# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
China country assessment report on ageing and health

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A health transition from communicable to noncommunicable disease is well under way in China. Chronic noncommunicable disease prevalence will increase by at least 40% by 2030. Almost 80% of all deaths in people aged 60 years or over are attributable to chronic noncommunicable disease.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Learn more about how Statista can support your business.

National Bureau of Statistics of China. (January 18, 2021). Monthly surveyed urban unemployment rate in China from December 2018 to December 2020 [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved March 04, 2021, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109881/surveyed-monthly-unemployment-rate-in-china/

National Bureau of Statistics of China. "Monthly surveyed urban unemployment rate in China from December 2018 to December 2020." Chart. January 18, 2021. Statista. Accessed March 04, 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109881/surveyed-monthly-unemployment-rate-in-china/

National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2021). Monthly surveyed urban unemployment rate in China from December 2018 to December 2020. Statista. Statista Inc.. Accessed: March 04, 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109881/surveyed-monthly-unemployment-rate-in-china/

National Bureau of Statistics of China. "Monthly Surveyed Urban Unemployment Rate in China from December 2018 to December 2020." Statista, Statista Inc., 18 Jan 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109881/surveyed-monthly-unemployment-rate-in-china/

National Bureau of Statistics of China, Monthly surveyed urban unemployment rate in China from December 2018 to December 2020 Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109881/surveyed-monthly-unemployment-rate-in-china/ (last visited March 04, 2021)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
China: monthly surveyed unemployment rate 2020 | Statista

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Learn more about how Statista can support your business. National Bureau of Statistics of China. (January 18, 2021). Monthly surveyed urban unemployment rate in China from December 2018 to December 2020 [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved March 04, 2021, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109881/surveyed-monthly-unemployment-rate-in-china/ National Bureau of Statistics of China.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Two solutions to the challenges of population aging

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Aging populations pose a challenge to the fiscal and macroeconomic stability of many societies due to increased government spending on pension, healthcare, and social benefits programs for the elderly. In a new blog, Milena Nikolova poses two possible solutions to relive some of these fiscal pressures.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
China's one-child policy has probably gotten as much time in the spotlight as the size of its population, the world's largest at more than 1.39 billion people. Implemented in 1979, the goal of China's one-child policy was to make sure that population growth did not outpace economic development and to ease environmental and natural resource challenges and imbalances caused by a rapidly expanding population.

Initially, the one-child policy was meant to be a temporary measure and is estimated to have prevented up to 400 million births since it was instituted. The government-mandated policy was formally ended with little fanfare on Oct. 29, 2015, after its rules had been slowly relaxed to allow more couples fitting certain criteria to have a second child. Now, all couples are allowed to have two children.

In this article, we discuss the history behind the controversial China's one-child policy, how the government implemented the restrictions, and the deep impact they had on China's population.

Key Takeaways

History of China's One-Child Policy

Increased Population Growth

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping introduced the one-child policy in 1979 to curb China's rapidly growing population, which was estimated at 970 million at the time.﻿﻿ The policy was a result of the years that followed the founding of The People's Republic of China in 1949. After years of unrest, medical care and sanitation improved and China's population finally began to grow. At the time, this was seen as an economic boon for a country that was transforming into an industrial nation from an agricultural one.

By the 1950s, population growth started to outpace the food supply, and the government started promoting birth control. Following Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward in 1958﻿, a plan to rapidly modernize China's economy, a catastrophic famine ensued, which resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of Chinese.﻿﻿

In the wake of the famine, the government continued to promote family planning, such as postponing having children and using birth control. This was derailed temporarily by the upheaval caused by the Cultural Revolution in 1966, though by the late 1960s, the government began stepping up family planning campaigns. By the mid-1970s it introduced the family planning slogan "Late, Long, and Few," meaning encouraging later marriages, longer intervals between births, and fewer children-around two children for urban families and three for rural ones.﻿﻿

"Later, Longer, Fewer"

Implementing China's One-Child Policy

China's one-child policy was highly controversial and criticized for the state's forced abortions and sterilizations of women. In many cases, the Chinese government forced women to get IUDs and other forms of birth control in order to crack down on overpopulation.

A Chinese family with a child born during the one-child policy was required to apply for a family planning service certificate. Due to the Chinese Communist Party's wide reach and government-owned societal structure, they enforced the one-child policy through a kind of "neighborhood watch" reporting structure in communities and workplaces. Neighbors were encouraged to spy on each other, reporting any suspicions for a monetary reward and thus participate in a larger form of government-sanctioned blackmail.﻿﻿

Incentives or rewards for families who adhered to the one-child policy included better employment opportunities, higher wages, and government assistance. Those who didn't were subject to, at minimum, fines and restricted or revoked access to government assistance and employment opportunities.

That being said, the implementation of the one-child policy also largely varied based on location, especially between urban and rural areas. Since a majority of urban workers in China worked for a government-affiliated place of employment, authorities imposed peer pressure from coworkers to report superfluous pregnancies. Meanwhile, in rural areas, the village's family planning official or cluster leader would keep track of all the families in the area. According to a journal article by Harvard researchers, "these birth planning enforcers kept detailed records on each woman of child-bearing age under their responsibility, including past births, contraceptive usage, and even menstrual cycles."﻿﻿

Easing of China's One-Child Policy

When introduced, China's one-child policy mandated that Han Chinese, the ethnic majority, could only have one child. In the early 1980s, China relaxed the policy to allow couples to have a second child if each parent were both only children. Exceptions also included couples living in rural China and ethnic minorities with a small population.

In late 2013, as part of a package of social, economic, and legal reforms, the Chinese government amended the one-child policy to allow couples to have a second child if either parent instead of both is an only child. However, the impact of that change was modest as only an estimated 800,000 couples applied to have a second child that following year, according to statistics from China's government-run National Health and Family Planning Commission.﻿﻿ It was estimated that 11 million couples were eligible and that half would have eventually applied for a second child. However, it was suspected that one issue preventing Chinese couples from having a second child is that many of them lived in cities, where the cost of living was high enough to dissuade them-an issue also faced by couples in the West.

Ultimately, China ended its one-child policy in 2015 for demographical reasons: it realized that too many Chinese were heading into retirement, and the nation's population had too few young people entering the labor force to provide for the older population's retirement, healthcare, and continued economic growth.

Impacts of China's One-Child Policy

Gender Imbalance

One of the unintended side effects of the one-child policy is that China is the most gender-imbalanced country in the world for its sex ratio at birth, due to a cultural preference for male offspring.﻿﻿ Especially during the one-child policy era, many families opted to abort female fetuses in preference for males. Abortion is legal in China, although sex-selective abortion is not. In 2019, the gender ratio in China was 114 males for every 100 females born.﻿﻿

Aging Population

China's one-child policy had been successful in lowering its birth rate, which according to the World Bank, dropped from 6.4 to 2.7 between 1965 and 1979.﻿﻿ Since then, the fertility rate has continued to decline through the 1990s to an average of 1.7 in 2018, which means on average women give birth to 1.7 children. This also means China is now faced with an older population, who rely on their children to support them when they are elderly and no longer working.

In 2020, approximately 17.4% of China's population is estimated to be over the age of 60; this number is projected to rise to 34.6% in 2050.﻿﻿ Many families have also cited concerns over the "4-2-1" family structure, consisting of four older adults (grandparents on both sides), two parents, and only one child which puts strains on old-age support.

Shrinking Workforce

Population control had also resulted in a shrinking workforce. The number of workers entering China's overall labor force has been declining for the last three years, a trend that is expected to accelerate. China's labor force fell to 897.29 million workers in 2018, falling by 0.5% in the seventh straight year of decline, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).﻿﻿ China's increasing elderly population and the decreasing labor force was the impetus for the relaxation and end of the one-child policy.

China's One-Child Policy FAQs

Does China Still Have the One-Child Policy?

No. China reverted to a two-child policy after its one-child policy ended in 2015. While restrictions had been gradually loosened over time.

What Caused China's One-Child Policy?

China's one-child policy was implemented to curb overpopulation that strained the country's food supply and natural and economic resources following its industrialization in the 1950s.

What Are the Effects of China's One-Child Policy?

Gender imbalance, an aging population, and a shrinking workforce are all effects of China's 1979 policy. To this day, China has the most skewed sex ratio at birth in the world, due to a cultural preference for male offspring.

Who Ended the One-Child Policy?

The Chinese government, led by the Chinese Communist Party's Xi Jinping, ended the controversial one-child policy in 2015.

What Happened If You Broke the One-Child Policy?

Violators of China's one-child policy were fined, forced to have abortions or sterilizations, and lost their jobs.

The Bottom Line

To date, China's controversial one-child policy is still the most ambitious government-initiated birth control project in history. In some ways, the policy was successful: intended to curb overpopulation, it is estimated to have prevented up to 400 million births and reduced the country's birth ratio to just 1.7. Yet, the one-child policy also leaves behind multiple after-effects: now, China must face concerns of an aging population, shrinking labor force, and address the wounds of many families, especially women, by its gender discriminatory policies and treatment of women's bodies.

Now, with China's universal two-child policy in effect, the impacts are still speculative. While some believe that the policy's impact on population growth will be relatively small, peaking at 1.45 billion in 2029,﻿﻿ others are hopeful that the two-child policy will lead to better health outcomes and a reduction in abortions. It seems only time will tell.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Understanding China's Former One-Child Policy

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
China's one-child policy has probably gotten as much time in the spotlight as the size of its population, the world's largest at more than 1.39 billion people. Implemented in 1979, the goal of China's one-child policy was to make sure that population growth did not outpace economic development and to ease environmental and natural resource challenges and imbalances caused by a rapidly expanding population.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
国务院关于颁发《国务院关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法》和《国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法》的通知
国发［1978］104号

《国务院关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法》和《国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法》已经党中央和全国人民代表大会常务委员会原则批准，现在发给你们，请你们先行试点，总结经验，然后再普遍实行。

各地的试点工作，要在省、市、自治区党委的统一领导下进行。各地试点的情况、经验和主要意见，请于十月分报送国务院，并抄送中央组织部、国家劳动总局、民政部、财政部、卫生部、全国总工会。

一九七八年六月二日

国务院关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法（一九七八年五月二十四日第五届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二次会议原则批准）

当前，我们党和国家有一部分干部，由于年龄和身体关系不能继续坚持正常工作。这些干部在我国新民主主义革命和社会主义革命中，为党和人民做了许多工作，对革命事业做出了宝贵贡献。妥善安置这些干部，使他们各得其所，是党对他们的关怀和爱护，是我党干部政策的一个重要方面，也是我国社会主义制度优越性的具体体现。人总是要老的，这是自然规律。由于年龄和身体的关系而离休、退休、担任顾问或荣誉职务，是正常的，也是光荣的。对离休、退休的干部，要在政治上、生活上关心他们，及时解决他们的各种实际困难。同时，也要教育老弱病残干部，一切从国家和人民的需要出发，服从党组织的安排。认真做好老弱病残干部的安置工作，对于精兵简政、提高工作效率，对于建设老中青三结合的精干的领导班子，对于社会主义革命和社会主义建设，都具有重要意义。

为了妥善安置老弱病残干部，特制定如下办法：

第一条　国务院各部门及其所属司局级机构，各省、市、自治区革命委员会及其所属部门，省辖市、行政公署一级领导机关及其所属部门，县（旗）革命委员会，相当于县级和县级以上的企业、事业单位，都可以根据情况设顾问，在同级党组织和革命委员会领导下，根据他们的特长做些力所能及的工作。各级顾问安排同级或高一级的干部担任。安排对象是：担任实职有困难，有斗争经验，尚能做一些工作，一九四九年九月底以前参加革命工作的地委正副书记、行政公署正副专员及相当职务以上的干部；一九四二年底以前参加革命工作的县委正副书记、革命委员会正副主任及相 当职务的干部。

第二条　各级政协、视察室、参事室、文物管理委员会、文史馆等单位，可以安排一些老同志担任荣誉职务，安排的对象是：一九四九年九月底以前参加革命工作的地委正副书记、行政公署正副专员及相当职务以上的干部、一九四二年底以前参加革命工作的县委正副书记、革命委员会正副主任及相当职务的干部。

第三条　对于丧失工作能力，一九四九年九月底以前参加革命工作的地委正副书记、行政公署正副专员及相当职务以上的干部；一九四二年底以前参加革命工作的县委正副书记、革命委员会正副主任及相当职务的干部；一九三七年七月七日以前参加革命工作的于部，可以离职休养，工资照发。

第四条　党政机关、群众团体、企业、事业单位的干部，符合下列条件之一的。都可以退休。

（一）男年满六十周岁，女年满五十五周岁，参加革命工作年限满十年的；

（二）男年满五十周岁，女年满四十五周岁，参加革命工作年限满十年，经过医院证明完全丧失工作能力的；

（三）因工致残，经过医院证明完全丧失工作能力的。第五条干部退休以后，每月按下列标准发给退休费，直至去世为止。

符合第四条（一）项或（二）项条件，抗日战争时期参加革命工作的，按本人标准工资的百分之九十发给。解放战争时期参加革命工作的，按本人标准工资的百分之八十发给。中华人民共和国成立以后参加革命工作，工作年限满二十年的，按本人标准工资的百分之七十五发给；工作年限满十五年不满二十年的，按本人标准工资的百分之七十发给；工作年限满十年不满十五年的，按本人标准工资的百分之六十发给。退休费低于二十五元的，按二十五元发给。

符合第四条第（三）项条件，饮食起居需要人扶助的，按本人标准工资的百分之九十发给，还可以根据实际情况发给一定数额的护理费，护理费标准，一般不得超过一个普通工人的工资；饮食起居不需要人扶助的，按本人标准工资的百分之八十发给。同时具备两项以上的退休条件，应当按最高的标准发给。退休费低于三十五元的，按三十五元发给。

离休和退休的干部去世后，其丧事处理、丧葬补助费和供养直系亲属抚恤费，应当与在职去世的干部一样。

第六条　获得全国劳动英雄、劳动模范称号，在退休时仍然保持其荣誉的干部；省、市、自治区革命委员会认为在新民主主义革命和社会主义革命、社会主义建设的各条战线上有特殊贡献的干部；部队军以上单位授予战斗英雄称号和认为对作战、军队建设有特殊贡献的转业、复员军人，在退休时仍然保持其荣誉的，其退休费可以酌情高于本办法所定标准的百分之五至百分之十五，但提高标准后的退休费，不得超过本人原标准工资。

第七条　经过医院证明完全丧失工作能力，又不具备退休条件的干部，应当退职。退职后，按月发给相当于本人标准工资百分之四十的生活费，低于二十元的，按二十元发给。

第八条　离休、退休和退职的干部的安置，要面向农村和中小城镇。在大城市工作的，应当尽量安置到中小城镇和农村，也可以根据具体情况，到本人或爱人的原籍安置；在中小城镇和农村工作的，可以就地或回原籍中小城镇和农村安置。异地安置有实际困难的，也可以就地安置。跨省安置的，各有关省、市、自治区应当积极做好安置工作。对于其他省、市、自治区要求向北京、天津、上海安置的，要从严控制。

第九条　离休、退休干部异地安家的，一般由原工作单位一次发给一百五十元的安家补助费，由大中城市到农村安家的，发给三百元。退职干部异地安家的，可以发给本人两个月的标准工资，作为安家补助费。

第十条　离休于部的住房，就地安置的，由原单位负责解决；回原籍或到其他地区安置的，由接受安置的地区负责解决。确需修缮、扩建或新建住房的，由接受安置的省、市、自治区列入基建计划统一解决。

退休干部的住房，就地安置的，由原单位负责解决；回中小城镇安置的，其住房由接受安置的地区尽量从公房中调剂解决；确实不能调剂解决，需要修缮、扩建和新建住房的，也由接受安置的地区列入基建计划统一解决；回农村安置，住房确有困难的，可以由原单位给予适当补助。

离休或退休的干部确需修建住房的，其住房面积和标准，应当本着勤俭节约的原则，根据家庭人口和当地群众住房水平确定，不要脱离群众；自己有房屋可以居住的，不得另建新房。

第十一条　干部离休、退休、退职的时候，本人及其供养的直系亲属前往居住地点途中所需用的车船费、旅馆费、行李搬运费和伙食补助费，都按照现行的规定办理。

第十二条　离休、退休、退职干部本人，可以享受与所居住地区同级干部相同的公费医疗待遇。

第十三条　规定发给的退休费、退职生活费、企业单位、由企业行政支付。党政机关、群众团体和事业单位，就地安置的，由原工作单位负责；异地安置的，分别由负责管理的组织、人事和县级民政部门另列预算支付。

第十四条　干部离休、退休、退职，由所在单位按照干部管理权限报任免机关批准。

第十五条　各地区、各部门要加强对老弱病残干部安置工作的领导。党委的组织部门和革命委员会的人事、民政部门，要在党委和革命委员会的领导下，认真做好离休、退休干部的思想政治工作和管理工作。就地安置的，由原工作单位管理；异地安置的，分别由接受地区的组织、人事和民政部门管理。要注意安排他们学习马列和毛主席著作，按照规定阅读文件、听报告。要关心他们的身体健康和物质、文化生活。要及时研究解决离休、退休干部的实际困难，总结交流工作经验，表彰离休、退休干部中的好人好事。

第十六条　本办法适用于党政机关、群众团体和全民所有制企业、事业单位的干部，以及因工作需要由组织委派到集体所有制企业、事业单位工作的国家干部。

集体所有制企业、事业单位老弱病残干部的安置，各省、市、自治区革命委员会可以参照本办法作出具体规定，其各项待遇，不得高于本办法所定的标准。

第十七条　本办法自下达之月起实行，过去有关规定与本办法不一致的，以本办法为准。已按有关规定办理了退休的干部，符合本办法所定离职休养条件的，可以改为离职休养；退休费标准低于本办法所定标准的，可以改按本办法规定的标准发给，但解放战争时期参加革命工作，工作年限不满二十年的，只按本人标准工资的百分之七十五发给。退休改为离休以及改变退休费标准后的差额部分，一律不予补发。已经担任荣誉职务的干部，不再重新安排。已经退职的干部，不再重新处理。

国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法（一九七八年五月二十四日第五届全国人民代条大会常务委员会第二次会议原则批准）

老年工人和因工、因病丧失劳动能力的工人，对社会主义革命和建设做出了应有的贡献。妥善安置他们的生活，使他们愉快地度过晚年，这是社会主义制度优越性的具体体现，同时也有利于工人队伍的精干，对实现我国的四个现代化，必将起促进作用。为了做好这项工作，特制定本办法。

第一条　全民所有制企业、事业单位和党政机关、群众团体的工人，符合下列条件之一的，应该退休。

（一）男年满六十周岁，女年满五十周岁，连续工龄满十年的。

（二）从事井下、高空、高温、特别繁重体力劳动或者其他有害身体健康的工作，男年满五十五周岁，女年满四十五周岁，连续工龄满十年的。

本项规定也适用于工作条件与工人相同的基层干部。

（三）男年满五十周岁，女年满四十五周岁，连续工龄满十年，由医院证明，并经劳动鉴定委员会确认，完全丧失劳动能力的。

（四）因工致残，由医院证明，并经劳动鉴定委员会确认，完全丧失劳动能力的。

第二条　工人退休以后，每月按下列标准发给退休费，直至去世为止。

（一）符合第一条第（一）、（二）、（三）项条件，抗日战争时期参加革命工作的，按本人标准工资的百分之九十发给。解放战争时期参加革命工作的，按本人标准工资的百分之八十发给。中华人民共和国成立后参加革命工作，连续工龄满二十年的，按本人标准工资的百分之七十五发给；连续工龄满十五年不满二十年的，按本人标准工资的百分之七十发给；连续工龄满十年不满十五年的，按本人标准工资的百分之六十发给。退休费低于二十五元的，按二十五元发给。
（二）符合第一条第（四）项条件，饮食起居需要人扶助的，按本人标准工资的百分之九十发给，还可以根据实际情况发给一定数额的护理费，护理费标准，一般不得超过一个普通工人的工资；饮食起居不需要人扶助的，按本人标准工资的百分之八十发给。同时具备两项以上的退休条件，应当按最高的标准发给。退休费低于三十五元的，按三十五元发给。

第三条　患二、三期矽肺病离职休养的工人，如果本人自愿，也可以退休。退休费按本人标准工资的百分之九十发给，并享受原单位矽肺病人在离职休养期间的待遇。
患二、三期矽肺病离职休养的干部，也可以按照本条的办法执行。

第四条　获得全国劳动英雄、劳动模范称号，在退休时仍然保持其荣誉的工人；省、市、自治区革命委员会认为在革命和建设中有特殊贡献的工人；部队军以上单位授予战斗英雄称号的转业、复员军人，在退休时仍保持其荣誉的，其退休费可以酌情高于本办法所定标准的百分之五至百分之十五，但提高标准后的退休费。不得超过本人原标准工资。

第五条　不具备退休条件，由医院证明，并经劳动鉴定委员会确认，完全丧失劳动能力的工人，应该退职。退职后，按月发给相当于本人标准工资百分之四十的生活费，低于二十元的，按二十元发给。

第六条　退休工人异地安家的，一般由原工作单位一次发给一百五十元的安家补助费，从大中城市到农村安家的，发给三百元。

退职工人易异安家的，可以发给相当于本人两个月标准工资的安家补助费。

第七条　工人退休、退职的时候，本人及其供养的直系亲属前往居住地点途中所需的车船费、旅馆费行李搬运费和伙食补助费，都按照现行的规定办理。

第八条　退休、退职工人本人，可以继续享受公费医疗待遇。

第九条　工人的退休费、退职生活费，企业单位，由企业行政支付；党政机关、群众团体和事业单位，由退休、退职工人居住地方的县级民政部门另列预算支付。

第十条　工人退休、退职后，家庭生活确实困难的，或多子女上山下乡、子女就业少的，原则上可以招收其一名符合招工条件的子女参加工作。招收的子女，可以是按政策规定留城的知识青年，可以是上山下乡知识青年，也可以是城镇应届中学毕业生。

我国农业生产水平还比较低，粮食还没有过关，对增加城镇和其他吃商品粮的人口，必须严加控制。因此，家居农村的退休、退职工人，应尽量回到农村安置，本人户口迁回农村的，也可以招收他们在农村的一名符合招工条件的子女参加工作；退休、退职工人回农村后，其口粮由所在生产队供应、安排。招收子女的具体办法，由省、市、自治区根据上述原则结合本地区的实际情况自行规定。

第十一条　工人退休、退职后，不要继续留在全民所有制单位。他们到城镇街道、农村社队后，街道组织和社队要加强对他们的管理教育，关心他们的生活，注意发挥他们的积极作用。街道、社队集体所有制单位如果需要退休、退职工人从事力所能及的工作，可以付给一定的报酬，但连同本人退休费或退职生活费在内，不能超过本人在职时的标准工资．

对于单身在外地工作的工人，退休、退职后要求迁到家属所在地居住，迁入地区应当准予落户。

第十二条　各地区、各部门、各单位要切实加强对工人退休、退职工作的领导。对应该退休、退职的工人，要做好深入细致的思想政治工作，动员他们退休、退职。退休、退职工作要分期分批进行。要严格掌握退休、退职条件和招工条件，防止因招收退休、退职工人子女而任意扩大退休、退职范围和降低招工质量。

第十三条　集体所有制企业、事业单位工人的退休、退职，由省、市、自治区革命委员会参照本办法，结合本地区集体所有制单位的实际情况，自行制定具体办法，其各项待遇，不得高于本办法所定的标准。

第十四条　过去有关工人退休、退职的规定与本办法不一致的，*按本办法执行。已按有关规定办理了退休的工人，其退休费标准低于本办法所定标准的，自本办法下达之月起，改按本办法规定的标准发给，但解放战争时期参加革命工作，连续工龄不满二十年的，只按本人标准工资的百分之七十五发给。改变退休费标准后的差额部分一律不予补发。

已按有关规定办理了退职的工人，其待遇一律不再变动．

中共中央组织部老干部管理局关于贯彻执行《国务院关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法》的若干具体问题的处理意见（草案）

为了更好地贯彻执行《国务院关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法》（以下简称《暂行办法》）根据国务院一九七八年 104号文件通知的精神，现对执行《暂行办法》的若干具体问题提出处理意见（草案），请各地在试点中。认真调查研究，提出修改补充意见，经审定后，再通知执行。

一、一九四九年九月底以前参加革命工作，担任过地委正副书记、行政公署正副专员及相当职务以上的干部，一九四二年底以前参加革命工作，担任过县委正副书记、革命委员会正副主任及相当职务的干部，由于工作需要职务调低的，应按照担任过的职务享受《暂行办法》中规定的待遇。

二、符合《暂行办法》第四条规定的退休条件的干部，都可以退休，但确因工作需要继续工作的，可以暂不退休。

三、工作条件与从事井下、高空、高温、特别繁重体力劳动或其他有害身体健康工作的工人相同的干部。退休条件与一九七八年《国务院关于工人退休、*退职的暂行办法》第一条第（二〕项规定相同。

四、《暂行办法》第五条所称"抗日战争时期"，是从一九三七年七月七日起至一九四五年九月止；"解放战争时期"，是从一九四五年九月三日起至一九四九年九月三十日止。

五、《暂行办法》中所称"参加革命工作"时间是指：

（一）参加中国共产党机关工作或者接受党的任务以社会职业为掩护而实际从事革命工作的时间；

（二）参加民主党派的机关工作或者民主党派成员和无党派民主人士以社会职业为掩护而实际从事民主革命工作的时间；

（三）参加革命根据地、解放区和中华人民共和国政权机关工作的时间；

（四）参加革命军队及其所属单位工作的时间；

（五）参加革命根据地、解放军和中华人民共和国人民团体的机关工作的时间；

（六）参加革命根据地、解放区党政机关所属的企业、事业单位和中华人民共和国国营、合作社营、公私合营的企业、事业单位工作的时间；

（七）参加革命根据地的抗日军政大学、陕北公学、中。国女子大学等学校学习的时间；

（八）参加一九三八年在武汉成立的十个抗敌演剧队、四个抗敌宣传队和一个孩子剧团工作的人员中，凡是当时经过党组织决定，派到剧队（团），宣传队工作的共产党员，．以及政治上是革命的、始终坚持剧队（团）、宣传队工作的非党正式队员，他们参加剧队（团）、宣传队工作的时间为参加革命工作时间；

（九）起义人员参加革命工作的，起义之日为参加革命工作的时间；曾经资遣回家，以后参加革命工作的，参加革命工作之日为参加革命工作时间；

（十）当过临时工的干部，其在本单位最后一次当临时工的时间为参加革命工作的时间；

（十一）因组织原因脱离革命队伍后又回到命革队伍的，其参加革命工作的时间，应根据其离队期间的表现和离队时间的长短，由任免机关确定。个人私自脱离革命队伍后又参加革命工作的、应将后一次参加革命工作的时间为参加革命工作时间；其工作年限，应从后一次参加革命工作时算起，

（十二）受过开除处分或者刑事处分的工作人员，重新参加工作之日为参加革命工作的时间，但是情节较轻，并且经过任免机关批准的，他受处分以前参加革命工作的时间，也可以作为参加革命工作的时间。

六、按照本人标准工资计算退休费、退职生活费时，可以将地区生活费补贴、。因工残废补助费与本人标准工资合并作为计算退休费、退职生活费的基数，原来享受地区生活费补贴的干部退休、退职后，到没有地区生活费补贴的地方居住的，计算退休费、退职生活费时，不包括地区生活费补贴在内，如果从没有地区生活费补贴的地方退休、退职到有地区生活费补贴的地方居住的，计算退休费、退职生活费时，应当包括地区生活费补贴在内。

有保留工资的干部，退休、退职时，其保留工资原则上不作为计算退休费、退职生活费的基数，如有特殊情况．暂由省、市、自治区革命委员会酌情处理。

七、《暂行办法》第五条规定"护理费的标准，一般不得超过一个普通工人的工资"，其具体数额，由省、市、自治区根据本地区的具体情况确定，但是不要超过当地一般机械行业二级工的标准工资．

八、退休于部去世以后，其丧事处理、丧葬补助费、抚恤费和遗属生活照顾，由发给退休费的单位，按照原单位在职去世于部的待遇办理。供养直系亲属范围，按现行规定办理。

九、按照暂《行办法》第六条规定提高退休费标准的，要经过批准。中央党政机关和党的关系在中央党政机关的企业、事业单位，由中央党政机关批准；地方党政机关和党的关系在地方的企业、事业单位，由省、市、自治区革命委员会批准。

十、《暂行办法》第十一条中"按照现行的规定办理"，是指按照财政部有关差旅费的规定办理。

十一、退休、退职于部因病住院的伙食费和就医路费，由本人自理。因工残废的退休干部，旧伤复发必须到外县治疗的，需经负责发给退休费的单位同意，、县级卫生行政机构批准；到外省治疗的，需经负责发给退休费的单位同意，省级卫生行政机构批准。他们的就医路费，由发给退休费的单位据实报销；住院伙食费，由发给退休费的单位补助三分之

十二、干部退休、退职的时候，退休、退职当月的工资照发，从下月起改发退休费、退职生活费。党政机关、群众团体和事业单位，易地安置的，当年的离休工资、退休费、退职生活费，由原单位拨交接受地区有关部门，下年由接受地区列人预算支付。离休、退休、退职干部去世后，从去世下月起停发离休工资、退休费、退职生活费。

十三、干部离休、退休、退职以后，如果支付费用的单位撤销或合并，其费用由撤销单位的上一级主管单位或合并后的单位继续发给。

十四、干部离休、退休退职，由所在单位按照干部管理权限报任免机关批准。退休、退职干部，由县以上单位发给退休、退职证。证件由省、市、自治区按照统一式样印制。

十五、在军事系统无军籍的干部，可以按照、《暂行办法》的各项规定办理。离休、退休、退职的，按照易地安置的办法，由地方有关部门接受安置

十六、戴帽的地、富、反、坏分子，达到退休年龄的，可参照《暂行办法》中有关退职的规定，作退职处理。

十七、退休、退职干部因为违犯法纪被判处徒刑的时候，在服刑期间应该停止享受各种退休、退职待遇，并且收回其退休、退职证件＿服刑期满恢复政治权利后的生活待遇，由发给退休费、退职生活费的单位酌情处理。

十八、离休、退休、退职于部的档案。属于中央管理的干部职务名称表以内者，其档案由中央有关部门保管；其他干部按照当地干部管理权限由相应的组织、人事部门保管。

十九、按照《暂行办法》第十七条规定，需要改为离职休养和改变退休费标准的，由原单位负责办理。如果原单位已撤销或合并，由撤销单位的上一级主管单位或合并后的单位负责办理；没有上一级主管单位的，由现在发给退休费的单位负责办理。

二十、离休干部的政治、生活福利待遇，与原单位的在职干部一样。

国家劳动总局关于贯彻执行《国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法》的若于具体问题的处理意见（草案）

为了更好地贯彻执行《国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法》（以《暂行办法》），现对若干具体问题提出如下处理意见，请各地在试点中先行试办，并请在试点中，认真调查研究，提出修改补充意见，经审定后，在普遍实行《暂行办法》时，再通知各地区、各部门统一执方、

一、在军事系统无军籍的固定工人；各单位一九六六年底以前参加工作，在国家计划以内的长期临时工，可以按照《暂行办法》的各项规定办理。

二、曾经当过干部的女工人，退休时可按照《暂行办法》中有关女工人的退休条件办理。

三、患一期矽肺合并活动性肺结核病的工人，符合《暂行办法》第一条第（三）项的年龄条件的，也可以退休，其退休费标准按照《暂行办法》第三条规定办理。

四、从事高空二高温、特别繁重体力劳动和其他有害身体健康工作的范围和工种名称，除过去已经批准的一些工种外。需要新增加的工种由中央各主管部门会同卫生部提出，经国家劳动总局同意后实行。也可以由省、市、自治区的主管局，会同卫生局、劳动局提出，上报有关的主管部和卫生部审查、经国家劳动总局同意后实行。

从事高温工作是指经常在摄氏三十八度和热辐射强度三卡以上场所工作。

五、原劳动部过去已经批准一些部门列为第一条第二项的工种，其他部门如有与已批准的工种名称相同、劳动条件相同、专业性质相同的，也可以由省、市、自治区主管部门会同卫生部门提出，经同级劳动部门审查同意后实行，报卫生部和国家劳动总局备案。但是，其劳动条件应当与批准该工种当时的劳动条件相同。虽然工种名称相同，其劳动条件变化了的，就不应当列为第一条第二项的工种。例如混凝土工原来是手工搅拌，现在已改为机械搅拌的，就不应列为第一条第二项的工种。

六、从事井下、高空、高温、特别繁重体力劳动和其他有害身体健康工作的工人，无论是现在从事这类工作或者曾经从事过这类工作，都需要具备下列条件之一，才能够按照《暂行办法》第一条第（二）项办理：

（一）从事高空和特别繁重体力劳动工作累计满十年的；

（二）从事井下、高温工作累计满九年的，

（三）从事其他有害身体健康工作累计满八年的。

上述年限是实际工作年限。但是，在计算连续工龄时，凡从事井下、高温工作伪时间，每年按一年零三个月计算；从事其他有害身体健康工作的时间，每年按一年零六个月计算。

经常在摄氏零度以下低温场所工作的工人和常年在海拔四千五百米以上高原地区流动工作的工人，可以参照从事井下、。高温工作的工人办理；常年居住在四千五百米高山高原地区工作的工人可以参照从事其他有害身体健康工作的工人办理。

七、《暂行办法》中所称"完全丧失劳动能力"的工人，是经指定医院证明、劳动鉴定委员会确认不能继续从事原来的工作，也不能从事其他轻便工作的工人。

完全丧失劳动能力的具体标准，暂由省、市、自治区卫生部门会同有关部门制定，报省、市、自治区革命委员会批准后试行。

暂行办法》中所称"抗日战争时期"是从一九三七年七月七日起至一九四五年九月二日止；"解放战争时期"是从一九四五年九月三日起至一九四九年九月三十日止。

参加革命工作的时间是指：
（一）参加中国共产党机关工作或者接受党的任务以社会职业为掩护而实际从事革命工作的时间；
（二）参加民主党派的机关工作或者民主党派成员和无党派民主人士以社会职业为掩护而实际从事民主革命工作的时间I。
（三）参加革命根据地、解放区和中华人民共和国政权机关工作的时间；
（四）参加革命军队及其所属单位工作的时间；
（五）参加革命根据地、解放区、中华人民共和国人民团体的机关工作的时间；
（六）参加革命根据地、解放区党政机关所属的企业、事业单位和中华人民共和国国营、合作社营、公私合营的企业、事业单位工作的时间；
（七）因个人原因脱离过工作，以后又参加工作的，其参加革命工作时间，应从最后一次参加工作时起；
（八）起义人员参加革命工作的，起义之日为参加革命工作的时间；曾经资遣回家，以后参加革命工作的，从参加革命工作之日起为参加革命工作的时间；
（九）受过开除处分或者刑事处分的工人，重新参加革命工作之日为参加革命工作的时间，但是情节较轻，并且经过单位领导批准的，他们受处分以前参加革命工作的时间，也可以作为参加革命工作的时间；
（十）临时工转为固定工后，其在本单位最后一次当临时工的工作时间为参加革命工作的时间。

九、因组织原因中断过工作，以后又参加革命工作的工人，退休时一般可以将前后的工作时间合并计算，并以此确定其退休的待遇标准。例如：一九七八年六月份退休的工人，前后合并计算的工作时间为三十年，其退休待遇标准，可以按照一九四八年六月份参加革命工作的待遇标准发给。

十、按照本人标准工资计算退休费、退职生活费时，可以将地区生活费补贴，因工残废补助费与本人标准工资合并作为计算退休费的基数。原来享受地区生活费补贴的工人退休、退职后，到没有地区生活费补贴的地方居住的，计算退休费、退职生活费时，不包括地区生活费补贴在内；如果从没有地区生活费补贴地地方退休、退职到有地区生活费补贴的地方居住伪，计算退休费、退职生活费时，、应当包括地区生活费补贴在内。

有保留工资的工人．退休、退职时，其保留工资原则上不作为计算退休费、退职生活费的基数，如有特殊情况，暂 由省、市、自治区革命委员会酌情处理。'～

十一、《暂行办法》第二条第（二）项规定，"护理费 的标准，一般不得超过一个普通工人的工资"。其一具体一数额，由省、市、自治区根据本地区的具体情况确定，但是不实超过当地一般机械行业二级工的标准工资。

十二、按照《暂行办法》第四条规定提高退休费标准的，要经过批准。中央党政机关及其所属的企业、事业单位，由中央党政机关征得单位所在的省，市、自治区革命委员会同意后批准，地方党政机关及其所属的企业、事业单位由省、市、自治区革命委员会批准。

十三、退休工人因病住医院的伙食费和就医路费，由本人自理。因工残废的退休工人，旧伤复发必须到外县治疗的，需经负责发给退休费的单位同意，县级卫生行政机构批准。

到外省治疗的，需经负责发给退休费的单位同意，省级卫生行政机构批准。他们的就医路费，由发给退休费的单位据实报销；住烷伙食费，由发给退休费的单位补助三分之二。

十四、退休、退职工人享受医疗待遇的报销手续。企业单位的退休、退职工人凭指定医疗机构的证明按照原工作单位在职工人的医疗待遇。向原单位报销；党政机关、群众团体和事业单位的退休、退职工人，*由居住地方的县、市辖区掌管公费医疗经费的机关按照当地国家机关工作人员享受公费医疗待遇的现行办法办理。

十五、退休工人去世以后，丧事处理、丧葬补助费和供养直系亲属抚恤费．由发给退休费的单位，按照原单位在职去世工人的待遇办理。供养直系亲属的范围，按照现行的规定办理。

十六、《暂行办法》第七条中"按照现行的规定办理"，是指按照财政部有关差旅费的规定办理。

退休、退职工人去世后，从去世下月起停发退休费、退职生活费。

十八、退休、退职工人因为违犯法纪被判处徒刑的时候，在服刑期间应该停止享受各项退休、退职待遇，并且收 回其退休、退职证件。服刑期满恢复政治权利后的生活待遇，由原发给退休费和退职生活费的单位酌情处理。

十九、工人退休、退职，由原单位发给退休、退职证．证件由省、市、自治区按照统一式样印制。

二十、企业单位的工人退休、退职以后，如果支付费用的单位撤销或合并，其退休费、退职生活费由撤销单位的上一级主管单位或合并后的单位继续发给。

二十一、党政机关、群众团体、事业单位和军事系统无军籍的退休、退职工人，其退休费、退职生活费，当年由原单位拨交退休、退职工人所在地的民政部门发给，自下年起由民政部门列入预算支付。

二十二、依旧的地、富、反、坏分子，达到退休年龄的，可以参照《暂行办法》中有关退职的规定，作退职处理。

二十三、按照《暂行办法》第十四条规定需要改变退休费标准的，由原单位负责办理。如果原单位已撤销或合并，由撒销单位的上一级主管单位或合并后的单位负责办理；没有上一级主管单位的，由现在发给退休费的单位负责办理办

二十四、《暂行办法》规定招收退休、退职工人的子女，是指工人退休、退职时符合招工条件的亲生子女和自幼抚养长大的养子、养女。

二十五、工人退休、退职后需要招收的子女，原是城镇知识青年，现已是国营农、林、牧、渔场正式职工的，可以商调，国营农、林、牧、渔场应给予照顾。

在职工人死亡后，也可参照退休工人招收子女的原则办理。一九七八年七月十一月

北京南卫生局
北京市劳动局
北京市人事局
关于试行"北京职工因工因病完全丧失劳动能力或工作能力鉴定标准试行草案的通知
（79）京卫医字第96号
（79）市劳险字第37号
（79）市人工字第14号

各区、县革委会、市属各局、企事业单位、各医疗单位：

为了认真贯彻国发（1978）104号文件，做好职工因工因病完全丧失劳动能力或工作能力的鉴定，保证职工退休、退职工作的顺利进行，根据国发［1978）104号文件的要求和国家劳动总局的有关规定，制定了"北京市职工因工因病完全丧失劳动能力或工作能力鉴定标准试行草案"及说明。现印发给你们试行。各单位自行制定的标准，从文到之日起，应立即停止执行。

在试行中，你们有什么意见，请随时告诉我们，以便做进一步的修改和补充。

附："北京市职工因工因病完全丧失劳动能力或工作能力鉴定标准试行草案"及说明。

一九七九年二月二十四日
(2002-8-24 14:27:46 点击1795)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
State Council Circular on Issuing "State Council Temporary Measures on Providing for Old, Weak, Sick, and Handicapped Cadres" and "State Council Temporary Measures on Workers' Retirement, Resignation" (Chinese Text)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
国务院关于颁发《国务院关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法》和《国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法》的通知 国发［1978］104号 　　《国务院关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法》和《国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法》已经党中央和全国人民代表大会常务委员会原则批准，现在发给你们，请你们先行试点，总结经验，然后再普遍实行。 ...

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
China's rise from a poor developing country to a major economic power in about four decades has been spectacular. From 1979 (when economic reforms began) to 2017, China's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10%. According to the World Bank, China has "experienced the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history-and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty." China has emerged as a major global economic power. For example, it ranks first in terms of economic size on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, value-added manufacturing, merchandise trade, and holder of foreign exchange reserves.

China's rapid economic growth has led to a substantial increase in bilateral commercial ties with the United States. According to U.S. trade data, total trade between the two countries grew from $5 billion in 1980 to $660 billion in 2018. China is currently the United States' largest merchandise trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its largest source of imports. Many U.S. companies have extensive operations in China in order to sell their products in the booming Chinese market and to take advantage of lower-cost labor for export-oriented manufacturing. These operations have helped some U.S. firms to remain internationally competitive and have supplied U.S. consumers with a variety of low-cost goods. China's large-scale purchases of U.S. Treasury securities (which totaled $1.1 trillion as of April 2019 have enabled the federal government to fund its budget deficits, which help keep U.S. interest rates relatively low.

However, the emergence of China as a major economic power has raised concern among many U.S. policymakers. Some claim that China uses unfair trade practices (such as an undervalued currency and subsidies given to domestic producers) to flood U.S. markets with low-cost goods, and that such practices threaten American jobs, wages, and living standards. Others contend that China's growing use of industrial policies to promote and protect certain domestic Chinese industries or firms favored by the government, and its failure to take effective action against widespread infringement and theft of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) in China, threaten to undermine the competitiveness of U.S. IP-intensive industries. In addition, while China has become a large and growing market for U.S. exports, critics contend that numerous trade and investment barriers limit opportunities for U.S. firms to sell in China, or force them to set up production facilities in China as the price of doing business there.

The Chinese government views a growing economy as vital to maintaining social stability. However, China faces a number of major economic challenges that could dampen future growth, including distortive economic policies that have resulted in overreliance on fixed investment and exports for economic growth (rather than on consumer demand), government support for state-owned firms, a weak banking system, widening income gaps, growing pollution, and the relative lack of the rule of law in China. The Chinese government has acknowledged these problems and has pledged to address them by implementing policies to increase the role of the market in the economy, boost innovation, make consumer spending the driving force of the economy, expand social safety net coverage, encourage the development of less-polluting industries (such as services), and crack down on official government corruption. The ability of the Chinese government to implement such reforms will likely determine whether China can continue to maintain relatively rapid economic growth rates, or will instead begin to experience significantly lower growth rates.

China's growing economic power has led it to become increasingly involved in global economic policies and projects, especially infrastructure development. China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI) represents a grand strategy by China to finance infrastructure throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond. If successful, China's economic initiatives could significantly expand export and investment markets for China and increase its "soft power" globally.

This report provides background on China's economic rise; describes its current economic structure; identifies the challenges China faces to maintain economic growth; and discusses the challenges, opportunities, and implications of China's economic rise for the United States.

Prior to 1979, China, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, maintained a centrally planned, or command, economy. A large share of the country's economic output was directed and controlled by the state, which set production goals, controlled prices, and allocated resources throughout most of the economy. During the 1950s, all of China's individual household farms were collectivized into large communes. To support rapid industrialization, the central government undertook large-scale investments in physical and human capital during the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, by 1978 nearly three-fourths of industrial production was produced by centrally controlled, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), according to centrally planned output targets. Private enterprises and foreign-invested firms were generally barred. A central goal of the Chinese government was to make China's economy relatively self-sufficient. Foreign trade was generally limited to obtaining those goods that could not be made or obtained in China. Such policies created distortions in the economy. Since most aspects of the economy were managed and run by the central government, there were no market mechanisms to efficiently allocate resources, and thus there were few incentives for firms, workers, and farmers to become more productive or be concerned with the quality of what they produced (since they were mainly focused on production goals set by the government).

According to Chinese government statistics, China's real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.7% from 1953 to 1978, although the accuracy of these data has been questioned by many analysts, some of whom contend that during this period, Chinese government officials (especially at the subnational levels) often exaggerated production levels for a variety of political reasons. Economist Angus Maddison puts China's actual average annual real GDP growth during this period at about 4.4%. In addition, China's economy suffered significant economic downturns during the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, including during the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962 (which led to a massive famine and reportedly the deaths of up to 45 million people) and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 (which caused widespread political chaos and greatly disrupted the economy). From 1950 to 1978, China's per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, a common measurement of a country's living standards, doubled. However, from 1958 to 1962, Chinese living standards fell by 20.3%, and from 1966 to 1968, they dropped by 9.6% (see Figure 1). In addition, the growth in Chinese living standards paled in comparison to those in the West, such as Japan, as indicated in Figure 2.

In 1978, (shortly after the death of Chairman Mao in 1976), the Chinese government decided to break with its Soviet-style economic policies by gradually reforming the economy according to free market principles and opening up trade and investment with the West, in the hope that this would significantly increase economic growth and raise living standards. As Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China's economic reforms, put it: "Black cat, white cat, what does it matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice?"

Beginning in 1979, China launched several economic reforms. The central government initiated price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled them to sell a portion of their crops on the free market. In addition, the government established four special economic zones along the coast for the purpose of attracting foreign investment, boosting exports, and importing high technology products into China. Additional reforms, which followed in stages, sought to decentralize economic policymaking in several sectors, especially trade. Economic control of various enterprises was given to provincial and local governments, which were generally allowed to operate and compete on free market principles, rather than under the direction and guidance of state planning. In addition, citizens were encouraged to start their own businesses. Additional coastal regions and cities were designated as open cities and development zones, which allowed them to experiment with free-market reforms and to offer tax and trade incentives to attract foreign investment. In addition, state price controls on a wide range of products were gradually eliminated. Trade liberalization was also a major key to China's economic success. Removing trade barriers encouraged greater competition and attracted FDI inflows. China's gradual implementation of economic reforms sought to identify which policies produced favorable economic outcomes (and which did not) so that they could be implemented in other parts of the country, a process Deng Xiaoping reportedly referred to as "crossing the river by touching the stones."

Since the introduction of economic reforms, China's economy has grown substantially faster than during the pre-reform period, and, for the most part, has avoided major economic disruptions. From 1979 to 2018, China's annual real GDP averaged 9.5% (see Figure 3). This has meant that on average China has been able to double the size of its economy in real terms every eight years. The global economic slowdown, which began in 2008, had a significant impact on the Chinese economy. China's media reported in early 2009 that 20 million migrant workers had returned home after losing their jobs because of the financial crisis and that real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 had fallen to 6.8% year-on-year. The Chinese government responded by implementing a $586 billion economic stimulus package, aimed largely at funding infrastructure and loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending. Such policies enabled China to counter the effects of the sharp global fall in demand for Chinese products. From 2008 to 2010, China's real GDP growth averaged 9.7%. However, the rate of GDP growth declined slowed for the next six consecutive years, falling from 10.6% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2016. Real GDP ticked up to 6.8% in 2017, but slowed to 6.6% in 2018, (although it rose to 6.8% in 2017). The IMF's April 2019 World Economic Outlook projects that China's real GDP growth will slow each year over the next six years, falling to 5.5% in 2024 (Figure 4). Many economists warn that China's economic growth could slow further if the United States and China continue to impose punitive economic measures against each other, such the tariff hikes that have resulted from U.S. action under Section 301 and Chinese retaliation. The Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development (OECD) projects that increased tariffs on all trade between the United States and China could reduce China's real GDP in 2021-2022 by 1.1% relative to the OECD's baseline economic projections.

Economists generally attribute much of China's rapid economic growth to two main factors: large-scale capital investment (financed by large domestic savings and foreign investment) and rapid productivity growth. These two factors appear to have gone together hand in hand. Economic reforms led to higher efficiency in the economy, which boosted output and increased resources for additional investment in the economy.

China has historically maintained a high rate of savings. When reforms were initiated in 1979, domestic savings as a percentage of GDP stood at 32%. However, most Chinese savings during this period were generated by the profits of SOEs, which were used by the central government for domestic investment. Economic reforms, which included the decentralization of economic production, led to substantial growth in Chinese household savings as well as corporate savings. As a result, China's gross savings as a percentage of GDP is the highest among major economies. The large level of domestic savings has enabled China to support a high level of investment. In fact, China's gross domestic savings levels far exceed its domestic investment levels, which have made China a large net global lender.

Several economists have concluded that productivity gains (i.e., increases in efficiency) have been another major factor in China's rapid economic growth. The improvements to productivity were caused largely by a reallocation of resources to more productive uses, especially in sectors that were formerly heavily controlled by the central government, such as agriculture, trade, and services. For example, agricultural reforms boosted production, freeing workers to pursue employment in the more productive manufacturing sector. China's decentralization of the economy led to the rise of non-state enterprises (such as private firms), which tended to pursue more productive activities than the centrally controlled SOEs and were more market-oriented and more efficient. Additionally, a greater share of the economy (mainly the export sector) was exposed to competitive forces. Local and provincial governments were allowed to establish and operate various enterprises without interference from the government. In addition, FDI in China brought with it new technology and processes that boosted efficiency.

However, as China's technological development begins to converge with major developed countries (i.e., through its adoption of foreign technology), its level of productivity gains, and thus, real GDP growth, could slow significantly from its historic levels unless China becomes a major center for new technology and innovation and/or implements new comprehensive economic reforms. Several developing economies (notably several in Asia and Latin America) experienced rapid economic development and growth during the 1960s and 1970s by implementing some of the same policies that China has utilized to date to develop its economy, such as measures to boost exports and to promote and protect certain industries. However, at some point in their development, some of these countries began to experience economic stagnation (or much slower growth compared to previous levels) over a sustained time, a phenomenon described by economists as the "middle-income trap." This means that several developing (low-income) economies were able to transition to a middle-income economy, but because they were unable to sustain high levels of productivity gains (in part, because they could not address structural inefficiencies in the economy), they were unable to transition to a high-income economy. China may be at a similar crossroads now. The World Bank classifies development levels of economies using a per capita gross national income (GNI) methodology. According to the World Bank, China went from a low-income economy to a low-middle-income economy in 1997, and in 2010, it became an upper-middle-income country. China's 2017 per capita GNI (at $8,690) was 38.7% below the level China would need to obtain to become a high-income economy. The Chinese government projects that China can cross the high-income threshold by 2025. It hopes to achieve this largely by making innovation a major source of future economic growth. Skeptics contend that innovation growth in China will be hard to achieve, especially if it is mainly state-driven and imposes new restrictions on foreign firms,

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) projects that China's real GDP growth will slow considerably over the next several decades, eventually converging on U.S. growth rates by the year 2037 (U.S. and Chinese real GDP growth rates are both projected at 1.9%). For some years thereafter, EIU projects U.S. GDP growth to be greater than China's (Figure 6).

The Chinese government has indicated its desire to move away from its current economic model of fast growth at any cost to more "smart" economic growth, which seeks to reduce reliance on energy-intensive and high-polluting industries and rely more on high technology, green energy, and services. China also has indicated it wants to obtain more balanced economic growth. (These issues are discussed in more detail later in the report.)

The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has led many analysts to speculate if and when China will overtake the United States as the "world's largest economic power." The "actual" size of China's economy has been a subject of extensive debate among economists. Measured in U.S. dollars using nominal exchange rates, China's GDP in 2018 in nominal U.S. dollars was $13.4 trillion, which was 65.3% of the size of the U.S. economy, according to estimates made by the IMF. China's 2018 per capita GDP in nominal dollars was $9,608, which was 15.3% of the U.S. per capita level.

Many economists contend that using nominal exchange rates to convert Chinese data (or those of other countries) into U.S. dollars fails to reflect the true size of China's economy and living standards relative to the United States. Nominal exchange rates simply reflect the prices of foreign currencies vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, and such measurements exclude differences in the prices for goods and services across countries. To illustrate, one U.S. dollar exchanged for local currency in China would buy more goods and services there than it would in the United States. This is because prices for goods and services in China are generally lower than they are in the United States. Conversely, prices for goods and services in Japan are generally higher than they are in the United States (and China). Thus, one dollar exchanged for local Japanese currency would buy fewer goods and services there than it would in the United States. Economists attempt to develop estimates of exchange rates based on their actual purchasing power relative to the dollar in order to make more accurate comparisons of economic data across countries, usually referred to as purchasing power parity (PPP).

The PPP exchange rate increases the (estimated) measurement of China's economy and its per capita GDP. According to the IMF (which uses price surveys conducted by the World Bank), prices for goods and services in China are about half the level they are in the United States. Adjusting for this price differential raises the value of China's 2018 GDP from $13.4 trillion (nominal dollars) to $25.3 trillion (on a PPP basis) (see Table 1). IMF data indicate that China overtook the United States as the world's largest economy in 2014 on a PPP basis.

China's share of global GDP on a PPP basis rose from 2.3% in 1980 to an estimated 18.3% in 2017, while the U.S. share of global GDP on a PPP basis fell from 24.3% to an estimated 15.3%. This would not be the first time in history that China was the world's largest economy (see text box). China's economic ascendency as the world largest economy has been impressive, especially considering that in 1980, China's GDP on a PPP basis was only one-tenth that of the United States (see

Figure 7). The IMF predicts that by 2024, China's economy will be 56% larger than the U.S. economy on a PPP basis.

The Decline and Rise of China's Economy

According to a study by economist Angus Maddison, China was the world's largest economy in 1820, accounting for an estimated 32.9% of global GDP. However, foreign and civil wars, internal strife, weak and ineffective governments, natural disasters (some of which were man-made), and distortive economic policies caused China's share of global GDP on a PPP basis to shrink significantly. By 1952, China's share of global GDP had fallen to 5.2%, and by 1978, it slid to 4.9%. The adoption of economic reforms by China in the late 1970s led to a surge in China's economic growth and helped restore China as a major global economic power.

Source: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 960-2030, by Angus Maddison, 2007.

Figure 7. U.S. and Chinese GDP (PPP Basis) as a Share of Global Total: 1980-2018 (%)

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2019.

The PPP measurement also raises China's 2018 nominal per capita GDP (from $9,608) to $18,110, which was 28.9% of the U.S. level. Even with continued rapid economic growth, it would likely take many years for Chinese living standards to approach U.S. levels.

China as the World's Largest Manufacturer

China has emerged as the world's largest manufacturer according to the World Bank. Figure 8 lists estimates of the gross value added of manufacturing in China, the United States, and Japan expressed in U.S. dollars in 2006 and 2016. Gross value added data reflect the actual value of manufacturing that occurred in the country (i.e., they subtract the value of intermediate inputs and raw materials used in production). In 2016, the value of China's manufacturing on a gross value added basis was 49.2% higher than the U.S. level. Manufacturing plays a considerably more important role in the Chinese economy than it does for the United States. In 2016, China's gross valued added manufacturing was equal to 28.7% of its GDP, compared to 11.6% for the United States.

In its 2016 Global Manufacturing Competitiveness Index, Deloitte (an international consulting firm) ranked China as the world's most competitive manufacturer (out of 40 countries), based on a survey of global manufacturing executives, while the United States ranked second (it ranked fourth in 2010). The index found that global executives predicted that the United States would overtake China by 2020 to become the world's most competitive economy, largely because of its heavy investment in talent and technology (e.g., high levels of R&D spending and activities, the presence of top-notch universities, and large amounts of venture capital being invested in advanced technologies). On the other hand, while China was expected to remain a major manufacturing power because of its large R&D spending levels, movement toward higher-valued, advanced manufacturing, government policies to promote innovation, and a large pool of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics, it was viewed as facing several challenges, including a slowing economy, a decline in value-added manufacturing and overcapacity in several industries, rising labor costs, and a rapidly aging population. As a result, China was projected to fall to the second-most competitive manufacturer by 2020.

More broadly, the World Economic Forum (WEF) produces an annual report that assesses and ranks (based on an index) the global competitiveness of a country's entire economy, based on factors that determine the level of productivity of an economy, which in turn sets the level of prosperity that the country can achieve. The WEF's 2018 Global Competitive Index ranked China as the world's 28 th-most competitive economy (out of 140 economies), while the United States ranked first.

The decline in China's working age population may have contributed rising wages in China. As indicated in Figure 9, China's average monthly wages (converted into U.S. dollars) in 1990 were $55, compared with $32 for Vietnam and $221 for Mexico. However, in 2018, China's average monthly wages (at $990) were 316% higher than Vietnam's wages ($238) and 158.5% higher than Mexico's ($383). From 2007 to 2018, China's average monthly wages rose by 263%. The American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham China) 2019 Business Climate survey listed rising labor costs as the second-biggest challenge facing U.S. firms in China (56% of recipients cited them as their largest concern). Figure 10 shows a comparison of labor costs per unit of production for the countries listed in the previous figure, indexed relative to U.S levels. In 2000, China's unit labor production costs were 42.3 of U.S. levels and by 2018 they rose to 75.5% of U.S. levels.

China's trade and investment reforms and incentives led to a surge in FDI beginning in the early 1990s. Such flows have been a major source of China's productivity gains and rapid economic and trade growth. There were reportedly 445,244 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) registered in China in 2010, employing 55.2 million workers or 15.9% of the urban workforce. As indicated in Figure 11, FIEs account for a significant share of China's industrial output. That level rose from 2.3% in 1990 to a high of 35.9% in 2003, but fell to 25.9% in 2011. In addition, FIEs are responsible for a significant level of China's foreign trade. At their peak, FIEs accounted for 58.3% of Chinese exports in 2005 and 59.7% of imports, but these levels have subsequently fallen, reaching 41.7% and 43.7%, respectively, in 2018 (see Figure 12).

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that China has become a both a major recipient of global FDI as well as a major provider of FDI outflows (see Figure 13 ). China's FDI inflows in 2018 were $139 billion, making it the world's second-largest recipient of FDI after the United States. China's FDI outflows have grew rapidly after 2005 and exceeded FDI inflows for the first time in 2015. China's FDI outflows reached a historic peak of $196.1 billion in 2016, but declined in 2017 and 2018, reflecting a crackdown by the Chinese government on investment deemed wasteful and well as greater scrutiny by foreign governments of China's efforts to obtain advanced technology firms and other strategic assets. Still, China was the world's second-largest source of FDI outflows (after Japan).

The sharp increase in China's global FDI outflows in recent years appears to be largely driven by a number of factors, including Chinese government policies and initiatives to encourage firms to "go global." The government wants to use FDI to gain access to IPR, technology, know-how, famous brands, etc., in order to move Chinese firms up the value-added chain in manufacturing and services, boost domestic innovation and development of Chinese brands, and help Chinese firms (especially SOEs) to become major global competitors. China's slowing economy and rising labor costs have also encouraged greater Chinese overseas FDI in order to help firms diversify risk and expand business opportunities beyond the China market, and, in some cases, to relocate less competitive firms from China to low-cost countries. China's Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFCOM) reports that in 2018, Chinese nonfinancial FDI in BRI countries totaled $15.6 billion, up 8.9% over the previous year. Additionally, increased FDI outflows may be the result of the Chinese government attempting to diversify its foreign exchange reserve holdings (which totaled $3.1 trillion as of April 2019-by far the world's largest holder). The largest foreign investors in China (based on FDI stock through 2017) were Hong Kong (52.6% of total), the British Virgin Islands (10.6%), Japan (6.1%), Singapore (4.0%), and Germany (3.2%) (see Table 2).

A key aspect of China's economic modernization and growth strategy during the 1980s and 1990s was to attract FDI into China to help boost the development of domestic firms. Investment by Chinese firms abroad was sharply restricted. However, in 2000, China's leaders initiated a new "go global" strategy, which sought to encourage Chinese firms (primarily SOEs) to invest overseas. One key factor driving this investment is China's massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Traditionally, a significant level of those reserves has been invested in relatively safe but low-yielding assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities. On September 29, 2007, the Chinese government officially launched the China Investment Corporation (CIC) in an effort to seek more profitable returns on its foreign exchange reserves and diversify away from its U.S. dollar holdings. The CIC was originally funded at $200 billion, making it one of the world's largest sovereign wealth funds. Another factor behind the government's drive to encourage more outward FDI flows has been to obtain natural resources, such as oil and minerals, deemed by the government as necessary to sustain China's rapid economic growth. Finally, the Chinese government has indicated its goal of developing globally competitive Chinese firms with their own brands. Investing in foreign firms, or acquiring them, is viewed as a method for Chinese firms to obtain technology, management skills, and often, internationally recognized brands, needed to help Chinese firms become more globally competitive. For example, in April 2005, Lenovo Group Limited, a Chinese computer company, purchased IBM Corporation's personal computer division for $1.75 billion. The largest destinations of cumulative Chinese FDI outflows through 2017 were Hong Kong (54.2% of total), the Cayman Islands (13.9%), the British Virgin Islands (6.7%), and the United States (3.7%) (see Table 3).

A significant level of Chinese FDI that goes to Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands likely is redirected elsewhere. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) maintain the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT), a database that has been developed to track the actual flows (from the parent company to the final destination) of Chinese investment globally. The CGIT database tracks FDI valued at $100 million or more (which it refers to as "China's outward non-bond investment"). These data differ significantly from official Chinese FDI outflow data. The CGIT data on the top destinations of total Chinese outward non-bond outward investment from 2005 to 2017 included the United States ($172.7 billion), Australia ($103.7 billion), the United Kingdom ($75 billion), Brazil ($61.2 billion), and Russia ($53.8) (see Figure 14).

Economic reforms and trade and investment liberalization have helped transform China into a major trading power. Chinese merchandise exports rose from $14 billion in 1979 to $2.5 trillion in 2018, while merchandise imports grew from $18 billion to $2.1 trillion (see Table 4 and Figure 15). China's rapidly growing trade flows have made it an increasingly important (and often the largest) trading partner for many countries. According to China, it was the largest trading partner for 130 countries in 2013. From 2000 to 2008, the annual growth of China's merchandise exports and imports averaged 25.1% and 24.2%, respectively. However, China's exports and imports fell by 15.9% and 11.2%, respectively, due to the impact of the global financial crisis. China's trade recovered in 2010 and 2011, with export growth averaging 25.8% and import growth averaging 31.9%. However, since that time, China's trade growth slowed sharply. From 2012 to 2014, China's exports and imports grew at an average annual rate of 7.2% and 4.1%, respectively. From 2015 to 2016 exports and imports fell by an average rate of 4.7% and 11.6%, respectively (see Figure 16), reflecting a sluggish global economy and a decline in commodity prices (such as oil and ores). However, in 2017, China's exports and imports rose by 6.7% and 17.4%, respectively. Exports and imports in 2018 rose by 9.3 and 17.8%, respectively. However, during the first three months of 2001, China's exports grew by 1.0%, while imports fell 1.1% year-over-year. China's merchandise trade surplus grew sharply from 2004 to 2008, rising from $32 billion to $297 billion. That surplus fell each year over the next three years, dropping to $158 billion in 2011. However, it rose in each of the next four years, reaching a record $679 billion in 2015 before falling to $611 billion in 2016, $489 billion in 2017, and $382 billion in 2018. In 2009, China overtook Germany to become both the world's largest merchandise exporter and the second-largest merchandise importer (after the United States). In 2012, China overtook the United States as the world's largest merchandise trading economy (exports plus imports). As indicated in Figure 17, China's share of global merchandise exports grew from 2.0% in 1990 to 14.1% in 2015, but fell to 13.4% in 2016 and to 13.2% in 2017.

Table 5 lists official Chinese trade data on its seven largest trading partners in 2018 (based on total trade). These include the 28 countries that make up the European Union (EU28), the United States, the 10 nations that constitute the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. China's top three export markets were the United States, the EU28, ASEAN, while its top sources for imports were the EU28, ASEAN, and South Korea. According to Chinese data, it maintained large trade surpluses with the United States ($282 billion), Hong Kong ($274 billion) and the EU28 ($129 billion), and reported large trade imbalances with Taiwan ($112 billion) and South Korea ($74 billion). China's trade data differ significantly from those of many of its trading partners. These differences appear to be largely caused by how China's trade via Hong Kong is counted in official Chinese trade data. China treats a large share of its exports through Hong Kong as Chinese exports to Hong Kong for statistical purposes, while many countries that import Chinese products through Hong Kong generally attribute their origin to China for statistical purposes, including the United States.

China's abundance of low-cost labor has made it internationally competitive in many low-cost, labor-intensive manufactures. As a result, manufactured products constitute a significant share of China's trade. A substantial amount of China's imports is comprised of parts and components that are assembled into finished products, such as consumer electronic products and computers, and then exported. Often, the value-added to such products in China by Chinese workers is relatively small compared to the total value of the product when it is shipped abroad.

China's top 10 imports and exports in 2018 are listed in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively, using the harmonized tariff system (HTS) on a two-digit level. Major imports included electrical machinery and equipment; mineral fuels; nuclear reactors, boilers, and machinery (such as automatic data process machines and machines to make semiconductors); ores; and optical, photographic, medical, or surgical instruments. China's biggest exports were electrical machinery and equipment; nuclear reactors, boilers, and machinery; furniture; plastics; and vehicles.

China is currently undergoing a major restructuring of its economic model. Policies that were employed in the past to essentially produce rapid economic growth at any cost were very successful. However, such policies have entailed a number of costs (such as heavy pollution, widening income inequality, overcapacity in many industries, an inefficient financial system, rising corporate debt, and numerous imbalances in the economy) and therefore the old growth model is viewed by many economists as no longer sustainable. China has sought to develop a new growth model ("the new normal") that promotes more sustainable (and less costly) economic growth that puts greater emphasis on private consumption and innovation as the new drivers of the Chinese economy. Implementing a new growth model that sustains healthy economic growth could prove challenging unless China is able to effectively implement new economic reforms. Many analysts warn that without such reforms, China could face a period of stagnant economic growth and living standards, a condition referred to by economists as the "middle-income trap" (Several of these challenges are discussed below.

Despite China's three-decade history of widespread economic reforms, Chinese officials contend that China is a "socialist-market economy." This appears to indicate that the government accepts and allows the use of free market forces in a number of areas to help grow the economy, but the government still plays a major role in the country's economic development.

According to the World Bank, "China has become one of the world's most active users of industrial policies and administrations." China's State Council has said that there are currently 150,000 SOEs at the central and local government level. China's SOEs may account for up of 50% of non-agriculture GDP. In addition, although the number of SOEs has declined sharply, they continue to dominate a number of sectors (such as petroleum and mining, telecommunications, utilities, transportation, and various industrial sectors); are shielded from competition; are the main sectors encouraged to invest overseas; and dominate the listings on China's stock indexes. One study found that SOEs constituted 50% of the 500 largest manufacturing companies in China and 61% of the top 500 service sector enterprises. Not only are SOEs dominant players in China's economy, many are quite large by global standards. Fortune's 2016 list of the world's 500 largest companies includes 103 Chinese firms (compared to 29 listed firms in 2007). Of the 103 Chinese firms listed, Fortune identified 75 companies (73% of total) where the government owned 50% or more of the company. Together, these 75 firms in 2016 generated $7.2 trillion in revenues, had assets valued at $20.7 trillion, and employed 16.2 million workers. Of the 28 other Chinese firms on the Fortune 500 list, several appear to have financial links to the Chinese government.

China and Global Steel Overcapacity

China has become a major global producer of steel. From 2001 to 2016, China's production of raw steel rose from 152 million metric tons to 805 million metric tons, an increase of 459.9%. During this period, China's share of global production rose from 17.9% to 50.3% and China accounted for 87.1% of the increase in global steel production. While much of China's increased steel capacity has been in response to domestic demand (resulting from China's large-scale fixed investment), it is also a major exporter. In 2015, China was the second-largest exporter of semifinished and steel products (after the EU) at 111.6 million metric tons, or 24.1% of global total.

Concerns have been raised over the past few years over the effects of increased global steel production despite falling global steel demand. Following an EU Symposium on Excess Capacity and Structural Adjustment in the Steel Sector in April 2016, then-U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and then-USTR Michael Froman issued a joint statement that said that the "U.S. steel industry is in a crisis driven in large part by global excess capacity.... led by unsustainable expansion in steelmaking capacity by China," and noted that global steel overcapacity had impacted the U.S. industry through price declines, decreased profitability, and over 13,000 jobs lost.

Many analysts contend that China's steel industry is heavily supported by government entities at the central and local government level through low-cost credit and subsidies. These enable many Chinese steel firms to operate, even when they are unprofitable and heavily in debt-these are termed by some as "zombies." The government is reluctant to allow such firms to go bankrupt due to concerns over effects layoffs could have on social stability. One study by Renmin University estimated that half of Chinese steel firms were "zombie enterprises." In April 2016, the USTR released a list of 86 government subsidies from 2011 to 2014 given to Hebei Iron & Steel Company, one of the largest steel companies in China, which was obtained from the company's annual reports.

In February 2016, the Chinese government announced plans to shut 100 million to 150 million metric tons of crude steel capacity over the next five years and cut 500,000 jobs. The USTR's 2016 report on China's WTO compliance stated that China had committed to "ensure that no central government plans, policies, directives, guidelines, lending or subsidization targets the net expansion of steel capacity," and to take steps to reduce existing capacity, including "actively and appropriately dispose of 'zombie enterprises' through bankruptcies and other means."

China's banking system is largely dominated by state-owned or state-controlled banks. According to one analyst, the mangers of China's state banks are drawn from the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party cadre system, which "enables the party and government leaderships to exert influence over bank lending." In 2015, the top five largest banks in China in terms of assets were state-owned entities. The percentage share of assets held by state-owned commercial banks (including the five large state-owned banks), the three government policy banks, and joint-stock commercial banks (where government entities are a major stock holder), together accounted for 68.5% of total bank assets in China. Foreign participation in China's banking system is relatively small, accounting for 1.6% of total bank assets. SOEs are believed to receive preferential credit treatment by government banks, while private firms must often pay higher interest rates or obtain credit elsewhere. According to one estimate, SOEs accounted for 85% ($1.4 trillion) of all bank loans in 2009. It is believed that oftentimes SOEs do not repay their loans, which may have saddled the banks with an ever-increasing amount of nonperforming loans. Many analysts contend that one of the biggest weaknesses of the banking system is that it lacks the ability to ration and allocate credit according to market principles, such as risk assessment.

The Chinese central government uses the banking system to boost credit in order to help meet its GDP growth objectives and to, when needed, offset the impact of global economic downturns, such as after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the global financial crisis. From 2007 to 2016, China's domestic credit increased in dollar terms by 218% (see Figure 18), and as a share of GDP, the level rose from 125% to 212%. As indicated in Figure 19, China's combined household, corporate, and government debt levels as a percentage of GDP as of mid-2016 are comparable to those of the United States and South Korea and lower than those of Japan and the European Union. However, China's debt levels (in both dollars and as a percentage of GDP) have risen sharply within a relatively short time, which, some have speculated, could spark an economic crisis in China in the future. From 2006 year-end to mid-2016, China's total nonfinancial sector debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 143% to 254% (up 111 percentage points). Much of the rise in that debt came from the corporate sector, which, as a percentage of GDP, rose from 107% in 2006 to 171% in mid-2016 (up 64 percentage points). In dollar terms, China's corporate debt rose from $3 trillion to $17.8 trillion (up $14.8 trillion) and currently greatly exceeds U.S. corporate debt levels (see Figure 20). Several observers have warned that China's credit growth may be too extensive and could undermine future growth by sharply boosting debt levels, causing overcapacity in many industrials (especially extending credit to firms that are unprofitable to keep them operating), contributing to bubbles (such as in real estate), and reducing productivity by proving preferential treatment to SOEs and other government-supported entities.

Local government debt is viewed as a big problem in China, largely because of the potential impact it could have on the Chinese banking system. During the beginning of the global financial slowdown, many Chinese subnational government entities borrowed extensively to help stimulate local economies, especially by supporting infrastructure projects. In December 2013, the Chinese National Audit Office reported that from the end of 2010 to mid-year 2013, local government debt had increased by 67% to nearly $3 trillion. The Chinese government reported that local government debt rose to $4.3 trillion as of 2015. Efforts have been made over the past few years by the central government to restructure local government debt and restrict local government borrowing, with mixed success, according to some press reports, because of pressures on local governments to maintain rapid economic growth.

Many economists blame China's closed capital account for much of China's debt problems. The Chinese government has maintained restrictions on capital inflows and outflows for many years, in part to control the exchange of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the dollar and other currencies in order to boost exports. Many argue the Chinese government's restrictions on capital flows have greatly distorted financial markets in China, preventing the most efficient use of capital, such as overinvestment in some sectors (such as real estate) and underinvestment in others (such as services).

China's economic growth model has emphasized the growth of heavy industry in China, much of which is energy-intensive and high polluting. The level of pollution in China continues to worsen, posing serious health risks to the population. The Chinese government often disregards its own environmental laws in order to promote rapid economic growth. China's environmental challenges are illustrated by the following incidents and reports.

A 2018 report by ExxonMobil estimated that China contributed about 60% of the growth in global CO2 emissions from 2000 to 2016, and that its emissions would surpass the combined CO2 levels of the United States and EU by 2025.

A 2017 OECD report estimated the health costs of China's air pollution in 2015 at $1.4 trillion, equivalent to 7.8% of its GDP.

A 2015 study by the Rand Corporation estimated that the costs (in terms of health impact and lost productivity) from China's air pollution were equal to 6.5% of GDP each year from 2000 to 2010. It further estimated the costs as a percentage of GDP of water pollution and soil degradation at an additional 2.1% and 1.1%, respectively.

On August 12, 2015, a series of large explosions in several warehouses containing chemicals occurred in the Chinese port city of Tianjin, claiming the lives of at least 163 people. Some press reports have blamed poor government enforcement of environmental regulations for the disaster. For example, some in China have questioned why dangerous chemicals were warehoused so close to residential areas and have raised concerns over the extent of chemical contamination in the area that may have resulted from the explosions.

The U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which monitors and reports air quality in China based on an air quality index of particulate matter (developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) considered to pose a health concern, reported that the air quality in Beijing for a majority of the days in January 2013 ranged from "unhealthy" to "hazardous" (based on 24-hour exposure) and, on a few days, it recorded high readings that were "beyond index." The level of poor air quality in Beijing was termed by some in China as "Airpocalypse," and reportedly forced the government to shut down some factories and reduce the level of official cars on the road. On December 9, 2013, China's media reported that half of China was blanketed by smog. The U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai reported that were a number of days in December 2013 where its measurement of the air quality in Shanghai was hazardous or very unhealthy, and during some time periods on December 5, 2013, its readings were "beyond index." According to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, from 2008 to 2015, nearly two-thirds of the days in Beijing had air pollution considered to be unhealthy.

In February 2013, China's Geological Survey reportedly estimated that 90% of all Chinese cities had polluted groundwater, with two-thirds having "severely polluted" water.

According to a 2012 report by the Asian Development Bank, less than 1% of the 500 largest cities in China meet the air quality standards recommended by the World Health Organization, and 7 of these are ranked among the 10 most polluted cities in the world.

The Chinese government has indicated that it is taking steps to reduce energy consumption, boost enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, reduce coal usage by expanding the use of cleaner fuels (such as natural gas) to general power, and relocate high-polluting factories away from large urban areas, although such efforts have had mixed results on the overall level of pollution in China. In addition, China has become a major global producer and user of clean and renewable energy technology. In January 2017, the Chinese government said it would spend $361 billion on renewable energy power generation by 2020.

The relative lack of the rule of law in China has led to widespread government corruption, financial speculation, and misallocation of investment funds. In many cases, government "connections," not market forces, are the main determinant of successful firms in China. Many U.S. firms find it difficult to do business in China because rules and regulations are generally not consistent or transparent, contracts are not easily enforced, and intellectual property rights are not protected (due to the lack of an independent judicial system). The relative lack of the rule of law and widespread government corruption in China limit competition and undermine the efficient allocation of goods and services in the economy. A New York Times article reported that (former) Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's family controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion. One study estimates that between 2001 and 2010, China was the world's largest source of illicit capital outflows at $3.8 trillion. A 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project reported that 50% of respondents said that corrupt officials are a very big problem (up from 39% in 2008). Chinese officials often identify government corruption as the greatest threat to the Chinese Communist Party and the state. The Chinese government's anticorruption watchdog reported that 106,000 officials were found guilty of corruption in 2009. Since assuming power in 2012, Chinese Xi Jinping has carried out an extensive anticorruption drive. China has reportedly sought cooperation with the United States to obtain extradition of 150 alleged corrupt officials who have fled to the United States. However, many analysts contend that government anticorruption campaigns are mainly used to settle political scores with out-of-favor officials. Some analysts contend that President's Xi anticorruption drive is more about consolidating his own political than instituting reforms. In addition, there are some indicators that the current anticorruption campaign may be having a negative impact on the Chinese economy, due to hesitancy by some local officials to pursue projects they feel will lead to scrutiny from the central government. Many observers argue that meaningful progress against government corruption cannot occur without greater government transparency, a system of checks and balances, a free press, Internet freedom, and an independent judiciary. In October 2014, China held its fourth Plenum of the 18 th Party Conference. The meeting focused on the need to enhance the rule of law in China, but emphasized the leading role of the Communist Party in the legal system.

China maintains a weak and relatively decentralized government structure to regulate economic activity in China. Laws and regulations often go unenforced or are ignored by local government officials. As a result, many firms cut corners in order to maximize profits. This has led to a proliferation of unsafe food and consumer products being sold in China or exported abroad. Lack of government enforcement of food safety laws led to a massive recall of melamine-tainted infant milk formula that reportedly killed at least four children and sickened 53,000 others in 2008. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2016 ranked China 79 th out of 176 countries and territories, up from 72 nd in 2007.

Many economists contend that China's demographic policies, particularly its one-child policy (first implemented in 1979), are beginning to have a significant impact on the Chinese economy. For example, according to a McKinsey Global Institute study, China's fertility rate fell from about 5.8 births per woman in 1964 to 1.6 in 2012. This is now affecting the size of the Chinese workforce.

The existence of a large and underemployed labor force was a significant factor in China's rapid economic growth when economic reforms were first introduced. Such a large labor force meant that firms in China had access to a nearly endless supply of low-cost labor, which helped enable many firms to become more profitable, which in turn led them to boost investment and production. Some economists contend that China is beginning to lose this labor advantage. According to the Chinese government, the size of its working age population (ages 16 to 59) peaked at 925 million in 2011, but then fell for seven consecutive years to 897 million in 2018. The Chinese government projects that its working age population will drop to 830 million by 2030 and to 700 million by 2050. If these projections prove accurate, the Chines working age population could drop by 225 million individuals (2011-2050).

The one-child policy has also resulted in a rapidly aging society in China. According to the Brookings Institute, China already has 180 million people aged over 60, and this could reach 240 million by 2020 and 360 million by 2030. The population share of people aged over 60 could reach 20% by 2020, and 27% by 2030. With a declining working population and a rising elderly population, the Chinese government will face challenges trying to boost worker productivity (such as enhancing innovation and high-end technology development) and expanding spending on health care and elderly services. China's Hukou (household registration) system also poses challenges to the government.

First introduced in 1951, the Chinese Hukou (household registration) system is a categorization of its citizens based on both their place of residence and eligibility for certain socioeconomic benefits. Hukou is issued through a registration process administered by local authorities and solidified into inheritable social identities. The classification of the system is composed by two related parts: socioeconomic eligibility (agriculture/nonagriculture); and residential location (living in urban/rural areas). The Chinese government imposed the system with the purpose of regulating population distribution, especially in regard to cities. Since economic reforms were begun in 1979, hundreds of millions of people have been allowed to leave their home towns to work in urban areas, such as Shanghai. The number of rural laborers working in China's cities was 274 million in 2014, over one-third (36%) of the total workforce. Although such workers are allowed to reside in the cities where they work, they are generally denied access to social entitlements, such as pensions, medical insurance, and basic education for children. This forces such workers to save a very high level of their income to pay for these services. Due to China's desire to increase the urbanization of its population, combat demographic disparities, and boost domestic consumption, the Chinese government is currently considering implementing new reforms to the Hukou system.

President Xi's report to the 19 th Party Congress in November 2017 stated that socialism with Chinese characteristics had entered a new era. He stated that China would work to become a "moderately prosperous society in all respects" by 2050. Major goals include boosting living standards for poor and rural people, addressing income disparities (e.g., rich-poor and urban-rural), making private consumption the driver of the economy, boosting services, reducing pollution, promoting innovation and economic modernization, and improving overall living standards. For example, the report states the following:

We will work faster to build China into a manufacturer of quality and develop advanced manufacturing, promote further integration of the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence with the real economy, and foster new growth areas and drivers of growth in medium-high end consumption, innovation-driven development, the green and low-carbon economy, the sharing economy, modern supply chains, and human capital services. We will support traditional industries in upgrading themselves and accelerate development of modern service industries to elevate them to international standards. We will move Chinese industries up to the medium-high end of the global value chain, and foster a number of world-class advanced manufacturing clusters.

The report indicated that China would continue to pursue trade and investment reforms, noting the following:

We will adopt policies to promote high-standard liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment; we will implement the system of pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list across the board, significantly ease market access, further open the service sector, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors. All businesses registered in China will be treated equally.

However, the report emphasized the continued importance of the state sector and the government's continued role in various economic sectors:

We will improve the systems for managing different types of state assets, and reform the system of authorized operation of state capital. In the state-owned sector, we will step up improved distribution, structural adjustment, and strategic reorganization. We will work to see that state assets maintain and increase their value; we will support state capital in becoming stronger, doing better, and growing bigger, and take effective measures to prevent the loss of state assets. We will further reform of state-owned enterprises, develop mixed-ownership economic entities, and turn Chinese enterprises into world-class, globally competitive firms.

China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI), also called "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR), was launched in 2013 to boost economic integration and connectivity (such as infrastructure, trade, and investment) with its neighbors and various trading partners in Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. At the APEC summit in November 2017, President Xi said the following:

The Belt and Road Initiative calls for joint contribution and it has a clear focus, which is to promote infrastructure construction and connectivity, strengthen coordination on economic policies, enhance complementarity of development strategies and boost interconnected development to achieve common prosperity. This initiative is from China, but it belongs to the world. It is rooted in history, but it is oriented toward the future. It focuses on the Asian, European and African continents, but it is open to all partners. I am confident that the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative will create a broader and more dynamic platform for Asia-Pacific cooperation.

Many U.S. analysts view the BRI differently than how Chinese leaders describe it. For example, Nadège Rolland, senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research states the following:

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is generally understood as China's plan to finance and build infrastructure projects across Eurasia. Infrastructure development is in fact only one of BRI's five components which include strengthened regional political cooperation, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges. Taken together, BRI's different components serve Beijing's vision for regional integration under its helm. It is a top-level design for which the central government has mobilized the country's political, diplomatic, intellectual, economic and financial resources. It is mainly conceived as a response to the most pressing internal and external economic and strategic challenges faced by China, and as an instrument at the service of the PRC's vision for itself as the uncontested leading power in the region in the coming decades. As such, it is a grand strategy.

Many aspects of the BRI initiative remain unclear, including which (and how many) countries will participate, how much China will spend to finance the initiative, and what projects will fall under the BRI. For example, the government's China Belt and Road Portal currently lists profiles of 70 countries on its website. However, China's official media in December 2017 stated that 86 countries and international organizations had signed 100 cooperation agreements with China under the BRI. Nadège Rolland said that China pledged it would spend $1 trillion to $1.3 trillion, T he Economist reports that China put the figure at $4 trillion, and the World Economic Forum estimates that China could ultimately spend $8 trillion on BRI.

The initiative could provide a big boost to China's economy and soft power image. China hopes to gain a better return on its foreign exchange reserves, create new overseas business opportunities for Chinese firms, create new markets for industries currently experiencing overcapacity, and stimulate economic development in poorer regions of China. However, the initiative could pose financial risks if borrowers do not repay loans or if recipient countries do not view Belt and Road as benefiting them. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson criticized certain aspects of Belt and Road initiative in remarks made in October 2017:

We have watched the activities and actions of others in the region, in particular China, and the financing mechanisms it brings to many of these countries which result in saddling them with enormous levels of debt. They don't often create the jobs, which infrastructure projects should be tremendous job creators in these economies, but too often, foreign workers are brought in to execute these infrastructure projects. Financing is structured in a way that makes it very difficult for them to obtain future financing, and oftentimes has very subtle triggers in the financing that results in financing default and the conversion of debt to equity.

China has undertaken other major financial initiatives as well. In July 2014, China, along with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa, announced the creation of a $100 billion "New Development Bank," which is headquartered in Shanghai, China. The new bank aims to fund infrastructure projects in developing countries. In October 2014, China launched the creation of a new $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB), aimed at funding infrastructure projects in Asia. Fifty-seven nations joined as founding members. The AIIB, headquartered in Beijing, announced it was open for business in January 2016. To date, the United States has chosen not to join the AIIB.

The "Made in China 2025" initiative, announced in 2015, is one of several recently announced ambitious projects aimed at increasing the competitiveness of Chinese industries, fostering Chinese brands, boosting innovation, and reducing China's reliance on foreign technology by making China a major or dominant global manufacturer of various technologies. According to Chinese media, the initiative intends to "transform China from a manufacturing giant into a world manufacturing power" by 2049. For example, the plan states a goal of achieving 40% of domestically manufactured basic components and basic materials by 2020 and 70% by 2025. An updated version of the plan released in January 2018 said China aimed to become the world's leading manufacturer of telecommunication, railway, and electrical power equipment by 2025, and that China's robotics, high-end automation, and new energy vehicles industries would globally rank second or third by 2025. The methods the Chinese government plans to use to achieve its goals have raised concerns among U.S. firms and policymakers because they appear to involve large subsidies, protection of domestic industries, directed policies to purchase technology and IPR from abroad, increased pressure on foreign firms to transfer technology in order to do business in China, and what appears to be a goal of deliberately reducing foreign participation in China's markets.

In an interview on November 3, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer stated that China's Made in China 2025 initiative was "a very, very serious challenge, not just to us, but to Europe, Japan and the global trading system." The USTR's 2017 annual report on China's WTO compliance focused heavily on the initiative, stating that Made in China 2025 differed from industry support by other WTO members in the level of ambition and scale of resources dedicated to obtaining its goals, and the USTR report warned that "even if the Chinese government fails to achieve the industrial policy goals set forth in Made in China 2025, it is still likely to create or exacerbate market distortions and create severe excess capacity in many of the targeted industries."

China's rapid economic growth and emergence as a major economic power have given China's leadership increased confidence in its economic model. Many believe the key challenges for the United States are to convince China that (1) it has a stake in maintaining the international trading system, which is largely responsible for its economic rise, and should take a more active leadership role in maintaining that system; and (2) further economic and trade reforms are the surest way for China to grow and modernize its economy. Lowering trade and investment barriers would boost competition in China, lower costs for consumers, increase economic efficiency, and spur innovation. However, many U.S. stakeholders are concerned that China's efforts to boost the development of indigenous innovation and technology could result in greater intervention by the state (such as subsidies, trade and investment barriers, and discriminatory policies), which could negatively affect U.S. IP-intensive firms.

Opinions differ as to the most effective way to deal with China on major economic issues. Some support a policy of engagement with China using various forums. Others support a somewhat mixed policy of using engagement when possible, coupled with a more aggressive use of the WTO dispute settlement procedures to address China's unfair trade policies. Others, who see China as a growing threat to the U.S. economy and the global trading system, advocate a policy of trying to contain China's economic power and using punitive measures, such as increased tariffs under Section 301, to either counter the negative impact of China's industrial policies on U.S. firms or push China to modify distortive and discriminatory policies (such as the Made in China 2025 initiative). Responding to China's BRI is viewed by some as a major challenge to U.S. global economic interests. While China's financial support of infrastructure projects in numerous countries could produce positive economic results, U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns that China will use BRI to mainly benefit its own firms, that the process of implementation of projects will not be transparent, that BRI participation could saddle countries with large debts, and that China will use the BRI to spread its economic system to other countries.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Prior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization nearly 40 years ago, China maintained policies that kept the...

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
< BACK

When we were kids, we used to eat a lot of potatoes in our diet. We would get them served as a side dish with meaty meals or use them as a base in the (non)famous "Granatier," "gypsy fried egg," or a baked potato with butter and salt for dinner. On the other side of the spectrum, there was rice - always known as a food of healthy Asians but never really heavily used in our country. I only remember rice from rice pudding and again, as a side dish with chicken sauté or with a baked chicken leg.
I guess neither of these was perceived healthier than the other, it was more about buying local produce than anything else. Our mothers were taught that Slovak food was meant to be eaten by Slovaks, that our bodies were designed for local food, (which can actually be scientifically proven), however, nobody was thinking about nutritional values or calories back then. A few decades ago came a time of the "healthy food clan" and we started eating Chinese rice instead of Slovak potatoes, exotic limes instead of apples from the neighbor´s tree, and avocados as a toast spread alternative for butter. The question is, have we found the ultimate health recipe, or are we just slowly losing our minds counting calories in carambolas and basmati rice?
Rice vs. potatoes - nutritional values & weight-loss
The calorific difference between two types of rice and a baked potato is so negligible we cannot draw a conclusion based on it. What can help in our comparison though are the nutritional values which indicate an improved health or potential aid in fighting diseases. To start with, rice, depending on type, contains 0.6 - 3.5g of fiber, while potato lies on a range between 2.3 - 3g, with the higher number thanks to its skin, if it wasn´t removed. Both rice and potatoes are great thanks to their fat content being less than 1g, which makes them perfect candidates for weight-loss foods. Vitamin-wise, rice is a great source of vitamin B spectrum, while potatoes have gotten their good reputation in vitamin C content as one of the highest amongst vegetables. They also contain a lot of potassium, actually even more than a banana. Rice, on the other hand, cannot by any means beat them with the vitamin and mineral content.

What is also very important in weight-loss management while talking carbohydrates is a glycemic index - the number which ranges between 0 and 100 to identify how much the particular carbohydrate can raise your blood sugar levels. It is important to know especially if you´re diabetic or if you´re trying to lose weight because the smaller the number, the longer you´ll feel full and satisfied. However, in this case, the numbers won´t really tell us anything breakthrough. White rice scores 64 and brown rice 55, whilst white potato is only 50 but russet potato is a stunning 85.

As you´ve probably already noticed, the only real difference you can make in your weight-loss plan is choosing the right kinds of food. If you´re going out for a sushi, it is probably not going to be made from organic brown rice. That doesn´t mean though, that sushi is not healthy because the ingredients contained in it push the glycemic index down, making it easier for you to sustain a low-calorie diet and feel full for a long time. With potatoes, the main obstacle comes with the way they are prepared. Cooked potato is about 20 kcal lighter than a baked one, on the other hand, the skin in a baked one contains lots of fiber and vitamins you´ll lose if peeling it. Another thing with potatoes can be a more difficult choice of meals containing them, since most of these are also filled with sour cream, cheese, or bacon. Anyway, either food choice you´ll make, be sure to pick the "healthier option" even if it seems minor, like choosing brown or parboiled rice over white one or white potatoes instead of russet potatoes, and you´ll be better off.
Rice beats potatoes in ALLERGY notice
There is one major setback of potatoes that is very little known by general public but can cause serious health problems. Potatoes are one of the 4 foods called "Nightshades" that we ordinarily eat in quite large quantities unaware of their negative impact. The term includes tomatoes, all kinds of peppers, eggplant, and potatoes. The problem with nightshades is their content of alkaloids - chemical compounds containing solanine, traces of nicotine, and capsaicin (that makes chili so hot!) to protect plants containing them from bugs but causing problems when eaten. One of these plants, Belladonna was used in a famous Shakespeare´s play Macbeth as a very deadly poison, which causes concern because, yes, in large quantities, nightshades really are poisonous.
Those that we eat contain only small amounts of alkaloids which have no impact on most healthy people. However, if you´re one of those suffering from allergies and other autoimmune diseases or have just recently developed one, it is a pretty rational step to check out these trouble-makers. One negative impact of alkaloids in these foods is increasing the immune system´s response, which in people with autoimmune diseases basically means a catastrophe. In such patients, their immune system basically gets confused and attacks its own cells - for example in alopecia when one´s hair starts to fall out because their body thinks the follicles are foreign objects like bacteria or so. Vegetables and spices from the nightshade family usually make the condition much worse and may even trigger new allergies. Moreover, they also contain lectins which irritate the digestive system and in sensitive people may even cause the leaky gut syndrome. BUT, nightshades have also been shown to reduce inflammation in healthy individuals thanks to capsaicin contained in spicy peppers like cayenne, very often used in celebrity diets because it boosts metabolism.
Which is the winner then?
The information gathered leads us to a conclusion that rice, especially brown or parboiled kind (white one with added nutrients) is a better choice than potatoes thanks to its high vitamin content and low glycemic index. Also, it is very easily combinable with super healthy vegetables, fish and meat in sushi, risotto, or as a side dish and even the preparation is quick and easy.
With potatoes it is a little bit more difficult. We cannot say they´re not healthy, they actually contain more vitamins and minerals while keeping the calories and glymemic index at the same level as rice, and provide great amounts of fiber when eaten with skin. There´s the catch though - if you´re sensitive to nightshades (try 7 days nightshade-free and see for yourself), you may have to cut them out of your diet right away before they damage your immune system completely, or peel the skin off, which takes away part of the vitamins and fiber, or always cook them and thus increase the calorific value. The conclusion then goes...

RICE > potatoes
by Katarína Vicová

References:
Appleby, M. (n.d.). The nutrients in rice vs. potatoes. Retrieved from: http://healthyeating.sfgate.com/nutrients-rice-vs-potatoes-2871.html
Holly´s helpings (2015). [picture]. Retrieved from: http://hollyshelpings.com/2011/12/20/my-first-time-making-sushi/
Jono & Jules do food and wine. [picture]. Retrieved from: http://jonoandjules.com/2013/01/17/jacket-pots-prawns/
Paleo Leap (2015). All about nightshades. Retrieved from: http://paleoleap.com/nightshades/

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
BACK When we were kids, we used to eat a lot of potatoes in our diet. We would get them served as a side dish with meaty meals or use them as a base in the (non)famous "Granatier," "gypsy fried egg," or a baked potato with butter and salt for dinner.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In the 2018/2019 crop year, China produced some 148.5 million metric tons of milled rice, a higher volume than any other country. India came in second place with 116.42 million metric tons of milled rice in that crop year.
Milled rice
After the rice is grown and harvested from rice paddies, it undergoes a process to prepare it for human consumption, known as milling. Milling removes the rice husk and bran layers, and the end product is the rice that can be found in your local grocery store or supermarket. The total volume of milled rice produced worldwide reached 495.9 million metric tons in the 2018/2019 crop year.
Rice consumption worldwide
The top rice consuming countries are China, India, and Indonesia in that order. In 2018/2019, China's rice consumption amounted to 143.79 million metric tons. The per capita consumption of rice worldwide has remained remarkably stable since the year 2000, and amounted to about 53.9 kilograms per year in 2018/2019.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Top countries based on production of milled rice | Statista

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
In the 2018/2019 crop year, China produced some 148.5 million metric tons of milled rice, a higher volume than any other country. India came in second place with 116.42 million metric tons of milled rice in that crop year.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2019, with forecasts to 2025. In 2019, gross national debt ranged at around 52.6 percent of the national gross domestic product.

The debt-to-GDP ratio

In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio. It is a useful indicator for investors to measure a country's ability to fulfill future payments on its debts. A low debt-to-GDP ratio also suggests that an economy produces and sells a sufficient amount of goods and services to pay back those debts. Among the important industrial and emerging countries, Japan displayed one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. In 2017, the estimated national debt of Japan amounted to about 235 percent of its GDP, up from around 180 percent in 2004. One reason behind Japan's high debt load lies in its low annual GDP growth rate.

Development in China

China's national debt related to GDP grew slowly but steadily from around 23 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, only disrupted by the global financial crisis in 2008. In recent years, China increased credit financing to spur economic growth, resulting in higher levels of debt. International trade frictions and the Covid-19 pandemic require further stimulating measures by the government and will predictably lead to even higher debt growth in the years ahead.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
China: national debt to GDP 2012-2025 | Statista

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The graph shows national debt in China related to gross domestic product until 2019, with forecasts to 2025. In 2019, gross national debt ranged at around 52.6 percent of the national gross domestic product. In economics, the ratio between a country's government debt and its gross domestic product (GDP) is generally defined as the debt-to-GDP ratio.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Tourists shop at a duty-free shopping mall in Sanya City, south China's Hainan Province, Oct. 5, 2020. China's gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded the 100-trillion-yuan (15.42 trillion U.S. dollars) threshold as it posted a 2.3 percent year-on-year expansion to 101.5986 trillion yuan in 2020, data from the National Bureau of Statistics showed Monday. (Xinhua/Guo Cheng)

BEIJING, Jan. 18 (Xinhua) -- China's gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded the 100-trillion-yuan (15.42 trillion U.S. dollars) threshold in 2020, official data showed Monday.

The country, which saw its GDP increase 2.3 percent year on year to 101.5986 trillion yuan last year, is expected to be the only major economy to post growth in the pandemic-ravaged year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).

The hard-earned achievement marked a new economic milestone for the Chinese economy after the country's GDP per capita exceeded 10,000 U.S. dollars in 2019 for the first time in history.

The advance also came as the world's second-largest economy won a decisive victory in poverty eradication last year while making historic achievements in the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects.

"These achievements show that China's economic, scientific and comprehensive strengths have leapt by another big step," said Ning Jizhe, head of the NBS.

Growing from 10 trillion yuan 20 years ago, China's economy is now likely to account for around 17 percent of the global economy, Ning told a press conference, attributing the growth to progress in fields including grain production, industrial production, high-speed railway construction and 5G technologies.

In 2020, China's per capita disposable income rose 2.1 percent to 32,189 yuan, basically keeping pace with the GDP increase, according to NBS data. Meanwhile, a total of 11.86 million new urban jobs were created in 2020, completing 131.8 percent of the target set for the whole year.

Noting that China remains the largest developing country in the world, Ning said the country's GDP per capita is still lower than the global average and has a gap with that of major developed countries.

Crossing the 100-trillion-yuan threshold is also of significance for China in its pursuit of fully building a modern socialist country, the country's second centenary goal, according to Ning.

Looking forward, China is expecting its per capita GDP to reach the level of moderately developed countries by 2035, according to the Communist Party of China leadership's proposals for formulating the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) and long-range goals.

The World Bank Group said earlier this month that it expects China's economy to expand by 7.9 percent this year, while the global economy is on track to grow by 4 percent. Enditem

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Tourists shop at a duty-free shopping mall in Sanya City, south China's Hainan Province, Oct. 5, 2020. China's gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded the 100-trillion-yuan (15.42 trillion U.S. dollars) threshold as it posted a 2.3 percent year-on-year expansion to 101.5986 trillion yuan in 2020, data from the National Bureau of Statistics showed Monday.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Introduction

China's historical civilization dates to at least 13th century B.C., first under the Shang (to 1046 B.C.) and then the Zhou (1046-221 B.C) dynasties. The imperial era of China began in 221 B.C. under the Qin Dynasty and lasted until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. During this period, China alternated between periods of unity and disunity under a succession of imperial dynasties. In the 19 th century, the Qing Dynasty suffered heavily from overextension by territorial conquest, insolvency, civil war, imperialism, military defeats, and foreign expropriation of ports and infrastructure. It collapsed following the Revolution of 1911, and China became a republic under SUN Yat-sen of the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist) Party. However, the republic was beset by division, warlordism, and continued foreign intervention. In the late 1920s, a civil war erupted between the ruling KMT-controlled government led by CHIANG Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Japan occupied much of northeastern China in the early 1930s, and then launched a full-scale invasion of the country in 1937. The resulting eight years of warfare devastated the country and cost up to 20 million Chinese lives by the time of Japan's defeat in 1945. The Nationalist-Communist civil war continued with renewed intensity following the end of World War II and culminated with a CCP victory in 1949, under the leadership of MAO Zedong.

MAO and the CCP established an autocratic socialist system that, while ensuring the PRC's sovereignty, imposed strict controls over everyday life and launched agricultural, economic, political, and social policies - such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) - that cost the lives of millions of people. MAO died in 1976. Beginning in 1978, subsequent leaders DENG Xiaoping, JIANG Zemin, and HU Jintao focused on market-oriented economic development and opening up the country to foreign trade, while maintaining the rule of the CCP. Since the change, China has been among the world's fastest growing economies, with real gross domestic product averaging over 9% growth annually through 2021, lifting an estimated 800 million people out of poverty, and dramatically improving overall living standards. By 2011, the PRC's economy was the second largest in the world. The growth, however, has created considerable social displacement, adversely affected the country's environment, and reduced the country's natural resources. Current leader XI Jinping has continued these policies, but also has maintained tight political controls. Over the past decade, China has also increased its global outreach, including military deployments, participation in international organizations, and initiating a global connectivity initiative in 2013 called the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI). While many nations have signed on to BRI agreements to attract PRC investment, others have balked at the opaque lending behavior; weak environment, social, and governance (ESG) standards; and other practices that undermine local governance and foster corruption associated with some BRI-linked projects. XI Jinping assumed the positions of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2012 and President in 2013. In March 2018, the PRC's National People's Congress passed an amendment abolishing presidential term limits, opening the door for XI to seek a third five-year term in 2023.

Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.

Geography

slightly smaller than the US

Yangtze - 6,300 km; Huang He - 5,464 km; Amur river source (shared with Mongolia and Russia [m]) - 4,444 km; Mekong river source (shared with Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam [m]) - 4,350 km; Brahmaputra river source (shared with India and Bangladesh [m]) - 3,969 km; Indus river source (shared with India and Pakistan [m]) - 3,610 km; Salween river source (shared with Thailand and Burma [m]) - 3,060 km; Irrawaddy river source (shared with Burma [m]) - 2,809 km; Pearl (shared with Vietnam [s]) - 2,200 km; Red river source (shared with Vietnam [m]) - 1,149 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Pacific Ocean drainage: Amur (1,929,955 sq km), Huang He (944,970 sq km), Mekong (805,604 sq km), Yangtze (1,722,193 sq km)
Indian Ocean drainage: Brahmaputra (651,335 sq km), Ganges (1,016,124 sq km), Indus (1,081,718 sq km), Irrawaddy (413,710 sq km), Salween (271,914 sq km)
Arctic Ocean drainage: Ob (2,972,493 sq km)
Internal (endorheic basin) drainage: Tarim Basin (1,152,448 sq km), Amu Darya (534,739 sq km), Syr Darya (782,617 sq km), Lake Balkash (510,015 sq km)

frequent typhoons (about five per year along southern and eastern coasts); damaging floods; tsunamis; earthquakes; droughts; land subsidence

volcanism: China contains some historically active volcanoes including Changbaishan (also known as Baitoushan, Baegdu, or P'aektu-san), Hainan Dao, and Kunlun although most have been relatively inactive in recent centuries

China map showing major cities as well as the many bordering East Asian countries and neighboring seas.

People and Society

Standard Chinese or Mandarin (official; Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages (see Ethnic groups entry); note - Zhuang is official in Guangxi Zhuang, Yue is official in Guangdong, Mongolian is official in Nei Mongol, Uighur is official in Xinjiang Uygur, Kyrgyz is official in Xinjiang Uygur, and Tibetan is official in Xizang (Tibet)

major-language sample(s):
世界概況 - 不可缺少的基本消息來源 (Standard Chinese)

The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.

Mandarin audio sample:

improved: urban: 97.3% of population

rural: 91.5% of population

total: 95.1% of population

unimproved: urban: 2.7% of population

rural: 8.5% of population

total: 4.9% of population (2020 est.)

improved: urban: 97.6% of population

rural: 90.6% of population

total: 94.9% of population

unimproved: urban: 2.4% of population

rural: 9.4% of population

total: 5.1% of population (2020 est.)

Environment

municipal solid waste generated annually: 210 million tons (2015 est.)

Yangtze - 6,300 km; Huang He - 5,464 km; Amur river source (shared with Mongolia and Russia [m]) - 4,444 km; Mekong river source (shared with Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam [m]) - 4,350 km; Brahmaputra river source (shared with India and Bangladesh [m]) - 3,969 km; Indus river source (shared with India and Pakistan [m]) - 3,610 km; Salween river source (shared with Thailand and Burma [m]) - 3,060 km; Irrawaddy river source (shared with Burma [m]) - 2,809 km; Pearl (shared with Vietnam [s]) - 2,200 km; Red river source (shared with Vietnam [m]) - 1,149 km
note - [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth

Pacific Ocean drainage: Amur (1,929,955 sq km), Huang He (944,970 sq km), Mekong (805,604 sq km), Yangtze (1,722,193 sq km)
Indian Ocean drainage: Brahmaputra (651,335 sq km), Ganges (1,016,124 sq km), Indus (1,081,718 sq km), Irrawaddy (413,710 sq km), Salween (271,914 sq km)
Arctic Ocean drainage: Ob (2,972,493 sq km)
Internal (endorheic basin) drainage: Tarim Basin (1,152,448 sq km), Amu Darya (534,739 sq km), Syr Darya (782,617 sq km), Lake Balkash (510,015 sq km)

Government

23 provinces (sheng, singular and plural), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu, singular and plural), 4 municipalities (shi, singular and plural), and two special administrative regions (tebie xingzhengqu, singular and plural)

provinces: Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang; (see note on Taiwan)

autonomous regions: Guangxi, Nei Mongol (Inner Mongolia), Ningxia, Xinjiang Uyghur, Xizang (Tibet)

note: China considers Taiwan its 23rd province; see separate entries for the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau

Economy

Since the late 1970s, China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role. China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion, resulting in efficiency gains that have contributed to a more than tenfold increase in GDP since 1978. Reforms began with the phaseout of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, growth of the private sector, development of stock markets and a modern banking system, and opening to foreign trade and investment. China continues to pursue an industrial policy, state support of key sectors, and a restrictive investment regime. From 2013 to 2017, China had one of the fastest growing economies in the world, averaging slightly more than 7% real growth per year. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price differences, China in 2017 stood as the largest economy in the world, surpassing the US in 2014 for the first time in modern history. China became the world's largest exporter in 2010, and the largest trading nation in 2013. Still, China's per capita income is below the world average.

In July 2005 moved to an exchange rate system that references a basket of currencies. From mid-2005 to late 2008, the renminbi (RMB) appreciated more than 20% against the US dollar, but the exchange rate remained virtually pegged to the dollar from the onset of the global financial crisis until June 2010, when Beijing announced it would resume a gradual appreciation. From 2013 until early 2015, the renminbi held steady against the dollar, but it depreciated 13% from mid-2015 until end-2016 amid strong capital outflows; in 2017 the RMB resumed appreciating against the dollar - roughly 7% from end-of-2016 to end-of-2017. In 2015, the People's Bank of China announced it would continue to carefully push for full convertibility of the renminbi, after the currency was accepted as part of the IMF's special drawing rights basket. However, since late 2015 Beijing has strengthened capital controls and oversight of overseas investments to better manage the exchange rate and maintain financial stability.

Beijing faces numerous economic challenges including: (a) reducing its high domestic savings rate and correspondingly low domestic household consumption; (b) managing its high corporate debt burden to maintain financial stability; (c) controlling off-balance sheet local government debt used to finance infrastructure stimulus; (d) facilitating higher-wage job opportunities for the aspiring middle class, including rural migrants and college graduates, while maintaining competitiveness; (e) dampening speculative investment in the real estate sector without sharply slowing the economy; (f) reducing industrial overcapacity; and (g) raising productivity growth rates through the more efficient allocation of capital and state-support for innovation. Economic development has progressed further in coastal provinces than in the interior, and by 2016 more than 169.3 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find work. One consequence of China's population control policy known as the "one-child policy" - which was relaxed in 2016 to permit all families to have two children - is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. Deterioration in the environment - notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the North - is another long-term problem. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and urbanization. Beijing is seeking to add energy production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, focusing on natural gas, nuclear, and clean energy development. In 2016, China ratified the Paris Agreement, a multilateral agreement to combat climate change, and committed to peak its carbon dioxide emissions between 2025 and 2030.

The government's 13th Five-Year Plan, unveiled in March 2016, emphasizes the need to increase innovation and boost domestic consumption to make the economy less dependent on government investment, exports, and heavy industry. However, China has made more progress on subsidizing innovation than rebalancing the economy. Beijing has committed to giving the market a more decisive role in allocating resources, but its policies continue to favor state-owned enterprises and emphasize stability. Beijing in 2010 pledged to double China's GDP by 2020, and the 13th Five Year Plan includes annual economic growth targets of at least 6.5% through 2020 to achieve that goal. In recent years, China has renewed its support for state-owned enterprises in sectors considered important to "economic security," explicitly looking to foster globally competitive industries. Beijing also has undermined some market-oriented reforms by reaffirming the "dominant" role of the state in the economy, a stance that threatens to discourage private initiative and make the economy less efficient over time. The slight acceleration in economic growth in 2017-the first such uptick since 2010-gives Beijing more latitude to pursue its economic reforms, focusing on financial sector deleveraging and its Supply-Side Structural Reform agenda, first announced in late 2015.

$23,009,780,000,000 (2020 est.)

$22,492,450,000,000 (2019 est.)

$21,229,360,000,000 (2018 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars
country comparison to the world: 1

47% of GDP (2017 est.)

44.2% of GDP (2016 est.)

note: official data; data cover both central and local government debt, including debt officially recognized by China's National Audit Office report in 2011; data exclude policy bank bonds, Ministry of Railway debt, and China Asset Management Company debt
country comparison to the world: 111

Energy

electrification - total population: 100% (2020)

10,773,248,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from coal and metallurgical coke: 8,652,419,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from petroleum and other liquids: 1,520,552,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)

from consumed natural gas: 600.276 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
country comparison to the world: 1

Communications

Transportation

Military and Security

People's Liberation Army (PLA): Ground Forces, Navy (PLAN, includes marines and naval aviation), Air Force (PLAAF, includes airborne forces), Rocket Force (strategic missile force), and Strategic Support Force (information, electronic, and cyber warfare, as well as space forces); People's Armed Police (PAP, includes Coast Guard, Border Defense Force, Internal Security Forces); PLA Reserve Force (2022)

note 1: the Strategic Support Force includes the Space Systems Department, which is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking, and control, and space warfare

note 2: the PAP is a paramilitary police component of China's armed forces that is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and charged with internal security, law enforcement, counterterrorism, and maritime rights protection

note 3: in 2018, the Coast Guard was moved from the State Oceanic Administration to the PAP; in 2013, China merged four of its five major maritime law enforcement agencies - the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Maritime Police, Fishery Law Enforcement (FLE), and Anti-Smuggling Police - into a unified coast guard

1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)

1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)

1.7% of GDP (2019) (approximately $290 billion)

1.7% of GDP (2018) (approximately $265 billion)

1.8% of GDP (2017) (approximately $260 billion)
country comparison to the world: 88

established in 1927, the PLA is the military arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission; the Central Military Commission is China's top military decision making body

the PRC's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People's Armed Police (PAP), and the militia; the PLA support the internal security forces as necessary:

the MPS controls the civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order; its primary mission is domestic law enforcement and maintaining order, including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism

the MSS is the PRC's main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service

the PAP is a paramilitary component (or adjunct) of the PLA; its primary missions include internal security, maintaining public order, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war; it is under the command of the Central Military Commission (CMC); the China Coast Guard (CCG) administratively falls under the PAP; the CCG has a variety of missions, such as maritime sovereignty enforcement, surveillance, resource protection, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement

the militia is an armed reserve of civilians which serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA upon mobilization; it is distinct from the PLA's reserve forces; militia units are organized around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission; they have dual civilian-military command structures; a key component of the militia are the local maritime forces, commonly referred to as the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM); the PAFMM consists of mariners (and their vessels) who receive training, equipment, and other forms of support from the Navy and CCG (although the PAFMM remains separate from both) to perform tasks such as maritime patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance, emergency/disaster response, transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary tasks in support of naval operations in wartime; the PAFMM's tasks are often conducted in conjunction or coordination with the Navy and the CCG; it has been used to assert Beijing's maritime claims in the East and South China seas

(2022)

Transnational Issues

China and India continue their security and foreign policy dialogue started in 2005 related to a number of boundary disputes across the 2,000 mile shared border; India does not recognize Pakistan's 1964 ceding to China of the Aksai Chin, a territory designated as part of the princely state of Kashmir by the British Survey of India in 1865; China claims most of the Indian state Arunachal Pradesh to the base of the Himalayas, but the US recognizes the state of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory; Bhutan and China continue negotiations to establish a common boundary alignment to resolve territorial disputes arising from substantial cartographic discrepancies, the most contentious of which lie in Bhutan's west along China's Chumbi salient; Chinese maps show an international boundary symbol (the so-called "nine-dash line") off the coasts of the littoral states of the South China Sea, where China has interrupted Vietnamese hydrocarbon exploration; China asserts sovereignty over Scarborough Reef along with the Philippines and Taiwan, and over the Spratly Islands together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei; the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea eased tensions in the Spratlys, and in 2017 China and ASEAN began confidential negotiations for an updated Code of Conduct for the South China Sea designed not to settle territorial disputes but establish rules and norms in the region; this still is not the legally binding code of conduct sought by some parties; Vietnam and China continue to expand construction of facilities in the Spratlys and in early 2018 China began deploying advanced military systems to disputed Spratly outposts; China occupies some of the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan; the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands are also claimed by China and Taiwan; certain islands in the Yalu and Tumen Rivers are in dispute with North Korea; North Korea and China seek to stem illegal migration to China by North Koreans, fleeing privation and oppression; China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with their 2004 Agreement; China and Tajikistan have begun demarcating the revised boundary agreed to in the delimitation of 2002; the decade-long demarcation of the China-Vietnam land boundary was completed in 2009; citing environmental, cultural, and social concerns, China has reconsidered construction of 13 dams on the Salween River, but energy-starved Burma, with backing from Thailand, continues to consider building five hydro-electric dams downstream despite regional and international protests

a major source of precursor chemicals, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and synthetic drugs, including fentanyl precursors and methamphetamine; PRC criminal organizations, transnational crime, and organizations from Mexico and Southeast Asia traffic licit precursor chemical components and illicit finished drugs within the PRC as well as to international markets; significant illicit drug consumption of methamphetamine and ketamine; a major destination and transit country for heroin produced in neighboring countries; the PRC remains a major source of NPS sold in North America and Europe

(2021)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
China's historical civilization dates to at least 13th century B.C., first under the Shang (to 1046 B.C.) and then the Zhou (1046-221 B.C) dynasties. The imperial era of China began in 221 B.C. under the Qin Dynasty and lasted until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
1. United States

The United States' economy is the largest in the world as measured by nominal GDP. The biggest contributor to that GDP is the economy's service sector, which includes finance, real estate, insurance, professional and business services, and healthcare.

The United States has a relatively open economy, facilitating flexible business investment and foreign direct investment in the country. It is the world's dominant geopolitical power and is able to maintain a large external national debt as the producer of the world's primary reserve currency.

The U.S. economy is at the forefront of technology in many industries, but it faces rising threats in the form of economic inequality, rising healthcare and social safety net costs, and deteriorating infrastructure.

China has the world's second-largest nominal GDP in current dollars and the largest in terms of PPP. With annual growth that consistently outpaces that of the United States, China may be on track to become the largest economy in the world by nominal GDP in the years to come.

As China has progressively opened its economy over the past four decades, economic development and living standards have greatly improved. As the government has gradually phased out collectivized agriculture and industry, allowed greater flexibility for market prices, and increased the autonomy of businesses, foreign and domestic trade and investment have taken off.

Coupled with an industrial policy that encourages domestic manufacturing, this has made China the world's number one exporter. Despite these advantages, China faces some significant challenges, such as a rapidly aging population and severe environmental degradation.

Japan is the third-largest economy in the world. Its GDP crossed the $5 trillion mark in 2018. Strong cooperation between government and industry and advanced technological know-how have built Japan's manufacturing and export-oriented economy. Many major Japanese businesses are organized as networks of interlinked companies known as keiretsu.

After the Lost Decade of the 1990s and the impact of the global Great Recession, Japan has seen an uptick in growth in recent years under the policies of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe; however, Japan is poor in natural resources and dependent on energy imports, especially after the general shutdown of its nuclear power industry following the 2011 Fukushima disaster. Japan has also struggled with a rapidly aging population.

Fourth among world economies is Germany. Germany is also Europe's largest economy.

Germany is a top exporter of vehicles, machinery, chemicals, and other manufactured goods and has a highly skilled workforce. Germany, however, faces some demographic challenges to its economic growth. Its low fertility rate makes replacing its aging workforce more difficult, and its high levels of net immigration strain its social welfare system.

5. The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has the fifth-largest economy in the world.

The U.K. economy is driven by its large service sector, particularly in finance, insurance, and business services. The nation's extensive trading relationship with continental Europe has been greatly complicated by the resolution of Brexit subsequent to the 2016 vote to leave the European Union (EU). As of Jan. 31, 2020, the U.K. is officially not a member of the EU, but contentious negotiations over trade relations between the two are ongoing.

India is the sixth-largest economy in the world. Because of its large population, India has the lowest per-capita GDP on this list.

India's economy is a mixture of traditional village farming and handicrafts alongside booming modern industry and mechanized agriculture. India is a major exporter of technology services and business outsourcing, and the service sector makes up a large share of its economic output.

Liberalization of India's economy since the 1990s has boosted economic growth, but inflexible business regulation, widespread corruption, and persistent poverty pose challenges to ongoing expansion.

France has the seventh-largest GDP in the world. Tourism is an important industry, and France receives the most visitors of any country each year.

France is a mixed economy that has many private and semi-private businesses across a diverse range of industries. However, there is still heavy government involvement in certain key sectors, such as defense and electrical power generation.

The French government's commitment to economic intervention in favor of social equality also creates some challenges for the economy, such as a rigid labor market with high unemployment and a large public debt relative to other advanced economies.

The world's eighth-largest GDP belongs to Italy. It is also the eurozone's third-largest economy.

Italy's economy and level of development vary notably by region, with a more developed, industrial economy in the north and underdeveloped southern regions. Italy faces persistently sluggish economic growth due to a very high public debt, an inefficient court system, a weak banking sector, an inefficient labor market with chronically high youth unemployment, and a large underground economy.

Canada is the world's ninth-largest economy. Canada has a well-developed energy extraction sector, with the world's third-largest proven oil reserves. Canada also has impressive manufacturing and service sectors, based mostly in urban areas near the U.S. border.

Canada's free trade relationship with the United States means that three-quarters of Canadian exports head to the U.S. market each year. Canada's close ties to the United States mean that it has developed largely in parallel to the world's largest economy.

10. South Korea

Rounding out the top 10 economies in the world by GDP is South Korea.

South Korea's economy is a 20th-century success story that is today firmly established as an advanced, industrial economy. Known for its strategy of export-led growth and the dominance of its chaebols (large business conglomerates), South Korea in recent decades has built a network of free trade agreements covering 58 countries that account for more than three-quarters of the world's GDP. It is a major producer and exporter of electronics, telecommunications equipment, and motor vehicles.

With this progress, however, South Korea also now faces some of the same challenges that many other advanced economies are dealing with, including slower growth and an aging workforce.

Russia is the world's 11th largest economy.

Russia has moved toward a more market-based economy over the 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but government ownership of and intervention in business is still common. As a leading exporter of oil and gas, as well as other minerals and metals, Russia's economy is highly sensitive to swings in world commodity prices.

In 2022, Russia launched an invasion against its neighbor, Ukraine. As a result of its actions, the country was hit by many sanctions and other economic punishments, which are expected to greatly hurt its economy in 2022 and beyond.

Brazil is the 12th largest economy in the world and the largest in South America. Brazil's diversified economy runs the gamut from heavy industries, such as aircraft and automotive production, to mineral and energy resource extraction. It also has a large agricultural sector that makes it a major exporter of coffee and soybeans.

Brazil emerged from a severe recession in 2017 and suffered a series of high-level corruption scandals along the way. In the wake of these events, Brazil instituted a series of major economic reforms intended to rein in public spending and debt, invest in energy infrastructure, lower barriers to foreign investment, and improve labor market conditions.

13. Australia

Australia is the 13th largest economy in the world

Australia combines a relatively open domestic economy with an extensive network of free trade agreements with trading partners all around the Asia-Pacific Rim. This works to the advantage of Australia's abundant natural resources and agricultural export industries; however, it has also left Australia vulnerable to swings in world commodity demand and prices in energy (coal and natural gas), metals (iron ore and gold), and agricultural products (beef and sheep products).

Spain's GDP makes it the 14th largest economy in the world.

Spain's economy suffered severely during the Great Recession, with unemployment soaring above 25% and a rising national debt despite attempts at fiscal austerity. It has recovered in recent years as moderating inflation and labor costs have encouraged foreign investment and increased the competitiveness of Spain's exports, including manufactured machinery and foodstuffs. However, political instability has hindered the government's ability to sustain further economic reforms.

Mexico is the 15th largest economy in the world.

Over the past three decades, Mexico has emerged as a manufacturing economy under a series of free trade agreements with the United States, Canada, and 44 other countries. Many major U.S. manufacturers have integrated supply chains with counterparts or operations in Mexico. Mexico supports a variety of exports, including consumer electronics, vehicles, and auto parts, as well as petroleum and agricultural products.

The international drug trade constitutes an ongoing challenge to Mexico's development, contributing directly to violence and corruption in the country. Weak legal institutions have made it difficult to regulate and integrate the large informal economy that employs more than half of Mexico's workforce.

16. Indonesia

Indonesia is the world's 16th largest economy.

Indonesia's economy is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and is based largely on commodity export industries. Major exports include coal and petroleum products, in addition to agricultural commodities suitable for industrial use, such as rubber and palm oil. Indonesia's budget deficit for 2023 is targeted at 2.81% to 2.95% of GDP; however, regional inequality, lack of infrastructure, and governmental corruption remain problems for Indonesia's rising economy.

17. Netherlands

The Netherlands stands as the 17th largest economy in the world.

The Netherlands is a major commercial transportation hub, with some industrial manufacturing as well as petroleum extraction and processing. It has a highly developed agricultural sector and is the second-largest agricultural exporter in the world. The Netherlands has a large financial services sector, with assets four times the size of Dutch GDP.

18. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the 18th largest economy in the world.

The Saudi economy is heavily based on oil and is the world's largest oil exporter. The Saudi government owns and operates much of the country's major industry through its oil company, Aramco; however, with global environmental concerns driving increasing interest in developing non-fossil fuel energy sources, the Saudis are looking to diversify their economy by encouraging more private investment in healthcare and other service industries.

The Saudi government has also begun to at least partially privatize Aramco, listing the company on the Saudi Stock Exchange through an initial public offering (IPO) in December 2019.

Turkey is the 19th largest economy in the world.

Turkey has a largely open economy, with large industrial and service sectors. Major industries include electronics, petrochemicals, and automotive production. Political turmoil and involvement in regional armed conflicts have led to some financial and currency market instability and uncertainty about Turkey's economic future in recent years.

20. Switzerland

The Alpine nation of Switzerland is the 20th largest economy in the world.

Switzerland has a large service sector, including financial services, and a high-tech manufacturing sector served by a highly skilled labor force. High-quality legal, political, and economic institutions and solid physical infrastructure set the stage for a productive economy with one of the highest per-capita GDPs in the world.

Poland is the 21st largest economy in the world. Heavy industry, including iron and steel production, machinery manufacturing, shipbuilding, and coal mining, is an important part of Poland's economy.

Poland's business-friendly climate and sound macroeconomic policies allowed it to be the only EU country to avoid recession in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. However, inefficient legal and regulatory structures and an aging population are challenges for Poland's ongoing growth in the future.

Sweden is the 22nd largest economy in the world. Sweden is a competitive economy, with a high standard of living and a mix of free enterprise alongside a generous social welfare state. Sweden's manufacturing economy relies heavily on foreign exports, including machinery, motor vehicles, and telecommunications.

Sweden has taken in a large number of new immigrants and thus faces a short- to medium-term challenge with integrating them into Swedish society and its labor market.

Belgium is the 23rd largest world economy. Belgium is a trade and transport hub that has a diversified economy with a mix of services, manufacturing, and high-tech industry.

Because of its deep integration with the rest of the European economy, Belgium is highly sensitive to swings in the overall economic performance of its neighbors. Belgium faces a high public debt burden relative to its GDP, which can constitute an obstacle to growth.

24. Thailand

Thailand is the 24th largest economy in the world.

The Thai economy enjoys relatively high-quality infrastructure, in addition to pro-free-enterprise and pro-investment policies. Thailand is highly dependent on exports, which account for about two-thirds of its GDP. Its main exports include electronics, agricultural products, motor vehicles and parts, and food products. Thailand also has a substantial international tourism industry. Its agricultural sector makes up approximately 10% of its economy but employs about 30% of its workers.

Last but certainly not least is Ireland, the 25th largest world economy.

A strong component of Ireland's economy is its export sector from foreign multinational corporations. Ireland has a low corporate tax of 12.5% and a pool of high-tech workers, making it an appealing place for foreign companies to set up shop and attractive for business investment. Due to international pressure, Ireland will implement more stringent tax laws. Its economy is supported by a strong export sector and job growth.

How Do You Calculate GDP?

What Are the Top 5 Largest Economies?

What Country Has the Strongest Economy?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The United States' economy is the largest in the world as measured by nominal GDP. The biggest contributor to that GDP is the economy's service sector, which includes finance, real estate, insurance, professional and business services, and healthcare. The United States has a relatively open economy, facilitating flexible business investment and foreign direct investment in the country.

# data[].attributes.body
When the pandemic hit China during February 2020, unemployment rates shot up to 6.2%.

# data[].attributes.headline
Get to Know the Creators of this Padlet!

# data[].attributes.subject
Get to Know the Creators of this Padlet!

# data[].attributes.body
Hi! Welcome to our Padlet! This is Maxine and Shanixia of Grade 10 Solomon. We are diagnosing the economic health of China! We hope you learn a lot and enjoy the information placed on this interactive Padlet! 🤩 🤩 🤩

# data[].attributes.body
1. Silver, C. (2020, December 24). The Top 25 Economies in the World. Investopedia. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/

2. China. (n.d.). Central Intelligence Agency - CIA. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/china/#economy

3. China. (n.d.). World Bank Open Data | Data. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/country/china

4. China's GDP tops 100 trln Yuan in 2020 - Xinhua | English.news.cn. (2021, January 18). 新华网 XinhuaNet. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/18/c_139677413_2.htm

5. National Debt in Relation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China. (2020, October 13). Statista. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/270329/national-debt-of-china-in-relation-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp/

6. Top Countries Based on Production of Milled Rice. (n.d.). Statista. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/255945/top-countries-of-destination-for-us-rice-exports-2011/https://www.statista.com/statistics/255947/top-rice-exporting-countries-worldwide-2011/

7. Rice vs. Potatoes. (2015, October 28). MONDIEU. https://en.mondieu.sk/rice-vs-potatoes/

8. China Country Assessment Report on Ageing and Health. (n.d.). World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/ageing/publications/china-country-assessment/en/https://time.com/5523805/china-aging-population-working-age/

9. China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States. (2006, July 12). Every CRS Report. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33534.html

10. State Council Circular on Issuing "State Council Temporary Measures on Providing for Old, Weak, Sick, and Handicapped Cadres" and "State Council Temporary Measures on Workers' Retirement, Resignation" (Chinese Text). (n.d.). Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/state-council-circular-on-issuing-state-council-temporary-measures-on

11. Zhang, A. (2020, December 19). Understanding China's Former One-Child Policy. Investopedia. Retrieved March 4, 2021, from https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/120114/understanding-chinas-one-child-policy.asp

12. Nikolova, M. (2016, May 2). Two Solutions to the Challenges of Population Aging. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/05/02/two-solutions-to-the-challenges-of-population-aging/

13. China: Monthly Surveyed Unemployment Rate 2020. (n.d.). Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109881/surveyed-monthly-unemployment-rate-in-china/

# data[].attributes.body
Although China claims that they have eliminated absolute poverty, many are suspicious of this, because proper computations were not shown.

# data[].attributes.body
Hi! I am the universal stud.

# data[].attributes.body
Background:

China = world’s largest rice producer, world’s 7th largest rice exporter

BUT,

60% of its groundwater is polluted

3 million hectares of farmland has poor soil

Effects:

Poor soil → rice is harder to grow

Affects China’s economy → they won’t be able to export as much rice

They become dependent on the USA for rice supply → NOT what China wants

Solutions:

Grow potatoes instead!

Easy to grow on bad soil

Carb, which can act as a substitute for rice

High vitamin C content

Universal stud → Many other countries also have high demands for potatoes, so China can benefit economically from this as well!

Fun Fact: China has recently noticed their rice problem, so they started promoting potatoes around the country! Watch this informative video featuring a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ‘Sister Potato’, who loves potatoes!

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Why China Is Obsessed With Promoting Potatoes (HBO)

# data[].attributes.body
Background:

China’s Population = over 1.4 billion

In 1979, China introduced their one-child policy (Listen to the recording for more information!)

China’s retirement age → 60 for men, 55 for female civil servants, and 50 for female workers

BUT,

As of 2020, 17.4% of China’s population was at 60 years old and above

By 2040, an estimated 28% of China’s population will be at 60 years old and above

Effects:

Currently,

17.4% of the population at 60+ years old → 17.4% of the population already at retirement age/nearly at retirement age → 17.4% of the population unable to contribute to the economy’s output

If this continues, by 2040,

28% of the population at 60+ years old → 28% of the population already at retirement age/nearly at retirement age → 28% of the population unable to contribute to the economy’s output

In a growing economy like China’s, an aging population is NOT what they need. In order to continue stable economic growth, China needs WORKING PEOPLE contributing to the economy’s output.

Solution:

Encourage the elderly to remain in the labor force by raising the retirement age

Improves the elderly’s monetary status

Leads to higher tax revenue and more consumer spending, which will be beneficial for economic growth

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Why China's Former One-Child Policy Is Not Helping  Their Current Aging Population in Less Than 1 Minute and 30 seconds

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.metadata.title
Why China's Former One-Child Policy Is Not Helping  Their Current Aging Population in Less Than 1 Minute and 30 seconds

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
G10 Soc Stud - GRAPHICS_ Diagnosing a Nation’s Economic Health

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
G10 Soc Stud - GRAPHICS_ Diagnosing a Nation’s Economic Health

# data[].attributes.body
Did you know❓
China has been the most populous country for over a century!