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Tripartite Pact makes Germany and Italy allies. This causes tension between US and Japan.
Economic sanctions were introduced due to Japanese aggression toward China.
America also set up embargos on fuel which also caused tension between the 2 nations.

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The Japanese have been preparing for an attack on the Pacific. Japanese forces have been training for over a year. Many events led to the attack, but the axis powers wanted the US to enter the war. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/pearl-harbor-bombed#&gid=ci023944f6f00027a8&pid=2-pearl-harbor-photo-gallery-getty-548806941

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The US received a warning about a Pacific attack. The exact location was not revealed, however, Pearl Harbor was not mentioned.
http://www.american-historama.org/1929-1945-depression-ww2-era/pearl-harbor-facts.htm

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The attack on Pearl Harbor happened on December 7, 1941. Many people lost their lives as a result of bombings and shootings from the Japanese. This attack resulted in the United States entering WWII.

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The Japanese are headed toward Pearl Harbor. They launched the first wave of 183 planes. This was the first warning.

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USS Arizona sinking
NPS

Nationalistic and militaristic fervor in Imperial Japan and a strong belief in Japan's destiny and divine right to rule all of Southeast Asia brought Japan and the United States into increasing diplomatic confrontation throughout the 1930s. Compounding the matter was a bloody undeclared war the Japanese were waging in China and the weakening of European control in Asian colonies as a result of the Second World War. The signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which allied Japan with Germany and Italy, aggravated tensions between the United States and Japan as the latter nation joined the Axis Powers. When Japan seized a major portion of Southeast Asia under agreement with Vichy France, the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was moved to action. Already outraged by Japanese aggression in China, the Roosevelt administration introduced economic sanctions to make its point clear: The United States would not facilitate Japan's expansion into the Pacific, just as it opposed German expansion in Europe. An American embargo cut off shipments of scrap steel, raw materials, oil and high-octane gasoline, while freezing Japanese financial assets in the United States. The Japanese, having only a six-month supply of strategic fuel available for its armed forces, felt the only choice was to initiate the conquest of Southeast Asia, which meant in evitable war with America, Britain, and the Netherlands. Japan had seen the United States expand its naval authority in the Pacific in the late 1930s. The bolstering of defenses in the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, Midway and Wake Island, as well as stationing the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, made America the first priority for a Japanese attack.

Fearing that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would pose a formidable obstacle to Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto, the commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, visualized a bold attack on the Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor at Pearl Harbor. Such a "surprise strategical" attack, bold and daring in its execution, would secure the Pacific and initiate the war, following in the tradition of the Japanese naval victory over the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904 and the opening maneuvers in Japan's invasion of China. Although nationalistic and militaristic pride was driving Japan inexorably toward war with the United States, some military leaders were concerned about the long-range implications of a protracted war with an industrial giant. Yamamoto expressed doubt, apprehension and disgust over Japan's headlong push toward conflict. In January 1941 he wrote to Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was the president of Japan's rightist nationalistic organization Kokusai Domei and one of Yamamoto's staunch supporters:

... if there should be a war between Japan and America, then our aim, of course, ought not to be Guam or the Philippines, nor Hawaii or Hong Kong, but a capitulation at the White House, in Washington itself. I wonder whether the politicians of the day really have the willingness to make sacrifices, and the confidence, that this would entail? (Agawa 1979:291)

Thus the admiral who was about to initiate the opening attack of the war revealed his personal attitude. Although he was reluctant to push toward war, he possessed a strong sense of duty. With Japanese policy indicating that war was now inevitable, Yamamoto took a hard look at the navy and Japan's chances, noting he expected to "run wild" for six months, with the outcome after that up in the air. In order to hit U.S. forces so hard that America would seek a quick peace, Yamamoto explained to Navy Minster Koshiro Oikawa, "We should do our very best.., to decide the fate of the war on the very first day." He described his operational plan to attack Pearl Harbor.

The plan had been mentioned before. In the spring of 1940 Japan's air fleet had conducted aerial torpedo exercises under the watchful eyes of Yamamoto and Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, head of the first division of the naval general staff. In passing conversation, almost in a whisper, Yamamoto had said, "I wonder if an aerial attack can't be made at Pearl Harbor?" (Prange 1981:14). Even then, the thought was not new. Exercises by both countries had played out such a scenario, but both Japan and the United States believed an aerial torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was impossible. The actual plan of operation, formulated by a young tactical genius in aerial warfare, Commander Minoru Genda, was agreed to after months of internal dissension among the ranks of command in the Japanese navy. When negotiations with the United States were deemed unsatisfactory to the Japanese government of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, official blessing was sought for the "Hawaii Operation." It was given on September 6, 1941, at an Imperial Conference. Japan was committed to war.

The First Air Fleet had held maneuvers for almost a year, and the results were promising. Under the direction of Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who would lead the air assault on Pearl Harbor, the "impossible" task of an aerial torpedo attack was made possible. Conventional aerial torpedoes plunged to more than 100 feet in depth and ran a long distance to arm. The 45-foot average depth of Pearl Harbor and the short runs necessary to sink ships there were dealt with by adding wooden fins to the torpedoes, altering the arming devices, and by training in simulated conditions.

A task force of 32 vessels -- particularly the carriers AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, KAGA, ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU --was dubbed the "Kido Butai" (Strike Force). Secretly assembling on Tankan Bay in Northern Japan, the force was placed under the direct command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. At 6:00 a.m. on November 26, 1941, the Japanese fleet weighed anchor and slipped out to sea for Hawaii. In planning the operation, the northern approach to Hawaii had been selected even though the weather and seas would be rough. The winter storms would mask the Japanese fleet and lessen the chances of encountering the enemy while on the high seas. A screening force of submarines traveled 200 miles ahead, and as the fleet approached Hawaii, it received up-to-date reports from agents on Oahu as well as the submarines, which finally were picketed around the islands. On December 2 a coded message arrived in Tokyo: "Climb Mt. Nitaka." This pre-arranged message signaled the final decision to wage war. The fleet was to press forward and attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Hawaii time.

At 6:00 a.m. on December 7 the Japanese fleet was 230 miles north of Oahu. Six carriers turned into the wind and launched the first wave -- 183 planes. At the launching, two Zero fighters dropped from the mission: One crashed into the sea on takeoff, another developed engine trouble and was left on board the carrier. At 6:20 Commander Fuchida led the first wave of planes toward Pearl Harbor.

As soon as the first wave departed, the carrier crews readied the second wave. At 7:05 the carriers again swung eastward into the wind and began launching 167 aircraft. As before, the first lift-offs were the Nakajima B5 N2 "Kates," which served as torpedo bombers on the first wave, and as horizontal bombers on the first and second waves. The Kates were followed by the Aichi D3A1 "Vals" (dive bombers) and Mitsubishi A6M2 Reisen Zero fighters. Only one dive bomber from the HIRYU developed engine trouble and failed to make the trip, leaving 350 planes in the air.

Meanwhile on Oahu, two warnings of the impending attack occurred. In the waters just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor, the destroyer WARD at 6:30 a.m. fired on, depth-charged and sank a submarine within the defensive sea area. Bureaucratic delays and the need for confirmation caused an hour to go by before the report was forwarded to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The second warning occurred at 7:02 a.m., nearly half an hour after the WARD fired the first shot of America's Pacific War. Two Army radar operators at the Opana station above Kahuku Point on Oahu's north shore picked up a large formation of planes on their radar screens. After checking and rechecking equipment, they notified the watch officer at Fort Shafter. No action was taken because the officer believed the planes to be a flight of B-17s flying in from California.

Flying through thick cloud cover, Commander Fuchida thought for a moment he had overflown Oahu, but a sudden parting of the clouds revealed the island's north shore. The signal was given to assume attack formation. As Fuchida looked toward Pearl Harbor and the surrounding airfields, he was relieved to see that the attack was a surprise, and the earlier report of Kido Butai's scout plane "Enemy fleet in port!" was accurate. To Fuchida's disappointment, the prime targets of the attack -- the aircraft carriers -- were absent. Changing their plan, the torpedo planes concentrated on the battleships lined up along Battleship Row and the east side of Ford Island.

With assignments memorized by constant training, the first wave of planes attacked at 7:55 a.m. At about the same time, fighters and dive bombers hit the airfields at Kaneohe, Hickam, Ewa, Bellows and Wheeler. Within two hours, most American air power in Hawaii was destroyed.

At Pearl Harbor, as morning colors were readied and sailors and civilians ate breakfast, the Japanese planes struck. In 15 minutes the main battle line of the Pacific fleet was neutralized. The battleships CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA and ARIZONA were sunk, as was the old battleship UTAH then being used as a target and antiaircraft training vessel. The battleships MARYLAND, TENNESSEE and PENNSYLVANIA were damaged. Initially, the American response to the attack was sporadic, but within five minutes American vessels began to fire back in earnest against the attackers. "Air Raid Pearl Harbor, this is no drill!" was relayed to the fleet.

The assault of the first wave ended about 8:45 a.m. There was a momentary lull before the second wave of Japanese planes arrived at 8:50 a.m. No torpedo planes came with the second group of dive and high-altitude bombers.

As the second wave withdrew, Fuchida circled Pearl Harbor and assessed the damage. Satisfied, he took a last look and signaled his pilots to return to the carrier. The main objective of the attack -- demobilizing the Pacific Fleet -- had been accomplished. More than 2,400 Americans were killed and 1,104 wounded. Twenty-one ships of the Pacific Fleet had been sunk or damaged, and 75 percent of the planes on the airfields surrounding Pearl Harbor were damaged or destroyed.

It was nearly 10 o'clock when the first wave of Japanese aircraft began landing on their carriers. By noon, the last planes had been recovered. Twenty-nine Japanese planes were lost, along with 55 airmen. The Special Attack Unit of midget submarines had lost 10 crewmen and all five boats, one boat and one prisoner were captured by Americans the following day on the beaches near Bellows Airfield.

Fuchida was gratified to see planes being readied for a third assault because many targets had been left untouched, particularly the naval shipyard, oil-storage facilities, and a number of American ships. While he wondered when the third wave would be launched, a heated debate was underway on the bridge of the fleet flagship HIJMS AKAGI.

Admiral Nagumo had feared the operation would not be successful, yet he had achieved successful results with minimal casualties. It was his contention that the mission was accomplished. Furthermore, the fleet's fuel was running low. More important, American carriers and other ships not in port were now searching for him. At 1 o'clock the task force altered course and began its journey back to Japan. This decision was a major blunder that greatly minimized the long-term effects of the attack on the American war machine.

Excerpt from the Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona and Pearl Harbor National Historic Landmark

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The Pearl Harbor Attack (U.S. National Park Service)

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Joseph P. McDonald receives a message from Opana. The radar had detected movement. Airplanes were coming in from the north. Despite the message sounding serious, the Lieutenant rejected it.

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Joseph P. McDonald Remembers the Pearl Harbor Attack, December 7, 1941

by George McDonald

Joseph McDonald at the Arizona Memorial on December 7, 1961

My father, Joseph P. McDonald was in the army stationed at the Information Center Ft.Shafter Hawaii. His story or variations of it has been told in many books and movies including The Day of Infamy by Walter Lord At Dawn We Slept by Gordon Prange and Donald Goldstein, the movie Tora, Tora, Tora and the movie Pearl Harbor.

Pvt. Joseph McDonald started his shift at 5 PM December 6,1941. The Information Center was connected with the 5 radar sites from various locations on Oahu. The people at the center had been on alert for a few weeks. The rumor was that the alert was called because the Japanese Navy could not be located. The alert was cancelled just before December 7. Joseph McDonald manned the switchboard at 6 PM. Most of the time he was alone. At 4 AM, December 7th the plotters entered the information center. The radars were to operate between 4 AM and 7 AM.

General Short thought that was the most likely time that an attack could take place. The center had a large table with a map of Hawaii. The plotters would move arrows on the table to designate planes picked up by the radar sites .The radar sites had a direct line to the plotters.

At 7 AM the plotters exited the Information Center and headed for breakfast. Joseph McDonald's orders were scheduled until 6 AM. Today was Sunday and Joseph stayed on duty beyond his time until his replacement ate breakfast at 7 AM. Joseph thought that he was in the center alone. Shortly after 7 AM the switchboard buzzed. He inserted the plug into the phone and answered. It was the northern radar station Opana. An excited voice that he could hardly hear asked if the plotters were still around. McDonald said "No". The voice from Opana said, "There are a large number of planes coming in from the north 3 points east." Joseph replied, "I am not sure what to do there is nobody here." At that point the connection was broken. (Pvt. George Elliott made this call)

McDonald looked at the clock to time the message and saw a Lieutenant from the Air Corps sitting at the plotting table. He walked in and said, "I just received a call from 6QN Opana reporting a large number of planes coming in from the north 3 points east." The Lieutenant said that there was nothing to get excited about. McDonald returned to the switchboard and called the man back on the Opana radar unit. McDonald relayed the Lieutenant's lack of concern. The voice at Opana was coming in stronger now. He recognized the voice as his friend Joseph Lockard. Pvt. Lockard was excited and stated that a large number of planes were heading fast towards Oahu. "Hey Mac there is a heck of a big flight of planes coming in and the whole scope is covered." McDonald told Joseph Lockard to hold on. McDonald, infected by his friend's excitement, again returned to the plotting table. McDonald said, "Sir, this is the first call that I have ever received like this. This sounds serious! Do you think that we ought to do something about it? Shall I call back the plotters?"

The Lieutenant said that it was probably a flight from the states. Pvt. Lockard asked to talk directly with the Lieutenant. The Lieutenant took the phone and my father could hear "Well don't worry about it". After the Lieutenant got off the phone, Joseph McDonald asked if he should recall the plotters and call Wheeler Field. The Lieutenant replied, "Don't worry about it".

McDonald was sure that it was serious. He knew that the Lieutenant was inexperienced in the information center's operations as it was only his second day there. McDonald was pretty sure that it was serious. A number of times he grabbed the line for Wheeler Field. McDonald then thought that he could be court marshaled for going around the Lieutenant. Who would listen to a private anyway? At about 7:45 McDonald's replacement arrived.

My father was exhausted after working over 14 hours yet the communication from Opana kept gnawing on his mind. He thought that he would call Wheeler from the orderly tent. He passed by the orderly tent and saw the Sergeant using the phone. He returned to his tent to tell his tent mate Pvt. Richard Schimmel "Shim the Japs are coming". McDonald sat on his bunk and recounted the call from the Opana radar. A few moments later, they could hear the drone of planes.

Their tent was on a hill overlooking Pearl Harbor. Finally, they could see the planes coming over. There were a lot of them and they seemed to play follow the leader. They were flying in single file. Finally, the lead plane dived and the others followed. They could hear the loud roar of explosions and black smoke. A radio was playing in a nearby tent. The music stopped and a frantic voice said," all cars keep clear of Pearl Harbor! Pearl Harbor is under attack by the Japanese.

McDonald and Schimmel ran to get a better view on top of the mess hall. They could see planes diving on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field. The explosions kept getting worse. Everybody was stunned. Some guys were running out of their tents with their pants half down and some no pants on at all. Everybody seemed to be running in different directions. Confusion ruled as the torpedo planes flew overhead. The planes were so low that some threw stones at them.

All of the ammunition was locked up. The rocks became their only weapon. Anti aircraft guns from the 64th C.A. across the street tried to knock down the oncoming planes. They came so close that it knocked Schimmel and McDonald down to floor of the mess hall roof. They ran to their tent and got their guns and gas masks and headed to the information center. They worked through the day answering the calls from the various military bases.

Later in an investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts reportedly said to my father that the message that my father received was far greater than than the "Message to Garcia". This reference was to a message from the President to the Commanding General in Cuba during the Spanish American War. It was critical to win that war. Later, as written by Col. USAF (Ret) W.H. Tetley Commanding Officer of the 580th Aircraft Warning Company Signal Corps:

Joseph McDonald performed in an outstanding manner on 7 December 1941 when he manned the AWS switchboard in order to keep the Air Corps duty-officer appraised of the position of the approaching Japanese bomber force. Had that duty-officer been able to get his Fighter Wing airborne, it could have deprived the Japanese of the important element of surprise which was so much in their favor.

Tetley also believed that lives would have been saved during the Pearl Harbor Attack had the radar warning been heeded, also the damage from the attack would have been much less. This was reported February 11, 1987 in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. That was my father's longest day. My father continued in the central Pacific hopping on a number of islands Kanton, Makin, Kwajalein, Guadalcanal, New Guinea and Saipan as the military headed for Japan. He did not talk a lot about Pearl Harbor publicly. He always questioned how many lives might have been saved if the radar warning was heeded.

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

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Joseph P. McDonald Remembers the Pearl Harbor Attack, December 7, 1941 by George McDonald Joseph McDonald at the Arizona Memorial on December 7, 1961 My father, Joseph P. McDonald was in the army stationed at the Information Center Ft.Shafter Hawaii.

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Japan launches its attack on Pearl Harbor. Bombs were thrown and bullets were shot, resulting in many casualties.

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On December 7, 1941, at 7:55 a.m. Hawaii time, a Japanese dive bomber bearing the red symbol of the Rising Sun of Japan on its wings appears out of the clouds above the island of Oahu. A swarm of 360 Japanese warplanes followed, descending on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in a ferocious assault. The surprise attack struck a critical blow against the U.S. Pacific fleet and drew the United States irrevocably into World War II.

With diplomatic negotiations with Japan breaking down, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisers knew that an imminent Japanese attack was probable, but nothing had been done to increase security at the important naval base at Pearl Harbor. It was Sunday morning, and many military personnel had been given passes to attend religious services off base. At 7:02 a.m., two radar operators spotted large groups of aircraft in flight toward the island from the north, but, with a flight of B-17s expected from the United States at the time, they were told to sound no alarm. Thus, the Japanese air assault came as a devastating surprise to the naval base.
READ MORE: Why Did Japan Attack Pearl Harbor?
Much of the Pacific fleet was rendered useless: Five of eight battleships, three destroyers, and seven other ships were sunk or severely damaged, and more than 200 aircraft were destroyed. A total of 2,400 Americans were killed and 1,200 were wounded, many while valiantly attempting to repulse the attack. Japan's losses were some 30 planes, five midget submarines, and fewer than 100 men. Fortunately for the United States, all three Pacific fleet carriers were out at sea on training maneuvers. These giant aircraft carriers would have their revenge against Japan six months later at the Battle of Midway, reversing the tide against the previously invincible Japanese navy in a spectacular victory.

The day after Pearl Harbor was bombed, President Roosevelt appeared before a joint session of Congress and declared, "Yesterday, December 7, 1941-a date which will live in infamy-the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan." After a brief and forceful speech, he asked Congress to approve a resolution recognizing the state of war between the United States and Japan. The Senate voted for war against Japan by 82 to 0, and the House of Representatives approved the resolution by a vote of 388 to 1. The sole dissenter was Representative Jeannette Rankin of Montana, a devout pacifist who had also cast a dissenting vote against the U.S. entrance into World War I. Three days later, Germany and Italy declared war against the United States, and the U.S. government responded in kind.

The American contribution to the successful Allied war effort spanned four long years and cost more than 400,000 American lives.

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At 7:55 a.m. Hawaii time, a Japanese dive bomber descends on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in a ferocious assault. The surprise attack struck a critical blow against the U.S. Pacific fleet and drew the United States into World War II.

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USS Arizona explodes and sinks after a bomb is dropped in the ammunition magazine.

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The USS Oklahoma was an oil-carrying ship who was sunk shortly after the USS Arizona. The USS Oklahoma was hit by 8 torpedoes during the first 10 minutes of the attack. 429 of the 2402 deaths were from the USS Oklahoma.

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At this time, after 2 hours after the first wave of planes, all of American airpower was destroyed. Most battleships were sunk.

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USS Arizona sinking
NPS

Nationalistic and militaristic fervor in Imperial Japan and a strong belief in Japan's destiny and divine right to rule all of Southeast Asia brought Japan and the United States into increasing diplomatic confrontation throughout the 1930s. Compounding the matter was a bloody undeclared war the Japanese were waging in China and the weakening of European control in Asian colonies as a result of the Second World War. The signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which allied Japan with Germany and Italy, aggravated tensions between the United States and Japan as the latter nation joined the Axis Powers. When Japan seized a major portion of Southeast Asia under agreement with Vichy France, the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was moved to action. Already outraged by Japanese aggression in China, the Roosevelt administration introduced economic sanctions to make its point clear: The United States would not facilitate Japan's expansion into the Pacific, just as it opposed German expansion in Europe. An American embargo cut off shipments of scrap steel, raw materials, oil and high-octane gasoline, while freezing Japanese financial assets in the United States. The Japanese, having only a six-month supply of strategic fuel available for its armed forces, felt the only choice was to initiate the conquest of Southeast Asia, which meant in evitable war with America, Britain, and the Netherlands. Japan had seen the United States expand its naval authority in the Pacific in the late 1930s. The bolstering of defenses in the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, Midway and Wake Island, as well as stationing the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, made America the first priority for a Japanese attack.

Fearing that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would pose a formidable obstacle to Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto, the commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, visualized a bold attack on the Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor at Pearl Harbor. Such a "surprise strategical" attack, bold and daring in its execution, would secure the Pacific and initiate the war, following in the tradition of the Japanese naval victory over the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904 and the opening maneuvers in Japan's invasion of China. Although nationalistic and militaristic pride was driving Japan inexorably toward war with the United States, some military leaders were concerned about the long-range implications of a protracted war with an industrial giant. Yamamoto expressed doubt, apprehension and disgust over Japan's headlong push toward conflict. In January 1941 he wrote to Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was the president of Japan's rightist nationalistic organization Kokusai Domei and one of Yamamoto's staunch supporters:

... if there should be a war between Japan and America, then our aim, of course, ought not to be Guam or the Philippines, nor Hawaii or Hong Kong, but a capitulation at the White House, in Washington itself. I wonder whether the politicians of the day really have the willingness to make sacrifices, and the confidence, that this would entail? (Agawa 1979:291)

Thus the admiral who was about to initiate the opening attack of the war revealed his personal attitude. Although he was reluctant to push toward war, he possessed a strong sense of duty. With Japanese policy indicating that war was now inevitable, Yamamoto took a hard look at the navy and Japan's chances, noting he expected to "run wild" for six months, with the outcome after that up in the air. In order to hit U.S. forces so hard that America would seek a quick peace, Yamamoto explained to Navy Minster Koshiro Oikawa, "We should do our very best.., to decide the fate of the war on the very first day." He described his operational plan to attack Pearl Harbor.

The plan had been mentioned before. In the spring of 1940 Japan's air fleet had conducted aerial torpedo exercises under the watchful eyes of Yamamoto and Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, head of the first division of the naval general staff. In passing conversation, almost in a whisper, Yamamoto had said, "I wonder if an aerial attack can't be made at Pearl Harbor?" (Prange 1981:14). Even then, the thought was not new. Exercises by both countries had played out such a scenario, but both Japan and the United States believed an aerial torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was impossible. The actual plan of operation, formulated by a young tactical genius in aerial warfare, Commander Minoru Genda, was agreed to after months of internal dissension among the ranks of command in the Japanese navy. When negotiations with the United States were deemed unsatisfactory to the Japanese government of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, official blessing was sought for the "Hawaii Operation." It was given on September 6, 1941, at an Imperial Conference. Japan was committed to war.

The First Air Fleet had held maneuvers for almost a year, and the results were promising. Under the direction of Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who would lead the air assault on Pearl Harbor, the "impossible" task of an aerial torpedo attack was made possible. Conventional aerial torpedoes plunged to more than 100 feet in depth and ran a long distance to arm. The 45-foot average depth of Pearl Harbor and the short runs necessary to sink ships there were dealt with by adding wooden fins to the torpedoes, altering the arming devices, and by training in simulated conditions.

A task force of 32 vessels -- particularly the carriers AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, KAGA, ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU --was dubbed the "Kido Butai" (Strike Force). Secretly assembling on Tankan Bay in Northern Japan, the force was placed under the direct command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. At 6:00 a.m. on November 26, 1941, the Japanese fleet weighed anchor and slipped out to sea for Hawaii. In planning the operation, the northern approach to Hawaii had been selected even though the weather and seas would be rough. The winter storms would mask the Japanese fleet and lessen the chances of encountering the enemy while on the high seas. A screening force of submarines traveled 200 miles ahead, and as the fleet approached Hawaii, it received up-to-date reports from agents on Oahu as well as the submarines, which finally were picketed around the islands. On December 2 a coded message arrived in Tokyo: "Climb Mt. Nitaka." This pre-arranged message signaled the final decision to wage war. The fleet was to press forward and attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Hawaii time.

At 6:00 a.m. on December 7 the Japanese fleet was 230 miles north of Oahu. Six carriers turned into the wind and launched the first wave -- 183 planes. At the launching, two Zero fighters dropped from the mission: One crashed into the sea on takeoff, another developed engine trouble and was left on board the carrier. At 6:20 Commander Fuchida led the first wave of planes toward Pearl Harbor.

As soon as the first wave departed, the carrier crews readied the second wave. At 7:05 the carriers again swung eastward into the wind and began launching 167 aircraft. As before, the first lift-offs were the Nakajima B5 N2 "Kates," which served as torpedo bombers on the first wave, and as horizontal bombers on the first and second waves. The Kates were followed by the Aichi D3A1 "Vals" (dive bombers) and Mitsubishi A6M2 Reisen Zero fighters. Only one dive bomber from the HIRYU developed engine trouble and failed to make the trip, leaving 350 planes in the air.

Meanwhile on Oahu, two warnings of the impending attack occurred. In the waters just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor, the destroyer WARD at 6:30 a.m. fired on, depth-charged and sank a submarine within the defensive sea area. Bureaucratic delays and the need for confirmation caused an hour to go by before the report was forwarded to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The second warning occurred at 7:02 a.m., nearly half an hour after the WARD fired the first shot of America's Pacific War. Two Army radar operators at the Opana station above Kahuku Point on Oahu's north shore picked up a large formation of planes on their radar screens. After checking and rechecking equipment, they notified the watch officer at Fort Shafter. No action was taken because the officer believed the planes to be a flight of B-17s flying in from California.

Flying through thick cloud cover, Commander Fuchida thought for a moment he had overflown Oahu, but a sudden parting of the clouds revealed the island's north shore. The signal was given to assume attack formation. As Fuchida looked toward Pearl Harbor and the surrounding airfields, he was relieved to see that the attack was a surprise, and the earlier report of Kido Butai's scout plane "Enemy fleet in port!" was accurate. To Fuchida's disappointment, the prime targets of the attack -- the aircraft carriers -- were absent. Changing their plan, the torpedo planes concentrated on the battleships lined up along Battleship Row and the east side of Ford Island.

With assignments memorized by constant training, the first wave of planes attacked at 7:55 a.m. At about the same time, fighters and dive bombers hit the airfields at Kaneohe, Hickam, Ewa, Bellows and Wheeler. Within two hours, most American air power in Hawaii was destroyed.

At Pearl Harbor, as morning colors were readied and sailors and civilians ate breakfast, the Japanese planes struck. In 15 minutes the main battle line of the Pacific fleet was neutralized. The battleships CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA and ARIZONA were sunk, as was the old battleship UTAH then being used as a target and antiaircraft training vessel. The battleships MARYLAND, TENNESSEE and PENNSYLVANIA were damaged. Initially, the American response to the attack was sporadic, but within five minutes American vessels began to fire back in earnest against the attackers. "Air Raid Pearl Harbor, this is no drill!" was relayed to the fleet.

The assault of the first wave ended about 8:45 a.m. There was a momentary lull before the second wave of Japanese planes arrived at 8:50 a.m. No torpedo planes came with the second group of dive and high-altitude bombers.

As the second wave withdrew, Fuchida circled Pearl Harbor and assessed the damage. Satisfied, he took a last look and signaled his pilots to return to the carrier. The main objective of the attack -- demobilizing the Pacific Fleet -- had been accomplished. More than 2,400 Americans were killed and 1,104 wounded. Twenty-one ships of the Pacific Fleet had been sunk or damaged, and 75 percent of the planes on the airfields surrounding Pearl Harbor were damaged or destroyed.

It was nearly 10 o'clock when the first wave of Japanese aircraft began landing on their carriers. By noon, the last planes had been recovered. Twenty-nine Japanese planes were lost, along with 55 airmen. The Special Attack Unit of midget submarines had lost 10 crewmen and all five boats, one boat and one prisoner were captured by Americans the following day on the beaches near Bellows Airfield.

Fuchida was gratified to see planes being readied for a third assault because many targets had been left untouched, particularly the naval shipyard, oil-storage facilities, and a number of American ships. While he wondered when the third wave would be launched, a heated debate was underway on the bridge of the fleet flagship HIJMS AKAGI.

Admiral Nagumo had feared the operation would not be successful, yet he had achieved successful results with minimal casualties. It was his contention that the mission was accomplished. Furthermore, the fleet's fuel was running low. More important, American carriers and other ships not in port were now searching for him. At 1 o'clock the task force altered course and began its journey back to Japan. This decision was a major blunder that greatly minimized the long-term effects of the attack on the American war machine.

Excerpt from the Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona and Pearl Harbor National Historic Landmark

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The Pearl Harbor Attack (U.S. National Park Service)

# data[].attributes.body
The Japanese had a successful attack. They were returning to Japan due to low fuel. Pearl harbor was destroyed.

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USS Arizona sinking
NPS

Nationalistic and militaristic fervor in Imperial Japan and a strong belief in Japan's destiny and divine right to rule all of Southeast Asia brought Japan and the United States into increasing diplomatic confrontation throughout the 1930s. Compounding the matter was a bloody undeclared war the Japanese were waging in China and the weakening of European control in Asian colonies as a result of the Second World War. The signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which allied Japan with Germany and Italy, aggravated tensions between the United States and Japan as the latter nation joined the Axis Powers. When Japan seized a major portion of Southeast Asia under agreement with Vichy France, the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was moved to action. Already outraged by Japanese aggression in China, the Roosevelt administration introduced economic sanctions to make its point clear: The United States would not facilitate Japan's expansion into the Pacific, just as it opposed German expansion in Europe. An American embargo cut off shipments of scrap steel, raw materials, oil and high-octane gasoline, while freezing Japanese financial assets in the United States. The Japanese, having only a six-month supply of strategic fuel available for its armed forces, felt the only choice was to initiate the conquest of Southeast Asia, which meant in evitable war with America, Britain, and the Netherlands. Japan had seen the United States expand its naval authority in the Pacific in the late 1930s. The bolstering of defenses in the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, Midway and Wake Island, as well as stationing the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, made America the first priority for a Japanese attack.

Fearing that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would pose a formidable obstacle to Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto, the commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, visualized a bold attack on the Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor at Pearl Harbor. Such a "surprise strategical" attack, bold and daring in its execution, would secure the Pacific and initiate the war, following in the tradition of the Japanese naval victory over the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904 and the opening maneuvers in Japan's invasion of China. Although nationalistic and militaristic pride was driving Japan inexorably toward war with the United States, some military leaders were concerned about the long-range implications of a protracted war with an industrial giant. Yamamoto expressed doubt, apprehension and disgust over Japan's headlong push toward conflict. In January 1941 he wrote to Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was the president of Japan's rightist nationalistic organization Kokusai Domei and one of Yamamoto's staunch supporters:

... if there should be a war between Japan and America, then our aim, of course, ought not to be Guam or the Philippines, nor Hawaii or Hong Kong, but a capitulation at the White House, in Washington itself. I wonder whether the politicians of the day really have the willingness to make sacrifices, and the confidence, that this would entail? (Agawa 1979:291)

Thus the admiral who was about to initiate the opening attack of the war revealed his personal attitude. Although he was reluctant to push toward war, he possessed a strong sense of duty. With Japanese policy indicating that war was now inevitable, Yamamoto took a hard look at the navy and Japan's chances, noting he expected to "run wild" for six months, with the outcome after that up in the air. In order to hit U.S. forces so hard that America would seek a quick peace, Yamamoto explained to Navy Minster Koshiro Oikawa, "We should do our very best.., to decide the fate of the war on the very first day." He described his operational plan to attack Pearl Harbor.

The plan had been mentioned before. In the spring of 1940 Japan's air fleet had conducted aerial torpedo exercises under the watchful eyes of Yamamoto and Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, head of the first division of the naval general staff. In passing conversation, almost in a whisper, Yamamoto had said, "I wonder if an aerial attack can't be made at Pearl Harbor?" (Prange 1981:14). Even then, the thought was not new. Exercises by both countries had played out such a scenario, but both Japan and the United States believed an aerial torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was impossible. The actual plan of operation, formulated by a young tactical genius in aerial warfare, Commander Minoru Genda, was agreed to after months of internal dissension among the ranks of command in the Japanese navy. When negotiations with the United States were deemed unsatisfactory to the Japanese government of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, official blessing was sought for the "Hawaii Operation." It was given on September 6, 1941, at an Imperial Conference. Japan was committed to war.

The First Air Fleet had held maneuvers for almost a year, and the results were promising. Under the direction of Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who would lead the air assault on Pearl Harbor, the "impossible" task of an aerial torpedo attack was made possible. Conventional aerial torpedoes plunged to more than 100 feet in depth and ran a long distance to arm. The 45-foot average depth of Pearl Harbor and the short runs necessary to sink ships there were dealt with by adding wooden fins to the torpedoes, altering the arming devices, and by training in simulated conditions.

A task force of 32 vessels -- particularly the carriers AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, KAGA, ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU --was dubbed the "Kido Butai" (Strike Force). Secretly assembling on Tankan Bay in Northern Japan, the force was placed under the direct command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. At 6:00 a.m. on November 26, 1941, the Japanese fleet weighed anchor and slipped out to sea for Hawaii. In planning the operation, the northern approach to Hawaii had been selected even though the weather and seas would be rough. The winter storms would mask the Japanese fleet and lessen the chances of encountering the enemy while on the high seas. A screening force of submarines traveled 200 miles ahead, and as the fleet approached Hawaii, it received up-to-date reports from agents on Oahu as well as the submarines, which finally were picketed around the islands. On December 2 a coded message arrived in Tokyo: "Climb Mt. Nitaka." This pre-arranged message signaled the final decision to wage war. The fleet was to press forward and attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Hawaii time.

At 6:00 a.m. on December 7 the Japanese fleet was 230 miles north of Oahu. Six carriers turned into the wind and launched the first wave -- 183 planes. At the launching, two Zero fighters dropped from the mission: One crashed into the sea on takeoff, another developed engine trouble and was left on board the carrier. At 6:20 Commander Fuchida led the first wave of planes toward Pearl Harbor.

As soon as the first wave departed, the carrier crews readied the second wave. At 7:05 the carriers again swung eastward into the wind and began launching 167 aircraft. As before, the first lift-offs were the Nakajima B5 N2 "Kates," which served as torpedo bombers on the first wave, and as horizontal bombers on the first and second waves. The Kates were followed by the Aichi D3A1 "Vals" (dive bombers) and Mitsubishi A6M2 Reisen Zero fighters. Only one dive bomber from the HIRYU developed engine trouble and failed to make the trip, leaving 350 planes in the air.

Meanwhile on Oahu, two warnings of the impending attack occurred. In the waters just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor, the destroyer WARD at 6:30 a.m. fired on, depth-charged and sank a submarine within the defensive sea area. Bureaucratic delays and the need for confirmation caused an hour to go by before the report was forwarded to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The second warning occurred at 7:02 a.m., nearly half an hour after the WARD fired the first shot of America's Pacific War. Two Army radar operators at the Opana station above Kahuku Point on Oahu's north shore picked up a large formation of planes on their radar screens. After checking and rechecking equipment, they notified the watch officer at Fort Shafter. No action was taken because the officer believed the planes to be a flight of B-17s flying in from California.

Flying through thick cloud cover, Commander Fuchida thought for a moment he had overflown Oahu, but a sudden parting of the clouds revealed the island's north shore. The signal was given to assume attack formation. As Fuchida looked toward Pearl Harbor and the surrounding airfields, he was relieved to see that the attack was a surprise, and the earlier report of Kido Butai's scout plane "Enemy fleet in port!" was accurate. To Fuchida's disappointment, the prime targets of the attack -- the aircraft carriers -- were absent. Changing their plan, the torpedo planes concentrated on the battleships lined up along Battleship Row and the east side of Ford Island.

With assignments memorized by constant training, the first wave of planes attacked at 7:55 a.m. At about the same time, fighters and dive bombers hit the airfields at Kaneohe, Hickam, Ewa, Bellows and Wheeler. Within two hours, most American air power in Hawaii was destroyed.

At Pearl Harbor, as morning colors were readied and sailors and civilians ate breakfast, the Japanese planes struck. In 15 minutes the main battle line of the Pacific fleet was neutralized. The battleships CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA and ARIZONA were sunk, as was the old battleship UTAH then being used as a target and antiaircraft training vessel. The battleships MARYLAND, TENNESSEE and PENNSYLVANIA were damaged. Initially, the American response to the attack was sporadic, but within five minutes American vessels began to fire back in earnest against the attackers. "Air Raid Pearl Harbor, this is no drill!" was relayed to the fleet.

The assault of the first wave ended about 8:45 a.m. There was a momentary lull before the second wave of Japanese planes arrived at 8:50 a.m. No torpedo planes came with the second group of dive and high-altitude bombers.

As the second wave withdrew, Fuchida circled Pearl Harbor and assessed the damage. Satisfied, he took a last look and signaled his pilots to return to the carrier. The main objective of the attack -- demobilizing the Pacific Fleet -- had been accomplished. More than 2,400 Americans were killed and 1,104 wounded. Twenty-one ships of the Pacific Fleet had been sunk or damaged, and 75 percent of the planes on the airfields surrounding Pearl Harbor were damaged or destroyed.

It was nearly 10 o'clock when the first wave of Japanese aircraft began landing on their carriers. By noon, the last planes had been recovered. Twenty-nine Japanese planes were lost, along with 55 airmen. The Special Attack Unit of midget submarines had lost 10 crewmen and all five boats, one boat and one prisoner were captured by Americans the following day on the beaches near Bellows Airfield.

Fuchida was gratified to see planes being readied for a third assault because many targets had been left untouched, particularly the naval shipyard, oil-storage facilities, and a number of American ships. While he wondered when the third wave would be launched, a heated debate was underway on the bridge of the fleet flagship HIJMS AKAGI.

Admiral Nagumo had feared the operation would not be successful, yet he had achieved successful results with minimal casualties. It was his contention that the mission was accomplished. Furthermore, the fleet's fuel was running low. More important, American carriers and other ships not in port were now searching for him. At 1 o'clock the task force altered course and began its journey back to Japan. This decision was a major blunder that greatly minimized the long-term effects of the attack on the American war machine.

Excerpt from the Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona and Pearl Harbor National Historic Landmark

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The Pearl Harbor Attack (U.S. National Park Service)

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President Roosevelt is informed about the attack. He has many meetings later throughout the day to prepare for his response.

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On December 7, 1941, at around 1:30 p.m., President Franklin Roosevelt is conferring with advisor Harry Hopkins in his study when Navy Secretary Frank Knox bursts in and announces that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor. The attack killed more than 2,400 naval and military personnel.

For weeks, a war with Japan had appeared likely since negotiations had deteriorated over the subject of Japan's military forays into China and elsewhere in the Pacific during World War II. FDR and his advisors knew that an attack on the U.S. fleet at the Philippines was possible, but few suspected the naval base at Pearl Harbor would be a target.

In her account of Roosevelt and first lady Eleanor during the years of the Second World War, No Ordinary Time, historian Doris Kearns Goodwin recounts the scene at the White House on that tragic and pivotal day: Eleanor had just finished hosting a luncheon and walked into FDR's study just as he received confirmation of the attack via telephone. While aides and secretaries scurried around the room, Eleanor overheard some of her husband's conversation and knew that, in her words, "the final blow had fallen and we had been attacked."
READ MORE: Pearl Harbor Attack: Photos from the Devastating Attack
Although Eleanor, who knew Roosevelt best, later recalled her husband's demeanor on that day as "deadly calm," she knew that he was incensed by the attacks. He was concerned that it might only be a matter of time until Germany, too, would officially declare war on the United States and that, at that moment, U.S. forces would be hard-pressed to fight a war on two fronts. According to Goodwin, he told Eleanor that it would take time for the United States to build up its military and that he feared the nation would "have to take a good many defeats before we can have a victory." Indeed, FDR and his advisors had discussed the possibility that the Japanese were already planning an invasion of the mainland somewhere on the West Coast.

As the day wore on, Roosevelt displayed a calm and steady efficiency: He consulted with military advisors, enlisted his son James' help to work with the media and spoke by telephone with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who told him "we are all in the same boat now." Early that evening, Roosevelt dictated a speech to his secretary, Grace Tully, which he planned to deliver to Congress the next day. (Eleanor actually addressed the nation on the subject of war before her husband. That evening she delivered a scheduled weekly radio broadcast in which she told listeners that although the United States had been thrust reluctantly into the war she was confident that "whatever is asked of [America] we shall accomplish it; we are the free and unconquerable people of the U.S.A.") Late that night, Roosevelt updated his cabinet and Congressional members on the situation: "this is probably the most serious crisis any Cabinet has confronted since the Civil War." One cabinet member later noted that the president, a former Navy man, was visibly distraught while recounting what he had been told of the strafing of sailors and the destruction of most of the Pacific fleet. After the meeting, Roosevelt went to bed.

The next day, Roosevelt addressed Congress and the nation with a somber yet stirring speech in which he swore that America would never forget December 7, 1941, as a "date that would live in infamy."
READ MORE: Pearl Harbor - Facts, Casualties & Impact

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FDR reacts to news of Pearl Harbor bombing

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On December 7, 1941, at around 1:30 p.m., President Franklin Roosevelt is conferring with advisor Harry Hopkins in his study when Navy Secretary Frank Knox bursts in and announces that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor. The attack killed more than 2,400 naval and military personnel.

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First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt talks to American citizens through radio. She reassured them that everything would be fine.

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" A day that would live in infamy." A quote from the president's speech addressing congress, before he declared war on Japan. The United States enters war.

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USS Arizona sinking
NPS

Nationalistic and militaristic fervor in Imperial Japan and a strong belief in Japan's destiny and divine right to rule all of Southeast Asia brought Japan and the United States into increasing diplomatic confrontation throughout the 1930s. Compounding the matter was a bloody undeclared war the Japanese were waging in China and the weakening of European control in Asian colonies as a result of the Second World War. The signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which allied Japan with Germany and Italy, aggravated tensions between the United States and Japan as the latter nation joined the Axis Powers. When Japan seized a major portion of Southeast Asia under agreement with Vichy France, the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was moved to action. Already outraged by Japanese aggression in China, the Roosevelt administration introduced economic sanctions to make its point clear: The United States would not facilitate Japan's expansion into the Pacific, just as it opposed German expansion in Europe. An American embargo cut off shipments of scrap steel, raw materials, oil and high-octane gasoline, while freezing Japanese financial assets in the United States. The Japanese, having only a six-month supply of strategic fuel available for its armed forces, felt the only choice was to initiate the conquest of Southeast Asia, which meant in evitable war with America, Britain, and the Netherlands. Japan had seen the United States expand its naval authority in the Pacific in the late 1930s. The bolstering of defenses in the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, Midway and Wake Island, as well as stationing the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, made America the first priority for a Japanese attack.

Fearing that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would pose a formidable obstacle to Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto, the commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, visualized a bold attack on the Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor at Pearl Harbor. Such a "surprise strategical" attack, bold and daring in its execution, would secure the Pacific and initiate the war, following in the tradition of the Japanese naval victory over the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904 and the opening maneuvers in Japan's invasion of China. Although nationalistic and militaristic pride was driving Japan inexorably toward war with the United States, some military leaders were concerned about the long-range implications of a protracted war with an industrial giant. Yamamoto expressed doubt, apprehension and disgust over Japan's headlong push toward conflict. In January 1941 he wrote to Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was the president of Japan's rightist nationalistic organization Kokusai Domei and one of Yamamoto's staunch supporters:

... if there should be a war between Japan and America, then our aim, of course, ought not to be Guam or the Philippines, nor Hawaii or Hong Kong, but a capitulation at the White House, in Washington itself. I wonder whether the politicians of the day really have the willingness to make sacrifices, and the confidence, that this would entail? (Agawa 1979:291)

Thus the admiral who was about to initiate the opening attack of the war revealed his personal attitude. Although he was reluctant to push toward war, he possessed a strong sense of duty. With Japanese policy indicating that war was now inevitable, Yamamoto took a hard look at the navy and Japan's chances, noting he expected to "run wild" for six months, with the outcome after that up in the air. In order to hit U.S. forces so hard that America would seek a quick peace, Yamamoto explained to Navy Minster Koshiro Oikawa, "We should do our very best.., to decide the fate of the war on the very first day." He described his operational plan to attack Pearl Harbor.

The plan had been mentioned before. In the spring of 1940 Japan's air fleet had conducted aerial torpedo exercises under the watchful eyes of Yamamoto and Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, head of the first division of the naval general staff. In passing conversation, almost in a whisper, Yamamoto had said, "I wonder if an aerial attack can't be made at Pearl Harbor?" (Prange 1981:14). Even then, the thought was not new. Exercises by both countries had played out such a scenario, but both Japan and the United States believed an aerial torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was impossible. The actual plan of operation, formulated by a young tactical genius in aerial warfare, Commander Minoru Genda, was agreed to after months of internal dissension among the ranks of command in the Japanese navy. When negotiations with the United States were deemed unsatisfactory to the Japanese government of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, official blessing was sought for the "Hawaii Operation." It was given on September 6, 1941, at an Imperial Conference. Japan was committed to war.

The First Air Fleet had held maneuvers for almost a year, and the results were promising. Under the direction of Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, who would lead the air assault on Pearl Harbor, the "impossible" task of an aerial torpedo attack was made possible. Conventional aerial torpedoes plunged to more than 100 feet in depth and ran a long distance to arm. The 45-foot average depth of Pearl Harbor and the short runs necessary to sink ships there were dealt with by adding wooden fins to the torpedoes, altering the arming devices, and by training in simulated conditions.

A task force of 32 vessels -- particularly the carriers AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, KAGA, ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU --was dubbed the "Kido Butai" (Strike Force). Secretly assembling on Tankan Bay in Northern Japan, the force was placed under the direct command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. At 6:00 a.m. on November 26, 1941, the Japanese fleet weighed anchor and slipped out to sea for Hawaii. In planning the operation, the northern approach to Hawaii had been selected even though the weather and seas would be rough. The winter storms would mask the Japanese fleet and lessen the chances of encountering the enemy while on the high seas. A screening force of submarines traveled 200 miles ahead, and as the fleet approached Hawaii, it received up-to-date reports from agents on Oahu as well as the submarines, which finally were picketed around the islands. On December 2 a coded message arrived in Tokyo: "Climb Mt. Nitaka." This pre-arranged message signaled the final decision to wage war. The fleet was to press forward and attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Hawaii time.

At 6:00 a.m. on December 7 the Japanese fleet was 230 miles north of Oahu. Six carriers turned into the wind and launched the first wave -- 183 planes. At the launching, two Zero fighters dropped from the mission: One crashed into the sea on takeoff, another developed engine trouble and was left on board the carrier. At 6:20 Commander Fuchida led the first wave of planes toward Pearl Harbor.

As soon as the first wave departed, the carrier crews readied the second wave. At 7:05 the carriers again swung eastward into the wind and began launching 167 aircraft. As before, the first lift-offs were the Nakajima B5 N2 "Kates," which served as torpedo bombers on the first wave, and as horizontal bombers on the first and second waves. The Kates were followed by the Aichi D3A1 "Vals" (dive bombers) and Mitsubishi A6M2 Reisen Zero fighters. Only one dive bomber from the HIRYU developed engine trouble and failed to make the trip, leaving 350 planes in the air.

Meanwhile on Oahu, two warnings of the impending attack occurred. In the waters just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor, the destroyer WARD at 6:30 a.m. fired on, depth-charged and sank a submarine within the defensive sea area. Bureaucratic delays and the need for confirmation caused an hour to go by before the report was forwarded to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The second warning occurred at 7:02 a.m., nearly half an hour after the WARD fired the first shot of America's Pacific War. Two Army radar operators at the Opana station above Kahuku Point on Oahu's north shore picked up a large formation of planes on their radar screens. After checking and rechecking equipment, they notified the watch officer at Fort Shafter. No action was taken because the officer believed the planes to be a flight of B-17s flying in from California.

Flying through thick cloud cover, Commander Fuchida thought for a moment he had overflown Oahu, but a sudden parting of the clouds revealed the island's north shore. The signal was given to assume attack formation. As Fuchida looked toward Pearl Harbor and the surrounding airfields, he was relieved to see that the attack was a surprise, and the earlier report of Kido Butai's scout plane "Enemy fleet in port!" was accurate. To Fuchida's disappointment, the prime targets of the attack -- the aircraft carriers -- were absent. Changing their plan, the torpedo planes concentrated on the battleships lined up along Battleship Row and the east side of Ford Island.

With assignments memorized by constant training, the first wave of planes attacked at 7:55 a.m. At about the same time, fighters and dive bombers hit the airfields at Kaneohe, Hickam, Ewa, Bellows and Wheeler. Within two hours, most American air power in Hawaii was destroyed.

At Pearl Harbor, as morning colors were readied and sailors and civilians ate breakfast, the Japanese planes struck. In 15 minutes the main battle line of the Pacific fleet was neutralized. The battleships CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA and ARIZONA were sunk, as was the old battleship UTAH then being used as a target and antiaircraft training vessel. The battleships MARYLAND, TENNESSEE and PENNSYLVANIA were damaged. Initially, the American response to the attack was sporadic, but within five minutes American vessels began to fire back in earnest against the attackers. "Air Raid Pearl Harbor, this is no drill!" was relayed to the fleet.

The assault of the first wave ended about 8:45 a.m. There was a momentary lull before the second wave of Japanese planes arrived at 8:50 a.m. No torpedo planes came with the second group of dive and high-altitude bombers.

As the second wave withdrew, Fuchida circled Pearl Harbor and assessed the damage. Satisfied, he took a last look and signaled his pilots to return to the carrier. The main objective of the attack -- demobilizing the Pacific Fleet -- had been accomplished. More than 2,400 Americans were killed and 1,104 wounded. Twenty-one ships of the Pacific Fleet had been sunk or damaged, and 75 percent of the planes on the airfields surrounding Pearl Harbor were damaged or destroyed.

It was nearly 10 o'clock when the first wave of Japanese aircraft began landing on their carriers. By noon, the last planes had been recovered. Twenty-nine Japanese planes were lost, along with 55 airmen. The Special Attack Unit of midget submarines had lost 10 crewmen and all five boats, one boat and one prisoner were captured by Americans the following day on the beaches near Bellows Airfield.

Fuchida was gratified to see planes being readied for a third assault because many targets had been left untouched, particularly the naval shipyard, oil-storage facilities, and a number of American ships. While he wondered when the third wave would be launched, a heated debate was underway on the bridge of the fleet flagship HIJMS AKAGI.

Admiral Nagumo had feared the operation would not be successful, yet he had achieved successful results with minimal casualties. It was his contention that the mission was accomplished. Furthermore, the fleet's fuel was running low. More important, American carriers and other ships not in port were now searching for him. At 1 o'clock the task force altered course and began its journey back to Japan. This decision was a major blunder that greatly minimized the long-term effects of the attack on the American war machine.

Excerpt from the Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona and Pearl Harbor National Historic Landmark

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The Pearl Harbor Attack (U.S. National Park Service)

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3 days after the attack, Germany and Italy declare war on the US. Now, America was formally in the war.

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By Craig Shirley - December 11, 2014

Even with the dastardly attack on Pearl Harbor four days earlier, America had still not formally entered World War II as of the morning December 11, 1941.

In the intervening time, the country's military and civilian population had gone to battle stations, even before President Roosevelt had asked Congress for a formal declaration of war after the Empire of Japan had attacked U.S. military installations at Oahu, Wake Island, Guam and Midway along with British military outposts at Hong Kong and Singapore.

Lost to history is that FDR was not the first member of the Roosevelt family to speak to the American people after the attack. The evening of December 7, first lady Eleanor Roosevelt had gone on radio to talk to her fellow citizens about war and sacrifice and her four sons, all of military age -- including the eldest, James, who was already in the Marine Corps. (All four Roosevelt boys served with distinction in World War II and all saw action. John, who joined the U.S. Navy, was awarded a Bronze Star.)

Hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor and despite plenty of warning, the Philippines, under the command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, were also attacked and dozens of American planes were destroyed on the ground.

After the formality of voting unanimously in the Senate (with only Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin voting no in the House), Congress approved FDR's declaration of war the afternoon of December 8. But it was only a declaration of war against Japan -- and not against her Tripartite Pact allies, Germany and Italy.

Americans simply had no taste for another war in Europe. After what at the time was referred to as "The Great War," a saying went around America that "all we got was death and debt and George M. Cohan," a reference to the famed Broadway song-and-dance man who wrote the World War I ditty "Over There."

By 1941, most Americans regarded Europe as decadent and beyond help, despite the courage of Winston Churchill and the British people; a majority believed that Lend-Lease was as far as FDR should go. FDR was well-aware of the national aversion to fighting another European war. He'd won re-election in 1940 in part because of his repeated assurances to American mothers that their "boys" would not die in another war on that continent.

From the afternoon of December 7until the morning of December 11, no prominent U.S. politician, no widely read newspaper columnist, no administration official, no major business leader called for declaring war on Germany and Italy. Roosevelt was aware of this, as well: In the papers of Secretary of War Henry Stimson was discovered a draft of Roosevelt's avowal before Congress, but with a pencil line drawn through the names of Germany and Italy.

Clearly, FDR's war counsel had discussed on the evening of December 7 declaring war on all three Axis countries and being done with it. The United States certainly had justification to declare war on Germany as Adolf Hitler had issued a personal order to German U-boats to shoot on sight any American ship on the North Atlantic, military or civilian, the same barbaric tactic that had pushed Woodrow Wilson into war.

Hitler hated the United States -- he often ranted about supposed Jewish control of the country -- and was particularly obsessed with Roosevelt, whom he crudely slandered in public and private. The Fuhrer sometimes called FDR "Frau Roosevelt," and made fun of his confinement to a wheelchair. On December 8, however, FDR had only asked for a declaration of war against Japan.

The Anti-Comintern Pact (and, later, the Tripartite Pact) were mutual defense treaties between the three Axis powers. But by 1941 no one expected Hitler to feel bound by a piece of paper. Just ask Neville Chamberlain or Josef Stalin. Hitler had broken agreements with both men, invading Poland and thus pulling Britain into the war, and invading the Soviet Union. (Speaking of papers, on December 9, German diplomats at their Washington, D.C., embassy were observed burning documents. Within a short time, they would be transferred to a remote resort south of Washington, where they had nothing to do but get drunk all day. The Japanese envoys were already deep into their own stash of hooch.)

Drunk with power, Hitler allowed his hatred for America and FDR, his arrogance, and anti-Semitism to spill out in a speech to the Nazi Party at the Reichstag where he called for a general mobilization against the Unites States of America. Hours later, diplomatic representatives of Germany and Italy delivered their countries' war declarations to Cordell Hull, the secretary of state. Hull thought so little of the Italian legation -- which was late in arriving at the State Department -- that he sent an aide out to receive the message.

In response, FDR sent a message to Capitol Hill, asking for a declaration of war against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This time it was approved unanimously, as Rep. Rankin abstained. The congressional galleries were only half-filled. The drama of just four days earlier was, by and large, gone, replaced by a resolute government, military and citizenry.

Nonetheless, it was the events of December 11, 1941, that plunged America into the inferno of a fully involved world war, one it had vowed to stay out of, changing the future of the country and the world. The United States would never again be an isolationist nation.
Craig Shirley is the author of two best-selling books about Ronald Reagan, including "Rendezvous With Destiny" and "Reagan's Revolution." He is also the author of the best-selling "December 1941; 31 Days That Changed America and Saved the World" and is the president of Shirley & Banister. He is now writing several more books about Reagan, including "Last Act." He has lectured at the Reagan Library, is the Visiting Reagan Scholar at Eureka College, and is a member of the Board of Governors of the Reagan Ranch.

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December 11, 1941: A Date Which Should Live in Infamy | RealClearPolitics

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By Craig Shirley - December 11, 2014 Even with the dastardly attack on Pearl Harbor four days earlier, America had still not formally entered World War II as of the morning December 11, 1941.