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Jayden McCullough- Period 5

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The battle of leyte gulf is considered to have been the largest naval battle of world war 2 and, by some people , possibly the largest naval battle in history with over 200,000 naval personnel involved. It was fought in waters near the Philipinne islands of Leyte Samar, and Luzon, from 23 to 26 October 1944, between combined American and Australian forces and the Imperial Japanese Navy, as part of the invasion of Leyte, which aimed to isolate Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia which were a vital source of industrial and oil supplies.

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By the time of the battle, Japan had fewer capital ships left than the Allied forces had total aircraft carriers, underscoring the disparity in force strength at this point in the war. Regardless, the IJN mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied invasion, but it was repulsed by the U.S. Navy's 3rd and 7th fleets. The battle consisted of four main separate engagements: the battle of shibuya sea, the battle of Surigao, the battle of the cape Engano and the battle of Samar, as well as lesser actions.

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The Allied campaigns of August 1942 to early 1944 had driven Japanese forces from many of their island bases in the south and the central Pacific Ocean, while isolating many of their other bases (most notably in the Solomon Islands, Bismarck Archipelago, Admiralty Islands, New Guinea, Marshal Islands, and Wake Islands), and in June 1944, a series of American amphibious landings supported by fifth fleet's fast carrier force captured most of the mariana islands. This offensive breached Japan's strategic inner defense ring and gave the Americans a base from which long-range boeing b-29 superforces bombers could attack the Japanese home islands.

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The Japanese counterattacked in the battle of the philippine sea. The U.S. Navy destroyed three Japanese aircraft carriers, damaged other ships, and shot down approximately 600 Japanese aircraft, leaving the Japanese Navy with very little carrier-borne air power and few experienced pilots. However, the considerable land-based air power the Japanese had amassed in the Philippines was thought too dangerous to bypass by many high-ranking officers outside the Joint chiefs of staff, including Admiral Chester Nimitz.

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Formosa vs. Philippines as invasion target

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Formosa vs. Philippines as invasion target

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The next logical step was to cut Japan's supply lines to Southeast Asia, depriving them of fuel and other necessities of war, but there were two different plans for doing so. Admiral Ernest J. King, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Nimitz favored blockading Japanese forces in the Philippines and invading Formosa (taiwan), while u.s. army General douglas mcarthur, wanting to make good on his famous 1942 promise "I shall return", championed an invasion of the Philippines.

While Formosa could also serve as a base for an invasion of mainland china, which MacArthur felt was unnecessary, it was also estimated that it would require about 12 divisions from the Army and Marines. Meanwhile, the Australian Army, spread thin by engagements in the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies and various other Pacific islands, would not have been able to spare any troops for such an operation. As a result, an invasion of Formosa, or any operation requiring much larger ground forces than were available in the Pacific in late 1944, would be delayed until the defeat of Germany freed the necessary manpower.

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A meeting between MacArthur, Nimitz, and President Roosevelt helped confirm the Philippines as a strategic target but did not reach a decision, and the debate continued for two months. Eventually Nimitz changed his mind and agreed to MacArthur's plan, and it was eventually decided that MacArthur's forces would invade the island of Leyte in the central Philippines. Amphibious forces and close naval support would be provided by Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid.

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BIGGEST NAVAL BATTLE OF WWII (Part 2): The Battle of Leyte Gulf | Battle 360 | History

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The American options were apparent to the IJN. Combined Fleet Chief Soemu Toyoda prepared four "victory" plans: Shō-Gō 1 was a major naval operation in the Philippines, while Shō-Gō 2, Shō-Gō 3 and Shō-Gō 4 were responses to attacks on Formosa, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Kurile Islands, respectively. The plans were for complex offensive operations committing nearly all available forces to a decisive battle, despite substantially depleting Japan's slender reserves of fuel oil.

On 12 October 1944, Halsey began a series of carrier raids against Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands with a view to ensuring that the aircraft based there could not intervene in the Leyte landings. The Japanese command, therefore, put Shō-Gō 2 into action, launching waves of air attacks against Third Fleet's carriers. In what Admiral Halsey refers to as a "knock-down, drag-out fight between carrier-based and land-based air", the Japanese were routed, losing 600 aircraft in three days – almost their entire air strength in the region. Following the American invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese Navy made the transition to Shō-Gō

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U.S. Seventh Fleet at this time contained units of the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. Before the major naval actions in Leyte Gulf had begun, HMAS Australia and USS Honolulu were severely damaged by air attacks; during the battle proper these two cruisers were retiring, escorted by HMAS Warramunga, for repairs at the major Allied base at Manus Island, 1,700 miles away.

Lack of unified command structures
U.S. Third Fleet, commanded by Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., with Task Force 38, as its main component, would provide more distant cover and support for the invasion. A fundamental defect in this plan was there would be no single American naval admiral in overall command. Kinkaid fell under MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander Southwest Pacific, whereas Halsey's Third Fleet reported to Nimitz as. This lack of unity of command, along with failures in communication, was to produce a crisis and very nearly a strategic disaster for the American forces. By coincidence, the Japanese plan, using three separate fleets, also lacked an overall commander.

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The Japanese Navy’s “Victory Operation” not only failed to disrupt the Leyte landings, it resulted in serious losses to what remained of Japan’s surface fleet. Japan’s total losses in the Battle of Leyte Gulf amounted to 3 battleships, 1 large carrier, 3 light carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. The United States lost 1 light carrier, 2 escort carriers, and several other vessels. The Imperial Japanese Navy had all but ceased to exist as an offensive force.