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They may lose the option to join other coalitions, and they may lose personal effectiveness because they are assumed to be puppets of the coalition’s leadership.

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The more publicly identified they become with the coalition, the more others may see their future actions as motivated by coalition membership and not by their own interests

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ome coalition members may prefer anonymity

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Desire for anonymit

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Groups that interacted face-to-face were less likely to exclude a party than groups that interacted through a text-based online communication system

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if the coalition’s activity becomes public, actual contributions may become known and some members will be recognized as actually having contributed very little, which could then lead to infighting and threaten the viability of mutual cooperation in the future

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If the coalition is informal, all can take credit and feel good

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exclusion in a three-person game, where deals were possible with only two parties

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Public acknowledgment of the coalition may also lead to turmoil within the alliance that could damage future coalition activity.

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The exclusion of parties from coalitions may depend in part on the communication channels through which multiparty negotiation and coalition politics play out

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Turmoil within

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Revenge can eventually pit coalitions against each other so that each one’s sole objective is to keep the other side from succeeding

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If a coalition “wins” and is identified, the nonwinners may eventually want payback

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Revenge of the vanquished

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individuals forming coalitions are motivated not only to pursue personal gain, but also to maintain personal relationships and minimize harm to excluded individuals

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 if they have not met before, then parties may begin to jockey for  key role. 

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 if they have not met before, then parties may begin to jockey for  key role. 

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If the group already has a structure, then key roles—lead negotiators, issue specialists, technical experts, record keepers, and so on—will already have been determined

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If the group already has a structure, then key roles—lead negotiators, issue specialists, technical experts, record keepers, and so on—will already have been determined

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Murnighan and Brass (1991) identify several reasons it is risky for a coalition to remain intact after the successful resolution of an issue

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a newly created free trade organization that hurts countries not participatin

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Actors left out of a coalition may be worse off as a result

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When a critical action or decision is forthcoming, they mobilize to work together, then go back to their own individual activities and environments when either the objective is achieved or the critical moment passes

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Coalitions don’t just add members; they also exclude members.

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The coalition seldom meets formally; instead, pairs and subgroups may meet informally

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Successful coalitions are focused: They are often drawn together quickly around key issues and mobilize simply

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Over time, though, the Tea Party began to act less

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Tea Party conservatives are individuals who originally came together to try to steer the Republican Party in a more conservative direction on certain issues

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if they do become permanent and public, their members tend to be seen as the opposition,

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- It establishes the issues to be discussed.
- Depending on how the issues are worded, it can also define how each issue is positioned and framed (refer back to our discussion of framing in Chapter 6).
- It can define the order in which issues are discussed.
- It can be used to introduce process issues (decision rules, discussion norms, member roles, discussion dynamics), as well as substantive issues, simply by including them.
- It can assign time limits to various items, thereby indicating the importance of the different issues.

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having reached a critical mass at the same time less necessary and the coalition may continue to accumulate more members, “especially in particularly politicized, turbulent environments”

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Coalitions do not have to be permanent, large, or public to be effective.

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because they recognize that their current friends and associates are already members

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How large they get is determined by a number of factors

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Many Successful Coalitions Form Quietly and Disband Quickly

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Learning the Issues and Constructing an Agenda

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Learning the Issues and Constructing an Agenda

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We follow that model here; in addressing these three stages,
we also identify what a single negotiator can do when:
• The individual is simply one of the parties in a multiparty negotiation and wants to ensure that his or her own issues and interests are clearly incorporated into the final agreement.
• The individual wants to ensure that the group reaches the highest quality and best possible final agreement.
• The individual is responsible for overseeing a multiparty negotiation process to ensure that many of the strategic and procedural complexities are effectively managed.

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Whose status will be enhanced simply by being at the table?

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Whose status will be enhanced simply by being at the table?

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Founders, on the other hand, having extensive networks of weak ties with several other parties, often bring on those who have their own extensive networks, and use these ties to make contacts and build support.

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grow through pairwise discussions and matching processes

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Whose presence is likely to keep other parties from achieving their objectives

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Whose presence is likely to keep other parties from achieving their objectives

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Whose presence is likely to help other parties achieve their objectives 

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Whose presence is likely to help other parties achieve their objectives 

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Who could spoil the deal if they were excluded

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Who could spoil the deal if they were excluded

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group leaders think carefully about whether they want to allow or encourage side conversations, and the same advice is relevant for those who control process features of a multiparty negotiation

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Who must be included if a deal is to be reached

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Who must be included if a deal is to be reached

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veto players are more likely to wait until others approach them with initiatives and “bide their time until offers become attractive enough to accept”

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 Issues about participants can be decided on thebasis of the following

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 Issues about participants can be decided on thebasis of the following

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Three key stages:
- The prenegotiation stage
- Managing the actual negotiations
- Managing the agreement stage

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veto players are unlikely to be founders because they will not be willing to give much away and will have difficulty selling others on membership

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opportunities for side conversations in small groups give rise to norms of coalition formation and also give greater voice to minority points of view

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The founder can make some form of promise or commitment to the other about future rewards or benefits to be derived.

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Are parties really willing to live with the possible costs of no agreement, and at what point will they collectively endorse that possibility?

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Motivation to form a coalition may not be enough if the parties involved don’t also have the right opportunity to explore their mutual interests

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In organizational settings

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The other wants less than other people do in order to be a member of the coalition.

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The other has something important to bring to the coalition that will enhance its strength.

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a few strong ties, with interaction that happens often and in a variety of ways, already have a small coalition that demands a lot of their attention

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Negotiators are prone to perceptual biases that lead them to believe they are better than others, their options are better than others’ options, they are more likely to achieve their outcomes than others, and they have more control over shaping an outcome than others.

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The founder or an early ally is instrumental in driving this process

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founders who have a large, diverse network of weak ties are often in a better position to form a coalition than those who have a small, uniform network of strong ties

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coalition founders will often seek out those who are the weakest for support because they will demand the least payoff for joining the coalition

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Coalitions Build by Adding One Member at a Time

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To make this decision effectively, they must consider what will happen if they fail to agree.

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Coalitions Exclude

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Coalitions Need to Achieve Critical Mass

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Weak Ties Can Be Strong

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Coalitions Need Opportunities to Form and Grow

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That multiparty negotiations have four core elements:
- Preferences
- People
- Processes
- Places

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Understanding the Costs and Consequences of No Agreement

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Understanding the Costs and Consequences of No Agreement

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Founders’ benefits from early coalitions are likely to be modest.

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Successful founders have extensive networks.

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Managing Multiparty Negotiations- The Prenegotiation Stage

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Managing Multiparty Negotiations- The Prenegotiation Stage

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founders may have to offer an unequal or inequitable share to early

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persuasion is not sufficient, and the founder may have to offer tangible rewards or benefits to get others to join the coalition.

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the founder develops some form of action agenda, vision, or commitment and persuades

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founders are those who recognize that they cannot get what they want through existing channels by themselves.

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Coalitions Start with a Founder