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War is an intense armed conflict between states, governments, societies, or paramilitary groups such as mercenaries, insurgents, and militias. It is generally characterized by extreme violence, aggression, destruction, and mortality, using regular or irregular military forces. Warfare refers to the common activities and characteristics of types of war, or of wars in general. Total war is warfare that is not restricted to purely legitimate military targets, and can result in massive civilian or other non-combatant suffering and casualties.

While some war studies scholars consider war a universal and ancestral aspect of human nature, others argue it is a result of specific socio-cultural, economic or ecological circumstances.

The English word war derives from the 11th-century Old English words wyrre and werre, from Old French werre (also guerre as in modern French), in turn from the Frankish * werra, ultimately deriving from the Proto-Germanic * werzō 'mixture, confusion'. The word is related to the Old Saxon werran, Old High German werran, and the German verwirren, meaning "to confuse", "to perplex", and "to bring into confusion".

The earliest evidence of prehistoric warfare is a Mesolithic cemetery in Jebel Sahaba, which has been determined to be approximately 14,000 years old. About forty-five percent of the skeletons there displayed signs of violent death. Since the rise of the state some 5,000 years ago, military activity has occurred over much of the globe. The advent of gunpowder and the acceleration of technological advances led to modern warfare. According to Conway W. Henderson, "One source claims that 14,500 wars have taken place between 3500 BC and the late 20th century, costing 3.5 billion lives, leaving only 300 years of peace (Beer 1981: 20)." An unfavorable review of this estimate mentions the following regarding one of the proponents of this estimate: "In addition, perhaps feeling that the war casualties figure was improbably high, he changed 'approximately 3,640,000,000 human beings have been killed by war or the diseases produced by war' to 'approximately 1,240,000,000 human beings...&c.'" The lower figure is more plausible, but could still be on the high side considering that the 100 deadliest acts of mass violence between 480 BC and 2002 AD (wars and other man-made disasters with at least 300,000 and up to 66 million victims) claimed about 455 million human lives in total. Primitive warfare is estimated to have accounted for 15.1% of deaths and claimed 400 million victims. Added to the aforementioned figure of 1,240 million between 3500 BC and the late 20th century, this would mean a total of 1,640,000,000 people killed by war (including deaths from famine and disease caused by war) throughout the history and pre-history of mankind. For comparison, an estimated 1,680,000,000 people died from infectious diseases in the 20th century.

In War Before Civilization, Lawrence H. Keeley, a professor at the University of Illinois, says approximately 90-95% of known societies throughout history engaged in at least occasional warfare, and many fought constantly.

Keeley describes several styles of primitive combat such as small raids, large raids, and massacres. All of these forms of warfare were used by primitive societies, a finding supported by other researchers. Keeley explains that early war raids were not well organized, as the participants did not have any formal training. Scarcity of resources meant defensive works were not a cost-effective way to protect the society against enemy raids.

In Western Europe, since the late 18th century, more than 150 conflicts and about 600 battles have taken place. During the 20th century, war resulted in a dramatic intensification of the pace of social changes, and was a crucial catalyst for the emergence of the political Left as a force to be reckoned with.

A distinctive feature of war since 1945 is the absence of wars between major powers-indeed the near absence of any traditional wars between established countries. The major exceptions were the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, and the Gulf War of 1990-91. Instead, combat has largely been a matter of civil wars and insurgencies.

Types of warfare

Asymmetric warfare is a conflict between belligerents of drastically different levels of military capability or size.

Biological warfare, or germ warfare, is the use of weaponized biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi.

Chemical warfare involves the use of weaponized chemicals in combat. Poison gas as a chemical weapon was principally used during World War I, and resulted in over a million estimated casualties, including more than 100,000 civilians.

Cold warfare is an intense international rivalry without direct military conflict, but with a sustained threat of it, including high levels of military preparations, expenditures, and development, and may involve active conflicts by indirect means, such as economic warfare, political warfare, covert operations, espionage, cyberwarfare, or proxy wars.

Conventional warfare is declared war between states in which nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are not used or see limited deployment.

Cyberwarfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's information systems.

Insurgency is a rebellion against authority, when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents (lawful combatants). An insurgency can be fought via counterinsurgency, and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population, and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime.

Information warfare is the application of destructive force on a large scale against information assets and systems, against the computers and networks that support the four critical infrastructures (the power grid, communications, financial, and transportation).

Nuclear warfare is warfare in which nuclear weapons are the primary, or a major, method of achieving capitulation.

Total war is warfare by any means possible, disregarding the laws of war, placing no limits on legitimate military targets, using weapons and tactics resulting in significant civilian casualties, or demanding a war effort requiring significant sacrifices by the friendly civilian population.

Unconventional warfare, the opposite of conventional warfare, is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict.

Entities contemplating going to war and entities considering whether to end a war may formulate war aims as an evaluation/propaganda tool. War aims may stand as a proxy for national-military resolve.

Definition

Fried defines war aims as "the desired territorial, economic, military or other benefits expected following successful conclusion of a war".

Classification

Tangible/intangible aims:

Tangible war aims may involve (for example) the acquisition of territory (as in the German goal of Lebensraum in the first half of the 20th century) or the recognition of economic concessions (as in the Anglo-Dutch Wars).

Intangible war aims - like the accumulation of credibility or reputation - may have more tangible expression ("conquest restores prestige, annexation increases power").

Explicit/implicit aims:

Explicit war aims may involve published policy decisions.

Implicit war aims can take the form of minutes of discussion, memoranda and instructions.

Positive/negative aims:

"Positive war aims" cover tangible outcomes.

"Negative war aims" forestall or prevent undesired outcomes.

War aims can change in the course of conflict and may eventually morph into "peace conditions" - the minimal conditions under which a state may cease to wage a particular war.

Military and civilian casualties in recent human history

Throughout the course of human history, the average number of people dying from war has fluctuated relatively little, being about 1 to 10 people dying per 100,000. However, major wars over shorter periods have resulted in much higher casualty rates, with 100-200 casualties per 100,000 over a few years. While conventional wisdom holds that casualties have increased in recent times due to technological improvements in warfare, this is not generally true. For instance, the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) had about the same number of casualties per capita as World War I, although it was higher during World War II (WWII). That said, overall the number of casualties from war has not significantly increased in recent times. Quite to the contrary, on a global scale the time since WWII has been unusually peaceful.

Largest by death toll

The deadliest war in history, in terms of the cumulative number of deaths since its start, is World War II, from 1939 to 1945, with 60-85 million deaths, followed by the Mongol conquests at up to 60 million. As concerns a belligerent's losses in proportion to its prewar population, the most destructive war in modern history may have been the Paraguayan War (see Paraguayan War casualties). In 2013 war resulted in 31,000 deaths, down from 72,000 deaths in 1990. In 2003, Richard Smalley identified war as the sixth biggest problem (of ten) facing humanity for the next fifty years. War usually results in significant deterioration of infrastructure and the ecosystem, a decrease in social spending, famine, large-scale emigration from the war zone, and often the mistreatment of prisoners of war or civilians. For instance, of the nine million people who were on the territory of the Byelorussian SSR in 1941, some 1.6 million were killed by the Germans in actions away from battlefields, including about 700,000 prisoners of war, 500,000 Jews, and 320,000 people counted as partisans (the vast majority of whom were unarmed civilians). Another byproduct of some wars is the prevalence of propaganda by some or all parties in the conflict, and increased revenues by weapons manufacturers.

On military personnel

Military personnel subject to combat in war often suffer mental and physical injuries, including depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, disease, injury, and death.

In every war in which American soldiers have fought in, the chances of becoming a psychiatric casualty - of being debilitated for some period of time as a consequence of the stresses of military life - were greater than the chances of being killed by enemy fire.

Swank and Marchand's World War II study found that after sixty days of continuous combat, 98% of all surviving military personnel will become psychiatric casualties. Psychiatric casualties manifest themselves in fatigue cases, confusional states, conversion hysteria, anxiety, obsessional and compulsive states, and character disorders.

One-tenth of mobilised American men were hospitalised for mental disturbances between 1942 and 1945, and after thirty-five days of uninterrupted combat, 98% of them manifested psychiatric disturbances in varying degrees.

- 14-18: Understanding the Great War, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker

Based on 1860 census figures, 8% of all white American males aged 13 to 43 died in the American Civil War, including about 6% in the North and approximately 18% in the South. The war remains the deadliest conflict in American history, resulting in the deaths of 620,000 military personnel. United States military casualties of war since 1775 have totaled over two million. Of the 60 million European military personnel who were mobilized in World War I, 8 million were killed, 7 million were permanently disabled, and 15 million were seriously injured.

During Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, more French military personnel died of typhus than were killed by the Russians. Of the 450,000 soldiers who crossed the Neman on 25 June 1812, less than 40,000 returned. More military personnel were killed from 1500 to 1914 by typhus than from military action. In addition, if it were not for modern medical advances there would be thousands more dead from disease and infection. For instance, during the Seven Years' War, the Royal Navy reported it conscripted 184,899 sailors, of whom 133,708 (72%) died of disease or were 'missing'.

It is estimated that between 1985 and 1994, 378,000 people per year died due to war.

On civilians

Most wars have resulted in significant loss of life, along with destruction of infrastructure and resources (which may lead to famine, disease, and death in the civilian population). During the Thirty Years' War in Europe, the population of the Holy Roman Empire was reduced by 15 to 40 percent. Civilians in war zones may also be subject to war atrocities such as genocide, while survivors may suffer the psychological aftereffects of witnessing the destruction of war. War also results in lower quality of life and worse health outcomes. A medium-sized conflict with about 2,500 battle deaths reduces civilian life expectancy by one year and increases infant mortality by 10% and malnutrition by 3.3%. Additionally, about 1.8% of the population loses access to drinking water.

Most estimates of World War II casualties indicate around 60 million people died, 40 million of whom were civilians. Deaths in the Soviet Union were around 27 million. Since a high proportion of those killed were young men who had not yet fathered any children, population growth in the postwar Soviet Union was much lower than it otherwise would have been.

Typically, war becomes intertwined with the economy and many wars are partially or entirely based on economic reasons. Some economists[who? ] believe war can stimulate a country's economy (high government spending for World War II is often credited with bringing the U.S. out of the Great Depression by most Keynesian economists), but in many cases, such as the wars of Louis XIV, the Franco-Prussian War, and World War I, warfare primarily results in damage to the economy of the countries involved. For example, Russia's involvement in World War I took such a toll on the Russian economy that it almost collapsed and greatly contributed to the start of the Russian Revolution of 1917.

World War II

World War II was the most financially costly conflict in history; its belligerents cumulatively spent about a trillion U.S. dollars on the war effort (as adjusted to 1940 prices). The Great Depression of the 1930s ended as nations increased their production of war materials.

By the end of the war, 70% of European industrial infrastructure was destroyed. Property damage in the Soviet Union inflicted by the Axis invasion was estimated at a value of 679 billion rubles. The combined damage consisted of complete or partial destruction of 1,710 cities and towns, 70,000 villages/hamlets, 2,508 church buildings, 31,850 industrial establishments, 40,000 mi (64,374 km) of railroad, 4100 railroad stations, 40,000 hospitals, 84,000 schools, and 43,000 public libraries.

Theories of motivation

There are many theories about the motivations for war, but no consensus about which are most common. Carl von Clausewitz said, 'Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.'

Psychoanalytic

Other psychoanalysts such as E.F.M. Durban and John Bowlby have argued human beings are inherently violent. This aggressiveness is fueled by displacement and projection where a person transfers his or her grievances into bias and hatred against other races, religions, nations or ideologies. By this theory, the nation state preserves order in the local society while creating an outlet for aggression through warfare.

Despite Fornari's theory that man's altruistic desire for self-sacrifice for a noble cause is a contributing factor towards war, few wars have originated from a desire for war among the general populace. Far more often the general population has been reluctantly drawn into war by its rulers. One psychological theory that looks at the leaders is advanced by Maurice Walsh. He argues the general populace is more neutral towards war and wars occur when leaders with a psychologically abnormal disregard for human life are placed into power. War is caused by leaders who seek war such as Napoleon and Hitler. Such leaders most often come to power in times of crisis when the populace opts for a decisive leader, who then leads the nation to war.

Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship. ... the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.

Evolutionary

The latter school argues that since warlike behavior patterns are found in many primate species such as chimpanzees, as well as in many ant species, group conflict may be a general feature of animal social behavior. Some proponents of the idea argue that war, while innate, has been intensified greatly by developments of technology and social organization such as weaponry and states.

Psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker argued that war-related behaviors may have been naturally selected in the ancestral environment due to the benefits of victory.[failed verification ] He also argued that in order to have credible deterrence against other groups (as well as on an individual level), it was important to have a reputation for retaliation, causing humans to develop instincts for revenge as well as for protecting a group's (or an individual's) reputation (" honor").[citation needed ]

Crofoot and Wrangham have argued that warfare, if defined as group interactions in which "coalitions attempt to aggressively dominate or kill members of other groups", is a characteristic of most human societies. Those in which it has been lacking "tend to be societies that were politically dominated by their neighbors".

Ashley Montagu strongly denied universalistic instinctual arguments, arguing that social factors and childhood socialization are important in determining the nature and presence of warfare. Thus, he argues, warfare is not a universal human occurrence and appears to have been a historical invention, associated with certain types of human societies. Montagu's argument is supported by ethnographic research conducted in societies where the concept of aggression seems to be entirely absent, e.g. the Chewong and Semai of the Malay peninsula. Bobbi S. Low has observed correlation between warfare and education, noting societies where warfare is commonplace encourage their children to be more aggressive.

War can be seen as a growth of economic competition in a competitive international system. In this view wars begin as a pursuit of markets for natural resources and for wealth. War has also been linked to economic development by economic historians and development economists studying state-building and fiscal capacity. While this theory has been applied to many conflicts, such counter arguments become less valid as the increasing mobility of capital and information level the distributions of wealth worldwide, or when considering that it is relative, not absolute, wealth differences that may fuel wars. There are those on the extreme right of the political spectrum who provide support, fascists in particular, by asserting a natural right of a strong nation to whatever the weak cannot hold by force. Some centrist, capitalist, world leaders, including Presidents of the United States and U.S. Generals, expressed support for an economic view of war.

The Marxist theory of war is quasi-economic in that it states all modern wars are caused by competition for resources and markets between great ( imperialist) powers, claiming these wars are a natural result of capitalism. Marxist economists Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding and Vladimir Lenin theorized that imperialism was the result of capitalist countries needing new markets. Expansion of the means of production is only possible if there is a corresponding growth in consumer demand. Since the workers in a capitalist economy would be unable to fill the demand, producers must expand into non-capitalist markets to find consumers for their goods, hence driving imperialism.

Demographic

Demographic theories can be grouped into two classes, Malthusian and youth bulge theories:

Malthusian

Malthusian theories see expanding population and scarce resources as a source of violent conflict.

Pope Urban II in 1095, on the eve of the First Crusade, advocating Crusade as a solution to European overpopulation, said:

For this land which you now inhabit, shut in on all sides by the sea and the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; it scarcely furnishes food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage wars, and that many among you perish in civil strife. Let hatred, therefore, depart from among you; let your quarrels end. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from a wicked race, and subject it to yourselves.

The violent herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Sudan and other countries in the Sahel region have been exacerbated by land degradation and population growth.

Youth bulge

According to Heinsohn, who proposed youth bulge theory in its most generalized form, a youth bulge occurs when 30 to 40 percent of the males of a nation belong to the "fighting age" cohorts from 15 to 29 years of age. It will follow periods with total fertility rates as high as 4-8 children per woman with a 15-29-year delay.

Heinsohn saw both past "Christianist" European colonialism and imperialism, as well as today's Islamist civil unrest and terrorism as results of high birth rates producing youth bulges. Among prominent historical events that have been attributed to youth bulges are the role played by the historically large youth cohorts in the rebellion and revolution waves of early modern Europe, including the French Revolution of 1789, and the effect of economic depression upon the largest German youth cohorts ever in explaining the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s. The 1994 Rwandan genocide has also been analyzed as following a massive youth bulge.

Youth bulge theory has been subjected to statistical analysis by the World Bank, Population Action International, and the Berlin Institute for Population and Development. Youth bulge theories have been criticized as leading to racial, gender and age discrimination.

Geoffrey Parker argues that what distinguishes the "Western way of war" based in Western Europe chiefly allows historians to explain its extraordinary success in conquering most of the world after 1500:

The Western way of war rests upon five principal foundations: technology, discipline, a highly aggressive military tradition, a remarkable capacity to innovate and to respond rapidly to the innovation of others and-from about 1500 onward-a unique system of war finance. The combination of all five provided a formula for military success....The outcome of wars has been determined less by technology, then by better war plans, the achievement of surprise, greater economic strength, and above all superior discipline.

Parker argues that Western armies were stronger because they emphasized discipline, that is, "the ability of a formation to stand fast in the face of the enemy, where they're attacking or being attacked, without giving way to the natural impulse of fear and panic." Discipline came from drills and marching in formation, target practice, and creating small "artificial kinship groups: such as the company and the platoon, to enhance psychological cohesion and combat efficiency.

Rationalist

Rationalism is an international relations theory or framework. Rationalism (and Neorealism (international relations)) operate under the assumption that states or international actors are rational, seek the best possible outcomes for themselves, and desire to avoid the costs of war. Under one game theory approach, rationalist theories posit all actors can bargain, would be better off if war did not occur, and likewise seek to understand why war nonetheless reoccurs. Under another rationalist game theory without bargaining, the peace war game, optimal strategies can still be found that depend upon number of iterations played. In "Rationalist Explanations for War", James Fearon examined three rationalist explanations for why some countries engage in war:

"Issue indivisibility" occurs when the two parties cannot avoid war by bargaining, because the thing over which they are fighting cannot be shared between them, but only owned entirely by one side or the other.

" Information asymmetry with incentives to misrepresent" occurs when two countries have secrets about their individual capabilities, and do not agree on either: who would win a war between them, or the magnitude of state's victory or loss. For instance, Geoffrey Blainey argues that war is a result of miscalculation of strength. He cites historical examples of war and demonstrates, "war is usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis which cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power." Thirdly, bargaining may fail due to the states' inability to make credible commitments.

Within the rationalist tradition, some theorists have suggested that individuals engaged in war suffer a normal level of cognitive bias, but are still "as rational as you and me". According to philosopher Iain King, "Most instigators of conflict overrate their chances of success, while most participants underrate their chances of injury...." King asserts that "Most catastrophic military decisions are rooted in GroupThink" which is faulty, but still rational.

The rationalist theory focused around bargaining is currently under debate. The Iraq War proved to be an anomaly that undercuts the validity of applying rationalist theory to some wars.

Political science

The statistical analysis of war was pioneered by Lewis Fry Richardson following World War I. More recent databases of wars and armed conflict have been assembled by the Correlates of War Project, Peter Brecke and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.[citation needed ]

The following subsections consider causes of war from system, societal, and individual levels of analysis. This kind of division was first proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War and has been often used by political scientists since then.

System-level

There are several different international relations theory schools. Supporters of realism in international relations argue that the motivation of states is the quest for security, and conflicts can arise from the inability to distinguish defense from offense, which is called the security dilemma.

Within the realist school as represented by scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Hans Morgenthau, and the neorealist school represented by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, two main sub-theories are:

1. Balance of power theory: States have the goal of preventing a single state from becoming a hegemon, and war is the result of the would-be hegemon's persistent attempts at power acquisition. In this view, an international system with more equal distribution of power is more stable, and "movements toward unipolarity are destabilizing." However, evidence has shown power polarity is not actually a major factor in the occurrence of wars.

2. Power transition theory: Hegemons impose stabilizing conditions on the world order, but they eventually decline, and war occurs when a declining hegemon is challenged by another rising power or aims to preemptively suppress them. On this view, unlike for balance-of-power theory, wars become more probable when power is more equally distributed. This "power preponderance" hypothesis has empirical support.

The two theories are not mutually exclusive and may be used to explain disparate events according to the circumstance.

Liberalism as it relates to international relations emphasizes factors such as trade, and its role in disincentivizing conflict which will damage economic relations. Realists[who? ] respond that military force may sometimes be at least as effective as trade at achieving economic benefits, especially historically if not as much today. Furthermore, trade relations which result in a high level of dependency may escalate tensions and lead to conflict. Empirical data on the relationship of trade to peace are mixed, and moreover, some evidence suggests countries at war don't necessarily trade less with each other.

Societal-level

Diversionary theory, also known as the "scapegoat hypothesis", suggests the politically powerful may use war to as a diversion or to rally domestic popular support. This is supported by literature showing out-group hostility enhances in-group bonding, and a significant domestic "rally effect" has been demonstrated when conflicts begin. However, studies examining the increased use of force as a function of need for internal political support are more mixed. U.S. war-time presidential popularity surveys taken during the presidencies of several recent U.S. leaders have supported diversionary theory.

Individual-level

These theories suggest differences in people's personalities, decision-making, emotions, belief systems, and biases are important in determining whether conflicts get out of hand. For instance, it has been proposed that conflict is modulated by bounded rationality and various cognitive biases, such as prospect theory.

The two principal aspects of ethics in war, according to the just war theory, are jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

Jus ad bellum (right to war), dictates which unfriendly acts and circumstances justify a proper authority in declaring war on another nation. There are six main criteria for the declaration of a just war: first, any just war must be declared by a lawful authority; second, it must be a just and righteous cause, with sufficient gravity to merit large-scale violence; third, the just belligerent must have rightful intentions - namely, that they seek to advance good and curtail evil; fourth, a just belligerent must have a reasonable chance of success; fifth, the war must be a last resort; and sixth, the ends being sought must be proportional to means being used.

Jus in bello (right in war), is the set of ethical rules when conducting war. The two main principles are proportionality and discrimination. Proportionality regards how much force is necessary and morally appropriate to the ends being sought and the injustice suffered. The principle of discrimination determines who are the legitimate targets in a war, and specifically makes a separation between combatants, who it is permissible to kill, and non-combatants, who it is not. Failure to follow these rules can result in the loss of legitimacy for the just-war-belligerent.

Fascism, and the ideals it encompasses, such as Pragmatism, racism, and social Darwinism, hold that violence is good. Pragmatism holds that war and violence can be good if it serves the ends of the people, without regard for universal morality. Racism holds that violence is good so that a master race can be established, or to purge an inferior race from the earth, or both. Social Darwinism asserts that violence is sometimes necessary to weed the unfit from society so civilization can flourish. These are broad archetypes for the general position that the ends justify the means. Lewis Coser, U.S. conflict theorist and sociologist, argued conflict provides a function and a process whereby a succession of new equilibriums are created. Thus, the struggle of opposing forces, rather than being disruptive, may be a means of balancing and maintaining a social structure or society.

Limiting and stopping

Religious groups have long formally opposed or sought to limit war as in the Second Vatican Council document Gaudiem et Spes: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation."

Anti-war movements have existed for every major war in the 20th century, including, most prominently, World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War. In the 21st century, worldwide anti-war movements occurred in response to the United States invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Protests opposing the War in Afghanistan occurred in Europe, Asia, and the United States.

During a war, brief pauses of violence may be called for, and further agreed to- ceasefire, temporary cessation, humanitarian pauses and corridors, days of tranquility, de-confliction arrangements. There a number of disadvantages, obstacles and hesitations against implementing such pauses such as a humanitarian corridor. Pauses in conflict are also ill-advised; reasons such as "delay of defeat" and the "weakening of credibility". Natural causes for a pause may include events such as the 2019 coronavirus pandemic.

References

1. ^ "How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?" (PDF). International Committee of the Red Cross. March 2008.

2. ^ James, Paul; Friedman, Jonathan (2006). Globalization and Violence, Vol. 3: Globalizing War and Intervention. London: Sage Publications.

3. ^ Martin, Debra L.; Harrod, Ryan P.; Pérez, Ventura R., eds. (2012). The Bioarchaeology of Violence. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

4. ^ World War One - A New Kind of War | Part II Archived 27 February 2018 at the Wayback Machine, From 14 - 18 Understanding the Great War, by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker

5. ^ D. Hank Ellison (24 August 2007). Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Second Edition. CRC Press. pp. 567-70. ISBN 978-0-8493-1434-6.

6. ^ Sullivan, Patricia (16 July 2012). "War Aims and War Outcomes". Who Wins?: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press, USA (published 2012). p. 17. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199878338.003.0003. ISBN 9780199878338. A state with greater military capacity than its adversary is more likely to prevail in wars with 'total' war aims-the overthrow of a foreign government or annexation of territory-than in wars with more limited objectives.

7. ^ Fried, Marvin Benjamin (1 July 2014). Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans During World War I. Palgrave Macmillan (published 2014). p. 4. ISBN 9781137359018. War aims are the desired territorial, economic, military or other benefits expected following successful conclusion of a war.

8. ^ Fried, Marvin Benjamin (1 July 2014). Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans During World War I. Palgrave Macmillan (published 2014). p. 4. ISBN 9781137359018. Intangibles, such as prestige or power, can also represent war aims, though often (albeit not always) their achievement is framed within a more tangible context (e.g. conquest restores prestige, annexation increases power, etc.).

9. Compare:^ Katwala, Sunder (13 February 2005). "Churchill by Paul Addison". Books. The Guardian. Guardian News and Media Limited. [Churchill] took office and declared he had 'not become the King's First Minister to oversee the liquidation of the British empire'. [...] His view was that an Anglo-American English-speaking alliance would seek to preserve the empire, though ending it was among Roosevelt's implicit war aims.

10. Compare ^ Fried, Marvin Benjamin (1 July 2014). Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans During World War I. Palgrave Macmillan (published 2014). p. 4. ISBN 9781137359018. At times, war aims were explicitly stated internally or externally in a policy decision, while at other times [...] the war aims were merely discussed but not published, remaining instead in the form of memoranda or instructions.

11. ^ Fried, Marvin Benjamin (1 July 2015). "'A Life and Death Question': Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the First World War". In Afflerbach, Holger (ed.). The Purpose of the First World War: War Aims and Military Strategies. Schriften des Historischen Kollegs. Vol. 91. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH (published 2015). p. 118. ISBN 9783110443486. [T]he [Austrian] Foreign Ministry [...] and the Military High Command [...] were in agreement that political and military hegemony over Serbia and the Western Balkans was a vital war aim. The Hungarian Prime Minister István Count Tisza, by contrast, was more preoccupied with so-called 'negative war aims', notably warding off hostile Romanian, Italian, and even Bulgarian intervention.

12. ^ Haase, Hugo (1932). "The Debate in the Reichstag on Internal Political Conditions, April 5-6, 1916". In Lutz, Ralph Haswell (ed.). Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918. Hoover War Library publications. Stanford University Press. p. 233. ISBN 9780804723800. Gentlemen, when it comes time to formulate peace conditions, it is time to think of another thing than war aims.

13. ^ "Mortality and Burden of Disease Estimates for WHO Member States in 2004". World Health Organization.

14. *The Cambridge History of China: Alien regimes and border states, 907-1368, 1994, p. 622, cited by White ^
*Matthew White (2011-11-07). The Great Big Book of Horrible Things: The Definitive Chronicle of History's 100 Worst Atrocities.

15. ^ GBD 2013 Mortality and Causes of Death, Collaborators (17 December 2014). "Global, regional, and national age-sex specific all-cause and cause-specific mortality for 240 causes of death, 1990-2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013". Lancet. 385 (9963): 117-71. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(14)61682-2. PMC . PMID 25530442.

16. ^ "Top Ten Problems of Humanity for Next 50 Years", Professor R. E. Smalley, Energy & NanoTechnology Conference, Rice University, 3 May 2003.

17. McFarlane, Alan: The Savage Wars of Peace: England, Japan and the Malthusian Trap, Blackwell 2003, ISBN 0-631-18117-2,ISBN 978-0-631-18117-0 - cited by White

18. Wallinsky, David: ^ David Wallechinsky's Twentieth Century: History With the Boring Parts Left Out, Little Brown & Co., 1996, ISBN 0-316-92056-8, ISBN 978-0-316-92056-8 - cited by White

19. Lt. Col. Dave Grossman (1996). On Killing - The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War & Society. Little, Brown & Co.

20. Kitchen, Martin (2000), ^ The Treaty of Versailles and its Consequences Archived 12 May 2008 at the Wayback Machine, New York: Longman

21. ^ Obermeyer Z, Murray CJ, Gakidou E (June 2008). "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programme". BMJ. 336 (7659): 1482-86. doi:10.1136/bmj.a137. PMC . PMID 18566045.

22. ^ Davenport, Christian; Mokleiv Nygård, Håvard; Fjelde, Hanne; Armstrong, David (2019). "The Consequences of Contention: Understanding the Aftereffects of Political Conflict and Violence". Annual Review of Political Science. 22: 361-377. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-064057.

23. ^ Gatrell, Peter (2014). Russia's First World War : A Social and Economic History. Hoboken, New Jersey: Routledge. p. 270. ISBN 9781317881391.

24. Coleman, P. (1999) ^ "Cost of the War," World War II Resource Guide (Gardena, California: The American War Library)

25. ^ Marc Pilisuk; Jennifer Achord Rountree (2008). Who Benefits from Global Violence and War: Uncovering a Destructive System. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 136-. ISBN 978-0-275-99435-8.

26. ^ Levy, Jack S. (1989). Tetlock, Philip E.; Husbands, Jo L.; Jervis, Robert; Stern, Paul C.; Tilly, Charles (eds.). "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence" (PDF). Behavior, Society and Nuclear War. I: 295. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 September 2013.

27. ^ Peter Meyer. Social Evolution in Franz M. Wuketits and Christoph Antweiler (eds.) Handbook of Evolution The Evolution of Human Societies and Cultures Wiley-VCH Verlag

28. ^ Anderson, Kenneth (1996). "Warrior Ants: The Enduring Threat of the Small War and the Land-mine". SSRN 935783. Scholarly comparisons between human and ant wars

29. ^ "An Evolutionary Perspective on War" Archived 16 October 2015 at the Wayback Machine, Bobbi S. Low, published in Behavior, Culture, and Conflict in World Politics, The University of Michigan Press, p. 22

30. ^ Johnson, Noel D.; Koyama, Mark (2015). "States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints" (PDF). George Mason University WORKING PAPER.

31. ^ Roger Griffin and Matthew Feldman, eds., Fascism: Fascism and Culture, New York: Routledge, 2004.

32. ^ "In Mali, waning fortunes of Fulani herders play into Islamist hands". Reuters. 20 November 2016.

33. ^ Urdal, Henrik (2004): "The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict," [3],

34. Population Action International: "The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War"^ [4] Archived 10 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine

35. Kröhnert, Steffen (2004): "Warum entstehen Kriege? Welchen Einfluss haben demografische Veränderungen auf die Entstehung von Konflikten?" ^ [5] Archived 4 September 2018 at the Wayback Machine

36. Fearon, James D. (Summer 1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War". International Organization. 49 (3): 379-414. doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324. JSTOR 2706903.

37. ^ Powell, Robert (2002). "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict". Annual Review of Political Science. 5: 1-30. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.092601.141138.

38. ^ Lake, David A. (November 2010). "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War". International Security. 35 (3): 7-52. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00029. S2CID 1096131.

39. ^ Levy, Jack S. (June 1998). "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace". Annual Review of Political Science. 1: 139-65. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.139.

40. ^ Levy, Jack S. (March 1997). "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations" (PDF). International Studies Quarterly. 41 (1): 87-112. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00034. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 September 2015.

41. ^ DeForrest, Mark Edward. "GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF JUST WAR THEORY".

42. ^ Ian Dear, Michael Richard Daniell Foot (2001). The Oxford Companion to World War II. Oxford University Press. p. 88. ISBN 0-19-860446-7

43. ^ Griffin and Feldman, eds, Roger and Matthew (2004). Fascism: Fascism and Culture. Routledge. p. 185.

44. ^ Woodley, Daniel (2010). Fascism and political theory critical perspectives on fascist ideology (PDF). London: Routledge. p. 276. ISBN 978-0-203-87157-7. Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 January 2012.

45. ^ Glossary of Terms: Pauses During Conflict (PDF), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, June 2011

46. ^ Reindorp, Nicola; Wiles, Peter (June 2001). "Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience" (PDF). Overseas Development Institute, London - via UNHCR.

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External links

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
War is an intense armed conflict between states, governments, societies, or paramilitary groups such as mercenaries, insurgents, and militias. It is generally characterized by extreme violence, aggression, destruction, and mortality, using regular or irregular military forces. Warfare refers to the common activities and characteristics of types of war, or of wars in general.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Global Warming refers to average increase in the earth's temperature due to increase in pollution which results in greenhouse effect which in turn leads to climate change. Global warming may lead to rise in the sea level due to melting of glaciers, shrinkage of forests, changes in the rainfall pattern and wide range of impacts on plants and humans.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a group of over 2,500 scientists from countries across the world have determined that a number of human activities are contributing towards the growth of global warming by releasing excessive amount of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.

These greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide accumulate into the atmosphere and trap heat that would normally would exit into the outer space. Over the last few decades cars, industries and power plants have released tons of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and this has caused the temperature of the earth to rise from .6 degree Celsius between 1901 and 2000. If nothing is done to stop global warming now then it could prove to be a big disaster for the human kind.

Greenhouse Gases

Greenhouse Gases called carbon dioxide, methane, water vapour and other gases have heat trapping capacity and are needed to create greenhouse effect that keeps the earth warm which is required to support plants, animals and humans. Some of these greenhouse gases occur naturally while other are released in tons of capacity every year all over the world by us.

These gases are released when we drive cars, burn wood or coal, large power plants. Deforestation(cutting down of forests) is also a reason for the greenhouse gases because fewer trees means less carbon di oxide converted to oxygen. Now, when accumulation of these greenhouse gases grows, more heat gets trapped into the atmosphere and as a result few heat escapes backs into the space and it heat ups the earth surface.

Future Of Global Warming

As we are going to more fossil fuels the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the earth atmosphere is going to rise and rise. And these greenhouse gases will raise the earth's surface temperature with them. According to IPCC, the temperature of the earth will rise from 2 degree Celsius to 6 degree Celsius by the end of 21st century. With the rise in such temperature the glaciers and ice shelves around the world will start melting. Scientists project rising sea levels will increase between 7 and 22 inches by 2100. When the sea level will rise combined with the rise in the temperature of the sea, tropical storms such as tsunami could increase.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Global Warming refers to average increase in the earth's temperature due to increase in pollution which results in greenhouse effect which in turn leads to climate change. Global warming may lead to rise in the sea level due to melting of glaciers, shrinkage of forests, changes in the rainfall pattern and wide range of impacts on plants and humans.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The current rainfall across much of mainland Portugal, which is due to stop from Sunday, will not be sufficient to end the current drought, Portugal's Environment Minister has warned. This was followed by the chairman of the Portuguese Met Office, saying that a "November miracle" was required to end the drought.

While substantial rain has fallen, especially across fire-ravaged central and northern Portugal, these showers will not compensate the chronic lack of water.
The President of the Portuguese Met Office (IMPA) Miguel Miranda, said this week that the "November miracle we need is for a steady drizzle to fall during a very long time".
But with more than 80 percent of the country in a state of severe drought, the weather chief said that current models forecast below average rainfall in the mid-term.
The Bishop of Lisbon, perhaps following on the calls for a miracle, this week issued a statement calling for prayer, with Dom Clemente calling on priests to pray for "the necessary rainfall" during Mass.
While the country waits for a "miracle" to break the drought, the government has in the meantime called on Portuguese to be much more sparing in their use of water and has told local authorities to limit the water they use to clean and irrigate towns and cities.
Portugal's Environment Minister, João Matos Fernandes, in announcing the measures said "no-one must be mistaken" about the seriousness of the drought that is affecting the country. He said two or three days' rain will not change the situation, adding that a campaign is to be launched to encourage the careful use of water by everyone.
The Government praised independent initiatives being taken by Town Halls, singling out the case in Nelas, where the council decreed the closure of municipal swimming pools until water levels had returned to satisfactory levels.
The Environment Minister forecast that he expected other Town Halls to follow suit, especially with the expected deterioration of the drought.
João Matos Fernandes added the sole priority of the Government is to ensure sufficient water for human consumption.
The latest monthly weather bulletin issued by the IPMA however paints a bleak picture of the current state of the climate in Portugal.
IPMA chief Miguel Miranda says he is unable to find examples where Portugal has seen the state of a drought deteriorate during the month of October.
He said that the rainfall recorded last month was 50 percent below existing averages, and in many cases, only 20 percent of average rainfall for October was registered.
The Met Office also revealed that yet another weather record was broken in October, being the hottest since 1931, when weather details were first logged.
The average temperature was said to be 3 degrees Celsius above normal, while average maximum temperatures soared to 5 degrees above the median.
The IPMA also said there were two heat waves between 1 and 16 and between 23 and 30 October in most of the country except the coastal areas.
This comes after September was found to be the driest month ever in
Portugal.
The six-month period from April to September was also said to be the second driest since records began, while the average maximum temperatures for this period were also the highest meteorologists had ever seen in Portugal. Average temperatures across the mainland were meanwhile the second highest they had ever been.
Back in May, a British study predicted that Portugal could be subject to "megadroughts" lasting for many years. According to climate models drawn up by researchers at Newcastle University in the study, entitled 'Assessing the threat of future megadrought in Iberia', the area could see a 15-year period of rainfall at less than half the average level.
Researchers selected a total of 15 different climate models used by leading scientific bodies around the world, including Nasa, the UK Met Office and the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology.
Writing in the International Journal of Climatology, they said: "All models project an intensification of drought conditions for the Douro, Tagus and Guadiana."
However they strongly disagree on the magnitude of these changes.
"Some project small increases in drought conditions but most project multi-year droughts reaching up to (...) eight years of mean annual rainfall missing [over a 15-year period] (...) by the end of the century."
According to a 424-page study published earlier this year by the European Environment Agency (EEA), titled 'Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016', cash-strapped Portugal has suffered monetary losses of 6.8 billion euros as a result of climate change between 1980 and 2013.
Southern and south-eastern Europe is forecast to be a climate change hotspot, as it is expected to face the highest number of adverse impacts, the EEA report reveals.
"This region is already experiencing large increases in heat extremes and decreases in precipitation and river flows, which have heightened the risk of more severe droughts, lower crop yields, biodiversity loss and forest fires", researchers found, warning further that more frequent heatwaves and changes in the distribution of climate-sensitive infectious diseases are expected to increase risks to human health and well-being.
Average temperatures in Portugal have in the last 40 years increased at a rate of 0.5 degrees per decade - twice as fast as globally.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The current rainfall across much of mainland Portugal, which is due to stop from Sunday, will not be sufficient to end the current drought, Portugal's Environment Minister has warned. This was followed by the chairman of the Portuguese Met Office, saying that a "November miracle" was required to end the drought.