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The Indonesian school system is immense and diverse. With over 50 million students and 2.6 million teachers in more than 250,000 schools, it is the third largest education system in the Asia region and the fourth largest in the world (behind only China, India and the United States). Two ministries are responsible for managing the education system, with 84 percent of schools under the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and the remaining 16 percent under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA). Private schools play an important role. While only 7 percent of primary schools are private, the shares increase to 56 percent in junior secondary and 67 percent in senior secondary.

Primary school net enrollment rates are below 60% in poor districts compared to more well-off districts that have universal enrollment. Net enrollment rates for secondary education have experienced a steady climb (currently 66% in Junior Secondary and 45% in Senior Secondary) but are still low compared to other countries in the region. Indonesia is also trailing behind its neighbors in Early Childhood Education and Higher Education, with gross enrollment rates of 21% and 11.5% respectively.

Education is central to the Indonesian Government's development agenda. Education spending has increased significantly in the years since the economic crisis. In real terms, education spending doubled between 2000 and 2006. In 2007, spending on education was more than for any other sector, reaching an equivalent US$14 billion equivalent, or more than 16 percent of total government expenditure. As a share of GDP (3.4 percent) this is comparable to other similar countries.

The Law on National Education (No.20/2003) and the Constitution Amendment III emphasize that all Indonesian citizens have the right to education; that the Government has an obligation to finance basic education without charging fees; and that the Government is mandated to allocate 20% of its expenditure on education. The Teacher Law (No. 14/2005) introduced important changes to the employment conditions and requirements for the certification of teachers, aiming at improving education quality. The Ministry of Education's strategic plan for 2005-2009 has three main pillars:
1. Increased access to education; 2. Improved education quality; and 3. Better governance of the education sector.
In 2005 the Government launched a massive program called BOS (Biaya Operasional Sekolah, or School Operations Fund), as a way of injecting funds directly into schools in order to keep children in school and give schools some flexibility in managing their own funds. Supporting this and the decentralization effort in general, the Government has moved to anchor the principles of School-Based Management (SBM) in the national education system and also to provide a framework of National Standards for Education.

The education team at the World Bank focuses on supporting the Ministry of National Education's Strategic Plan (RENSTRA)
Starting with the 2005-2009 RENSTRA, the Bank has developed a broad portfolio of support to the key programs identified by the Ministry as needing additional support. The Thematic Education Dialogue led by Bappenas (a forum for Government and development partners to discuss sector issues at a policy level) provides a steer to the Bank and development partners on areas of focus for future support. It is currently leading an Education Sector Assessment which will provide the analytical base for strategic decisions on directions for the 2010-2014 RENSTRA, which development partners will use as a frame for future support.

The World Bank's program will effectively bridge the 2005-9 and 2010 RENSTRA programs with its ongoing and pipeline portfolio of investment loans, Trust Funds, and analytical work on behalf of the Ministry, providing comprehensive support to the work of the Directorates General in the areas of teacher quality, basic education, higher education, and early childhood development.

The Education Cluster project portfolio comprises projects in Early Childhood, Basic, Higher, and Non-Formal Education. In addition, a youth training project and a sector wide initiative is currently in the pipeline. More than US$ 830 million is committed to the Government of Indonesia for Education by the IDA and IBRD. Total project costs of active and pipeline projects exceed US$ 1.5 billion. Furthermore, there are large Trust Funds that bolster the lending program.
Key Issues
Although Indonesia has recovered well from the economic crisis of the late 90's, the country continues to under-perform neighboring countries in terms of access to quality education services. The focus of efforts now is on the quality of institutions and public expenditures. Key challenges include:

Junior secondary enrollment. Indonesia has almost universal primary enrollment but at the junior secondary level improvements are slower. Only 55 percent of children from low-income families are enrolled in junior secondary schools.

Student learning achievement. Indonesia continues to rank low in international standardized tests of student performance, even after taking socio-economic conditions into account. In 2003, Indonesia ranked 33 out of 45 countries in the Third International Mathematics Science Study (TIMSS). In the 2006 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), which looks at how well 15-year-old students are prepared for life, Indonesia ranked around 50 out of 57 countries in science, reading and math.

Allocation of spending. Despite recent increases in overall spending education, Indonesia is still under-investing in secondary education, particularly junior secondary education. At the same time, operational budgets have been squeezed due to substantial increases in salary expenditures.

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The Indonesian school system is immense and diverse. With over 50 million students and 2.6 million teachers in more than 250,000 schools, it is the third largest education system in the Asia region and the fourth largest in the world (behind only China, India and the United States).

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Indonesia must tackle conflicts between schools and communities

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Indonesia must tackle conflicts between schools and communities

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In many places in Indonesia, there is a long-standing conflict between communities and the schools that provide education for their children.

First, schools often lack proper land documentation. Second, communities are “free-riding”, using school properties without proper care. Third, schools face vandalism or theft.

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Indonesian students, already struggling in maths, reading and science, are often in the middle of conflicts between their schools and communities. AAP/Diana Plater

Indonesia's new Culture and Elementary and Secondary Education Minister Anies Baswedan has a huge task ahead of him.

Australia was alarmed when its students ranked 19th in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests in 2012. But Southeast Asia's largest economy performed much worse. Its students scored the second-lowest out of 65 countries. Vietnamese students scored better than Indonesians (and Australians), ranking 17th on the chart.

Daniel Giovanni/Flickr, CC BY-NC

The Indonesian government has made efforts to improve the quality of education. It has mandated 20% of the national budget for education. There are plans to improve the learning process and to enhance the quality of teachers.

But there is one big problem that has often been overlooked.

Students caught in the crossfire

In many places in Indonesia, there is a long-standing conflict between communities and the schools that provide education for their children.

Trapped in the middle of the conflict are the students whose studies are often disrupted as a consequence.

Research in Bulukumba regency, in South Sulawesi and Sekadau, and Bengkayang regency, in West Kalimantan, revealed that one in three schools visited is in conflict with communities for several reasons.

First, schools often lack proper land documentation. Second, communities are "free-riding", using school properties without proper care. Third, schools face vandalism or theft.

These challenges exist not only in these two provinces, but across Indonesia, wherever increased urbanisation is converting villages to cities or creating new jurisdictions as a consequence of decentralisation.

Conflict over land

EPA/WEDA

Schools in rural areas often start with members of the community granting or selling a piece of land without proper documentation. As time goes by, these schools expand. Yet the land certification had never been completed until another party brings this issue to the front.

For example, the school bought the land a long time ago when the price of land was still low but did not immediately process proper land titles. As the price of land dramatically increased with the process of urbanisation, the next of kin of the former land owners became tempted to claim the land and demand a large amount of money.

Problems of schools that lack proper land documentation are widespread in Indonesia. In Mamuju regency in West Sulawesi, nearly all elementary schools - about 90% - do not own land titles. In Bulukumba regency, 70% of schools have the same problem. Half of the elementary schools in Lebak regency in Banten province also don't own land titles.

Many schools have been ignoring this problem. Principals and teachers are too busy with teaching duties to resolve this. In extreme cases, the community seals the schools, barring entry to students and teachers.

In Sumenep regency in East Java, students had to temporarily use people's home terraces before moving to a classroom of an Islamic school and then to a seaweed warehouse. In Bulukumba, students had to use the basement of people's homes.

Problems in land documentation reflect school's ignorance of the legal status of their land. Also, school officials often do not know how to handle land documentation problems, not to mention lacking the funds to acquire land. This is not only the case in rural areas or outside Java but also in urban areas and in Java.

The free-riders problem

Another type of conflict happens when communities use school grounds for non-school activities such as grazing areas for their cattle or goats after school time. This makes the school dirty and creates unsanitary conditions for students. It may cause health problems and prevent students' full participation in the education system.

Villagers also often use school grounds to store community tools and equipment. In one fishing village we visited, the fishermen put their net in the schoolyard as it was close to the sea.

Communities also use school grounds for recreational activities. Anybody can enter the school area to play football and, in the process, destroy plants or break classroom windows.

This issue affirms the fact that schools have been viewed as common goods and community members act like free riders. Anybody in the neighbourhood is free to take advantage of the school yard. Schools are regularly used by trespassers for individual benefits.

Vandalism and theft

The third conflict is caused by vandalism and theft of school property. Schools in both rural and urban areas face this issue.

In some cases, young delinquents loiter, get drunk and spray graffiti on school grounds. These activities are often combined with criminal action where school assets are stolen. School officials feel it is unsafe to keep various learning resources and materials at school.

While problems of land documentation have been reported in local media, the problems of free riders and vandalism are often unreported. Unless we visit the schools, we would not know they face these challenges. Schools seem to be helpless in defending themselves in these conflicts with the community.

Possible solutions

How should this be solved? For one thing, the new minister and regional governments should be aware of this long-standing problem.

The government should provide training for school principals to help them learn "soft" skills to engage with the community and revitalise school committees. School principals need to understand the culture of the local community and be open to working with them. Appointing principals who are part of the community might help ease the problems.

The school committee has an important role as a mediator between the school and the community. But often it is seen as a money-collecting institution for the school.

Many school committees have been inactive and lack the capacity to intervene. Conflicts with the community should be a spur to revitalise the school committee.

In terms of land issues, the local government should start documenting schools that presently lack land titles. Each school should keep its own land documentation.

The local government should also set aside budget funds to acquire problematic pieces of land. To solve this problem, government agencies, for example the Education Agency and the Land Agency, need to work together.

In terms of free riding, vandalism and theft, it is important to note that many schools still have no clear physical boundaries. Schools need financial assistance to build proper fences or hire security guards to protect grounds after school hours.

It is crucial for the government to enact measures that will improve learning processes and teaching capacity. But these measures can only be effective when schools are free from conflict with their communities.

The PISA results show that Indonesian students face serious challenges in their schooling. We should, at the very least, make sure they can study in peace.

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Indonesia must tackle conflicts between schools and communities

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Indonesia's new Culture and Elementary and Secondary Education Minister Anies Baswedan has a huge task ahead of him. Australia was alarmed when its students ranked 19th in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests in 2012. But Southeast Asia's largest economy performed much worse.

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Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia

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Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia

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Since 1998, which marked the end of the thirty-three-year New Order regime under President Suharto, there has been a dramatic increase in ethnic conflict and violence in Indonesia. In his innovative and persuasive account, Jacques Bertrand argues that conflicts in Maluku, Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, and East Timur were a result of the New Order's narrow and constraining reinterpretation of Indonesia's 'national model'. The author shows how, at the end of the 1990s, this national model came under intense pressure at the prospect of institutional transformation, a reconfiguration of ethnic relations, and an increase in the role of Islam in Indonesia's political institutions. It was within the context of these challenges, that the very definition of the Indonesian nation and what it meant to be Indonesian came under scrutiny. The book sheds light on the roots of religious and ethnic conflict at a turning point in Indonesia's history.

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Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia

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Since 1998, which marked the end of the thirty-three-year New Order regime under President Suharto, there has been a dramatic increase in ethnic conflict and violence in Indonesia. In his innovative and persuasive account, Jacques Bertrand argues that conflicts in Maluku, Kalimantan, Aceh, Papua, and East Timur were a result of the New Order's narrow and constraining reinterpretation of Indonesia's 'national model'.

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Challenges and opportunities in climate change

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Challenges and opportunities in climate change

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Climate change is one of the major challenges of our time. From shifting weather patterns that threaten food production, to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic flooding, the impact of climate change is global in scope and unprecedented in scale.

In Indonesia, landslides caused by rains in deforested lands affect mostly the rural poor. Restoring and maintaining key ecosystems can help communities in their adaptation efforts while also creating jobs.

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Indonesia: A vulnerable Country in the Face of Climate Change

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Indonesia: A vulnerable Country in the Face of Climate Change

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The shocks of climate change are already harshly felt in Indonesia, with additional droughts, heat waves, and floods. Hence, if these effects continue to increase in Indonesia, it will pose as an even greater threat to the country’s developmentchallenge.

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Climate Change in Indonesia- implications for Human and Nature

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Climate Change in Indonesia- implications for Human and Nature

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climate change impacts:

water availability- droughts, uncertain ability to produce agricultural goods, economic instability, and more undernourished people, hindering progress against poverty and food insecurity.

Sea level rise- 1 million at risk from flooding and sea-water inriusion. dry season, negative impact on aquaculture industry and infrastructure along the coasts.

biodiversity and ecosystem service- declines in fishing etc.

Human health- heat waves, floods, prolonged droughts leading to increased injury, illness and death. Increased vector-borne infections (malaria)...

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Indonesia coral reefs under dire climate change threat

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Indonesia coral reefs under dire climate change threat

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Short video on climate change and its affects on the coral

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Indonesia coral reefs under dire climate-change threat

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Rising water temperatures are damaging country's once pristine reefs by causing widespread bleaching.

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'Proxy Wars' Threaten Indonesia, Says Generals

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'Proxy Wars' Threaten Indonesia, Says Generals

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Since 2014, a new ideology has been rising in Indonesia that might be called "fear of foreign proxies."

The “proxies” include shadowy organizations that defy identification but nonetheless constitute an unspecified but growing threat –small countries, NGOs, mass media or individuals acting as stand-ins for more powerful hidden entities out to attack Indonesia’s interests.

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Since 2014, a new ideology has been rising in Indonesia that might be called "fear of foreign proxies" and that emphasizes a threat to Indonesia from proxy wars.

According to Indonesian Army chief of staff General Gatot Nurmantyo, the "proxies" include shadowy organizations that defy identification but nonetheless constitute an unspecified but growing threat -small countries, NGOs, mass media or individuals acting as stand-ins for more powerful hidden entities out to attack Indonesia's interests.

These threats, Gatot implied, could include Indonesians. In fact, his list seemed to include many organizations that might demand accountability from the rapidly consolidating power of the oligarchy. As "fear of foreign proxies" spreads, these organizations or individuals may find it more difficult to criticize corruption, environmental pillaging and trampling of ethnic groups because oligarchies may label them as proxies for foreign interests.

Could this new ideology be manipulated by Indonesia's elites to consolidate their growing power and block dissent? Could the threat of foreign proxies replace the Suharto-era threat of communism, allowing Indonesia's oligarchs to brand dissenters as proxies?

In April 2014, Gen. Gatot told university students in Bandung that "proxy wars" present a growing threat to Indonesia and that Indonesian youth have a role to play in defending against them. Since the election of President Joko Widodo, this ideology has been gaining momentum. In September 2014, Gatot warned students in Jogyakarta about the threats. In early October 2014, Hanura parliamentarian Susaningtyas Kertopati .

In mid- October 2014, Gatot was spreading the ideology to eastern Indonesia. He told university students in Ambon that the spread of narcotics into Indonesia was part of an international conspiracy to destroy the country . Then he continued on to Merauke and told Papuans that oil interests had used a proxy war in 1999 to separate Timor-Leste from Indonesia . At the end of October, he was telling university students in Bali that foreign interests might seek to restrict development and education . Similarly in October 2014, other military officials ran a seminar in Lampung titled " the role of youth in facing proxy wars."

This emerging ideology appears largely to have escaped the attention of the English language media so most links in this article are to Bahasa Indonesia news sites.

By November 2014, warnings about "proxy wars" were spreading fast. The military was warning high school kids about the threat.University students in Depok, South Jakarta, were warned against foreign interests who recruit Indonesia's younger generation with indoctrination, education facilities and materials, so that they would become agents of foreign countries.

In 2015, the military campaign against "proxies" has continued. The Jakarta Post finally reported on visits by Gatot to Semarangand Medan in March and April, when he said East Timor was lost because of a proxy war involving the Sunrise oil field. He failed to mention a 25-year history of Indonesian military atrocities as a contributing factor.

Why now? Proxy wars are not new. Many conflicts before and during the Cold War were proxy wars, including some would say Indonesia's purges in 1965 and occupation of East Timor in 1975. One thing that may be new is that the national legislature and police force have become the most corrupt institutions in Indonesia and have, since mid-2014, been consolidating their power.

Parliamentarians' attempts to undermine others who might challenge them began with an unsuccessful attempt in mid-2014 to have provincial governors appointed not by direct election but by local parliaments. In early 2015, parliamentarians and senior police tried to cripple the nation's Corruption Eradication Commission [KPK] with a string of arrests of KPK officials who challenged the appointment of a plainly corrupt national police chief. There is a growing risk that the military's proxy war ideology may be harnessed to go after other Indonesian organizations that might challenge them.

Like all other nationalities, Indonesians may need to be wary of being caught up in proxy wars. Xenophobia is not healthy but wariness and the ability to critically analyze foreign interests is certainly healthy. But Indonesians also need to critically analyze the selfish interests of their own elites.

If the KPK is neutralized, NGOs and civil society organizations are two remaining voices trying to hold the oligarchs accountable. What may have started as a well-intentioned campaign by the military may be manipulated by elites to less nationalistic purposes.

Voices of dissent are now vulnerable to being branded as proxies if they speak out in favor of improved government accountability, stricter controls over environmental exploitation, respect for marginalized ethnic groups, workers' rights and improved government services for the nation's millions of poor people. If this happens, Indonesia will slip further into the noose of a legislative-police-oligarchy triumvirate whose recent treatment of the KPK suggests their first priority is their own bank accounts.

Warren Doull is a pseudonym. He worked for UNTAET in Timor-Leste in 2001-2002 and has also lived and worked extensively in Indonesia.

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'Proxy Wars' Threaten Indonesia, Say Generals - Asia Sentinel

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Since 2014, a new ideology has been rising in Indonesia that might be called "fear of foreign proxies" and that emphasizes a threat to Indonesia from proxy wars.

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Indonesia's transition to democracy under threat as new president is sworn in

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Indonesia's transition to democracy under threat as new president is sworn in

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The administration of the new president of Indonesia Joko Widodo already faces political crisis. "It might just be the crisis Indonesia needs to complete its transition to democracy."

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On October 20, the new president of Indonesia, Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, will be sworn in, but his incoming administration already faces political crisis. It might just be the crisis Indonesia needs to complete its transition to democracy.

After Suhartoresigned in 1998, Indonesia rapidly introduced the institutions of liberal democracy, including popular elections, separation of powers and legal and judicial checks and balances. But it has been less successful in opening access to power at the national level, which has remained tightly held by the old elite.

Ready and waiting: Joko Widido, President-elect of Indonesia will be sworn in on October 20.
Photo: Getty Images

Every president since Suharto was a prominent national figure when he was in power. Habibie was Suharto's deputy and protege. Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid was the son of a dynasty that led Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation. Megawati Sukarnoputri was the daughter of Indonesia's first president, leader of the opposition to Suharto, and then Wahid's deputy. The incumbent, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was a Suharto-era general who became a senior cabinet member under Megawati.

Jokowi breaks this mould. A provincial businessman who ran a successful furniture business, he only recently rose to national prominence by winning contested popular elections to become mayor of his hometown, Surakarta (Solo) and then Governor of Jakarta. He did so through his electoral appeal as an anti-corruption and good governance reformer, and a track record of forcing through change that delivered direct benefits to the poor in areas including healthcare, education, access to benefits and housing.

It was this that enabled him to defeat the insider candidate in the July poll, Prabowo Subianto. By contrast to Jokowi's humble origins as the son of an itinerant worker, Prabowo is another former general and the scion of one the country's most prominent and very wealthy elite families - and a former son-in-law of Suharto. He also has a track record of human rights abuse while in the military that has led the USA and the United Kingdom to deny him entry.

During the campaign, it become clear that just as Jokowi was committed to continuing his reforms at the national level, so Prabowo wanted to stop them - and even roll back much of the democratic and governance reform introduced post-Suharto. Unsurprisingly, many of the political and economically powerful rushed to back Prabowo.

The introduction of direct popular elections, improved institutional checks and balances, and oversight agencies with significant investigative powers have created a siege mentality among Indonesia's political and economic elites. They find themselves losing elections or, worse still, being arrested and jailed for practices that, while corrupt, have always been the way they do business. Some now see Jokowi's incoming administration with its focus on combating corruption and supporting small and medium business as a direct threat. They are doing everything they can to stop it.

So far, they have been very successful. Prabowo's Red and White Coalition controls more than 60 per cent of the new legislature elected in April. This has allowed him to force though laws allowing his coalition to win leadership roles in the legislature, from the Speaker down.

Most revealingly, Prabowo's team have shown their true colours by passing a law abolishing one of the more important democratising reforms introduced in the past Suharto period: election of local government heads. In fact, this regressive law was initiated by the Democrats, the party of outgoing President Yudhoyono but shocked by the angry public response, he has issued an emergency regulation that has effectively suspended the law. The legislature, however, will get the chance to undo that at its next sitting.

Embattled tycoon Aburizal Bakrie is the head of Golkar, the party established by Suharto. Although very unpopular with the public, he is also a senior member of Prabowo's Red and White Coalition. He has suggested they now plan to use their numbers to amend the constitution to abolish direct presidential elections too, cutting off the democratic process by which an outsider like Jokowi could rise to national power. Instead, they want a legislative council to directly select the president without popular election, as used to be the case under Suharto. If they can pull this off, the road will be open to impeach Jokowi and replace him with Prabowo.

The result is a national political confrontation, which seems to leave Jokowi's agenda in tatters before he even gets to the palace. Certainly, if things don't change, Jokowi will be in deep trouble and many of his supporters are starting to panic.

But things may well change, and the crisis could turn out to be not the end of the reform process, as Prabowo hopes. It might instead signal the beginning of the end of the control the Suharto-era elite have enjoyed over Indonesia politics and business for the last 15 years.

It was always to be expected that the period between the election in July and the October installation would be a period of intense horse trading and political shenanigans as politicians jostle for position for the next five years. Jokowi has repeatedly said his cabinet will be dominated by technocrats, but there will also have to be places for members of the coalition based around his own party, PDI-P, led by the formidable former President, Megawati. Putting massive pressure now on Jokowi and Megawati is an excellent way for political hopefuls to force concessions and win places in the new administration.

But it can equally be expected that once Jokowi is inaugurated, some of those now opposing him will become more conciliatory as they seek to win favour from the new government. In fact legislative coalitions are notoriously fluid and unreliable in Indonesia, and cracks are already beginning to show in Prabowo's Red and White coalition.

Golkar, the biggest party on Probowo's side, is now split between supporters of Bakrie and those who blame him for leading them into opposition for the first time in their history. Jusuf Kalla, Jokowi's politically-experienced and wily Vice President, was also Vice President in Yudhoyono's first term. He used that position then to take control of Golkar and still commands a following. There is therefore a real possibility that Golkar - or a big part of it - will eventually swap sides.

The same is true for the Democrats, Yudhoyono's party. Their leader is now an unpopular lame duck, seen by most Indonesians as weak and vacillating. His party has been ravaged by corruption scandals that lost it the plurality in the legislature. At the moment, deep personal animosity between Yudhoyono and Megawati keeps the Democrats on Prabowo's side, but that could change once Yudhoyono steps down. Other Red and White parties have also made overtures to Jokowi, including the largest Muslim party, PPP, which last week voted against Prabowo's coalition.

It is clear that President Jokowi will face aggressive and ruthless opposition from Prabowo's camp, determined to retain their grip on political and economic power and, if possible, wind back the reforms that threaten their privileges. This could well disrupt government for years to come.

It is also clear, however, that the extreme position Prabowo's coalition has adopted in order to tear Jokowi down could erode its support.

Many Indonesians see the crisis as a direct confrontation between the old guard and reformers over how the country is to be run in the future. That is galvanising civil society organisations, a hugely potent force in the new Indonesia. They mobilised to deliver Jokowi victory in the last weeks of the campaign, when PDI-P seemed to have blown it and the charismatic Prabowo looked unstoppable. Now, sympathetic media groups, activists and netizens are back on the warpath, desperate to prevent him unravelling the democratic reforms that gave them voice.

Furious at his loss, a vengeful Prabowo has swung the wrecking ball but it may well swing back against him once Jokowi takes office.

So far, Jokowi has kept his cool. He knows that if he survives (as is likely) and eventually gets much of his agenda through, then another very important step in his country's long transition from autocracy will have been taken. Indonesian democracy will have proved its resilience and, more importantly, its capacity to deliver a society where national power is genuinely contestable, even by an outsider.
Tim Lindsey is Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society at the University of Melbourne.

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Indonesia's transition to democracy under threat as new president is sworn in

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On October 20, the new president of Indonesia, Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, will be sworn in, but his incoming administration already faces political crisis. It might just be the crisis Indonesia needs to complete its transition to democracy. After Suhartoresigned in 1998, Indonesia rapidly introduced the institutions of liberal democracy, including popular elections, separation of powers and legal and judicial checks and balances.

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Transnational Security Threats to Indonesia 

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Transnational Security Threats to Indonesia 

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Indonesia has no conventional external threat to its security. National security priorities therefore tend to focus on the internal and transnational security challenges that Indonesia faces today. This paper focuses on terrorism, corruption and security sector, environmental crime, narcotics trafficking and piracy, human trafficking and threat of pandemic disease, implications for the US.

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Indonesia's deft diplomacy pays dividends 

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Indonesia's deft diplomacy pays dividends 

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Indonesia’s diplomacy follows the maxim that ‘less is more’ and so is often more effective in influencing outcomes. Indonesia’s approach is that of a country which can be entrusted to promote the common interests of the region. In ASEAN parlance, it seeks to be a country that works at the ‘comfort level’ of its regional peers.

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Author: R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Indonesia

Indonesia's experience within ASEAN has been that leadership in a world of sovereign states must be earned and nurtured, not imposed at will.

Geographically, demographically and economically speaking, Indonesia constitutes a significant part of ASEAN. But these elements do not automatically translate on their own into influence and leadership. The geopolitics and geo-economics of the Southeast Asia region depend on skills of statecraft and diplomacy: these are the qualities which translate the potential for leadership into reality. Indonesia's approach has been to apply smart power - namely, a combination of soft power and hard power, together with a readiness to provide intellectual and policy leadership.

Drawing lessons from the past, and driven not least by a keen interest not to repeat the shortcomings of larger countries, recent Indonesian foreign policy has crafted a more nuanced, calibrated and deft approach to leadership within ASEAN. This is an approach which places primacy on the promotion of trust and confidence in Indonesia within ASEAN. Rather than being a country that throws its weight around, Indonesia's diplomacy follows the maxim that 'less is more' and so is often more effective in influencing outcomes. Indonesia's approach is that of a country which can be entrusted to promote the common interests of the region. In ASEAN parlance, it seeks to be a country that works at the 'comfort level' of its regional peers.

At the risk of oversimplification, three themes at the national, regional and global levels illustrate Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN over the recent years.

The first is the introduction of the subjects of democracy and human rights in ASEAN discourse through the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community (the others being the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Communities). The discourse was adopted in 2003 during Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN as part of the Bali Concord II platform.

While there is clearly a fair way to go to attain the kind of democratic community envisaged in the APSC, it is not possible to exaggerate the fundamental significance of the APSC vision. No longer can there be a blanket disregard of developments within each individual member state given that ASEAN now constitutes a 'community' or even a 'family'. For Indonesia, the 'democratisation' of ASEAN, while naturally occurring at different speeds, has been essential to ensure that there is no 'disconnect' between regional level developments and Indonesia's national level democratisation since 1998.

Indonesia's leadership in strengthening ASEAN's democratic architecture has not been limited to the building of norms and principles, through documents such as the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, as well as institutions such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Indonesia has also made significant strides in promoting certain practices, such as transparency around internal sovereign developments at ASEAN meetings, in the hope that they will generate a 'demonstrative spill-over effect' elsewhere. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the acceleration of reform in Myanmar in 2011 took place during Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN. This was the result of, among other things, a judicious combination of policies, formal and informal, regional and bilateral, which in total helped create conditions conducive for further reform.

A second illustration of Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN has been on the issue of regional architecture. In recent years, Indonesia has been at the forefront in ensuring that the group's much-cited principle of being in the 'driving seat' of regional integration is tangibly realised in the association's engagement with its external partners. In this way Indonesia has, again in a judicious and consensus-building manner, sought to provide leadership in ASEAN. Hence, its vision of an East Asia Summit that included India, Australia and New Zealand, rather than one that was limited to the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), came to fruition in 2005. In the subsequent evolution of the EAS, Indonesia was able to achieve the concurrent admission of Russia and the United States in 2011, representing the realisation of its 'dynamic equilibrium' policy. Indonesia has also been successful in having the EAS adopt the so-called Bali Principles in 2011 that inter alia provide for peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force among EAS members.

Indonesia's leadership on regional security has clearly extended beyond regional architecture-building. A case in point was its role in managing the real potential for conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in 2011 over the disputed Preah Vihear temple in the border region. Another was its unprecedented 'shuttle diplomacy' in 2012 that helped restore ASEAN unity on the issue of the South China Sea through the adoption of the so-called 'Six Point Principles'.

And Indonesia's leadership took ASEAN cooperation to a higher level through the Bali Concord III of 2011. The ' ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations ' envisions a common ASEAN approach to addressing global issues. Much like the Bali Concord II, the Bali Concord III aims to ensure synergy between Indonesia's increasing global reach and the region's own global-level ambitions and aspirations. This is a true reflection of Indonesia as a regional power with global interests.

For Indonesia, leadership in ASEAN has had to be earned through sound policies. To successfully navigate, and indeed lead, the dynamic ASEAN framework has more often required quiet rather than megaphone diplomacy; an ability to master informal rather than formal channels of communication; and an emphasis on common rather than narrow interests. Last but not least, embracing a leadership role in ASEAN demands the capacity to be forward-looking - to shape and mould - rather than just react to developments.

Leadership in ASEAN is a process, not an event. It is one quite distinct from ASEAN chair alone. It must be nurtured, and above all, it must be earned.
M. Marty M. Natalegawa was Foreign Minister of Indonesia from 2009 to 2014.
This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly , 'Leadership in the region' .

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Indonesia's deft diplomacy pays dividends

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Author: R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Indonesia Indonesia's experience within ASEAN has been that leadership in a world of sovereign states must be earned and nurtured, not imposed at will. Geographically, demographically and economically speaking, Indonesia constitutes a significant part of ASEAN. But these elements do not automatically translate on their own into influence and leadership.

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Since the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia has been struggling against the threat of violent terrorism. As the Indonesian government has developed a counterterrorism strategy, it has sought to address both the immediate threat and underlying causes of terrorism.

Radicalism, spurred by extremist religious teachings, has become the primary challenge of Indonesia's counterterrorism campaign. Given Indonesia's social diversity, radical preachers often deliver messages of hate and violence.

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Members of the Indonesian army anti-terror squad take part in an anti-terror drill at the police special forces headquarter compound in Depok, Indonesia's West Java province (Beawiharta/Courtesy Reuters).

Since the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia has been struggling against the threat of violent terrorism. As the Indonesian government has developed a counterterrorism strategy, it has sought to address both the immediate threat and underlying causes of terrorism. Indonesia's multipronged approach to counterterrorism and continued efforts to thwart radicalism provide valuable examples for other nations.
Terrorism in Indonesia
Radicalism, spurred by extremist religious teachings, has become the primary challenge of Indonesia's counterterrorism campaign. Given Indonesia's social diversity, radical preachers often deliver messages of hate and violence. With the growing threat of religious intolerance and radicalism, the Indonesian government is coordinating and developing coherent counterradicalization programs in order to revitalize "national resilience" against venomous radical ideology.

No longer do terrorist groups affiliate themselves with a global cause or ideology; rather, they mostly emerge from the splinters of and . The of Indonesian jihadists also comes from ordinary public schools rather than Islamist boarding schools ( ), and they often form from small but radical religious study groups ( ) in different parts of the country. Similarly, the main bases of terrorist operations in the country have also shifted to Poso region in central Sulawesi.

Alongside these transformations, notable trends have emerged in recent terrorist threats in Indonesia. First, the police have become the main target of terrorist plots and attacks. In December 2012, for instance, a police patrol was ambushed by gunmen in Tambarana, Poso, causing the deaths of four officers. Recent incidents have also taken place in areas outside Poso, including Jakarta. These include the violent against a policeman in front of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) building on September 11, 2013.

Second, despite their ideological distinctions, relationships between jihadist fighters and religious vigilante groups have emerged. The Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)-a militant Islamist organization has allegedly as the liaison among the like-minded radicals through lectures by radical preachers who instill in their audience a commitment to jihad. In recent years, violence against minority groups has taken place in various parts of Indonesia. Attacks against Ahmadiyya and Shia believers have claimed lives and displaced hundreds, and Christian communities continue to experience intimidation by radical Islamists. These incidents provide opportunities for the jihadist groups to recruit new operators and enhance their influence in society.
Indonesia's Counterterrorism Regime
In light of these threats, the Indonesian government has sought to broaden the scope of its counterterrorism campaign, including the involvement the Indonesian military (TNI). Currently, however, the responsibility for counterterror operations remains under the Indonesian police, particularly the unit Detachment-88. As of 2012, this elite counterterrorism unit has successfully captured hundreds of terrorist suspects and confiscated their weapons across the Indonesian archipelago.
Source: adapted from a presentation by Muhammad Tito Karnavian, former Deputy of National Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT) at the Focus Group Discussion on "Indonesia's Security Index" organized by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), 14 August 2012.
More recently, the newly appointed TNI Chief, General Moeldoko, put forward the military's plan to establish a counterterror taskforce. The new unit will be from troops with relevant skills for special operations on ground, sea and air, and each respective division of the armed services will retain command of these soldiers during peacetime. The National Coordinating Agency for Counter-Terrorism (BNPT) will also of the army's extensive territorial structure for counterradicalization and intelligence gathering purposes.

While improving the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations, Indonesian authorities have also been working on deradicalization and counterradicalization strategies. A recent suggests that many convicted Indonesian terrorists are due for release after serving time in prison. Given the grave danger of terrorist recidivism, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights seeks to reform the correction system and improve the physical condition of many prisons in Indonesia as part of its deradicalization program for terrorist inmates.

As the terrorist groups are also adapting to the new environment and beginning to update their operations and targets, Indonesia has developed a comprehensive counterterrorism approach. The capture of ex-terrorist convicts, including Lutfi Haedaroh (aka Ubaid) and Abdullah Sunata in 2010 shows the importance of addressing the overall environment that breeds religious extremism and terrorist activities. In that sense, the Indonesian government has begun incorporating persuasive measures to tackle the dissemination of radical religious doctrines and discriminative sentiments at the grassroots level.
Indonesia's Experience: Lessons for Global Counterterrorism
Indonesia has come a long way, but still faces the threat of terrorism in the future. The country's porous land and sea borders, endemic criminality and residual radical views continue to provide an attractive logistical and operational theatre for terrorist networks. Weaknesses are also looming from the suboptimal interagency cooperation, especially between the police and military, due to conflicting spheres of jurisdiction and functional confusion arising from the laws mandating domestic security role for the military.

Nevertheless, Indonesia's experiences in tackling the threats of religious radicalism and terrorism are invaluable and relevant for other nations. As a result of its counterterror offensive, Indonesia today is less susceptible to major terrorist attacks than it was in the early 2000s. In particular, there are three lessons from the country's counterterrorism that can be applied at the global level.

First, Indonesia addresses the threats of terrorism through the lens of law enforcement. With this approach, the Indonesian government seeks to try terrorist suspects according to the existing laws while modestly using coercive measures against violent terror attacks. To its credit, the police's counterterror squads have been successful in conducting raids, capturing terrorist suspects, and canceling their plots in recent years.

Second, given the sensitivity of military force employment, the Indonesian government carefully engages the TNI in the counterterrorism campaign. To date, the military has played a crucial role in intelligence gathering. It also contributes to counterradicalization programs through civic missions in conflict-prone areas.

Third, as the threat of terrorism evolves, the Indonesian government enhances its counterterrorism strategy. In addition to counterterror operations, it undertakes a persuasive approach-including prison reform, rehabilitation programs and counter-propaganda. The purpose of these measures is to disengage terrorist convicts from future terrorism activities and prevent or disrupt the radicalization process of Indonesian society.

In a nutshell, an overarching focus of counterterrorism strategy is critical for all nations to address the evolving threats of terrorism.

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Since the 2002 bombings in Bali, the Indonesian government has developed a counterterrorism strategy that seeks to address both the immediate threat and underlying causes of terrorism. Indonesia's multipronged approach to counterterrorism and continued efforts to thwart radicalism provide valuable examples for other nations, writes expert Iis Gindarsah.

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Indonesia holds conference on anti-terrorism measures as concern grows over fighters joining Islamic State 

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Indonesia holds conference on anti-terrorism measures as concern grows over fighters joining Islamic State 

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Concern is increasing in Indonesia over the number of people leaving the country to fight with Islamic States (IS) militants and other groups in Iraq and Syria.

A security consultant speaking at the conference warned terrorism now posed a bigger global threat than when the World Trade Centre was attacked in NY.

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Updated March 24, 2015 12:05:08

Concern is mounting in Indonesia over the number of people leaving the country to fight with Islamic State (IS) militants and other groups in Iraq and Syria.

As pressure increased on the Indonesian government to take action, it called experts to a conference on how to tackle IS and terrorism.

A security consultant speaking at the conference warned terrorism now posed a bigger global threat than when the World Trade Centre was attacked in New York.

Professor Angel Rabasa of the RAND Corporation in the United States said the world had not faced a threat this big since planes flew into buildings in the United States in 2001.

"A threat that looking back two or three years ago, almost nobody had predicted," he said.

He said Islamic State had been far more successful than Al Qaeda, building a following through social media sites like twitter.

IS shares propaganda videos to tens of thousands of followers, he said, "who would then create new pages and links, so it's almost impossible to stop".

"The videos are uploaded on YouTube for further viewing," Mr Rabasa said.

Singapore based terrorism expert Professor Rohan Gunaratna agreed Islamic State's social media strategy was one of its strongest weapons.

He also blamed western intervention in the Middle East for creating an environment for terrorist groups.

But he told the anti-terrorism conference he had faith in Indonesia's ability to again crush terrorist networks, as it had done since the 2002 Bali bombings and 2004 Jakarta embassy attacks.

Terrorism busts halt fighters heading to Syria

In the latest of a string of terrorism related busts, a group of aspiring foreign fighters faced court in Jakarta on Monday, accused of attempting to join a local terrorism cell linked to Islamic State.

The four ethnic Uyghur men from China had allegedly been prevented from entering Syria through Turkey to join Islamic State militants.

Instead they travelled to Indonesia to train with one of the country's most wanted terrorists, Santoso.

"Essentially they have an evil conspiracy with the Poso Group of Santoso," Prosecutor Dicky Octavia said.

Santoso is the head of East Indonesia Mujahideen, or MIT, a group that has sworn an affiliation with Islamic State militants.

Santoso makes propaganda videos from his jungle hide out in central Sulawesi.

In the videos members of MIT talk of killing infidels and taking on the police and military.

Indonesia's military announced it was sending more then 3,000 troops to the area, for what it called military exercises.

Santoso indicated in a video the move was not welcomed.

"Because the Densus [a Special Forces Indonesian counter-terrorism squad] is under the orders of America and Australia, there are actually foreign troops, which are here to slaughter the Muslims," he said.

Meanwhile, on Sunday morning, Indonesian police raided the house of a man accused of helping 16 Indonesians get to Syria to fight for IS.

Topics: terrorism, unrest-conflict-and-war, government-and-politics, indonesia

First posted March 24, 2015 08:17:27

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Push to tackle homegrown terrorists in Indonesia

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Updated March 24, 2015 12:05:08 Concern is mounting in Indonesia over the number of people leaving the country to fight with Islamic State (IS) militants and other groups in Iraq and Syria. As pressure increased on the Indonesian government to take action, it called experts to a conference on how to tackle IS and terrorism.

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Indonesia's new government is likely to find the going tough on the economic front before it can reach the kind of growth the president is looking for.

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Updated October 28, 2014 18:24:34

Indonesia's new government is likely to find the going tough on the economic front before it can reach the kind of growth the president is looking for.

That is the message from the country's previous finance minister, Chatib Basri, who faced a torrid task in managing the economic levers.

The new Indonesian cabinet has just been sworn-in, with president Joko Widodo at the helm who campaigned on bumping growth back up to 7 per cent.

However, the team faces immediate challenges such as a $21 billion drain on the budget to pay for fuel subsidies, and ratty infrastructure.

Chatib Basri had the opposite problem of having to slow growth down.

"I don't see that (7 per cent growth) would happen during 2015, but if you're talking beyond 2016 I think there's a lot of chance," he said.

"I believe the normalisation of the US monetary policy in 2015 will be very tough to the new administration. I hope I am wrong but it could be more severe than 2013."

Mr Basri has warned before of the impact of the winding back of the US Federal Reserve's easy money policy. He had barely stepped into the minster's role in May last year when then US Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke made comments about tapering that rocked emerging markets.

Indonesia was one of several countries that had to put in measures to slow imports and growth.

"We tried to come up with various policies handling this issue, managing this issue, and as a result I have to come up with the policy that is probably not popular, by slowing down the growth," said Mr Basri.

"And it was by design of course, it's not something that I really want to happen."

Quick action needed from Widodo

In an interview with the ABC in the last few weeks of his duties, Chatib Basri looked back at his time and the challenges ahead.

An economist by training, he found himself at the centre of Indonesia's unforgiving politics after a stint heading the nation's investment body.

"He came in at a really difficult time with a president who didn't want to make tough decisions," said Hal Hill a professor from the Australian National University specialising in South-East Asian economies.

Indonesia has relied on commodities such as palm oil and coal to push its growth beyond 6 per cent but, with that number now closer to 5 per cent, it has to find new ways to create economic traction.

According to Professor Hill, it is not clear what the next major drivers of the country's growth are, and jobs will have to be found at a time of slowing growth and rising inequality.

"Joko Widodo has got a 100 day agenda. He needs a few quick wins to demonstrate that he can change things," said Professor Hill.

The president has vetted his cabinet past the nation's anti-corruption and financial transactions bodies, something never done before.

He also comes in with a reputation as a clean reformer.

"The good thing for a president to have, to really get support from the people, is credibility, the policy credibility," said Mr Basri.

"If you have the credibility you don't need to explain (policies) to them because they are going to support you."

It is for this reason that Chatib Basri believes a fast move could be made to change the fuel subsidy scheme.

Another long-time observer of Indonesian economics is calling for the new government to grab an opportunity to create 21 million jobs in labour intensive production line industries that China is moving out of.

Gustav Papanek, an emeritus economics professor at Boston University, outlines in a book with two Indonesian experts that such a strategy would lift growth to 10 per cent.

However, the reforms that are needed will have to be done now, and take political courage.

"It's worth carrying out some of these reforms in order to create jobs for people, because in five years from now people will remember the industrial growth and they will have forgotten the costs in the first or second year," said Professor Papanek.

End of the 'Australian Economic Mafia'

Crucial to the decisions that president Joko Widodo makes is the advice that he will receive from his new team.

That includes Indonesia's new finance minister, Bambang Brodjonegoro, who comes into the job highly respected for his work in the finance ministry, including as deputy to Chatib Basri.

Sorry, this video has expired

Mr Brodjonegoro's work included crunching numbers over how to deal with a growing current account deficit, which at one stage reached $10 billion.

He also watched as his then boss managed to push through parliament a rise in the fuel price to ease the cost of the subsidy.

Investors are also watching to see if changes will be made to conflicting regulations and anti-foreign sentiment.

"One of the reasons Jokowi would like the 7 per cent growth is that he needs to provide jobs, to reduce poverty. But if he wants to get 7 per cent growth definitely he cannot rely on domestic investors," said Mr Basri.

"He needs to get support from the foreign investor. It means that, even though many people talk about economic nationalism, at the end of the day if you want to grow at 7 per cent you need to be realistic."

The change in government also marks the end of the time of a grouping known as the 'Australian Economic Mafia', a slightly cheeky term used within some bureaucratic circles to describe four influential government people, including the former vice-president, who all studied at some point in Australia.

There was speculation that Chatib Basri would continue in the finance minister's, role but he has other things on his mind.

"If you ask me what is something really in my mind now ... I really want to go for a holiday," he exclaimed.

First posted October 28, 2014 16:55:30

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Indonesia faces long road to economic growth rebound

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Updated October 28, 2014 18:24:34 Indonesia's new government is likely to find the going tough on the economic front before it can reach the kind of growth the president is looking for. That is the message from the country's previous finance minister, Chatib Basri, who faced a torrid task in managing the economic levers.

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Indonesia is South-east Asia's largest economy is a major exporter of commodities such as palm oil, rubber, coal and tin but saw revenues fall owing to falling prices.

It has also seen foreign investment cool because of political uncertainty.

President Joko has pledged to cut bureaucracy, improve infrastructures and fiscal problems.

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Indonesia's economy expanded at its weakest annual pace since the global financial crisis after being affected by falling oil and commodity prices.

Gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 5% in 2014, compared to a revised 5.58% the previous year.

South-east Asia's largest economy is a major exporter of commodities such as palm oil, rubber, coal and tin but saw revenues fall owing to falling prices.

It has also seen foreign investment cool because of political uncertainty.

We think a rebound is unlikely in the short-term, with weak commodity prices and high interest rates set to weigh on economic activity
Gareth Leather, Capital Economics

Gareth Leather, an Asia economist at Capital Economics, called the growth figures were "disappointing".

"The country's new president, Joko Widodo, despite a promising first few months in office, faces a tough challenge to reinvigorate the economy," he wrote in a report.

"While we don't think growth will slow any further from here, we think a rebound is unlikely in the short-term, with weak commodity prices and high interest rates set to weigh on economic activity."

Mr Widodo took office in October, pledging to cut bureaucracy, improve infrastructure and address the country's fiscal problems to attract more investment.

The country has struggled to contain high inflation, which eased to 6.96% in January from 8.36% in December.

It also has a sizeable current-account deficit - which occurs when a country imports more than it exports - that stood at 3.1% of gross domestic product in the third quarter.

Indonesia's stock market fell by 0.8% following the GDP release.

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Indonesia's economy expanded at its weakest annual pace since the global financial crisis after being affected by falling oil and commodity prices. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 5% in 2014, compared to a revised 5.58% the previous year.

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The Rupiah has lost 10% its value against the dollar. Serious problem for economic and businesses.

The slowdown in sales because of the volatility in the rupiah isn't limited to laptops. Car and motorcycle sales dropped by 20%.

The government has come up with a slew of economic packages ranging from tax incentives, to a visa-free initiative in the hopes it will convince foreigners to buy more Indonesian goods, to boost the value of the rupiah.

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The mood at the Harco electronics department store in central Jakarta is grim. The bright blue neon lights and strains of Indonesian pop music do nothing to lift the spirits of shop-owners here.

Business is slow, and it's not what they're used to.

For these retailers there's one central problem: the value of the currency. The rupiah has lost 10% of its value against the dollar since last year. And it's a problem that is dogging Indonesia, even while the country welcomes delegations from around the world to the World Economic Forum and the president promises stronger growth.

The measures now being introduced to tackle the problem include lifting visa fees for tourists and tax changes in the hope that will lift the rupiah's value.

Many store owners in Harco say they've seen their neighbours' shops close down, or go out of business because of the drastic fall in the currency.

Eddie Widjaja has been running his store Edicom electronics for the last decade in Harco.

"We sell in rupiah, but we pay to the dealer in dollars, so that means our costs have effectively gone up by 20 to 25%," he tells me as he shows me around his small store.

"We can't increase our prices by that much, there's too much competition here in this mall. I'm not going to get involved in a price war - that's just a race to the bottom. I'm hopeful my good service will keep customers coming back."

'Big challenge'

The slowdown in sales because of the volatility in the rupiah isn't limited to laptops. Car and motorcycle sales dropped by 20% in February.

South East Asia's largest economy has been struggling with the drastic decline in the rupiah, which is the worst performing currency in Asia this year.

The Indonesian president Joko Widodo has said the weakening rupiah is his top concern and he has been in several meeting with economic ministers this month to discuss it.

"The weak rupiah is quite a big challenge to business," said Suryo Bambang Sulisto, chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce. "Just imagine if you're an importer, and you have to buy dollars to import - what will you do then?

"You're hit especially hard if you're borrowing in US dollars. Some say it's good for exporters - but not really, because a lot of exporters import their raw materials. So it hurts them too."

Welcoming tourists

The government has come up with a slew of economic packages ranging from tax incentives, to a visa-free initiative in the hopes it will convince foreigners to buy more Indonesian goods, to boost the value of the rupiah.

Until recently many western tourists had to pay $35 on arrival in Indonesia for a visa. But under new rules that took effect this month, many holidaymakers will be able to enter for free.

The move is a bid to attract more tourists to Indonesia's tourist hot-spots like Bali and Lombok.

"In my view these six policies are only a part of a long list of policy reforms to stabilize the rupiah," says Wijayanto Samirin, the Indonesian vice president's special economic advisor.

"The tourist policy has worked for other countries like Malaysia and Thailand. We currently get 9 million tourists a year - Malaysia gets 27 million a year.

"Assuming one tourist brings $1,000 - imagine how much money will be spent here - and what impact that would have on our rupiah.

"If we can make it easy (for people to come here) then we should expect a flood of tourists from abroad, and a flood of money too."

There appears to be no impact yet though - although the policies have already come into practice. The currency is still trading at more than 12,900 rupiah to the US dollar - nearing decade lows.

Investors' concerns

But some experts say the measures may not have an immediate or the desired impact and are not addressing the fundamental problems which are undermining the rupiah's value.

"The current volatility in the Indonesian rupiah is down to three factors," says Ben Bingham of the IMF, "the strength of the US dollar, political uncertainty and an unfriendly business environment - shoddy infrastructure and an inefficient bureaucracy.

"There's nothing Indonesia can do about the first factor, but it can certainly work towards improving the others."

In Harco, store-owners close up after another dismal day of sales. The gloomy faces on many of the shopkeepers underline just how precarious the economy has become.

While Indonesia's economic environment is still strong, the rupiah's depreciation has shaken many Indonesians. It is a psychological barometer of how well this country is doing. Over the last decade Indonesia has been heralded as a comeback kid - and a strong and stable rupiah was part of that story.

Any prolonged instability will be seen as a sign of weakness - and a cause for concern amongst even the most confident of Indonesia's investors.

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The mood at the Harco electronics department store in central Jakarta is grim. The bright blue neon lights and strains of Indonesian pop music do nothing to lift the spirits of shop-owners here. Business is slow, and it's not what they're used to. For these retailers there's one central problem: the value of the currency.

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Challenges facing the Indonesian economy

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Challenges facing the Indonesian economy

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1- There is not enough movement to tackling the infrastructure.

2- Multiple layers of red types and officials.

3. lack of skilled workers.

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Despite the occasional hiccup, Indonesia'€™s economy has performed well in recent years. Economic growth, at around 5.8 percent in the past 10 years, has made Indonesia one of the world'€™s fastest growing large economies.

Its macro-economic management has been commendable, with fiscal deficits down to less than 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and external debt has fallen from a worrying 87 percent of GDP in 2000 to just 28 percent. Foreign investment has been rising, reflecting growing confidence in the economy among the world'€™s biggest corporations. This has helped fund the relatively small current-account deficit while helping Indonesia build manufacturing competence in the longer term.

Nevertheless, Indonesia can do better. The country'€™s growth rate still under-performs the impressive rates that China has enjoyed and is still well below what the country itself achieved in the late 1980s up to 1997. Indonesia can and should grow by 8 percent a year, a pace of growth that would deliver good jobs and rising incomes to common folk.

The external environment is improving and is offering Indonesia a once in a generation chance to really make it. What are these opportunities and what does Indonesia need to do to achieve its potential?

The global financial crisis is finally over. Economic recovery in the US is gathering momentum after a small deceleration as a result of an unusually harsh winter. The eurozone has also put the worst of its sovereign debt crisis behind it while the Bank of Japan'€™s unconventional policies seem to be reversing years of deflation.

While China is slowing a tad, it is now so large that the extra demand it generates for commodities and manufactured components is massive.

And as China moves up the value chain, its costs are escalating. This means that labor-intensive activities are relocating out of China and seeking new homes in labor-abundant countries. Indonesia can be a beneficiary if it offers the right incentives.

Moreover, Japanese companies are showing a renewed interest in Asian economies outside China as Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate. Japan and Indonesia have had a mutually beneficial relationship so Japan can become a very important positive driver of our economic development in coming years.

Indonesia'€™s demographics are also excellent, with a youthful working population unlike China'€™s increasingly aging one. It is well endowed with energy and natural resources and unlike China, India and many other developing economies, it has fewer challenges with water availability. Indonesia is also fortunate in being part of an ASEAN, which is increasingly integrated and is growing rapidly, potentially providing Indonesia with a bigger market and the scale economies to compete with the likes of China and India.

And yet, Indonesia does not appear to be benefiting from these sizable opportunities. Given the right environment, Indonesia'€™s businessmen and workers have what it takes to bring Indonesia to a higher level. So, the trick is to provide them with that environment. To do so, we need to go beyond well-known problems such as infrastructure, an uncertain regulatory environment and a lack of skilled labor. We need to get back to basics and ask ourselves why, in the first place, do we have these problems?

Take infrastructure. The reason why there has been so little movement in tackling infrastructure despite the best intentions is that we do not yet have the appropriate bureaucratic and regulatory framework in place. The actual disbursement of public sector spending on infrastructure in areas such as energy, irrigation and transport has fallen well short of the budget for many years.

Multiple layers of red tape and officials'€™ unfamiliarity with new regulations quite often slow the process. The responsibility for infrastructure tends to be split among too many agencies, with coordinating bodies lacking the power to break deadlocks among these agencies. Finally, price regulation has undermined incentives for private sector companies to participate in infrastructure development.

Thus the first step must be to reform the bureaucracy. We need to improve pay and perquisites for government officials so they are properly incentivized and so government service is able to attract talented and dynamic individuals. There has to be a comprehensive audit of rules and regulations as China has done, to eliminate as many archaic or contradictory or unclear regulations as possible.

Not only will efficiency improve but openings for corruption will also be reduced as a result. A major effort should also be made to improve the way in which legislation is drafted '€" all too often, laws are passed that are not precisely worded, giving scope for confusion and misinterpretation.

Another fundamental issue is how the state intervenes in the economy. Whether it is price regulation of infrastructure projects or our labor laws or the recent controversial ban on exports of unprocessed mineral ore, this
nation needs a new, well thought-out consensus on the best way the state intervenes in and plans the economy.

Take the labor laws, which hinder employment by imposing onerous obligations on employers. The result is that much foreign investment that could have created high-quality jobs and built a strong industrial base is bypassing Indonesia and helping to develop the likes of Vietnam and Cambodia instead. Indonesia is missing out on the relocation of manufacturing out of China, an opportunity which will never come again.

Consequently, too few jobs are being created in the formal sector while too many Indonesians languish in informal sector jobs that pay too little, with little protection. Too often, well intentioned policies end up hurting the very people they are meant to help. We need to subject such policies to rigorous examination so that the true intent of these measures is realized.

Step up privatization and unleash the initiative and energies of individuals. There are enough examples in countries as diverse as Korea and Malaysia that private companies make more efficient use of resources and can help accelerate economic growth.

Even in India, not a paragon of privatization, we have examples of private companies being able to build global standard airports when government bodies were not able to.

Whether it is in power generation, airports, ports or toll roads, Indonesia will be well served by allowing more room for its private companies to build infrastructure.

In other areas such as plantations, privatization could well result in higher yields. Such privatization can be structured so as to benefit small holders, giving more individual farmers the opportunity to enrich themselves, as has happened in Thailand and Malaysia.

The global economy is giving Indonesia a huge set of opportunities to accelerate its growth. If it can focus on the basics and improve the business environment by reforming the state role in the economy, Indonesia will deliver transformational improvements in living standards to its people.

Let us not miss this chance.

______________

There has to be a comprehensive audit of rules and regulations to eliminate as many unclear regulations as possible.

_____________________
The writer is deputy chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) and president director of PT Gobel International.
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Challenges facing the Indonesian economy

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Despite the occasional hiccup, Indonesia'€™s economy has performed well in recent years. Economic growth, at around 5.8 percent in the past 10 years, has made Indonesia one of the world'€™s fastest growing large economies.

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Internal security threats and challenges to Indonesian on Australian's perspective. Papua and Aceh separatists groups are the main military threats in Indonesia.

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Grayson Lloyd
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
27 June 2000
Contents
A Survey of Current Events in Indonesia
(I) Indonesia's Unitary State: Origins and Challenges
Early Challenges to the Unitary State

(II) Decentralisation in Indonesia
(III) Demands for Independence

(IV) Australia, the Region and Indonesia's national unity
Conclusion
Endnotes

Major Issues

This paper argues that the unitary state of Indonesia, while experiencing a period of deep political, economic and national identity crisis at the moment, is unlikely to disintegrate. Historically the Indonesian nation-state has evolved from colonialist boundaries and developed in an unorthodox fashion. Yet the territorial integrity of Indonesia has survived numerous regionalist and separatist campaigns in the past. For it to do so in the future in part requires domestic political stability in Indonesia, the effective implementation of a program of decentralisation to cater to regionalist concerns and the sensitive handling of the concerns of genuine independence movements in Aceh and Papua and anywhere else they may arise.

It is easy, (although perhaps misleading) to believe that the resolve of Indonesians to stay together as a nation will overcome concerns about national disintegration or disunity. Indonesia's more than five decades of statehood have been moulded in part by military force, in part by political and administrative control (colonialism) from the centre and partly through the consistent application of assimilationist policies intended to unify (not always successfully) social, cultural and ethnic differences. The problems of regional autonomy and independence movements now threatening Indonesia's national unity are the legacy of this history. President Abdurrahman Wahid, under increasing domestic pressure on a number of fronts, is being forced to walk a fine line on the questions of regional autonomy/decentralisation. Jakarta must exhibit sufficient control from the centre to somehow elicit cooperation from the regions.

The post-Soeharto transition towards democracy and civil society in Indonesia has illustrated the fragility underlining Indonesia's national slogan of Unity in Diversity ( Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). In the last couple of years calls have increased for Indonesia to adopt a federalist or decentralised system and to devolve more powers to regional areas in part to stymie separatist and independence movements. In April 1999 former President Jusuf Habibie sparked the decentralisation process with the signing of two important laws designed to promote regional autonomy and fiscal balance between the centre and regions. Unlike President Soeharto's heavy-handed approach, President Wahid has adopted an approach in Papua and Aceh based on political dialogue designed to achieve a compromise on the basis of extensive special autonomy. Whether or not this approach succeeds is a moot point, especially given the changeability of the Wahid mind-set. The Government seems disinclined to move to the granting of full independence in either province and it remains uncertain just how far the independence movements in both are prepared to push the issue especially given the continued threat of military retaliation.
Introduction
There are a myriad issues causing genuine concern in post-Soeharto Indonesia although none is more important than the survival of the unitary state and the potential for national disintegration. At this time of significant economic and political crisis in Indonesia, the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid in fact faces two rising and parallel challenges.

The first challenge is the requirement to implement an ambitious decentralisation program designed to deal with demands for regional autonomy but which is likely to stretch the administrative and political resources of the Government. The struggle for more economic and decision making parity between the highly centralised and often authoritarian Government in Jakarta and the resource laden but ostensibly disenfranchised and under-financed regions has shadowed Indonesia's development as a nation.

The second challenge involves coping with demands for independence in Aceh and Papua, which of all of Indonesia's restive provinces are the areas with the most obvious and credible independence credentials at the moment. Despite renewed calls for independence from activists within both regions the central Government in Jakarta is unlikely to sanction independence in either province. For varying reasons both Aceh (where there was recently signed a humanitarian pause between the Government and the Free Aceh Movement ( Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM)) and Papua (scene of the recent landmark Papuan People's Congress) are important test cases for Indonesia's national unity. Given its history of close association with the Republic, especially during the 1945-9 revolutionary period, many observers in Indonesia fear that the secession of Aceh would mark the beginning of the decline of the Indonesian state. However, it does not necessarily follow that independence by one or both regions would precipitate the domino-like collapse of the Indonesian nation-state especially given the paucity of genuine independence (not to be confused with devolutionist) movements in other provinces. As the East Timor case demonstrated, the Indonesian nation-state is capable of shrinking without collapsing.

This Paper is divided into four distinct parts. After a brief survey of recent developments in the reform and political process in Indonesia, part one addresses the question of the formation of Indonesia's unitary state and the challenges it has faced particularly in the first few decades after independence. Part two surveys the issue of decentralisation in Indonesia and the challenges facing this process in the future. Part three focuses on the struggle for independence in Papua and Aceh. Part four reviews the significance of these issues for Australia and the region.

A Survey of Current Events in Indonesia

In this reformist political period, the Indonesian nation is struggling to effectively integrate an infant democratic system presently lacking cohesion. Indeed it is a difficult task for an administration that has been in place for less than a year to institute a democratic system after more than thirty years of authoritarianism. While the economy is showing some signs of improvement, the ramifications from the Asian financial crisis of August 1997 are still widely evident and will persist for some time to come. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) backed restructuring and rehabilitation of Indonesia's banking and corporate sectors is under way but much remains to be done. The scale of reconstruction required in the judicial system-needed to institutionalise an equitable justice system and to restore the faith of foreign investors-is, quite simply, staggering. Both of these processes-legal reform and corporate and bank restructuring-are complicated by the uncertainty of the domestic political situation.

The Indonesian military (TNI) is a disillusioned organisation increasingly sidelined from formal politics.⁽¹⁾ None the less, despite the broad ranging reform process experienced by the military in the last few years, it retains a significant potential to influence political events in Indonesia through its territorial organisation. The military's territorial units are dispersed throughout the archipelago essentially partnering organs of civil Government. As such the TNI is able to rationalise interference in local politics on the basis of maintaining 'stability'. This is likely to have significant ramifications for the democratisation process in Indonesia. The possibility of increased regional autonomy in Indonesia may result in greater regionalism in the TNI and hence division along ethnic, religious and regional lines.⁽²⁾ Further complicating the future position of the TNI is the ambiguity over its dual function role ( dwifungsi).⁽³⁾ This has directly contributed to the sense of political uncertainty and regional instability in Indonesia.

President Abdurrahman Wahid has been under siege recently following the sometimes controversial and perplexing dismissals of various ministers and advisers. The President's health and leadership skills have come under intense parliamentary and public scrutiny-especially from People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Speaker Amien Rais, and also from assorted radical Islamic groups. The Government appears to be foundering amid allegations of corruption and perceived errors of judgement against the background threat of a coup. Dealing with calls for regional autonomy/independence and instituting an effective decentralised system assume an ever more pressing position on the Government's agenda. To date President Abdurrahman Wahid's response to the issues of separatism and decentralisation has been cautious. There is no sense that Jakarta's elite has a blueprint for overcoming regional pressures-indeed perhaps none exists. However it is crucial in addressing this issue that sustained economic development and durable political stability is achieved. The lack of both does not augur well for future endeavours to resolve regionalist issues or to lessen the sense of crisis pervasive in Jakarta at the moment.

The Republic formed in Indonesia had a rather unsettled beginning. This was in part a reflection of the arbitrary nature of its colonially determined boundaries and the ethnic and cultural diversity of its people. Indonesian nationalism evolved quite rapidly after the 'liberation' of the Netherlands Indies by the allies at the end of the Second World War. However, the growth of virulent anti-colonialist (anti-Dutch) nationalism was tempered by the sizeable political and administrative gulf between Java and Sumatra and the outer islands.⁽⁴⁾ The constitution of the new Republic established on 17 August 1945 made some concession to the autonomy demands of the outer islands by creating seven provinces, although it moved away from regional autonomy.⁽⁵⁾ The Republic at this point bore little resemblance to current day Indonesia. Control had been assumed in Java, much of Sumatra and somewhat less securely in Bali and South Sulawesi, although the youth movement ( pemuda) was challenging the Dutch elsewhere notably in Sumatra.

There was deep suspicion among Republican leaders of the Federal model developed by the Dutch in early 1946. The model proposed a federal system encompassing four states: Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Eastern Indonesia each with differing degrees of autonomy. Republican leaders believed the federal idea represented a tactical policy of divide and rule designed to split the nationalist movement and prey on outer island suspicions and mistrust of Java.⁽⁶⁾ It was viewed as a means of extending Dutch influence after the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic-making the federated states puppets of the colonial regime-and thus, as one observer has noted, ensuring that support for the unitary state became an article of nationalist faith.⁽⁷⁾ It has been observed elsewhere that such a model did not accord with Javanese perceptions of the unified nature of authority and power.⁽⁸⁾ Full sovereignty was transferred to the newly created Federal Republic of Indonesia ( Republic Indonesia Serikat, RIS) in December 1949. In less than a year the federalist model, viewed by Republicans as a necessary short-term compromise, was replaced by the unitary Republic proclaimed in August 1945.

Early Challenges to the Unitary State

The anxiety with which many among Indonesia's leadership elite view the question of threats to the nation's unity is sourced in the tumultuous nature of the first decade and a half after the Republic's birth. The distinguished American anthropologist Clifford Geertz has written:

Archipelagic in geography, eclectic in civilization and heterogeneousin culture, Indonesia flourishes when it accepts and capitalizes on its diversity and disintegrates when it denies and suppresses it⁽⁹⁾

This statement is as pertinent to the reforming Indonesia of today as it was to the period of parliamentary democracy and Guided Democracy in Indonesia during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Furthermore in many respects the Indonesian social and political system is as vulnerable now as it was during the traumatic events in 1965-66 which brought President Soeharto to power. The collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime on 21 May 1998 produced a vacuum of political authority in Indonesia. Indonesia is searching for a figure capable of filling this vacuum and advancing the causes of democracy, civil society and justice in the present environment clouded by economic hardship and fragile national unity. In such an environment calls to be aware ( sadar) of threats to the nation's well-being assume a greater resonance than they did under President Soeharto's authoritarian regime where they were widely viewed as techniques for maintaining political control.

The decade and half after independence was characterised by sporadic regional dissidence, calls for greater local autonomy and what one observer described as 'centrifugal pulls of an economic system which the Jakarta Government appeared quite unable to control.'⁽¹⁰⁾ In the early days of the Republic the authority of the central Government was challenged by various movements particularly, but not exclusively, in areas where the power of the Government in Jakarta was incomplete or non-existent. In the South Moluccas, for instance, resistance to the central Government was led by pro-federalist elements unhappy with the dismantling of the Dutch-sponsored federal state in 1950. The Government eventually managed to overcome this revolt by military force.

In West Java a Darul Islam insurgency began in 1948 and persisted as a movement of regional, social and religious discontent which the Government was largely powerless to stop until the death of the movement's leader in 1962. In 1953 a serious regional revolt broke out in Aceh with political, economic and religious origins. In South Sulawesi a rebellion influenced by Darul Islam and led by Kahar Muzakkar began in 1951 and continued until 1964. In these last two cases, the central Government created a considerable degree of animosity by appointing outsiders to important positions over local men ( anak daerah).⁽¹¹⁾

However perhaps the most significant post-revolutionary threat to Indonesia's unity emerged with the PRRI-Permesta regionalist challenge in 1957-8 in Sumatra and Sulawesi. These revolts posed a direct challenge to the power and authority of the central Government. And while they were easily crushed, the revolts none the less marked the end of Indonesia's relatively brief flirtation with parliamentary democracy, thus heralding the re-emergence of the 1945 presidential constitution and the era of President Sukarno's Guided Democracy ( demokrasi terpimpin). Ostensibly from this point in the late 1950s the power of the central Government in Indonesia has been all pervasive, particularly in establishing uniformity in education, health and numerous other areas extending down to the village level. With the exception of the Fretilin-led struggle in East Timor, regional and independence movements in Indonesia struggled throughout the New Order period to attract domestic understanding or consistent international support.

The regionalist cause in Indonesian history has generally followed a well-worn path. Whether conceived religiously, ethnically or on a broader nationalistic basis it tends to espouse the feeling that the present system has not justly distributed the resources derived from the people and argues against the decision making process in the nation-state as the preserve of a narrowly defined elite. Invariably regionalist campaigns are also influenced by local power struggles between religious or political moderates and radicals and by those who dislike domination by the centre (Java). Separatist movements, however, are typically more complex than simple regionalist demonstrations of angst against the centre. They propound the cause of independence on the basis of long held cultural, social or historical distinctiveness, and often possess an international element. Such factors are evident in the cases of Aceh and Papua which have retained long-term relevance, and have been treated as serious threats to the long-term stability of the Indonesian nation-state.

Contrary to the argument of numerous media reports predicting otherwise, East Timor's independence has not been a catalyst for general state collapse in Indonesia. Fears sponsored by the armed forces and ultra-nationalists that the loss of East Timor would trigger the disintegration of the unitary state have so far proved unfounded. That said, the independence movements in Aceh and Papua have certainly been rejuvenated by events in East Timor. However East Timor was a special case. Its people are overwhelmingly Catholic, it was never a part of the Dutch East Indies (the precursor to the Indonesian Republic), and moreover the United Nations did not recognise the territory's absorption into Indonesia. In nationalistic terms Indonesia is thus no less Indonesian after the loss of East Timor-indeed it may be more so.⁽¹²⁾

In other areas, such as oil-rich East Kalimantan and the similarly oil abundant Riau in Central Sumatra, the problems centre on regional autonomy and the ever-present regional demand for a larger return on oil or other revenues from the central Government. In Maluku (especially Ambon and Halmahera), and West Kalimantan the central Government is faced with provinces afflicted by widespread inter-communal violence and disorder. These are neither separatist nor independence campaigns, however they do represent a continuing challenge to the maintenance of national unity.

Indonesia has not yet reached the point where it can take its national unity for granted. In reality it is unlikely to arrive at such a point, but it does not follow that Indonesia will fracture and collapse. There are at least two significant reasons why this is unlikely to happen. The first is that no political, economic or other agenda in Indonesia would be served by disintegration.⁽¹³⁾ The second is that many if not most Indonesians recognise that the economic and social justice benefits achieved by remaining united-challenging though this is in the present climate-outweigh the potential consequences of disintegration.⁽¹⁴⁾ But the resolve of Indonesians to stay together as a nation is not in itself sufficient. This resolve will need to be accompanied by sensitive Government policies and a genuine desire to overcome real and widespread problems.

The Indonesian nation was constructed in an arbitrary manner and given the very considerable heterogeneity of its ethnic groups and cultures, and the spread of the people across an elongated archipelago, it is surprising that Indonesia has remained 'unified' for as long as it has. During the authoritarian New Order (1966-98) period this unity was enforced from above. The New Order's veto on discussion of racial, ethnic and religious issues (so-termed 'SARA' issues) combined with pervasive administrative control from the centre together maintained the veneer of national unity.⁽¹⁵⁾ Observers of the Indonesian situation find themselves caught between warning of the fragility of the nation's territorial integrity and celebrating the staggering nation-building achievement that has taken place. President Sukarno's mantra was nation building-a vision he pursued with much gusto. President Soeharto was described as the one who could fulfil the nation's potential; in a way giving substance to Sukarno's vision. However, the results on this front were mixed. The challenge for Abdurrahman Wahid is to maintain Indonesia's status as a unified state.

Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. Its people are dispersed over an elongated archipelago consisting of thousands of islands. These factors, together with the archipelago's tremendous ethnic and cultural diversity, mean that Indonesia requires an effective system of local governance. Along with its neighbour Malaysia, Indonesia appears to meet the criteria for a federal structure. However for reasons outlined earlier, Indonesia's experience of such a system has left a lasting distaste.⁽¹⁶⁾ In April 1999 the administration of President Habibie signed two very important laws to promote regional autonomy. The first was Law 22/1999 on regional Government, and the second, Law 25/99 on balancing finances between the central and regional Governments. Before examining the nature and likely ramifications of these laws a little background is required.

In 1903 the Dutch Government introduced a form of decentralisation in Indonesia to increase the efficiency of Government administration.⁽¹⁷⁾ Nearly two decades later district level Governments were established to create more representative administrations. However the concept of decentralisation has experienced a rather vexed history in Indonesia. Debate on the issue has been inconsistent and vague despite broad agreement on the need for regional autonomy in a country the size of Indonesia. During the Sukarno era, from the late 1950s until the mid-1960s, instead of promoting democratic Government decentralisation became a mechanism promoting political stability.

It was only with Law 5/1974, set forth nearly three decades after the proclamation of independence by Sukarno and Hatta, that Indonesia developed a more concerted approach to decentralisation. However implementation of this law under the Soeharto administration might be conservatively described as gradual. This law established the legal basis for the current system of regional/local Government and emphasised the mobilisation of the regions in the effort of national development.⁽¹⁸⁾ The law embodied three principles for the distribution of Governmental functions: (i) decentralisation of responsibilities to 'autonomous' provincial and local Governments (i.e. kotamadya and kabupaten level); (ii) de-concentration of activities to regional offices of central ministries at the provincial and local level; (iii) co-administration whereby provincial and local Governments carry out activities on behalf of the central Government. The essence of the law was designed to rein in local autonomy by emphasising obligations to the central Government over regional rights.⁽¹⁹⁾ The law governed both the administrative structure of the central Government and the gradual spread of regional autonomy without intending to provide every province with autonomous Governments. Regional autonomy was an almost incidental detail. Law 5 was ostensibly intended to promote national stability through the promotion of an authoritarian structure extending from Jakarta to village level Indonesia.

Law No. 5 was not designed to govern central-local financial relationships for which purpose a follow up law was intended. Debate on this issue has been complicated by a lack of consensus within the Government on the form of decentralisation to be pursued and by the issue of the distribution of national resources between regions.⁽²⁰⁾ This has been a sensitive issue given the central Government's dependence on resources from certain outer islands and the subsequent spending of these revenues in more densely populated and less well endowed regions such as Java.⁽²¹⁾ The issue of regional autonomy triggered a debate between supporters of the existing unitary system (notably the Megawati Soekarnoputri headed Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P) and those advocating an examination of a federalist alternative (especially the leader of the National Mandate Party, PAN, Dr Amien Rais).

In this context the legislation introduced by the Habibie administration in April 1999 proposed a radical model of extending broad regional autonomy within the existing unitary constitution. The two basic levels of governance under Law 22/99 on regional Government are the central Government headed by President Abdurrahman Wahid and the autonomous local Governments of Kabupaten (districts) and Kotamadya (cities).⁽²²⁾ The implication of Law 22 is that there is a division of powers and responsibilities between these levels of Government that is not strictly hierarchical.⁽²³⁾ Reinforcing this position, and contrary to the manipulated elections of the Soeharto period, it provides for the (supposedly free) election of provincial governors and district heads.

The powers under Law 22 decentralised authority over all fields except foreign affairs, defence, security, justice, monetary and fiscal policy, religion and certain economic policy areas.⁽²⁴⁾ Interestingly the powers under the law are devolved to the 300 or so districts throughout Indonesia and not to the 26 provinces.⁽²⁵⁾ Provincial Governments will handle central Government affairs in the regions and any tasks not able to be dealt with by the district administrations because of lack of appropriately trained personnel. Doubt has already been raised by some ministers in the central Government over the state of readiness at the district level to undertake activities many ministers see as better carried out by the central organisation in the name of a 'national' policy.⁽²⁶⁾

Law 25/99 on balancing finances between the central and regional Governments is the corollary of Law 22. Basically, if properly implemented, it will allow regional Governments to secure a considerable portion of the revenues produced in their regions. Under the new law the regions would be permitted to retain 80 per cent of revenues from forestry, fisheries and general mining, 15 per cent from oil and 30 per cent from natural gas.⁽²⁷⁾ Also within the scope of the law is a re-allocation of 25 per cent of the central Government's budget to the regions based on needs and economic potential. Although intended as a means of placating the resource-rich regions (East Kalimantan and Riau for instance) which have been consistently milked for huge profits by Jakarta with little local benefit, it is easily imaginable how this policy will result in a decrease in funds flowing to resource-poor regions.⁽²⁸⁾

The problem with both laws is that they have yet to be implemented and this exacerbates their ambiguity and lack of clarity and certainty. Full implementation of regional autonomy is expected to occur in 2001. A number of potential problems will need to be addressed in the interim. Perhaps the most obvious is the capability of district Governments-in skill and personnel terms-to cope with the full range of powers conveyed to them under the new laws. Concerns also arise over the potential for powerful foreign or domestic interests to exert economic pressure on individual district Governments on matters relating to mining or forestry contracts and negotiations. Even more fundamental is the likelihood of jurisdictional disputes arising between local and central Government officials. Examination will now focus on the second part of Indonesia's parallel crisis-independence movements in Papua and Aceh.

At the Hague Round Table conference in August 1949 the status of West New Guinea (or Irian Jaya as it came to be known under Indonesian control) was not included in discussions leading to the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia. Dispute over the exercise of sovereignty in the territory continued well into the 1960s. As tensions increased between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the early 1960s, culminating in a brief military engagement in 1962, the international climate moved against the Netherlands. Australia, which until late 1962 had been supportive of Dutch policy on the issue, now followed the lead of the United States and urged the Dutch to form an agreement with Indonesia regarding the future of West New Guinea. An agreement was signed in New York in 1962 under which West New Guinea was placed under UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) awaiting an 'act of self-determination in accordance with international practice.'⁽²⁹⁾ (See forthcoming Current Issues Brief, 'Is West Papua Another East Timor?' by Dr. J. R.Verrier).

In 1969 the so-termed 'Act of Free Choice' took place designed to determine the future status of West New Guinea. Predictably the 1025 delegates from West New Guinea selected by the Indonesian Government decided in the popular consultation to join the Republic of Indonesia. Since the transfer of the territory of Papua (as it is now referred to by the Indonesian Government) to effective Indonesian control in May 1963 armed Papuan rebels have conducted military-style operations against the Indonesian Government. In the early 1960s those opposed to Indonesian rule in Papua formed the Free Papua Movement ( Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM). In 1971 the OPM announced the formation of a Provisional Republic of West Papua New Guinea, and proclaimed independence for the territory. Over the last three decades the OPM have conducted a dual policy of an intermittent guerrilla campaign and an international propaganda effort. While portrayed as a rag-tag bunch of terrorists by the Indonesian Government, the OPM has none the less managed to be a continuing source of irritation to the Indonesian Government despite its disorganisation and frequent leadership changes.

Unlike the campaign waged by the East Timorese, the OPM has never managed to attract international diplomatic support for its struggle. Private views aside, no Government has publicly disputed Indonesia's sovereignty in Papua.⁽³⁰⁾ The nature of the armed struggle in Papua is considerably different from Indonesia's past experiences with armed separatism such as the Darul Islam movement and the PRRI Permesta Revolt and indeed from the successful independence campaign waged by Fretilin in East Timor. While in the past there has been a tendency to dismiss the struggle in Papua as merely a problem of national integration, such is clearly not the case now. The fall of President Soeharto marked an increase in demands for independence in Papua.

Papua is a resource, particularly mineral, rich territory. It contributes far more to the national budget than it receives in return, which is a source of considerable angst given the widespread poverty in the province. Its natural wealth has also been a major attraction to foreign companies such as the Freeport-McMoran mining company. Tom Beanal, a leader in the Amungme tribe and Vice-Chairman of the newly formed Papuan presidium, has tried in vain to sue Freeport for billions of dollars in compensation.⁽³¹⁾ Of the nearly two million people who inhabit Papua, between 750 000-850 000 were born outside the territory.⁽³²⁾ In Jayapura (recently renamed Port Numbay) 80 per cent of the population are non-indigenous people.⁽³³⁾ The development of a Papua-wide identity is a relatively recent phenomenon notwithstanding the cultural and historical distinctiveness of the Papuan position in the Indonesian state. Awareness of this identity has been heightened by transmigration schemes operated by the central Government which dramatically altered the ratio of non-indigenous inhabitants in Papua and further increased the numbers of non-Papuans in the civil service. Papuan identity was further accentuated, and separatist sympathies heightened, by the brutality of the operations of the Indonesian military in the territory.

From the late 1990s leadership of the independence struggle transferred from guerrilla fighters to prominent figures in Jayapura and elsewhere who viewed the change in leadership in Jakarta as offering new prospects.⁽³⁴⁾ A delegation of 100 Papuan leaders met with President Habibie in February 1999 where they openly demanded independence-a remarkable indication of the changed times. Numerous independence-related flag-raising ceremonies were conducted throughout Papua in the second half of 1999. The Abdurrahman Wahid administration has pursued a similar dialogue-based approach maintaining lines of communication with the Papuan nationalists. There appears little doubt, however, that if offered independence the overwhelming majority of Papuans would support such a proposal.

As the People's Congress of Papua which opened in Jayapura on 29 May 2000 indicated, Indonesia's new laws on regional autonomy and financing will be inadequate to overcome the deep anti-Indonesian feeling in Papua. Abdurrahman Wahid's 'act of good faith' to change the name of the province to Papua in a ceremony on 1 January 2000, was misinterpreted by many Papuans as an indication of his preparedness to move further on the issue. Abdurrahman Wahid was initially supportive of the Congress, provided it with funding and had intended to attend. His attitude toward the OPM has been quite progressive given the history of relations between the organisation and the Indonesian Government. He has been sensitive to details such as the flying of the OPM flag (provided it was not flown higher than the Indonesian flag) and has encouraged the expression of views. However, in defiance of warnings from Jakarta, the People's Congress ended with a declaration stating that the Papuan people reject the 1969 Act of Free Choice, and demand the United Nations revoke UN resolution No. 2504 of 19 December 1969. In essence Papua was declared to be no longer a part of the Republic of Indonesia and a quasi-legislative institution-a reformulated Papuan presidium-was formed. As the Secretary-General of the Congress, Thaha Alhamid, noted, ' West Papua has been an independent nation since 1 December, 1961.' ⁽³⁵⁾ This is the date on which the territory was granted independence from the Netherlands.

The Indonesian President was clear in his response to this declaration, noting that a state within a state was not an option and independence would not be countenanced. The Indonesian Government was particularly concerned about the appeals made at the congress to international powers (the Netherlands, the United States and the United Nations) to reassess their recognition of Indonesian rule in Papua.⁽³⁶⁾ In an apparent bid to appease calls for independence in Papua the Indonesian Government agreed to set up a body to investigate human rights violations.⁽³⁷⁾

However this offer was quickly followed by the likelihood that Indonesia would send armed police reinforcements to Papua in the wake of the declaration by the People's Congress. What is most needed in Papua at the moment is for the central Government to prudently assess how best it can accommodate the aspirations of the Papuan people. Blanket rejection of independence by the central Government, or excessive military involvement, will likely exacerbate problems of national disunity. One problem for the central Government, however, is that it cannot be certain of the intentions of the Indonesian military. There are suspicions in some quarters that the current escalation of events in Papua is not entirely related to Papuan demands for independence but rather a part of a campaign to de-stabilise the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid. Those pushing for independence in Papua face a difficult struggle. While approximately 60 per cent of the population is Protestant, the campaign for unity and sovereignty is complicated by the diversity of the population speaking hundreds of different languages and dispersed over mountainous terrain.⁽³⁸⁾ None the less the Indonesian Government is right to be concerned about events in Papua. Indonesia's Minister for Regional Autonomy, Ryaas Rasyid, believes Papua is a more serious independence threat than Aceh because of the Christian basis in the province which, he believes, is more likely to garner Western sympathy than Islamic Aceh.⁽³⁹⁾ This is particularly the case given the lingering resentment in Papua of the events surrounding the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969.

Aceh is a province containing some four million people and vast resources of oil and natural gas. Indonesia is the world's leading exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and forty per cent of the country's LNG comes from Aceh's northern coast.⁽⁴⁰⁾ For decades the Acehnese have seen a much greater proportion of their resources siphoned to the central Government than have been remitted back to the province.

In Aceh armed resistance opposed rule from Jakarta as early as 1953 only to fade and re-emerge in the late 1970s. The fact that Acehnese supporters of the Darul Islam movement in 1953 proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia in Aceh ( Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) is not particularly surprising. Aceh has enjoyed a long history of Islamic identity, a trade based economy and resistance to colonial intrusion. After a thirty year war the Sultan of Aceh eventually surrendered to the Dutch in 1903 who established a civilian administration in the region allowing the Acehnese a good deal of autonomy. Aceh was the only major region to remain almost entirely free of Dutch control during the 1945-9 independence struggle in Indonesia.⁽⁴¹⁾ Many Acehnese felt that their role during the national revolution and their historical separateness would be recognised in the formation of an Indonesian state. Aceh confirmed its 'nationalist' credentials by refusing to participate in a Dutch-sponsored conference to establish a state of Sumatra. In early 1949 the central Government appointed military governor of Aceh, Tengku M. Daud Beureueh, noted in response to the proposal for Aceh to become self-governing in a Dutch sponsored federal system: '... we have no intention of establishing a Great Aceh state as we are Republican spirited... The Acehnese people are convinced that separate independence, region by region, state by state, can never lead to enduring independence.'⁽⁴²⁾

The Acehnese were none the less united behind the creation of an Islamic state. This perspective was at odds with the national trend in Indonesia which was against the creation of an Islamic state for the nation as a whole. Relations between Aceh and the central Republican Government deteriorated when the latter moved to dissolve the province of Aceh and incorporate Aceh in a larger province of North Sumatra. With this policy in place by the early 1950s, the Acehnese felt their autonomy and identity threatened by the appointment of many Javanese and non-Acehnese to senior positions in the new province. The TNI units in Aceh were replaced by non-Acehnese units. Many Acehnese resisted the changes, but the situation was complicated by the lack of unity within the Acehnese community stemming from the divisive social revolution in Aceh in 1946-7.⁽⁴³⁾

A considerable transformation took place in Aceh between 1950 and the establishment of the Negara Islam Indonesia in 1953. This involved a central Government crackdown on dissent and a de-Islamisation campaign. The remainder of the decade was a turbulent period. Leaders of the Aceh rebellion had no intention of separating the region from Indonesia but envisaged it as an autonomous province. In 1955 the State of Aceh ( Negara Bahagian Aceh, NBA) was announced and an Acehnese Government was established under the authority of Tengku M. Daud Beureueh. Negotiations between the NBA and the Indonesian Government continued until 1957 with Tengku M. Daud Beureueh calling for a separate state. In April of that year a cease-fire was agreed including a package promising a separate province and promotion of Islam. The rebellion in fact persisted and fluctuated in intensity for the next four years until August 1961. Despite occasional expressions of dissatisfaction over the status of the province Aceh remained relatively trouble free until the launching of the Free Aceh Movement ( Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and the proclamation of the independent state of Aceh in 1976. This decision by GAM's leader, Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro, was based on several factors at least. The first was a realisation that a federalist structure was not going to solve Aceh's problems. The second was dissatisfaction with the New Order Government's lack of commitment to development in the territory and its emphasis on policies of assimilation.

The activities of GAM continued on an episodic basis throughout the 1980s. In truth GAM is now a small group whose main architect, Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro, lives in self-imposed exile in Sweden. The campaign for independence is now increasingly led by student groups. None the less in response the Indonesian military initiated a severe counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh in the late 1980s. In fact between 1989 and 1998 Aceh was placed under military rule, during which period special army units engaged in the routine torture and murder of suspected members of the Free Aceh movement.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Since the start of the 1990s the Acehnese had come to feel increasingly threatened by the migration of Indonesians from other provinces attracted by economic opportunities in Aceh.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The fall of the Soeharto regime raised the possibility of change and as a consequence military atrocities were widely publicised and head of the Indonesian armed forces, General Wiranto, apologised to the Acehnese for abuses committed by his troops. President Habibie promised an investigation into human rights abuses, and many Acehnese held out hope for a change in their fortunes.

Habibie's focus wavered, however, as preoccupation with the power struggle in Jakarta left little time for attention on Aceh. And despite the public apology, military abuses and a terror campaign continued unabated in Aceh. The terror campaign conducted by the Indonesian military in Aceh far from crushing dissent, in fact broadened the wide cross-section of resentment in the territory against Indonesian rule. In other words, many students and people who would otherwise not have associated themselves with GAM reacted in unity against the brutality of Indonesian rule in Aceh via the forum of GAM. The commission appointed by President Habibie in mid-1999 to inquire into human rights abuses in Aceh eventually brought a number of cases to trial in April-May 2000. However, the long delay in arranging a trial and the absence of high-ranking culprits meant that the process lacked credibility.

Large scale strikes and demonstrations were held throughout the province in support of a referendum on independence. A particularly large demonstration occurred supporting this goal in Banda Aceh on 13 November 1999. Aceh's historical distinctiveness, revolutionary history and 'national' struggle, comparatively high ethnic homogeneity (relative to other areas in Indonesia) and strong Islamic underpinning elicited considerable support for its cause among many Indonesians. It is doubtful, however, if this positive feeling extended to support for Aceh's independence. While sympathetic to the cause, Abdurrahman Wahid prevaricated on the question of independence which did not endear him to many Achenese.

In a rather desperate attempt to keep Aceh within the fold the Government compromised and offered to hold a referendum on the implementation of Islamic law-a move which fell well short of Acehnese demands. The Government's negotiations with the Acehnese (which included intervention by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad) has been complicated by the diverse strains of political opinion within the province. The Government has focused attention in this respect on the Islamic religious leaders ( ulama) in an attempt to reduce the efficacy of the students, GAM and other pro-independence forces.⁽⁴⁶⁾ In May 2000 an agreement was reached for a 'Humanitarian pause' in hostilities in Aceh.⁽⁴⁷⁾

This agreement may lead to more talks and perhaps the realisation on the part of the Indonesian military that the Aceh issue will not be resolved militarily. Yet herein lies the paradox for Aceh and Indonesia. While ever there is a prospect for Acehnese independence Indonesia's national integrity remains under threat and the military (or the police who now have responsibility for internal security) will be involved. However to conceive of Aceh as an independent democratic state within the Indonesian nation, a distant but not implausible possibility, the central Government in Indonesia must lessen its emphasis on national unity enforced by the military.⁽⁴⁸⁾ While Aceh has a number of legitimate grievances, the future of the territory will be determined in significant part by the attitude in Jakarta and need not involve independence. An autonomous Aceh, for instance within a broader federalist state, may preserve Aceh's sense of place.

Fears of the break up of Indonesia, partly validated by the independence campaigns in Aceh and Papua, an uncertain decentralisation process, a central Government lurching from one crisis to another and the increased frequency of outbreaks of inter-communal violence heighten concerns among Indonesia's neighbours. The absolute priority for ASEAN leaders and for the Australian Government (and the United States for that matter) is the stability of the Indonesian nation-state. The security and stability of the Southeast Asian region is contingent upon the survival of the unitary state of Indonesia even if this assumes a slightly different form in the future. While it needs to be considered, the alternative is a confronting possibility. The emergence of an independent Islamic Republic of Aceh, for instance, and its potential impact on Islamic insurgency in the southern Philippines and Thailand would be of obvious concern. Potentially huge scale refugee flows to Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and other areas in the wake of the fracturing of Indonesia would be extremely worrying.

However for Australia, lingering ill-feeling within the Indonesian elite over the East Timor episode means that many suspicions have to be overcome to convince Indonesia of the genuineness of Australia's support for Indonesian national unity. The situation in Papua looms as another important test case for relations between Australia and Indonesia. A number of individuals within the elite in Jakarta believe that Australia is fomenting the independence movement in Papua.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has explicitly refuted such allegations saying on 30 May, 'Australia has always [supported] and continues to support and to recognise the integration of West Papua within the Republic of Indonesia'.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Prime Minister Howard asserted that Australia 'fully and unequivocally supports the sovereignty and integrity of Indonesia'.⁽⁵¹⁾ On this point Australia's foreign policy appears to have bipartisan support as opposition leader Kim Beazley noted in a speech in Jakarta on 2 May, 'Australia respects Indonesia's territorial integrity and is aware of the difficulties of maintaining stability in such a diverse and widespread grouping of islands.'⁽⁵²⁾ It is conceivable Australia will face future challenges to this position, particularly if border disputes intensify between Indonesia and PNG. For the moment, Australia can do little but reinforce its support for Indonesia and hope that the decentralisation/regional autonomy process in Indonesia proceeds relatively smoothly.

There is no doubt that Indonesia is in a chronic state of crisis. However, the Indonesian nation-state is unlikely to disintegrate at the moment. This situation could change in the future if the authority of the Abdurrahman regime wanes, if the decentralisation laws fail when implemented and if Aceh and Papua succeed in their bids to achieve independence. In the interim the outbreaks of inter-communal violence in Maluku province (especially Ambon and Halmahera) and West Kalimantan and in other areas exacerbate the sense of crisis. The nature of Indonesia's national unity is unusual because the basis for this unity has rested at least as much upon geographical propinquity, historical accident and cultural and ethnic homogeneity imposed from above as it has on a sense of national togetherness. The Indonesian nation-state was the product of a colonial regime and has henceforth evolved in piecemeal fashion. There is a fundamental need for sensitive Governmental policy making in order to preserve national unity in Indonesia. There is a reasonable prospect that given creative policy initiatives on this issue, and other factors notwithstanding, Indonesia can maintain its national integrity even if in a slightly altered form.

1. In an official seminar in September 1998 a so-termed 'new paradigm' was adopted by the military foreshadowing a dramatic reduction (but not abandonment) of its political role.

2. Greg Sheridan, 'Neighbours' Priority is a Stable Archipelago', The Australian, 11 September 1999.

3. Following a seminar in 1965 the Indonesian army produced the doctrine of the Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function) of the armed forces endorsing their dual role as a military and social-political force.

4. In 1938 the Dutch administration sought to decentralise their administration by creating three autonomous regional Governments in Sumatra, Borneo and the 'Great East'. During the interim allied administration, and indeed the Japanese occupation prior to this, the outer islands were governed separately from Java and Sumatra.

5. These were East, West and Central Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku (including West New Guinea) and Sunda Kecil. See Ron May, 'Ethnic Separatism In Southeast Asia', Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 31, no. 2, 1990, p. 29.

6. J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1961, p. 8.

7. ibid.

8. B.R.O'G. Anderson, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture' in C. Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1972, p. 23.

9. Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution' in Old Societies and New States, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1963.

10. J. A. C. Mackie, 'Integrating and Centrifugal Factors in Indonesian Politics Since 1945', in J. A. C. Mackie ed., Indonesia: The Making of a Nation, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1980.

11. ibid., Mackie, p. 672. As Mackie notes, in the eyes of those in the central Government revolutionary records did not compare with educational attainment or bureaucratic seniority.

12. A similar argument is proffered in Donald Emmerson, 'Will Indonesia Survive?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, May-June 2000.

13. Robert Cribb, 'Not the Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2, 1999, p. 175.

14. ibid., p. 177. Cribb further argues that the impact of globalisation and the trend toward small state development in international relations are unlikely to make much of an impact in Indonesia.

15. SARA refers to Suku, Agama, Ras and Antar-golongan-basically ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group relations public discussion of any of which was taboo during the New Order.

16. Nick Devas, 'Indonesia: what do we mean by decentralization?', Public Administration and Development, vol. 17, 1997, p. 354.

17. Terence H. Hull, 'Striking a Most Delicate Balance: The Implications of Otonomi Daerah for the Planning and Implementation of Development Cooperation Projects', Final Report of the AusAID funded ANU-LIPI project on Population Related Research for Development Planning and Development Assistance, 3 December 1999, p. 2.

18. ibid., p. 2.

19. M. Morfitt, 'Strengthening the Capacities of Local Government: Policies and Constraints', in C. MacAndrews, ed., Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 59.

20. Devas, op. cit., p. 355.

21. Booth, ed., Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Policy and Performance in the Soeharto Era, Oxford University Press, Singapore 1992.

22. Law 22 was the initiative of the Minister for Regional Autonomy, Ryaas Rasyid, when he was Director General of the Department of Internal Affairs.

23. Hull. op. cit., p. 3.

24. The decentralisation is embodied in Article 7, (1) of Law 22. The economic policy areas include macro-development planning, state economic institutions, development of human and natural resources and high technology.

25. Indonesia now has twenty-six provinces with the loss of East Timor.

26. See the statement by the Indonesian Minister for National Education quoting research from Gajah Mada university concluding that only 5 out of 300 Kabupaten were prepared for the new autonomy status (Jakarta Post, 2 November 1999).

27. International Crisis Group Report, 'Indonesia's Crisis: Chronic But Not Acute', 31 May 2000.

28. It is estimated that application of the fiscal law will dramatically alter provincial economic relations and induce bankruptcies among the less well financially endowed regions. International Crisis Group Report, p. 19.

29. R. J. May, 'Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia', Pacific Viewpoint, vol.31, no. 2, 1990, p. 40.

30. ibid., p. 43.

31. Theys Eluay is Chairman of the presidium. Before the formula for revenue sharing was fixed, Papua had demanded a share of the overall revenue range of between 75-80 per cent. This roughly approximates the figure the regions will be allowed to keep of forestry, fishery and mining resources under proposed Law 25.

32. Louise Williams, 'Strangers In Their Own Land', The Age, 10 July, 1998.

33. ibid.

34. International Crisis Group Report, op. cit., p.21.

35. 'West Papuans Declare Independence from Indonesia', The Jakarta Post, 5 June 2000. Papua is the name now used by the central Indonesian Government to refer to the area previously referred to by the Indonesian Government as Irian Jaya. Some Papuans refer to the territory as West Papua.

36. Lindsay Murdoch, 'Military Threat to Curb Self Rule Move', Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 2000.

37. 'Indonesia Promises Probe into Rights in Irian Jaya', The Sunday Canberra Times, 11 June 2000.

38. Donald K. Emmerson, 'Will Indonesia Survive?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, May-June 2000, p. 101.

39. ibid., p. 105.

40. ibid., p. 98

41. R. J. May, 'Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia', Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 31, no. 2, 1990, p. 35.

42. Semangat Merdeka, 23 March 1949, quoted in Dua Windhu Kodam-I/Iskandar Muda, p. 154.

43. Aceh's domestic political situation at this time was complicated by a struggle between Islamic conservatives and reformists. In early 1946 extremist members of the All-Aceh Religious Scholars' Association, (PUSA) purged elements of the traditional aristocracy in Aceh.

44. International Crisis Group Report, op.cit., p. 20.

45. International Crisis Group Report, op.cit., p. 20.

46. Ed. Aspinall, 'Whither Aceh?', Inside Indonesia, no. 62, April-June 2000.

47. This agreement was intended as a symbolic recognition by the Indonesian Government of Tengku M. Hasan di Tiro's position, although it is understood implicitly by the Indonesian Government that he no longer has effective control over events in Aceh.

48. Anthony Reid has argued that Indonesia can survive Aceh becoming a state if it does not remain hostage to its military. See Anthony Reid, 'Which Way Aceh?', Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 March 2000, p. 36.

49. Peter Hartcher, 'West Papua Shaping as Howard's Next East Timor', Australian Financial Review, 10 June 2000. The argument is taken to extraordinary lengths by some who feel that Australia wishes to see the fracturing of the archipelago as a way of limiting Jakarta's future power in Southeast Asia.

50. Robert Garran, 'W Papuans to Stay Put: Canberra', The Australian, 31 May 2000.

51. ibid.

52. Kim Beazley, 'Australia and Indonesia: Neighbours in Geography, Neighbours in Democracy' Address to the Australia-Indonesia Business Council, Jakarta, 2 May 2000, p. 8.

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Indonesia's Future Prospects: Separatism, Decentralisation and the Survival of the Unitary State

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Contents A Survey of Current Events in Indonesia (I) Indonesia's Unitary State: Origins and Challenges Early Challenges to the Unitary State (II) Decentralisation in Indonesia (III) Demands for Independence (IV) Australia, the Region and Indonesia's national unity Conclusion Endnotes Major Issues This paper argues that the unitary state of Indonesia, while experiencing a period of deep political, economic and national identity crisis at the moment, is unlikely to disintegrate.

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Armed group declares "all-out war" against Indonesian in Papua

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Armed group declares "all-out war" against Indonesian in Papua

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Armed separatists from Free Papua Organisation (FPO) declared war against Indonesian security forces.

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Armed separatists in Indonesia's Papua province have declared open war on the military and non-Papuan civilians, insisting that their decades-long struggle for independence is not over and denouncing as a lie President Joko Widodo's reassurances that the region is peaceful.

Enden Wanimbo, a commander of the National Liberation Army (TPN) of the Free Papua Organization (OPM), told the Jakarta Globe on Friday that his group was declaring "a total revolutionary war from Sorong to Merauke", referring to the westernmost and easternmost ends of the region.

"This means all-out war against all Indonesians in the Papuan land," he said by phone.

Enden, long sought by the Indonesian authorities and believed to be based in Lanny Jaya district, an OPM stronghold, rejected any notion of dialogue with Jakarta, saying that Papuan independence from Indonesia the was at the heart of the group's demands.

Indonesia annexed the territory, comprising the western half of the island of New Guinea, in 1969, following a ballot now widely considered a sham. The OPM has for decades mounted a low-level armed insurgency against the Indonesian security forces, who are regularly accused by residents and rights activists of a litany of human rights violations in their attempts to quash the insurgency.

President Joko, in a visit to the region earlier this month, said he wanted to tackle perceptions of the region as a conflict zone, and declared it open to foreign journalists for the first time since the annexation.

However, Enden said the impression that Joko was giving to the world about the situation in the region was a lie.

"We want to show that President Jokowi's statement, that Papua is at peace, is not true," he said.

Puron Wenda, another OPM commander also based in Lanny Jaya, agreed that the president's assessment was false.

"The OPM is ready for war. We no longer want any more dialogues that are rigged by Indonesia [...] which likes to cheat us," he said.

"Indonesia should get out of Papua, because we will continue to fight for an independent Papua," Puron said.

He said that the group of fighters he led with Enden would attack not just the security forces, but also civilians who were "non-Papuan," or not ethnic Melanesian.

"Businesspeople, construction workers, civil servants - all Indonesians will be killed, chased out; not just soldiers or police, anyone with straight hair," he said.

"We're not a criminal group, we're not troublemakers, we're not a small group. We're Papuan freedom fighters."

Enden welcomed the foreign press to come to Papua and witness the coming war.

"International reporters and national ones must be free to report the news from Papua," he said.

There was no immediate response from the military on Friday to the OPM's declaration of war, which comes just days after police arrested dozens of activists for staging a demonstration in support of de facto recognition of an independent West Papua state by a group of Pacific island nations.

At least 70 members of the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) were arrested during the rally in Jayapura on Wednesday and held for questioning by police, the group's spokesman Sarpas Mbisikmbk said.

Sarpas said protestors had gathered to show support for the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULM), formed late last year by the KNPB, the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation and the Federal Republic of West Papua, to gain full membership in the Melanesian Spearhead Group, an inter-governmental grouping of Melanesian states.

The MSG is expected to decide on the ULM bid for membership in July, and Indonesia has recently stepped up its lobbying of Melanesian states to prevent the proposal succeeding.
Original story: Source: The Jakarta Globe OPM Declares Open War on Security Forces, Non-Papuan Civilians

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armed group declares 'all-out war' against indonesians in papua

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Armed group declares 'all-out war' against Indonesians in Papua - ucanews.com

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Armed separatists in Indonesia's Papua province have declared open war on the military and non-Papuan civilians, insisting that their decades-long struggle for independence is not over and denouncing as a lie President Joko Widodo's reassurances that the region is peaceful.

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Since the formation of the Association of South East Asian Nations in 1967 with the Bangkok Declaration, there have been no major wars between its members - although there have been a number of militarized border disputes. Constructivists (Amitav Acharya premier among them, writing on the subject from 1991-present) maintain that this "lasting peace" is the result of community, and that ASEAN is therefore a security community (SC). I contend that there are more important factors than community at play that are responsible for the lack of war, and moreover that ASEAN is not as secure as it appears.

To begin, let's define our terms. "Security" is, to be concise, the absence of violence and threat of violence. A "community," aptly described by Acharya, is a group with a shared identity and common norms. "Security community," a term coined by Karl Deutsch in 1957 and best defined by him, is a group "with reasonable expectations for lasting peaceful change" - that is, the resolution of disputes by peaceful means.

Is ASEAN a security community? Both the assertion that it is secure and a community are dubious - while there has been no war, the militarized border disputes have occasionally resulted in casualties, including civilian losses. Individual member states also have tainted track records on human rights and human security, raising questions about the security of individual citizens: Thailand's 2003 "war on drugs" witnessed the extra-judicial killing of at least 2500 alleged drug dealers; according to Human Rights Watch's recent assessment, Burma's human rights situation is regressing; and several ASEAN states have questionable levels of freedom of speech and assembly.

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A community feeling is suspiciously absent as well, evidenced in the 2003 anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh, the Malaysian threats to cut off Singapore's water supply to apply political pressure, and the disputed territories of Pedra Branca (claimed by Singapore and Malaysia; the ICJ ruled in Singapore's favor in 2008) and the Ambalat sea block (claimed by Malaysia and Indonesia; still contested). Most telling, however, is the 2003 Bali Concord II which establishes the goal of an ASEAN SC, acknowledging that it is as of yet unreached; this was reaffirmed in the 2009 " Blueprint."

Even if we suppose that ASEAN meets the most minimal definition of an SC - having both the S and the C - that its S is caused by its C is even more difficult to prove. To validate constructivist claims we would require this thicker level of causation, and building on that a thicker level still which separates SCs as distinct from other security arrangements in causing peace.

If not an SC, what is responsible for ASEAN's lasting peace - or more accurately, ASEAN's lack of major war? Realists would invoke the tired "balance of power" explanation, a collective hedging against Beijing and Washington (and possibly Tokyo); the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration, asserting that ASEAN will be free from the interference of outside powers, is the key example here. But realists would be remiss to think that ASEAN, even collectively, could deter a great power - never mind ASEAN's hard refusal to adopt a military pact, opting instead for the "ASEAN Way" of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference, consensus-style decision-making based on tolerance and equality, and a preference for an informal, barely institutionalized environment (much of ASEAN's inter-diplomacy is Track II). Democratic peace theorists might point to economic interdependence and democracy but ASEAN does not, as a whole, practice democracy; nor is it economically interdependent - only Singapore and Malaysia have a high ratio of bilateral trade and economic interdependence.

Chih-Mao Tang, an assistant professor at Soochow University, Taiwan, posits a " long, capitalist peace ": since gaining independence, ASEAN states shifted focus from nationalism to state-building, earning legitimacy through economic growth. They adopted liberal capitalism, changing from import-substitution strategies to export-orientated economies (Singapore in 1965; Indonesia and Thailand in the 1970s; Malaysia in 1980s; Vietnam in 1990s), which requires regional stability to attract investors and trading partners. In adopting liberal capitalism, these states were benignly signaling each other, assuring the intent to avoid conflict - at least on the state level.

But what of human security? Alan Collins, a senior professor at Swansea University, U.K., points to the increased involvement of civil society, shifting policy influence from the elites exclusively toward the people. The Bali Concord II, for the first time in ASEAN scripture, mentioned the "D" word: it envisions "a just, democratic, harmonious environment." But in this context democracy is less a commitment to pluralism than it is a definition of difference, i.e. not-communist - after all, ASEAN was founded on the common threat of communist insurgencies and ethnic separatists. The increased participation of civil society would demonstrate a real interest in democracy beyond the lip-service of Bali II, and could herald a shift toward peace inclusive of human security. Of course, "democracy" is usually nothing more than a euphemism for "liberal capitalism," which has no vested interest in amplifying citizens' voices, encouraging their participation in government, or protecting individual human security beyond ensuring workers' willingness and ability to produce labor.

Rizal Sukma, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, says that, in Deutschian terms, ASEAN is not a security community but a security regime; but, without violating the sacred principle of non-interference, it could be a community that is mindful of human security by increasing cooperation on transnational issues (such as climate change and drug trafficking) and humanitarian crises.

Constructivism, like all grand theories of IR, is flawed, and these flaws become increasingly apparent as we "zoom in" on case studies. ASEAN's lasting peace (again, ignoring human security) could more easily be explained by liberal capitalism, which has no room for war at the state level, than by community. It is the task of future researchers to determine the formula, if such a task is achievable, for creating ASEAN's lasting peace and supposing how it might be implemented elsewhere. More importantly, it is the role of scholars and policymakers alike to focus less on theory and more on praxis, in discovering how we might make ASEAN (and elsewhere) peaceful not only at the state level but the transnational and individual levels.
Morgan Potts is an assistant editor at Sino-NK, and a production editor at the British Association for Korean Studies.

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Since the formation of the Association of South East Asian Nations in 1967 with the Bangkok Declaration, there have been no major wars between its members - although there have been a number of militarized border disputes.

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over 52 per cent of of the Indonesian military equipment has been used for more then three decades. There is big concerns for the Indonesian's military in this unstable region.

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Last month's crash of a C-130 Hercules aircraft which killed 140 put the modernisation of Indonesia's military, or TNI, in sharp focus again.

In the wake of the disaster, defence minister Ryamizard Ryacudu said that Indonesia would decommission all military aircraft older than 30 years. The question is how fast can this be done?

In a country where more than 52 per cent of the TNI's equipment has been used for over three decades, speeding up the military's modernisation is going to be tough.

It is a challenge that President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo is determined on meeting. He's promised to boost Indonesia's defence budget to 1.5 per cent of GDP (currently at 0.8 per cent) to meet 'Minimal Essential Force' by 2024.

In this podcast, New Mandala talks to Evan A Laksmana, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, about the challenges and opportunities for military change in Indonesia.

Laksmana outlines the key security threats facing Indonesia, civil-military relations and their impact on democracy in the country, increasing rivalry between the police and military (which may only increase under the current president), and Jokowi's vision of Indonesia as a 'maritime fulcrum'.

"Jokowi has a narrow agenda in what he wants to achieve in his first term," says Laksmana. "But with a narrow agenda comes a narrow set of interests.

"Civil-military relations, defence policy, foreign policy, I'm afraid, aren't a part of that agenda."

Laksmana also reflects on whether other countries in the region, including Australia, should welcome or be wary of a modernising Indonesian military.

Listen to the full 14-minute interview in the player above.

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Modernising Indonesia's military - New Mandala

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Last month's crash of a C-130 Hercules aircraft which killed 140 put the modernisation of Indonesia's military, or TNI, in sharp focus again. In the wake of the disaster, defence minister Ryamizard Ryacudu said that Indonesia would decommission all military aircraft older than 30 years. The question is how fast can this be done?

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Diseases Threaten Indonesia's Economic health

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Diseases Threaten Indonesia's Economic health

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Indonesia’s high rate of economic growth could fall victim to its high rate of tropical disease, warns a study by a team of U.S.-based academics and disease experts from the World Health Organization.

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Indonesia's high rate of economic growth could fall victim to its high rate of tropical disease, warns a study by a team of U.S.-based academics and disease experts from the World Health Organization. The country has some of the world's highest concentrations of these diseases, including dengue and leprosy.

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Diseases Threaten Indonesia's Economic Health

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Indonesia's high rate of economic growth could fall victim to its high rate of tropical disease, warns a study by a team of U.S.-based academics and disease experts from the World Health Organization. The country has some of the world's highest concentrations of these diseases, including dengue and leprosy.

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China’s Economic Relations with Indonesia: Threats and Opportunities

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China’s Economic Relations with Indonesia: Threats and Opportunities

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Benefits and cost of increasing trade and FDI between Indonesia and China. The author concluded that, it will have negative consequences for Indonesian's economy. Indonesia produces raw material in exchange for manufactured imports.

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1-Terrorism: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Laskar Jihad, Hizbullah Front and Islamic Defenders Front

2- Corruption:

3-Environmental Crime, Narcotics trafficking and piracy

4- Human trafficking and Threats of Pandemic disease

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ASEAN | ONE VISION ONE IDENTITY ONE COMMUNITY

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ASEAN | ONE VISION ONE IDENTITY ONE COMMUNITY

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Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, community of opportunity, connectivity, economic community, political - security community, socio - cultural community

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MIKTA and Middle Power Diplomacy is the South China Sea

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MIKTA and Middle Power Diplomacy is the South China Sea

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The group of middle powers MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korean, Turkey, Australia) could potentially play an important role in the SCS disputes.

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MIKTA - an association consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia - is still a relatively new platform, having been formed in 2013, but it may now be confronted with its first real opportunity to have an impact on the global stage. The South China Sea is quickly becoming a tinder box capable of igniting the next great power war. Three of the MIKTA members - Indonesia, Korea, and Australia - have a direct interest in reducing tensions in the region, and all would be adversely affected if one miscalculation turns into a large scale conflict.

In all likelihood, though, none of the individual members of this association could impact the developments in the South China Sea alone. Case in point is Australia, rebuked by the Chinese media for speaking out on China's land reclamation efforts. Meanwhile, Korea has been called out by the U.S. for not exerting enough effort on the South China Sea issue. Korea is understandingly reluctant to choose between its military alliance partner in the U.S. and its largest trading partner in China when its diplomatic effort alone is unlikely to lead to any real progress. However, the combined effort of MIKTA members could prove crucial in easing tensions and finding a peaceful solution to the territorial disputes. The key to achieving this will be the MIKTA members making effective use of middle power diplomacy.

Middle powers and middle power diplomacy is a relatively new concept in international relations, emerging following the end of the Cold War. Defining a middle power is tricky, but one approach is to view a state's capacity as compared with other states. Thus, the MIKTA countries can all be classified as middle powers as they can all be dubbed regional powers but find it difficult to play a large role internationally. Statements released by MIKTA also point to their desire to be classified as middle powers and to pursue middle power diplomacy, defined by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal as the "tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, [the] tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and [the] tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide its diplomacy." MIKTA reflects this clearly in its vision statement: "We will play the role of an agenda-setter and assume a constructive role on the global stage. We will make joint efforts for building norms, developing guidelines, sharing best practices and forging collective responses in a manner agreeable to all MIKTA members."

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While the main goal of MIKTA may be to serve as a global forum for solving emerging global issues, promoting global norms, and facilitating communication between various regions, it has already shown a willingness to inject itself into pressing global issues, in particular North Korea's nuclear and missile tests. In April 2014, MIKTA issued a communiqué expressing, "grave concern over the recent ballistic missile launches by North Korea," and stated its agreement with UN Security Council resolutions calling for North Korea to "dismantle all its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, including its uranium enrichment program, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner."

Not surprisingly, the statement did little to move the needle on the North Korea issue. That highlights the weakness of MIKTA, namely that until now, the group itself and the status of its member states as so-called middle powers has been largely ignored by greater powers, particularly the U.S. and China. For example, Scott Synder argues that while the U.S. will continue to demand more of South Korea as an alliance partner, "there has not been a formal U.S. recognition or policy toward middle powers as a group, nor is there evidence that middle powerness as an attribute has been consequential to U.S. foreign policy toward countries that classify themselves in this way." This is seen in the North Korea issue: Despite calls by MIKTA as an organization, or efforts by South Korea as a middle power, nothing seems to be able to budge the U.S. from its North Korea policy of "strategic patience."

It is this lack of recognition that encouraged the MIKTA states to decide to band together and form a formal association. Individually, they are regional powers with confined spheres of influence that lack significant leverage to change the course of world events. Together, assuming they can agree on what is in their collective best interest, they have significantly greater leverage. And the fact that the member states hail from different regions and individually have sway with different actors means that they can exert more leverage over other states, including potentially the U.S. and China.

So when it comes to the South China Sea, does MIKTA have a collective interest in exerting leverage to ensure a peaceful resolution to the territorial disputes plaguing the region? From the individual state perspective, Indonesia certainly as an interest in peacefully resolving this issue, as China's nine-dash line overlaps with its exclusive economic zone. South Korea could see itself pulled into a U.S.-China confrontation due to its alliance commitments, and following the recent statement by U.S. President Barrack Obama confirming that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fall under the purview of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, this possibility seems slightly more likely. Australia has stepped up its rhetoric against Chinese land reclamation efforts over the summer with an obvious interest in maintaining freedom of the seas to protect its trade routes. Turkey and Mexico have no apparent direct interest, but both have economic or military ties with the U.S. and China, meaning any sort of major conflict will affect their economies.

But the most crucial factor is whether or not the individual member states have enough faith in their new association to allow them to inject themselves into the South China Sea disputes and play a bridging role between the various claimants. This bridging role is an important aspect of middle power diplomacy and there is a clear need for an honest broker to mediate disputes between claimants in order to calm tensions. But whether or not MIKTA as an association has the willingness to play such a role in the South China Sea and the diplomatic skills to pull it off is still unknown. MIKTA has a prime opportunity to make a positive impact on global politics. Will it step up and be the bridge that the region so desperately needs?
Benjamin Engel is a Research Fellow/Program Officer in the Peace and Security Research Unit at the East Asia Institute (Seoul, South Korea). He is a Ph.D. candidate in East Asian Studies at Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies and holds an MA in Korean Studies from the same school. His research interests include modern Korean history, democratization in East Asia, and U.S. foreign policy.

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MIKTA and Middle Power Diplomacy in the South China Sea

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MIKTA - an association consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia - is still a relatively new platform, having been formed in 2013, but it may now be confronted with its first real opportunity to have an impact on the global stage.

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Tough Times Ahead for the Indonesian Navy

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Tough Times Ahead for the Indonesian Navy

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Indonesian President Joko revealed his Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision. Great expectations from his government.

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Almost a year has elapsed since Indonesian President Joko Widodo revealed his Global Maritime Fulcrum vision. Since then, Jakarta has undertaken several initiatives aimed at fulfilling the five pillars of the vision: maritime culture, marine resources, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defense.

The last of these pillars is essentially an enabler of the other four pillars and not standalone. When Widodo came to power, he effectively inherited his predecessor's legacy of modernizing the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Laut, TNI-AL for short). The challenge is to continue and sustain that modernization.
Great Expectations
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The contemporary TNI-AL modernization is inspired by the Minimum Essential Force Blueprint conceived over the 2010-24 timeline, executed in three strategic plans (rencana strategis in Bahasa Indonesia, or renstra for short). Renstra I (2010-14) was completed last year. Since then, the TNI-AL is at Renstra II, which runs up to 2019.

The end-state, going by the envisaged plan, is to create a greenwater TNI-AL by 2024 - a service that is balanced and capable of undertaking an array of missions within the immediate regional waters while having limited ability to project force into distant waters.

By 2024, the service is meant to comprise 274 vessels and 137 aircraft of various types. The former category is divided into the Combat Strike Group (110 vessels including 10-12 submarines, 56 frigates and corvettes, 26 missile- and 12 torpedo fast attack craft), the Patrol Group (66 patrol vessels), and a 98-vessel Support Force. The 137 aircraft include up to 35 maritime patrol aircraft.

Ever since Renstra I was kicked into motion, the TNI-AL has ridden the momentum of government support. In January 2013, then Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro announced plans to possibly reduce the renstras to two, aiming to fulfill MEF targets by 2019 instead of 2024. Buoyed by having achieved 28.7 percent of the MEF targets that year, Indonesian military authorities optimistically predicted in 2014 that 40-42 percent will be met by the time Renstra I is completed.
Renstra I (2010-14): "Renaissance" for the TNI-AL?
It would be imperative here to take stock of the gains made by the TNI-AL over Renstra I. Indeed, the period of 2010-14 marked a "renaissance" of sorts for the service following the significant acquisition programs (for example, SIGMA-90 corvettes, Makassar-class landing platform, docks, and Yakhont supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles) made in the preceding years. These new primary weapon systems ( alutsista in Bahasa Indonesia) represent a stark contrast to the malaise suffered by the TNI-AL following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98.

Notwithstanding derogatory comments about the lackluster progress of the TNI-AL modernization efforts, Renstra I did oversee oft-overlooked qualitative improvements to the alutsista Indonesia relies on for maritime defense.

For example, the PKR10514 (modified Dutch SIGMA-105) frigate is equipped with the VL-MICA, a vertically-launched air defense system that can destroy incoming high-performance aerial and missile targets at 20 kilometers. Suffice to say, prior to that, the TNI-AL relied on the Mistral SIMBAD/SADRAL that has only an effective 6-kilometer range. The PKR thus confers on the TNI-AL a real shipboard anti-air warfare capability for the first time.

In 2012, the TNI-AL was poised to revitalize its ageing undersea capability with the acquisition of three submarines from South Korea. A French-built naval research ship KRI Rigel equipped with an advanced autonomous underwater vehicle was commissioned in late 2014. Regrettably, it did not arrive in time to assist in the search and recovery of the ill-fated AirAsia QZ8501.

Other noteworthy qualitative improvements include the induction of new CN235 PATMAR maritime patrol aircraft and most recently AS-656MBe Panther anti-submarine helicopters - altogether representing a major enhancement to the long-underequipped TNI-AL Naval Aviation.

The Korps Marinir, Indonesia's Marine Corps, undergoes mobility enhancement and mechanization with the purchase of new amphibious fighting vehicles from Russia and Ukraine, along with the construction of the indigenous Teluk Bintuni-class of landing ship, tank.
Size Matters
In all, despite the modest quantities of new alutsista procured, the TNI-AL has attained laudable qualitative improvements. The question remains whether the MEF targets, going by the current pace of modernization efforts, can realistically be met.

In July 2015, outgoing Indonesian military chief General Moeldoko admitted that the envisaged 40-42 percent of MEF targets could not be met. Instead, by the end of Renstra I only 34 percent had been attained. Moeldoko's successor, General Gatot Nurmantyo is expected to boost this figure to 68 percent. However, this means ramping up expenditures.

In March this year, Moeldoko cautioned that defense expenditures, set at Rp102 trillion ($7.7 billion), will be increased to around Rp109 trillion by 2017 only if the economy grows by 7 percent. The sustainability of MEF is thus irrevocably contingent on sustained economic growth in order to reach its envisaged 2024 targets.

But time is conspiring against modernization efforts; the TNI-AL's alutsista is aging. By 2008 (pre-Renstra I) about 74 percent of the alutsista optimized for maritime defense were aged 20 years or more, 15 percent between 11 and 19 years, and barely 11 percent counted as "young" - at 10 years or less. These figures had improved by the time Renstra I was completed, at 67 percent, 11 percent and 22 percent, respectively, in the fall of 2014.

It will be misleading to say that such improvements are attributed solely to Renstra I. In fact, results attained by the close of 2014 were in no small part due to the pre-Renstra I projects, for example the delivery of new SIGMA corvettes in 2007-10.
Buying Second-Hand?
Compounding the problem of aging equipment is also the issue of relying on second-hand procurements as the alternative. For example, by the time the three British-built Multi-Role Light Frigates originally intended for Brunei were delivered to the TNI-AL in late 2014, they were already past a decade old.

Certainly for a fiscally constrained Indonesia, new assets entail high costs, especially when procured overseas. The required fiscal, human and material investments are substantial, since it is not enough to just purchase platforms - the associated supporting infrastructure, logistics, and training are also essential.

This invariably limits the quantity that can be purchased at any one time. For instance, the TNI-AL has originally planned for a total of 40 SIGMAs to be procured by 2015. But as of 2014, the force size of this type had stalled at just four vessels. A pair of more capable PKR10514 only began construction in recent months.

However, the commonly used alternative approach of buying second-hands is not sustainable in the long run, as a result of age and the potential risk of accidents. Moreover, second-hand buys may come with a superficially attractive price tag but still entail "hidden costs."

For example, Jakarta purchased 39 former East German warships at $468-million, but had to spend another $800 million on refurbishment and requisite supporting infrastructure. Other "hidden costs" include inflated operating expenditures. An Indonesian government audit conducted in 2007 found that the TNI-AL had squandered Rp64 billion in petroleum, oil, and lubricants consumption attributable to aging warships.
Newbuilds: Good to Have, Costly to Buy
To Jakarta's credit, there have been conscious efforts to avoid buying second-hand, such as the rejection of used Libyan warships and Russian submarines because of their dubious operational conditions. However, given the MEF targets by 2024, Indonesia is caught between a rock and a hard place.

Some equipment has to be sourced from overseas, especially if it constitutes the core of the TNI-AL's combat capability. "Big ticket" newbuilds such as frigates and submarines are clearly too expensive to purchase in significant quantities.

Procuring newbuilds through foreign or domestic sources require a considerable gestation period - at least five to eight years from the time an alutsista project is being conceived, a process involving negotiations, contracting, construction, and a mandatory series of equipment trials prior to final operational capability. Delays may stretch this timeline to a decade or more. The more complex the platform, the longer it takes.

This means that if one regards the results achieved by the end of Renstra I to be any indication, one-for-one alutsista replacement of existing MEF targets may prove to be too ambitious. New alutsista purchased during Renstra I may possibly meet in-service timelines within Renstra II. However, quantities inducted into service for such high-capability assets as frigates and submarines will leave much to be desired.
Rethinking and Recalibrating the MEF Targets?
To meet the original MEF targets, more substantial procurements will be needed during Renstra II. But the perennial problem boils down again to funding. To compound the problem, by the end of Renstra II in 2019 alutsista that were already more than 20 years old as of 2014 will have to be readied for retirement, whereas the process for block replacements will need to be initiated for those 11-19 years or less.

To accommodate the limited budget, long gestation periods for especially high-capability alutsista, problems of second-hand buys, and the limitations of Indonesia's domestic industries, it may be worth rethinking and recalibrating the MEF targets to ensure that TNI-AL force goals are met by 2024.

The basic starting point would be to consider Indonesia's maritime interests and corresponding naval force priorities. However, the current State Defense Policy 2014 (Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara Tahun 2014) essentially constitutes a "grab bag" of all conceivable challenges to Indonesia's maritime interests - non-traditional threats such as illegal fishing, the South China Sea flashpoint, and so on.

An oft-suggested, straightforward solution will be to acquire the widest possible array of capabilities to cope with such a broad spectrum of security challenges. But this is scarcely helpful insofar as limited funds are concerned. There is clearly a need to prioritize those interests in order to recalibrate force requirements, which enables the optimal allocation of scarce resources.

Despite the recent South China Sea flare-ups, which led Jakarta to embark on a military buildup in the Natuna Islands in preparation for high-intensity operations, it is more evident that low-intensity scenarios involving non-state actors appear more conceivable - a "clear and present threat" so to speak. As such, a hi/lo-lo/hi dual-configuration for the envisaged TNI-AL force composition could be one possible solution.
Less on the Heavies
The hi/lo configuration applies to the Combat Strike Group, for which 10-12 submarines and 56 frigates and corvettes would seem ambitious. The proposed recalibration envisages a reduction in the numbers of larger high-capability platforms - the frigates and corvettes - while increasing the proportion of missile-armed fast attack craft, which are comparatively cheaper and simpler to construct in larger numbers.

This approach leverages on the niche strengths of Indonesia's domestic industrial base, which has so far produced the KCR40/60-series fast attack craft for the TNI-AL as well as making notable strides in developing combat systems. In fact, the KCR40-60-series has been one of the major areas experiencing rapid growth during Renstra I, with up to 18 units in all being commissioned or in various stages of construction and trials since 2011.

The end state of this recalibration may be a smaller fleet of frigates and corvettes, which serve as flotilla leaders and key command and control nodes for combat strike task forces in times of war. They may also conduct defense diplomacy missions, such as the TNI-AL's regular contribution to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
A 'PKR-Minus' Solution?
The proposed lo/hi configuration would suit the Patrol Group. There may be a need to recalibrate the MEF targets by reducing the envisaged 110 vessels in the Combat Strike Group in order to ramp up the Patrol Group from the 66 vessels originally planned. The indigenous 250-ton PC-43 fast patrol craft is intended to form the Patrol Group's mainstay. However, its size confines it to inshore and coastal missions, leaving it less suited for sustained operations in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) optimized for EEZ duties may be worth considering. Such vessels need not be technically complex, but should possess the requisite seakeeping and loitering characteristics. They are cheaper than combat-configured frigates and corvettes, and can be equipped with no heavier than a medium-caliber gun for credible deterrence against non-state actors.

With that, a potential solution may be to scale down the initial technical requirements for the frigates and corvettes, assuming the retention of the envisaged force size of 56 vessels. This "PKR-minus" configuration envisages a common SIGMA-105 hull outfitted first as an OPV for potential future scaling up to its full warfighting potential. In any case, the hull is usually one of the cheapest warship components. Most of the high costs originates from the combat systems and integration work. This is not an uncommon approach.

Consider the Polish Navy, which converted the sole Project-621 Gawron II (modified German MEKO A100) ship from its original multi-purpose corvette configuration into an OPV, following over a decade of delays. While fitting it out as a multipurpose corvette would cost another PLN1 billion ($266 million), reconfiguring it as an OPV costs just PLN250 million instead. The ship, the ORP Slazak, was eventually launched in July 2015, something that would have not been possible if the Polish Navy had insisted on sticking to its original configuration.
Austere Times Ahead
Indeed, even discounting the alutsista, meeting MEF targets will invariably require investments in several other areas, such as the potential increase in crewing requirements to ensure a round-the-clock naval presence. This certainly goes against the grain of the "zero-growth" manpower policy described in existing defense plans.

Not only that, increased investment in human capital is needed to raise the quality of TNI-AL personnel to a level able to cope with a multitude of complex challenges. Moeldoko once cautioned about the long-term sustainability of increasing remuneration and base salaries of military personnel. This is not to forget the need to invest in the logistics for sustained operations. In particular, whether the problem of fuel shortages (just 27 percent of the required amount allotted to the TNI-AL as reported in November 2014) will be resolved remains to be seen.

Coping with multiple competing needs will be a tough challenge for the TNI-AL. There is simply too much to do and insufficient wherewithal available. Purchasing assets in itself is not an adequate solution, given that naval capacity-building remains a holistic undertaking. With the 2024 timeline in mind, some innovation and creativity will be needed if the TNI-AL is to secure Indonesia's maritime interests in a time geopolitical and fiscal uncertainty. Recalibrating the MEF force goals may be the best way forward.
Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of international Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He primarily researches naval modernization in Southeast Asia.

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Tough Times Ahead for the Indonesian Navy?

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Almost a year has elapsed since Indonesian President Joko Widodo revealed his Global Maritime Fulcrum vision. Since then, Jakarta has undertaken several initiatives aimed at fulfilling the five pillars of the vision: maritime culture, marine resources, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defense.