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https://europe.unc.edu/iron-curtain/power-and-politics-the-prisoners-dilemma/

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On this page you will learn about the political game theory and the Prisoner's Dilemma in relation to global Cold War politics.

More about Power and Politics: The EU and Soft Power ~ Democratization

THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION: INTRODUCTION

As both sides built up massive arsenals of nuclear arms, it became clear that the Cold War had put the world in the most dangerous situation it had faced yet. The military doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction emerged during John F. Kennedy's presidency, and was put to the test during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union had allied itself with communist Cuba, and, in 1962, was caught building a nuclear warhead on the island, only 90 miles from U.S. soil.

After many secret meetings with his top advisors, President Kennedy ordered a naval blockade around Cuba to cut off Soviet military supply lines, and ordered the Soviet Union to remove the missile and destroy its production site. Kennedy wrote to Soviet leader Khrushchev reminding him of the " catastrophic consequences " this crisis would have for the world if it were not solved peacefully.

The two leaders of the world's greatest powers wrote back and forth to each other for several days, questioning each other's true motives and eventually negotiating terms of settlement. After 13 days of crisis, the Soviet Union finally agrees to remove the missile in exchange (primary documents) for the United States lifting the naval blockade on Cuba and agreeing not invade the country.

In this case the "prisoner's" dilemma is clear: each side can cooperate avoid annihilating each other, or they can defect and shoot first, guaranteeing total destruction of their countries and significant portion of the world.

Despite the crisis, the nuclear buildup continued. Neither side had an incentive to reduce their arsenal while the other grew theirs; however, MAD and the game theory behind it more or less guaranteed that neither side would ever actually use a nuclear missile, and luckily for the world, they never did.

Video: What Is the Prisoner's Dilemma?
Credits: This page curated by CES.

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Power and Politics - The Prisoner's Dilemma

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On this page you will learn about the political game theory and the Prisoner's Dilemma in relation to global Cold War politics. More about Power and Politics: The EU and Soft Power ~ Democratization As both sides built up massive arsenals of nuclear arms, it became clear that the Cold War had put the world in the most dangerous situation it had faced yet.

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St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha

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St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha

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St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=emyi4z-O0ls

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How to outsmart the Prisoner’s Dilemma - Lucas Husted

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https://padlet.com/analeticiabm/gp2m5hsx50e2r533

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https://europe.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/314/2017/05/Dilemma-Study-Guide.pdf

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https://www.cfr.org/blog/overcoming-prisoners-dilemma-reach-peace-afghanistan

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Last week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad's appointment as special advisor on Afghanistan with the stated objective of "developing the opportunities to get the Afghans and the Taliban to come to a reconciliation." This appointment, the strongest sign that the Donald J. Trump administration is taking the prospect of peace seriously, follows several noteworthy developments this year that underscored a desire for peace among the parties to the conflict and international actors. There is an opportunity to further the peace process, but, to do so, Khalilzad will have to overcome a quintessential prisoner's dilemma between the core parties to the conflict.

The prisoner's dilemma is a fundamental example in game theory where rational actors (in this case, the United States, the Afghan government and polity, the Taliban, Pakistan, and regional actors) fail to cooperate even if they would benefit from doing so. In this example, each actor would benefit from a peaceful outcome in Afghanistan but may perceive unacceptable short-term costs associated with that outcome.

Each actor would benefit from a peaceful outcome in Afghanistan but may perceive unacceptable short-term costs.

Peace in Afghanistan would allow the United States to end its longest war-now in its seventeenth year-on which it spends approximately $45 billion annually and has lost more than 2,300 U.S. service members. The Afghan government could better invest the billions of dollars of international security assistance it receives in infrastructure; commerce; and the Afghan people, who are among the poorest in the world. Taliban members could contest for and hold power as a legitimate part of the Afghan polity without combatting international military efforts and sanctions. Pakistan, which receives widespread blame for providing sanctuary to Taliban senior leaders, could see an improvement in bilateral ties with the United States and greater stability on its western border.

Despite these long-term benefits, these actors might focus instead on the immediate risks of cooperation.

The United States, for one, is rightly skeptical of the Taliban as a negotiating partner, given divisions between the group's political and military wings, and likely internal divisions on pivotal issues such as the constitution and the structure of the Afghan government. Working with the Taliban directly may also risk undermining Kabul if the Taliban refuses to move beyond talks with Washington.

For the Afghan government-aside from overcoming the deep history of animosity from the unpopular Taliban rule and subsequent violent insurgent campaign-politically legitimizing the Taliban would threaten the influence of current power brokers. Kabul would also likely be sensitive to a sharp reduction in development and security assistance that could accompany a conclusion of the international military effort.

The Taliban may perceive little incentive to talk to the current Afghan government, which could be replaced in presidential elections scheduled for April 2019. Moreover, the 2019 presidential election could be contested, further reducing the cohesion and legitimacy of the Afghan government, which would put the Taliban in a stronger negotiating position. The Taliban may also assess that Kabul does not have the power to reach the group's core goal of reducing foreign troop presence. Formally joining negotiations could also undermine internal Taliban narratives that drive its recruiting and military campaigns.

It is possible to overcome the prisoner's dilemma in Afghanistan and arrive at a mutually beneficial outcome.

Lastly, according to many observers, it is a matter of Pakistani strategic doctrine to maintain the Taliban as a powerful actor in Afghanistan in order to protect Pakistan's interests-a concept that strategists refer to as "strategic depth"-and prevent India from establishing a stronghold of influence on its Western flank. Islamabad therefore probably has little incentive to militarily target senior Taliban leaders living on Pakistani soil, minimizing the urgency behind leaders' involvement in negotiations.

Despite these immediate obstacles, it is possible to overcome the prisoner's dilemma in Afghanistan and arrive at a mutually beneficial outcome but, at a minimum, it will require incremental and sustained confidence-building among all parties and bold, catalytic diplomacy. A steady stream of confidence-building measures allows each actor to consider the benefits of peace while reducing the gulf of mistrust between all sides. A renewed diplomatic effort, perhaps represented by Khalilzad's recent appointment, to relentlessly engage skeptical parties and align seemingly divergent immediate interests will help to achieve the consensus goal. Ultimately, an end state in which all parties to the Afghanistan conflict see themselves as better off than they are today does exist. With the right approach, the parties need not take undue risks to achieve it.
Courtney Cooper is an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a position being sponsored by the U.S. government. Samir Kumar is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely the views of the authors.

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Overcoming the Prisoner's Dilemma to Reach Peace in Afghanistan

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Last week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad's appointment as special advisor on Afghanistan with the stated objective of "developing the opportunities to get the Afghans and the Taliban to come to a reconciliation." This appointment, the strongest sign that the Donald J.

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What Is the Prisoner's Dilemma? - Instant Egghead #9

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Defining An Acceptable Outcome in Russia's War in Ukraine Pop-up Case

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5. Nuclear deterrence and arms control - Very Short Introductions

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https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/myths-and-misconceptions-debate-russia

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60602936

https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/27/what-are-global-implications-of-ukraine-crisis-pub-55112

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Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank

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This report deconstructs 16 of the most prevalent myths that shape contemporary Western thinking on Russia, and explains their detrimental impact on the design and execution of policy.

Western policies towards Russia have failed to achieve their basic goal of establishing a stable and manageable relationship with Moscow because the thinking behind them has often been unrealistic or simply flawed. This study encourages Western governments and institutions to reassess their assumptions about Russia in order to develop more effective responses to the increasing challenges the country presents. 'Effective' in this context means, in particular, deterring Russian aggression abroad and ultimately securing a less adversarial relationship with Russia without compromising principles of sovereignty and security and the values on which they are based.

To this end, the report presents 16 of the most prevalent 'myths' - in a broadly defined sense - that distort the Western policy debate on Russia. It outlines how specific misconceptions have gained unwarranted traction in policymaking circles in the 'West' (understood here principally as Western Europe and North America). It describes the impact of these misconceptions on Western policy towards Russia, and in each case suggests what better-informed policy would look like.

The origins and causes of these myths can be divided into several broad categories. Some originate in the West, based on the default assumptions of politicians and policymakers whose formative experience has been restricted to operating in Western democratic systems and interacting with like-minded countries. The belief, for example, that Russia and the West have the same desired end state for their relationship arises when we project our own values on to Moscow and assume that we share a default common understanding of basic principles. So, too, does the argument that it is necessary or desirable for the West to make concessions to win Russian cooperation on particular issues. Similarly, the notion that the problem in relations with Russia is a lack of dialogue presupposes that more dialogue will narrow differences, when in fact Russia's current leadership is strongly motivated to maintain confrontation as a means of forcing concessions from the West.

Other prevalent myths simply reflect inadequate knowledge of Russia. For example, the widespread impression that the regime is effectively a one-man show controlled by Vladimir Putin is a consequence of insufficient understanding of how the country is really governed, and of the significant roles played by other individual officials and the institutions they control in shaping, negotiating and delivering policy. Similarly, the assumption that what comes after Putin must necessarily be better than the current leadership derives from an entirely human inclination towards optimism which has not been tempered by exposure to the realities of Russian politics and history.

A further, distinct category of myth relates to Russia's relationship with China. For example, the idea that the West as a whole can find common cause with Russia against China, or contrive a means to set Russia and China against each other, is a confection of multiple myths - most notably regarding the complex nature of the Sino-Russian relationship itself, and Russia's long-term objectives for its own relationships with Euro-Atlantic states and institutions.

However, the majority of the myths presented here have become embedded in Western policy discourse as a direct result of deliberate Russian lobbying and disinformation. Several of the myths are prevalent not only because they arise spontaneously and out of good faith, but also because it is in the Kremlin's interest to cultivate them. Some reflect long-standing aspirations on the part of Russia: its quest for a pan-European security system on a Russian design has persisted in various forms since the 1950s. Equally, certain myths reflect broader strategic narratives that provide a framework for legitimizing Russian foreign policy goals: for example, the notion that Russia can rightfully lay claim to a sphere of privileged interests; or the suggestion that Ukrainians and Belarusians together with Russians are one Slavic people rather than having their own identities and separate forms of statehood. At other times, Russia's aim in propagating a myth can be linked to a discrete foreign policy outcome such as promoting the Eurasian Economic Union as an economic integration project equivalent to the EU.

Many of these myths, whether deliberately promoted and promulgated by Russia or not, find a willing audience in the West because they sit comfortably with audiences not attuned to Russia's understanding of history and its current leaders' definition of national interests. Adherence to myths can sometimes provide convenient excuses for inaction - or coping strategies in the face of fear and discomfort over the idea of Russia as a strategic adversary, and in the face of Russian actions that should otherwise be unacceptable. As such, the myths exert a pernicious influence on Western policy, distorting it to favour or permit outcomes desirable for Russia but not for the West.

One of the aims of this report is to call out these myths and encourage a reappraisal by Western policymakers who have misconstrued the nature of the relationship with Russia for too long. By challenging incorrect assumptions about Russia, and the flawed policy arguments that are based on them, this report urges Western politicians and officials to re-examine their positions on Russia and the effects of their assumptions on policy.

In April 2021, US President Joe Biden stated a desire for 'predictable and stable relations' with Russia. This was not a naive call for a reset. The explicit invitation to de-escalate, accompanying a carefully calibrated package of new sanctions, showed a clear intent to influence Russia's risk-benefit calculus and offer Russia a route to a better and less fraught relationship with the US and the West more broadly.

Russia's immediate and emphatic rejection of this offer means that the relationship seems to have returned to its usual unstable path. That said, in one respect the relationship with Russia is predictable: the analyses presented in this report strongly suggest that Russia, for the foreseeable future, will continue to trample on internationally accepted principles of behaviour and commit further aggressions undeterred, using some of the myths below as justification.

The Russian leadership will, of course, also continue its efforts to redefine the balance of global power and negotiate with Washington in a context more favourable to Russia. For US policymakers and their allies, as well as their respective publics, unravelling myth from reality in dealing with Russia has arguably never been more important.

The myths

Myth 01: 'Russia and the West are as "bad" as each other'

This pervasive view ignores significant differences in policy and conduct. 'The West' is a community of shared interests and values; NATO and EU enlargements have been demand-driven. Russia instead seeks to impose 'firm good neighbourliness' on other states whether they agree or not, and regards a 'sphere of privileged interests' as an entitlement. Controversies over Western military interventions bear no comparison to the duplicity, the absence of diplomacy and the wholesale abrogation of treaties that preceded Russia's interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. The West requires greater clarity in presenting its own policies, but there is no equivalence to acknowledge.

Myth 02: 'Russia and the West want the same thing'

Western policies that aim to engage with Russia fail if they are founded on the notion that at some level Russian and Western interests must align or at least overlap. The drive to normalize relations without addressing the fundamental causes of discord makes things worse not better. Both strategically and in detail on specific issues, Russian objectives and underlying assumptions about relations between states are incompatible with what Western states and societies find acceptable. Recognizing that Western and Russian values and interests are not reconcilable, and adjusting for that reality in the long-term conduct of the relationship, is key to managing these conflicts and contradictions.

Myth 03: 'Russia was promised that NATO would not enlarge'

Contrary to the betrayal narrative cultivated by Russia today, the USSR was never offered a formal guarantee on the limits of NATO expansion post-1990. Moscow merely distorts history to help preserve an anti-Western consensus at home. In 1990, when Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a united Germany's incorporation into NATO, he neither asked for nor received any formal guarantees that there would be no further expansion of NATO beyond the territory of a united Germany. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR transformed the security situation in Europe. Russia's new leaders did not question the principle that countries in Europe were completely free to make their own security arrangements. Similarly, the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 1997 recognized the 'inherent right' of all states 'to choose the means to ensure their own security'.

Myth 04: 'Russia is not in a conflict with the West'

Euro-Atlantic policymakers may be reluctant to admit it, but Moscow's natural state is one of confrontation with the West. A key feature of the conflict is the use of unconventional hostile measures that remain above the threshold of accepted peacetime activities but below that of warfare. The Kremlin seeks to undermine Western interests through a well-established toolkit, such as election interference, targeted state-sanctioned assassinations, and information warfare. Crucially, unconventional hostile measures and indirect actions are not just features of this conflict, but contribute to the (mistaken) perception of there being no conflict.

Myth 05: 'We need a new pan-European security architecture that includes Russia'

Russian leaders advocate a treaty-based and continent-wide European security system that would replace existing 'Euro-Atlantic' structures, particularly NATO. This proposal is problematic: it ignores basic differences between Russia and Western countries over the issue of sovereignty. Russia wants 'great power' privileges for itself, limits on the sovereignty of neighbouring countries, and agreement that states should not be criticized if they run their domestic affairs in ways inconsistent with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This perspective clashes with core Western interests and values. As such, even if a new pan-European security architecture were to be established, the fundamental differences in outlook between the two sides would stop such a system from functioning. Western policymakers should be clear that disagreements with Russia over the European security architecture are profound and unlikely to be reconciled soon.

Myth 06: 'We must improve the relationship with Russia, even without Russian concessions, as it is too important'

This myth rests on the premise that a combination of supposedly self-evident geopolitical weight, mutual economic interests and compensation for losing the Cold War are overriding imperatives for a successful reset with Russia - leading to a necessarily fully functional relationship. That this may leave 'lesser powers' more vulnerable to intimidation or influence is, according to those who subscribe to the myth, an unfortunate side effect and/or a price worth paying. Yet quite apart from the deep ethical ambiguities such an accommodation implies, the arrangement simply would not work.

Partly, this is because the presentation of the West, and the US in particular, as a threat to 'Fortress Russia' is an essential support to the Kremlin's increasingly authoritarian domestic rule. Few areas show promise for cooperation with Russia. Efforts in those most frequently mooted - cybersecurity, the Middle East and North Africa, trade - have all failed so far because of Russia's illiberal approach to each subject. It is also worth remembering that Moscow itself is not putting forward cooperation wishlists; they are invariably the work of Western politicians and diplomats. Western policymakers must expect that the Kremlin's vision of Russia as a fortress entitled to a commanding role in the world yet threatened by outside powers, and by the US in particular, will remain at the heart of its beliefs.

Myth 07: 'Russia is entitled to a defensive perimeter - a sphere of "privileged interests" including the territory of other states'

The idea that Russia should be entitled to an exclusive sphere of influence in other states, notably in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, is deeply problematic. It is incompatible with professed Euro-Atlantic values around states' sovereignty and rights to self-determination. It is detrimental to geopolitical order and international security, as it implicitly gives licence to Russian actions - territorial aggression, annexation, even outright war - that risk creating instability in Russia's neighbours and Europe more widely. It effectively entitles Russia to dominate neighbouring states and violate their territorial integrity. And it misconstrues contemporary geopolitical realities, such as Russia's grudging acceptance of a second player in its vicinity - China (specifically, in relation to the expansion of China's influence in Central Asia). Betrayal aside, it is doubtful that it is even within the gift of the West to concede a sphere of influence to Russia - or that such an understanding would work if somehow established. Failure to critically re-examine geopolitical doctrines on this subject risks reproducing reductive Cold War-era postures. And while some post-Soviet and Eastern European states - and even their populations - may desire closer relations with Russia, none of them want to sacrifice their sovereign rights.

Myth 08: 'We must drive a wedge between Russia and China to impede their ability to act in tandem against Western interests'

The notion that the West can exploit tensions between Russia and China both misunderstands the nature of the relationship between the two countries and overestimates its susceptibility to external leverage. A corollary of the myth is the assumption that Russia and China form a single strategic entity that was somehow 'allowed' to develop by negligent Western policymakers. Yet just as the West did not join Russia and China together, it cannot put them asunder. The two powers have a natural ideological compatibility as well as complementary economies and interests in a range of spheres, including technology, cyber cooperation and defence. At the same time, the myth distorts the nature of the Sino-Russian relationship by ascribing to it a behavioural convergence and a grand conspiratorial character, while overlooking each state's commanding imperative to retain full autonomy in decision-making. Given that the two powers currently have more to gain from cooperation than competition, both Russia and China have chosen to push their differences to the background for the foreseeable future. But latent bilateral tensions could come to the fore in the future as China's ascendancy continues. The emergence of an 'axis of authoritarianism' is thus not in prospect.

Myth 09: 'The West's relations with Russia must be normalized in order to counter the rise of China'

Rapprochement with Russia as a strategic means of countering China would likely take place on the Kremlin's terms, and would mean sacrificing the hard-won sovereignty of other post-Soviet states. Moreover, to subscribe to this myth is to assume that the Kremlin even wants normalized relations with the West, and to forget that a better relationship with Russia, whatever its price, would do little to prevent China's reach and capabilities from continuing to grow. Most importantly, while China's transgressions of international law and violations of human rights are no more to be excused than those of Russia, an alliance with the Kremlin implicitly removes the possibility of China and the West having sustainable relations in the longer term. Western nations do not have the luxury of focusing solely on the challenges posed by China while somehow glossing over Russia's aggressive behaviour.

Myth 10: 'The Eurasian Economic Union is a genuine and meaningful counterpart to the EU'

Russia presents the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as a partner for the EU in a proposed free-trade area stretching 'from Lisbon to Vladivostok'. In reality, the EAEU is a political project lacking the features of a true common market. Russia disregards the rules of the very organization through which it seeks to reassert its power, and with which it wants the EU to cooperate. Trade policy does not constitute a separate, non-politicized track in Russia's foreign policy; it is subordinated to it. Due to this instrumental use and deep politicization of economic diplomacy, the EAEU is functionally unable to act as an integration body in Eurasia, not least because Russia has no economic interest in comprehensive trade liberalization either inside the EAEU or via a free-trade area with the EU.

Myth 11: 'The peoples of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are one nation'

The Kremlin misrepresents the region's history in order to legitimize the idea that Ukraine and Belarus are part of Russia's 'natural' sphere of influence. In fact, both countries have stronger European roots than the Kremlin cares to admit. It is historically inaccurate to claim that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus ever formed a single national entity (indeed, the latter two countries also have political and cultural roots in intrinsically European structures such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). The Kremlin's narrative, which served to justify Russia's claim to the status of primus inter pares among post-Soviet republics, acknowledges Russia's right to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbours to this day. The idea of a 'triune' Russian nation downgrades the uniqueness of historic indigenous cultures. Moreover, in questioning the authenticity of Ukrainian identity and the viability of 'Belarusianness' as national building-blocks, it seeks to entrench in international public opinion stereotypes that would make it harder for the two countries to pursue greater integration with Europe.

Myth 12: 'Crimea was always Russian'

The Kremlin propagates the fiction that Crimea legitimately and willingly 'seceded' from Ukraine and 'rejoined' Russia in 2014. If unchallenged, this myth risks further undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity and encouraging expansionist powers elsewhere. The subsequent drastic militarization of Crimea by Russia, and the latter's unlawful restrictions on navigation in the Sea of Azov, increase the vulnerability both of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to Russian security threats.

Yet the reality is that Crimea has been in Russian hands for only a fraction of its history. Historically (before 2014), Crimea belonged to Russia for a total of only 168 years, or less than 6 per cent of its written history. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, no major separatist movement has existed in Crimea. Ukrainians, Russians and Crimean Tatars co-existed peacefully, with wide-ranging autonomy provided by the constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The 'referendum' organized by Russia and held under duress on 16 March 2014 was in fact merely a smokescreen to formalize Russia's military takeover of the peninsula.

Myth 13: 'Liberal market reform in the 1990s was bad for Russia'

The myth is that in Russia in the 1990s liberal market reform created a prolonged recession. It is true that liberal reform was attempted and that output fell heavily over six years, but the former did not cause the latter. Liberal reform as originally conceived was never fully or adequately implemented in Russia. In Poland, in contrast, where reform was carried out, the decline in output was brief and modest. In Russia, politically weak authorities failed to follow through on stabilizing the economy (including getting inflation under control and managing the public finances), while another key strand of reform, privatization, was marred by corruption. The false belief that a well-functioning market economy is somehow incompatible with Russia weakens Western policy.

Myth 14: 'Sanctions are the wrong approach'

Economic sanctions have already demonstrated practical and normative value as responses to unacceptable Russian behaviour - but they need to be allowed time to work, and their effectiveness should not be judged against impossible tests. Despite claims to the contrary, sanctions have influenced Russian actions and have taken effect despite the challenges of their use on a large and resilient target. Sanctions also demonstratively condemn unacceptable behaviour and reaffirm collective commitment to the norms and principles of international order.

Myth 15: 'It's all about Putin - Russia is a manually run, centralized autocracy'

Governance in Russia is not a one-man show. Contrary to widespread thinking, many different actors and institutions can play a meaningful role in decision-making and policy implementation in the country. The president's personal role is often exaggerated, with external observers overlooking or misunderstanding the roles of collective bodies (for example, the Presidential Administration and the Security Council), overestimating the degree of managerial competence and discipline (presidential orders are, for instance, frequently not fulfilled), or failing to take into account the self-interested behaviour of actors beyond Putin. Although Putin may have the ability to intervene in all types of decision-making, that does not mean that he always does or wants to. To understand how governance actually works in the country, we need to take into account the power and complexity of the Russian bureaucracy - which will only continue to grow in importance.

Myth 16: 'What comes after Putin must be better than Putin'

This myth again reflects the triumph of hope over experience and analysis. Russia has structural issues that go beyond the difficulties associated with Putin's rule. As a result, the likelihood of a post-Putin Russia building a viable democratic political system is now lower than it was during the 1990s. In particular, the country will need a new professional cadre of elite bureaucrats and policymakers if it is to deliver accountable and effective governance. Yet conditions for the cultivation of such a cadre do not exist in today's Russia. Irrespective of who eventually succeeds Putin, Russia's political culture is certain to continue to impede the development of more constructive relations with the West.

Recommendations

Each of the authors in this volume has accompanied their analysis of a particular myth with recommendations for better policy that is more grounded in reality. These recommendations make full use of the combined decades of experience of the analysts represented here - experience which, unlike that of politicians, has not been limited or constrained by electoral terms or the cycles of political fashion. For ease of presentation, the collected recommendations are distilled here, and grouped by theme. (A condensed set of 10 principles for dealing more effectively and rationally with Russia, drawing on a selection of the authors' specific recommendations and the points below, is also presented in the 'Conclusion' chapter of this report.)

The authors offer the following advice to Western policymakers:

First principles: understanding the relationship

Understand that Russia is not currently a partner of the West, and recognize the reality of disagreement. There are good reasons why attempts to find common ground with Russia have consistently failed over the past 25 years: the strategic interests of Moscow and the West are at presen t incompatible.

Do not assume by default that Russia is interested in cooperation to reduce tensions, or that Western countries can persuade the Russian leadership to change its position. Confrontation with the West currently helps the Kremlin to consolidate its rule at home.

Accept that a poor relationship with Russia is not a tragedy if there are currently no means to improve it. Diplomatic tensions are an inevitable result of properly recognizing the nature of the Russian system in its current form.

Dealing with Russia's leaders

Identify what a realistic desired state of relations with Russia should be - what should the West expect from Russia, and what can and can't it live with? Define actions that are 'unacceptable' and ensure there are meaningful consequences for Russian transgressions of international law and norms.

Acknowledge the role of people and institutions beyond Putin in decision-making. The limits of Putin's power, as well as the importance of many actors who enable him and at times constrain him, must be recognized.

At the same time, do not posit policy on an anticipated improvement in Russia after the current leadership departs. Putin and his entourage subscribe to long-standing Russian policy principles, and their disruptive foreign policy should not automatically be considered as an anomaly.

Supporting Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space

Insist that Russia is not entitled to an exclusive sphere of influence at the expense of the sovereignty of its neighbours. A Russian veto on the foreign and security policies of independent countries around its periphery should be publicly deemed unacceptable, not only because it is antithetical to Western values and priorities but because it is destabilizing for the security of Europe.

Reject the concept of a single Russian nation encompassing Ukraine and Belarus. Russia's contention that the core Slavic nations are 'one people' is an attempted legitimating device for intervention in those nations' affairs. The idea must be contested because it is a serious obstacle to both countries' stable development.

Maintain commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbours, including Ukraine, and clearly communicate this to Russia. The illegality of the occupation and annexation of Crimea must not be glossed over or no longer discussed simply because it is inconvenient to do so.

Build on the success of NATO security programmes in the Baltic Sea region by expanding these to the Black Sea. Such measures should include a reinforced forward presence in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and should also utilize the new Enhanced Opportunities Programme for Ukraine as a vehicle to increase Black Sea security.

International security

Russia and China

Sanctions

Maintain the use of sanctions as the West's most potent instrument. Sanctions can be a precision tool, targeting individuals and sectors with little impact on the wider population, especially compared to domestic structural factors. The West enjoys escalation dominance here, and can apply more severe measures in the event of further unacceptable Russian behaviour.

Do not hold sanctions to impossible tests they will inevitably fail. Sanctions on their own may not cause Russia to reverse the most important actions it has taken. But no foreign policy instrument achieves all its goals. Sanctions influence Russian capacities and choices, and have discouraged the regime from escalating its actions on specific occasions.

The business community and the Russian economy

Addressing Western fallibility

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Myths and misconceptions in the debate on Russia

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This report deconstructs 16 of the most prevalent myths that shape contemporary Western thinking on Russia, and explains their detrimental impact on the design and execution of policy. Western policies towards Russia have failed to achieve their basic goal of establishing a stable and manageable relationship with Moscow because the thinking behind them has often been unrealistic or simply flawed.

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VERSION 1: The invasion of Ukraine reflects Russia's genuine security concerns about the eastward expansion of NATO

VERSION 2: The invasion of Ukraine reflects Russia's genuine security concerns about the eastward expansion of NATO

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLyUeKa2jzY

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How Putin's Invasion is Changing Our World Forever

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https://youtu.be/If61baWF4GE

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The Logic of Nuclear Terror - Introduction

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The Logic of Nuclear Terror - Introduction

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https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003081111/logic-nuclear-terror-roman-kolkowicz?refId=82aebf9d-ebd1-41e2-9c75-05ab787e021d&context=ubx

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Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics.

The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

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The Logic of Nuclear Terror | Roman Kolkowicz | Taylor & Francis eBook

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Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time.

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https://www.brookings.edu/research/managing-risk-nuclear-weapons-in-the-new-geopolitics/

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Madelyn R. Creedon, Robert Einhorn, Kate Hewitt, Bonnie Jenkins, Bruce Jones, Suzanne Maloney, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Jung H. Pak, Frank A. Rose, and Strobe Talbott

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Managing risk: Nuclear weapons in the new geopolitics

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Brookings experts discuss their assessments of the new nuclear world order; the current state of arms control with Russia and China; the impacts of emerging technologies; the status of the non-proliferation regime, including a look at North Korea and Iran; and U.S. nuclear policy moving forward.

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https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/how-likely-use-nuclear-weapons-russia

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Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank

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What is Putin's nuclear weapons threat?

On 21 February, as part of his televised speech that heralded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin issued what was interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons against NATO countries should they interfere in Ukraine. 'Russia will respond immediately' he said, 'and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history'.

Then on 27 February, Putin ordered Russia to move nuclear forces to a 'special mode of combat duty', which has a significant meaning in terms of the protocols to launch nuclear weapons from Russia. According to Russian nuclear weapons experts, Russia's command and control system cannot transmit launch orders in peacetime, so increasing the status to 'combat' allows a launch order to go through and be put into effect.

Putin portrayed this as a defensive response to the imposition of economic sanctions, but outside Russia it is seen as a pathway for Russia to use its nuclear weapons in a first strike surprise attack. This is a highly dangerous situation in which mixed messaging with the potential for misinterpretation could lead to decisions being made under false assumptions - there is a well-documented history of close calls with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons deterrence was developed in the Cold War primarily on the basis of what was called 'mutually assured destruction' (MAD). The idea behind MAD is that the horror and destruction from nuclear weapons is enough to deter aggressive action and war. But the application of deterrence theory to the post-cold war realities is hotly contested and far more complicated in the era of cyberattacks which can interfere with the command and control of nuclear weapons.

Which countries have nuclear weapons?

There are five recognized nuclear weapons states under the global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US. Almost every country in the world participates in the NPT but outside the Treaty three more countries openly declare their possession of nuclear weapons - India, Pakistan, and North Korea - while Israel has not declared the possession of nuclear weapons but is assumed to have them.

The application of deterrence theory to the post-cold war realities is hotly contested and far more complicated in the era of cyberattacks

Nuclear weapons can be divided into different categories depending on their delivery vehicles and launch platforms - land, sea, or air missiles and short, intermediate, and long-range missiles. The US and Russia exchange information on their strategic, long-range nuclear missiles under the New START agreement - a treaty to reduce and monitor nuclear weapons between the two countries.

But with the US decision to exit the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, there are no longer any agreements between the US and Russia regulating the number or the deployment of ground-launched nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres. Short-range nuclear weapons were withdrawn and put in storage as a result of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives but are not subject to any legal restraints.

Would Russia use nuclear weapons?

It assumed that if Russia were to use nuclear weapons it would do so in its attack on Ukraine, not to attack a NATO state which could trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and set off a full NATO response. In such an attack, short range, lower yield 'battlefield' nuclear weapons - of which there are thought to be more than 1,000 in reserve - would be the most likely used.

These would have to be taken from storage and connected to missiles, or placed in bombers, or as shell in artillery. Putin recently supervised an exercise focusing on the readiness of military command and control, combat crews, warships, and strategic missile carriers, as well as the reliability of strategic nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The drill involved Russia's Aerospace Forces, its Southern Military District, Strategic Missile Forces, Northern Fleet, and Black Sea Fleet.

Any movement to ready and deploy Russian nuclear weapons would be seen and monitored by US and others' satellites, which can see through cloud cover and at night. Depending on other intelligence and analysis - and the failure of all diplomatic attempts to dissuade Russia - NATO countries may decide to intervene to prevent launch by bombing storage sites and missile deployment sites in advance.

But there are enormous risks associated with this decision, as to attack might precipitate a far worse attack from Russia and could be characterized as an act of aggression by NATO rather than of pre-emptive defence. However, not to pre-empt leaves Ukraine or other countries open to nuclear weapons explosions with the possibility of hundreds of thousand dead, depending on the target.

How would NATO respond to a Russian nuclear attack?

If Russia were to attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons, NATO countries would most likely respond on the grounds that the impact of nuclear weapons crosses borders and affects the countries surrounding Ukraine. NATO could respond either by using conventional forces on Russian strategic assets, or respond in kind using nuclear weapons as it has several options available. The US has around 150 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs stationed in five NATO countries - Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey - and the US, UK, and France also have long range capability for nuclear attacks under NATO auspices.

Any movement to ready and deploy Russian nuclear weapons would be seen and monitored by US and others' satellites, which can see through cloud cover and at night

But both scenarios mean NATO being drawn into a major war with Russia and so the advantage of deciding to hold back on nuclear retaliation - and communicating that response now - is that Putin cannot portray NATO as threatening Russia with nuclear weapons.

It is always possible - although assumed to be highly unlikely - that Putin may decide to launch a long-range ballistic missile attack against the US, but he knows - as do all his officials - that this would be the end of Russia.

Does Ukraine have nuclear weapons?

As part of the USSR, Ukraine hosted Soviet nuclear missiles along with Belarus and Kazakhstan and, at the end of the Cold War, Ukraine hosted approximately one-third of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons but did not have control over them and so could not have launched them.

In 1994, Ukraine committed to joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and agreed to transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia for elimination by 1996. As part of this arrangement, Russia, the UK, and the US along with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed the Budapest Memorandum to provide security assurances if the former Soviet states joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

The Memorandum agreed that Belarusian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian independence and sovereignty would be respected in the extant borders, that parties would refrain from the threat or the use of force - and specifically from the use of nuclear weapons - against Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and from using economic pressure to influence their politics.

They also agreed immediate United Nations (UN) Security Council action to help Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine if they were a 'victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used'.

On 27 February, in a stage-managed national referendum on constitutional reforms, Belarus voted to allow Russian forces and nuclear weapons and Russian forces to be hosted on a permanent basis, going against the terms of the Budapest memorandum. Belarus also allowed Russian troops to use Belarusian territory to invade Ukraine from the north.

What role does nuclear power play in any threat?

Having civil nuclear power plants and developing nuclear weapons are distinct categories, and the third pillar of the NPT promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although some countries view the production of civil nuclear energy as a proliferation risk, there are many measures to verify a country's status such as International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and verification and export control regimes.

In total, there are 15 nuclear reactors scattered across Ukraine and the country depends on nuclear power for half of its electricity needs - its energy production is composed of nuclear (54 per cent) coal (29 per cent), natural gas (eight per cent), hydro (five per cent), solar (two per cent), and wind (one per cent).

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How likely is the use of nuclear weapons by Russia?

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On 21 February, as part of his televised speech that heralded the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin issued what was interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons against NATO countries should they interfere in Ukraine. 'Russia will respond immediately' he said, 'and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history'.

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https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons

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Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank

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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021.

As part of a project examining NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for members of the NATO Alliance.

NATO has long maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the new treaty, meaning that under current circumstances it is unlikely that any NATO member will join the TPNW. But the reality for NATO, its members and partners is that the TPNW is now here to stay.

There is a risk that if the Alliance maintains an intense focus on opposing the TPNW, this may obscure NATO's broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament, and may undermine the potential for NATO and supporters of the TPNW to work together to advance the common goal of nuclear disarmament.

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NATO and the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons

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The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. As part of a project examining NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for members of the NATO Alliance.

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https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/uncertainty-and-complexity-nuclear-decision-making

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Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank

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Complex systems modelling is already implemented in critical policy areas such as climate change and health. It could also play an important role in the nuclear weapons sphere - by opening alternative pathways that may help mitigate risks of confrontation and escalation - but such modelling has yet to be fully embraced by policymakers in this community.

By applying a complexity lens, policy- and decision-makers at all stages along the nuclear chain of command might better understand how their actions could have significant consequences for international security and peace. Nuclear decision-making is shaped by, and interacts with, the ever-changing international security environment and nuclear weapons policy. Tackling problems in the nuclear weapons policy field requires the implementation of 'system of systems' design principles, mathematical modelling approaches and multidisciplinary analysis.

This research paper presents nuclear weapons decision-making as a complex endeavour, with individual decisions being influenced by multiple factors such as reasoning, intuition (also referred to in the literature as 'gut feeling'), biases and system-level noise. At a time of crisis, these factors may combine to cause risks of escalation. The authors draw on past examples of near nuclear use to examine decision-making in the nuclear context as a wicked problem, with multi-layered, interacting and constantly fluctuating elements.

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Uncertainty and complexity in nuclear decision-making

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Complex systems modelling is already implemented in critical policy areas such as climate change and health. It could also play an important role in the nuclear weapons sphere - by opening alternative pathways that may help mitigate risks of confrontation and escalation - but such modelling has yet to be fully embraced by policymakers in this community.

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Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank

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The press has widely reported claims made by a Google engineer, recently placed on 'administrative' leave, that its AI chatbot called LaMDA 'has become sentient' with an ability to express and share thoughts and feelings the same way a human child would. This claim has been met with interest from the public, but also a lot of scepticism.

However, the promotion of over-hyped narratives on AI technologies is not only alarmist, it is also misleading. It carries the risk of shifting public attention away from major ethical and legal risks; framing the technology in a way that would lead to dangerous over-confidence in its reliability; and paving the way towards ethical- and legal-compliance-washing.

Inherent risks of AI

From helping to advance research in cancer screening to supporting efforts at tackling climate change, AI holds tremendous potential in enabling progress in all segments of society. This is assuming that the technology is reliable and that it works in the intended way.

It also rests on the assumption that both developers and end-users are aware of the technology's limitations and its inherent legal, ethical, and societal implications and risks; and that they are actively seeking to mitigate risks of harm.

Yet, there is an unhelpful tendency, from the media and a segment of the AI community, to present hyperbolic accounts of these technologies' nature and capabilities. This trend subsequently results in derailing the public attention on the already-pressing ethical and legal risks stemming from these technologies and their subsequent harms.

There is an unhelpful tendency, from the media and a segment of the AI community, to present hyperbolic accounts of these technologies' nature and capabilities.

In fact, there is an established and growing body of literature documenting the associated risks of harm from these widely deployed and pervasive technologies. These include sexism, racism, ableism, the centralization of power, lack of clear democratic oversight and accountability, and violation of privacy.

For example, large language models, like Google's LaMDA hold the potential to assist with tasks such as supporting customer services with chatbots, enhancing translation services at much higher speed and with greater accuracy, or even helping to collect and synthesize key patterns and findings from large sets of research papers in specific, specialized subjects like science and the humanities. However, they also carry inherent ethical and legal risks.

One of the most widely discussed risks relate to the absorption of hegemonic worldviews and (harmful) biases reflected in these models' outputs: text collected from the internet in US and UK English were found to overrepresent white supremacist, misogynistic and ageist views. If this data is used to train large language models, they will inevitably reflect these harmful biases.

Another key risk emanating from large language models relates to their deliberate misuse to generate and disseminate disinformation and misinformation campaigns, thus leading to serious risks of harm - ranging from harm on individuals to democratic processes (e.g., electoral fraud).

A third, under-researched but serious example of risk from large language models relates to the acceleration of language loss. Most of these large language models are developed and trained in English and other dominant languages: the more they are deployed and the more pervasive and dependable they are, the more they will lead to the undermining, or even erasure of indigenous languages which, arguably, echoes colonization-era and assimilation policies.

The importance of narrative

The serious implications AI technologies have in real life shed light on the importance of a sensitive and critical approach to the way they are presented. Sensationalist and hyperbolic framings are not only out of touch with reality, they also have the following dangerous implications:

First, there is a risk of over-confidence in these technologies which, subsequently, could lead to over-reliance and a lack of appropriate critical oversight. The capabilities and reliability of AI technologies may be (unintentionally) exaggerated, leading to an under-appreciation of their shortfalls.

This is particularly problematic in light of limited technical literacy in the public policy sphere and among end-users in widely deployed technologies. For example, over-confidence in autonomous vehicles and navigating systems can result in serious, or even lethal risks for the safety of drivers and passengers.

The capabilities and reliability of AI technologies may be (unintentionally) exaggerated, leading to an under-appreciation of their shortfalls.

Second, the anthropomorphizing of AI can mislead policymakers and the public into asking the wrong questions when the societal stakes are so high. This tendency is, to a certain extent, understandable, especially in the mainstream media and news (e.g., Terminator) as it makes the concept of AI more 'relatable' than the intangible, code-riddled programme that more closely reflects the reality of AI.

This is even more the case as progress is proceeding apace in the field and some could argue that artificial intelligence is getting closer to artificial general intelligence - in other words, programmes with similar levels of general intelligence to those of a human. This approach, however, can mislead the public and policymakers into asking the wrong questions and contributing to sterile debates (e.g., legal responsibility of robots) instead of meaningful discussions (e.g., criminal responsibility of developers in the case of fatal accidents).

Third, hyperbolic accounts on AI, coupled with the anthropomorphizing of AI, sets the threshold high on what would constitute technologies 'of concern': this could lead to an overlooking and an under-appreciation of the actual level of ethical and legal risks inherent to the technology in question.

For example, in the military sphere, both the terms 'killer robots' and 'lethal autonomous weapons systems' (LAWS) have been the product of such stigmatization that, as a result, technologies that fall under their high threshold will be overlooked. China has expressed its view that 'LAWS should be understood as fully autonomous lethal weapon systems' - which therefore excludes all technologies that are not 'fully autonomous'.

Yet, it has been rightly argued that ' the overwhelming majority of military investments in AI will not be about lethal autonomous weapons, and indeed none of them may be'. This does not mean, however, that these systems that fall below the threshold of 'sentient' killer robots/LAWS are any less problematic; for example those programmes developed for mass surveillance and intelligence collection, and those used to inform potentially lethal decision-making.

The need for reframing discussions

Without reframing the discussions surrounding AI, actors, including states and big tech companies, will - advertently - steer clear of meaningful discussions surrounding the legal and ethical implications of the technologies they are developing and deploying, including under the pretext that they fall under the high threshold of technologies 'of concern' (e.g., sentient).

Distraction paves the way towards ethical and legal compliance washing practices, where major stakeholders set up processes meant to address key ethical and legal risks but remain opaque, lack an appropriate level of democratic oversight, and do not ultimately address the inherent risks of these technologies.

Distraction paves the way towards ethical and legal compliance washing practices.

Inaction would ultimately leave space, and time, for these technologies to continue to cause harm particularly on vulnerable populations. Instead:

1. Key stakeholders, both from the public and private sectors, should encourage and facilitate meaningful and realist discussions on the development, deployment and use of AI technologies and their societal implications and inherent risks. This must be done with diversity, inclusion and intersectionality at the heart of the deliberations and involving stakeholders from all levels. Collaborative and multidisciplinary research incorporating perspectives from minorities and marginalized populations, and viewpoints from beyond 'the West' is key to enable such reflection.

2. There must be greater willingness and openness to re-evaluate the role of these technologies on the power relationship between governments and corporations on the one hand, and the population on the other hand; identify privileges of those benefitting from these technologies and conversely harm on others; and adopt the appropriate and adequate policy and solutions.

3. The limitations and assumptions behind the technologies developed and deployed must be clear to end-users and all potentially impacted by their use. This transparency is critical in light of greater human-machine teaming and as we grow increasingly dependent on AI. More generally, there must be open and accessible mechanisms of verifying claims made about AI development.

4. Fostering technical literacy among policymakers will help inform meaningful decision-making and prevent the derailing of focus resulting from over-hyped and sensationalist representations of AI. On the flipside of the coin, there must also be greater effort at incorporating ethics and law to inform and shape the development, testing and deployment of AI technologies, which current research in machine learning is in dire need of.

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Intelligence is dead; long live Artificial Intelligence

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The press has widely reported claims made by a Google engineer, recently placed on 'administrative' leave, that its AI chatbot called LaMDA 'has become sentient' with an ability to express and share thoughts and feelings the same way a human child would. This claim has been met with interest from the public, but also a lot of scepticism.

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Nuclear Deterrence

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5. Nuclear deterrence and arms control - Very Short Introductions

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ESSAY MATERIAL

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https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/end-nation-states-part-4-what-post-westphalian-world-age-platforms#top

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The platforms increasingly play the role of aggregators: they structure data that can be used by other companies very efficiently, since it is consistent over very large volumes.

Given the picture sketched by our last articles, the question may almost seem incongruous. However, the answer is not necessarily self-evident, because platforms can only really be effective when they are fully able to implement their logic of increasing returns. Be it in terms of search engines, chatbots, or navigation services, size, not to say domination, is an important condition for efficiency. Moreover, these platforms increasingly play the role of aggregators: they structure data that can be used by other companies very efficiently, since it is consistent over very large volumes.

Hence, one regulatory approach, which is becoming more and more popular, would be to ensure that the data collected by these platforms be used freely and without charge by public good stakeholders, or even be accessible by competitors in order to deconcentrate the market (the French Digital Council has launched a reflection along these lines in France). But of course, other topics also need to be discussed: are platforms obstacles to innovation? This question has been obstructing regulators' work for decades now, with no conclusive answer at this stage, as a data-based antitrust doctrine seems particularly difficult to create. Similarly, one may wonder whether these platforms' social functions are not qualifying them as enemies of democracy, since the equity of voices necessary for public debate seems easily altered through their services.

It is true that it is not easy for governments and regulators to decide on the best stance to adopt towards platforms. While it is difficult to imagine states taking ownership of platforms' attributes, deciding on the model on which to base the coexistence of these two different types of players is particularly challenging, given that platforms are now so embedded in our daily lives. There are four possible scenarios we could nonetheless consider.

Four potential stances to adopt towards meta-platforms

According to this scenario, states will try to pursue their missions as they have done in the past. This scenario would certainly involve a massive shift of sovereign services (healthcare, education, transport, etc.) towards platforms. The latter's action would consist in an "over-treatment" both of traditional actors (doctors, hospitals, schools, teachers, etc.) and of innovation actors (third-party startups using data from and synchronized by platforms). The algorithm provided by one of these meta-platforms would, for instance, be in charge of recommending a particular pedagogical model for a particular student, whose risk of dropping out of school would otherwise be significant. The software of one of these meta-platforms would also diagnose early an emerging cancer, in order to recommend a prescription and to ensure compliance. In this scenario, not only would the transfer of value be important, but it would obviously also involve an equally significant transfer of sovereignty. As we have seen, there seems to be no reason why, in the long run, essential functions such as identity control would not be transferred to platforms either.

This scenario is currently unfolding in many countries, including in France. It's not that our nation is not trying to implement an ambitious digital transformation. It's more that the underlying drivers of change are so deteriorated (poor quality of the education system, sparse governance, resistance of the administrative and productive body) that it is difficult to have a fast and effective impact on the course of events. The tax model linked to the notion of a stable establishment, the absence of truly binding regulation by data, public services' inability to create quality user or citizen experiences, massively facilitate the transfer of skills, and therefore of value, to meta-platforms.

The democratic techno-sovereign scenario

In this second model, both the functions of the central state (i.e. the rather popular idea of a platform state) and of social and economic regulation could be reviewed. The doctrine of competition would no longer be based on market shares, but more generally on the sharing of data, which meta-platforms would place at the service of the common good. Data could also be used to regulate actors of worrying importance. All this, it is true, remains very theoretical, as there is almost no general framework within which to operate. In this scenario, the size of meta-platforms would probably not be so much of a matter of concern, but their ability to influence the experience of the consumer-citizen and, ultimately, of society as a whole, would.

Estonia is the central state that comes closest to this model: not only does it have a long-term technological planning capacity allowing it to provide a wide range of digital public services, but it is also particularly precautious regarding its own potential drifts, so as to avoid transforming into an Orwellian State. A special court of justice for issues related to the use of citizens' data has been set up. To fight the digital divide, squads of public officials assist people in situations of "illectronism". Even issues of resilience (in the event of an attack on their Russian neighbour) seem to have been addressed by a technological approach that goes so far as developing a digital identity for autonomous citizens on blockchain.

For the time being, this scenario seems out of reach for the French state. First of all, civil servants, starting with senior civil servants, are neither trained nor even aware of the potential dimensions of a platform state. Moreover, human capital is lacking and the project has not been the subject of any pedagogical work or democratic debate, given the lack of skills among public servants. These prerequisites are essential for the implementation of such an initiative. Indeed, there is a significant risk that these technologies could, in the event of the advent of autocratic power, negatively impact and subject the most disadvantaged populations. This hypothesis is regularly highlighted in France by many organizations to oppose anything that allows citizens to be "monitored". The risk inherent in this second scenario is that it will slip into the third, presented below.

The totalitarian techno-sovereignty scenario

The Chinese model, whose social credit ratings revealed in 2016 outshine Orwell's dystopia, obviously comes to mind (on this topic, I recommend reading the vertiginous article published in June 2018 in Wired, "The complicated truth about China's social credit system"). The Social Rating that is implemented there is ultimately nothing less than a form of omnipresent and ongoing justice, evaluating through bonus-malus the value of an individual's contribution to the common good. The latter is obviously expected to suffer from little criticism. It is worth noting, however, that this scenario is very well suited to private actors who exchange all the information they gather with the police system, in order for the latter to better control the country. Anonymity is prohibited on social networks, as well as on e-commerce sites and on online media. The truth obviously does not emerge from collectively constructed analyses, but from official propaganda. In this scenario, the size of the platforms is virtuous, because it extends the power of the totalitarian state beyond its borders. Vitally important companies, such as those in the telecom infrastructure sector, are now generally considered more strategic from a military and economic point of view than is an elite battalion. This explains the extreme sensitivity the Chinese and the American governments express when their infrastructure champions (Huawei, ZTE, Cisco, Qualcomm...) are challenged in their expansion strategies.

This scenario is obviously the one promoted by the Silicon Valley culture. It is that of a globalized, post-state world, where physical boundaries have become obsolete. Many arguments stand in favour of this model. First of all, that of efficiency: California's digital players can undoubtedly report breathtaking successes in this domain. And as emphasized by the American authors of the CypherPunk movement John Gilmour or Phil Karn, and more recently by Peter Thiel, there is no reason why these technologies should not eventually generate an entirely new civilization, where public institutions would be reduced to a small share, thus putting an end to five centuries of nation states holding plenipotentiary powers. In this scenario, therefore, the State would only be in charge of the most basic functions (mainly security) and the rest would happily be privatized.

Second, advocates of this scenario believe that, in a world where innovation now consists mainly of risky attempts - the famous serendipity -, it is important to leave significant room to these forms of innovation. This argument is not incidental: American success in the digital world is, whatever one may say, largely the result of its mistrust towards Washington and lawmakers who aim to corset risk-takers. American regulators have often relied on Adam Smith and Schumpeter to preserve a laissez-faire approach, and to favour the implementation of a posteriori regulations, i.e. as a last resort.

But even beyond regulators, the libertarian scenario could well be driven by the very nature of information technology. For the architecture of information systems and networks seems to be inexorably decentralized, while the very autonomy of these systems seems to be increasing, to the point of making them neither seizable nor controllable by states themselves. Here, we are obviously thinking about the well-known Bitcoins, and beyond that, about the probable architectures of future data networks - Fog, Edge computing, etc. - which give pride of place to calculations distributed in the network. However, the nature of these architectures is deeply decentralized, which greatly complexifies control operations.

This model's disadvantage lies in the feudal e-republic project it carries. Indeed, many techno-libertarian players speak of eugenics and technological selection as inevitable, if not necessary, forces. Moreover, this scenario induces major social risks, insofar as the main beneficiaries of such a model would be the upper economic classes.

The 21st century state

The forces in place are thus significant, while many developed countries remain sort of stunned and largely inactive in the face of the emergence of these protean digital empires. Indeed, most of these countries lack a clear strategy. Within the European Union, obvious disagreements between states too often obstruct the development of the virtuous dynamics that would allow them to regain leadership. The latter is nevertheless accessible given the quality of our continent's human capital.

A modern state should agree to facilitate the emergence of new public service offers by third parties, while focusing on its truly sovereign functions. Hence the need for sanctioning powers, which are absolutely necessary to ensure that the coexistence with platforms takes place within a fair legislative and regulatory framework. This argument alone justifies the necessity of European integration. We've witnessed France not being listened to when it tried to impose controls on key digital players, whereas control at the European level is much more coercive, and therefore effective. However, this division of tasks requires that the state develop a digital culture and focus on some of its functionalities in order to delegate others to third parties.

While companies necessarily have a role to play in this framework, citizen initiatives such as Bayes Impact seem decisive in combining the common good with radical technological and service innovation. Resorting to open source, to open standards and to citizen communities of coders, which are inherently more attentive to the beneficiaries of public action, is still too often discarded as an unsustainable option. However, these approaches have a lot of potential, provided they are well understood and supported. Through them, the state could pursue an adequate form of data governance between actors that are generally situated outside of the state's realm. It would also encourage respect for necessarily open standardization, privacy, data portability, system integrity, citizen debates around digital topics, fair tax collection, and the strengthening of human capital. Such would be the main tasks assigned to a state of the 21st century.

The forces in place are thus significant, while many developed countries remain sort of stunned and largely inactive in the face of the emergence of these protean digital empires.

Some delicate issues, such as identity, will still need to be tackled. For some, entrusting its provision to states involves great risks of abuse. This is a complex debate, as the notion of pseudonymization (non-nominal identification) emerging within artificial intelligence could impact the founding elements of our law. But beyond that, the immense challenge facing liberal nations is that of preserving the possibility of trust within disparate social groups. To do this, they must, if still possible, find models to combat fake news (several platforms, including Facebook, are seeking to develop information verification systems such as " CrossCheck", but based on instant artificial intelligence), maintain and strengthen the construction of the public sphere, and avoid political destabilization by non-democratic states. These risks are largely underestimated, and the Yellow Vests episode could, for lack of an adequate response, be mere foreshadowing.

Given the powers involved (companies with almost unlimited capital, states whose imperious behaviour and lack of concern for fundamental rights is no longer to be demonstrated, the collapse of liberal states), the choice of a strategy favoring technological emergence seems to be a difficult one between bad solutions. Yet the technological reading of the world allows us to consider a strong alternative. The latter is accessible, and it is probably because it does not yet exist that it represents the most viable choice for those who are attracted neither by imperious nations nor by a world dominated by meta-platforms and private interests.

THE END.

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The End of Nation States? Part 4: What Post-Westphalian World in the Age of Platforms?

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The platforms increasingly play the role of aggregators: they structure data that can be used by other companies very efficiently, since it is consistent over very large volumes. Given the picture sketched by our last articles, the question may almost seem incongruous.

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http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article5577.html

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by Jayabrata Sarkar

Over the past three-and-a-half centuries, the principles and practices of the Westphalian Treaty (1648) gradually spread from Europe to the rest of the world. The Westphalian order assumed a vital importance for three main reasons. First, it secularised international politics by divorcing it from any particular religious footing, anchoring it instead on the tenets of national interest and reasons of state. Second, it promoted sovereignty, the legal doctrine that no higher authority stands above the state, except that to which the state voluntarily assents. Third, it accepted a conception of international society based on the legal equality of states. All sovereign states possessed the same rights and duties. They had the right to manage matters within their boundaries without outside interference, as well as the duty to abstain from intervening in the domestic affairs of other states. Thus, the Westphalian treaty marks the birth of the nation-state, itself the primary subject of modern international law.

Increasingly, however, scholars and policy-makers are asking whether the Westphalian international order continue to be applicable in the 21st century. Contemporary world is shaped by centripetal and centrifugal forces underlined by the process of globalisation pulling many of the planet's inhabitants together and fragmenting, pushing people apart. It would be fair to suggest that the world is seemingly becoming more cosmopolitan but at the same time more parochial. Intricate patterns of transnational exchange compete with emotional ties of national identity. Nation-states are enmeshed in a complex network of transnational governance that includes corporations, banks, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. In sum, the world today is being shaped by forces that challenge the Westphalian state-centric view of international politics.

The consequences of globalisation are not limited only to undermining the rules of international relations but also contesting the power that lay with the nation-state and raising it to a higher level, which is distant and spread on a global level, separated from 'nation-state politics'. A nation cannot do anything even when it has taken momentous decisions on policy matters, because, with increasing proportion the 'operative part' of it is 'dependent' or is the 'responsibility' of a variety of non-state actors, organisations and corporations. This trend accelerated in the 1990s with the growing belief that the multi-dimensional processes of globali-sation had the capacity to greatly compromise, if not erode, state sovereignty. As nation-states begin to share more power with non-state entities, international relations is increasingly becoming "two-pronged", not just state-to-state, but between states on the one hand and sub-national and supra-national actors on the other.

It would not be out of place to suggest that we are entering a 'phase of global governance' bringing more uncertainty and ambiguity in an already anarchic international order. The Commission on Global Governance refers to it as constituting "the sum of the many individuals and institutions, public and private, that manage their common affairs", not only involving intergovernmental relations but "as also involving non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market". "Global governance does not solely refer only to the formal institutions and organisations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained", but includes any "systems of rule at all levels of human activity-from the family to the international organisation-in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions". It might also mean "collective actions towards an attempt to establish international institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences of adverse supranational, transnational, or national problems". It is in essence about governing without sovereign authority, engaging in relationships that transcend national frontiers, or, simply put, a "sort of international governance similar to what governments do at home". Global governance means activities supported by shared values that may result from formal-legal duties and that do not inevitably demand the support of national political power to over-come obstacles and enhance their accomplish-ment. However, the rising importance of governance without government bears witness to a new form of anarchy. It involves not only the absence of a higher statutory organisation, but also encom-passes an extensive disaggregation of regulatory powers prescribed by law so as to allow for much 'greater flexibility, innovation and experimentation in the development and application' of newer ways to comprehend disparate nation-states across the world.

A political conceptualisation of a post-Westphalian international order is constitutive of four significant features.
The 'Agency' of Transnational Corporation
The increasing importance of the global economy and global interdependence have forced developed states or the "trading states" to concentrate on increasing their share of the world economy. States where capital, labour and technology are mobile, and where they dominate the economy, the urge to increase the market-share has supplanted that of territorial acquisition. A transnational or multinational corporation (TNC), headquartered in one country and operating wholly or partially owned subsidiaries in one or more other countries, has generated controversy because of their "economic and political power" and the mobility and complexity of their operations. With one quarter of the world's productive assets under their control, TNCs have the potential to affect the functioning of regulatory agencies of national governments compromising their sovereignty. The problem is more serious from the moment when the most important decisions on an economic, financial and developmental level are taken not by states but by "groups of power"-by holding companies, multinationals, lobbies and the so-called "market" -demonstrating how global corpora-tions have the capacity to circumvent and alter the domestic policies of states. While the degree of global economic challenges to national sovereignty varies from country to country and assumes a far more complex dimension in poorer Third World nations, one thing is clear: that fundamentally the Westphalian notion of nation-state's sovereignty is being hampered and redrawn if it is not in peril. States do not have the requisite power, authority or resources to operate, negotiate or resist the increased "political power" of the TNCs operating at global distances. As states struggle to redesign their sovereignty in a global world, mega-corporations have begun to assume an ever more stateless quality, leaving them less and less accountable to any government anywhere. The problem facing individual governments in a post-industrial global economic order is how to benefit, "generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of competing efforts by governments (and non-governmental actors) to manipulate the system for their own benefit?"
Non-Governmental Organisations
Beginning with the last decade of the 20th century NGOs have substantially proliferated the international relations system. The growth of non-state/non-government actors or organisations (NGOs) have in large part been fuelled by the perceived inability of both domestic and international institutions to respond to the social, economic and political consequences of rapid advances in science and technology, growing economic interdependence and political fragmen-tation.

The motivations that have led to the develop-ment of this trend are political-diplomatic with increased NGO representation to the UN, academic debating on the concept of global civil society, and technical, that is, the internet and the communications systems that favour the rapid dissemination of the information. NGOs of the transnational variant such as Freedom House in the USA, Medecins Sans Frontieres in France, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch etc., who often play a pervasive role in global affairs, endorse well-defined goals, mobilising networks, framing issues for public consumption and promoting new norms in their area of activity, such as human rights, minority rights, medical assistance, refugees, environmental protection, disaster relief, humanitarian aid or development assistance, especially in war-torn societies.

The majority of the NGOs aim to indirectly influence the decisions of the state actors to bring changes in policies of govern-ments or international organisations, by means of demonstrations, media pressure, recruitment of political leaders and opinion formers.

An example would demonstrate the significant presence that NGOs have in a post-Westphalia globalised world. NGOs such as Partners in Health, Programme for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) Medecins Sans Frontieres, Global Alliance For Improved Nutrition etc. have played a pivotal role in creating a "public health governance" environment by partnering the World Health Organisation to fight epidemics such as SARS, AIDS/HIV that are a grave threat to global health security, livelihood of populations, the functioning of health systems and the stability and growth of economies. In this regard it is necessary to mention the role of China AIDS Roadmap Tactical Support (CHARTS), a UK-China partnership performing an 'irreplaceable role in China's arduous battle' against the disease.

Second, it must be mentioned that with the emergence of NGOs in public health programmes innovative health strategies such as global health governance (GHG), a new kind of a political process and global public goods for health (GPGH), which is a new kind of substantive policy goal, has emerged. GHG involves non-state actors, such as Global Fund seeking to eradicate AIDS, TB, and Malaria, in the governance process of statutory international bodiesas board of directors or as voting members. On the other, NGO sponsored GPGH, are goods and services the consumption of which is non-excludable and non-rival across boundaries and involving countries and people that are different in regional groupings. GPGH does not serve interests of great powers but seeks to produce globally accessible health goods and services.
Global Security and Terrorism
The extent of the debate on global security arose in the early 1990s as a US-led political response to what it viewed as the slow, arduous process of the UN, as the world's conscience-keeper of peace, to strategise military options in troubled regions. Yet US sponsored defence doctrines, encapsulated in a global security paradigm, pushed ahead for ratification in the UN Security Council, remain a complicated venture, highlighted by the military interventions in Afghanistan, the second war in the Gulf and Iraq under the banner of 'US backed coalition forces' or the 'Coalition of the Willing' post-9/11 against global terror organisations like the Al-Qaeda. The operation of such 'military adventurism', with easier 'exit policies' for states unwilling to carry on a long drawn and protracted conflict with terror groups, reinforced the view as the 'just wars' went on that there remained a strong 'transatlantic split', with different views on the use of military force still existing.

Considering that new non-classical asymmetric transnational threats are in a continuous increase and diversification, with polycentric terror groups operating with hi-tech sophisticated weapons targeting vital communication, defence installations and global business interests, an increasing number of states question the Westphalia regulations which clearly distinguish between what is internal and what is international, finding themselves in the situations to expand their conceptions on security and defence. Certainly, the 'category' of traditional military alliances in the post-Cold War period is not 'dated' even as new regional or even sub-regional security initiatives and defence regimes are being constructed. On the other hand, the US as the hegemon power is seeking to shape an efficient and reliable global security network ideologically re-ordered to lend clarity and purpose to an unclear global politico-military architecture. But, as mentioned earlier, recent military actions by the US and its allies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the phased military 'pull-out' that has followed, suggest that the US would have to settle for a far less fulfilment of its approved objective it had initially set out to achieve in those regions.

Thus, US intentions to assume dominance over an 'anarchic hostile unpredictable world of states' and to thwart 'states opposed to freedom and democracy' cannot be achieved through an exclusive 'class of military partner states' pursuing a unilateral political course of action. A comprehensive global political dialogue is required that must adhere to a consensual participatory and democratic representation of states in debating the multi-dimensional nature of security challenges across the world. It is in the light of this development that the UN must be endorsed as an important partner in this collective initiative.
Humanitarian Intervention
Humanitarian intervention began at the same time as the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, with its firm restatement of the principle of national sovereignty based on power realities, that is, those in power physically are in charge legally. With the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, however, and later the International Covenant on Genocide, to mention only the most prominent international agreements, the countervailing principle of national obligations began to take form. Previously, national governments were responsible only for inter-state obligations, but the new human rights legislation created a set of norms designed to regulate a government's relations with its own population. The idea began to spread that governments could be judged as legitimate or not in terms of internal, as well as external, behaviour. Internal despotism, as well as external aggression, could cost a given government its right to rule.

At first this principle was used sparingly. The international community castigated the apartheid regime of South Africa and challenged its legitimacy, but only authorised the use of sanctions and embargoes in an effort to change the government's policies. In the early years of the 1990s, the Security Council authorised the creation of de facto UN trusteeship governments in Cambodia and Somalia, countries where, because governments had collapsed, the Council decided the situation of local populations created humanitarian crises that were also threats to regional, if not international, peace and security. In Haiti, the international community decided or at least acquiesced in the view strongly held by the US Government that the Haitian Government was illegitimate. The United States took the lead in replacing that government by forcible intervention. Most recently, the UN, NATO, and Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) introduced in the Balkans a de facto international trusteeship regime in a situation where national sovereignties in conflict existed.

The debate surrounding the "right to humani-tarian intervention" is symptomatic of a tendency to subordinate the institutional. It relates, apparently, to nothing less than the demand for a coherent sequence for the transforming impact of human rights as the grammar of universal convenience. The cast-iron principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, the touchstone of traditional international law under the state-centred system, is replaced in the contemporary post-Westphalian order by the right-if not the actual legal duty-to intervene with force to oblige other states to implement basic human rights.

Yet, whatever the post-Westphalian inter-national order may be, it cannot ignore the persistence of some of the mainstays of the Westphalian order. For a start, there is the unequal distribution of power to consider. And within this context it is fitting to ask what is actually new in the discourse on humanitarian intervention. Richard Falk comments: "Are we dealing mainly with a change in discursive reality such that what has mainly changed is language, not behaviour, with major states still retaining on a behavioural level a discretionary option to use force?" The true choice in this area is, as Olivier Corten recalls, "between a 'new international humanitarian order', formalised and regulated by the United Nations, and the 'right to intervene', on the pretext of removing a 'perceived unfriendly government' which may be exercised freely and unilaterally by the most powerful states and whose implementation gives rise to the danger of the emergence of a new world order expressed as a Pax Americana".

A number of viewpoints abound that speculate about the possible directions of statecraft, diplomacy and governance in an era that has moved beyond the dominant paradigm of international relations of the mid-17th Century-the Westphalian order-with govern-ments hesitantly and gingerly making their way towards newer, untried practices-involving such competitors for power as TNCs and NGOs, borderless states and religiously-based international terrorist security threats-in the early 21st Century. History teaches and demonstrates that power structures, no matter how long-lived, are never immutable and that, slowly or rapidly, such structures change, metamorphose or disappear altogether. The Westphalian legacy did not bequeath us any determined institutional model, it only opened horizons. With the loss of absolute and exclusive state-centeredness, the post-Westphalian era is one of constant innovation and experimentation with notions of power, political structures and institutional dynamics underlined by the losing validity of traditional definitions of power in purely military and political terms.

The unpredictability of a 'new international order' or more appropriately its 'constant making and re-making' may in a different role bring back the salience of the nation-state as powerful actors constantly pushing for a new regulatory culture by enhancing the structuration of an international system that poses a challenge by being elusive.

What forms would a post-Westphalian world order with its belief in manoeuvrability in an infinitely open space take? Suter has put forward four cogent future possibilities. First, a continuation of the current international order, that is termed as 'Steady State'; second, greater international cooperation through a strengthened United Nations, as a 'World State'; third, a continued decline of national governments with economies being run by transnational corporations termed 'Earth Inc.'; and fourth, a breakdown of nation-states and of transnational corporations resulting in national and international chaos, the 'Wild State'. Upon reflection, each of the four predictions is capable of realisation.
Readings
1. Anthony Elliot, Contemporary Social Theory: An Introduction, Routledge, USA, 2009, pp. 310-317, 322-328.

2. Michael Vaughan, 'After Westphalia, whither the nation-state, its people and its governmental institutions', paper presented at the International Studies Association Asia Pacific Regional Conference on September 29, 2011.

3. S. Tutuianu, Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World, Springer, UK,, 2013, pp. 43-44, 59-70.

4. Edward Marks, "From post-Cold War to post-Westphalia", American Diplomacy,URL: (http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_14/marks_westph.html) (available from November 18, 2014)

5. Carlo Bordoni, "A Crisis of the State: End of the post-Westphalian model", Social Europe Journal, URL: (http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/02/a-crisis-of-the-state-the-end-of-post-westphalian-model) (available from December 4, 2014)

6. Jose Manuel Pureza, "Towards a post-Westphalian Internationalism", Eurozine, URL: (http://www.eurozine. com/articles/2002-04-26-pureza-en.html) (available from November 21, 2014)

7. D.P. Fidler, 2003, "SARS: Political pathology of the first post-Westphalian pathogen", Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, vol. 31, Issue 4, December, pp. 485-505.
Dr Jayabrata Sarkar is an Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Deshbandhu College, New Delhi.

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Debating a Post-Westphalian International Order

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by Jayabrata Sarkar Over the past three-and-a-half centuries, the principles and practices of the Westphalian Treaty (1648) gradually spread from Europe to the rest of the world. The Westphalian order assumed a vital importance for three main reasons.

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https://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/our-departments/environment-and-society-programme/creative-power-non-state-actors-and

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Chatham House - International Affairs Think Tank

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The 21st century reveals ever more clearly the limitations facing national governments to achieve their international objectives unilaterally. Without visible leadership from governments, more attention is now focused on so-called bottom-up efforts - whether from individuals, business, cities or municipalities. Addressing complex global challenges in this context will require a fundamental re-think on strategies and capacities to act.

This project seeks to explore the capacities and strategies used by non-state actors to exert influence on the global climate agenda. The project focuses on four stakeholder groups: civil society, corporations, financial institutions and sub-national governments.

The project discusses the extent to which countries are influenced and supported by non-state actors, and what is the direct and indirect role of these actors in key international processes. It also seeks to review the extent to which non-national state actors' influence is received by international fora, such as the UNFCCC, the lessons we can learn from past experience, and what other approaches could be taken.

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Creative Power: Non-State Actors and the Global Climate Agenda

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The 21st century reveals ever more clearly the limitations facing national governments to achieve their international objectives unilaterally. Without visible leadership from governments, more attention is now focused on so-called bottom-up efforts - whether from individuals, business, cities or municipalities. Addressing complex global challenges in this context will require a fundamental re-think on strategies and capacities to act.

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Australian Museum, William Street, Darlinghurst NSW, Australia

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Australian Museum, William Street, Darlinghurst NSW, Australia

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Australian Museum, William Street, Darlinghurst NSW, Australia

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TIMETABLE!

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SYLLABUS!!!!

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2. The global organization of political authority - Very Short Introductions

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Does the nation-state work?

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How do we begin to think about the word?

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INTRODUCTORY READING

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Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation