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Indicia
ABRITRAL POWER
- Adjudication about what rights/obligations should exist in future suggest arbitral  (Precision Data)
-  Policy considerations in making decision suggest arbitral  (Precision Data)
- Arbitral power is not binding - needs to be taken to a court to be enforced (Precision Data)
- Considerations for policy factors (Alinta)
- Orders open to challenge (Alinta)

JUDICIAL POWER
- Application of well-recognised legal criteria/standards (e.g., on the balance of probabilities) (Thomas)

- The power has been given to a judicial body (Brandy)
- The enforceability of decisions (Brandy)
NB: A body’s decisions are enforceable if they are automatically enforced by another body

- Finding a violation of the law (Alinta)

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 Implications from Representative and Responsible Government:  Voting Rights and Safe Access Zones

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 Implications from Representative and Responsible Government:  Voting Rights and Safe Access Zones

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A tax IS – Positive Attributes

·      A compulsory exaction

·      By a public authority (But not essential)

·      For public purposes - Includes ‘public interest’ (Aus Tape)

·      Revenue raising = core concept (But can have other functions)

A tax is NOT – Negative Attributes

·      A fine or penalty

·      A licence fee

·      A fee for services (NB: Proportionality requirement – fee must reflect the cost of service (Air Caledonie))

But: Exceptions, noting the special factual situation re. monopoly etc. – (Airservices)

·      A mechanism to enforce private rights (Luton v Lessels)

·      A royalty (Australian Tape Manufacturers)

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Representation And Rights: Freedom Of Political Communication

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Representation And Rights: Freedom Of Political Communication

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Case Law; Freedom of Interstate Trade and Commerce

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Case Law; Freedom of Interstate Trade and Commerce

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Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, Casebook 657 – 666.

Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, Casebook 672 – 678.

Betfair Pty Limited v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418, Casebook 682 – 687.

Palmer v Western Australia [2021] HCA 5

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Freedom of Interstate Trade and Commerce

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Freedom of Interstate Trade and Commerce

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Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314 (for noting only), Casebook 696 – 697.

“The Meaning of ‘Excise’: Before Dennis Hotels”, Casebook 697 – 700.

Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v Victoria (1960) 104 CLR 529, Casebook 700 – 705.

Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v Victoria (1983) 151 CLR 599, Casebook 709 – 713.

Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465, Casebook 715 – 729.

“Reform”, Casebook 734 – 736.

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1.     Intergovernmental Immunities (Second Uniform Tax Case)

2.     Religious Establishment: s 116 (DOGS Case) - note that s 116 has been interpreted narrowly

3.     Discrimination: s 51(ii), s 99 (Moran)

4.     Acquisition of Property: s 51(xxxi) (ICM Agriculture)

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Vic v Cth: Second Uniform Tax Case (1957)

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Vic v Cth: Second Uniform Tax Case (1957)

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- Give a very broad reading to s 96: the only restriction is that the grant cannot be directly coercive

- Court endorsed Vic v Cth on acceptable features of a grant:

1.  Binds state to apply money specifically to a Cth-defined object

2.  The object is outside the power of the Cth

3.  Payments are left to the discretion of the Cth Minister and

4.  Money is provided as the Cth’s contribution for an object for which the State will also contribute

5.  Grant conditions can include that the State make payments to be made to third parties

Grants can be made for purposes other than supplementing the state treasury

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South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373 (‘First Uniform Tax Case’), Casebook 622 – 628.

Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575 (‘Second Uniform Tax Case’), Casebook 630 – 634.

Attorney General (Vic) (Ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 (‘DOGS Case’), Casebook 636 – 637.

Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v WR Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735, Casebook 639 – 642.

WR Moran Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1940] AC 838 (Privy Council), Casebook 642 – 644.

ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, Casebook 647 – 651.

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- Does not matter if Cth creates the need for the grant under s 96

- A grant law cannot coerce states to abandon or deprive states of their power, but it can provide an inducement for states to abstain from exercising their power

- This is so even if the conditions are such that states in effect have no choice but to accept the inducement (‘temptation is not coercion’), or the Cth creates the need for a grant

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Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth (1988) 165 CLR 462, Casebook 560 – 562.

Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines (2000) 202 CLR 133, Casebook 563 – 568.

Australian Tape Manufacturers Assn Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480 (joint reasons only), Casebook 568 – 573.

Luton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333, Casebook 577 – 581.

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Commonwealth Constitution, ss 51(ii), 53, 55

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Commonwealth Constitution, ss 51(ii), 53-56, 94, 96, Ch IV

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Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, Casebook 130 – 138, 141 – 142 (and Notes & Questions 138 – 141, 142 – 143)

South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, Casebook 163 – 172

Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 (paragraph 2.660 only), Casebook 173 – 174.

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Limb 2: Federal courts (as opposed to state) can only exercise federal judicial power (or powers incidental to it)

Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, Casebook 1140 – 1142, 1143 – 1148.

Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 (paragraph 13.280 only), Casebook 1117 – 1124.

Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, Casebook 1127 – 1128.

Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1, Casebook 1128 – 1138.

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There must be either a statute or constitutional authorisation.

Statute is not required for Executive to spend for:

-  Administration of a department of state (ss 61, 64)

-  Carrying out of ordinary and well recognised functions of government

-  Exercise of power conferred or derived from an Act of Parliament

-  Execution and maintenance of the laws of the Commonwealth

-  Activities that fall within the Commonwealth executive’s prerogative powers; and

-  Activities that fall within the scope of the Commonwealth executive’s nationhood power

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Limb 1: Federal judicial power can only be vested in Chapter III courts

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, Casebook 1085 – 1087.

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, Casebook 1089 – 1095.

“Notes & Questions” (for noting), Casebook 1095 – 1103.

Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259, Casebook 1149 – 1152.

Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, Casebook 1160 – 1169

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R v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 (Boilermakers’ Case), Casebook 1107 – 1113.

Attorney-General (Cth) v The Queen [1957] AC 288 (Boilermakers’ Case (Privy Council)), Casebook 1114.

Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, Casebook 1062 – 1065.

Attorney-General (Cth) v Alinta Ltd (2008) 233 CLR 542; [2008] HCA 2, Casebook (paragraph 13.70 only), Casebook 1065 – 1066.

Brandy v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245, Casebook 1055 – 1059.

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- The Executive has the power to contract and appropriate and spend moneys.
- Specific constitutional provisions require the passage of an appropriation law (ss 81, 83) which impose limitations on the Executive's spending power.

Pape v Federal Commissioner (2009)
To what extent does the Executive require constitutional authorisation to spend monies?
- The relevant power to expend public monies, being limited by s 81 to expenditure for “the purposes of the Commonwealth”, must be found elsewhere in the Constitution or statutes made under it’

- In order for the Executive to spend, there must be an appropriation, and the subject matter of the spending must fall within Cth power

HELD: Payments upheld as valid on 2 grounds:

- There was an appropriation

- The payments were upheld by the nationhood power (implied incidental power based on s 61 and s 51(xxxix))

- Could also rely on the ‘grants power’ in s 96 to give the money to the states.

- Can grant money to the States on such terms and conditions as it sees fit

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Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 (‘Williams No 1’) & Williams v Commonwealth (2014) 252 CLR 416 (‘Williams No 2’).

Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, Casebook 259 – 271 (including paragraph 3.350)

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Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192 (judgment of Mason J only)

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- This is the first implication from the Constitution which limits Commonwealth legislative power which we study.

- The Court argues that the federal structure of the Australian Constitution has important implications that limit Parliament’s ability to legislate under the heads of power in Section 51.

- Development of a ‘two-limbed’ principle which prohibited Commonwealth laws that
- (1) involve discrimination against a particular State or the States as a group; or
- (2) ‘destroy or curtail the continued existence of the States or their capacity to function as governments’.

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The Source, Nature and Scope of Commonwealth Executive Power (class 11).

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The scope of the head of powers must ascertained “not only by the text but also to its subject matter and the entire context of the Constitution, including any implications to be derived from its general structure.” Re: Australian Education Union at 225 (plurality)