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School counselors are called upon to collaborate with instructional staff to support student success and encourage  promote positive and equitable reception of career and post-secondary educational institutions. Upon completing my Master of Education in Guidance and Counseling, I hope to begin functioning as an academic counselor as a high school campus. I choose to tailor my  Legal and ethical principals' project around the topic of secondary career and college options for students with disabilities. Given the statistics that only 14% of people with disabilities earn a Bachelor’s degree or higher and only 35% are employed indicates a greater need for transitional support (U.S Department of Education, 1999).
I chose this topic with the foremost aspiration to promote institutional change to ensure accessibility and inclusion for students with disabilities and booster advocacy for their satisfactory transition plan for the postsecondary educational institution.

References

U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. Students With Disabilities in Post-secondary Education: A Profile of Preparation, Participation, and Outcomes, NCES 1999–187, by Laura Horn and Jennifer Berktold. Project Officer: Larry Bobbitt. Washington DC: 1999

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I was fortunate to interview Mrs. Dallas Swafford, the Director of Student Disability Services at the University of Angelo State. I selected her since my research topic was very much in the director's bailiwick. Legal statues crafted by legislators have a massive impact on all postsecondary educational institutions. Take for example title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act which covers private colleges and vocational schools. Now, if a school receives federal dollars regardless of whether it is private or public, it is also covered by the regulations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requiring schools to make their programs accessible to qualified students with disabilities. I was provided with several fruitful practices that she employs diurnal in her position.

In order to stay abreast of all matters regarding student disability rights, she attends informative conferences twice a year to gather precise information about the laws and legislation pertaining to disability services.

Conveying an open channel system with students and faculty is a vital component. She like to perform an adjustable probe on students inquiring for any feedback. She encourages faculty members to reach out to her if they perceive anything in the letter of accommodation that causes concern. It is not unusual to encounter instructors who feel classroom or testing accommodations give students with disabilities an unfair advantage over other students(D. Swafford, personal communication, July 15, 2020).

Student's modifications themselves are rarely substantive or expensive she says. The most challenging aspect of modifying classroom policies or practices for students with disabilities is that they require thought and prior preparation. Therefore, it is crucial for students to submit their accommodation requests early in the semester(D. Swafford, personal communication, July 15, 2020).

Concerning the question, are you monitoring any legislation, in particular, she answered that she does not expect any enactments to change their existing disability services policies or procedures at the moment. She informed me that state or federal policy reforms are bifurcated into higher education institutions or secondary public schools.It is extremely difficult to keep up with the ever-changing landscape of federal laws and regulations governing special education(D. Swafford, personal communication, July 15, 2020).
I solicited to her about the Respond, Innovate, Succeed, and Empower Act , which was recently enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress. It aims to amends the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide students with disabilities and their families with access to critical information needed to select the right college and succeed once enrolled. She responded by stating the University already reports on the number of students with accommodations without including any personally identifiable information. At first glance, H. R. 3086 should not have a significant impact on how I work with students and their families (D. Swafford, personal communication, July 15, 2020).

References

Respond, Innovate,Succeed, and Empower (RISE) Act (20 U.S.C.1094(a))

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC § 12103(1)

Higher Education Act of 1965 ( 20 U.S.C. ch. 28 § 1001 et seq)

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq)

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The IRIS Center website is funded through a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Department of Education and Office of Special Education programs.  The site contains an array of informative resources and materials dedicated to improving education outcomes for all children, especially those with disabilities, through effective evidence-based practices and interventions. I found their crafted modules indispensable for professional development for any educational professional.

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This module focuses on the transition process from high school to post-secondary settings. Among other topics, it discusses IEP planning, engaging students in the process so as to become better advocates for their own needs, and the importance of outside agencies such as vocational rehabilitation (est. completion time: 1 hour).

Work through the sections of this module in the order presented in the STAR graphic above.

Related to this module

Copyright 2022 Vanderbilt University. All rights reserved.

The IRIS Center Peabody College Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN 37203 iris@vanderbilt.edu. The IRIS Center is funded through a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) Grant #H325E170001. The contents of this Website do not necessarily represent the policy of the U.S. Department of Education, and you should not assume endorsement by the Federal Government. Project Officer, Sarah Allen.

Copyright 2022 Vanderbilt University. All rights reserved.

* For refund and privacy policy information visit our Help & Support page.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

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Secondary Transition: Helping Students with Disabilities Plan for Post-High School Settings

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This module focuses on the transition process from high school to post-secondary settings. Among other topics, it discusses IEP planning, engaging students in the process so as to become better advocates for their own needs, and the importance of outside agencies such as vocational rehabilitation (est. completion time: 1 hour).

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Accommodation for Distance Disabled Learners article #1

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Accommodation for Distance Disabled Learners article #1

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As the country navigates through the pandemic, many educational institutions are grappling with educating students with disabilities. The schooling of students who are forced out of school by the pandemic is already a huge undertaking. It's even more of a challenge for educators to figure out how to educate the millions students with disabilities the most appropriate way. It is a compound situation where school districts are considering mobilizing distance learning for all students, fearing the ire of federal regulators if they provide distance learning without tailoring it for students who have individualized education plans(Camera, 2020). Many students with disabilities rely on accommodations to help navigate the classroom environment. The vast majority of schools in the U.S. have transitioned from the brick and mortar classroom to asynchronous format, consequently discarding the student population that receives special education services.

This situation points out that students with disabilities are at a real disadvantage when it comes to transitioning their special needs services out to postsecondary higher education or other unforeseen circumstances.

References

Camera, L. (2020) Schools struggle to educate students with disabilities amid pandemic. U.S News.Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2020-04-15/schools-struggle-to-educate-students-with-disabilities-amid-pandemic

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Setting up distance learning for the 55 million students who were forced out of school by the coronavirus pandemic is a challenge, but it's even more of a challenge for educators to figure out how to best educate the 7 million students with disabilities. And those students, who are less likely to be able to access online education, are also at much greater risk of falling behind.

"I like to look at things realistically," Eriel Jeffrey, a special education teacher and coordinator at the John F. Kennedy High School in Montgomery County, Maryland, says. "I'm not really sure what else we can do to really help and give the kids the services that are usually what they get in school because of contact. The kids we work with need that close proximity that we can't provide right now."

"I am nervous," she continues. "The ones that will fare well are the ones that are in households where somebody is able to work with them specifically and consistently throughout this and can provide structure."

Photos: America at Standstill

"I'm really concerned about the ones who aren't able to have that because their parents are working or sometimes there is a language barrier because they live in a house where English is not the first spoken language. They might be the only one in the house to speak that language. My heart goes out to them because I know it's really difficult."

At issue are a confluence of circumstances: The sudden crush of COVID-19 cases forced schools to close with little to no time to plan for how they would transition students to a comprehensive and effective distance learning model, especially for students with disabilities who have individualized learning plans tailored to their specific needs.

While some districts sent students home with workbooks that covered a few weeks worth of material, others emailed parents links to online learning programs or established virtual classes through conference platforms like Zoom and Google. For rural school districts and those that serve large numbers of poor students whose families may not have a home internet connection, many districts were quick to hand out thousands of Chromebooks, laptops and other tablets, and partner with internet companies to set up WiFi hotspots for the estimated 12 million children nationwide that lack one.

Meanwhile, largely lost in the rapid response to establish something - anything - that would allow students to continue learning, were students with disabilities, the very students who research shows are most negatively impacted by lost learning time.

In fact, only 27% of parents of children in public schools in New York reported that schools were providing instructional materials for students with disabilities, according to a poll of 1,200 parents commissioned by The Education Trust and conducted by Global Strategy Group from March 25 to April 1. A separate poll they conducted among 1,200 parents in California during the same timespan shows that just 24% reported that schools were providing instructional material for students with disabilities.

"The reality is that most likely whenever kids go back to school after the coronavirus, there is going to be regression for all kids," Miriam Rollin, director of the Education Civil Rights Alliance, says. "But the problem is kids with disabilities are starting further behind and they're likely to regress even more. That's why it's such a moral and legal imperative to make sure schools are doing everything possible."

For students with disabilities, needs vary greatly based on the specific impairment - encompassing everything from auditory to visual to cognitive to physical and more. As a result, individualized education plans run the gamut, from extra time for tests and personalized tutoring, to a special education aide dedicated to a student for the entirety of the school day.

Under federal law, schools must provide students with disabilities with a "free and appropriate public education," and some districts - rightly or wrongly - have been slow to mobilize distance learning for all students, fearing the ire of federal regulators if they provide distance learning without tailoring it for students who have individualized education plans.

"This isn't a yes or no question," Rollin says. "The answer is yes, we're going to do this. So the only question is how and figuring that out with maximum creativity and making it work to the extent that it can under these circumstances."

"We get that's going to look very different than when schools were open, but that doesn't mean you do nothing," she continues. "It means actually making individualized outreach to students and their parents and figuring out what can be done to prevent regression."

Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, after hearing reports that some districts weren't pursuing distance learning for any students because they lacked the capacity to personalize it for students with disabilities, scolded educators during one of the daily coronavirus briefings last month at the White House.

"Nothing issued by this department should in any way prevent any school from offering educational programs through distance instruction," she clarified. "We need schools to educate all students out of principle, rather than educate no students out of fear."

The guidance subsequently issued by the Education Department's Office for Civil Rights stipulates that schools "should not opt to close or decline to provide distance instruction, at the expense of students, to address matters pertaining to services for students with disabilities."

But the guidance also underscores that the department "recognizes that exceptional circumstances may affect how special education and related services and supports are provided to students with disabilities," and promises to offer "flexibility" when it comes to delivering that support.

Advocates for students with disabilities have been about what exactly that flexibility means, and whether it will exempt school districts from their responsibilities to some of the most vulnerable students.

Notably, the relief package that Congress passed last month to bolster the economy amidst the coronavirus pandemic tasks DeVos with recommending to Congress the types of waivers it should grant to states and school districts to relieve them from certain federal mandates that might be impossible to meet because of schools being closed for months at a time.

Some education groups, including the AASA School Superintendents Association, are urging DeVos to recommend to Congress that schools be granted flexibility under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the federal law that ensures students receive a robust education.

"We're not talking about flexibility from providing every single service for every single child," Noelle Ellerson Ng, associate executive director of policy and advocacy at the superintendents association says. "We're talking about flexibilities for our students who are the most medically fragile who have the most severe physical and cognitive disabilities. These are kids who have individualized education plans who require their services to be provided in-person, hand over hand, and that's something you just cannot legally do right now. So if you legally can't be in school, and you actually can't legally implement the IEP, who's liable?"

"You might be talking about students who are blind and deaf and they need a teacher aide right by them," she continues. "You might have a child who is non-verbal, so they need to visually see someone signing in front of them, or their vision is bad and they can't access online. Superintendents are trying to figure out how we can navigate IDEA without having the perfect be the enemy of the very, very good."

Some examples of the flexibilities they're seeking include the ability to retroactively change individualized education plans based on limitations stemming from the coronavirus outbreak and extend various federal timelines that outline when specific services are due for students with disabilities.

"We're talking about narrow in scope, time-limited flexibility," Ellerson Ng says. "Things we are looking for are ways you can provide a little bit of common sense flexibility to absolutely hold schools accountable. This population needs to be served."

Some school superintendents complain that advocates for students with disabilities are treating the situation as a zero sum game - either students with disabilities receive as robust an education as they were when schools were open, or districts aren't meeting their federal obligations - while advocates say they understand these are unprecedented times but that doesn't mean district leaders and others can flout the education and civil rights of students with disabilities.

"Am I going to say there won't be any lawsuits if schools try and don't get it done," Rollin asks. "No, I'm not going to say that. But what I am going to say is the best strategy to avoid liability is to do their best."

With so little information available for teachers about how to effectively establish distance learning for students with disabilities, most, including Jeffrey, have been left to tackle it themselves, learning as they go.

"Districts are really struggling," Lindsay Jones, president and CEO of the National Center for Learning Disabilities, says. "They are working really hard and I think they could use more support, especially from the federal government. But there isn't a playbook."

Jones and the leaders of about a dozen other advocacy organizations for students with disabilities launched a web site earlier this week that tracks best practices in real-time as districts across the country experiment to figure out what strategies are most effective.

"The key to this situation is going to be sharing information about what's working in real time," Jones says. "We have to get this information out to districts because we don't have really strong evidence about how to deliver special education instruction online."

Jeffrey says that despite the incredible challenges, most of her students with disabilities are receiving some type of instruction. All of her students have access to school-issued Chromebooks, for example, or have a family computer, and can log into Zoom meetings. Those who need it have talk-to-text programs. For those with more severe cognitive disabilities, she says, she emails parents links to lessons to print out and then follows up with the parents after they help their children through it, either by email or text.

The key, she says, is maintaining constant communication with parents, school staff and school leadership in order to constantly fine tune strategy.

"Everything changes if not every hour than every other hour," Jeffrey says. "Logistics are constantly changing and we're constantly evolving. It takes a lot of flexibility, but I think each day gets a little bit better. "

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Schools Struggle to Educate Students With Disabilities Amid Pandemic

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Setting up distance learning for the 55 million students who were forced out of school by the coronavirus pandemic is a challenge, but it's even more of a challenge for educators to figure out how to best educate the 7 million students with disabilities.

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Accommodation for Distance Disabled Learners article #2

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Accommodation for Distance Disabled Learners article #2

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The New York Times article highlights the recently grass-root movement to render the university websites accessible to prospective disabled students. The report covers several suits have been filed in federal court in Manhattan over various University failing to comply with Americans With Disabilities Act by operating disquiet websites for disabled students. The article is an excellent news story illustrating the growing number of actions involving accessibility and the internet. Higher educational institutions are bound to the federal law requires that mandate public accommodations be accessible to those with disabilities. Legal battles have long revolved around physical spaces and, therefore, tangible solutions, such as elevators or wheelchair ramps. Now, advocates and lawyers argue, websites are also public spaces and need to be accessible, with things like captions or audio descriptions (Wang, 2017, para.3).

The article applies to my topic as it demonstrates the practicality of postsecondary planning and researching. The transition going from high school to college is going to be challenging for families with students with disabilities without proper diligence. Districts should develop programs and initiatives to explain and reinforce the parents' educational and postsecondary planning process. Thus, raising awareness of the decision-making process that leads to postsecondary options for their child.

References

Wang, V. (2017) College websites must accommodate disabled students, lawsuits say. The New York Times.  Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/nyregion/college-websites-disabled.html

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Hofstra University on Long Island is one of eight New York colleges named in lawsuits because, the suits say, their websites are inaccessible to the plaintiff, who is blind, and therefore in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Credit... George Etheredge for The New York Times

The lawsuits came one after the other, against Fordham University, Manhattan College, Long Island University and other area colleges and universities.

In all, eight suits have been filed in federal court in Manhattan over the past two weeks, most recently against Hofstra University on Long Island on Oct. 4. In each case, lawyers for Emanuel Delacruz, who is blind, charged that the college's website is inaccessible to their plaintiff and therefore in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act.

The filings are part of a growing number of actions involving accessibility and the internet. The federal law requires that public accommodations be accessible to those with disabilities, and legal battles have long revolved around physical spaces and therefore physical solutions, such as elevators or wheelchair ramps. Now, advocates and lawyers argue, websites are also public spaces and need to be accessible, with things like captions or audio descriptions.

Since January 2015, at least 751 lawsuits have been filed over the issue. The vast majority have focused on retailers and restaurants, according to a legal blog that tracks such suits. Only seven of the suits have been directed at academic websites. Mr. Delacruz's suits alone doubled that count. And another website, which includes not only lawsuits but also government investigations into web or technological accessibility, lists 37 schools that have been accused of noncompliance with disability law.

Advocates for the deaf sued Harvard and M.I.T. in 2015 for failing to caption online lectures, courses and other educational materials. In 2016, after a complaint by two deaf people, the Department of Justice's civil rights division found the University of California, Berkeley, had violated disability law by not providing the appropriate accommodations for its own free video lectures and podcasts.

"As more and more students are aware of their rights, and as websites have become so much of what universities now focus on, in their marketing materials for example, it's not surprising to me that there will be an increase in these types of lawsuits," said Arlene Kanter, director of the Disability Law and Policy Program at Syracuse University's law school.

Whether the plaintiffs will prevail is unclear. The Americans With Disabilities Act, written in 1990, makes no mention of the internet. The Department of Justice, which enforces the act, has issued guidelines about web accessibility but no formal regulations on how to achieve it - and they seem unlikely to materialize soon, after the federal government in July placed web regulations on its list of " inactive " agenda items.

The question has largely been left to judges, who have ruled both for and against disabled plaintiffs. In March, for example, a California judge dismissed a blind man's suit against Domino's Pizza, because the chain offered an option to order by telephone. But in June, a Florida judge ruled that the grocery store Winn-Dixie had to offer the same accommodations on its website as it did in stores, and in July, a judge in Brooklyn ruled that the website for Blick Art Materials had to be readily accessible to a blind man.

The result of these conflicting rulings is a legal gray area ripe for, depending on your viewpoint, either significant civil rights advances or exploitation by lawyers looking to make a quick buck through settlements, said Tom Stebbins, executive director of the Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York.

Absent clarity from the federal government, Mr. Stebbins said, some lawyers have filed identical lawsuits against multiple businesses or universities in the hopes of reaching a settlement with one or more of them.

"These are cut-and-paste lawsuits," he said. "You just have these lawyers taking advantage of a good-intentioned law to make money."

The lawsuits filed in New York on behalf of Mr. Delacruz are "all similar," his lawyer, Dana Gottlieb, wrote in an email. They state that Mr. Delacruz tried to find information, such as tuition costs, school location and academic calendars, but was unable gain access because the websites were not readable by his screen-reading software.

A hyperlink in one complaint, against Hofstra, opens the website of the College of New Rochelle. According to court records, Ms. Gottlieb was ordered to refile one of the complaints because the wrong party was selected as the defendant.

Ms. Gottlieb, of the Gottlieb & Associates law firm, declined to comment further or to say anything more about her client, including his age and what he hoped to study. But Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, the founder of the firm, wrote in an email that private lawyers had to step in to promote web accessibility, given the lack of government action.

"When 'lawsuit-reform' organizations protest about the nature of these lawsuits, they are only advancing the interests of wealthy corporate interests that fund them," he wrote. "If they were truly reform oriented, they would advocate for more government intervention to protect the rights of those who most need protection."

Most of the colleges did not respond to requests for comment. A spokesman for Iona College said that it "takes all matters of discrimination seriously and strives to ensure that everyone is treated fairly and appropriately. The college will continue to ensure everyone has equitable access to its facilities including its website."

Some disability rights advocates, acknowledging the charges that some lawyers are just looking to cash in, have distanced themselves from the suits.

"We do not condone just filing a blizzard of lawsuits in order to get settlements. That's not solving the underlying problem," said Chris Danielson, public relations director for the National Federation of the Blind. His organization has pushed instead for clearer federal guidelines on web accessibility.

Critics have also pointed to the Berkeley case as evidence that the strategy can go awry. After the Department of Justice found the university to be in violation of the disabilities act, Berkeley responded by taking down more than 20,000 publicly accessible videos and audio files, a move administrators had called " unenviable " but unavoidable given the "extremely expensive" cost of compliance.

But disability rights lawyers and advocates said the concerns were misplaced.

"There will always be lawyers who are eager to find business," Ms. Kanter, the Syracuse professor, said. "But if the university is vulnerable, and if they have violated the law by not providing accessibility, that's what the role of lawyers should be, which is to monitor such complaints."

Eve Hill, a former deputy assistant attorney general in the civil rights division of the Department of Justice, said lawyers could not manufacture plaintiffs out of thin air. Ultimately, she said, lawyers represent people who - regardless of their lawyers' motivations - are being barred from accessing public services.

"There has to be somebody who is trying to access the website," said Ms. Hill, who is now a disability rights lawyer. "Imagine if you were that person. Imagine if you were trying to apply to school, and every college you went to check out refused to tell you how."

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College Websites Must Accommodate Disabled Students, Lawsuits Say

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The lawsuits came one after the other, against Fordham University, Manhattan College, Long Island University and other area colleges and universities. In all, eight suits have been filed in federal court in Manhattan over the past two weeks, most recently against Hofstra University on Long Island on Oct. 4.

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Students With Disabilities disparity in higher ed

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Students With Disabilities disparity in higher ed

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Upward of 90% of students with disabilities graduate high school meeting standards necessary to be college-ready (Chatani,2017)

Yet, fewer than 35% of students with disabilities graduate from four-year institutions within eight years (Chatani,2017)

2011 federal study showing special education students earn on average $4 less an hour than other graduates (Chatani,2017)

Institutions can do a better job of providing disability services to attending college students.

One solution would be offering training programs for high school teachers to prepare students better to enter college (Chatani,2017)

Help high schools build out their pre-existing programs to create a pipeline of students that have received instruction and make sure that these particular students continue to receive attention throughout their postsecondary education (Chatani,2017)

This article is at the central of my objective as a prospective school counselor highlighting the importance of stabilizing a connection between secondary and postsecondary education to bolster positive outcomes.

References

Chatani, S. (2017) Report finds higher ed is failing students with disabilities. Educationdive. Retrieved fromhttps://www.educationdive.com/news/report-finds-higher-ed-is-failing-students-with-disabilities/510967/

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Dive Brief:

Though experts estimate up to 90% of students with disabilities graduate high school meeting standards necessary to be college-ready, federal data shows fewer than 35% of students with disabilities graduate from four-year institutions within 8 years, with outcomes at two-year institutions not being much better, according the Hechinger Report.

Experts will contend however that students with disabilities have the capacity to do well, but require more attention in development of soft skills to help them get through, with K-12 groups like Noblesvilles Schools' Special Education Department working with the local district and business leaders to students' executive functioning, communication, critical thinking, and social skills.

But even with attention on soft skills in high schools, institutions like the University of Ozarks are realizing that services like mentors and coordinators to help students with disabilities organize their workload are necessary to move the needle on graduation rates and prepare students for the workforce more equally - with 2011 federal study showing special education students earn on average $4 less an hour than other graduates.

Dive Insight:

Stony Brook University Chief Diversity Officer Lee Bitsoi recently said students with disabilities should be a huge focus for higher ed administrators, as they often fall through the cracks of conversations. But Beacon College President George Hagerty, whose institution exists primarily to ensure the success of these students, says that while these students have individual "islands of challenge" which are unique to their individual experiences, the types of supports these students need are the same types administrators should be employing to shore up the success of any students. Things like assistance with organizing workloads, immersing themselves in new environments and developing the types of soft skills - like easily communicating with others and thinking critically on the spot - are not only key to their feeling comfortable throughout the university experience, but also necessary to their ability to do well in the workforce and beyond. And these are the same types of skills which institutions should be working to impart for first-generation students and others who may not have someone readily available to walk them through the higher ed process.

To target these students, institutions can do a better job of providing services and making them publicly available to the students who need them, in a way that doesn't seem ostracizing or negative. These would include mentorship opportunities and counselors that are able to work with students on their skill development; schools can also invest in faculty development opportunities to work with teachers on their abilities to tailor their instruction and content to meet the learning needs of these students.

Additionally, universities truly seeking to move ahead in increasing graduation rates for students with disabilities can look toward creating K-12 partnerships, offering training programs for high school teachers to better prepare students to enter college. And institutions can help high schools build out their pre-existing programs to create a pipeline of students that have received instruction and make sure that these particular students continue to receive attention throughout their postsecondary education.

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Report finds higher ed is failing students with disabilities

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Though experts estimate up to 90% of students with disabilities graduate high school meeting standards necessary to be college-ready, federal data shows fewer than 35% of students with disabilities graduate from four-year institutions within 8 years, with outcomes at two-year institutions not being much better, according the Hechinger Report.

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SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FREE SCHOOLS.

Texas Constitution is lucid about modifications to the public education system for students betterment.  It shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools(Texas Const. art. 7, § 1). This clause in the Texas Constitution opens the door for groundbreaking fundamental change in the state's public educational institutions.

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THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION



ARTICLE 7. EDUCATION



Sec. 1. SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FREE SCHOOLS. A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.


Sec. 2. PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND. All funds, lands and other property heretofore set apart and appropriated for the support of public schools; all the alternate sections of land reserved by the State out of grants heretofore made or that may hereafter be made to railroads or other corporations of any nature whatsoever; one half of the public domain of the State; and all sums of money that may come to the State from the sale of any portion of the same, shall constitute a permanent school fund.


(Amended Nov. 8, 2011)


Sec. 2A. RELEASE OF STATE CLAIM TO CERTAIN LANDS AND MINERALS WITHIN SHELBY, FRAZIER, AND MCCORMICK LEAGUE AND IN BASTROP COUNTY. (a) The State of Texas hereby relinquishes and releases any claim of sovereign ownership or title to an undivided one-third interest in and to the lands and minerals within the Shelby, Frazier, and McCormick League (now located in Fort Bend and Austin counties) arising out of the interest in that league originally granted under the Mexican Colonization Law of 1823 to John McCormick on or about July 24, 1824, and subsequently voided by the governing body of Austin's Original Colony on or about December 15, 1830.


(b) The State of Texas relinquishes and releases any claim of sovereign ownership or title to an interest in and to the lands, excluding the minerals, in Tracts 2-5, 13, 15-17, 19-20, 23-26, 29-32, and 34-37, in the A. P. Nance Survey, Bastrop County, as said tracts are:


(1) shown on Bastrop County Rolled Sketch No. 4, recorded in the General Land Office on December 15, 1999; and


(2) further described by the field notes prepared by a licensed state land surveyor of Travis County in September through November 1999 and May 2000.


(c) Title to such interest in the lands and minerals described by Subsection (a) is confirmed to the owners of the remaining interests in such lands and minerals. Title to the lands, excluding the minerals, described by Subsection (b) is confirmed to the holder of record title to each tract. Any outstanding land award or land payment obligation owed to the state for lands described by Subsection (b) is canceled, and any funds previously paid related to an outstanding land award or land payment obligation may not be refunded.


(d) The General Land Office shall issue a patent to the holder of record title to each tract described by Subsection (b). The patent shall be issued in the same manner as other patents except that no filing fee or patent fee may be required.


(e) A patent issued under Subsection (d) shall include a provision reserving all mineral interest in the land to the state.


(f) This section is self-executing.


(Added Nov. 2, 1993; amended Nov. 6, 2001.)


Sec. 2B. AUTHORITY TO RELEASE STATE'S INTEREST IN CERTAIN PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND LAND HELD BY PERSON UNDER COLOR OF TITLE. (a) The legislature by law may provide for the release of all or part of the state's interest in land, excluding mineral rights, if:


(1) the land is surveyed, unsold, permanent school fund land according to the records of the General Land Office;


(2) the land is not patentable under the law in effect before January 1, 2002; and


(3) the person claiming title to the land:


(A) holds the land under color of title;


(B) holds the land under a chain of title that originated on or before January 1, 1952;


(C) acquired the land without actual knowledge that title to the land was vested in the State of Texas;


(D) has a deed to the land recorded in the appropriate county; and


(E) has paid all taxes assessed on the land and any interest and penalties associated with any period of tax delinquency.


(b) This section does not apply to:


(1) beach land, submerged or filled land, or islands; or


(2) land that has been determined to be state-owned by judicial decree.


(c) This section may not be used to:


(1) resolve boundary disputes; or


(2) change the mineral reservation in an existing patent.


(Added Nov. 6, 2001; Subsec. (d) expired Jan. 2, 2002.)


Sec. 2C. RELEASE OF STATE CLAIM TO CERTAIN LANDS IN UPSHUR AND SMITH COUNTIES. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section, the State of Texas relinquishes and releases any claim of sovereign ownership or title to an interest in and to the tracts of land, including mineral rights, described as follows:


Tract 1:


The first tract of land is situated in Upshur County, Texas, about 14 miles South 30 degrees east from Gilmer, the county seat, and is bounded as follows: Bound on the North by the J. Manning Survey, A-314 the S.W. Beasley Survey A-66 and the David Meredith Survey A-315 and bound on the East by the M. Mann Survey, A-302 and by the M. Chandler Survey, A-84 and bound on the South by the G. W. Hooper Survey, A-657 and by the D. Ferguson Survey, A-158 and bound on the West by the J. R. Wadkins Survey, A-562 and the H. Alsup Survey, A-20, and by the W. Bratton Survey, A-57 and the G. H. Burroughs Survey, A-30 and the M. Tidwell Survey, A-498 of Upshur County, Texas.


Tract 2:


The second tract of land is situated in Smith County, Texas, north of Tyler and is bounded as follows: on the north and west by the S. Leeper A-559, the Frost Thorn Four League Grant A-3, A-9, A-7, A-19, and the H. Jacobs A-504 and on the south and east by the following surveys: John Carver A-247, A. Loverly A-609, J. Gimble A-408, R. Conner A-239, N.J. Blythe A-88, N.J. Blythe A-89, J. Choate A-195, Daniel Minor A-644, William Keys A-527, James H. Thomas A-971, Seaborn Smith A-899, and Samuel Leeper A-559.


(b) This section does not apply to:


(1) any public right-of-way, including a public road right-of-way, or related interest owned by a governmental entity;


(2) any navigable waterway or related interest owned by a governmental entity; or


(3) any land owned by a governmental entity and reserved for public use, including a park, recreation area, wildlife area, scientific area, or historic site.


(c) This section is self-executing.


(Added Nov. 8, 2005.)


Sec. 3. TAXES FOR BENEFIT OF SCHOOLS; PROVISION OF FREE TEXT BOOKS; SCHOOL DISTRICTS. (a) One-fourth of the revenue derived from the State occupation taxes shall be set apart annually for the benefit of the public free schools.


(b) It shall be the duty of the State Board of Education to set aside a sufficient amount of available funds to provide free text books for the use of children attending the public free schools of this State.


(c) Should the taxation herein named be insufficient the deficit may be met by appropriation from the general funds of the State.


(d) The Legislature may provide for the formation of school districts by general laws, and all such school districts may embrace parts of two or more counties.


(e) The Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in all school districts and for the management and control of the public school or schools of such districts, whether such districts are composed of territory wholly within a county or in parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts for the further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school buildings therein; provided that a majority of the qualified voters of the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose, shall approve the tax.


(Amended Aug. 14, 1883, Nov. 3, 1908, Aug. 3, 1909, Nov. 5, 1918, Nov. 2, 1920, Nov. 2, 1926, and Nov. 2, 1999.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 3: See Appendix, Note 1.)


Sec. 3a. (Repealed Aug. 5, 1969.)


Sec. 3-b. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT AND JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICT TAXES AND BONDS NOT AFFECTED BY CHANGES IN BOUNDARIES. No tax for the maintenance of public free schools voted in any independent school district and no tax for the maintenance of a junior college voted by a junior college district, nor any bonds voted in any such district, but unissued, shall be abrogated, cancelled or invalidated by change of any kind in the boundaries thereof. After any change in boundaries, the governing body of any such district, without the necessity of an additional election, shall have the power to assess, levy and collect ad valorem taxes on all taxable property within the boundaries of the district as changed, for the purposes of the maintenance of public free schools or the maintenance of a junior college, as the case may be, and the payment of principal of and interest on all bonded indebtedness outstanding against, or attributable, adjusted or allocated to, such district or any territory therein, in the amount, at the rate, or not to exceed the rate, and in the manner authorized in the district prior to the change in its boundaries, and further in accordance with the laws under which all such bonds, respectively, were voted; and such governing body also shall have the power, without the necessity of an additional election, to sell and deliver any unissued bonds voted in the district prior to any such change in boundaries, and to assess, levy and collect ad valorem taxes on all taxable property in the district as changed, for the payment of principal of and interest on such bonds in the manner permitted by the laws under which such bonds were voted. In those instances where the boundaries of any such independent school district are changed by the annexation of, or consolidation with, one or more whole school districts, the taxes to be levied for the purposes hereinabove authorized may be in the amount or at not to exceed the rate theretofore voted in the district having at the time of such change the greatest scholastic population according to the latest scholastic census and only the unissued bonds of such district voted prior to such change, may be subsequently sold and delivered and any voted, but unissued, bonds of other school districts involved in such annexation or consolidation shall not thereafter be issued.


(Added Nov. 6, 1962; amended Nov. 8, 1966.)


Sec. 4. SALE OF PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND LANDS; INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS. The lands herein set apart to the Permanent School fund, shall be sold under such regulations, at such times, and on such terms as may be prescribed by law; and the Legislature shall not have power to grant any relief to purchasers thereof. The proceeds of such sales must be used to acquire other land for the Permanent School fund as provided by law or the proceeds shall be invested by the comptroller of public accounts, as may be directed by the Board of Education herein provided for, in the bonds of the United States, the State of Texas, or counties in said State, or in such other securities, and under such restrictions as may be prescribed by law; and the State shall be responsible for all investments.


(Amended Aug. 14, 1883, Nov. 5, 1985, Nov. 7, 1995, and Nov. 8, 2011.)


Sec. 4A. (Repealed Nov. 6, 2001.)


(TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISION for Sec. 4A: See Appendix, Note 3.)


Sec. 4B. DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY BY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR HISTORICAL PRESERVATION. (a) The legislature by general law may authorize the board of trustees of an independent school district to donate district real property and improvements formerly used as a school campus for the purpose of preserving the improvements.


(b) A law enacted under this section must provide that before the board of trustees may make the donation, the board must determine that:


(1) the improvements have historical significance;


(2) the transfer will further the preservation of the improvements; and


(3) at the time of the transfer, the district does not need the real property or improvements for educational purposes.


(Added Nov. 6, 2001.)


Sec. 5. PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND AND AVAILABLE SCHOOL FUND: COMPOSITION, MANAGEMENT, USE, AND DISTRIBUTION. (a) The permanent school fund consists of all land appropriated for public schools by this constitution or the other laws of this state, other properties belonging to the permanent school fund, and all revenue derived from the land or other properties. The available school fund consists of the distributions made to it from the total return on all investment assets of the permanent school fund, the taxes authorized by this constitution or general law to be part of the available school fund, and appropriations made to the available school fund by the legislature. The total amount distributed from the permanent school fund to the available school fund:


(1) in each year of a state fiscal biennium must be an amount that is not more than six percent of the average of the market value of the permanent school fund, excluding real property belonging to the fund that is managed, sold, or acquired under Section 4 of this article, but including discretionary real assets investments and cash in the state treasury derived from property belonging to the fund, on the last day of each of the 16 state fiscal quarters preceding the regular session of the legislature that begins before that state fiscal biennium, in accordance with the rate adopted by:


(A) a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the State Board of Education, taken before the regular session of the legislature convenes; or


(B) the legislature by general law or appropriation, if the State Board of Education does not adopt a rate as provided by Paragraph (A) of this subdivision; and


(2) over the 10-year period consisting of the current state fiscal year and the nine preceding state fiscal years may not exceed the total return on all investment assets of the permanent school fund over the same 10-year period.


(b) The expenses of managing permanent school fund land and investments shall be paid by appropriation from the permanent school fund.


(c) The available school fund shall be applied annually to the support of the public free schools. Except as provided by this section, the legislature may not enact a law appropriating any part of the permanent school fund or available school fund to any other purpose. The permanent school fund and the available school fund may not be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school. The available school fund shall be distributed to the several counties according to their scholastic population and applied in the manner provided by law.


(d) The legislature by law may provide for using the permanent school fund to guarantee bonds issued by school districts or by the state for the purpose of making loans to or purchasing the bonds of school districts for the purpose of acquisition, construction, or improvement of instructional facilities including all furnishings thereto. If any payment is required to be made by the permanent school fund as a result of its guarantee of bonds issued by the state, an amount equal to this payment shall be immediately paid by the state from the treasury to the permanent school fund. An amount owed by the state to the permanent school fund under this section shall be a general obligation of the state until paid. The amount of bonds authorized hereunder shall not exceed $750 million or a higher amount authorized by a two-thirds record vote of both houses of the legislature. If the proceeds of bonds issued by the state are used to provide a loan to a school district and the district becomes delinquent on the loan payments, the amount of the delinquent payments shall be offset against state aid to which the district is otherwise entitled.


(e) The legislature may appropriate part of the available school fund for administration of a bond guarantee program established under this section.


(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, in managing the assets of the permanent school fund, the State Board of Education may acquire, exchange, sell, supervise, manage, or retain, through procedures and subject to restrictions it establishes and in amounts it considers appropriate, any kind of investment, including investments in the Texas growth fund created by Article XVI, Section 70, of this constitution, that persons of ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence, exercising the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing, acquire or retain for their own account in the management of their affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital.


(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution or of a statute, the State Board of Education, the General Land Office, or another entity that has responsibility for the management of revenues derived from permanent school fund land or other properties may, in its sole discretion and in addition to other distributions authorized under this constitution or a statute, distribute to the available school fund each year revenue derived during that year from the land or properties, not to exceed $600 million by each entity each year.


(Amended Aug. 11, 1891, and Nov. 3, 1964; Subsec. (a) amended and (b) and (c) added Nov. 8, 1983; Subsec. (d) added Nov. 8, 1988; Subsec. (b) amended Nov. 7, 1989; Subsec. (a) amended, a new (b) added, a portion of (a) redesignated as (c), former (b) and (c) amended, former (b)-(d) redesignated as (d)-(f), and (g) and (h) added Sept. 13, 2003; former Subsec. (g) and Subsec. (h) expired Dec. 1, 2006; Subsec. (a) amended and current Subsec. (g) added Nov. 8, 2011; Subsec. (g) amended Nov. 5, 2019.)


Sec. 6. COUNTY SCHOOL LANDS AND PROCEEDS OF SALES HELD AS SCHOOL TRUST. All lands heretofore, or hereafter granted to the several counties of this State for educational purposes, are of right the property of said counties respectively, to which they were granted, and title thereto is vested in said counties, and no adverse possession or limitation shall ever be available against the title of any county. Each county may sell or dispose of its lands in whole or in part, in manner to be provided by the Commissioners Court of the county. Said lands, and the proceeds thereof, when sold, shall be held by said counties alone as a trust for the benefit of public schools therein; said proceeds to be invested in bonds of the United States, the State of Texas, or counties in said State, or in such other securities, and under such restrictions as may be prescribed by law; and the counties shall be responsible for all investments; the interest thereon, and other revenue, except the principal shall be available fund.


(Amended Aug. 14, 1883, and Nov. 6, 2001.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISION for Sec. 6: See Appendix, Note 3.)


Sec. 6a. COUNTY AGRICULTURAL OR GRAZING SCHOOL LAND SUBJECT TO TAX. All agriculture or grazing school land mentioned in Section 6 of this article owned by any county shall be subject to taxation except for State purposes to the same extent as lands privately owned.


(Added Nov. 2, 1926.)


Sec. 6b. COUNTY PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND: REDUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6, Article VII, Constitution of the State of Texas, any county, acting through the commissioners court, may reduce the county permanent school fund of that county and may distribute the amount of the reduction to the independent and common school districts of the county on a per scholastic basis to be used solely for the purpose of reducing bonded indebtedness of those districts or for making permanent improvements. The commissioners court shall, however, retain a sufficient amount of the corpus of the county permanent school fund to pay ad valorem taxes on school lands or royalty interests owned at the time of the distribution. Nothing in this Section affects financial aid to any school district by the state.


(Added Nov. 7, 1972.)


Sec. 7. (Repealed Aug. 5, 1969.)


Sec. 8. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. The Legislature shall provide by law for a State Board of Education, whose members shall be appointed or elected in such manner and by such authority and shall serve for such terms as the Legislature shall prescribe not to exceed six years. The said board shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law.


(Amended Nov. 6, 1928.)


Sec. 9. (Repealed Nov. 6, 2001.)


(TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISION for Sec. 9: See Appendix, Note 3.)


Sec. 9-a. (Added Nov. 6, 2001; expired Jan. 1, 2005.)


Sec. 10. ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS; AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT. The legislature shall as soon as practicable establish, organize and provide for the maintenance, support and direction of a University of the first class, to be located by a vote of the people of this State, and styled, "The University of Texas," for the promotion of literature, and the arts and sciences, including an Agricultural, and Mechanical department.


Sec. 11. ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND; INVESTMENT IN GOVERNMENT BONDS. In order to enable the Legislature to perform the duties set forth in the foregoing Section, it is hereby declared all lands and other property heretofore set apart and appropriated for the establishment and maintenance of the University of Texas, together with all the proceeds of sales of the same, heretofore made or hereafter to be made, and all grants, donations and appropriations that may hereafter be made by the State of Texas, or from any other source, except donations limited to specific purposes, shall constitute and become a Permanent University Fund. And the same as realized and received into the Treasury of the State (together with such sums belonging to the Fund, as may now be in the Treasury), shall be invested in bonds of the United States, the State of Texas, or counties of said State, or in School Bonds or municipalities, or in bonds of any city of this State, or in bonds issued under and by virtue of the Federal Farm Loan Act approved by the President of the United States, July 17, 1916, and amendments thereto; and the interest accruing thereon shall be subject to appropriation by the Legislature to accomplish the purpose declared in the foregoing Section; provided, that the one-tenth of the alternate Section of the lands granted to railroads, reserved by the State, which were set apart and appropriated to the establishment of the University of Texas, by an Act of the Legislature of February 11, 1858, entitled, "An Act to establish the University of Texas," shall not be included in, or constitute a part of, the Permanent University Fund.


(Amended Nov. 4, 1930, and Nov. 8, 1932.)


Sec. 11a. INVESTMENT OF PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND. In addition to the bonds enumerated in Section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Texas, the Board of Regents of The University of Texas may invest the Permanent University Fund in securities, bonds or other obligations issued, insured, or guaranteed in any manner by the United States Government, or any of its agencies, and in such bonds, debentures, or obligations, and preferred and common stocks issued by corporations, associations, or other institutions as the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System may deem to be proper investments for said funds; provided, however, that not more than one per cent (1%) of said fund shall be invested in the securities of any one (1) corporation, nor shall more than five per cent (5%) of the voting stock of any one (1) corporation be owned: provided, further, that stocks eligible for purchase shall be restricted to stocks of companies incorporated within the United States which have paid dividends for five (5) consecutive years or longer immediately prior to the date of purchase and which, except for bank stocks and insurance stocks, are listed upon an exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or its successors.


In making each and all of such investments said Board of Regents shall exercise the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing which men of ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income therefrom as well as the probable safety of their capital.


The interest, dividends and other income accruing from the investments of the Permanent University Fund, except the portion thereof which is appropriated by the operation of Section 18 of Article VII for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or notes issued thereunder, shall be subject to appropriation by the Legislature to accomplish the purposes declared in Section 10 of Article VII of this Constitution.


This amendment shall be self-enacting, and shall become effective upon its adoption, provided, however, that the Legislature shall provide by law for full disclosure of all details concerning the investments in corporate stocks and bonds and other investments authorized herein.


(Added Nov. 6, 1956; amended Nov. 5, 1968.)


Sec. 11b. EXPANDED INVESTMENT AUTHORITY FOR PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND. Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, in managing the assets of the permanent university fund, the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System may acquire, exchange, sell, supervise, manage, or retain, through procedures and subject to restrictions it establishes and in amounts it considers appropriate, any kind of investment, including investments in the Texas growth fund created by Article XVI, Section 70, of this constitution, that prudent investors, exercising reasonable care, skill, and caution, would acquire or retain in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the fund then prevailing, taking into consideration the investment of all the assets of the fund rather than a single investment.


(Added Nov. 8, 1988; amended Nov. 7, 1995, and Nov. 2, 1999.)


Sec. 12. SALE OF PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND LANDS. The land herein set apart to the University fund shall be sold under such regulations, at such times, and on such terms as may be provided by law; and the Legislature shall provide for the prompt collection, at maturity, of all debts due on account of University lands, heretofore sold, or that may hereafter be sold, and shall in neither event have the power to grant relief to the purchasers.


Sec. 13. AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE. The Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, established by an Act of the Legislature passed April 17th, 1871, located in the county of Brazos, is hereby made, and constituted a Branch of the University of Texas, for instruction in Agriculture, the Mechanic Arts, and the Natural Sciences connected therewith. And the Legislature shall at its next session, make an appropriation, not to exceed forty thousand dollars, for the construction and completion of the buildings and improvements, and for providing the furniture necessary to put said College in immediate and successful operation.


Sec. 14. PRAIRIE VIEW A&M UNIVERSITY. Prairie View A&M University in Waller County is an institution of the first class under the direction of the same governing board as Texas A&M University referred to in Article VII, Section 13, of this constitution as the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas.


(Amended Nov. 6, 1984.)


Sec. 15. GRANT OF ADDITIONAL LANDS TO UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS. In addition to the lands heretofore granted to the University of Texas, there is hereby set apart, and appropriated, for the endowment maintenance, and support of said University and its branches, one million acres of the unappropriated public domain of the State, to be designated, and surveyed as may be provided by law; and said lands shall be sold under the same regulations, and the proceeds invested in the same manner, as is provided for the sale and investment of the permanent University fund; and the Legislature shall not have power to grant any relief to the purchasers of said lands.


Sec. 16. COUNTY TAXATION OF CERTAIN UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS LANDS. All land mentioned in Sections 11, 12, and 15 of Article VII, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, now belonging to the University of Texas shall be subject to the taxation for county purposes to the same extent as lands privately owned; provided they shall be rendered for taxation upon values fixed by the State Tax Board; and providing that the State shall remit annually to each of the counties in which said lands are located an amount equal to the tax imposed upon said land for county purposes.


(Added Nov. 4, 1930.)


Sec. 16-a. TERMS OF OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL OFFICERS. The Legislature shall fix by law the terms of all offices of the public school system and of the State institutions of higher education, inclusive, and the terms of members of the respective boards, not to exceed six years.


(Added Nov. 6, 1928; amended Nov. 4, 1997.)


Sec. 17. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION NOT SUPPORTED BY AVAILABLE UNIVERSITY FUND. (a) In the fiscal year beginning September 1, 1985, and each fiscal year thereafter, there is hereby appropriated out of the first money coming into the state treasury not otherwise appropriated by the constitution $100 million to be used by eligible agencies and institutions of higher education for the purpose of acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, major repair or rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements, acquisition of capital equipment, library books and library materials, and paying for acquiring, constructing, or equipping or for major repair or rehabilitation of buildings, facilities, other permanent improvements, or capital equipment used jointly for educational and general activities and for auxiliary enterprises to the extent of their use for educational and general activities. For the five-year period that begins on September 1, 2000, and for each five-year period that begins after that period, the legislature, during a regular session that is nearest, but preceding, a five-year period, may by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house increase the amount of the constitutional appropriation for the five-year period but may not adjust the appropriation in such a way as to impair any obligation created by the issuance of bonds or notes in accordance with this section.


(b) The funds appropriated under Subsection (a) of this section shall be for the use of the following eligible agencies and institutions of higher education (even though their names may be changed):


(1) East Texas State University including East Texas State University at Texarkana;


(2) Lamar University including Lamar University at Orange and Lamar University at Port Arthur;


(3) Midwestern State University;


(4) University of North Texas;


(5) The University of Texas-Pan American including The University of Texas at Brownsville;


(6) Stephen F. Austin State University;


(7) Texas College of Osteopathic Medicine;


(8) Texas State University System Administration and the following component institutions:


(9) Sam Houston State University;


(10) Southwest Texas State University;


(11) Sul Ross State University including Uvalde Study Center;


(12) Texas Southern University;


(13) Texas Tech University;


(14) Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center;


(15) Angelo State University;


(16) Texas Woman's University;


(17) University of Houston System Administration and the following component institutions:


(18) University of Houston;


(19) University of Houston-Victoria;


(20) University of Houston-Clear Lake;


(21) University of Houston-Downtown;


(22) Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi;


(23) Texas A&M International University;


(24) Texas A&M University-Kingsville;


(25) West Texas A&M University; and


(26) Texas State Technical College System and its campuses, but not its extension centers or programs.


(c) Pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature, institutions of higher education may be created at a later date by general law, and, when created, such an institution shall be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section if it is not created as a part of The University of Texas System or The Texas A&M University System. An institution that is entitled to participate in dedicated funding provided by Article VII, Section 18, of this constitution may not be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section.


(d) In the year 1985 and every 10 years thereafter, the legislature or an agency designated by the legislature no later than August 31 of such year shall allocate by equitable formula the annual appropriations made under Subsection (a) of this section to the governing boards of eligible agencies and institutions of higher education. The legislature shall review, or provide for a review, of the allocation formula at the end of the fifth year of each 10-year allocation period. At that time adjustments may be made in the allocation formula, but no adjustment that will prevent the payment of outstanding bonds and notes, both principal and interest, may be made.


(d-1) Notwithstanding Subsection (d) of this section, the allocation of the annual appropriation to Texas State Technical College System and its campuses may not exceed 2.2 percent of the total appropriation each fiscal year.


(e) Each governing board authorized to participate in the distribution of money under this section is authorized to expend all money distributed to it for any of the purposes enumerated in Subsection (a). In addition, such governing board may issue bonds and notes for the purposes of refunding bonds or notes issued under this section or prior law, acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, acquiring capital equipment, library books, and library materials, paying for acquiring, constructing, or equipping or for major repair or rehabilitation of buildings, facilities, other permanent improvements, or capital equipment used jointly for educational and general activities and for auxiliary enterprises to the extent of their use for educational and general activities, and for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements, and may pledge up to 50 percent of the money allocated to such governing board pursuant to this section to secure the payment of the principal and interest of such bonds or notes. Proceeds from the issuance of bonds or notes under this subsection shall be maintained in a local depository selected by the governing board issuing the bonds or notes. The bonds and notes issued under this subsection shall be payable solely out of the money appropriated by this section and shall mature serially or otherwise in not more than 10 years from their respective dates. All bonds issued under this section shall be sold only through competitive bidding and are subject to approval by the attorney general. Bonds approved by the attorney general shall be incontestable. The permanent university fund may be invested in the bonds and notes issued under this section.


(f) The funds appropriated by this section may not be used for the purpose of constructing, equipping, repairing, or rehabilitating buildings or other permanent improvements that are to be used only for student housing, intercollegiate athletics, or auxiliary enterprises.


(g) The comptroller of public accounts shall make annual transfers of the funds allocated pursuant to Subsection (d) directly to the governing boards of the eligible institutions.


(h) To assure efficient use of construction funds and the orderly development of physical plants to accommodate the state's real need, the legislature may provide for the approval or disapproval of all new construction projects at the eligible agencies and institutions entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section.


(i) (Repealed.)


(j) The state systems and institutions of higher education designated in this section may not receive any additional funds from the general revenue of the state for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements except that:


(1) in the case of fire or natural disaster the legislature may appropriate from the general revenue an amount sufficient to replace the uninsured loss of any building or other permanent improvement; and


(2) the legislature, by two-thirds vote of each house, may, in cases of demonstrated need, which need must be clearly expressed in the body of the act, appropriate additional general revenue funds for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements.


This subsection does not apply to legislative appropriations made prior to the adoption of this amendment.


(k) Without the prior approval of the legislature, appropriations under this section may not be expended for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, or for constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, for a branch campus or educational center that is not a separate degree-granting institution created by general law.


(l) This section is self-enacting upon the issuance of the governor's proclamation declaring the adoption of the amendment, and the state comptroller of public accounts shall do all things necessary to effectuate this section. This section does not impair any obligation created by the issuance of any bonds and notes in accordance with prior law, and all outstanding bonds and notes shall be paid in full, both principal and interest, in accordance with their terms. If the provisions of this section conflict with any other provisions of this constitution, then the provisions of this section shall prevail, notwithstanding all such conflicting provisions.


(Added Nov. 6, 1984; Subsecs. (a), (b), (e), (f), and (g) amended and (d-1) added Nov. 2, 1993; Subsec. (l) amended Nov. 7, 1995; Subsec. (b) amended Nov. 6, 2007; Subsec. (i) repealed Nov. 3, 2009.)


Sec. 18. FUNDING TO SUPPORT TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM AND UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM; AVAILABLE UNIVERSITY FUND. (a) The Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System may issue bonds and notes not to exceed a total amount of 10 percent of the cost value of the investments and other assets of the permanent university fund (exclusive of real estate) at the time of the issuance thereof, and may pledge all or any part of its one-third interest in the available university fund to secure the payment of the principal and interest of those bonds and notes, for the purpose of acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, major repair and rehabilitation of buildings and other permanent improvements, acquiring capital equipment and library books and library materials, and refunding bonds or notes issued under this Section or prior law, at or for The Texas A&M University System administration and the following component institutions of the system:


(1) Texas A&M University, including its medical college which the legislature may authorize as a separate medical institution;


(2) Prairie View A&M University, including its nursing school in Houston;


(3) Tarleton State University;


(4) Texas A&M University at Galveston;


(5) Texas Forest Service;


(6) Texas Agricultural Experiment Stations;


(7) Texas Agricultural Extension Service;


(8) Texas Engineering Experiment Stations;


(9) Texas Transportation Institute; and


(10) Texas Engineering Extension Service.


(b) The Board of Regents of The University of Texas System may issue bonds and notes not to exceed a total amount of 20 percent of the cost value of investments and other assets of the permanent university fund (exclusive of real estate) at the time of issuance thereof, and may pledge all or any part of its two-thirds interest in the available university fund to secure the payment of the principal and interest of those bonds and notes, for the purpose of acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, major repair and rehabilitation of buildings and other permanent improvements, acquiring capital equipment and library books and library materials, and refunding bonds or notes issued under this section or prior law, at or for The University of Texas System administration and the following component institutions of the system:


(1) The University of Texas at Arlington;


(2) The University of Texas at Austin;


(3) The University of Texas at Dallas;


(4) The University of Texas at El Paso;


(5) The University of Texas of the Permian Basin;


(6) The University of Texas at San Antonio;


(7) The University of Texas at Tyler;


(8) The University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas;


(9) The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston;


(10) The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston;


(11) The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio;


(12) The University of Texas System Cancer Center;


(13) The University of Texas Health Center at Tyler; and


(14) The University of Texas Institute of Texan Cultures at San Antonio.


(c) Pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature, institutions of higher education may be created at a later date as a part of The University of Texas System or The Texas A&M University System by general law, and, when created, such an institution shall be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section for the system in which it is created. An institution that is entitled to participate in dedicated funding provided by Article VII, Section 17, of this constitution may not be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section.


(d) The proceeds of the bonds or notes issued under Subsection (a) or (b) of this section may not be used for the purpose of constructing, equipping, repairing, or rehabilitating buildings or other permanent improvements that are to be used for student housing, intercollegiate athletics, or auxiliary enterprises.


(e) The available university fund consists of the distributions made to it from the total return on all investment assets of the permanent university fund, including the net income attributable to the surface of permanent university fund land. The amount of any distributions to the available university fund shall be determined by the board of regents of The University of Texas System in a manner intended to provide the available university fund with a stable and predictable stream of annual distributions and to maintain over time the purchasing power of permanent university fund investments and annual distributions to the available university fund. The amount distributed to the available university fund in a fiscal year must be not less than the amount needed to pay the principal and interest due and owing in that fiscal year on bonds and notes issued under this section. If the purchasing power of permanent university fund investments for any rolling 10-year period is not preserved, the board may not increase annual distributions to the available university fund until the purchasing power of the permanent university fund investments is restored, except as necessary to pay the principal and interest due and owing on bonds and notes issued under this section. An annual distribution made by the board to the available university fund during any fiscal year may not exceed an amount equal to seven percent of the average net fair market value of permanent university fund investment assets as determined by the board, except as necessary to pay any principal and interest due and owing on bonds issued under this section. The expenses of managing permanent university fund land and investments shall be paid by the permanent university fund.


(f) Out of one-third of the annual distribution from the permanent university fund to the available university fund, there shall be appropriated an annual sum sufficient to pay the principal and interest due on the bonds and notes issued by the Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System under this section and prior law, and the remainder of that one-third of the annual distribution to the available university fund shall be appropriated to the Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System which shall have the authority and duty in turn to appropriate an equitable portion of the same for the support and maintenance of The Texas A&M University System administration, Texas A&M University, and Prairie View A&M University. The Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System, in making just and equitable appropriations to Texas A&M University and Prairie View A&M University, shall exercise its discretion with due regard to such criteria as the board may deem appropriate from year to year. Out of the other two-thirds of the annual distribution from the permanent university fund to the available university fund there shall be appropriated an annual sum sufficient to pay the principal and interest due on the bonds and notes issued by the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System under this section and prior law, and the remainder of such two-thirds of the annual distribution to the available university fund, shall be appropriated for the support and maintenance of The University of Texas at Austin and The University of Texas System administration.


(g) The bonds and notes issued under this section shall be payable solely out of the available university fund, mature serially or otherwise in not more than 30 years from their respective dates, and, except for refunding bonds, be sold only through competitive bidding. All of these bonds and notes are subject to approval by the attorney general and when so approved are incontestable. The permanent university fund may be invested in these bonds and notes.


(h) To assure efficient use of construction funds and the orderly development of physical plants to accommodate the state's real need, the legislature may provide for the approval or disapproval of all new construction projects at the eligible agencies and institutions entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section except The University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M University in College Station, and Prairie View A&M University.


(i) The state systems and institutions of higher education designated in this section may not receive any funds from the general revenue of the state for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements except that:


(1) in the case of fire or natural disaster the legislature may appropriate from the general revenue an amount sufficient to replace the uninsured loss of any building or other permanent improvement; and


(2) the legislature, by two-thirds vote of each house, may, in cases of demonstrated need, which need must be clearly expressed in the body of the act, appropriate general revenue funds for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements.


This subsection does not apply to legislative appropriations made prior to the adoption of this amendment.


(j) This section is self-enacting on the issuance of the governor's proclamation declaring the adoption of this amendment, and the state comptroller of public accounts shall do all things necessary to effectuate this section. This section does not impair any obligation created by the issuance of bonds or notes in accordance with prior law, and all outstanding bonds and notes shall be paid in full, both principal and interest, in accordance with their terms, and the changes herein made in the allocation of the available university fund shall not affect the pledges thereof made in connection with such bonds or notes heretofore issued. If the provisions of this section conflict with any other provision of this constitution, then the provisions of this section shall prevail, notwithstanding any such conflicting provisions.


(Added Aug. 23, 1947; amended Nov. 6, 1956, Nov. 8, 1966, and Nov. 6, 1984; former Subsec. (f) expired Nov. 6, 1994; Subsec. (j) amended Nov. 7, 1995; Subsec. (e) amended and current Subsec. (f) added Nov. 2, 1999.) (TEMPORARY PROVISION for Sec. 18: See Appendix, Note 2.)


Sec. 19. TEXAS TOMORROW FUND. (a) The Texas tomorrow fund is created as a trust fund dedicated to the prepayment of tuition and fees for higher education as provided by the general laws of this state for the prepaid higher education tuition program. The assets of the fund are held in trust for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries and may not be diverted. The state shall hold the assets of the fund for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the program.


(b) Financing of benefits must be based on sound actuarial principles. The amount contributed by a person participating in the prepaid higher education program shall be as provided by the general laws of this state, but may not be less than the amount anticipated for tuition and required fees based on sound actuarial principles. If in any fiscal year there is not enough money in the Texas tomorrow fund to pay the tuition and required fees of an institution of higher education in which a beneficiary enrolls or the appropriate portion of the tuition and required fees of a private or independent institution of higher education in which a beneficiary enrolls as provided by a prepaid tuition contract, there is appropriated out of the first money coming into the state treasury in each fiscal year not otherwise appropriated by the constitution the amount that is sufficient to pay the applicable amount of tuition and required fees of the institution.


(c) Assets of the fund may be invested by an entity designated by general law in securities considered prudent investments. Investments shall be made in the exercise of judgment and care under the circumstances that a person of ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercises in the management of the person's affairs, not for speculation, but for the permanent disposition of funds, considering the probable income from the disposition as well as the probable safety of capital.


(d) The state comptroller of public accounts shall take the actions necessary to implement this section.


(e) To the extent this section conflicts with any other provision of this constitution, this section controls.


(Added Nov. 4, 1997.)


Sec. 20. NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY FUND. (a) There is established the national research university fund for the purpose of providing a dedicated, independent, and equitable source of funding to enable emerging research universities in this state to achieve national prominence as major research universities.


(b) The fund consists of money transferred or deposited to the credit of the fund and any interest or other return on the investment assets of the fund. The legislature may dedicate state revenue to the credit of the fund.


(c) The legislature shall provide for administration of the fund, which shall be invested in the manner and according to the standards provided for investment of the permanent university fund. The expenses of managing the investments of the fund shall be paid from the fund.


(d) In each state fiscal biennium, the legislature may appropriate as provided by Subsection (f) of this section all or a portion of the total return on all investment assets of the fund to carry out the purposes for which the fund is established.


(e) The legislature biennially shall allocate the amounts appropriated under this section, or shall provide for a biennial allocation of those amounts, to eligible state universities to carry out the purposes of the fund. The money shall be allocated based on an equitable formula established by the legislature or an agency designated by the legislature. The legislature shall review and as appropriate adjust, or provide for a review and adjustment, of the allocation formula at the end of each state fiscal biennium.


(f) The portion of the total return on investment assets of the fund that is available for appropriation in a state fiscal biennium under this section is the portion determined by the legislature, or an agency designated by the legislature, as necessary to provide as nearly as practicable a stable and predictable stream of annual distributions to eligible state universities and to maintain over time the purchasing power of fund investment assets. If the purchasing power of fund investment assets for any rolling 10-year period is not preserved, the distributions may not be increased until the purchasing power of the fund investment assets is restored. The amount appropriated from the fund in any fiscal year may not exceed an amount equal to seven percent of the average net fair market value of the investment assets of the fund, as determined by law. Until the fund has been invested for a period of time sufficient to determine the purchasing power over a 10-year period, the legislature may provide by law for means of preserving the purchasing power of the fund.


(g) The legislature shall establish criteria by which a state university may become eligible to receive a portion of the distributions from the fund. A state university that becomes eligible to receive a portion of the distributions from the fund in a state fiscal biennium remains eligible to receive additional distributions from the fund in any subsequent state fiscal biennium. The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University are not eligible to receive money from the fund.


(h) An eligible state university may use distributions from the fund only for the support and maintenance of educational and general activities that promote increased research capacity at the university.


(Added Nov. 3, 2009.)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 7. EDUCATION

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 7. EDUCATION Sec. 1. SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FREE SCHOOLS. A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.

# data[].attributes.headline
The Individuals with Disabilities Act (20 USC 1400) (Statutory Law)

# data[].attributes.subject
The Individuals with Disabilities Act (20 USC 1400) (Statutory Law)

# data[].attributes.body
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the federal special education law that ensures all children with disabilities have access to a free, appropriate public

education (34 CFR §300.100(a)). It requires states and school districts to have a transition plan in place for all students with disabilities. The transition plan should prime students for further education, employment, and independent living. Furthermore, it establishes a

requirement that by age sixteen, a student's individualized education program (I.E.P)must be included in their transition plan (34 CFR § 300.320).

References

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Text - H.R.1350 - 108th Congress (2003-2004): Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Text for H.R.1350 - 108th Congress (2003-2004): Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004

# data[].attributes.headline
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC § 12103(1) (Statutory Law)

# data[].attributes.subject
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC § 12103(1) (Statutory Law)

# data[].attributes.body
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was a historical benchmark for people with disabilities. It entrenched the rights of people with disabilities and extended the rights beyond that of Section 504. It was a civil rights law that forbids discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of public life, including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and

private places open to the general public. It ensures that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services (28 CFR § 36.303).

# data[].attributes.headline
Texas State Requirements for the postsecondary transition process

# data[].attributes.subject
Texas State Requirements for the postsecondary transition process

# data[].attributes.body
A) COUNSELING REGARDING POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION
(Texas Education Code, § 33.007)

Outlines the responsibility for school counselors to guide students and their parents to organize, monitor, and manage the student's educational development, including the provision of providing information regarding postsecondary opportunities. This rule in the Texas education code grants me justification for crafting presentations in regards to the topic.

B) By age 14, your Admission, Review and Dismissal committee must consider and, if appropriate, address any of the following:

how involved you will be in your transition to life after high school

If you are younger than 18, how your parents will be involved in your transition planning

If you are least 18, how your parents or others that you know and trust will be involved in your transition if they are invited to participate in your ARD committee meeting

Any post-school education preparation and choices

If you need a functional vocational evaluation

Work goals and objectives

Educational preparation and choices available for you once you turn 18 to get ready for college, training, work, or independent living.

Texas Administrative Code (TAC) § 89.1055. Content of the Individualized Education
Program (IEP)

C) Texas Education Code (TEC) §29.0111. Beginning of Transition Planning

Appropriate state transition planning under the procedure adopted under Section 29.011 must begin for a student not later than when the student reaches 14 years of age

D) Tex. educ. Code § 29.011(b)-(c)
Transition and Employment coordinator for special education students.

Every district must designate one or more employees to serve as its designee to coordinate transition and employment services for students receiving special education services.

# data[].attributes.headline
 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson School District

# data[].attributes.subject
 Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson School District

# data[].attributes.body
The case served as the first interpretation of what was then called the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, “IDEA")

Defendant: Amy Rowley, a student at the Furnace Woods School in Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Peekskill, N.Y had a hearing impairment deficiency.

Rowley's parents requested that the school provide their child with a sign-language interpreter and other accommodations identified in the child's IEP. However, the district's Committee on the Handicapped, maintained that Amy did not need an interpreter.

The school counter-argument was that Rowley was capable of comprehending at minuscule disadvantages compared to her other peers.  Rowley's parents asserted that Amy would be equivalent to her peers with an interpreter.

Rowley's parents felt they were denying Anna of a Free and Appropriate Education.

The Rowley's won their case at the local court, but the school district appealed.

Supreme court ruled that "Amy was not receiving a “free appropriate public education,” which he defined in her case as “an opportunity to achieve her full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children(Walton, 1982)".

Rowley was an important case because it established a broad standard to measure whether the IEP provides an appropriate education. Under the Rowley decision, an IEP must provide “some educational benefit.”

Issue: What is meant by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act's (Act), requirement of a "free appropriate public education"? And what is the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by the Act.

References

Board of Education v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176 (1982)

Walton, S., (1982) High court issues first major ruling on handicapped. Education Week. Retrieved fromhttps://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1982/08/18/02320038.h01.html

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
458 U.S. 176

102 S.Ct. 3034

73 L.Ed.2d 690

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BD. OF ED., WESTCHESTER COUNTY, et al., Petitioners
v.
Amy ROWLEY, by her parents and natural guardians, Clifford and Nancy Rowley etc.

No. 80-1002.

The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act) provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped children. To qualify for federal assistance, a State must demonstrate, through a detailed plan submitted for federal approval, that it has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a "free appropriate public education," which policy must be tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an "individualized educational program" (IEP). The IEP must be prepared (and reviewed at least annually) by school officials with participation by the child's parents or guardian. The Act also requires that a participating State provide specified administrative procedures by which the child's parents or guardian may challenge any change in the evaluation and education of the child. Any party aggrieved by the state administrative decisions is authorized to bring a civil action in either a state court or a federal district court. Respondents-a child with only minimal residual hearing who had been furnished by school authorities with a special hearing aid for use in the classroom and who was to receive additional instruction from tutors, and the child's parents-filed suit in Federal District Court to review New York administrative proceedings that had upheld the school administrators' denial of the parents' request that the child also be provided a qualified sign-language interpreter in all of her academic classes. Entering judgment for respondents, the District Court found that although the child performed better than the average child in her class and was advancing easily from grade to grade, she was not performing as well academically as she would without her handicap. Because of this disparity between the child's achievement and her potential, the court held that she was not receiving a "free appropriate public education," which the court defined as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children." The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held:

1. The Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education" is satisfied when the State provides personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the handicapped child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State's educational standards, must approximate grade levels used in the State's regular education, and must comport with the child's IEP, as formulated in accordance with the Act's requirements. If the child is being educated in regular classrooms, as here, the IEP should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade. Pp. 187-204.

(a) This interpretation is supported by the definitions contained in the Act, as well as by other provisions imposing procedural requirements and setting forth statutory findings and priorities for States to follow in extending educational services to handicapped children. The Act's language contains no express substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children. Pp. 187-190.

(b) The Act's legislative history shows that Congress sought to make public education available to handicapped children, but did not intend to impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than is necessary to make such access to public education meaningful. The Act's intent was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children by means of specialized educational services than to guarantee any particular substantive level of education once inside. Pp. 191-197.

(c) While Congress sought to provide assistance to the States in carrying out their constitutional responsibilities to provide equal protection of the laws, it did not intend to achieve strict equality of opportunity or services for handicapped and nonhandicapped children, but rather sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free public education. The Act does not require a State to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. Pp. 198-200.

2. In suits brought under the Act's judicial-review provisions, a court must first determine whether the State has complied with the statutory procedures, and must then determine whether the individualized program developed through such procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more. Pp. 204-208.

(a) Although the judicial-review provisions do not limit courts to ensuring that States have complied with the Act's procedural requirements, the Act's emphasis on procedural safeguards demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with prescribed procedures will in most cases assure much, if not all, of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP. Pp. 204-207.

(b) The courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. Once a court determines that the Act's requirements have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States. Pp. 207-208.

3. Entrusting a child's education to state and local agencies does not leave the child without protection. As demonstrated by this case, parents and guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the Act. Pp.208-209

4. The Act does not require the provision of a sign-language interpreter here. Neither of the courts below found that there had been a failure to comply with the Act's procedures, and the findings of neither court will support a conclusion that the child's educational program failed to comply with the substantive requirements of the Act. Pp. 209-210.

632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), reversed and remanded.

Raymond G. Kuntz, Bedford Village, N. Y., for petitioners.

Michael A. Chatoff, Floral Park, N. Y., for respondent.

Elliott Schulder, Washington, D. C., for the United States as amicus curiae by special leave of Court.

Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals and the District Court misconstrued the requirements imposed by Congress upon States which receive federal funds under the Education of the Handicapped Act. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

* The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.IV), provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped children, and conditions such funding upon a State's compliance with extensive goals and procedures. The Act represents an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped children, and was passed in response to Congress' perception that a majority of handicapped children in the United States "were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to 'drop out.' " H.R.Rep.No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975) (H.R.Rep.). The Act's evolution and major provisions shed light on the question of statutory interpretation which is at the heart of this case.

Congress first addressed the problem of educating the handicapped in 1966 when it amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to establish a grant program "for the purpose of assisting the States in the initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects . . . for the education of handicapped children." Pub.L. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204. That program was repealed in 1970 by the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub.L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175, Part B of which established a grant program similar in purpose to the repealed legislation. Neither the 1966 nor the 1970 legislation contained specific guidelines for state use of the grant money; both were aimed primarily at stimulating the States to develop educational resources and to train personnel for educating the handicapped. 1

Dissatisfied with the progress being made under these earlier enactments, and spurred by two District Court decisions holding that handicapped children should be given access to a public education, 2 Congress in 1974 greatly increased federal funding for education of the handicapped and for the first time required recipient States to adopt "a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children." Pub.L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974 statute). The 1974 statute was recognized as an interim measure only, adopted "in order to give the Congress an additional year in which to study what if any additional Federal assistance [was] required to enable the States to meet the needs of handicapped children." H.R.Rep., at 4. The ensuing year of study produced the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.

In order to qualify for federal financial assistance under the Act, a State must demonstrate that it "has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). That policy must be reflected in a state plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Education, 3 § 1413, which describes in detail the goals, programs, and timetables under which the State intends to educate handicapped children within its borders. §§ 1412, 1413. States receiving money under the Act must provide education to the handicapped by priority, first "to handicapped children who are not receiving an education" and second "to handicapped children . . . with the most severe handicaps who are receiving an inadequate education," § 1412(3), and "to the maximum extent appropriate" must educate handicapped children "with children who are not handicapped." § 1412(5). 4 The Act broadly defines "handicapped children" to include "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, [and] other health impaired children, [and] children with specific learning disabilities." § 1401(1). 5

The "free appropriate public education" required by the Act is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an "individualized educational program" (IEP). § 1401(18). The IEP, which is prepared at a meeting between a qualified representative of the local educational agency, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child, consists of a written document containing

"(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved." § 1401(19).

Local or regional educational agencies must review, and where appropriate revise, each child's IEP at least annually. § 1414(a)(5). See also § 1413(a)(11).

In addition to the state plan and the IEP already described, the Act imposes extensive procedural requirements upon States receiving federal funds under its provisions. Parents or guardians of handicapped children must be notified of any proposed change in "the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," and must be permitted to bring a complaint about "any matter relating to" such evaluation and education. §§ 1415(b)(1)(D) and (E). 6 Complaints brought by parents or guardians must be resolved at "an impartial due process hearing," and appeal to the state educational agency must be provided if the initial hearing is held at the local or regional level. §§ 1415(b)(2) and (c). 7 Thereafter, "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the state administrative hearing has "the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy." § 1415(e)(2).

II

This case arose in connection with the education of Amy Rowley, a deaf student at the Furnace Woods School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Peekskill, N.Y. Amy has minimal residual hearing and is an excellent lipreader. During the year before she began attending Furnace Woods, a meeting between her parents and school administrators resulted in a decision to place her in a regular kindergarten class in order to determine what supplemental services would be necessary to her education. Several members of the school administration prepared for Amy's arrival by attending a course in sign-language interpretation, and a teletype machine was installed in the principal's office to facilitate communication with her parents who are also deaf. At the end of the trial period it was determined that Amy should remain in the kindergarten class, but that she should be provided with an FM hearing aid which would amplify words spoken into a wireless receiver by the teacher or fellow students during certain classroom activities. Amy successfully completed her kindergarten year.

As required by the Act, an IEP was prepared for Amy during the fall of her first-grade year. The IEP provided that Amy should be educated in a regular classroom at Furnace Woods, should continue to use the FM hearing aid, and should receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each week. The Rowleys agreed with parts of the IEP, but insisted that Amy also be provided a qualified sign-language interpreter in all her academic classes in lieu of the assistance proposed in other parts of the IEP. Such an interpreter had been placed in Amy's kindergarten class for a 2-week experimental period, but the interpreter had reported that Amy did not need his services at that time. The school administrators likewise concluded that Amy did not need such an interpreter in her first-grade classroom. They reached this conclusion after consulting the school district's Committee on the Handicapped, which had received expert evidence from Amy's parents on the importance of a sign-language interpreter, received testimony from Amy's teacher and other persons familiar with her academic and social progress, and visited a class for the deaf.

The District Court found that Amy "is a remarkably well-adjusted child" who interacts and communicates well with her classmates and has "developed an extraordinary rapport" with her teachers. 483 F.Supp. 528, 531 (1980). It also found that "she performs better than the average child in her class and is advancing easily from grade to grade," id., at 534, but "that she understands considerably less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not deaf" and thus "is not learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she would without her handicap," id., at 532. This disparity between Amy's achievement and her potential led the court to decide that she was not receiving a "free appropriate public education," which the court defined as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children." Id., at 534. According to the District Court, such a standard "requires that the potential of the handicapped child be measured and compared to his or her performance, and that the resulting differential or 'shortfall' be compared to the shortfall experienced by nonhandicapped children." Ibid. The District Court's definition arose from its assumption that the responsibility for "giv[ing] content to the requirement of an 'appropriate education' " had "been left entirely to the [federal] courts and the hearing officers." Id., at 533. 8

We granted certiorari to review the lower courts' interpretation of the Act. 454 U.S. 961, 102 S.Ct. 500, 70 L.Ed.2d 376 (1981). Such review requires us to consider two questions: What is meant by the Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education"? And what is the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by 20 U.S.C. § 1415? We consider these questions separately. 9

III

A.

This is the first case in which this Court has been called upon to interpret any provision of the Act. As noted previously, the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he Act itself does not define 'appropriate education,' " 483 F.Supp., at 533, but leaves "to the courts and the hearing officers" the responsibility of "giv[ing] content to the requirement of an 'appropriate education.' " Ibid. See also 632 F.2d, at 947. Petitioners contend that the definition of the phrase "free appropriate public education" used by the courts below overlooks the definition of that phrase actually found in the Act. Respondents agree that the Act defines "free appropriate public education," but contend that the statutory definition is not "functional" and thus "offers judges no guidance in their consideration of controversies involving 'the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education.' " Brief for Respondents 28. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of respondents, states that "[a]lthough the Act includes definitions of a 'free appropriate public education' and other related terms, the statutory definitions do not adequately explain what is meant by 'appropriate.' " Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13.

We are loath to conclude that Congress failed to offer any assistance in defining the meaning of the principal substantive phrase used in the Act. It is beyond dispute that, contrary to the conclusions of the courts below, the Act does expressly define "free appropriate public education": "The term 'free appropriate public education' means special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title." § 1401(18) (emphasis added).

Like many statutory definitions, this one tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is scarcely a reason for abandoning the quest for legislative intent. Whether or not the definition is a "functional" one, as respondents contend it is not, it is the principal tool which Congress has given us for parsing the critical phrase of the Act. We think more must be made of it than either respondents or the United States seems willing to admit.

According to the definitions contained in the Act, a "free appropriate public education" consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child "to benefit" from the instruction. Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition also requires that such instruction and services be provided at public expense and under public supervision, meet the State's educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular education, and comport with the child's IEP. Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a "free appropriate public education" as defined by the Act.

Other portions of the statute also shed light upon congressional intent. Congress found that of the roughly eight million handicapped children in the United States at the time of enactment, one million were "excluded entirely from the public school system" and more than half were receiving an inappropriate education. 89 Stat. 774, note following § 1401. In addition, as mentioned in Part I, the Act requires States to extend educational services first to those children who are receiving no education and second to those children who are receiving an "inadequate education." § 1412(3). When these express statutory findings and priorities are read together with the Act's extensive procedural requirements and its definition of "free appropriate public education," the face of the statute evinces a congressional intent to bring previously excluded handicapped children into the public education systems of the States and to require the States to adopt procedures which would result in individualized consideration of and instruction for each child.

B

"While much progress has been made in the last few years, we can take no solace in that progress until all handicapped children are, in fact, receiving an education. The most recent statistics provided by the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimate that . . . 1.75 million handicapped children do not receive any educational services, and 2.5 million handicapped children are not receiving an appropriate education." 121 Cong.Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams).

Both the House and the Senate Reports attribute the impetus for the Act and its predecessors to two federal-court judgments rendered in 1971 and 1972. As the Senate Report states, passage of the Act "followed a series of landmark court cases establishing in law the right to education for all handicapped children." S.Rep., at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p. 1430. 14 The first case, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F.Supp. 1257 (Ed Pa.1971) and 343 F.Supp. 279 (1972) ( PARC ), was a suit on behalf of retarded children challenging the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which acted to exclude them from public education and training. The case ended in a consent decree which enjoined the State from "deny[ing] to any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education and training." 334 F.Supp., at 1258 (emphasis added).

PARC was followed by Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.C.1972), a case in which the plaintiff handicapped children had been excluded from the District of Columbia public schools. The court's judgment, quoted in S.Rep., at 6, provided that

"no [handicapped] child eligible for a publicly supported education in the District of Columbia public schools shall be excluded from a regular school assignment by a Rule, policy, or practice of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia or its agents unless such child is provided (a) adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any educational alternative." 348 F.Supp., at 878 (emphasis added).

Mills and PARC both held that handicapped children must be given access to an adequate, publicly supported education. Neither case purports to require any particular substantive level of education. 15 Rather, like the language of the Act, the cases set forth extensive procedures to be followed in formulating personalized educational programs for handicapped children. See 348 F.Supp., at 878-883; 334 F.Supp., at 1258-1267. 16 The fact that both PARC and Mills are discussed at length in the legislative Reports 17 suggests that the principles which they established are the principles which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the Act. Indeed, immediately after discussing these cases the Senate Report describes the 1974 statute as having "incorporated the major principles of the right to education cases." S.Rep., at 8, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p. 1432. Those principles in turn became the basis of the Act, which itself was designed to effectuate the purposes of the 1974 statute. H.R.Rep., at 5. 18

It is evident from the legislative history that the characterization of handicapped children as "served" referred to children who were receiving some form of specialized educational services from the States, and that the characterization of children as "unserved" referred to those who were receiving no specialized educational services. For example, a letter sent to the United States Commissioner of Education by the House Committee on Education and Labor, signed by two key sponsors of the Act in the House, asked the Commissioner to identify the number of handicapped "children served" in each State. The letter asked for statistics on the number of children "being served" in various types of "special education program[s]" and the number of children who were not "receiving educational services." Hearings on S. 6 before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 205-207 (1975). Similarly, Senator Randolph, one of the Act's principal sponsors in the Senate, noted that roughly one-half of the handicapped children in the United States "are receiving special educational services." Id., at 1. 20 By characterizing the 3.9 million handicapped children who were "served" as children who were "receiving an appropriate education," the Senate and House Reports unmistakably disclose Congress' perception of the type of education required by the Act: an "appropriate education" is provided when personalized educational services are provided. 21

(ii)

The educational opportunities provided by our public school systems undoubtedly differ from student to student, depending upon a myriad of factors that might affect a particular student's ability to assimilate information presented in the classroom. The requirement that States provide "equal" educational opportunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons. Similarly, furnishing handicapped children with only such services as are available to nonhandicapped children would in all probability fall short of the statutory requirement of "free appropriate public education"; to require, on the other hand, the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential is, we think, further than Congress intended to go. Thus to speak in terms of "equal" services in one instance gives less than what is required by the Act and in another instance more. The theme of the Act is "free appropriate public education," a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word "equal" whether one is speaking of opportunities or services.

The legislative conception of the requirements of equal protection was undoubtedly informed by the two District Court decisions referred to above. But cases such as Mills and PARC held simply that handicapped children may not be excluded entirely from public education. In Mills, the District Court said:

"If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom." 348 F.Supp., at 876.

The PARC court used similar language, saying "[i]t is the commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity. . . ." 334 F.Supp., at 1260. The right of access to free public education enunciated by these cases is significantly different from any notion of absolute equality of opportunity regardless of capacity. To the extent that Congress might have looked further than these cases which are mentioned in the legislative history, at the time of enactment of the Act this Court had held at least twice that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to expend equal financial resources on the education of each child. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327 (ND Ill.1968), aff'd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322, 89 S.Ct. 1197, 22 L.Ed.2d 308 (1969).

In explaining the need for federal legislation, the House Report noted that "no congressional legislation has required a precise guarantee for handicapped children, i.e. a basic floor of opportunity that would bring into compliance all school districts with the constitutional right of equal protection with respect to handicapped children." H.R.Rep., at 14. Assuming that the Act was designed to fill the need identified in the House Report-that is, to provide a "basic floor of opportunity" consistent with equal protection-neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than equal access. Therefore, Congress' desire to provide specialized educational services, even in furtherance of "equality," cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive educational standard upon the States.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals thus erred when they held that the Act requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. Desirable though that goal might be, it is not the standard that Congress imposed upon States which receive funding under the Act. Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free public education.

Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a "free appropriate public education" is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. It would do little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to a public education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that education. The statutory definition of "free appropriate public education," in addition to requiring that States provide each child with "specially designed instruction," expressly requires the provision of "such . . . supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education." § 1401(17) (emphasis added). We therefore conclude that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child. 23

The determination of when handicapped children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act presents a more difficult problem. The Act requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite variations in between. One child may have little difficulty competing successfully in an academic setting with nonhandicapped children while another child may encounter great difficulty in acquiring even the most basic of self-maintenance skills. We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our analysis to that situation.

The Act requires participating States to educate handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible. 24 When that "mainstreaming" preference of the Act has been met and a child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the system itself monitors the educational progress of the child. Regular examinations are administered, grades are awarded, and yearly advancement to higher grade levels is permitted for those children who attain an adequate knowledge of the course material. The grading and advancement system thus constitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit. Children who graduate from our public school systems are considered by our society to have been "educated" at least to the grade level they have completed, and access to an "education" for handicapped children is precisely what Congress sought to provide in the Act. 25

C

IV

A.

As mentioned in Part I, the Act permits "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the state administrative hearings "to bring a civil action" in "any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy." § 1415(e)(2). The complaint, and therefore the civil action, may concern "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." § 1415(b)(1)(E). In reviewing the complaint, the Act provides that a court "shall receive the record of the [state] administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." § 1415(e)(2).

Thus the provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the "preponderance of the evidence" is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review. The very importance which Congress has attached to compliance with certain procedures in the preparation of an IEP would be frustrated if a court were permitted simply to set state decisions at nought. The fact that § 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court "receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings" carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these proceedings. And we find nothing in the Act to suggest that merely because Congress was rather sketchy in establishing substantive requirements, as opposed to procedural requirements for the preparation of an IEP, it intended that reviewing courts should have a free hand to impose substantive standards of review which cannot be derived from the Act itself. In short, the statutory authorization to grant "such relief as the court determines is appropriate" cannot be read without reference to the obligations, largely procedural in nature, which are imposed upon recipient States by Congress.

Therefore, a court's inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e)(2) is twofold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? 27 And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? 28 If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.

B

In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. 29 The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child. The Act expressly charges States with the responsibility of "acquiring and disseminating to teachers and administrators of programs for handicapped children significant information derived from educational research, demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopting, where appropriate, promising educational practices and materials." § 1413(a)(3). In the face of such a clear statutory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2). 30

We previously have cautioned that courts lack the "specialized knowledge and experience" necessary to resolve "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 42, 93 S.Ct., at 1301. We think that Congress shared that view when it passed the Act. As already demonstrated, Congress' intention was not that the Act displace the primacy of States in the field of education, but that States receive funds to assist them in extending their educational systems to the handicapped. Therefore, once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.

V

"The Committee recognizes that in many instances the process of providing special education and related services to handicapped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome. By changing the language [of the provision relating to individualized educational programs] to emphasize the process of parent and child involvement and to provide a written record of reasonable expectations, the Committee intends to clarify that such individualized planning conferences are a way to provide parent involvement and protection to assure that appropriate services are provided to a handicapped child." S.Rep., at 11-12, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p. 1435.

See also S.Conf.Rep.No.94-445, p. 30 (1975); 34 CFR § 300.345 (1981). As this very case demonstrates, parents and guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the Act. 31

VI

Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.

Although I reach the same result as the Court does today, I read the legislative history and goals of the Education of the Handicapped Act differently. Congress unambiguously stated that it intended to "take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity." S.Rep.No.94-168, p. 9 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p. 1433 (emphasis added). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A)(i) (requiring States to establish plans with the "goal of providing full educational opportunity to all handicapped children").

As I have observed before, "[i]t seems plain to me that Congress, in enacting [this statute], intended to do more than merely set out politically self-serving but essentially meaningless language about what the [handicapped] deserve at the hands of state . . . authorities." Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 32, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1547, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The clarity of the legislative intent convinces me that the relevant question here is not, as the Court says, whether Amy Rowley's individualized education program was "reasonably calculated to enable [her] to receive educational benefits," ante, at 207, measured in part by whether or not she "achieve[s] passing marks and advance[s] from grade to grade," ante, at 204. Rather, the question is whether Amy's program, viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially equal to that given her nonhandicapped classmates. This is a standard predicated on equal educational opportunity and equal access to the educational process, rather than upon Amy's achievement of any particular educational outcome.

As the Court demonstrates, ante, at 184-185, petitioner Board has provided Amy Rowley considerably more than "a teacher with a loud voice." See post, at 215 (dissenting opinion). By concentrating on whether Amy was "learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she would without her handicap," 483 F.Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y.1980), the District Court and the Court of Appeals paid too little attention to whether, on the entire record, respondent's individualized education program offered her an educational opportunity substantially equal to that provided her nonhandicapped classmates. Because I believe that standard has been satisfied here, I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.

Justice WHITE, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

In order to reach its result in this case, the majority opinion contradicts itself, the language of the statute, and the legislative history. Both the majority's standard for a "free appropriate education" and its standard for judicial review disregard congressional intent.

* The majority first turns its attention to the meaning of a "free appropriate public education." The Act provides:

The majority reads this statutory language as establishing a congressional intent limited to bringing "previously excluded handicapped children into the public education systems of the States and [requiring] the States to adopt procedures which would result in individualized consideration of and instruction for each child." Ante, at 189. In its attempt to constrict the definition of "appropriate" and the thrust of the Act, the majority opinion states: "Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children. Certainly the language of the statute contains no requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts-that States maximize the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.' " Ante, at 189-190, quoting 483 F.Supp. 528, 534 (SDNY 1980).

I agree that the language of the Act does not contain a substantive standard beyond requiring that the education offered must be "appropriate." However, if there are limits not evident from the face of the statute on what may be considered an "appropriate education," they must be found in the purpose of the statute or its legislative history. The Act itself announces it will provide a " full educational opportunity to all handicapped children." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (emphasis added). This goal is repeated throughout the legislative history, in statements too frequent to be " 'passing references and isolated phrases.' " 1 Ante, at 204, n. 26, quoting Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 596, 600, 102 S.Ct. 1957, 1960, 72 L.Ed.2d 358 (1982). These statements elucidate the meaning of "appropriate." According to the Senate Report, for example, the Act does "guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity." S.Rep.No.94-168, p. 9 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p. 1433 (emphasis added). This promise appears throughout the legislative history. See 121 Cong.Rec. 19482-19483 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); id., at 19504 (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 19505 (Sen Beall); id., at 23704 (Rep. Brademas); id., at 25538 (Rep. Cornell); id., at 25540 (Rep. Grassley); id., at 37025 (Rep. Perkins); id., at 37030 (Rep. Mink); id., at 37412 (Sen. Taft); id., at 37413 (Sen. Williams); id., at 37418-37419 (Sen. Cranston); id., at 37419-37420 (Sen. Beall). Indeed, at times the purpose of the Act was described as tailoring each handicapped child's educational plan to enable the child "to achieve his or her maximum potential." H.R.Rep.No.94-332, pp. 13, 19 (1975); see 121 Cong.Rec. 23709 (1975). Senator Stafford, one of the sponsors of the Act, declared: "We can all agree that education [given a handicapped child] should be equivalent, at least, to the one those children who are not handicapped receive." Id., at 19483. The legislative history thus directly supports the conclusion that the Act intends to give handicapped children an educational opportunity commensurate with that given other children.

The majority opinion announces a different substantive standard, that "Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful." Ante, at 192. While "meaningful" is no more enlightening than "appropriate," the Court purports to clarify itself. Because Amy was provided with some specialized instruction from which she obtained some benefit and because she passed from grade to grade, she was receiving a meaningful and therefore appropriate education. 2

This falls far short of what the Act intended. The Act details as specifically as possible the kind of specialized education each handicapped child must receive. It would apparently satisfy the Court's standard of "access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child," ante, at 201, for a deaf child such as Amy to be given a teacher with a loud voice, for she would benefit from that service. The Act requires more. It defines "special education" to mean "specifically designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child. . . ." § 1401(16) (emphasis added). 3 Providing a teacher with a loud voice would not meet Amy's needs and would not satisfy the Act. The basic floor of opportunity is instead, as the courts below recognized, intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible. Amy Rowley, without a sign-language interpreter, comprehends less than half of what is said in the classroom-less than half of what normal children comprehend. This is hardly an equal opportunity to learn, even if Amy makes passing grades.

II

The majority assigns major significance to the review provision's being found in a section entitled "Procedural safeguards." But where else would a provision for judicial review belong? The majority does acknowledge that the current language, specifying that a court "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate," § 1415(e)(2), was substituted at Conference for language that would have restricted the role of the reviewing court much more sharply. It is clear enough to me that Congress decided to reduce substantially judicial deference to state administrative decisions.

The legislative history shows that judicial review is not limited to procedural matters and that the state educational agencies are given first, but not final, responsibility for the content of a handicapped child's education. The Conference Committee directs courts to make an "independent decision." S.Conf.Rep.No.94-455, p. 50 (1975). The deliberate change in the review provision is an unusually clear indication that Congress intended courts to undertake substantive review instead of relying on the conclusions of the state agency.

On the floor of the Senate, Senator Williams, the chief sponsor of the bill, Committee Chairman, and floor manager responsible for the legislation in the Senate, emphasized the breadth of the review provisions at both the administrative and judicial levels:

"Any parent or guardian may present a complaint concerning any matter regarding the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child. In this regard, Mr. President, I would like to stress that the language referring to 'free appropriate education' has been adopted to make clear that a complaint may involve matters such as questions respecting a child's individualized education program, questions of whether special education and related services are being provided without charge to the parents or guardians, questions relating to whether the services provided a child meet the standards of the State education agency, or any other question within the scope of the definition of 'free appropriate public education.' In addition, it should be clear that a parent or guardian may present a complaint alleging that a State or local education agency has refused to provide services to which a child may be entitled or alleging that the State or local educational agency has erroneously classified a child as a handicapped child when, in fact, that child is not a handicapped child." 121 Cong.Rec. 37415 (1975) (emphasis added).

There is no doubt that the state agency itself must make substantive decisions. The legislative history reveals that the courts are to consider, de novo, the same issues. Senator Williams explicitly stated that the civil action permitted under the Act encompasses all matters related to the original complaint. Id., at 37416.

Thus, the Court's limitations on judicial review have no support in either the language of the Act or the legislative history. Congress did not envision that inquiry would end if a showing is made that the child is receiving passing marks and is advancing from grade to grade. Instead, it intended to permit a full and searching inquiry into any aspect of a handicapped child's education. The Court's standard, for example, would not permit a challenge to part of the IEP; the legislative history demonstrates beyond doubt that Congress intended such challenges to be possible, even if the plan as developed is reasonably calculated to give the child some benefits.

Parents can challenge the IEP for failing to supply the special education and related services needed by the individual handicapped child. That is what the Rowleys did. As the Government observes, "courts called upon to review the content of an IEP, in accordance with 20 U.S.C. [§] 1415(e) inevitably are required to make a judgment, on the basis of the evidence presented, concerning whether the educational methods proposed by the local school district are 'appropriate' for the handicapped child involved." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. The courts below, as they were required by the Act, did precisely that.

Under the judicial review provisions of the Act, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals was bound by the State's construction of what an "appropriate" education means in general or by what the state authorities considered to be an appropriate education for Amy Rowley. Because the standard of the courts below seems to me to reflect the congressional purpose and because their factual findings are not clearly erroneous, I respectfully dissent.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BD. OF ED., WESTCHESTER COUNTY, et al., Petitioners v. Amy ROWLEY, by her parents and natural guardians, Clifford and Nancy Rowley etc.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
458 U.S. 176 102 S.Ct. 3034 73 L.Ed.2d 690 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BD. OF ED., WESTCHESTER COUNTY, et al., Petitionersv.Amy ROWLEY, by her parents and natural guardians, Clifford and Nancy Rowley etc. No. 80-1002.

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Wynne v. Tufts University Medical Center I & II

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Wynne v. Tufts University Medical Center I & II

# data[].attributes.body
In determining whether an individual meets the "otherwise qualified" requirement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 794, it is necessary to look at more than the individual's ability to meet a program's present requirements.

The appellant Steven Wynne, a medical student, was dismissed from Tufts University School of Medicine (appellee) after failing numerous courses during successive attempts to complete the first-year program

In his court case, Wynne alleged that he was learning-disabled and that Tufts University had discriminated against him on the basis of his handicap

Eventually, the district court granted summary judgment in Tufts' favor on the ground that Wynne, because of his inability to pass biochemistry, was not an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ( Federal Reporter, (n.d))

References

Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1991).

The Federal Reporter.(n.d.). Retrieved https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/976/976.F2d.791.92-1437.html

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976 F.2d 791

77 Ed. Law Rep. 1136, 3 NDLR P 121

Steven WYNNE, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TUFTS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 92-1437.

United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.

Robert LeRoux Hernandez, with whom Ellis & Ellis, Worcester, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Alan D. Rose, with whom Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for defendant, appellee.

Before BREYER, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and SELYA, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to revisit a longstanding dispute between Tufts University School of Medicine and Steven Wynne, a former student. On a previous occasion, we vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment in Tufts' favor. See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.1991) (en banc). After further proceedings, the district court again entered summary judgment for the defendant. This time around, on an augmented record, we affirm.

Background

The facts pertinent to Wynne's banishment from the groves of academe are chronicled in our earlier opinion and need not be fully rehearsed. A succinct summary suffices.

Wynne matriculated at Tufts in 1983. He failed eight of fifteen first-year courses. Although academic guidelines provided for dismissal after five course failures, the dean granted Wynne a special dispensation and allowed him to repeat the first year of medical school. Over the summer of 1984, Wynne underwent neuropsychological testing at Tufts' instance and expense. The results, described in detail in our earlier opinion, id. at 21, showed cognitive deficits and weaknesses in processing discrete units of information. However, no differential diagnosis of dyslexia or any other particularized learning disability was made at this time.

During Wynne's second tour of the first-year curriculum, Tufts arranged to supply him with tutors, counsellors, note-takers, and other aids. This time, he passed all but two courses: pharmacology and biochemistry. Tufts still did not expel Wynne. Instead, it permitted him to take make-up examinations in these two subjects. He passed pharmacology but failed biochemistry. That ended the matter. Wynne was dismissed in September, 1985.

Prior Proceedings

In his court case, Wynne alleged that he was learning-disabled and that Tufts had discriminated against him on the basis of his handicap. In short order, Wynne refined his claim to allege that his disability placed him at an unfair disadvantage in taking written multiple-choice examinations and that Tufts, for no good reason, had stubbornly refused to test his proficiency in biochemistry by some other means. Eventually, the district court granted summary judgment in Tufts' favor on the ground that Wynne, because of his inability to pass biochemistry, was not an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988), as explicated by the relevant caselaw.

On appeal, a panel of this court reversed. That opinion was withdrawn, however, and the full court reheard Wynne's appeal. We concluded that, in determining whether an aspiring medical student meets section 504's "otherwise qualified" prong, it is necessary to take into account the extent to which reasonable accommodations that will satisfy the legitimate interests of both the school and the student are (or are not) available and, if such accommodations exist, the extent to which the institution explored those alternatives. See Wynne, 932 F.2d at 24-26 (citing, inter alia, School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987)). Recognizing the unique considerations that come into play when the parties to a Rehabilitation Act case are a student and an academic institution, particularly a medical school training apprentice physicians, we formulated a test for determining whether the academic institution adequately explored the availability of reasonable accommodations:

If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials within the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility, cost and effect on the academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation. In most cases, we believe that, as in the qualified immunity context, the issue of whether the facts alleged by a university support its claim that it has met its duty of reasonable accommodation will be a purely legal one. Only if essential facts were genuinely disputed or if there were significantly probative evidence of bad faith or pretext would further fact finding be necessary.

Id. at 26 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the summary judgment record did not satisfactorily address this issue, 1 we vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, leaving the district court "free to consider other submissions [and] to enter summary judgment thereon if [an expanded record] meet[s] the standard we have set forth." Id. at 28.

Following remand, Tufts filed a renewed motion for summary judgment accompanied by six new affidavits. The plaintiff filed a comprehensive opposition supported, inter alia, by his own supplemental affidavit. The court below read the briefs, heard oral argument, reviewed the parties' updated submissions, and determined that Tufts had met its burden under Wynne. In the lower court's view, the expanded record clearly showed that Tufts had evaluated the available alternatives to its current testing format and had reasonably concluded that it was not practicable in this instance to depart from the standard multiple-choice format. Accordingly, the court again entered summary judgment in Tufts' favor. This appeal ensued.

Issues

The principal issue on appeal is whether, given those facts not genuinely in dispute, Tufts can be said, as a matter of law, either to have provided reasonable accommodations for plaintiff's handicapping condition 2 or to have demonstrated that it reached a rationally justifiable conclusion that accommodating plaintiff would lower academic standards or otherwise unduly affect its program. There is also a secondary issue: whether plaintiff has advanced significantly probative evidence sufficient to ground a finding that Tufts' reasons for not making further accommodations were pretextual or asserted in bad faith.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment has a special place in civil litigation. The device "has proven its usefulness as a means of avoiding full-dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby freeing courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways." Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). In operation, summary judgment's role is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required. See id.; see also Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). Since appellate review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary, the court of appeals, like the trial court, "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990).

We uphold a grant of summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When, as here, the movant-defendant has suggested that competent evidence to prove the case is lacking, the burden devolves upon the nonmovant-plaintiff to "document some factual disagreement sufficient to deflect brevis disposition." Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822.

This burden is discharged only if the cited disagreement relates to a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "In this context, 'genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party [and] 'material' means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Etc. (Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, R.I.), 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement has sharp teeth: the plaintiff "must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822. Such evidence "cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial." Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). As the Court has cautioned, evidence that "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative" cannot deter summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).

Discussion

We have carefully reviewed the amplitudinous record and are fully satisfied that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. Fairly read, the record presents no genuine issue as to any material fact. Because this case has consumed so many hours of judicial time, we resist the temptation to wax longiloquent. Instead, we add only a few decurtate observations embellishing what the en banc court previously wrote and remarking the significance of the new materials adduced below.

First: Following remand, Tufts satisfactorily filled the gaps that wrecked its initial effort at summary judgment. The expanded record contains undisputed facts demonstrating, in considerable detail, that Tufts' hierarchy "considered alternative means" and "came to a rationally justifiable conclusion" regarding the adverse effects of such putative accommodations. Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26. Tufts not only documented the importance of biochemistry in a medical school curriculum, but explained why, in the departmental chair's words, "the multiple choice format provides the fairest way to test the students' mastery of the subject matter of biochemistry." Tufts likewise explained what thought it had given to different methods of testing proficiency in biochemistry and why it eschewed alternatives to multiple-choice testing, particularly with respect to make-up examinations. In so doing, Tufts elaborated upon the unique qualities of multiple-choice examinations as they apply to biochemistry and offered an exposition of the historical record to show the background against which such tests were administered to Wynne. In short, Tufts demythologized the institutional thought processes leading to its determination that it could not deviate from its wonted format to accommodate Wynne's professed disability. It concluded that to do so would require substantial program alterations, result in lowering academic standards, and devalue Tufts' end product--highly trained physicians carrying the prized credential of a Tufts degree.

To be sure, Tufts' explanations, though plausible, are not necessarily ironclad. For instance, Wynne has offered evidence that at least one other medical school and a national testing service occasionally allow oral renderings of multiple-choice examinations in respect to dyslexic students. But, the point is not whether a medical school is "right" or "wrong" in making program-related decisions. Such absolutes rarely apply in the context of subjective decisionmaking, particularly in a scholastic setting. The point is that Tufts, after undertaking a diligent assessment of the available options, felt itself obliged to make "a professional, academic judgment that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not available." Wynne, 932 F.2d at 27-28. Phrased another way, Tufts decided, rationally if not inevitably, that no further accommodation could be made without imposing an undue (and injurious) hardship on the academic program. With the diligence of its assessment and the justification for its judgment clearly shown in the augmented record, and with the fact of the judgment uncontroverted, the deficiency that spoiled Tufts' original effort at brevis disposition has been cured.

Second: The undisputed facts show that Tufts neither ignored Wynne nor turned a deaf ear to his plight. To the contrary, the defendant (a) warned Wynne in 1983 that he was failing biochemistry and suggested he defer his examination (a suggestion that Wynne scotched); (b) arranged for a complete battery of neuropsychological tests after Wynne failed eight courses in his freshman year; (c) waived the rules and permitted Wynne to repeat the first-year curriculum; (d) furnished Wynne access to tutoring, taped lectures, and the like; (e) allowed him to take untimed examinations; and (f) gave him make-up examinations in pharmacology and biochemistry after he again failed both courses. Given the other circumstances extant in this case, we do not think that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Tufts, having volunteered such an array of remedial measures, was guilty of failing to make a reasonable accommodation merely because it did not also offer Wynne, unsolicited, an oral rendering of the biochemistry examination.

Third: Reasonableness is not a constant. To the contrary, what is reasonable in a particular situation may not be reasonable in a different situation--even if the situational differences are relatively slight. Cf., e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir.1991) (concluding that "reasonableness has a protean quality"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 774 (1992); Sierra Club v. Secretary of the Army, 820 F.2d 513, 517 (1st Cir.1987) (paraphrasing Emerson and observing that "reasonableness 'is a mutable cloud, which is always and never the same.' "). Ultimately, what is reasonable depends on a variable mix of factors.

In the section 504 milieu, an academic institution can be expected to respond only to what it knows (or is chargeable with knowing). This means, as the Third Circuit has recently observed, that for a medical school "to be liable under the Rehabilitation Act, [it] must know or be reasonably expected to know of [a student's] handicap." Nathanson v. Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1381 (3d Cir.1991). A relevant aspect of this inquiry is whether the student ever put the medical school on notice of his handicap by making "a sufficiently direct and specific request for special accommodations." Id. at 1386. Thus, we must view the reasonableness of Tufts' accommodations against the backdrop of what Tufts knew about Wynne's needs while he was enrolled there.

Several factors are entitled to weight in this equation, including the following: (a) Wynne was never diagnosed as dyslexic while enrolled at Tufts; (b) the school gave him a number of special dispensations and "second chances"--including virtually every accommodation that he seasonably suggested; (c) Wynne had taken, and passed, multiple-choice examinations in several courses; and (d) he never requested, at any time prior to taking and failing the third biochemistry exam, that an oral rendering be substituted for the standard version of the multiple-choice test. 3 Under these circumstances, we do not believe a rational factfinder could conclude that Tufts' efforts at accommodation fell short of the reasonableness standard.

Fourth: Wynne's allegations of pretext do not raise prohibitory doubts about the reasonableness of Tufts' attempted accommodations or about the honesty of its assessment of alternatives to multiple-choice examinations vis-a-vis the school's educational plan. When pretext is at issue in a discrimination case, it is a plaintiff's duty to produce specific facts which, reasonably viewed, tend logically to undercut the defendant's position. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 181, 116 L.Ed.2d 143 (1991); Mack, 871 F.2d at 181. The plaintiff may neither "rest[ ] merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation," Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990), nor measurably bolster his cause by hurling rancorous epithets and espousing tenuous insinuations. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 826; Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, 932 F.2d 89, 92 (1st Cir.1991).

Here, Wynne's charges comprise more cry than wool. They consist of unsubstantiated conclusions, backed only by a few uncoordinated evidentiary fragments. More is required to forestall summary judgment. See Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26.

Conclusion

We need go no further. In our earlier opinion, we recognized the existence of a statutory obligation on the part of an academic institution such as Tufts to consider available ways of accommodating a handicapped student and, when seeking summary judgment, to produce a factual record documenting its scrupulous attention to this obligation. Id. at 25-26. Of course, the effort requires more than lip service; it must be sincerely conceived and conscientiously implemented. We think that Tufts, the second time around, has cleared the hurdle that we envisioned: the undisputed facts contained in the expanded record, when considered in the deferential light that academic decisionmaking deserves, id. at 25, meet the required standard.

We add a final note of caution. Although both parties to this litigation invite us to paint with a broad brush, we decline their joint invitation. The issue before us is not whether a medical student, authoritatively diagnosed as a dyslexic and known to the school to be so afflicted, is ever entitled, upon timely request, to an opportunity to take an examination orally. Rather, we are limited to the idiosyncratic facts of Wynne's case. The resulting record presents a narrower, easier issue--and we believe that the district court resolved that issue correctly.

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976 F.2d 791 77 Ed. Law Rep. 1136, 3 NDLR P 121 Steven WYNNE, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.TUFTS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, Defendant, Appellee. No. 92-1437. United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit. Robert LeRoux Hernandez, with whom Ellis & Ellis, Worcester, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant. Alan D.

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(A) The Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) was established as a sub-cabinet policy agency subdivision from the United States Department of Labor. According to the ODEP website, this office "provides national leadership by developing and influencing disability-related employment policy and practice affecting the employment of people with disabilities. The department of labor works extensively with community colleges by contributing monetary funding to projects that have developed innovative practices in recruitment, retention, and credential attainment for youth and young adults with disabilities(U.S Department of Labor, (n.d)). Supportive programming included summer bridge programs for transitioning high school disable students and administer peer mentoring, academic, and career coaching.

References

U.S Department of Labor. (n.d). Office of Disability Employment Policy: Community Colleges. Retrieved from https://www.dol.gov/odep/topics/Youth/CommunityColleges.htm

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Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) - U.S. Department of Labor

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Establishing Reasonable Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

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Establishing Reasonable Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

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(B) The following record outlines the procedures for establishing reasonable accommodations for students with disabilities attending the University of Angelo state. Referring to the University's policy, I am fond of the provision that grants letters of accommodation to be submitted at any time during the semester, which is implemented from the date presented to the faculty member until the completion of the semester (OP. 10.24,3(c)).

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American School Counselor Association (ASCA) Position

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American School Counselor Association (ASCA) Position

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Adhering to the ASCA's Ethical precepts, School counselors must recognize the importance of student and family choices in the recruitment process and assist them in making informative postsecondary educational decisions. Referring to subsection A.4. of ethical standards, academic counselors must create a culture of postsecondary readiness and identify gaps in college and career access(American School Counselor Association,2016).

References

American School Cousnelor Association, (2016). ASCA ethical standars for school cousnelors. Retrieved From https://www.schoolcounselor.org/asca/media/asca/Ethics/EthicalStandards2016.pdf

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Given that my research topic focuses on matriculating students with disabilities to postsecondary educational institutions, the following analysis publication is an excellent supplement to peruse. It is a transition guidance periodical liaison between the U.S. Department of Education and the Office of Special Education Rehabilitative Services. It contains invaluable information pertaining to the transition services and its requirements, as authorized by IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act. It is teeming with eclectic examples that follow sections B or D of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Furthermore, the booklet guide references its programs, interventions, and models in compliance with the instrumental section 504, part of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act.

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Best Practices in Promoting   Secondary Transition 

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Best Practices in Promoting   Secondary Transition 

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Since the inception of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, there has been a steady increase in the enrollment of students with disabilities in higher education. Other laws such as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) aims to ensure children with disabilities obtain a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that prepares them for further education, employment, and independent living. The proper transition of youth from high school to the adult world is critical to ensure youngsters with disabilities are ready for the next phase of their lives. All school districts should adhere to federal laws, such as the Every Student Succeeds Act and The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, to promote the development of meaningful pathways to postsecondary opportunities for students with disabilities. The following bullets summaries are some of the most beneficial compliance practices educators should concede in adopting.

Develop plans that ensure students with disabilities have access to a rigorous curriculum and adequate supports and services that allow them to pursue their IEP goals and meet the state's accountability standards.

Conducts regular IEP audits to ensure compliance with federal and state law, in addition to the district's special education policies and procedures.

Hold teacher professional development that encompasses the understanding of federal and state special education rules, regulations, and practices (Article 7 and IDEA) strongly.

Comply with the Special education timelines and requirements are set forth by statutes written and enacted by the United States Congress. Such as establishing beginning with the first IEP to be in effect when a student turns 16, or younger if determined appropriate by the IEP Team and initiating transition services at student turns 16, or younger if determined appropriate by the IEP Team (34 CFR §§ 300.320(b))

Inform parents and students about postsecondary educational institution's obligations to provide academic adjustments, including auxiliary aids and services, to ensure that the school does not discriminate based on disability under Section 504 and Title II. In doing so will improve their opportunity to succeed as you enter postsecondary education

Recognize that research shows that when students with disabilities are expected to meet state academic standards are better prepared for the rigor of college and may more successfully transition to postsecondary education and work. According to Rojewski, Lee, and Gregg (2015), students with disabilities earning 80% or more academic credits in general education settings were two times more likely to enroll and persist in postsecondary education than students receiving fewer credits in general education settings.

The school district should increase interagency collaboration at the state, regional, and local levels to proving employment, independent living, and postsecondary education outcomes for its students with disabilities population.

The school district is responsible for providing transition services that will reasonably enable the student to move toward the attainment of postsecondary goals. The postsecondary goals should become increasingly detailed and focused over time with age.

Regardless of which type of learning format is being utilized, students with disabilities need support to access and process the curricular content to maximize their learning as outlined by federal IDEA regulations. School districts must consider reviewing their current policies and procedures to determine enablers and online learning barriers. In August of 2016, the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), within the Department of Education, issued a dossier stating that "the requirements of IDEA apply to SEAs and LEAs, regardless of whether a child is enrolled in a virtual school that is a public school of the LEA or a public school that is constituted as an LEA by the State" (U.S Department of Education, 2015).

References
a) Rojewski, J. W., Lee, I. H., & Gregg, N. (2015). Causal effects of inclusion on postsecondary education outcomes of individuals with high-incidence disabilities. Journal of Disability Policy Studies, 25(4), 210–219. doi: 10.1177/1044207313505648

b) U.S Department of Education. (2015). Online and Virtual

Schools and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [Letter]. Retrieved from 2016.pdfhttps://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/dcl--virtual-schools--08-05-2016.pdf